

Computational Advertising*

* Slides based on Jeff Ullman, Anand Rajaraman, and Jure Leskovec

Online vs. Offline Algorithms

- **Classic model of algorithms**


- ▶ You get to see the entire input, then compute some function of it
- ▶ In this context, “offline algorithm”

- **Online Algorithms**

- ▶ You get to see the input one piece at a time, and need to make irrevocable decisions along the way
- ▶ **Similar to the data stream model**

Aside: Online Bipartite Matching


Example: Bipartite Matching



Nodes: Boys and Girls; Edges: Preferences


Goal: Match boys to girls so that maximum number of preferences is satisfied

Example: Bipartite Matching



$M = \{(1,a), (2,b), (3,d)\}$ is a **matching**
Cardinality of matching = $|M| = 3$

Example: Bipartite Matching



$M = \{(1,c), (2,b), (3,d), (4,a)\}$ is a
perfect matching

Perfect matching ... all vertices of the graph are matched

Maximum matching ... a matching that contains the largest possible number of matches


Matching Algorithm

- **Problem:** Find a maximum matching for a given bipartite graph
 - ▲ A perfect one if it exists
- There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm based on augmenting paths (Hopcroft & Karp 1973, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hopcroft-Karp_algorithm)
- **But what if we do not know the entire graph upfront?**

Online Graph Matching Problem

- **Problem:** Find a maximum matching for a given bipartite graph
 - ▲ A perfect one if it exists
- There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm based on augmenting paths (Hopcroft & Karp 1973, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hopcroft-Karp_algorithm)
- **But what if we do not know the entire graph upfront?**

Online Graph Matching: Example



(1,a)

(2,b)

(3,d)

Greedy Algorithm

- Greedy algorithm for the online graph matching problem:
 - ▲ Pair the new girl with **any** eligible boy
 - If there is none, do not pair girl
- How good is the algorithm?

Competitive Ratio

- For input I , suppose greedy produces matching M_{greedy} while an optimal matching is M_{opt}


Competitive ratio =

$$\min_{\text{all possible inputs } I} (|M_{greedy}| / |M_{opt}|)$$

(what is greedy's worst performance over all possible inputs I)

Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm

- Consider a case: $M_{greedy} \neq M_{opt}$
- Consider the set G of girls matched in M_{opt} but not in M_{greedy}
- Then every boy B adjacent to girls in G is already matched in M_{greedy} :



- ▲ If there would exist such non-matched (by M_{greedy}) boy adjacent to a non-matched girl then greedy would have matched them
- Since boys B are already matched in M_{greedy} then
(1) $|M_{greedy}| \geq |B|$

Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm

- **Summary so far:**

- ▶ Girls G matched in M_{opt} but not in M_{greedy}

- ▶ (1) $|M_{greedy}| \geq |B|$

- There are at least $|G|$ such boys ($|G| \leq |B|$) otherwise the optimal algorithm couldn't have matched all girls in G


- ▶ So: $|G| \leq |B| \leq |M_{greedy}|$

- By definition of G also: $|M_{opt}| \leq |M_{greedy}| + |G|$

- ▶ Worst case is when $|G| = |B| = |M_{greedy}|$

- $|M_{opt}| \leq 2|M_{greedy}|$ then $|M_{greedy}|/|M_{opt}| \geq 1/2$

Worst-Case Scenario



(1,a)

(2,b)

Back to Main Topic: Computational Advertising

History of Web Advertising

- **Banner ads (1995-2001)**

- ▶ Initial form of web advertising
- ▶ Popular websites charged X\$ for every 1,000 “impressions” of the ad
 - Called “**CPM**” rate
(Cost per thousand impressions)
 - Modeled similar to TV, magazine ads
- ▶ From **untargeted** to **demographically targeted**
- ▶ **Low click-through rates**
 - Low ROI for advertisers



Performance-based Advertising

- Introduced by Overture around 2000
 - ▲ Advertisers **bid** on **search keywords**
 - ▲ When someone searches for that keyword, the **highest bidder's ad is shown**
 - ▲ Advertiser is charged only if the ad is clicked on
- Similar model adopted by Google with some changes around 2002
 - ▲ Called **Adwords**

Ads vs. Search Results

Web

Results 1 - 10 of about 2,230,000 for **geico**. (0.04 sec)

[GEICO](#) Car Insurance. Get an auto insurance quote and save today ...

GEICO auto insurance, online car insurance quote, motorcycle insurance quote, online insurance sales and service from a leading insurance company.

[www.geico.com/](#) - 21k - Sep 22, 2005 - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

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[Geico](#), Google Settle Trademark Dispute

The case was resolved out of court, so advertisers are still left without legal guidance on use of trademarks within ads or as keywords.

[www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3547356](#) - 44k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Google and [GEICO](#) settle AdWords dispute | The Register

Google and car insurance firm **GEICO** have settled a trade mark dispute over ... Car insurance firm **GEICO** sued both Google and Yahoo! subsidiary Overture in ...

[www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/09/google_geico_settlement/](#) - 21k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[GEICO](#) v. Google

... involving a lawsuit filed by Government Employees Insurance Company (**GEICO**). **GEICO** has filed suit against two major Internet search engine operators, ...

[www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/geico_google.html](#) - 19k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

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Get 5 Free Quotes In Minutes!
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Missouri

Web 2.0

- **Performance-based advertising works!**
 - ▲ Multi-billion-dollar industry
- **Interesting problem:**
What ads to show for a given query?
 - ▲ (Our focus)
- **If I am an advertiser, which search terms should I bid on and how much should I bid?**
 - ▲ (We won't cover this question)

AdWords Problem

- **Given:**

- ▲ **1.** A set of bids by advertisers for search queries
- ▲ **2.** A click-through rate for each advertiser-query pair
- ▲ **3.** A budget for each advertiser (say for 1 month)
- ▲ **4.** A limit on the number of ads to be displayed with each search query

AdWords Problem

- Respond to each search query with a set of advertisers such that:
 - ▲ 1. The size of the set is no larger than the limit on the number of ads per query
 - ▲ 2. Each advertiser has bid on the search query
 - ▲ 3. Each advertiser has enough budget left to pay for the ad if it is clicked upon

AdWords Problem

- A stream of queries arrives at the search engine:
 q_1, q_2, \dots
- Several advertisers bid on each query
- When query q_i arrives, search engine must pick a subset of advertisers whose ads are shown
- **Goal:** Maximize search engine's revenues
 - ▲ **Simple solution:** Instead of raw bids, use the “expected revenue per click” (i.e., $\text{Bid} \times \text{CTR}$)
- **Clearly we need an online algorithm!**

The AdWords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
A	\$1.00	1%	1 cent
B	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
C	\$0.50	2.5%	1.125 cents

Click through
rate

Expected
revenue

The AdWords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
B	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
C	\$0.50	2.5%	1.125 cents
A	\$1.00	1%	1 cent

Complications: Budget

- **Two complications:**
 - ▲ **Budget**
 - ▲ **CTR of an ad is unknown**
- **Each advertiser has a limited budget**
 - ▲ **Search engine guarantees that the advertiser will not be charged more than their daily budget**

Complications: CTR

- **CTR: Each ad has a different likelihood of being clicked**
 - ▲ **Advertiser 1** bids \$2, click probability = 0.1
 - ▲ **Advertiser 2** bids \$1, click probability = 0.5
 - ▲ **Clickthrough rate (CTR)** is measured **historically**
 - **Very hard problem: Exploration vs. exploitation**
 - Exploit:** Should we keep showing an ad for which we have good estimates of click-through rate
 - or**
 - Explore:** Shall we show a brand new ad to get a better sense of its click-through rate

Greedy Algorithm

- **Our setting: Simplified environment**
 - ▲ There is **1** ad shown for each query
 - ▲ All advertisers have the same budget **B**
 - ▲ All ads are equally likely to be clicked
 - ▲ Value of each ad is the same (**=1**)
- **Simplest algorithm is greedy:**
 - ▲ For a query pick any advertiser who has bid **1** for that query
 - ▲ **Competitive ratio of greedy is $1/2$**

Bad Scenario for Greedy

- **Two advertisers A and B**
 - ▶ **A** bids on query **x**, **B** bids on **x** and **y**
 - ▶ Both have budgets of \$4
- **Query stream: x x x x y y y y**
 - ▶ Worst case greedy choice: **B B B B _ _ _ _**
 - ▶ Optimal: **A A A A B B B B**
 - ▶ **Competitive ratio = $\frac{1}{2}$**
- **This is the worst case!**
 - ▶ **Note:** Greedy algorithm is deterministic – it always resolves draws in the same way

BALANCE Algorithm

- **BALANCE** Algorithm by Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani
 - ▲ For each query, pick the advertiser with the largest unspent budget
 - Break ties arbitrarily (but in a deterministic way)

Example: BALANCE Algorithm

- **Two advertisers A and B**
 - ▲ A bids on query x , B bids on x and y
 - ▲ Both have budgets of \$4
- **Query stream: $x x x x y y y y$**
- **BALANCE choice: A B A B B B _ _**
 - ▲ Optimal: A A A A B B B B
- **In general: For BALANCE on 2 advertisers**
Competitive ratio = $\frac{3}{4}$

General Version of the Problem

- Arbitrary bids and arbitrary budgets!
- Consider we have 1 query q , advertiser i
 - ▶ Bid = x_i
 - ▶ Budget = b_i
- In a general setting BALANCE can be terrible
 - ▶ Consider two advertisers A_1 and A_2
 - ▶ A_1 : $x_1 = 1$, $b_1 = 110$
 - ▶ A_2 : $x_2 = 10$, $b_2 = 100$
 - ▶ Consider we see 10 instances of q
 - ▶ BALANCE always selects A_1 and earns 10
 - ▶ Optimal earns 100

Generalized BALANCE Algorithm

- **Arbitrary bids:** consider query q , bidder i
 - ▲ Bid = x_i
 - ▲ Budget = b_i
 - ▲ Amount spent so far = m_i
 - ▲ Fraction of budget left over $f_i = 1 - m_i/b_i$
 - ▲ Define $\psi_i(q) = x_i(1 - e^{-f_i})$
- Allocate query q to bidder i with largest value of $\psi_i(q)$
- Same competitive ratio $(1 - 1/e)$