

INTRODUCTION

As E.M. Rogers put it: "When new ideas are invented, diffused, and are adopted or rejected, leading to certain consequences, social change occurs" [1]. This project concerns itself with the way in which novel innovations may result in a dichotomy between innovation *adopters* and *luddites* (those who reject innovations.) Such a dichotomy is especially relevant in a time when extreme partisanship and anti-politics run rampant through society [2]. We introduce a novel model, the Terminal LISA (T-LISA) model, as a modification to the LISA model [3] such that the resulting stable state contains only *adopter* and *luddite* population proportions. Following the LISA model, our model includes *ignorant* and *susceptible* populations proportions as an intermediary between *adopter* and *luddite*. The T-LISA model is ultimately a generalization of Frank Bass's 1969 Bass model [4] for predicting the timeline of consumer good adoption. We explore the results of the T-LISA model in the mean-field theory, where it acts like a standard contagion model, and in stochastic simulation. We analyze the agreement between stochastic simulation and mean-field theory.

MEAN-FIELD MODEL DESCRIPTION

- In the mean-field theory (MFT) we assume a well mixed system in which every agent has some effect on every other agent in the system. While this isn't the case for actual social networks, it gives us a good starting point to understand our model.

- We define the following coupled set of differential equations which govern our model in the mean field:

$$\begin{aligned} L' &= \gamma r S I + \omega r A I \\ I' &= -(S + A) I - \gamma r S I - \omega r A I \\ S' &= (S + A) I - \gamma S \\ A' &= \gamma S \end{aligned}$$

- Parameter γ sets the rate at which *susceptibles* turn to *adopters*, making L' dependent on the rate of increase in *adopters*.
- Parameter ω represents the *ignorant* population's tendency to become anti-establishment, or to reject innovation when many others in the system adopt it.
- Parameter r establishes the prevalence of luddism for the particular innovation at hand.

MEAN-FIELD MODEL RESULTS




Figure 1. MFT plots of T-LISA model with $\omega = \gamma$, $r = 0.9$, and $S_0 = 0.2$. LISA model [3] results based on the listed γ and r values are overlayed on each graph with less opacity.




Figure 2. Phase diagram for the T-LISA model with $r = 0.9$, and $S_0 = 0.2$. The range of black and green dots coming off the $\omega = 0$ line represent the possible results for L_{tMax} when introducing an anti-establishment pressure parameter ranging from 0 to 1.

AGENT-BASED MODEL DESCRIPTION

- For agent-based simulation, we define Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph $G(N, k)$ where N is the total number of nodes in G , and k is the average degree of a node within G .
- The following propensities for node i to change state based on s_i (node i 's *susceptible* neighbors) a_i (node i 's *adopted* neighbors) and k_i (node i 's total neighbors.)

$$\begin{aligned} I \rightarrow S &: \frac{s_i + a_i}{N} \\ I \rightarrow L &: r \left(\gamma \frac{s_i}{k_i} + \omega \frac{a_i}{k_i} \right) \\ S \rightarrow A &: \gamma \end{aligned}$$

- Using Monte-Carlo methods, we iterate over the entirety of G and update node states based on the above propensities.

COMPARING MFT AND AGENT-BASED RESULTS

- To rescale MFT to fit our ER graph simulation, we must multiply the two-body contagion processes I' and S' by a factor of k/N .
- We calculate error by subtracting MFT results from Monte-Carlo results at every integer step of time. We average these lists to find average error for L , I , S , and A . We average the absolute value of average error in L , I , S , and A to calculate total average error.




Figure 3. MFT vs. agent-based results for $N = 300$, $r = 0.9$, $\gamma = 0.08$, $\omega = 0.08$, $k = 20$. Monte-Carlo simulated results are overlayed with low opacity.




Figure 4. Distribution of total average error across 9000 Monte-Carlo simulations, grouped by N . Error is especially high for low values of N .

CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

We have demonstrated a match in our agent-based Monte-Carlo simulation on ER graphs and deterministic mean-field simulation. The match is particularly good for ER graphs with a large N . We plan to address the following questions:

- Does Luddism spread in network clusters?
- How does network position (centrality, in-betweenness, and degree) impact a node's likelihood to become a *luddite* or *adopter*?
- How do varying initial conditions effect Monte-Carlo simulations?
- How does our model perform on real-life social network data? What insights can we draw from this?

REFERENCES

- [1] Everett M. Rogers. Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Ed. New York: The Free Press, 2003.
- [2] Alan I. Abramowitz and Steven Webster. The rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st Century. Electoral Studies, 41:12–22, 2016.
- [3] Andrew Mellor, Mauro Mobilia, S. Redner, Alastair M. Rucklidge, and Jonathan A. Ward. Influence of Luddism on Innovation Diffusion. Phys. Rev. E, 92:012806, Jul 2015.
- [4] Frank M. Bass. A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables. Management Science, 15(5): 215–227, 1969.