

Mason Competitive Cyber

If Forensics and Crypto had a baby



Forensics in the real world



- Digital Forensics (branch of Forensic science)
 - Computer Forensics
 - Mobile Device Forensics
 - Diff = integrated communication system + proprietary storage systems
 - Network Forensics
 - Database Forensics
- Gather data, analyze data, investigate devices, recover data found in devices, etc.
- Incident Response / SOC analyst
- Often involved with the criminal justice system
 - Providing evidence for a trial
- Tools often used
 - EnCase - collection, analysis, & reporting
 - FTK (Forensic Toolkit) - file discovery and volume replication
 - Helix - non-destructive forensic analysis
 - Cracking tools - cracking encrypted media
 - Other proprietary tools I don't know about, probably



Forensics in the CTF world



- Imbedded files
 - Extraction of files within other files
 - ***Iterative compression***
- Fixing files
 - Magic bytes, PNG chunking, file formats, etc
- Traffic/Packet analysis
 - PCAPs, PCAPs, PCAPs, and PCAPs
 - Chall could ask you just about anything about PCAPs
- -----Warning: Baby making area -----
- Steganography
 - Image or audio
 - LSB, changing color planes
 - spectrogram, mp3->morse
- Cracking
 - Tip: Reduce key space before brute forcing
 - Encrypted pdfs, hashes, plain passwords
 - WPA cracking from PCAPs

Forensics in the CTF world



- Imbedded files
 - Binwalk, foremost (scalpel), other tool you find on github, or manually
- Fixing files
 - Hex editors (Bless, Hexedit, HXd, etc)
 - Pngcheck
- Traffic/Packet analysis
 - Wireshark or tcpdump
- -----Warning: Baby making area -----
- Steganography
 - Stegsolve, zsteg, steghide, sonic visualizer, morse code audio decoder,
- Cracking
 - John the Ripper
 - Hashcat
 - Airmon-ng



- What is it and what is it used for?
 - Protocol analyzer
 - Analyzing protocols
 - Completely passive tools
 - No injection or packet manipulation
- What can you do with wireshark?
 - Capture live packet data from a network interface
 - Analyze said packet data
 - Gather information on potential attack
- How is it used in a CTF?
 - Often you will be given a .pcap file
 - It's your job to sift through it efficiently to find various things
 - IOCs
 - Web page content
 - Files transmitted
 - Literally anything else



tv-netflix-problems-2011-07-06.pcap

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Expression...

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
343	65.142415	192.168.0.21	174.129.249.228	TCP	66	40555 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5888 Len=0 TSval=491519346 TSecr=551811827
344	65.142715	192.168.0.21	174.129.249.228	HTTP	253	GET /clients/netflix/flash/application.swf?flash_version=flash_lite_2.1&v=1.5&n...
345	65.230738	174.129.249.228	192.168.0.21	TCP	66	80 → 40555 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=188 Win=6864 Len=0 TSval=551811850 TSecr=491519347
346	65.240742	174.129.249.228	192.168.0.21	HTTP	828	HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
347	65.241592	192.168.0.21	174.129.249.228	TCP	66	40555 → 80 [ACK] Seq=188 Ack=763 Win=7424 Len=0 TSval=491519446 TSecr=551811852
348	65.242532	192.168.0.21	192.168.0.1	DNS	77	Standard query 0x2188 A cdn-0.nflximg.com
349	65.276870	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.21	DNS	489	Standard query response 0x2188 A cdn-0.nflximg.com CNAME images.netflix.com.edge...
350	65.277992	192.168.0.21	63.80.242.48	TCP	74	37063 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=491519482 TSecr=...
351	65.297757	63.80.242.48	192.168.0.21	TCP	74	80 → 37063 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=3295...
352	65.298396	192.168.0.21	63.80.242.48	TCP	66	37063 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5888 Len=0 TSval=491519502 TSecr=3295534130
353	65.298687	192.168.0.21	63.80.242.48	HTTP	153	GET /us/nrd/clients/flash/814540.bun HTTP/1.1
354	65.318730	63.80.242.48	192.168.0.21	TCP	66	80 → 37063 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=88 Win=5792 Len=0 TSval=3295534151 TSecr=491519503
355	65.321733	63.80.242.48	192.168.0.21	TCP	1514	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

> Frame 349: 489 bytes on wire (3912 bits), 489 bytes captured (3912 bits)

> Ethernet II, Src: Globalsc_00:3b:0a (f8:ad:4e:00:3b:0a), Dst: Vizio_14:8a:e1 (00:19:9d:14:8a:e1)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.0.1, Dst: 192.168.0.21

> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 53 (53), Dst Port: 34036 (34036)

▼ Domain Name System (response)

[Request In: 348]

[Time: 0.034338000 seconds]

Transaction ID: 0x2188

> Flags: 0x8180 Standard query response, No error

Questions: 1

Answer RRs: 4

Authority RRs: 9

Additional RRs: 9

▼ Queries

> cdn-0.nflximg.com: type A, class IN

> Answers

> Authoritative nameservers

0020 00 15 00 35 84 f4 01 c7 83 3f 21 88 81 80 00 01 ...5....?|....

0030 00 04 00 09 00 09 05 63 64 6e 2d 30 07 6e 66 6cc dn-0.nfl

0040 78 69 6d 67 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 c0 0c 00 xing.com

0050 05 00 01 00 00 05 29 00 22 06 69 6d 61 67 65 73). ".images

0060 07 6e 65 74 66 6c 69 78 03 63 6f 6d 09 65 64 67 .netflix.com.edg

0070 65 73 75 69 74 65 03 6e 65 74 00 c0 2f 00 05 00 esuite.n et./...

Identification of transaction (dns.id), 2 bytes

Packets: 10299 · Displayed: 10299 (100.0%) · Load time: 0:0.182 · Profile: Default

Cracking



- Scale is the only difference between real world cracking and CTF cracking
 - Single cpu vs a cluster of high-performing-specifically-built GPUs

- Identification
- Check other sources first
- Decrease key space is best as possible
- Compute how
- Sit back and hope

MD2 128 bits

MD4 128 bits

MD5 128 bits

MD6 Up to 512 bits

RIPEMD-128 128 bits

RIPEMD-160 160 bits

RIPEMD-320 320 bits

SHA-1 160 bits

SHA-224 224 bits

SHA-256 256 bits

SHA-384 384 bits

SHA-512 512 bits

SHA-3 (originally known as Keccak) arbitrary

Tiger 192 bits

Whirlpool 512 bits

HASHCAT



```
Home - PuTTY

aircrack-ng 1.0

[00:00:18] Tested 1514 keys (got 30566 IVs)

KB  depth  byte (vote)
0  0/ 9    1F(39680) 4E(38400) 14(37376) 5C(37376) 9D(37376)
1  7/ 9    64(36608) 3E(36352) 34(36096) 46(36096) BA(36096)
2  0/ 1    1F(46592) 6E(38400) 81(37376) 79(36864) AD(36864)
3  0/ 3    1F(40960) 15(38656) 7B(38400) BB(37888) 5C(37632)
4  0/ 7    1F(39168) 23(38144) 97(37120) 59(36608) 13(36352)

KEY FOUND! [ 1F:1F:1F:1F ]
Decrypted correctly: 100%

~$ █
```



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CACI

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CH 9][Elapsed: 4 s][2007-03-24 16:58][WPA handshake: 00:14:6C:7E:40:80

BSSID	PWR	RXQ	Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
00:14:6C:7E:40:80	39	100	51	116 14	9	54	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	teddy

BSSID	STATION	PWR	Lost	Packets	Probes
00:14:6C:7E:40:80	00:0F:B5:FD:FB:C2	35	0	116	