



Security Issues of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

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- The goal of this exercise to study the weakness of WEP.
- It is not intended to be used as a tool to steal information or to damage systems.





Objectives

- The main objective of this experiment is to understand how does WEP work
- To understand the weak points of WEP
- To understand ARP and IP packets
- And to write a C program to be able to crack a password of WiFi router that uses WEP





Requirements


- Wireless AP
- Wireless NIC
- Wireshark
- A C compiler





Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

■ WEP Encryption uses RC4 stream cipher








Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

WEP Decryption uses RC4 stream cipher







- > a proprietary cipher owned by RSA DSI
- > another Ron Rivest design, simple but effective
- variable key size, byte-oriented stream cipher
- widely used (web SSL/TLS, wireless WEP/WPA)
- > key forms random permutation of all 8-bit values
- uses that permutation to scramble input info processed a byte at a time





ECE RC4: Two Steps

RC4 Key Schedule (Initialization)

```
for i = 0 to 255 do
   S[i] = i;
   T[i] = K[i \mod keylen];
\dot{\exists} = 0
for i = 0 to 255 do
   j = (j + S[i] + T[i]) \pmod{256};
   swap (S[i], S[j]);
```

RC4 Encryption

```
i = j = 0;
for each message byte M_{\rm i}
   i = (i + 1) \pmod{256};
   j = (j + S[i]) \pmod{256};
   swap(S[i], S[j]);
   t = (S[i] + S[j]) \pmod{256};
   C_i = M_i \text{ XOR S[t]};
```





Example

- The size of S is 8 instead of 256
- K = [1 2 3 6]
- M = [4 2 3 2]
- The step is to generate the stream.
- Initialise the state vector S and temporary vector T. S is initialised so the S[i] = i,
- and T is initialised so it is the key K (repeated as necessary).
- \blacksquare S = [0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7]
- T = [1 2 3 6 1 2 3 6]





Now perform the initial permutation on S.

- at i = 0:
- = j = (0 + 0 + 1) mod 8
- \blacksquare = 1
- Swap(S[0],S[1]);
- \blacksquare S = [1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7]





- T = [1 2 3 6 1 2 3 6]
- at i = 1:
- j = 3
- Swap(S[1],S[3])
- \blacksquare S = [1 3 2 0 4 5 6 7];
- At the end of itrations
- S= [2 3 7 4 6 0 1 5];





- Now we generate 3-bits at a time, k, that we XOR with each 3-bits of plaintext to
- produce the ciphertext. The 3-bits k is generated by:

```
i = j = 0;
for each message byte M_i
i = (i + 1) \pmod{8};
j = (j + S[i]) \pmod{8};
swap(S[i], S[j]);
t = (S[i] + S[j]) \pmod{8};
C_i = M_i \text{ XOR } S[t];
```





- The first iteration:
- \blacksquare **S** = [2 3 7 4 0 1 6 5]
- \bullet i = (0 + 1) mod 8 = 1
- $= j = (0 + S[1]) \mod 8 = 3$
- Swap(S[1],S[3])
- \blacksquare **S** = [2 4 7 3 0 1 6 5]
- $t = (S[1] + S[3]) \mod 8 = 7$
- k = S[7] = 5
- Remember, M= [4 2 3 2]
- So our first 3-bits of ciphertext is obtained by: k XOR P
- 5 XOR 4 = 101 XOR 100 = 001= 1





- The second iteration:
- \blacksquare **S** = [2 4 7 3 0 1 6 5]
- $i = (1 + 1) \mod 8 = 2$
- $= j = (2 + S[2]) \mod 8 = 1$
- Swap(S[2],S[1])
- \blacksquare **S** = [27430165]
- $t = (S[2] + S[1]) \mod 8 = 3$
- k = S[3] = 3
- Second 3-bits of ciphertext are:
- 3 XOR 2 = 011 XOR 010 = 001 = 1





- The third iteration:
- \blacksquare **S** = [2 7 4 3 0 1 6 5]
- $i = (2 + 1) \mod 8 = 3$
- $= j = (1 + S[3]) \mod 8 = 4$
- Swap(S[3],S[4])
- \blacksquare **S** = [27403165]
- $t = (S[3] + S[4]) \mod 8 = 3$
- k = S[3] = 0
- Third 3-bits of ciphertext are:
- 0 XOR 2 = 000 XOR 011 = 011 = 3





- The final iteration:
- \blacksquare **S** = [2 7 4 0 3 1 6 5]
- $= j = (4 + S[4]) \mod 8 = 7$
- Swap(S[4],S[7])
- \blacksquare **S** = [27405163]
- $t = (S[4] + S[7]) \mod 8 = 0$
- k = S[0] = 2
- Last 3-bits of ciphertext are:
- 2 XOR 2 = 010 XOR 010 = 000 = 0





■ So to encrypt the plaintext stream **M** = [4 2 3 2] with key **K** = [1 2 3 6] using our simplified RC4 stream cipher we get **C** = [1 1 3 0].





RC4 and WEP


- WEP requires each packet to be encrypted with a separate RC4 key.
- The RC4 key for each packet is a concatenation of a 24-bit IV (initialization vector) and a 40 or 104-bit long-term key.

RC4 key: IV (24) Long-term key (40 or 104 bits)





802.11 frames using WEP



- ICV: integrity check value (for data integrity)
- FCS: frame check sequence (for error detection)
- Both use CRC32





ECE WEP Vulnerability

- WEP protocol has several flaws
 - Short IV length
 - 24 bits IV not sufficient
 - Clear text IV as part of the key
 - 24 bits of every key in cleartext
 - Collect and analyze IVs to extract the WEP key





WEP decryption step-by-step

- Step 1: Build the keystream
- Extract the IV from the incoming frame
- Prepend the IV to the key
- Use RC4 to build the keystream





WEP decryption step-by-step

Step 2: Decrypt the plaintext and verify

- XOR the keystream with the ciphertext
- Verify the extracted message with the some known data in the packet






Initialization vector (IV)

- It's carried in plaintext in the "encrypted" message!
- It's only 24 bits!
- There are no restrictions on IV reuse!
- The IV forms a significant portion of the "seed" for the RC4 algorithm!



What do we know about the packets?






- With 802.11, you know the first eight bytes of a packet
- Many IP services have packets of fixed lengths
- Most WLAN IP addresses follow common conventions.
- Many IP behaviors have predictable responses
- The network part of IP address is known





Example







ARP packet

15555 10010/5005 10001141251050210151102110		0001	302 1101211 11111/2
15442 101.052322 cisco_d9:dc:80	Broadcast	ARP	116 Who has 131.188
15529 101.256162 Tp-LinkT_12:58:84	Broadcast	802.11	140 Beacon frame, S
15530 101.258034 131.188.37.28	239.255.255.250	SSDP	231 M-SEARCH * HTTF
15634 101.666700 131.188.37.28	224.0.0.2	IGMPv2	116 Leave Group 224
15683 101 8715//7/131 188 37 28	22/L0 0 252	LLMND	122 Standard Allery

```
<Hardware address: Cisco_d9:dc:80 (00:25:b4:d9:dc:80)>
   <Hardware address (resolved): Cisco_d9:dc:80>
 WEP parameters
     Initialization Vector: 0x778e26
     Key Index. 0
     WEP ICV: 0x4c905b08 (correct)
E Logical-Link Control

    Address Resolution Protocol (request)

     aa aa 03 00 00 00 08 06
                            0 01 08 00 06 04 00 01
0000
                           25 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
     83 bc 25 c0 00 00 00 00
0020
                          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0030
     00 00 00 00 00 00
                     Some common data in all ARP packets
```

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Cracking the password

- Brute Force method
- Get the IV from an ARP packet (data packet)
- Get the encrypted data from the Packet as hex
- Assume the password consists from small/capital letters in addition to numbers
- Concatenate a 40 bits (5 chars) key to have the complete Key.
- Key schedule, obtain the vector S based on the key
- Using the encrypted data and S, decode the encrypted message and compare the results in byte 0, 1, 2,3,and 4, with 0xaa, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00.
- If the results are true, then the password is cracked





Bibliography

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