

Demystifying WebAuthn and Passkeys



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Why are we here?



Where are we at?



Embraced by platforms and credential providers...



...and online services

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YAHOO!
JAPAN



authenticate

COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER

PUBLICATIONS

NIST SP 800-63-4 (Initial Public Draft) 

Digital Identity Guidelines





Google





Since September 15th...

Over 150,000 passkeys




authenticate

This is how we're doing it.



Let's talk about passkeys


- The term **passkey** is the most important term to understand outside of FIDO2 and WebAuthn, especially for consumers and executive leadership.



Let's talk about passkeys

- Passkeys are probably the most accessible and common means by which people will be introduced to passwordless authentication for the web.
- "Passkeys are a replacement for passwords that provide faster, easier, and more secure sign-ins to websites and apps across a user's devices." - FIDO Alliance
- They're mostly a marketing term. Describing it in technical terms is possible, but quickly introduce complexity!






**Authenticator
or
Passkey Provider**



Client




Relying Party



How about WebAuthn?

- WebAuthn makes passkeys possible.
 - WebAuthn is the **browser API** that facilitates the creation and use of WebAuthn/FIDO credentials.
- One half of the **FIDO2** Framework.
 - **WebAuthn** and **CTAP2** work together to also allow **cross-platform authenticators** to communicate with a relying party.
- **CTAP2** is mainly used with hardware tokens, and is not a requirement for responding to a WebAuthn request.






**Authenticator
or
Passkey Provider**



CTAP2



Client



WebAuthn



Relying Party



**FIDO2
Authentication**



So what's the technical side of passkeys?

- Passkeys are **discoverable FIDO2 credentials**. Depending on their **backup-eligibility** and **backup-status** they can be "synced" or "device-bound." Synced passkeys are typically synced between devices by a **passkey provider's** sync fabric.
- Passkeys, as with **all WebAuthn credentials**, still **require user proximity**.
- **Synced** passkeys and **device-bound** passkeys hold different and nuanced security properties.



Recap of FIDO2 authentication....



Passwords	FIDO
Human generated symmetric secret	Machine generated private/public keypair
Often re-used across websites	Bound to a single RP (relying party)
Easily phished	Phishing-resistant
Subject to credential stuffing, social engineering and server leakage	Impractical to remotely attack



Client
(computing device, user,
authenticator with private key)

I'm ready to login

Ok, here's a random challenge

Here's the challenge signed with my private key

Yep, that's correct

Relying-Party
(website, FIDO server, user
accounts with public keys)



User Presence

- User presence is important for achieving **phishing resistance** during the WebAuthn ceremony.
 - Requiring that a user performs a physical action (**biometric** scan, **PIN entry**, device interaction) gives RP's assurance that the user is near the authenticator and it is not being initiated remotely.
 - Provides **something you have**.



PIN Support and Biometrics

- During registration and authentication, passwordless RP's also look for **user verification**.
 - **User verification** assures that the human initiating the request is the true owner of the authenticator.
 - Provides **something you know** or **something you are**.
- Generally, devices that support biometrics can fall back to PIN. There is **no guarantee of biometric-only use** of WebAuthn.




Synced vs Device-Bound

- A **passkey** is a **discoverable credential**.
- When a passkey can be used from **multiple devices**, it is a **synced passkey**.
- When a passkey can only be used from a **single device**, it is a **device-bound passkey**.




Many overlapping circles...



Synced Passkeys

A passkey that can be backed up and synchronized by a passkey provider across a user's devices.



- A passkey provider might be a platform/OS vendor, or 3rd-party software such as a password manager.
- Facilitates new device bootstrapping and simplifies account recovery.
- Security of synced passkeys is the responsibility of the passkey provider.



How can you tell what you got?

- Many passkey providers return a unique but **unattested AAGUID**...
 - Good for UX hints, but you can't trust it without attestation.
- **Direct attestation** can still be requested, but it is often returned exclusively by security keys.
- Additional signals like browser **user agent**, **transports**, and **attachment** can be used to infer provider identity as a fallback.



Hybrid Authentication

- Hybrid authentication allows for passkeys, **bound to one device**, to be used to authenticate into a **separate device**.
- The device with the passkey generates a WebAuthn request and hands it back to the requesting client.



The Good.

- Passkeys can be used to define most types of FIDO credentials.
- More passkey providers are becoming available!
- Some passkeys can be synced across devices! Great for availability and recovery!

The Bad.

- Passkeys can be used to define most types of FIDO credentials.
- Many providers have to intercept WebAuthn API calls in the browser.
- This is a potential showstopper for regulated and high assurance companies.

The Ugly.

- Differences in keys can cause confusion.
- There isn't an easy solution for this problem!
- Solving this is an ongoing discussion.



This is where we're headed.



Streamlining Passkey Enrollment

- There is work currently being done in the **FIDO Alliance** and the **W3C** to provide RPs, clients, and passkey providers with a way to **register a passkey after a user authenticates** with existing login credentials.
- This aims to reduce user frictions when **migrating users from traditional username + password + 2FA** auth to passkeys.



Better Credential Metadata Management

- Passkey providers store **metadata** with passkeys, including the **user name** that gets shown to users during authentication.
- It's a tricky problem. **W3C** is working on how best to enable RP's to inform providers of metadata changes in response to real life: legal name changes, email address updates, etc...



Where is this work taking place?

- Discussions about passkeys, providers, and authenticators happen right here in **The FIDO Alliance**:
 - **Technical Working Group (TWG)**
 - **Credential Provider SIG**
 - **Consumer/Enterprise Deployment Working Groups**
- Discussions about WebAuthn, browser extensions, and browser features take place in the **World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)**:
 - **Web Authentication Working Group (WAWG)**
 - **WebAuthn Adoption Community Group (WACG)**



Resources

Learn more about adding passkeys to your site:

- For **Developers**:
 - <https://passkeys.dev>
 - <https://webauthn.io>
 - <https://www.w3.org/groups/cg/webauthn-adoption>
- For **C-levels**:
 - <https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys/>



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Q & A



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