



Network Attacks

Aggelos Kiayias






Networks...

- Computers connected to each other.
- Each machine has a unique address.
- Each message from the sender to receiver may stop at many intermediate hops till it reaches its destination. (networks are not complete graphs ...routing...)





Networks







Communication Media

- Wire (copper wire: cheap, slow) 10 Mbps, ~100m.
 Carries electrical signal.
- Coax Cable (wire+insulation jacket) 100Mbps ~500m.
- Optical fiber (thin strand of glass). Carries pulses of light. I 000Mbps. ~4km.
- Wireless: WiFi, Radio signals.
- infrared, satellite etc...





OSI Model

Open Systems Interconnection Model

0.000			
7	Application	User-level data	
6	Presentation	Data format (ascii etc.)	
5	Session	Sequencing	
4	Transport	Flow control (acks, retransmissions errors)	
3	Network	Routing (where to send)	
2	Data Link	Local delivery	
I	Physical	Bit level representation	





Example: e-mail

7	Application	e-mail composition
6	Presentation	text based transliteration, compression
5	Session	_
4	Transport	error-correcting codes, logical connection
3	Network	chop in packets - put addresses
2	Data Link	chop in frames - add MAC addresses
I	Physical	chop in bits - transmit





TCP/IP

- Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol.
- Four layers:
 - Application.
 - Host-to-Host Transport.
 - Internet.
 - Physical.



TCP/IP

Application Layer	Prepare messages from user	Addressing/ Interaction
Transport Layer (e.g., TCP)	Packets are made	Sequencing, Reliability Error Correction
Network Layer (IP)	Into Datagrams	Routing
Data Link Layer	Connection between adjacent hosts - Bits	
Physical	Bit representation	e.g. radio modulation





Data Link Layer Frames

- Source and destination Physical Addresses
- Encoding of bits
- Physical layer aspects (e.g., modulation).





IP Datagrams

- Contain time to live (TTL) information (# of hops).
- Source and Destination IP addresses.
- Information about the encapsulated protocol.





TCP Packets

- Source / Destination ports.
- Acknowledgment number for connecting packets of a session.
- Sequence numbers.
- Integrity (checksums).





Application Data

- Depends on the application layer protocol used.
- Example:





Physical Layer: eth the 2 MAC addresses

+ IP indication

Example

Network Layer: IP IP addresses, TTL, checksum, fragmentation

```
00 Of db 4d 77 95 00 Od 93 b0 a3 24 08 00 45 00
0000
0010
       01 75 c8 de 40 00 40 06 44 dd c0 a8 01 2e 40 ec
0020
0030
0040
0050
0060
0070
0800
0090
00a0
       67 75 61 67 65 3a 20 65 6e 0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70
00b0
00c0
                                65 0d 0a 52 65 66 65 72
00d0
00e0
00f0
0100
0110
0120
0130
0140
0150
0160
0170
             3a 20 69 2e 61 2e 63 6e 6e 2e 6e 65
0180
       0a 0d 0a
```

.u..@.@.D....@. ,)....P...M%.q. ..GET /cnn/2006/ US/02/27/katrina .poll/t1.2135.mo n.beads.ap.jpg H TTP/1.1..Accept: */*..Accept-Lan guage: en..Accep t-Encoding: gzip , deflate..Refer er: http://www.c nn.com/..User-Aq ent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/41 7.9 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/4 17.8..Connection : keep-alive..Ho st: i.a.cnn.net.

...Mw....\$..E.

Transport Layer: TCP Ports, Seq Ack numbers, checksum, timestamps

Application Layer: HTTP Request: GET Request URI Referrer User-agent info Connection info



Internet Protocols


- Data link Layer: ethernet, wi-fi etc.
- Network Layer: ICMP (Internet control message), IP etc.
- Transport Layer: UDP (user datagram protocol), TCP etc.
- Application Layer: Finger, FTP (file transfer), HTTP (hypertext transfer), IMAP (internet message access), IRC (internet relay chat), POP (post office), SMTP (simple mail transfer), TELNET (terminal emulation), X-window, etc.



UDP Protocol

- user datagram protocol.
- lightweight alternative to TCP.
- Faster, lighter adds 8 bytes for control.
- stateless sending and no ordering.
- used for application layer protocols as SNMP (simple network monitoring), Syslog (system audit log), Time etc.





How does data find its way?

- Application. HTTP request to <u>www.website.com</u> (DNS resolution)
- Transport. which in turn will result to some packets directed to a certain **port** #.
- Internet. which in turn will result to some frames directed to a IP address.
- Physical. which in turn will result to some actual bits being sent to MAC address





Addressing

- Two mappings are necessary:
 - From host name to IP address.
 - From IP address to MAC address.
- Host name will be mapped to an IP address through a protocol called DNS
- MAC address will be obtained from an address resolution table. (ARP)





Transmitting a packet

- A packet needs to be directed to a certain IP address.
- To figure out where to send it next, a routing table is consulted. Example:

Routing table: Destination default

Gateway 137.99.11.1

Flags UGSC

Refs 16

Netif Expire Use 1863

en0



Transmitting a packet, II

- Once the (intermediate hop) IP address is determined the packet must be split into frames and directed to the right MAC address.
- Internet to Ethernet address translation:

Address 137.99.11.1

HWtype ether

HWaddress 00:0B:46:9A:1B:3F

Flags Mask

Iface eth0





Receiving a packet

- Keep it or forward it.
- Based on destination address (and perhaps) other parameters).
- Forward it using the routing table as before.
- Routing and Address Resolution tables are dynamically updated.



IP Addresses and DNS

- 32-bit (IPv6 offers 128-bits).
- IP addresses are assigned to names according to Domain Name Service (DNS).
- Given a certain name at the application layer a query will be transmitted to a *Name* Server to resolve it for the corresponding IP address.



Trace route

- 1 192.168.63.11 (192.168.63.11) 3.896 ms 2.122 ms 1.511 ms
- 2 195.134.67.1 (195.134.67.1) 1.794 ms 2.839 ms 1.784 ms
- 3 grnetRouter.L1.uoa.athens-3.access-link.grnet.gr (194.177.209.97) 1.984 ms 2.262 ms 3.360 ms
- 4 eie2-to-koletti1.backbone.grnet.gr (195.251.27.46) 2.196 ms 4.345 ms 3.539 ms
- 5 core1.ams.net.google.com (195.69.144.247) 72.084 ms 72.003 ms 72.743 ms
- 6 209.85.248.88 (209.85.248.88) 74.182 ms * 74.916 ms
- 7 64.233.175.246 (64.233.175.246) 75.377 ms 75.800 ms 74.950 ms
- 8 209.85.255.143 (209.85.255.143) 77.161 ms 72.14.239.197 (72.14.239.197) 79.314 ms 209.85.255.166 (209.85.255.166) 90.792 ms
- 9 72.14.232.37 (72.14.232.37) 81.473 ms 72.14.232.41 (72.14.232.41) 84.950 ms 72.14.232.37 (72.14.232.37) 84.960 ms
- 10 ez-in-f104.1e100.net (66.102.13.104) 79.149 ms 78.015 ms 76.316 ms





How traceroute works

- Using a special IP header filed called TTL: time to live.
- TTL = number of hops a packet is allowed to make. Each router decreases by one.
- When TTL reaches 0 then a router discards the packet and notifies originator.
- For traceroute: send repeatedly packets and calibrate TTL as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...
- not all routers necessarily respond (* * *)





Client Server Model


- Application protocols, FTP, HTTP, Telnet etc.
- Server listens to port for client requests.
- Client initiates protocol



Talking over TCP/IP

Client





Server





Packet Sniffing


- Every computer in the Internet sends and receives packets.
- Anyone with the appropriate privileges in a certain host can "sniff" the packets that are being forwarded by the host (and not only the packets that are directed to the host).
- In this case the host is said to be in promiscuous mode.



Packet Sniffing, II

- If you have privileges for promiscuous mode then you can capture all traffic within the sub-network the host belongs to.
- You cannot capture traffic outside your subnetwork (e.g., traffic that is not directed towards your gateway).
- When you use your computer do always ponder what is your sub-network (consider: sitting at a cafe connected to a wireless access point)





Wireshark

- Wireshark is a powerful "network protocol analyzer"
- It not only sniffs data when put on promiscuous mode but also "knows" the protocols and structures the packets in the appropriate format.





Wireshark, II

screen dump of capture window after an FTP connection

No. 🗸	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Into
	1 0.000000	192.168.1.46	192.168.1.1	DNS	Standard query A ftp.debian.org
	2 0.156872	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.46	DNS	Standard query response A 128.101.240.212
	3 0.203708	192.168.1.46	128.101.240.212	TCP	58408 > ftp [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1
	4 0.311009	128.101.240.212	192.168.1.46	TCP_	ftp > 58408 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5792 Len=0 M:
	5 0.311128	192.168.1.46	128.101.240.212	TCP	58408 > ftp [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 TSV=79
	6 0.427572	128.101.240.212	192.168.1.46	FTP	Response: 220 saens.debian.org FTP server (vsftpd)
	7 0.457218	192.168.1.46	128.101.240.212	TCP	58408 > ftp [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=43 Win=65535 Len=0 TSV=7
	8 3.908879	192.168.1.46	128.101.240.212	FTP	Request: USER anonymous
	9 3.995051	128.101.240.212	192.168.1.46	TCP	ftp > 58408 [ACK] Seq 443 Ack=17 Win=6144 Len=0 TSV=0
1	0 3.995621	128.101.240.212	192.168.1.46	FTP	Response: 331 Please specify the password.
1	1 4.058261	192.168.1.46	128.101.240 212	TCP	58408 > ftp [ACK] Seq=17 Ack=77 Win=65535 Len=0 TSV=
1	2 8.388059	192.168.1.46	128.101.240.212	FTP (Request: PASS ak@ak.org
1	3 8.473188	128.101.240.212	192.168.1.46	FTP	Response: 230-
1	4 8.473824	128.101.240.212	192,168.1.46	FTP	Response: 230-This site is just another one in a worldwid
1	5 8.659296	192.168.1.46	128.101.240.212	TCP	58408 > ftp [ACK] Seq=33 Ack=158 Win=65535 Len=0 TS\
1	6 8.751453	128.101.240.212	192.168.1.46	FTP	Response: 230-It is not the "primary Debian FTP site" - it
1	7 8.758911	192.168.1.46	128.101.240.212	FTP	Request: SYST

the three-way handshake


Observe the password and username



A malicious client

Client





Server






A malicious client, II

Client



IP Spoofing



Server





SYN Flooding

- Client bombards Server with SYN packets that are never ACK'ed.
- IP spoofing can be used to make packets look like they are coming from other places.
- Physical limitation: bandwidth.
- If bandwidth on client is substantial compared to server there is serious potential for a Denial of Service (DoS) Attack



DoS Attacks


- Deplete / misconfigure / misallocate the resources on a target server host so that it cannot serve its clients.
 - resources:
 - bandwidth.
 - memory.
 - cpu.
 - ...



DoS By Flooding


- SYN Flooding we just saw it.
- Ping Floods: this is a flooding of ICMP Echo Request packets.

```
aggelos@grub:~$ ping 192.168.1.1
PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.686 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.611 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.617 ms
--- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 0.611/0.638/0.686/0.034 ms
```



Smurf Attack


- An enhanced Ping flood attack that utilizes IP Broadcast:
 - it is possible to specify the destination IP address as a broadcast to all hosts in a subnetwork.





Distributed DoS

• The real deal!







Botnet Creation

- Host compromised by virus, worm, trojan.
- Runs rootkit remote administration tool.
- When commanded it launches DoS attack against victim.
- Attack seems to be coming from everywhere!





Current Botnet Uses

- The convenience of separation between 'hacking a computer' and 'committing a crime.'
- Sending Spam.
- Click-Fraud.
- Identity Theft.
- Stealing files: e.g., game Diablo-2 items were stolen and sold on EBay...





Botnet Design Challenges

- Choosing botnet topology. (centralized, hierarchical, P2P).
- Command&Control flow (pull, push, ongoing).
- Command&Control protocols (old-use: IRC, IM, HTTP, specialized protocols).





Rallying Mechanism

- Botnet assembly:
 - hardcoded IP addresses.
 - list of DNS names.
 - Distributed DNS services implemented by the botnet itself.
 - DNS Fast Flux





Design challenges

- Bot should try to avoid being detected due its C&C communication or O/S footprint.
- Botnet may experience Bot loss.
- Botnet may experience Bot stealing.
- Botnet should detect fake bots that try to infiltrate.



Other DoS attacks

- The Fork Bomb: any program that constantly forks by creating child processes that do the same.
- Any time a process is called the O/S allocates memory for the process's requirements and enters the process specifics in a data structure.

```
int main(void) this little program may
{
     crash your PC
     while(1) {
```

Example:

```
while(1) {
  fork();
}
return 0;
You can write fork-bombs
for all major languages.
bash example :(){:|:&};:
```





Defending against DOS

- Attacks like Smurf, Fork Bombs etc. result from the ability of an entity to allocate more resources than necessary in normal operation.
- Restricting such capability will thwart the related attack, e.g.,
 - restrict the use of IP broadcasting.
 - restrict the number of processes a user may create.




IP Throttling

- Any IP address that issues a big upstream will have its incoming packets being dropped at a certain rate.
 - Advantage: can be configured in your router. No need to modify client/server.
 - Disadvantage: what are the right settings?



Ingress Filtering



http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2827.html





Defending against DDoS

- Harder since an attack may look as quite legitimate traffic: (e.g., HTTP)
- Challenge: distinguish between good traffic and DDoS traffic.
- We will examine some general approaches for DDoS defense next.




Simple Measures

- Try to use various parameters to make a system understand it is being attacked:
 - counting number of half-open connections (syn-rcvd).
 - counting number of connections refused.
- Once some red-flags are observed the system may shorten the time that it keeps half-open connections active.



SYN Cookies



A SYN-Cookie contains info derived by the source-address port, destination address and port etc.

Server can forget everything about the client till the ACK message that will include the SYN-Cookie

outsourcing the server state to the client



Proofs of Work

- Client is requested to solve a puzzle in order to establish a connection.
 - Pros: works in any client-server system. can be tuned to slow down malicious systems.
 - Cons: needs changes in the basic infrastructure (e.g., changes in both client and server). Will not eliminate bandwidth emaciation.



Example.

From Juels/Brainard (RSA)

Hash function

$$\mathcal{H}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^k$$

r = secret | time | client request

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
r \\
\downarrow \\
\mathcal{H} & x = \mathcal{H}(r) \\
x \in \{0,1\}^k \xrightarrow{\mathsf{trunc}} x' \in \{0,1\}^{k-w}
\end{array}$$

Server to client: sends $x', y = \mathcal{H}(x)$ stores (x, y)

Client needs to respond with $x'': \mathcal{H}(x'||x'') = y$ $x'' \in \{0,1\}^w$



IP Traceback

- A "forensic" technique:
 - try to identify the real path of a packet.
 - Have routers mark packets with their IP address. => problem: not enough space in a packet.



Edge Marking.

- With some low probability q a router marks a packet. Marking is defined as:
 - IF packet unmarked:
 - enter your IP address as the start IP address
 of the edge. Set distance = 0
 - ELSE: If distance = 0, enter your IP address as the end IP address of the edge. increment the distance.
- Otherwise increase the distance.



Encoding IP addresses

- Use only the 16 bits of the IP identification field used for fragmentation.
- How to pack 64+5 bit information into 16 bits?

 $\mathcal{H}_1, \mathcal{H}_2: \{0,1\}^{32} \to \{0,1\}^{11}$

Use

first router $\mathcal{H}_1(\text{startIP})$

second router $\mathcal{H}_1(\mathsf{startIP}) \oplus \mathcal{H}_2(\mathsf{endIP})$



Reconstruct Path

