

Find the Nash equilibria of and the set of rationalizable strategies for the games in Exercise 1 at the end of Chapter 6.

$NE = (B, L)$ or $S = (B, L)$

| | | |
|---|------|-------|
| 2 | L | R |
| 1 | | |
| A | 3, 3 | 2, 0 |
| B | 4, 1 | 8, -1 |

(a)

$NE = (U, L)$ and (M, C)

L dominates

| | | | |
|---|------|------|------|
| 2 | L | C | R |
| 1 | | | |
| U | 5, 9 | 0, 1 | 4, 3 |
| M | 3, 2 | 0, 9 | 1, 1 |
| D | 2, 8 | 0, 1 | 8, 4 |

UL makes more sense

(b)

$NE = (U, X)$

| | | | | |
|---|------|-------|-------|------|
| 2 | W | X | Y | Z |
| 1 | | | | |
| U | 3, 6 | 4, 10 | 5, 0 | 0, 8 |
| M | 2, 6 | 3, 3 | 4, 10 | 1, 1 |
| D | 1, 5 | 2, 9 | 3, 0 | 4, 6 |

(c)

(d)

| | | |
|---|------|------|
| 2 | L | R |
| 1 | | |
| U | 1, 1 | 0, 0 |
| D | 0, 0 | 5, 5 |

All S are rationalizable

$S = (U, X)$

| | | | | |
|---|------|-------|-------|------|
| 2 | W | X | Y | Z |
| 1 | | | | |
| U | 3, 6 | 4, 10 | 5, 0 | 0, 8 |
| M | 2, 6 | 3, 3 | 4, 10 | 1, 1 |
| D | 1, 5 | 2, 9 | 3, 0 | 4, 6 |

(c)