- 6. Imagine that a zealous prosecutor (P) has accused a defendant (D) of committing a crime. Suppose that the trial involves evidence production by both parties and that by producing evidence, a litigant increases the probability of winning the trial. Specifically, suppose that the probability that the defendant wins is given by  $e_D/(e_D + e_P)$ , where  $e_D$  is the expenditure on evidence production by the defendant and  $e_P$  is the expenditure on evidence production by the prosecutor. Assume that  $e_D$  and  $e_P$  are greater than or equal to 0. The defendant must pay 8 if he is found guilty, whereas he pays 0 if he is found innocent. The prosecutor receives 8 if she wins and 0 if she loses the case.
  - (a) Represent this game in normal form.

(b) Write the first-order condition and derive the best-response function for each player.

$$du = 8/(e_{P} \cdot e_{D}) - 7e_{P}(e_{P} \cdot e_{D})^{2} - 1 = 0$$

$$7/(P+D) - 8P = (P+D)^{2} \quad Or \quad 8D = (P+D)^{2}$$

$$9 = 2320 - P$$

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(c) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. What is the probability that the defendant wins in equilibrium.

## (d) Is this outcome efficient? Why?