
- 5. Consider a differentiated duopoly market in which firms compete by selecting prices and produce to fill orders. Let p_1 be the price chosen by firm 1 and let p_2 be the price of firm 2. Let q_1 and q_2 denote the quantities demanded (and produced) by the two firms. Suppose that the demand for firm 1 is given by $q_1 = 22 2p_1 + p_2$, and the demand for firm 2 is given by $q_2 = 22 2p_2 + p_1$. Firm 1 produces at a constant marginal cost of 10 and no fixed cost. Firm 2 produces at a constant marginal cost of c and no fixed cost. The payoffs are the firms' individual profits.
 - (a) The firms' strategies are their prices. Represent the normal form by writing the firms' payoff functions.

(b) Calculate the firms' best-response functions.

(c) Suppose that c = 10 so the firms are identical (the game is symmetric). Calculate the Nash equilibrium prices.



(d) Now suppose that firm 1 does not know firm 2's marginal cost c. With probability 1/2 nature picks c=14, and with probability 1/2 nature picks c=6. Firm 2 knows its own cost (that is, it observes nature's move), but firm 1 only knows that firm 2's marginal cost is either 6 or 14 (with equal probabilities). Calculate the best-response functions of player 1 and the two types (c=6 and c=14) of player 2 and calculate the Bayesian Nash equilibrium quantities.

1, - (P, -10) (22-2P, P,) - 42P + P, P, - 2P, 2 - 220-10P2 1, - (P, -6) (22-2P, P) - -2P2 + P, P, +34P, -6P, -132 124 - (P, -14) (22-2P, P) = -2P2 + P, P, +50P2 - 141P, -308 BA, - 42 + P, /4 BA, - -4P2 + P, +34 BA, + - -4P2 + P, +50

