

## Passed Solution Review

2. Find conditions on the discount factor under which cooperation can be supported in the infinitely repeated games with the following stage games.

		2	
		C	D
1	C	2, 2	0, 4
	D	4, 0	1, 1

(a)

		2	
		C	D
1	C	3, 4	0, 7
	D	5, 0	1, 2

(b)

		2	
		C	D
1	C	3, 2	0, 1
	D	7, 0	2, 1

(c)

Use the grim-trigger strategy profile.

a)  $\frac{2}{1-\delta} \geq 4 + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \rightarrow \delta \geq 2/3$  Game is symmetric so  $\delta$  is the same for both players

b) Player 1:  $3/(1-\delta) \geq 5 + \delta/(1-\delta) \rightarrow \delta \geq 1/2$   
 Player 2:  $4/(1-\delta) \geq (7-2) + 2/(1-\delta) \rightarrow \delta \geq 3/5 \rightarrow \delta \geq 3/5$

c) Player 1:  $3/(1-\delta) \geq (7-2) + 2/(1-\delta) \rightarrow \delta \geq 4/5$

Player 2: C,C is already good, no reason to deviate

$\rightarrow \delta \geq 4/5$