# **Deep Learning**

**Lecture 6: Adversarial models** 

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## Lecture overview



- Generative adversarial networks
- definition
- properties
- mode collapse
- Lipschitz continuity
- spectral normalisation
- conditional GANs
- information maximizing GANs
- adversarial autoencoders

# 2 Popular applications

- unpaired translation
- super resolution
- adversarial anomaly detection

# 3 Adversarial examples

- attacks
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# Generative adversarial networks definition




## **Definition:** generative adversarial networks

A generative adversarial network (GAN) is a non-coorporative zero-sum game where two networks compete against each other [1].

One network  $G(\mathbf{z})$  generates new samples, whereas D estimates the probability the sample was from the training data rather than G:

$$\begin{split} \min_{G} \max_{D} V(D, G) &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \sim p_{\mathsf{data}}(\mathbf{x})}[\log D(\mathbf{x})] \\ &+ \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{z} \sim p_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z})}[\log (1 - D(G(\mathbf{z})))]. \end{split}$$



# Generative adversarial networks properties




#### **GAN properties**

GANs benefit from differentiable data augmentation [2] for both reals and fakes, but are otherwise notoriously difficult to train:

- Non-convergence
- Diminishing gradient
- Difficult to balance
- Mode collapse (next slide)

### Link to Colab example ✓





# Generative adversarial networks mode collapse



## **Definition:** mode collapse

This is where the generator rotates through a small subset of outputs, and the discriminator is unable to get out of the trap. Mode collapse is arguably the main limitation of GANs.




Figure from [3]. The final column shows the target data distribution and the bottom row shows a GAN rotating through the modes.

# Generative adversarial networks Lipschitz continuity



#### **Definition:** Lipschitz function

A function f is Lipschitz continous if it is bounded by how fast it can change. Specifically if there exists a positive real constant k where:

$$|f(x) - f(y)| \le k|x - y|,$$

for all y sufficiently near x. For example, any function with a bounded first derivative is a Lipschitz function.

Wasserstein GANs [4, 5] were the first to reduce mode collapse in GANs by lowering the Lipschitz constant for the descriminator function.

## Distance functions are 1-Lipschitz





#### **Definition:** spectral normalisation

The matrix (spectral) norm defines how much a matrix can stretch a vector **x**:

$$\|\boldsymbol{A}\| = \max_{\mathbf{x} \neq 0} \frac{\|\boldsymbol{A}\mathbf{x}\|}{\|\mathbf{x}\|}$$

Spectral norm [6] normalises the weights for each layer using the spectral norm  $\sigma(\boldsymbol{W})$  such that the Lipschitz constant for every layer and the whole network is 1:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{W}}_{\mathsf{SN}} = \boldsymbol{W}/\sigma(\boldsymbol{W})$$
 $\sigma(\hat{\boldsymbol{W}}_{\mathsf{SN}}(\boldsymbol{W})) = 1$ 
 $\|f\|_{\mathsf{Lip}} = 1$ 

#### **Pseudocode:** 1-Lipschitz discriminator

```
class Discriminator(nn.Module):
  def __init__(self, f=64):
    super().__init__()
    self.discriminate = nn.Sequential(
      spectral_norm(Conv2d(1, f, 3, 1, 1)),
      nn.LeakyReLU(0.1, inplace=True),
      nn.MaxPool2d(kernel_size=(2,2)),
      spectral_norm(Conv2d(f, f*2, 3, 1, 1)),
      nn.LeakyReLU(0.1, inplace=True),
      nn.MaxPool2d(kernel_size=(2,2)),
      spectral_norm(Conv2d(f*2, f*4, 3, 1, 1)).
      nn.LeakyReLU(0.1, inplace=True),
      nn.MaxPool2d(kernel_size=(2,2)),
      spectral_norm(Conv2d(f*4, f*8, 3, 1, 1)).
      nn.LeakyReLU(0.1, inplace=True).
      nn.MaxPool2d(kernel_size=(2,2)),
      spectral_norm(Conv2d(f*8, 1, 3, 1, 1)).
      nn.Sigmoid()
```




#### **Definition:** conditional GAN

GANs can be conditioned with labels  ${\bf y}$  if available [7] by feeding the label information into both the generator and the discriminator:

$$\begin{split} \min_{G} \max_{D} V(D,G) &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y} \sim p_{\mathsf{data}}(\mathbf{x})}[\log D(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y})] \\ &+ \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{z} \sim p_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z})}[\log(1 - D(G(\mathbf{z},\mathbf{y})|\mathbf{y}))]. \end{split}$$

#### Link to Colab example 🗗






## **Definition:** information maximizing GANs

GANs can be trained to learn disentangled latent representations in a completely unsupervised manner. InfoGAN [8] popularised this by maximizing mutual information between the observation and a subset of the latents:

$$\min_{G,Q} \max_{D} V_{\mathsf{InfoGAN}}(D,G,Q) = V(D,G) - \lambda L_I(G,Q)$$

where  $L_I(G,Q)$  is a variational lower bound of the mutual information.

#### Link to Colab example 🗗






# Generative adversarial networks adversarial autoencoders



#### **Definition:** adversarial autoencoders

Adversarial autoencoders [9] are generative models that permit sampling.

In addition to the reconstruction loss, such  $\|\mathbf{x} - \hat{\mathbf{x}}\|^2$ , they use adversarial training to match the aggregated posterior of the hidden code vector  $\mathbf{z}$  of the autoencoder with an arbitrary prior distribution, such as  $\mathbf{z} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{I})$ .



# **Popular applications** skip connections (U-Net)



#### **Definition:** skip connections (U-Net)

Skip connections (U-Net) is a popular residual approach used for paired image translation tasks [10]. For example for images  $\mathbf{x}$  and paired masks  $\mathbf{m}$ , where:  $\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{m} \sim p_{\text{data}}} \left[ \left\| U(\mathbf{x}) - \mathbf{m} \right\|^2 \right]$ 

#### Link to Colab example 🗹

Note: U-Net is not an adversarial method, but the use of skip connections is popular in many papers, so now is a good time to introduce it.




# Popular applications unpaired translation (CycleGAN)



## **Definition:** unpaired translation (CycleGAN)

CycleGAN [11] propose an adversarial architecture that enables unpaired image translation. It has twin residual generators and two discriminators, which translate between the domains, alongside a cycle consistency loss (an L1 norm) which ensures the mapping can recover the original image.



# Popular applications super-resolution



#### **Definition:** super-resolution

Adversarial models are popular in super-resolution approaches. The challenge is that a single low-resolution (LR) input can map to a distribution of high-resolution (HR) outputs.

PULSE [12] investigates this by projecting points in the search of the latent space of StyleGAN (a large conditional GAN) onto a hypersphere, which ensures probable outputs in the high-dimensional latent space.

## Online example 🗗



PULSE




























# Popular applications adversarial anomaly detection



#### **Definition:** anomaly detection

Unsupervised anomaly detectors [13] learn a normal distribution over (healthy) observations. Then, when they observe something not observed in training (unhealthy/dangerous), they fail to reconstruct - detecting it as an anomaly. Region-based anomaly detectors [14] learn a distribution over inpainted (erased) regions.





# Adversarial examples attacks



## **Definition:** adversarial examples

These are small but intentionally worst-case perturbations that fool the model to output incorrect answers with high confidence [15]. It is possible to generate examples that also fool the human visual system [16]. Cat or dog?

original

adv

## **Example:** adversarial examples

Example adding an imperceptibly small vector by the sign of the elements of the gradient of the cost function with respect to the input [15]:



"panda"
57.7% confidence



 $sign(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}}J(\boldsymbol{\theta},\boldsymbol{x},y))$ "nematode"
8.2% confidence



 $\begin{array}{c} x + \\ \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, x, y)) \\ \text{"gibbon"} \\ 99.3 \% \text{ confidence} \end{array}$ 

# Adversarial examples defences



#### **Definition:** adversarial defence

There are several defence strategies that introduce the adversarial examples into training [15]. A popular approach uses U-Net to denoise and reduce the amplification of the adversarial perturbations [17].

Black-box adversarial defence is where an adversary can only monitor the outputs of the model. White-box methods are more difficult, as an adversary has access to the model allowing for specific attacks. White-box defence generally overfits to the attack used during training.

#### **Example:** adversarial defences

Question: What is the behaviour at the limit of the adversarial generative model arms-race? Who wins at convergence?



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