

# Anomaly detection in time series for TBM

A literature review of the useful AD-method for Tunneling Machines

Mathieu Giamberini, 2024

## Abstract

## Introduction

By default TBM (Tunnel Boring Machines) are complicated technical object and involved a lot of technologies to work together. Any defect in the chain could stop the entailer machine, there for detecting those before they become a real issue can save a lot of time and resources. Fortunately the number of sensor on the machines keep raising and thanks to platform like HK-connect their data can be access by any authorize user any where. These data must carry a lot of information regarding the sate of the machine, which beg the question on how to extract it to detect anomaly. At time of writing the task is mostly done by direct users of the TBM, and base on experience, e.g. a weird noise in the hydraulic pack, an odd torque increase on one of the main drive motors, and so on. This method is clearly limited and use only small portion of the data stream available, thanks fully the problem of anomaly detection is quite old and with the raise of machine leaning technic, keep getting better. This be the goal of these paper, having a first look of at the littery landscape of Anomaly detection method (ADM). First lets define exactly what we mean by that, given a multivariate time series:

$$\mathcal{X} = (\mathbf{x}_1, \dots \mathbf{x}_t, \dots \mathbf{x}_T) \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times T}$$

with  $N$  the number of sensor and  $T$  the number of temporal indices. The method  $\mathcal{M}$  will return a binary category for each data point telling where and when their is anomaly, ie:

$$\mathcal{M} : \mathbb{R}^{N \times T} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{N \times T}$$

We need to address some looses threads with this definition, first in most cases their is no ready to use labeled data to train the method on and labeling it by hand is no feasible, so the method must be unsupervised. Witch raise the need for a systemic definition of anomaly, most papers (ref) consider the training data to be normal and define some anomaly score which tel how far is the new data. Here the methods will be categorize base on the way this score is define.

For our context the training data is previous tunnel bore, which certainly contains anomaly in it, therefor we will also discus some papers witch tyred to address this issue by modifying the methods. The approach is sufficiently general to be use on most ADM, this will be categorize as an add-on, which will be a categories of method who don't do AD per say but can make the the method better.

# 1 Secondary sources

# 2 Overview

– type of method:

– Method :

\* Cluster/Density (probability)

\* Index monitoring

\* Forecasting

– Addon


\* Dimension reduction

\* Multivariate topologies

\* Training data Contamination

– plan

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### 3 Description

- Cluster/Density (probability)
  - idea, Training data is normal data,
  -
- Anomaly score
- Forecasting
- Graph
- Training with data Contamination

#### 3.1 Graph Deviation Network (GDN)

When using "distance to prediction" for AD in a multivariate settings, it's sensible to assume that related sensors have redundant information (e.g. a pressure and a extension sensors for a hydraulic cylinder). So if there measurement was put together to predict the next ones it could improve their prediction and so reduce the detection threshold. This is a base idea of the

GDN architecture in [?]. Mark the related sensor in a directed Graph and apply an attention layer on the past measurement of the neighborhoods to predict the next ones. Here is some short assertion and nice propriety of this approach :

- Even if every sensor of the TBM are in the graph, the AD is still localize to each sensor.
- The training data is assume to be free of anomaly.
- Prior knowledge of relation between sensor can be embedded in the graph by restricted some relationship. This can lower the complexity and the time of training.

To test their method the authors used dataset of simulated attack on water treatment physical test-bed systems, the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) and Water Distribution (WADI) dataset. As a base line they use other method which we discuss in other Section.

### Conclusion