
Implementability of a Black Box Secret Sharing Scheme

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Supervised by: Pierre KARPMAN

OUTLINE


- Quick introduction : basic notions related secret sharing
- Overview of the construction of CRAMER & XING
- 3. 1st result of the implementation
- 4. Conclusion/ Quick demo

What is a secret sharing scheme?



s: the secret

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Access structure in general:

two sets of configurations (and the rest):

Allow us to retrieve the secret

Can bring partial information

Doesn't give any information on the secret

Access structure in threshold n-k secret sharing scheme:

Only two sets:

Allow us to retrieve the secret

No combination of shares that bring partial information!

Doesn't give any information on the secret

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Only two sets:

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
Threshold Black box secret sharing scheme (BBSSS) computing a k-n threshold access structure is one which works on any abelian Group

BBSSS are:

- More expensive to build
- More complex
- but more versatile

1st step towards a secret sharing scheme :

Linear codes are common way to build linear secret sharing scheme and represented by a "Generator Matrix".



s : the secret g1, g2, ..., gk-1 : random elements from the Group (<u>random part of A</u>)

Properties on linear codes

Properties of a code influence the access structure:

For threshold secret sharing scheme => need Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code

For BBSSS, another interesting property: the expansion factor

To go further: Monotone Span Program

Very close definition to linear code except we added the way of encoding and decoding the secret:

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- A target vector which will describe how to encode the secret

An important **condition**: the target vector is **spanned** by the submatrix of M of support s

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
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- A surjective function that will **group the rows** of the matrix M for each share


An interesting family of codes: Reed-Solomon codes

Reed Solomon codes are MDS codes, here is an example of secret sharing scheme with Reed Solomon codes:



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Reed Solomon codes are **MDS** codes, here is an example of secret sharing scheme with Reed Solomon codes :



Limitations: the size of the Field should be greater than n!

We want: threshold BBSSS with a small expansion factor

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To do so, we need a secret sharing scheme which the matrix over Z compute the access structure modulo every prime number p

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- one generator matrix which work for any p <= n
- one generator matrix for any p > n => Vandermonde matrix!

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We compute m such that m >= log(n)

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For **each prime number** p <= n:

we generate a Reed Solomon code over the finite field of size p^m

2

RS code over the finite field of size 2^m

2 3

RS code over the finite field of size 2^m RS code over the finite field of size 3^m



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
- we generate a Reed Solomon code over the finite field of size p^m

We write each matrix (over Fpm) on the finite field of size p

example: taking a random simple RS code over F_23

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ y^2 + y + 1 & y^2 + 1 & y + 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

example : obtaining the RS code over F_2





(Matrices of size km x nm)

For a desired configuration n and k:


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
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We write each matrix (over Fpm) on the finite field of size p

We apply **Chinese remainder theorem** to each coefficients to obtain the desired matrix



Construction of Cramer & Xing: the full matrix



Instantiation of the BBSSS

we use SageMath

We instantiate the matrix with

n = 6

k = 3

 $m = 3 (m \ge log(n))$

Instantiation of the BBSSS

Implementation of all the steps defined before:

- instantiation of each RS code
- writing over the sub field
- vandermonde matrix

gluing each matrix

- in our instantiation: zeta_n > 10^1800

$$\rho_N = \prod_{S \subset [n], |S| = t} \left(\prod_{A \in \mathcal{M}_t(N_S), \det(A) \neq 0} \det(A) \right)$$

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- Use the **Hadamard's inequality** to bound the determinant of each submatrix

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- possible to bound it?
- zeta n is a product of determinant of submatrix of G:

- Use the **Hadamard's inequality** to bound the determinant of each submatrix

Bound the number of submatrices that have their determinant != 0

$$\rho_N = \prod_{S \subset [n], |S| = t} \left(\prod_{A \in \mathcal{M}_t(N_S), \det(A) \neq 0} \det(A) \right)$$

At the end, our bound is:

$$\left(\left(\left(\sqrt{m(k-1)}\kappa\right)^{m(k-1)}\right)^{\binom{mk-1}{m(k-1)}}\right)^{\binom{n}{k-1}}$$

approximately equals to 10^4700 => Not Tight!

Encoding function:




where I = k * m + k -1

where l' = n * (m+1)


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Decoding function:

- 1 we keep the corresponding submatrix
- 2 we solve the following linear system
- 3 compute the dot product **Solution * Shares**

Reconstruction

Share i_1, Share i_2, ..., Share i_k

= s

Conclusion

Theoretical construction, some limitations...


Limitations are only involved in the creation of the BBSSS!

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Appendix: towards a deeper understanding of the construction

Structures of the shares obtained by the MSP



The multiplication with the glued matrix returns $n \times (m+1)$ shares...