

Competitor Scale and Mutual Fund Behavior

László Jakab

March 19, 2018

Contents

Abstract	4
1 Introduction	5
2 Literature Review	9
3 Theoretical Motivation	11
3.1 Symmetric Information	12
3.2 Better Informed Managers	12
3.3 Similar Hypotheses Based on an Alternative Approach	13
4 Data	15
4.1 Fund Selection	16
4.2 Portfolio Weights	16
4.3 <i>CompetitorSize</i> Variable	17
4.4 Portfolio Liquidity Variables	18
4.5 Summary Statistics	18
4.6 Correlations	19
5 Competition and Capital Allocation	20
5.1 Decreasing Returns to Competitor Scale	20
5.2 Empirical Strategy	20
5.3 Results	21
6 Evidence From the 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal	23
6.1 Before and After Analysis	24
6.2 Linking <i>CompetitorSize</i> Directly to Abnormal Flows	27
7 Conclusion	33

<i>CONTENTS</i>	3
A Summary Statistics	34
A.1 Tables	34
A.2 Figures	34
B Competitor Size and Fund Performance	38
B.1 Benchmarking Returns	38
B.2 Regression Setup	39
B.3 Results	40
B.4 The Role of Portfolio Liquidity	40
B.5 Results Using Pre-2008 Data	42
C Additional Results: Capital Allocation	44
D Additional Results: Mutual Fund Scandal	46

Abstract

I study the effects of competition on the investment behavior and performance of active mutual funds. I find that funds respond to increased competitor scale by curtailing costly active management. To establish causality, I exploit quasi-exogenous variation in fund flows created by a natural experiment—the 2003 mutual fund scandal. Funds whose competitors were the most affected by the scandal expand active management and perform better after the scandal. Interpreting the findings through the lens of models of decreasing returns to scale indicates information asymmetry between fund managers and outside investors.

Chapter 1

Introduction

What is the impact of competition on the allocation of capital inside firms? In general, competition affects both a firm's efficient scale and the optimal composition of its investments. In the case of mutual funds, managers choose the composition of investments, while outside investors determine the capital allocated to the firm. I exploit changes in the size of competing funds to identify the effect of competition on capital allocation. I demonstrate that funds respond to competition by reallocating capital from costly active strategies to cheaper, more passive portfolios. I address endogeneity concerns by investigating a natural experiment created by the 2003 mutual fund scandal. Fund families engulfed by the scandal were penalized by investor outflows, which I exploit as quasi-exogenous variation in competitor size. I show that close competitors of affected funds increased active management, and reaped improved performance following the scandal.

My findings shed light on a key tension that occurs when mutual funds face decreasing returns to scale. As competition eliminates investment opportunities, the fund's optimal response is to reallocate capital toward passive portfolios. However, if investors are symmetrically informed, they withdraw capital from the fund ([Berk and Green, 2004](#)). Decreased fund size lowers the marginal cost of active management, countervailing the shift toward passivity. In models of fund behavior, the size effect dominates in equilibrium, predicting increased capital allocated to active strategies in response to competition ([Pástor et al., 2017b](#)). Interpreting my findings in this framework points to information asymmetry between funds and outside investors resulting in mismatch between investment opportunities and capital that is not fully undone by the firm's actions ([Berk et al., 2017](#)). This interpretation also provides a potential explanation for the observed relation between measures of activeness such as active share ([Cremers and Petajisto, 2009](#)) or industry concentration ([Kacperczyk et al., 2005](#)) and future fund performance: if managers have private information about investment opportunities, their actions carry information about expected returns.

[Pástor and Stambaugh \(2012\)](#) argue that each fund's investment opportunities become less lucrative as the size of competing funds increases. Decreasing returns to competitor scale are grounded in liquidity constraints and the associated price impact of other funds' trades. Consider a skilled fund receiving signals of the fundamental value of securities. In the absence of competitors, the limiting factor of the fund's profits is the price impact of its own trades. Introducing another fund that receives correlated signals is detrimental to the fund's profitability. Since both funds chase similar investments, either one might be first to invest in a particular opportunity, pushing up its price. The total impact of the other fund will depend on both

the similarity of its signals, which determines the likelihood of being leapfrogged, and the fund's size, which governs the magnitude of price impact. Competitor size is therefore the sum of the product of similarity and fund size across all potential competitors:

$$\text{Competitor Size}_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \text{Similarity}_{i,j} \times \text{Fund Size}_j.$$

If funds receive identical signals, similarity equals one, and competitor size will equal aggregate industry size (Pástor et al., 2015).¹ Unlike industry size, competitor size is specific to each fund, which allows for studying variation in the cross-section. Most importantly, taking fund similarity into account enables me to analyze novel evidence on decreasing returns to competitor scale from a natural experiment.

Berk and Green (2004) posit a relation between active share and fund size and fees. Pástor et al. (2017b) introduce a richer model of fund behavior, proposing that funds jointly optimize turnover and portfolio liquidity. Portfolio liquidity is a multi-dimensional object that can be decomposed as a product of stock liquidity and diversification (itself a product of coverage and balance). I make the model-driven argument that if investors do not fully recognize the detrimental impact of competition on future returns, then increases in competitor size will have a measurable impact on fund activeness even conditional on own size, fees, and time fixed effects.

My empirical analysis is based on a sample of actively managed U.S. equity funds spanning 1980-2014, with size and returns information from CRSP linked to Thomson Reuters holdings data. Guided by theory, I relate quarterly changes in competitor scale to changes in active share, turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio, and various components of portfolio liquidity, conditional on own size, expense ratio, and time fixed effects. I find that funds react to increases in competitor scale by decreasing active share and increasing all dimensions of portfolio liquidity.

I bolster the causal link between competitor scale, fund behavior, and performance by providing novel evidence from a natural experiment created by the 2003 mutual fund scandal. In September 2003, the New York State Attorney General announced investigations into illegal trading practices at several prominent mutual fund families. As investigations gained momentum, evidence mounted that families had allowed favored clients to abuse ordinary investors by trading fund shares at stale prices (Zitzewitz, 2006). By October 2004, a total of twenty-five fund families were embroiled in the scandal (Houge and Wellman, 2005). The involved families represented a considerable proportion of the industry, collectively managing over a fifth of assets prior to the scandal. Following the announcement of the investigations, investors abruptly began withdrawing capital from tainted families (Figure~6.1).

I exploit post-scandal outflows at tainted funds as an exogenous shock to the competitor size of funds pursuing similar investment strategies. We would expect the favorable impact of lessened competitor scale to be greatest for the closest pre-scandal competitors of tainted funds. Under the hypothesis of decreasing returns to competitor scale, these funds experience a comparative improvement in their investment opportunities. Therefore, we would expect them to increase capital allocation to active strategies relative to less close competitors of tainted funds, and see relative improvements in performance. I take two different approaches to testing these hypotheses, both of which confirm decreasing returns to competitor scale and the associated

¹I measure fund similarity by the cosine similarity of market capitalization adjusted portfolio weights. I cap adjust portfolio weights by dividing them with market weights, as cross-holdings of small-capitalization stocks are more informative of similarity than cross-holdings of large capitalization stocks [ccp05].

fund response.

Since involved funds are directly affected by the scandal, I identify decreasing returns to competitor scale by comparing outcome paths at untainted funds. The first approach compares pre- and post-scandal outcomes as a function of pre-scandal exposure to competition from tainted funds. I measure exposure by the fraction of competitor scale in August 2003 accounted for by prospective tainted families. The competitor size of high exposure funds decreased significantly more during the scandal. Consistent with comparatively improved investment opportunities, high exposure funds increased active share and decreased portfolio liquidity relative to low exposure funds, and experienced comparatively better performance. Statistical tests show no evidence of differential trends by scandal exposure in the pre-period.

The second approach links fund outcomes directly to abnormal outflows at tainted funds. I use a linear model to decompose post-scandal flows at involved funds between time variation common to all funds and abnormal flows attributable to scandal involvement. I show that untainted funds whose tainted competitors experienced greater abnormal outflows saw relative declines in competitor size, improvements in performance, and shifted to more active portfolio management. Variation in competitor size attributable purely to abnormal outflows is negatively related to both fund performance and activeness, providing direct quasi-experimental evidence of decreasing returns to competitor scale.

The picture which emerges from these analyses is one in which portfolio managers optimize investment behavior in real time as they respond to fluctuations in investment opportunities that are not immediately apparent to outside investors. Such a world seems sensible. It is unlikely that retail investors pay the same level of attention to market developments as professional portfolio managers. Fund managers make trading decisions based on their perception of investment opportunities on a daily basis. Since they have more short-term flexibility over trading than over fund expense ratios, it makes sense that their portfolio allocation decisions would serve as an important dimension of optimizing behavior. This interpretation is also consistent with recent evidence from the literature on fund optimizing behavior in the face of time-varying investment opportunities. [Kacperczyk et al. \(2016\)](#) argue that mutual funds allocate attention optimally between factor timing and stock picking as the nature of opportunities varies over the business cycle. [Pástor et al. \(2017a\)](#) present evidence that funds exploit improved investment opportunities by increasing turnover.

While the rise of “closet indexing” has received much attention and disapproval, scaling back active management ameliorates the pernicious effects of decreasing returns to scale, as it brings the costs of active trading closer in line with decreased benefits. Absent immediate outflows, deteriorating investment opportunities make a fund “too large.” The fundamental issue might not so much be closet indexing, but imperfect flows causing mismatch between capital and investment opportunities.

Studying internal capital markets is difficult due to the dearth of data on reallocation within firms.² Mutual funds are a useful testing ground in this respect. Regulation requires funds to regularly disclose information on capital allocation, size, and performance. While the organizational simplicity of funds precludes a study of agency theories of internal capital allocation, the setting is informative as a neoclassical benchmark.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework motivating the empirical analyses. Section 4 describes the data and the construction of competitor size. Section 5 presents an empirical analysis of capital allocation and competitor scale. Section 6

²As [Maksimovic and Phillips \(2013\)](#) point out in their review, “Because the study of internal capital markets pertains to difficult-to-observe flows within firms, data and measurement issues continue to be the focus of recent literature.”

presents evidence from the natural experiment created by the 2003 mutual fund scandal. Section 7 concludes. The [Data Appendix](#) describes in detail the steps in the construction of the dataset.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Fund investment behavior has previously been studied in the context of decreasing returns to own scale. [Pollet and Wilson \(2008\)](#) investigate the fund response to inflows. They find that funds diversify in response to new flows, especially if they operate in relatively illiquid markets. However, the extent of diversification is small compared to the tendency to mechanically scale up existing holdings. [Pástor et al. \(2017b\)](#) develop and test a model of decreasing returns to scale in which size, turnover, portfolio liquidity, and fund expense ratios are determined jointly in equilibrium. They show that in the cross-section, larger funds tend to trade less, cost less, and hold more liquid portfolios, all of which is consistent with decreasing returns to own scale. However, no paper to date has examined the impact of competition on fund behavior.

The existing literature has provided evidence of a negative relation between fund performance and competition. [Wahal and Wang \(2011\)](#) find that entry by similar funds is associated with decreased flows, performance, and increased exit for incumbents. [Pástor et al. \(2015\)](#) perform a within-fund analysis showing a negative relationship between performance and aggregate industry scale. [Hoberg et al. \(2017\)](#) use holdings-based estimates of fund similarity to measure the number of competing funds, finding that the number of similar funds is negatively related to both the level and the persistence of performance in the cross-section. My primary contribution to this literature is to improve identification by analyzing evidence from a natural experiment provided by the 2003 mutual fund scandal. I also provide additional observational evidence that fund performance is decreasing in competitor scale, especially for funds pursuing less liquid strategies.

My investigation of fund behavior is informed by models of decreasing returns to scale by [Berk and Green \(2004\)](#) and [Pástor et al. \(2017b\)](#).¹ Interpreting mutual funds as firms experiencing decreasing returns to scale in individual investments, my study is related to neoclassical models of multi-industry firms such as [Maksimovic and Phillips \(2002\)](#).

The preponderance of existing empirical evidence examining fund performance supports fund level decreasing returns to scale, despite mixed findings. [Chen et al. \(2004\)](#) document decreasing returns to scale using cross-sectional regressions. [Reuter and Zitzewitz \(2015\)](#) exploit inflows following discrete Morningstar ratings

¹Models of decreasing returns to scale rely on the assumption that trading costs increase in the size of trades, especially in illiquid securities. [Busse et al. \(2017\)](#) provide empirical evidence of such characteristics in mutual fund trading costs. Decreasing returns to scale are rooted in the price impact of mutual fund trades. Papers presenting evidence on price pressure due to mutual fund actions include [Coval and Stafford \(2007\)](#), [Khan et al. \(2012\)](#), [Lou \(2012\)](#), [Antón and Polk \(2014\)](#) and [Blocher \(2016\)](#).

changes to study the size-performance relation in a regression discontinuity framework, finding little evidence of decreasing returns to scale. [Pástor et al. \(2015\)](#) find a negative within-fund association between fund size and performance, but the economic magnitude of the effect is small, and the coefficients statistically insignificant when using bias-free estimation methods. [McLemore \(2016\)](#) studies returns following fund mergers, finding that the increased size of the acquiring fund is accompanied by decreased performance. In contemporaneous work, [Harvey and Liu \(2017\)](#) use a random effects model and estimate economically significant decreasing returns to own scale.

In a broad sense, I contribute to a long line of inquiry into the the nature of skill and constraints among active funds. The typical active fund fails to generate risk-adjusted returns ([Jensen, 1968](#); [Malkiel, 1995, 2013](#); [Gruber, 1996](#); [French, 2008](#); [Fama and French, 2010](#)). It would appear at first glance that skill is in short supply among active funds, a puzzle given the vast resources they manage. However, concurrent poor performance and large size is consistent with a combination of skill and decreasing returns to scale ([Berk and Green, 2004](#); [Pástor and Stambaugh, 2012](#)). My analysis gives additional credence to the existence of economically important constraints in active management due to decreasing returns to scale. The empirical results I present are consistent with optimizing behavior by portfolio managers in the face of evolving constraints in imperfect capital markets.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Motivation

In neoclassical models of capital allocation, firms trade off the benefit of allocating additional capital to their core competence with increasing marginal costs due to decreasing returns to scale. Firms optimally diversify across segments in which they have varying degrees of skill until marginal costs and benefits are equalized. I motivate my study by considering the impact of time-varying investment opportunities (due to competition, for instance) in two such theories of mutual fund behavior, [Berk and Green \(2004\)](#), and [Pástor et al. \(2017b\)](#).

Consider fund i managing $q_{i,t}$ assets in [Berk and Green \(2004\)](#). The fund posts a fixed expense ratio f ,¹ and splits assets between active and passive management according to $q_{i,t} = A_{i,t} + P_{i,t}$. While active management allows the fund to take advantage of positive NPV investment opportunities in its area of core competence, it also subjects the fund to quadratic trading costs. I parametrize costs as $C(A_{i,t}) = \frac{c_t}{M_t} A_{i,t}^2$, where $A_{i,t}$ is the amount actively managed, M_t the size of the market, and c_t a constant representing period by period trading costs. Normalizing trading costs by M_t implies that price impact per dollar of investment is lower when total market capitalization is higher. With the normalization, the model's predictions are in terms of $FundSize_{i,t} = q_{i,t}/M_t$, instead of the dollar value of assets under management.

Let $\mu_{i,t} = E(R_{t+1} \mid R_1, \dots, R_t)$ be the fund's expected skill, inferred from publicly available information. In addition, suppose that the returns to skill depend on time-varying external factors $x_{i,t}$, such that expected effective skill is $\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})$. %For convenience, I will later parametrize the function as the product of baseline skill and competitor size $\mu_i(X_{i,t}) = \mu_i CompetitorSize^{-\gamma}$. The fund's net alpha becomes

$$\frac{A_{i,t}}{q_{i,t}} \mu_{i,t} g(x_{i,t}) - \frac{c_t A_{i,t}^2}{q_{i,t} M_t} - f. \quad (3.1)$$

I focus on competitor size as the external constraint of interest. However, $x_{i,t}$ could be any time-varying external factor affecting the fund's investment opportunities.

Following equation (26) in [Berk and Green \(2004\)](#), the fund's profit maximizing choice for the amount of assets to keep under active management, conditional on overall size and market conditions, is $A_{i,t}^*(\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})) = \frac{\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})M_t}{2c_t}$. This implies that the fraction of assets under active management is governed by the first-order

¹Following Berk and Green, I assume that the fixed expense ratio f satisfies $f < f^*$, where f^* is the expense ratio corresponding to profit maximizing fund size q^* .

condition:

$$\frac{A_{i,t}^*}{q_{i,t}} = \frac{\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})}{2c_t(q_{i,t}/M_t)}. \quad (3.2)$$

Conditional on its size, the fund optimally responds to deterioration in the NPV of investment opportunities by scaling back active management.

3.1 Symmetric Information

In perfect capital markets investors are symmetrically informed of the fund's time varying investment opportunities, and the capital allocated to the fund increases with the square of $\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})$. The market clearing zero net alpha condition implies fund size of:

$$\frac{q_{i,t}^*}{M_t} = \frac{(\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t}))^2}{4c_t f}. \quad (3.3)$$

Combining equation (3.2) and (3.3), the equilibrium fraction of assets under active management is:

$$\frac{A_{i,t}^*}{q_{i,t}^*} = \frac{2f}{\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})}. \quad (3.4)$$

In perfect capital markets with symmetrically informed fund managers and outside investors, the share of assets under active management is decreasing in the profitability of investment opportunities $\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})$, conditional on fund expense ratio.

Testing the two above predictions separately would require modeling the evolution of $\mu_{i,t}$. However, we can combine the equilibrium conditions to eliminate fund skill and take logs to obtain

$$2 \ln(A_{i,t}^*/q_{i,t}^*) = \ln(f) - \ln(c_t) - \ln(q_{i,t}^*/M_t). \quad (3.5)$$

This leads to the first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Symmetric Information

If managers and investors share the same beliefs about the fund's investment opportunities, the share of assets under active management is fully determined by fund size and expense ratio. Business conditions such as competition play no role in determining capital allocation beyond their effect on fund size.

3.2 Better Informed Managers

Suppose that managers observe $x_{i,t}$, but investors do not. Investors allocate funds as if $g(x_{i,t}) = 1$,

$$\frac{A_{i,t}^*}{q_{i,t}^*} = \frac{2f}{\mu_{i,t}}. \quad (3.6)$$

The equilibrium relation between the share under active management, fund size, and expense ratio now contains an additional term

$$2 \ln(A_{i,t}^*/q_{i,t}^*) = \ln(f) - \ln(c_t) - \ln(q_{i,t}^*/M_t) + 2 \ln(g(x_{i,t})) \quad (3.7)$$

This gives an alternative hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: *Asymmetric Information*

If managers have superior information about the fund's time-varying investment opportunities relative to outside investors, the share of assets under active management will be positively related to variation in the profitability of opportunities. Business conditions such as competition play an additional role in determining capital allocation beyond their effect on fund size.

Note that under asymmetric information, net alpha is equal to $f_{i,t}(g(x_{i,t})^2 - 1)$. If managers are better informed of investment opportunities than outside investors, we would expect fund to make more when they take more active positions. In the cross-section, conditional on size, we would expect more active funds to perform better, potentially rationalizing findings that variables such as active share or industry concentration predict returns (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Kacperczyk et al., 2005).

3.3 Similar Hypotheses Based on an Alternative Approach

I develop hypotheses 1 and 2 based on Berk and Green (2004) and its particular assumptions, including fixed expense ratios and a particular cost structure. A different approach based on Pástor et al. (2017b) yields similar implications without assuming fixed expense ratios, and with the additional feature of multi-dimensional, micro-founded trading costs.

Pástor et al. (2017b) derive from first principles that larger funds that trade more and hold less liquid portfolios incur higher trading costs.² Specifically, trading costs are quadratic in $TL^{-1/2}$, the ratio of turnover T to the (square root of) portfolio liquidity L . In their model, funds trade off the costs and benefits of higher turnover and lower portfolio liquidity. The assumption is that funds can exploit a greater number of opportunities by trading more; conversely, they can increase alpha by focusing on their best ideas by holding less liquid portfolios. The fund's first-order condition, given fund size and trading opportunities, is

$$(T_{i,t}L_{i,t}^{-\frac{1}{2}})^* = \frac{\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})}{2c_t(q_{i,t}/M_t)}. \quad (3.8)$$

Under symmetric information, the market clearing zero net alpha condition implies the same fund size $\frac{q_{i,t}^*}{M_t} = \frac{(\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t}))^2}{4c_t f_{i,t}}$ as before. In perfect capital markets with symmetrically informed outside investors, equilibrium turnover-liquidity ratio is negatively related to profit opportunities:

$$(T_{i,t}L_{i,t}^{-\frac{1}{2}})^* = \frac{2f_{i,t}}{\mu_{i,t}g(x_{i,t})}. \quad (3.9)$$

²The key assumptions are that funds (expect to) turn over their portfolios proportionately, and incur trading costs for each stock that increase in the size of the trade relative to the stock's market capitalization.

With symmetric information, we have the equilibrium relation

$$2 \ln(TL^{-1/2})^* = \ln(f_{i,t}) - \ln(c_t) - \ln(q_{i,t}^*/M_t). \quad (3.10)$$

With asymmetric information, the information wedge influences internal capital allocation beyond its effect on fund size

$$2 \ln(TL^{-1/2})^* = \ln(f_{i,t}) - \ln(c_t) - \ln(q_{i,t}^*/M_t) + 2 \ln(g(x_{i,t})). \quad (3.11)$$

The approach based on the [Pástor et al. \(2017b\)](#) model reproduces hypotheses 1 and 2, with turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio $TL^{-1/2}$ taking the place of share of assets under active management. Ultimately, both the share of actively managed assets and the turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio measure the extent to which fund managers engage in active pursuit of profitable investment opportunities. An advantage of this formulation of the model is that portfolio liquidity is a multidimensional concept. Portfolio liquidity can be decomposed into a product of stock liquidity (market capitalization of holdings) and diversification, the latter of which can be further decomposed as a product of coverage (number of holdings relative to number of tradeable stocks) and balance (a measure of portfolio concentration). This framework allows the researcher to study each dimension, potentially allowing for a richer characterization of fund behavior.

Chapter 4

Data

I build my dataset around two main sources. From the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund database I obtain share class level information on returns, net asset values, expense ratios, TNA, fund turnover, first offer date, name, various fund objective classifications, and flags indicating index fund and ETF/ETN status. The CRSP Mutual Fund database includes data starting from January 1960. From the Thomson Reuters S12 database, I procure fund-level share holdings and additional information on fund investment objectives. Thomson’s predecessor first compiled holdings data in March 1980, subsequent to which consistent holdings reports are available.¹ I supplement these two main sources by security-level data on prices and shares outstanding from CRSP, monthly return factors from [Ken French’s data library](#), and active share ([Cremers and Petajisto, 2009](#); [Petajisto, 2013](#)) from [Antti Petajisto’s website](#).²

TNA is typically only available at the quarterly or semi-annual frequency in the CRSP files before 1991 (Figure [A.1](#)). I interpolate missing TNA by assuming zero net flows. For up to one year following the most recent non-missing TNA value, I replace missing time $t + 1$ values of TNA as $TNA_{t+1} = TNA_t(1 + r_{t+1})$, where r corresponds to net returns.

I link CRSP mutual fund data to Thomson holdings data using MFLINKS, initially developed by [Wermers \(2000\)](#) and recently updated by [Cao and Xue \(2015\)](#) until the end of 2014.³

Since CRSP data are at the share class level, at each date I aggregate variables to the portfolio level by taking the lagged TNA-weighted average of returns, expense ratio, turnover, and summing up TNA. Following [Pástor et al. \(2017a\)](#), I winsorize turnover at the 1% level. The final sample is a fund-month level panel spanning March 1980-December 2016.

¹The 1980 March vintage includes a smattering of holding reports dated between 1979 December and 1980 February. For a detailed discussion of vintage dates vs report dates, refer to the [Data Appendix](#). In the analysis, I only consider holdings reported during or after 1980 March.

²The active share dataset also includes the identity of the benchmark against which it is calculated.

³[Zhu \(2017\)](#) shows that Thomson’s coverage of new share classes deteriorates after 2008. In the [Online Appendix](#) (under construction), I carry out analyses using data up to 2008, finding similar results.

4.1 Fund Selection

My aim is to study competition among long-only, general purpose actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds. I purge my sample of fixed income and “balanced” funds, money market funds, international funds, passive index funds, specialist long-short and sector funds, as well as target date funds. I use a variety of filters, based partially on previous research, and developed through a process of case-by-case inspection.⁴ The filters primarily rely on a combination of various investment objective classifications, as well as exclusions based on fund names. I describe these filters in the [Data Appendix](#) in precise detail, and outline them below.

Since my analysis relies on within-fund variation, I construct filters at the fund level. I exclude all funds ever classified as International, Municipal Bonds, Bond & Preferred, Balanced, or Metals by Thomson investment objective codes. I exclude a fund if any of its share classes are ever assigned a policy code contrary to a long-only equity strategy,⁵ assigned a CRSP objective code indicating sector fund or fixed income fund, flagged as an index fund, or have names indicative of index funds, target date funds, international funds, or tax managed funds. As an additional screen for money market funds, I drop observations with NAV exactly equal to one. I exclude funds that are identified over 25% of the time as foreign equity by CRSP objective codes. This means that my dataset includes a handful of funds that transition to investing a portion of their assets in foreign markets.

In addition to the exclusion screens, I use objective codes to constructively identify actively managed domestic equity funds. I first use Lipper Class, including funds if any of their share classes are ever assigned a classification consistent with a domestic equity strategy⁶

then, if Lipper Class is not available I consider Strategic Insights Objective Codes,⁷ and if neither Lipper Class nor Strategic Insights Objective Codes are available, then Weisenberger Objective Codes.⁸ I exclude fund-month observations with expense ratio below 0.1% in an attempt to drop closet indexers. To lessen the impact of incubation bias ([Evans, 2000](#)), I drop fund-month observations with lagged TNA below \$15m in 2017 dollars.

4.2 Portfolio Weights

Although Thomson compiles updates on portfolio holdings at regular quarterly intervals, these updates do not exclusively consist of quarter-end reports of fund holdings. As shown in [Figure A.2](#), a significant proportion of reports are dated outside of quarter-end months.

⁴The skeleton of my filtering algorithm is the scheme described in [Kacperczyk et al. \(2008\)](#). However, inspection of the fund universe resulting from my implementation of this scheme indicated a significant number of remaining international funds, sector funds, money market funds, and so forth. This observation led me to revise the scheme significantly, and add a number of additional filters in order to exclude undesirable funds.

⁵Including codes corresponding to the following classifications: Balanced, Bonds & Preferred Stock, Bonds, Canadian & International, Leverage and/or Short Selling, Leases, Government Securities, Money Market, Preferred Stock, Sector/Highly Speculative, and various Tax Free.

⁶Included classes are: Equity Income Funds, Growth Funds, Large-Cap Core Funds, Large-Cap Growth Funds, Large-Cap Value Funds, Mid-Cap Core Funds, Mid-Cap Growth Funds, Mid-Cap Value Funds, Multi-Cap Core Funds, Multi-Cap Growth Funds, Multi-Cap Value Funds, Small-Cap Core Funds, Small-Cap Growth Funds, and Small-Cap Value Funds.

⁷Included codes correspond to Equity USA Aggressive Growth, Equity USA Midcaps, Equity USA Growth & Income, Equity USA Growth, Equity USA Income & Growth, or Equity USA Small Companies.

⁸Included codes correspond to Growth, Growth-Income, Growth and Current Income, Long-Term Growth, Maximum Capital Gains, or Small Capitalization Growth.

I index each fund i 's most recent reporting period at month t as t_r^i , yielding a many-to-one mapping from month t to report date t_r^i for each fund. Since portfolio holdings are considered stale beyond six months, there are at most six distinct values of t that correspond to each t_r^i . Let Q_{h,i,t_r^i} denote the number of split adjusted shares of security h held by fund i at reporting date t_r^i , $P_{h,t}$ the split adjusted price of security h at month t , and θ_{i,t_r^i} the set of securities classified as U.S. common equity by CRSP in fund i 's portfolio reported at t_r^i . I define the weight of security h in fund i 's portfolio at time t as

$$w_{h,i,t} = \frac{Q_{h,i,t_r^i} P_{h,t}}{\sum_{h \in \theta_{i,t_r^i}} Q_{h,i,t_r^i} P_{h,t}}. \quad (4.1)$$

Stacking the portfolio weights for each fund, denote the vector of portfolio weights by $\mathbf{w}_{i,t}$.

4.3 Competitor Size Variable

For each fund, I calculate *CompetitorSize* as the sum of all other funds' size, weighted by the cosine similarity between the funds' stock capitalization adjusted portfolio weights. I cap adjust portfolio weights, as cross-holding a given security is more informative about fund similarity when the market capitalization of the cross-held security is small (Cohen et al., 2005). I define capitalization adjusted weights as portfolio weights scaled by the inverse of the security's weight in the market portfolio:

$$\tilde{w}_{h,i,t} = \frac{w_{h,i,t}}{w_{h,m,t}}, \quad (4.2)$$

where $w_{h,m,t}$ is the weight in the market portfolio. I stack adjusted weights into vectors, denoted $\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_{i,t}$.

Define similarity weights $\psi_{i,j,t}^k$ for fund i with respect to fund j as the cosine similarity between their vectors of capitalization adjusted portfolio weights:⁹

$$\psi_{i,j,t} = \frac{\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_{i,t} \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{w}}_{j,t}}{\|\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_{i,t}\| \|\tilde{\mathbf{w}}_{j,t}\|}. \quad (4.3)$$

CompetitorSize is the similarity-weighted size of all other funds in the industry as of the fund's most recent reporting date:

$$CompetitorSize_{i,t} = \sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t_r^i} FundSize_{j,t_r^i}, \quad (4.4)$$

where

$$FundSize_{j,t_r^i} = \frac{TNA_{j,t_r^i}}{TotalMktCap_{t_r^i}}, \quad (4.5)$$

with *TotalMktCap* representing the total market capitalization of all U.S. domestic equity in the CRSP universe. *CompetitorSize* _{i,t} is invariant between each fund's reporting dates, mapping into conventional fund-quarter level analyses.¹⁰

⁹Cosine similarity represents the cosine of the angle between the funds' adjusted portfolio weight vectors. It is used widely in machine learning, and in finance academia with increasing frequency. For example, both Blocher (2016) and Hoberg et al. (2017) use cosine similarity of holdings to measure fund similarity. Cohen et al. (2016) use cosine similarity to measure similarity between company 10-K and 10-Q filings.

¹⁰The results remain virtually unchanged if I allow the measure to reflect within report date changes in the implied buy-and-hold portfolio weights and the size of competing funds by calculating it as $\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t} FundSize_{j,t}$.




Figure 4.1. Histograms of *CompetitorSize*. The left panel illustrates the variable’s unconditional distribution. The right panel shows the distribution after demeaning fund-by-fund.

4.4 Portfolio Liquidity Variables

I calculate portfolio liquidity variables according to [Pástor et al. \(2017b\)](#), constructing them with respect to the CRSP U.S. domestic equity universe.

4.5 Summary Statistics

Since my analysis relies on within-fund variation, I require each fund to have at least twelve months of non-missing observations of both returns and *CompetitorSize* to be included in the estimation sample. My sample runs from March 1980 to December 2016, and includes 2,554 distinct funds. *CompetitorSize* to performance. Table [A.1](#) reports summary statistics.

Figure [4.1](#) presents histograms of the distribution of *CompetitorSize*. The unconditional distribution is right skewed, as shown in the left panel. This is to be expected, as *CompetitorSize* is a weighted sum of the highly skewed *FundSize*. The within-fund distribution is centered more tightly, but still includes substantive variation.

The time series of the cross-sectional average competitor size and aggregate industry size are closely related (left panel of Figure [A.3](#)). The dynamics of fund similarity are substantively different from those of aggregate industry size (right panel of Figure [A.3](#)). Average similarity displays a negative trend in the first half of the sample. Similarity then increases rapidly until August 2003, peaking a month before first news of official investigations into the late trading scandal broke. Average similarity shows renewed increases after 2006 until close to the end of the sample.

4.6 Correlations

Panel A of Table A.2 presents unconditional pairwise correlations between variables, while Panel B presents within-fund pairwise correlations. *CompetitorSize* is positively correlated with *IndustrySize* both unconditionally ($\rho = 0.38$) and at the fund level ($\rho = 0.60$). The residual within-fund variation in *CompetitorSize* with respect to *IndustrySize* reflects heterogenous dynamics in competitor size across funds pursuing different investment strategies.¹¹

There is a small but negative correlation between *CompetitorSize* and risk adjusted gross returns, both unconditionally ($\rho = -0.02$) and within-fund ($\rho = -0.03$). *CompetitorSize* tends to increase over each fund's lifetime. The within-fund correlation between *CompetitorSize* and *FundAge* is $\rho = 0.51$. The unconditional correlation is markedly lower ($\rho = 0.10$), indicating that new funds begin their operations exploiting relatively lightly contested investment opportunities. *CompetitorSize* is highly correlated with portfolio liquidity both unconditionally ($\rho = 0.75$) and within-fund ($\rho = 0.63$), evidence that more liquid market segments are capable of absorbing higher levels of active investment. Consistent with the joint determination of fund size, portfolio liquidity, turnover, and expense ratios in Pástor et al. (2017b), larger funds tend to be more liquid, trade less, and charge lower fees.

¹¹This residual variation is useful for identification, as the time series correlation between *IndustrySize* and a linear time trend is $\rho = 0.93$, making industry level decreasing returns to scale hard to distinguish from simple trends in the data.

Chapter 5

Competition and Capital Allocation

5.1 Decreasing Returns to Competitor Scale

I develop empirical tests of hypotheses 1 and 2, using competitor scale as the external constraint on the profitability of investment opportunities. This choice is motivated by both the extant literature and novel evidence from my sample. [Pástor et al. \(2015\)](#) give time series evidence that funds suffer from decreasing returns to aggregate industry scale. In recent work, [Hoberg et al. \(2017\)](#) provide cross-sectional evidence of decreasing profitability due to inter-fund competition. I explore a cross between the two approaches, by running within-fund tests of decreasing returns to competitor scale. Appendix [B](#) provides the details of my investigation. The following is a brief summary of the results.

- A one standard deviation increase in competitor size is associated with a 76bp decrease in annual Fama-French three factor adjusted returns.
- Competitor size subsumes the negative effect of aggregate industry size in a head to head horse race.
- The negative impact of competitor size is smaller for funds which on average hold more liquid portfolios. This is consistent with liquidity constraints as the channel for decreasing returns to competitor scale.
- The negative impact of competitor size is smaller when funds tilt toward more liquid portfolios. These results suggest that increased portfolio liquidity shelters funds from the pernicious effects of decreasing returns to scale.
- Holding skill fixed, funds make more when they hold less liquid portfolios. One interpretation is that funds increase portfolio concentration when they perceive favorable investment opportunities in their core competence.

5.2 Empirical Strategy

Motivated by decreasing returns to competitor scale, I parametrize the profitability of the fund's time t investment opportunities as

$$g(x_{i,t}) = \text{CompetitorSize}_{i,t}^{-\gamma}. \quad (5.1)$$

This is a sensible choice in that the fund's alpha before transaction costs is a decreasing function of competitor scale, asymptoting to zero as the market approaches perfect competition.

The fraction of assets under active management in Berk and Green (2004) is similar in spirit to active share (denoted AS) from Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Petajisto (2013).¹ The Pástor et al. (2017b) portfolio choice maps directly into data on turnover and fund holdings. Therefore, letting $y_{i,t} \in \{AS_{i,t}, (TL^{-1/2})_{i,t}\}$, the equilibrium relation (with potential information asymmetry) in equation (3.7) implies the regression model

$$\ln(y_{i,t}) = \alpha_t + \eta_1 \ln(FundSize_{i,t}) + \eta_2 \ln(f_{i,t}) + \gamma \ln(CompetitorSize_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (5.2)$$

y and $CompetitorSize$ are both calculated based on the same portfolio weights. To ensure that my findings are not an artifact of measurement, I consider quarter end holding reports only, and calculate the log change in $CompetitorSize$, holding constant previous quarter-end similarity weights. That is, let t be quarter end dates, and define

$$\Delta CS_{i,t} = \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t} \right) - \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t-1} \right). \quad (5.3)$$

Note that the fund's change in capital allocation from $t-1$ to t has no mechanical effect on ΔCS , as it is determined only by changes in other fund size, holding similarity fixed.

I then estimate equation (5.2) in quarterly first differences as

$$\Delta \ln(y_{i,t}) = \alpha_t + \eta_1 \Delta \ln(FundSize_{i,t}) + \eta_2 \Delta \ln(f_{i,t}) + \gamma \Delta CS_{i,t} + \Delta \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (5.4)$$

I double cluster standard errors by fund and date \times portfolio group.² Under the hypothesis of symmetrically informed outside investors, $\gamma = 0$. Under the joint hypothesis of decreasing returns to competitor scale and asymmetric information, $\gamma < 0$. I also perform the analysis separating out portfolio liquidity and its components. In these regressions, the joint hypothesis of decreasing returns to competitor scale and asymmetric information implies $\gamma > 0$.

5.3 Results

Table 5.1 presents results from empirical tests evaluating hypothesis 1 against hypothesis 2. The statistically significant coefficients on ΔCS provide a rejection of the hypothesis that managers and outside investors are symmetrically informed of investment opportunities captured by changes in the scale of competing funds.

The results are consistent with managers reacting optimally to decreasing returns to own and competitor scale by scaling back active management. A one percent increase in competitor size is associated with a

¹Cremers (2017) shows that for funds that do not short or use leverage, active share is equal to one minus the sum of holdings that overlap with the benchmark. Letting J be the set of stocks held by the fund and B the set of stocks in the benchmark b , we have

$$ActiveShare = 1 - \sum_{j \in J \cap B} \min\{w_{i,j}, w_{b,j}\}.$$

²Fund portfolios are grouped using k-means cluster analysis of raw portfolio weights. Each month, this process constructs $k = 10$ archetypal portfolios (serving as cluster centers). These model portfolios are constructed and then funds are assigned to them such that the sum of squared differences between the weights of fund portfolios and their assigned model portfolio is minimized.

-0.05bp change in active share, and a -0.47bp change in the turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio. Increases in competitor scale are associated with statistically significant increases in each component of portfolio liquidity. A one percent increase in own size is associated with a -0.02bp change in active share, and a -0.18bp change in turnover to portfolio liquidity.

Table 5.1
Capital Allocation and Competitor Size

Observations are first differences at the fund \times quarter level, from 1980-2016. Dependent variables are noted in the column headers. AS is active share relative to self-declared benchmarks (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Petajisto, 2013), covering years 1980-2009. $TL^{-1/2}$ is the turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio, as in Pástor et al. (2017b). S , D , C , and B are the components of portfolio liquidity, namely stock liquidity, diversification, coverage, and balance (each calculated with respect to all U.S. equity). $\Delta CS_{i,t} = \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t} \right) - \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t-1} \right)$ is the change in log competitor size, holding previous quarter end similarity weights fixed. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and portfolio group \times quarter, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\Delta \ln(AS)$	$\Delta \ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\Delta \ln(L)$	$\Delta \ln(S)$	$\Delta \ln(D)$	$\Delta \ln(C)$	$\Delta \ln(B)$
ΔCS	-0.051** (0.022)	-0.472*** (0.059)	0.788*** (0.082)	0.659*** (0.086)	0.533*** (0.060)	0.173*** (0.034)	0.435*** (0.053)
$\Delta \ln(FundSize)$	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.184*** (0.016)	0.218*** (0.017)	0.108*** (0.013)	0.196*** (0.015)	0.115*** (0.011)	0.115*** (0.011)
$\Delta \ln(f)$	-0.018 (0.014)	0.063 (0.042)	-0.009 (0.032)	-0.025 (0.027)	0.005 (0.031)	0.023 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.026)
$\Delta \ln(T)$			-0.013* (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.014** (0.005)
$\Delta \ln(D)$				-0.340*** (0.018)			
$\Delta \ln(S)$					-0.570*** (0.017)	-0.194*** (0.013)	-0.458*** (0.021)
$\Delta \ln(B)$						-0.114*** (0.011)	
$\Delta \ln(C)$							-0.229*** (0.021)
Fixed Effects							
• Quarter	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	34,984	57,146	57,146	57,146	57,146	57,146	57,146
R^2	0.025	0.028	0.059	0.218	0.224	0.101	0.180
R^2 (proj. model)	0.005	0.018	0.045	0.202	0.209	0.081	0.171

Pástor et al. (2017b) argue that unit trading costs might vary by fund segment, implying a model with segment \times time fixed effects. To accommodate segment level variation in trading costs, I redo the analysis with benchmark \times quarter fixed effects in Table @ (tab: fundResponseMXBim). The results remain similar.

Overall, my findings are consistent with fund managers reacting optimally to short-term changes in investment opportunities that are not immediately apparent to outside investors. This interpretation fits in with a growing literature on the adjustments managers make in response to time variations in the investment opportunity set. Kacperczyk et al. (2016) show that managers are better at timing factors during recessions when the covariance between asset returns is high. Pástor et al. (2017a) provide evidence that funds increase trading when faced with more favorable opportunities.

Chapter 6

Evidence From the 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal

In September 2003, the New York Attorney General’s office launched investigations into several high-profile mutual fund families for illegal trading practices. Families were charged with allowing favored clients to trade fund shares at stale prices at the expense of ordinary shareholders (Houge and Wellman, 2005; Zitzewitz, 2006). By the end of October 2004, official investigations had been announced against a total of twenty-five mutual fund families.

Houge and Wellman (2005) and McCabe (2008) argue that investors penalized tainted funds with large outflows. This is borne out in my data. Figure 6.1 plots mean net flows by scandal involvement.¹

The two series track each other closely in the two years prior to the scandal, and diverge abruptly in September 2003. The wedge between the two groups persists until the end of 2006, coincident with the final settlements negotiated with the Securities and Exchange Commission (Zitzewitz, 2009).²

I conclude that the scandal caused a significant reallocation of resources away from tainted funds. Unless flows are perfectly offsetting, this shift will cause a relative reduction in the competitor size of the most similar funds. Under decreasing returns to competitor scale, we would expect the investment opportunities of these funds to improve in relative terms, leading them to differentially expand active management and earn higher returns.

I test these hypotheses by comparing untainted funds with differential pre-scandal similarity to prospective scandal funds. I discard tainted funds as the internal upheaval following the scandal likely had a direct

¹I follow Table 1 of Houge and Wellman (2005) for classifying fund families embroiled in the scandal. The following is the list of fund families tainted by the scandal by month of the news date of investigation. September 2003: Alliance Bernstein, Franklin Templeton, Gabelli, Janus, Nations, One Group, Putnam, Strong. October 2003: Alger, Federated. November 2003: Excelsior/US Trust, Fremont, Loomis Sayles, PBHG. December 2003: AIM/Invesco, MFS, Heartland. January 2004: Columbia, Scudder, Seligman. February 2004: PIMCO. March 2004: ING, RS. August 2004: Evergreen. October 2004: Sentinel.

I identify funds belonging to these families as of August 2003 in my sample based on the share class names in the CRSP mutual fund dataset. I classify 289 of the 1,462 funds in my sample in August 2003 with existing holdings and gross returns as members of future tainted families. Table-D.1 presents a snapshot of summary statistics as of August 2003 by future scandal involvement. Scandal funds are slightly older, larger, and have higher turnover to portfolio liquidity and expense ratios.

²The difference is statistically significant. I estimate a regression using a two year pre- and post-scandal window of observations of the form

$$flow_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \gamma Post_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

where $Post_{i,t}$ is an indicator for post news date for scandal funds. I find $\gamma = -9.16\%$ per year, with t-statistic of 4.6.




Figure 6.1. Net flows and relative size of funds involved in the scandal. I categorize funds according to Table 1 in [Houge and Wellman \(2005\)](#). The left panel plots mean monthly net flows, defined according to [Sirri and Tufano \(1998\)](#), by scandal involvement. The vertical line corresponds to August 2003, the month before the announcement of the first investigations. The right panel shows the total net assets of funds coming under investigation in a given month, relative to the total size of funds in my sample.

impact on their performance and investment behavior.³ I take two approaches. The first is a straightforward difference-in-differences-style comparison of fund outcomes before and after the scandal as a function of their pre-scandal exposure to tainted funds. The second approach links fund outcomes directly to variation in competitor size attributable to abnormal flows among tainted funds. I first present the analysis on fund capital allocation, followed up by the analysis of fund performance.

6.1 Before and After Analysis

I relate fund-by-fund differences in pre-scandal $[2003m8 - W, 2003m8]$ and post-scandal $[2004m11, 2004m11+W]$ \$ outcomes to pre-scandal exposure to competition from tainted funds. I consider $W \in \{1, 2\}$ year windows. For a fund to be included in the estimation sample, it must have available holdings information for August 2003, and I must observe it both in the pre- and the post-scandal period.

I measure pre-scandal exposure as the proportion of competitor size attributable to prospective tainted funds as of August 2003. Let Φ denote the set of funds that belong to families later investigated, and define

$$ScandalExposure_i = \frac{\sum_{j \in \Phi} \psi_{i,j,2003m8} FundSize_{j,2003m8}}{\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,2003m8} FundSize_{j,2003m8}}. \quad (6.1)$$

On average, 22% of untainted funds' competitor size is due to tainted fund families. Exposure ranges from 7% to over 40%, with upper quartile 25% and lower quartile 19%.

To present interpretable summary statistics, I sort funds into high and low exposure groups depending on whether their *ScandalExposure* is above or below the cross-sectional median. Table~D.2 gives a snapshot

³In the aftermath of the investigations, several executives stepped down, and a number of portfolio managers were fired. Perhaps the highest profile casualty of the scandal was Richard S. Strong, founder of Strong Capital Management, who resigned in December 2003. Strong would go on to pay \$60 million in settlements and be barred from the industry. Strong Capital itself was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2004.

taken in August 2003. High exposure funds are slightly smaller, have higher turnover to portfolio liquidity ratios, expense ratios, *CompetitorSize*, and worse performance. Fund age is almost identical across the two groups, limiting the plausibility of life cycle effects as an explanation for differences in outcome paths.

Figure 6.2 summarizes the identifying variation in the data. I plot the groupwise cross-sectional mean of within-fund deviations for competitor size, log active share, and log turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio. The differential impact of the scandal across groups is identified by the difference in the pre- and post-scandal period wedges between the series. The *CompetitorSize* of the low exposure group overall trends upward, despite a small dip in the middle of the scandal period. The *CompetitorSize* of high exposure funds drops more substantively during the scandal, and remains flat for almost a year after the end of the scandal period. The historical accident of scandal-related outflows at involved funds appear to have insulated their closest competitors from contemporaneous increases in the aggregate size of the industry.

The turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio of the low exposure group exhibits a steady decline until late 2005, despite a momentary increase during the scandal. The high exposure group shows parallel trends until the beginning of the scandal period. Consistent with improved investment opportunities during the scandal, high exposure funds substantially decreased portfolio liquidity and increased turnover during 2004. The gap in within-fund turnover to portfolio liquidity ratios only begins to close at the end of 2006 as abnormal flows at scandal funds vanish. Active share of low exposure funds is essentially flat during this period, whereas active share of high exposure funds show steady increases during and after the scandal.

Given the volatility of returns, for easier comparison of fund performance I plot the difference between high and low exposure group cross-sectional means of within-fund three factor adjusted returns. High exposure funds relatively underperform low exposure funds in the pre-scandal period, are essentially even during the scandal, and enjoy a string of relative outperformance in the year after the end of the scandal period. The differential relative before and after performance of the two groups is consistent with decreasing returns to competitor scale.

To formally test for differential differences in before and after outcomes as a function of ex ante exposure to competition from prospective scandal funds, I perform regressions of the form

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \gamma (\mathbb{I}_t \times ScandalExposure_i) + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\Gamma + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (6.2)$$

where $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$ includes log fund size and expense ratio, as dictated by theory. In the regression, exposure is a continuous variable.⁴ I double cluster standard errors by fund and portfolio group \times time. I normalize *ScandalExposure* by its interquartile range ($\approx 6\%$).

Table 6.1 presents results. The one (two) year window estimate implies a 6.7% (3.5%) post-scandal reduction in *CompetitorSize* for untainted funds at the 75th percentile of *ScandalExposure* relative to untainted funds at the 25th percentile of *ScandalExposure*. The same difference in *ScandalExposure* is associated with a 2.4% (2.6%) relative increase in active share, and a 6.3% (4.4%) increase in the turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio. The coefficients also imply a relative decline in portfolio liquidity and its components for high exposure funds. These findings are consistent with high exposure funds increasing activeness in response to softened competition.

The main concern with identification based on comparing pre- and post-event periods across groups is that

⁴Unreported binned scatter plots suggest reasonably linear relations between *ScandalExposure* and outcome variables after residualizing by fund and time fixed effects.




Figure 6.2. Untainted fund outcomes by exposure to competition from scandal funds. Funds are sorted into high and low exposure groups depending on whether their *ScandalExposure* is above or below the cross-sectional median. The $\ln(\text{CompetitorSize})$, $\ln(\text{AS})$, and $\ln(\text{TL}^{-1/2})$ panels plot cross-sectional means of the variables' deviations from their respective within fund means across exposure groups. The R^{FF3} panel plots the difference between the cross-sectional means of the within fund deviations of three factor adjusted gross returns across the two groups. Vertical lines correspond to August 2003, the month before the announcement of the first investigations, and October 2004, the month of the last investigations according to Table 1 of [Houge and Wellman \(2005\)](#).

the measured effect might be the manifestation of favorable trends across the groups in the pre-period. I test for differential trends in the pre-period as a function of *ScandalExposure* by estimating the regression

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \gamma(t \times ScandalExposure_i) + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\Gamma + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (6.3)$$

where t is a linear time trend and $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$ includes the usual controls. I estimate this regression on pre-period observations. Differential pre-trends by *ScandalExposure* would be a concern if the coefficient on the trend interaction was statistically significant and of the same sign as the corresponding interaction coefficient in Table 6.1. Results from these specifications fail to reject the null hypothesis of no differential trends in the pre-period (Table~D.3).

6.2 Linking *CompetitorSize* Directly to Abnormal Flows

The analysis above does not explicitly model fund outcomes as a function of scandal flows. In this section, I explore a more sophisticated approach. I first estimate outflows at tainted funds attributable to the scandal. In turn, I relate untainted fund outcomes to variation in competitor size explained by abnormal tainted competitor outflows.

I use a linear model to decompose variation in fund flows between the effects of the scandal and baseline variation. I pool tainted and untainted funds in the two year window surrounding the scandal period, consisting of observations from September 2001 to October 2006. Consider scandal funds as being from the same cohort d if news of investigation into their trading practices broke in month d . Denote the cohort of fund j as $j^{(d)}$. Let $\mathbb{I}_{t \geq j^{(d)}}$ be an indicator for post investigation months for fund j , and define $\mathbb{I}_{d,t}$ as cohort \times time dummy variables. I regress flows on the full set of post-investigation cohort \times time indicators, controlling for fund and time fixed effects:

$$flow_{j,t} = \alpha_j + \alpha_t + \beta_{j^{(d)},t} (\mathbb{I}_{t \geq j^{(d)}} \mathbb{I}_{j^{(d)},t}) + \varepsilon_{j,t}. \quad (6.4)$$

I interpret the betas as the path of abnormal flows attributable to the scandal for each cohort. I cumulate abnormal flows at each post-scandal date as

$$\hat{f}_{j,t} = \prod_{\tau \geq j^{(d)}}^t (1 + \hat{\beta}_{j^{(d)},\tau}) - 1. \quad (6.5)$$

I construct *ScandalOutFlow* for untainted fund i as the similarity- and size-weighted cumulative abnormal negative net flow among tainted funds $j \in \Phi$:

$$ScandalOutFlow_{i,t} = - \sum_{j \in \Phi} \psi_{i,j,2003m8} \left(\hat{f}_{j,t} FundSize_{j,2003m8} \right). \quad (6.6)$$

Figure 6.3 plots time series characteristics of abnormal flows and *ScandalOutFlow*. Abnormal flows are most negative in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the first investigations, and gradually converge to zero near the end of 2006. This pattern maps into almost linearly increasing cumulative outflows in the first two years after the scandal, reflected in the observed pattern in *ScandaOutFlow*. Importantly




Figure 6.3. Abnormal flows and *ScandalOutFlow*. The left panel shows the cross-sectional mean coefficient on post-scandal cohort \times time fixed effects from Equation (6.4). The right panel shows the time series of cross-sectional percentiles of *ScandalOutFlow* across untainted funds, calculated according to Equation (6.6).

for identifying differential spillover effects of the scandal, total predicted outflows at competing tainted funds vary substantially in the cross-section.

I link tainted funds' flows directly to untainted fund outcomes through the reduced form regressions

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \gamma \text{ScandalOutFlow}_{i,t} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\Gamma + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (6.7)$$

where $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$ includes log size and expense ratio. Table 6.2 presents results. The coefficient on *ScandalOutFlow* represents the expected difference in outcomes between funds across the variable's interquartile range. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of abnormal scandal-affected competitor outflow is associated with an approximately 18% relative decline in competitor size. Consistent with the difference-in-differences-style analysis, the results indicate that funds whose competitors were particularly affected by scandal-related outflows expanded active management relative to funds with less affected competitors, increasing active share, turnover to portfolio liquidity ratios, and decreasing portfolio liquidity.

In additional analyses I isolate the variation in *CompetitorSize* attributable to abnormal flows at tainted competitors, and measure its impact on capital allocation. I perform two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, instrumenting for $\ln(\text{CompetitorSize})$ by *ScandalOutFlow* in the specification

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \gamma \ln(\text{CompetitorSize}_{i,t}) + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\Gamma + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (6.8)$$

where $y_{i,t}$ is log active share or log turnover-liquidity ratio, and \mathbf{X} the usual controls. Table~D.7 presents results. As expected based on the first column of Table 6.2, the first stage F-statistics are high, and *ScandalOutFlow* passes the relevance criterion. Consistent with earlier results, variation in competitor size attributable to *ScandalOutFlow* is associated with decreased active management and increased portfolio liquidity.

6.2.1 Controlling for Sector Level Shocks

As an additional robustness check to ensure my results are not an artifact of common sector level shocks, I re-estimate the analysis using benchmark \times time fixed effects. The results remain similar (Tables D.4, D.5, D.6, D.8).

6.2.2 Fund Performance

The analysis presented so far is consistent with competitors of scandal-tainted funds reacting to improved investment opportunities by increasing capital allocated to active strategies. According to this line of reasoning we would expect the same funds to experience relatively improved performance. To investigate, in Table 6.3 I perform analyses similar to those presented above, but with risk adjusted gross returns as the outcome variable of interest. The results demonstrate that close competitors of tainted funds indeed saw an increase in relative performance following the scandal.

6.2.3 Investor Flows

I have argued that observing a relation between investment opportunities and funds' internal capital allocation after controlling for fund size is indicative of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Table ?? provides further evidence of sluggish adjustment in external capital markets to fund investment opportunities. Specifically, I test for differential relative net flows among untainted funds by their pre-scandal exposure to competition from tainted funds. I find no evidence of increased relative net flows to closely competing funds in the year surrounding the scandal, suggesting that investors did not foresee improvements in prospective performance. There is slight evidence of differential investor flows over a two year window, which I interpret as consistent with investors chasing performance instead of anticipating it.

Table 6.1
Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Before and After Analysis

Dependent variables are identified in the column headers. $\ln(C.S.)$ is an abbreviation for $\ln(CompetitorSize)$. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. The estimation sample includes only funds not directly involved in the scandal. It covers the period $\{(2003m8 - W, 2003m8], [2004m11, 2004m11 + W)\}$, where W corresponds to the number of years specified. *ScandalExposure* (abbreviated to *ScanEx*) is the fraction of untainted funds' *CompetitorSize* due to portfolio similarity with future scandal funds in August 2003. I normalize *ScandalExposure* by its interquartile range. \mathbb{I} is an indicator for the post scandal period. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and portfolio group \times date, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(C.S.)$	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window								
$\mathbb{I} \times ScanEx$	-0.064*** (0.019)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.011 (0.031)	-0.100*** (0.024)	-0.095*** (0.018)	-0.049** (0.022)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026 (0.017)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.130*** (0.020)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.182*** (0.030)	0.172*** (0.026)	0.083*** (0.015)	0.141*** (0.026)	0.074*** (0.019)	0.077*** (0.018)
$\ln(f)$	-0.004 (0.099)	-0.016 (0.029)	0.012 (0.137)	0.016 (0.116)	-0.067 (0.078)	0.067 (0.106)	0.098 (0.078)	-0.024 (0.077)
$\ln(T)$				-0.079*** (0.027)	-0.065*** (0.017)	-0.045* (0.025)	0.018 (0.015)	-0.064*** (0.018)
$\ln(D)$					-0.228*** (0.028)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.450*** (0.051)	-0.243*** (0.040)	-0.238*** (0.052)
$\ln(B)$							-0.057* (0.032)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.083* (0.046)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,079	6,072	24,192	6,893	6,893	6,893	6,893	6,893
R^2	0.926	0.914	0.895	0.962	0.987	0.941	0.942	0.892
R^2 (proj. model)	0.052	0.022	0.026	0.077	0.156	0.121	0.084	0.062
Panel B: 2 year window								
$\mathbb{I} \times ScanEx$	-0.034* (0.020)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.010 (0.031)	-0.100*** (0.025)	-0.105*** (0.018)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.016)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.149*** (0.016)	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.205*** (0.025)	0.184*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.014)	0.148*** (0.021)	0.074*** (0.016)	0.084*** (0.015)
$\ln(f)$	-0.096 (0.072)	0.004 (0.027)	0.113 (0.117)	-0.072 (0.107)	-0.169** (0.076)	0.040 (0.090)	0.105 (0.072)	-0.061 (0.070)
$\ln(T)$				-0.063*** (0.024)	-0.065*** (0.014)	-0.025 (0.022)	0.023* (0.014)	-0.049*** (0.015)
$\ln(D)$					-0.216*** (0.022)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.425*** (0.036)	-0.218*** (0.034)	-0.236*** (0.040)
$\ln(B)$							-0.056** (0.024)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.077** (0.033)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,666	11,773	46,660	13,291	13,291	13,291	13,291	13,291
R^2	0.895	0.878	0.860	0.943	0.980	0.914	0.914	0.848
R^2 (proj. model)	0.065	0.027	0.043	0.083	0.154	0.114	0.071	0.063

Table 6.2
Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Using Abnormal Flows

Dependent variables are identified in the column headers. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. The estimation sample includes untainted funds during $\{[2003m9 - W, 2004m10 + W]\}$, where W corresponds to the number of years specified at the bottom of each panel. *ScandalOutFlow* is the similarity-weighted cumulative abnormal outflows attributable to the scandal among involved funds. *ScandalOutFlow* is normalized by its interquartile range. $\ln(C.S.)$ is an abbreviation for $\ln(CompetitorSize)$. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and portfolio group \times time, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(C.S.)$	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window								
<i>ScandalOutFlow</i>	-0.181*** (0.017)	0.059*** (0.007)	0.114*** (0.024)	-0.221*** (0.024)	-0.120*** (0.015)	-0.181*** (0.022)	-0.076*** (0.015)	-0.127*** (0.015)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.092*** (0.017)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.149*** (0.027)	0.143*** (0.022)	0.080*** (0.013)	0.116*** (0.022)	0.075*** (0.017)	0.056*** (0.015)
$\ln(f)$	-0.066 (0.071)	-0.009 (0.024)	0.036 (0.110)	-0.027 (0.089)	-0.061 (0.059)	0.009 (0.083)	0.079 (0.062)	-0.064 (0.059)
$\ln(T)$				-0.057*** (0.019)	-0.045*** (0.011)	-0.038** (0.018)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.052*** (0.014)
$\ln(D)$					-0.267*** (0.024)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.522*** (0.045)	-0.269*** (0.036)	-0.318*** (0.047)
$\ln(B)$							-0.097*** (0.029)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.155*** (0.043)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,095	10,334	39,784	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689
R^2	0.935	0.933	0.904	0.967	0.988	0.949	0.950	0.901
R^2 (proj. model)	0.088	0.073	0.027	0.107	0.172	0.174	0.107	0.103
Panel B: 2 year window								
<i>ScandalOutFlow</i>	-0.168*** (0.015)	0.061*** (0.007)	0.110*** (0.022)	-0.209*** (0.021)	-0.125*** (0.014)	-0.162*** (0.019)	-0.075*** (0.015)	-0.104*** (0.013)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.113*** (0.014)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.182*** (0.023)	0.156*** (0.020)	0.083*** (0.013)	0.128*** (0.019)	0.072*** (0.015)	0.070*** (0.013)
$\ln(f)$	-0.132** (0.058)	0.011 (0.023)	0.135 (0.098)	-0.109 (0.094)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.016 (0.079)	0.076 (0.061)	-0.090 (0.062)
$\ln(T)$				-0.049** (0.019)	-0.049*** (0.011)	-0.024 (0.018)	0.017 (0.012)	-0.043*** (0.013)
$\ln(D)$					-0.259*** (0.020)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.506*** (0.035)	-0.254*** (0.031)	-0.305*** (0.038)
$\ln(B)$							-0.088*** (0.023)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.127*** (0.032)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,904	16,211	63,055	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309
R^2	0.907	0.898	0.869	0.951	0.982	0.924	0.922	0.860
R^2 (proj. model)	0.103	0.086	0.046	0.117	0.180	0.164	0.095	0.096

Table 6.3
Fund Performance and the Scandal

The dependent variable is Fama-French 3 factor adjusted gross returns, in annual percent units. Observations are monthly. The estimation sample includes only funds not tainted by the scandal. In columns (1)-(4) regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. In columns (5)-(6), regressions are estimated by two stage least squares, instrumenting $\ln(CompetitorSize)$ with $ScandalOutFlow$. In columns (1)-(2), the sample includes $\{(2003m8 - W, 2003m8), [2004m11, 2004m11 + W)\}$, where W corresponds to the number of years specified. In columns (3)-(6), the sample is taken over the period $\{[2003m9 - W, 2004m10 + W]\}$. $ScandalExposure$ (abbreviated to $ScanEx$) is the fraction of untainted funds' $CompetitorSize$ due to portfolio similarity with future scandal funds in August 2003. I normalize $ScandalExposure$ by its interquartile range. \mathbb{I} is an indicator for the post scandal period. $ScandalOutFlow$ is the similarity-weighted cumulative abnormal outflows attributable to the scandal among involved funds. $ScandalOutFlow$ is normalized by its interquartile range. Benchmarks are the indexes which yield the lowest active share, taken from [Petajisto \(2013\)](#). I use the most recently available benchmark when one is missing. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and portfolio group \times month in odd columns, and by fund and benchmark \times month in even columns (5)-(6). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 1 year window						
$\mathbb{I} \times ScanEx$	5.716*** (1.072)	4.059*** (0.681)				
$ScandalOutFlow$			1.688** (0.844)	2.691*** (0.673)		
$\ln(CompetitorSize)$					-9.576** (4.753)	-13.916*** (3.546)
$\ln(FundSize)$	-3.129*** (0.688)	-3.417*** (0.537)	-4.710*** (0.661)	-4.546*** (0.510)	-3.813*** (0.769)	-3.259*** (0.590)
Fixed Effects						
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
• Benchmark \times Month	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	24,909	24,909	41,333	41,333	41,333	41,333
R^2	0.111	0.208	0.101	0.209		
R^2 (proj. model)	0.019	0.011	0.008	0.008		
F (first stage)					4.1	15.4
Panel B: 2 year window						
$\mathbb{I} \times ScanEx$	2.508*** (0.871)	1.842*** (0.462)				
$ScandalOutFlow$			0.405 (0.494)	0.969*** (0.365)		
$\ln(CompetitorSize)$					-2.489 (3.035)	-6.204*** (2.386)
$\ln(FundSize)$	-3.715*** (0.517)	-3.682*** (0.333)	-4.170*** (0.486)	-3.974*** (0.313)	-3.878*** (0.601)	-3.246*** (0.426)
Fixed Effects						
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
• Benchmark \times Month	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	48,230	48,230	65,463	65,463	65,463	65,463
R^2	0.083	0.209	0.087	0.212		
R^2 (proj. model)	0.011	0.009	0.009	0.008		
F (first stage)					0.7	6.8

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Studying the allocation of capital inside firms is complicated by the difficulty of observation. Mutual funds are required to report their holdings, allowing the researcher to sidestep this issue. I provide novel evidence on the impact of competition on the capital allocation inside active mutual funds. I find that funds decrease allocation to costly active strategies in response to increased competition. I interpret this finding through the lens of existing models as evidence of information asymmetry between fund managers and outside investors.

While I argue that the evidence is consistent with managers possessing superior information about the fund's prospects relative to investors, modeling the incentive effects of this asymmetry is beyond the scope of this paper. One might expect instances of moral hazard to arise in this context. I leave an exploration of this issue to future research.

Appendix A

Summary Statistics

A.1 Tables

Table A.1
Summary Statistics

Alphas, returns, and expense ratios are expressed in annualized percentages. L , S , D , C , and B are portfolio liquidity, stock liquidity, diversification, coverage, and balance, respectively, as defined in [Pástor et al. \(2017b\)](#), calculated with respect to the market portfolio of U.S. common equity. $CompetitorSize$ is the portfolio similarity weighted size of each fund's competitors, as defined in Section 4.3. $IndustrySize$ is the total net assets of the funds in the sample, divided by the total market capitalization of all U.S. common equity in CRSP. $FundAge$ is the number of years since the fund's inception. $FundSize$ is the TNA of each fund as a fraction of the total market capitalization of all U.S. common equity in CRSP. AS is active share relative to self declared benchmarks ([Cremers and Petajisto, 2009](#); [Petajisto, 2013](#)). T is turnover ratio as defined by CRSP, winsorized at 1%.

	N	mean	sd	p1	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	p99
Panel A: Fund level means										
\bar{R}^{FF3}	2,395	-0.15	4.1	-12.96	-3.67	-1.2	0.26	1.58	2.81	6.82
\bar{R}^{FF3} (net)	2,554	-1.35	4.04	-13.51	-4.79	-2.42	-0.92	0.36	1.61	5.48
Expense ratio	2,414	1.29	0.42	0.39	0.83	1.01	1.25	1.51	1.84	2.48
$\bar{L} \times 10$	2,554	0.49	0.65	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.26	0.68	1.2	2.96
\bar{S}	2,554	10.26	9.57	0.15	0.43	1.3	9	16.51	22.46	38.4
$\bar{D} \times 10$	2,554	0.1	0.23	0	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.1	0.18	0.72
$\bar{C} \times 10$	2,554	0.23	0.44	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.14	0.22	0.4	1.47
\bar{B}	2,554	0.38	0.16	0.06	0.18	0.26	0.37	0.5	0.6	0.73
Panel B: Fund-month level statistics										
R^{FF3}	364,200	0.44	22.86	-61.61	-23.36	-10.55	0.3	11.15	24.06	65.84
R^{FF3} (net)	385,336	-0.78	22.72	-62.95	-24.51	-11.69	-0.87	9.89	22.68	64.43
Expense ratio	363,300	1.23	0.42	0.33	0.76	0.96	1.18	1.45	1.77	2.41
$CompetitorSize$	385,336	0.35	0.28	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.29	0.51	0.72	1.22
$IndustrySize$	385,336	0.14	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.17
$FundSize \times 10^4$	385,336	1.12	3.91	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.22	0.77	2.25	16.29
TNA (2017\$100m)	385,336	16.9	64.14	0.18	0.41	0.98	3.2	11.08	31.79	248.16
$FundAge$	385,195	14.75	13.8	0.75	2.92	5.75	10.75	18.42	31.08	69.75
AS	63,081	0.81	0.15	0.38	0.6	0.72	0.85	0.93	0.97	1
$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	343,154	1.38	1.18	-1.71	-0.1	0.63	1.4	2.19	2.87	3.96
T	343,154	0.8	0.67	0.03	0.18	0.34	0.62	1.05	1.63	3.73
$L \times 10$	385,336	0.48	0.67	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.23	0.64	1.22	3.17
S	385,336	9.92	9.65	0.13	0.41	1.23	8.29	15.76	22.43	40.01
$D \times 10$	385,336	0.09	0.23	0	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.1	0.18	0.69
$C \times 10$	385,336	0.22	0.41	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.14	0.22	0.37	1.57
B	385,336	0.37	0.19	0.04	0.14	0.23	0.36	0.51	0.63	0.78

A.2 Figures




Figure A.1. Data Availability in the CRSP Mutual Fund Dataset. Number of share class level observations passing filters for identifying actively managed domestic equity funds. Note that consistent mtna records begin January 1991. Further, there were over 300 share classes added to the dataset in Jan 1991, whose returns come online Feb 1992. However, these added share classes do not have size and expense ratio information, so do not majorly influence the fund level dataset used in the analysis.




Figure A.2. Fund report dates in Thomson. Time series plot of the number of funds reporting during a given month.




Figure A.3. Time series of *CompetitorSize*. Cross-sectional mean of *CompetitorSize* (scaled by 40 for exposition) against the time series of *IndustrySize*.

Table A.2
Correlations

The table presents pairwise correlations. Variables are defined in earlier tables.

	<i>Comp. Size</i>	R^{FF3}	Exp. ratio	<i>Fund Size</i>	<i>Fund Age</i>	<i>AS</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>L</i>	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	<i>Ind. Size</i>
Panel A: Unconditional										
<i>CompetitorSize</i>	1.00									
R^{FF3}	-0.02	1.00								
Expense ratio	-0.25	0.01	1.00							
<i>FundSize</i>	0.20	-0.00	-0.20	1.00						
<i>FundAge</i>	0.10	-0.01	-0.24	0.29	1.00					
<i>AS</i>	-0.69	-0.02	0.24	-0.14	-0.13	1.00				
<i>T</i>	-0.04	-0.00	0.20	-0.10	-0.11	0.06	1.00			
<i>L</i>	0.75	-0.01	-0.27	0.19	0.11	-0.83	-0.09	1.00		
$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	-0.47	0.01	0.35	-0.21	-0.21	0.54	0.70	-0.53	1.00	
<i>IndustrySize</i>	0.38	-0.01	0.08	-0.05	-0.09	-0.17	0.02	0.11	-0.03	1.00
Panel B: Within-fund correlations										
<i>CompetitorSize</i>	1.00									
R^{FF3}	-0.03	1.00								
Expense ratio	-0.04	0.03	1.00							
<i>FundSize</i>	0.26	-0.02	-0.06	1.00						
<i>FundAge</i>	0.51	-0.03	-0.16	0.14	1.00					
<i>AS</i>	-0.53	-0.00	-0.01	-0.16	-0.37	1.00				
<i>T</i>	-0.07	0.01	0.11	-0.07	-0.11	0.02	1.00			
<i>L</i>	0.63	-0.01	-0.04	0.21	0.24	-0.70	-0.08	1.00		
$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	-0.34	0.02	0.16	-0.15	-0.29	0.33	0.73	-0.38	1.00	
<i>IndustrySize</i>	0.60	-0.01	0.01	0.17	0.76	-0.39	-0.01	0.26	-0.18	1.00

Appendix B

Competitor Size and Fund Performance

B.1 Benchmarking Returns

Ideally, I would like to benchmark mutual fund returns by factors that are both near costlessly tradeable for funds, and span dimensions of risk that are of concern to investors. In the absence of such an ideal benchmark, I employ the conventional option of benchmarking returns with Fama-French factors. Define three factor benchmark adjusted gross returns as

$$R_{i,t}^{FF3} = R_{i,t} - \left[\hat{\beta}_i^{RMRF} RMRF_t + \hat{\beta}_i^{SMB} SMB_t + \hat{\beta}_i^{HML} HML_t \right], \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where $R_{i,t}$ is the gross return of fund i at month t in excess of the risk free rate, expressed in percentages. $RMRF$, SMB , and HML are the usual market, size, and value factors. The beta hats are the sample estimates of each fund's exposure to the respective factors, estimated by fund level regressions of the form

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i^{RMRF} RMRF_t + \beta_i^{SMB} SMB_t + \beta_i^{HML} HML_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (\text{B.2})$$

Therefore, $R_{i,t}^{FF3} = \hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\varepsilon}_{i,t}$, i.e. each period's benchmark adjusted returns are equal to the sum of the fund's estimated gross alpha and the given month's residual from the Fama-French time series regressions.

Benchmarking with a factor model has some shortcomings and advantages. The long-short SMB and HML portfolios are not tradeable for mutual funds. [Berk and van Binsbergen \(2015\)](#) argue that at each point in time the performance of active funds ought to be measured against the returns of the lowest cost passive funds readily available to retail investors. This is an eminently sensible suggestion for studying funds' value added for retail investors, but not an obviously superior method for testing whether fund alpha is decreasing in competitor scale. [Cremers et al. \(2012\)](#) note that Fama-French benchmarks imply nonzero alphas for a number of mainstream passive benchmarks. My results are robust to following their suggestion of benchmarking with index-based factors. Unlike self-designated benchmarks, Fama-French factors are not gameable by funds. They are also widely available.¹ Unlike characteristic based benchmarks, factor based benchmarks are not subject to errors in holdings data, are available monthly, and account for the unobserved actions of funds. Lastly, regardless of whether size and value correspond to risk, Fama-French factors capture a large fraction of variance in cross-sectional returns.

¹As argued by [Pástor et al. \(2015\)](#), Morningstar benchmarks share the feature of non-gameability, but are proprietary.

B.2 Regression Setup

I implement within-fund regression specifications of the following form to test for decreasing returns to competitor scale:

$$R_{i,t+1}^{FF3} = \alpha_i + \gamma \text{CompetitorSize}_{i,t} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\Gamma + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (\text{B.3})$$

where α_i are firm fixed effects, and $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$ is a vector of controls including *IndustrySize* and year-month fixed effects.² The coefficient of interest is γ . To make the economic magnitude of the coefficient easier to interpret, I annualize returns and divide *CompetitorSize* and *IndustrySize* by their respective standard deviations before performing the regressions. I re-scale *FundSize* by the difference between the 50th and 10th percentiles of its distribution.

I include fund fixed effects throughout to take into account the possibility that baseline fund skill and average competitor size are related in the cross-section, i.e. $\text{Cov}(\alpha_i, \overline{\text{CompetitorSize}_i}) \neq 0$. We would expect talented managers to be endogenously allocated where they are most capable of taking advantage of investment opportunities. Bolstering this view, Berk et al. (2017) show that fund families funnel capital toward skilled managers. A mechanical concern is that in the cross-section *CompetitorSize* tends to be higher for funds in large cap sectors. Since more liquid market segments can absorb a larger amount of active investment, not all cross-sectional variation of *CompetitorSize* reflects variation in the effective inter-fund competition for investment opportunities. Controlling for fund fixed effects is a parsimonious way of controlling for such fixed differences in funds' operating environment.

For the specifications including fund fixed effects only, deviations of *CompetitorSize* from its within-fund mean provide the variation identifying the coefficient of interest. For regressions including both fund and year-month fixed effects, the coefficient of interest is identified based on deviations of *CompetitorSize* from its within-fund mean, relative to the average within-fund deviation at each date. Year-month fixed effects control nonparametrically for common time series variation in returns and industry competition, ruling out the possibility that the identified effect of competitor size is an artifact of other aggregate developments, such as shared time-varying exposure to competition from hedge funds. However, including overly fine cross-sectional dummy variables would risk soaking up the variation of interest.

I include *IndustrySize* to demonstrate that *CompetitorSize* captures distinct variation in decreasing returns faced by funds. Controlling for *FundSize* is relevant for separating industry-level decreasing returns to scale from fund-level decreasing returns to scale.³

For constructing standard errors, each month I sort funds into ten mutually exclusive (but not necessarily equal sized) portfolio groups based on their most recently reported holdings.⁴ I double cluster standard errors by fund and year-month \times portfolio group, to account for both within-fund and cross-sectional correlation in errors. In practice, I find that clustering by fund in regressions of returns is essentially irrelevant, as within-fund correlation in the error term is negligible. On the other hand, the cross-sectional correlation structure of regression errors is substantive. The number of portfolio groups is similar to the number of Morningstar sectors. Each month's largest portfolio group cluster on average accounts for over a third of observations. Therefore, portfolio group \times month clusters allow for extensive within month correlation of errors, without reducing the number of clusters unreasonably.

²Since *IndustrySize* only varies in the time series, it is omitted in regressions featuring year-month fixed effects. Similarly, *FundAge* is fully absorbed by the combination of fund and year-month fixed effects.

³Interpreting the coefficient on *FundSize* is problematic in within-fund regressions of returns. To be unbiased, within-fund regressions require strict exogeneity of the regressors [Chamberlain (1982); stambaugh99], meaning $\text{Cov}(x_{i,t}, \varepsilon_{i,s}) = 0 \forall s \in \{1, 2, \dots, T_i\}$. Since past idiosyncratic high (low) returns mechanically increase (decrease) total net assets, we will typically have $\text{Cov}(\text{FundSize}_{i,t}, \varepsilon_{i,s}) > 0$ for $s < t$, and a downward bias in the estimated coefficient. In simulations, Harvey and Liu (2017) estimate the bias around 14%. Pástor et al. (2015) propose a recursive demeaning (RD) procedure for eliminating this bias. The point estimates they report with the RD procedure are similar to those from the fixed effects OLS regressions, but the standard errors increase almost twenty-fold. Given that estimating the magnitude of decreasing returns to own size is not the focus of this study and the unfavorable tradeoff between bias and variance, I choose to not implement the RD procedure.

⁴Funds are grouped using k-means cluster analysis of raw portfolio weights. Each month, this process constructs $k = 10$ archetypal portfolios (serving as cluster centers). These model portfolios are constructed and then funds are assigned to them such that the sum of squared differences between the weights of fund portfolios and their assigned model portfolio is minimized.

B.3 Results

Table B.1 presents results from the equation (B.3) regression specifications. There is a consistently negative, statistically significant within fund relation between *CompetitorSize* and fund performance. Coefficients range from -1.04 in the univariate within-fund regression to -0.76 in the specification featuring the full set of fund and year-month fixed effects and own size. While *IndustrySize* is associated with a statistically significant -0.40 coefficient in the specification with no other controls (column (2)), adding *CompetitorSize* to the specification (column (3)) subsumes its negative effect, with the coefficient on *IndustrySize* dropping to an insignificant 0.08. Although coefficients associated with own fund size are consistently negative and statistically significant, they are known to be biased and should be interpreted with caution.⁵

Table B.1
Decreasing Returns to Competitor Scale

The regression sample contains actively managed domestic equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2016. The dependent variable is three-factor adjusted gross returns, in annualized percentages. Size variables are as defined in Section 4.3. *CompetitorSize* and *IndustrySize* are normalized by their respective sample standard deviations. *FundSize* is normalized by the difference between the 50th and 10th percentile of its distribution. Each fund is assigned to one of ten portfolio group clusters each month based on k-means clustering of most recent portfolio holdings. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and year-month \times portfolio group, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>CompetitorSize</i>	-0.974*** (0.178)		-1.037*** (0.223)	-0.765*** (0.143)
<i>IndustrySize</i>		-0.398** (0.177)	0.080 (0.221)	
<i>FundSize</i>				-0.024*** (0.009)
Fixed Effects				
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	364,200	364,200	364,200	364,200
R^2	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.102
R^2 (proj. model)	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001

Expense ratios provide an informative comparison for the magnitude of the *CompetitorSize* coefficients. The mean expense ratio in my sample is 1.23% per year, with an interquartile range of 0.49%. A one standard deviation increase in *CompetitorSize* is associated with a drop in performance on the order of two thirds the typical fund expense ratio. Decreasing returns to competitor scale are a meaningful impediment to sustainable profitable operations for funds.

B.4 The Role of Portfolio Liquidity

Economic reasoning dictates that decreasing returns to competitor scale operate through the price impact of competing funds. Therefore, we would expect decreasing returns to be more severe for funds relying on less liquid strategies. I test this by comparing the magnitude of decreasing returns across funds with different levels of average portfolio liquidity. Specifically, I run regressions of the form

$$R_{i,t+1}^{FF3} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \gamma_1 \text{CompetitorSize}_{i,t} + \gamma_2 (\text{CompetitorSize}_{i,t} \times \overline{\text{PortLiq}_i}) + \eta_1 \text{FundSize}_{i,t} + \eta_2 (\text{FundSize}_{i,t} \times \overline{\text{PortLiq}_i}) + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (\text{B.4})$$

where $\overline{\text{Port.Liq}_i}$ is either the fund-level average portfolio liquidity measure proposed by Pástor et al. (2017b), or any of its sub-components of stock liquidity (average relative market capitalization of holdings), coverage (number of stocks held relative to total stocks in the market), and balance (a measure of how closely portfolio weights track market weights of stocks in the portfolio). Diversification is the product of coverage and balance.

⁵Consistent with Harvey and Liu (2017), I find much larger estimates of decreasing returns to own size when using a log transform of *FundSize*.

I re-scale each variable so that a unit increase corresponds to the interquartile range of within-fund means. If decreasing returns to scale are rooted in liquidity constraints, we expect $\gamma_2 > 0$.

Panel A of Table B.2 presents results from the regressions. All γ_2 coefficients are positive and three out of five are statistically significant. The economic magnitudes are large as well. Increasing average portfolio liquidity from the 25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution changes the impact of a one standard deviation increase in *CompetitorSize* by 0.23bp in annualized returns. Decomposing portfolio liquidity into its components demonstrates that the majority of the effect is attributable to stock liquidity, with a lesser amount attributable to diversification, including coverage and balance.⁶

Table B.2
The Role of Portfolio Liquidity

The dependent variable is three-factor adjusted gross returns, in annualized percentages. Size variables are normalized according to the Table B.1 caption. L_i, S_i, D_i, C_i, B_i are portfolio liquidity, stock liquidity, diversification, coverage, and balance, as defined in Pástor et al. (2017b). $\bar{L}, \bar{S}, \bar{D}, \bar{C}, \bar{B}$ denote fund-level means. X variables are normalized by interquartile range. Each fund is assigned to one of ten portfolio group clusters each month based on k-means clustering of most recent portfolio holdings. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and year-month \times portfolio group, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Fund Level Average Portfolio Liquidity					
$\bar{X} =$	\bar{L}	\bar{S}	\bar{D}	\bar{C}	\bar{B}
<i>Comp.Size</i> \times \bar{X}	0.231*** (0.075)	0.318 (0.284)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.020)	0.306 (0.191)
<i>FundSize</i> \times \bar{X}	0.028*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.022)	0.006** (0.003)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005 (0.015)
<i>CompetitorSize</i>	-1.178*** (0.206)	-1.073*** (0.316)	-0.859*** (0.152)	-0.925*** (0.161)	-1.272*** (0.355)
<i>FundSize</i>	-0.075*** (0.021)	-0.030 (0.022)	-0.034*** (0.011)	-0.036*** (0.013)	-0.032 (0.027)
Fixed Effects					
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	364,200	364,200	364,200	364,200	364,200
R^2	0.103	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102
R^2 (proj. model)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Panel B: Real Time Portfolio Liquidity					
$X =$	L	S	D	C	B
<i>Comp.Size</i> \times X	0.160*** (0.041)	-0.242 (0.245)	0.040** (0.019)	0.059*** (0.020)	0.419*** (0.125)
<i>FundSize</i> \times X	0.008** (0.004)	0.002 (0.008)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	0.015** (0.007)
X	-0.745*** (0.289)	-1.021* (0.560)	-0.054 (0.092)	0.027 (0.066)	-1.682*** (0.283)
<i>CompetitorSize</i>	-0.873*** (0.204)	-0.462* (0.270)	-0.893*** (0.157)	-0.958*** (0.164)	-1.088*** (0.283)
<i>FundSize</i>	-0.050*** (0.014)	-0.025** (0.013)	-0.052*** (0.010)	-0.043*** (0.011)	-0.048*** (0.015)
Fixed Effects					
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	364,200	364,200	364,200	364,200	364,200
R^2	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103
R^2 (proj. model)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

A related question is whether funds can actively ameliorate the pernicious effects of decreasing returns to (competitor) scale by choosing more liquid portfolios. I test this by replacing fund-level average measures of

⁶In unreported results, I find a similar pattern of more severe decreasing returns for funds employing less liquid strategies using ad hoc measures of portfolio liquidity such as the portfolio-weighted average market weight of holdings, number of stocks held, share of largest five holdings, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of portfolio weights, as well as own size and turnover.

portfolio liquidity in equation (B.4) with real time values:

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_{i,t+1}^{FF3} = & \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \gamma_1 \text{CompetitorSize}_{i,t} + \gamma_2 (\text{CompetitorSize}_{i,t} \times \text{PortLiq}_{i,t}) \\
 & + \eta_1 \text{FundSize}_{i,t} + \eta_2 (\text{FundSize}_{i,t} \times \text{PortLiq}_{i,t}) \\
 & + \gamma_3 \text{PortLiq}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{B.5}$$

Panel B of Table B.2 presents results from the regressions. With the exception of stock liquidity, the interaction terms are all positive and statistically significant, suggesting that increased portfolio liquidity shelters the fund from decreasing returns to scale. Note that the main effect of portfolio liquidity is negative, suggesting that funds make more when they hold more concentrated portfolios. This is consistent with funds responding to time-varying investment opportunities by decreasing portfolio liquidity when expected returns are high.

B.5 Results Using Pre-2008 Data

Table B.3
Decreasing Returns to Competitor Scale

The regression sample contains actively managed domestic equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2007. The dependent variable is three-factor adjusted gross returns, in annualized percentages. Size variables are as defined in Section 4.3. *CompetitorSize* and *IndustrySize* are normalized by their respective sample standard deviations. *FundSize* is normalized by the difference between the 50th and 10th percentile of its distribution. Each fund is assigned to one of ten portfolio group clusters each month based on k-means clustering of most recent portfolio holdings. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and year-month \times portfolio group, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>CompetitorSize</i>	-1.023*** (0.225)		-1.269*** (0.319)	-0.864*** (0.207)
<i>IndustrySize</i>		-0.314* (0.180)	0.271 (0.251)	
<i>FundSize</i>				-0.036*** (0.012)
Fixed Effects				
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	229,071	229,071	229,071	229,071
R^2	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.106
R^2 (proj. model)	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001

Table B.4
The Role of Portfolio Liquidity — Pre-2008 data

The dependent variable is three-factor adjusted gross returns, in annualized percentages. Size variables are normalized according to the Table B.1 caption. L , S , D , C , B are portfolio liquidity, stock liquidity, diversification, coverage, and balance, as defined in Pástor et al. (2017b). \bar{L} , \bar{S} , \bar{D} , \bar{C} , \bar{B} denote fund-level means. X variables are normalized by interquartile range. Each fund is assigned to one of ten portfolio group clusters each month based on k-means clustering of most recent portfolio holdings. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and year-month \times portfolio group, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Fund Level Average Portfolio Liquidity					
$\bar{X} =$	\bar{L}	\bar{S}	\bar{D}	\bar{C}	\bar{B}
$Comp.Size \times \bar{X}$	0.256** (0.123)	0.181 (0.382)	0.037* (0.021)	0.065** (0.031)	0.493* (0.264)
$FundSize \times \bar{X}$	0.030** (0.014)	0.026 (0.031)	0.011 (0.010)	0.003 (0.005)	0.006 (0.025)
$CompetitorSize$	-1.309*** (0.316)	-1.046** (0.479)	-0.901*** (0.216)	-0.976*** (0.231)	-1.638*** (0.486)
$FundSize$	-0.093*** (0.029)	-0.053* (0.031)	-0.055** (0.021)	-0.045** (0.021)	-0.045 (0.043)
Fixed Effects					
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	230,606	230,606	230,606	230,606	230,606
R^2	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106
R^2 (proj. model)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Panel B: Real Time Portfolio Liquidity					
$X =$	L	S	D	C	B
$Comp.Size \times X$	0.170*** (0.060)	-0.263 (0.322)	0.075** (0.035)	0.078 (0.047)	0.487*** (0.169)
$FundSize \times X$	0.006 (0.005)	0.008 (0.009)	0.014** (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)	0.011 (0.007)
X	-0.803** (0.378)	-0.673 (0.652)	-0.431*** (0.165)	-0.031 (0.138)	-2.139*** (0.380)
$CompetitorSize$	-0.929*** (0.298)	-0.468 (0.424)	-0.882*** (0.226)	-1.027*** (0.241)	-1.143*** (0.386)
$FundSize$	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.043*** (0.016)	-0.065*** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.017)
Fixed Effects					
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	230,606	230,606	230,606	230,606	230,606
R^2	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106
R^2 (proj. model)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Appendix C

Additional Results: Capital Allocation

Table C.1
Capital Allocation and Competitor Size — Benchmark \times Quarter FE

Observations are first differences at the fund \times quarter level, from 1980-2016. Dependent variables are noted in the column headers. AS is active share relative to self-declared benchmarks (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Petajisto, 2013), covering years 1980-2009. $TL^{-1/2}$ is the turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio, as in Pástor et al. (2017b). S , D , C , and B are the components of portfolio liquidity, namely stock liquidity, diversification, coverage, and balance (each calculated with respect to all U.S. equity). $\Delta CS_{i,t} = \ln\left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t}\right) - \ln\left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t-1}\right)$ is the change in log competitor size, holding previous quarter end similarity weights fixed. Benchmarks are the indexes which yield the lowest active share, taken from Petajisto (2013). I use the most recently available benchmark when one is missing. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and benchmark \times quarter, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\Delta \ln(AS)$	$\Delta \ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\Delta \ln(L)$	$\Delta \ln(S)$	$\Delta \ln(D)$	$\Delta \ln(C)$	$\Delta \ln(B)$
ΔCS	-0.036*** (0.013)	-0.350*** (0.076)	0.517*** (0.078)	0.395*** (0.072)	0.374*** (0.068)	0.081** (0.038)	0.341*** (0.060)
$\Delta \ln(FundSize)$	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.178*** (0.017)	0.209*** (0.017)	0.100*** (0.012)	0.190*** (0.015)	0.112*** (0.010)	0.111*** (0.011)
$\Delta \ln(f)$	-0.017 (0.015)	0.068 (0.042)	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.023 (0.027)	0.003 (0.032)	0.020 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.026)
$\Delta \ln(T)$			-0.013* (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.012* (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.013** (0.005)
$\Delta \ln(D)$				-0.335*** (0.016)			
$\Delta \ln(S)$					-0.572*** (0.017)	-0.196*** (0.013)	-0.457*** (0.019)
$\Delta \ln(B)$						-0.113*** (0.011)	
$\Delta \ln(C)$							-0.225*** (0.021)
Fixed Effects							
• Benchmark \times Quarter	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	34,984	57,146	57,146	57,146	57,146	57,146	57,146
R^2	0.125	0.060	0.099	0.262	0.254	0.134	0.216
R^2 (proj. model)	0.003	0.014	0.033	0.195	0.206	0.079	0.168

Table C.2
Capital Allocation and Competitor Size — Pre-2008 Data

Observations are first differences at the fund \times quarter level, from 1980-2007. Dependent variables are noted in the column headers. AS is active share relative to self-declared benchmarks (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Petajisto, 2013). $TL^{-1/2}$ is the turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio, as in Pástor et al. (2017b). S , D , C , and B are the components of portfolio liquidity, namely stock liquidity, diversification, coverage, and balance (each calculated with respect to all U.S. equity). $\Delta CS_{i,t} = \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t} \right) - \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t-1} \right)$ is the change in log competitor size, holding previous quarter end similarity weights fixed. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and portfolio group \times quarter, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\Delta \ln(AS)$	$\Delta \ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\Delta \ln(L)$	$\Delta \ln(S)$	$\Delta \ln(D)$	$\Delta \ln(C)$	$\Delta \ln(B)$
ΔCS	-0.047** (0.022)	-0.482*** (0.069)	0.871*** (0.091)	0.717*** (0.098)	0.614*** (0.066)	0.176*** (0.038)	0.519*** (0.057)
$\Delta \ln(FundSize)$	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.216*** (0.020)	0.249*** (0.025)	0.131*** (0.019)	0.225*** (0.021)	0.132*** (0.013)	0.132*** (0.016)
$\Delta \ln(f)$	-0.026* (0.014)	0.032 (0.045)	0.038 (0.035)	-0.011 (0.031)	0.055 (0.034)	0.056** (0.026)	0.011 (0.030)
$\Delta \ln(T)$			-0.020** (0.009)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.006)
$\Delta \ln(D)$				-0.379*** (0.023)			
$\Delta \ln(S)$					-0.587*** (0.019)	-0.166*** (0.015)	-0.499*** (0.025)
$\Delta \ln(B)$						-0.108*** (0.014)	
$\Delta \ln(C)$							-0.230*** (0.027)
Fixed Effects							
• Quarter	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	30,779	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500
R^2	0.024	0.036	0.070	0.247	0.255	0.099	0.221
R^2 (proj. model)	0.005	0.025	0.060	0.233	0.242	0.078	0.214

Table C.3
Capital Allocation and Competitor Size — Benchmark \times Quarter FE, Pre-2008 Data

Observations are first differences at the fund \times quarter level, from 1980-2016. Dependent variables are noted in the column headers. AS is active share relative to self-declared benchmarks (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Petajisto, 2013), covering years 1980-2009. $TL^{-1/2}$ is the turnover to portfolio liquidity ratio, as in Pástor et al. (2017b). S , D , C , and B are the components of portfolio liquidity, namely stock liquidity, diversification, coverage, and balance (each calculated with respect to all U.S. equity). $\Delta CS_{i,t} = \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t} \right) - \ln \left(\sum_{j \neq i} \psi_{i,j,t-1} FundSize_{j,t-1} \right)$ is the change in log competitor size, holding previous quarter end similarity weights fixed. Benchmarks are the indexes which yield the lowest active share, taken from Petajisto (2013). I use the most recently available benchmark when one is missing. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and benchmark \times quarter, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\Delta \ln(AS)$	$\Delta \ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\Delta \ln(L)$	$\Delta \ln(S)$	$\Delta \ln(D)$	$\Delta \ln(C)$	$\Delta \ln(B)$
ΔCS	-0.035*** (0.013)	-0.401*** (0.091)	0.640*** (0.095)	0.474*** (0.090)	0.485*** (0.084)	0.094** (0.047)	0.448*** (0.072)
$\Delta \ln(FundSize)$	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.210*** (0.019)	0.242*** (0.024)	0.122*** (0.017)	0.221*** (0.021)	0.130*** (0.013)	0.128*** (0.016)
$\Delta \ln(f)$	-0.025 (0.015)	0.034 (0.047)	0.041 (0.036)	-0.009 (0.031)	0.057 (0.036)	0.053* (0.029)	0.016 (0.030)
$\Delta \ln(T)$			-0.020** (0.009)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.007)
$\Delta \ln(D)$				-0.373*** (0.021)			
$\Delta \ln(S)$					-0.588*** (0.018)	-0.167*** (0.015)	-0.497*** (0.023)
$\Delta \ln(B)$						-0.107*** (0.014)	
$\Delta \ln(C)$							-0.225*** (0.027)
Fixed Effects							
• Benchmark \times Quarter	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	30,779	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500
R^2	0.128	0.073	0.112	0.289	0.286	0.135	0.257
R^2 (proj. model)	0.004	0.020	0.044	0.223	0.238	0.075	0.210

Appendix D

Additional Results: Mutual Fund Scandal

Table D.1
Fund Characteristics as of August 2003 by Scandal Involvement

Means of various characteristics as of August 2003, depending on whether the family the fund belongs to was later implicated in the late trading scandal. Returns are annualized, in percentages. Fund families are assigned to scandal involvement according to Table 1 of ?.

Scandal involvement	No	Yes
N	1,173	289
$CompetitorSize \times 10^2$	0.41	0.49
TNA (100m \$)	10.72	12.52
R^{FF3}	-6.77	-10.31
Fund age	11.62	14.73
Expense ratio	1.35	1.46
AS	0.72	0.79
T	0.84	1
L	0.06	0.06
$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	1.35	1.46

Table D.2
Snapshot of Untainted Fund Characteristics as of August 2003

<i>ScandalExposure:</i>	Below median	Above median
N	587	586
$CompetitorSize \times 10^2$	0.38	0.44
TNA (100m \$)	10.97	10.47
R^{FF3}	-2.34	-11.14
Fund age	11.57	11.66
Expense ratio	1.31	1.38
AS	0.71	0.74
T	0.72	0.96
L	0.06	0.05
$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	1.18	1.51

Table D.3
Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Testing for Pre-Trends

The estimation sample includes only funds not directly involved in the scandal, over the period [2003m8 – W, 2003m8]. Dependent variables are noted in the table header. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. *ScandalExposure* (abbreviated *ScanEx*) is the fraction of untainted funds' *CompetitorSize* due to portfolio similarity with future scandal funds in August 2003. *ScandalExposure* is normalized by its interquartile range. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and portfolio group \times time, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(C.S.)$	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window								
$t \times ScanEx$	0.106 (0.445)	0.016 (0.101)	0.665 (0.440)	0.302 (0.480)	0.396 (0.406)	0.090 (0.398)	0.236 (0.200)	-0.106 (0.349)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.085 (0.056)	0.025 (0.026)	-0.148*** (0.048)	0.090 (0.061)	0.053 (0.050)	0.075 (0.060)	0.023 (0.038)	0.063 (0.049)
$\ln(f)$	0.081 (0.188)	0.064 (0.063)	0.059 (0.217)	0.043 (0.182)	0.012 (0.090)	0.045 (0.181)	-0.058 (0.102)	0.101 (0.134)
$\ln(T)$				-0.008 (0.020)	-0.000 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.015)
$\ln(D)$					-0.350*** (0.077)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.527*** (0.129)	-0.273*** (0.080)	-0.346*** (0.124)
$\ln(B)$							-0.126** (0.063)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.235** (0.118)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,141	2,710	12,025	3,093	3,093	3,093	3,093	3,093
R^2	0.973	0.973	0.966	0.989	0.995	0.982	0.982	0.965
R^2 (proj. model)	0.003	0.005	0.008	0.004	0.187	0.186	0.127	0.111
Panel B: 2 year window								
$t \times ScanEx$	0.267 (0.216)	-0.010 (0.055)	0.621** (0.287)	0.147 (0.244)	-0.005 (0.153)	0.180 (0.247)	-0.017 (0.142)	0.214 (0.212)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.197*** (0.031)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.194*** (0.039)	0.262*** (0.041)	0.142*** (0.032)	0.221*** (0.037)	0.088*** (0.021)	0.162*** (0.033)
$\ln(f)$	-0.021 (0.080)	-0.021 (0.033)	0.164 (0.112)	0.014 (0.107)	-0.078 (0.081)	0.068 (0.092)	0.019 (0.059)	0.058 (0.084)
$\ln(T)$				-0.016 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.016)
$\ln(D)$					-0.304*** (0.039)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.538*** (0.077)	-0.241*** (0.054)	-0.369*** (0.076)
$\ln(B)$							-0.106*** (0.036)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.179*** (0.063)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,004	5,198	22,951	5,898	5,898	5,898	5,898	5,898
R^2	0.949	0.955	0.937	0.977	0.990	0.960	0.958	0.926
R^2 (proj. model)	0.037	0.002	0.023	0.053	0.177	0.181	0.086	0.124

Table D.4

Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Before and After Analysis — Benchmark \times Date FE

Dependent variables are identified in the column headers. $\ln(C.S.)$ is an abbreviation for $\ln(CompetitorSize)$. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. The estimation sample includes only funds not directly involved in the scandal. It covers the period $\{(2003m8 - W, 2003m8], [2004m11, 2004m11 + W)\}$, where W corresponds to the number of years specified. *ScandalExposure* (abbreviated to *ScanEx*) is the fraction of untainted funds' *CompetitorSize* due to portfolio similarity with future scandal funds in August 2003. *ScandalExposure* is normalized by its interquartile range. \mathbb{I} is an indicator for the post scandal period. Benchmarks are the indexes which yield the lowest active share, taken from [Petajisto \(2013\)](#). I use the most recently available benchmark when one is missing. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and benchmark \times date, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(C.S.)$	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window								
$\mathbb{I} \times ScanEx$	-0.050** (0.021)	0.018*** (0.006)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.076*** (0.028)	-0.067*** (0.021)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.017 (0.019)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.124*** (0.020)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.140*** (0.029)	0.148*** (0.026)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.128*** (0.025)	0.062*** (0.019)	0.074*** (0.017)
$\ln(f)$	0.006 (0.105)	-0.016 (0.027)	0.031 (0.132)	0.017 (0.118)	-0.084 (0.074)	0.078 (0.112)	0.072 (0.071)	0.012 (0.085)
$\ln(T)$				-0.051* (0.027)	-0.050*** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.026)	0.028* (0.015)	-0.052*** (0.019)
$\ln(D)$					-0.193*** (0.023)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.441*** (0.054)	-0.248*** (0.043)	-0.222*** (0.050)
$\ln(B)$							-0.051* (0.031)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.077* (0.046)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Benchmark \times Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,079	6,072	24,192	6,893	6,893	6,893	6,893	6,893
R^2	0.932	0.932	0.903	0.966	0.990	0.946	0.949	0.900
R^2 (proj. model)	0.039	0.008	0.015	0.046	0.114	0.102	0.079	0.048
Panel B: 2 year window								
$\mathbb{I} \times ScanEx$	-0.022 (0.022)	0.020*** (0.006)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.067** (0.029)	-0.076*** (0.023)	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.029* (0.017)	0.007 (0.019)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.138*** (0.017)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.178*** (0.024)	0.165*** (0.024)	0.059*** (0.012)	0.143*** (0.023)	0.067*** (0.016)	0.084*** (0.016)
$\ln(f)$	-0.089 (0.070)	0.007 (0.025)	0.109 (0.110)	-0.072 (0.107)	-0.140** (0.064)	0.020 (0.092)	0.071 (0.063)	-0.048 (0.074)
$\ln(T)$				-0.040* (0.023)	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.013 (0.021)	0.028** (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.015)
$\ln(D)$					-0.172*** (0.019)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.404*** (0.042)	-0.224*** (0.034)	-0.203*** (0.040)
$\ln(B)$							-0.046** (0.023)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.067** (0.033)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Benchmark \times Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,666	11,773	46,660	13,291	13,291	13,291	13,291	13,291
R^2	0.905	0.898	0.867	0.949	0.985	0.921	0.924	0.859
R^2 (proj. model)	0.052	0.010	0.031	0.056	0.102	0.094	0.066	0.048

Table D.5
Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Testing for Pre-Trends — Benchmark \times Time FE

The estimation sample includes only funds not directly involved in the scandal, over the period [2003m8 – W, 2003m8]. Dependent variables are noted in the table header. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. *ScandalExposure* (abbreviated *ScanEx*) is the fraction of untainted funds' *CompetitorSize* due to portfolio similarity with future scandal funds in August 2003. *ScandalExposure* is normalized by its interquartile range. Benchmarks are the indexes which yield the lowest active share, taken from [Petajisto \(2013\)](#). I use the most recently available benchmark when one is missing. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and benchmark \times time, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(C.S.)$	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window								
$t \times ScanEx$	0.112 (0.492)	0.071 (0.118)	0.433 (0.506)	0.339 (0.481)	-0.035 (0.338)	0.415 (0.470)	0.063 (0.242)	0.404 (0.408)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.067 (0.054)	0.015 (0.014)	-0.146*** (0.047)	0.082 (0.052)	0.079** (0.034)	0.052 (0.056)	0.003 (0.038)	0.055 (0.041)
$\ln(f)$	0.132 (0.198)	0.037 (0.047)	0.071 (0.219)	0.143 (0.157)	0.074 (0.084)	0.126 (0.154)	-0.036 (0.086)	0.171 (0.130)
$\ln(T)$				-0.009 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.015)	0.001 (0.018)
$\ln(D)$					-0.303*** (0.062)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.615*** (0.068)	-0.324*** (0.090)	-0.397*** (0.104)
$\ln(B)$							-0.122* (0.067)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.229* (0.124)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Benchmark \times Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,141	2,710	12,025	3,093	3,093	3,093	3,093	3,093
R^2	0.976	0.981	0.968	0.991	0.997	0.985	0.985	0.969
R^2 (proj. model)	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.004	0.191	0.188	0.132	0.108
Panel B: 2 year window								
$t \times ScanEx$	0.351 (0.270)	-0.011 (0.061)	0.851*** (0.328)	0.322 (0.282)	0.011 (0.180)	0.370 (0.270)	-0.090 (0.137)	0.485** (0.246)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.183*** (0.033)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.198*** (0.040)	0.266*** (0.042)	0.131*** (0.029)	0.226*** (0.039)	0.089*** (0.023)	0.162*** (0.035)
$\ln(f)$	-0.028 (0.085)	-0.025 (0.032)	0.174 (0.111)	0.002 (0.106)	-0.063 (0.068)	0.044 (0.094)	0.016 (0.055)	0.033 (0.084)
$\ln(T)$				-0.014 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.015)	0.001 (0.017)
$\ln(D)$					-0.263*** (0.039)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.517*** (0.082)	-0.244*** (0.060)	-0.335*** (0.084)
$\ln(B)$							-0.089** (0.037)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.157** (0.067)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Benchmark \times Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,004	5,198	22,951	5,898	5,898	5,898	5,898	5,898
R^2	0.953	0.962	0.939	0.979	0.992	0.963	0.963	0.933
R^2 (proj. model)	0.030	0.003	0.023	0.051	0.148	0.156	0.083	0.099

Table D.6
Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Using Abnormal Flows — Benchmark \times Time FE

Dependent variables are identified in the column headers. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. The estimation sample includes untainted funds during $\{[2003m9 - W, 2004m10 + W]\}$, where W corresponds to the number of years specified at the bottom of each panel. *ScandalOutFlow* is the similarity-weighted cumulative abnormal outflows attributable to the scandal among involved funds. *ScandalOutFlow* is normalized by its interquartile range. $\ln(C.S.)$ is an abbreviation for $\ln(CompetitorSize)$. Benchmarks are the indexes which yield the lowest active share, taken from [Petajisto \(2013\)](#). I use the most recently available benchmark when one is missing. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and benchmark \times time, and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(C.S.)$	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window								
<i>ScandalOutFlow</i>	-0.199*** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.008)	0.093*** (0.030)	-0.246*** (0.028)	-0.111*** (0.017)	-0.213*** (0.026)	-0.075*** (0.017)	-0.161*** (0.019)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.090*** (0.017)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.122*** (0.027)	0.124*** (0.022)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.106*** (0.021)	0.068*** (0.016)	0.051*** (0.015)
$\ln(f)$	-0.066 (0.075)	-0.010 (0.023)	0.041 (0.108)	-0.031 (0.089)	-0.074 (0.055)	0.011 (0.087)	0.065 (0.057)	-0.049 (0.065)
$\ln(T)$				-0.048** (0.019)	-0.036*** (0.011)	-0.032* (0.018)	0.015 (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.014)
$\ln(D)$					-0.235*** (0.021)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.518*** (0.047)	-0.265*** (0.036)	-0.313*** (0.046)
$\ln(B)$							-0.091*** (0.027)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.148*** (0.042)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Benchmark \times Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,095	10,334	39,784	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689
R^2	0.939	0.945	0.909	0.971	0.991	0.953	0.954	0.909
R^2 (proj. model)	0.075	0.053	0.015	0.088	0.141	0.160	0.095	0.100
Panel B: 2 year window								
<i>ScandalOutFlow</i>	-0.161*** (0.018)	0.059*** (0.007)	0.102*** (0.026)	-0.224*** (0.026)	-0.107*** (0.016)	-0.186*** (0.024)	-0.069*** (0.017)	-0.133*** (0.017)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.114*** (0.014)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.164*** (0.023)	0.143*** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.125*** (0.020)	0.069*** (0.014)	0.068*** (0.014)
$\ln(f)$	-0.123** (0.058)	0.010 (0.022)	0.132 (0.093)	-0.109 (0.095)	-0.143** (0.058)	-0.031 (0.082)	0.060 (0.054)	-0.091 (0.067)
$\ln(T)$				-0.037** (0.019)	-0.036*** (0.010)	-0.019 (0.018)	0.019* (0.012)	-0.039*** (0.013)
$\ln(D)$					-0.212*** (0.018)			
$\ln(S)$						-0.487*** (0.038)	-0.251*** (0.031)	-0.282*** (0.039)
$\ln(B)$							-0.078*** (0.022)	
$\ln(C)$								-0.116*** (0.032)
Fixed Effects								
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Benchmark \times Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,904	16,211	63,055	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309
R^2	0.913	0.913	0.875	0.955	0.986	0.930	0.930	0.871
R^2 (proj. model)	0.077	0.058	0.033	0.094	0.130	0.144	0.083	0.086

Table D.7
Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Instrumenting Competitor Size with Abnormal Flows

The estimation sample includes only funds not directly involved in the scandal, over the period $\{[2003m9 - W, 2004m10 + W]\}$, where W corresponds to the number of years specified. Dependent variables are noted in the column headers. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. *ScandalOutFlow* is the similarity-weighted cumulative abnormal outflows attributable to the scandal among involved funds. *ScandalOutFlow* is normalized by its interquartile range. I estimate regressions via two stage least squares, instrumenting for $\ln(CompetitorSize_{i,t})$ with *ScandalOutFlow*_{*i,t*}. The F-statistic of the first stage relation is reported at the bottom of each panel. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and portfolio group \times time, and are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window							
$\ln(CompetitorSize)$	-0.331*** (0.045)	-0.642*** (0.135)	1.212*** (0.091)	1.014*** (0.118)	1.077*** (0.089)	0.824*** (0.140)	0.856*** (0.076)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.020** (0.008)	-0.088*** (0.030)	0.030* (0.018)	0.026* (0.015)	0.026 (0.017)	0.031* (0.017)	0.004 (0.012)
$\ln(f)$	-0.025 (0.032)	0.002 (0.106)	0.034 (0.080)	0.012 (0.069)	0.049 (0.073)	0.068 (0.067)	-0.009 (0.050)
$\ln(T)$			-0.043*** (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.011)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.043*** (0.009)
$\ln(D)$				-0.739*** (0.060)			
$\ln(S)$					-0.705*** (0.035)	-0.560*** (0.059)	-0.528*** (0.039)
$\ln(B)$						-0.636*** (0.097)	
$\ln(C)$							-0.422*** (0.042)
Fixed Effects							
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,334	39,784	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689
F (first stage)	53.2	22.7	177.7	73.6	146.6	34.4	127.7
Panel B: 2 year window							
$\ln(CompetitorSize)$	-0.359*** (0.045)	-0.670*** (0.134)	1.240*** (0.098)	1.089*** (0.126)	1.045*** (0.093)	0.802*** (0.135)	0.792*** (0.081)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.028*** (0.009)	-0.106*** (0.027)	0.018 (0.018)	0.013 (0.016)	0.020 (0.017)	0.021 (0.016)	0.007 (0.012)
$\ln(f)$	-0.034 (0.026)	0.054 (0.093)	0.034 (0.067)	-0.001 (0.064)	0.076 (0.057)	0.095* (0.052)	0.003 (0.047)
$\ln(T)$			-0.035*** (0.013)	-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.020* (0.012)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.009)
$\ln(D)$				-0.775*** (0.062)			
$\ln(S)$					-0.657*** (0.028)	-0.513*** (0.049)	-0.484*** (0.036)
$\ln(B)$						-0.606*** (0.090)	
$\ln(C)$							-0.408*** (0.038)
Fixed Effects							
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,211	63,055	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309
F (first stage)	64.2	24.9	161.8	75.1	127.3	35.5	94.4

Table D.8
Capital Allocation and the Scandal: Instrumenting Competitor Size with Abnormal Flows —
Benchmark \times Time FE

The estimation sample includes only funds not directly involved in the scandal, over the period $\{[2003m9 - W, 2004m10 + W]\}$, where W corresponds to the number of years specified. Dependent variables are noted in the column headers. For regressions with $\ln(TL^{-1/2})$ as the dependent variable, observations are at the fund-month level. Other specifications are at the fund-report date level. *ScandalOutFlow* is the similarity-weighted cumulative abnormal outflows attributable to the scandal among involved funds. *ScandalOutFlow* is normalized by its interquartile range. I estimate regressions via two stage least squares, instrumenting for $\ln(CompetitorSize_{i,t})$ with *ScandalOutFlow*_{*i,t*}. The F-statistic of the first stage relation is reported at the bottom of each panel. Standard errors are double clustered by fund and benchmark \times time, and are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Dep. Var.:	$\ln(AS)$	$\ln(TL^{-1/2})$	$\ln(L)$	$\ln(S)$	$\ln(D)$	$\ln(C)$	$\ln(B)$
Panel A: 1 year window							
$\ln(CompetitorSize)$	-0.299*** (0.045)	-0.476*** (0.152)	1.230*** (0.098)	0.970*** (0.141)	1.131*** (0.099)	0.856*** (0.184)	0.954*** (0.087)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.021** (0.009)	-0.078*** (0.030)	0.014 (0.019)	0.011 (0.015)	0.012 (0.018)	0.021 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.013)
$\ln(f)$	-0.022 (0.030)	0.017 (0.103)	0.031 (0.078)	0.001 (0.065)	0.051 (0.074)	0.061 (0.065)	0.006 (0.054)
$\ln(T)$			-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.038*** (0.009)
$\ln(D)$				-0.706*** (0.074)			
$\ln(S)$					-0.716*** (0.038)	-0.573*** (0.075)	-0.553*** (0.042)
$\ln(B)$						-0.659*** (0.128)	
$\ln(C)$							-0.452*** (0.044)
Fixed Effects							
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,334	39,784	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689	11,689
F (first stage)	44.4	9.8	158.2	47.4	130.8	21.7	120.8
Panel B: 2 year window							
$\ln(CompetitorSize)$	-0.369*** (0.054)	-0.641*** (0.163)	1.375*** (0.113)	1.208*** (0.190)	1.229*** (0.111)	1.031*** (0.230)	1.026*** (0.102)
$\ln(FundSize)$	0.033*** (0.010)	-0.092*** (0.028)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.002 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.014)
$\ln(f)$	-0.031 (0.025)	0.055 (0.090)	0.040 (0.067)	0.014 (0.066)	0.072 (0.059)	0.079 (0.053)	0.020 (0.048)
$\ln(T)$			-0.026** (0.013)	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.028*** (0.009)
$\ln(D)$				-0.818*** (0.100)			
$\ln(S)$					-0.686*** (0.034)	-0.593*** (0.082)	-0.533*** (0.040)
$\ln(B)$						-0.763*** (0.159)	
$\ln(C)$							-0.483*** (0.045)
Fixed Effects							
• Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
• Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,211	63,055	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309	18,309
F (first stage)	46.6	15.5	147.3	40.2	123.3	20.1	102.0

Bibliography

- Antón, M. and Polk, C. (2014). Connected stocks. *Journal of Finance*, 69(3):1099–1127.
- Berk, J. B. and Green, R. C. (2004). Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(6):1269–1295.
- Berk, J. B. and van Binsbergen, J. H. (2015). Measuring skill in the mutual fund industry. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 118(1):1–20.
- Berk, J. B., van Binsbergen, J. H., and Liu, B. (2017). Matching capital and labor. *Forthcoming, Journal of Finance*.
- Blocher, J. (2016). Network externalities in mutual funds. *Journal of Financial Markets*, 30:1–26.
- Busse, J. A., Chordia, T., Jiang, L., and Tang, Y. (2017). Mutual fund trading costs. Working paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2350583>.
- Cao, B. and Xue, J. (2015). Mutual fund links update procedures. WRDS Research Note. Available at: https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_090MFLINKS/Mutual%20Fund%20Links%20Update%20Procedure.pdf.cfm.
- Chamberlain, G. (1982). Multivariate regression models for panel data. *Journal of Econometrics*, 18(1):5–46.
- Chen, J., Hong, H., Huang, M., and Kubik, J. D. (2004). Does fund size erode mutual fund performance? The role of liquidity and organization. *American Economic Review*, 94(5):1276–1302.
- Cohen, L. H., Malloy, C. J., and Nguyen, Q. H. (2016). Lazy prices. Working paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1658471>.
- Cohen, R. B., Coval, J. D., and Pástor, Luboš. (2005). Judging fund managers by the company they keep. *Journal of Finance*, 60(3):1057–1096.
- Coval, J. D. and Stafford, E. (2007). Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 86(2):479–512.
- Cremers, M. (2017). Active share and the three pillars of active management: Skill, conviction and opportunity. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 73(2):61–79.
- Cremers, M. and Petajisto, A. (2009). How active is your fund manager? A new measure that predicts performance. *Review of Financial Studies*, 22(9):3329–3365.
- Cremers, M., Petajisto, A., and Zitzewitz, E. W. (2012). Should benchmark indices have alpha? Revisiting performance evaluation. *Critical Finance Review*, 2:1–48.
- Evans, R. (2000). Mutual fund incubation. *Journal of Finance*, 65(4):1581–1611.
- Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (2010). Luck versus skill in the cross-section of mutual fund returns. *Journal of Finance*, 65(5):1915–1947.
- French, K. R. (2008). Presidential address: The cost of active investing. *Journal of Finance*, 63(4):1537–1573.

- Gruber, M. J. (1996). Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds. *Journal of Finance*, 51(3):783–810.
- Harvey, C. R. and Liu, Y. (2017). Decreasing returns to scale, fund flows, and performance. Duke I&E Research Paper No. 2017-13. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990737>.
- Hoberg, G., Kumar, N., and Prabhala, N. (2017). Mutual fund competition, managerial skill, and alpha persistence. *Forthcoming, Review of Financial Studies*.
- Houge, T. and Wellman, J. (2005). Fallout from the mutual fund trading scandal. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 62:129–139.
- Jensen, M. C. (1968). The performance of mutual funds in the period 1945–1964. *Journal of Finance*, 23(2):389–416.
- Kacperczyk, M., Nieuwerburgh, S. V., and Veldkamp, L. (2016). A rational theory of mutual funds’ attention allocation. *Econometrica*, 84(2):571–626.
- Kacperczyk, M., Sialm, C., and Zheng, L. (2005). On the industry concentration of actively managed equity mutual funds. *Journal of Finance*, 60(4):1983–2011.
- Kacperczyk, M., Sialm, C., and Zheng, L. (2008). Unobserved actions of mutual funds. *Review of Financial Studies*, 21(6):2379–2416.
- Khan, M., Kogan, L., and Serafeim, G. (2012). Mutual fund trading pressure: Firm-level stock price impact and timing of SEOs. *Journal of Finance*, 68(4):1371–1395.
- Lou, D. (2012). A flow-based explanation for return predictability. *Review of Financial Studies*, 25(12):3457–3489.
- Maksimovic, V. and Phillips, G. (2002). Do conglomerate firms allocate resources inefficiently across industries? theory and evidence. *Journal of Finance*, 57(2):721–767.
- Maksimovic, V. and Phillips, G. M. (2013). Conglomerate firms, internal capital markets, and the theory of the firm. *Annual Review of Financial Economics*, 5:225–244.
- Malkiel, B. G. (1995). Returns from investing in equity mutual funds, 1971–1991. *Journal of Finance*, 50(2):549–572.
- Malkiel, B. G. (2013). Asset management fees and the growth of finance. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 27(2):97–108.
- McCabe, P. (2008). The economics of the mutual fund trading scandal. Finance and economics discussion series, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.
- McLemore, P. (2016). Do mutual funds have decreasing returns to scale? evidence from fund mergers. Working paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2490824>.
- Pástor, v. and Stambaugh, R. F. (2012). On the size of the active management industry. *Journal of Political Economy*, 120(4):740–781.
- Pástor, v., Stambaugh, R. F., and Taylor, L. A. (2015). Scale and skill in active management. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 116(1):23–45.
- Pástor, v., Stambaugh, R. F., and Taylor, L. A. (2017a). Do funds make more when they trade more? *Journal of Finance*, 72(4):1483–1528.
- Pástor, v., Stambaugh, R. F., and Taylor, L. A. (2017b). Fund tradeoffs. Working paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011700>.
- Petajisto, A. (2013). Active share and mutual fund performance. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 69(4):73–93.

- Pollet, J. M. and Wilson, M. (2008). How does size affect mutual fund behavior? *Journal of Finance*, 63(6):2941–2969.
- Reuter, J. and Zitzewitz, E. W. (2015). How much does size erode mutual fund performance? a regression discontinuity approach. Working paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1661447>.
- Sirri, E. R. and Tufano, P. (1998). Costly search and mutual fund flows. *Journal of Finance*, 53(5):1589–1622.
- Wahal, S. and Wang, A. Y. (2011). Competition among mutual funds. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 99(1):40–59.
- Wermers, R. (2000). Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock-picking talent, style, transaction costs, and expenses. *Journal of Finance*, 55(4):1655–1695.
- Zhu, Q. (2017). The missing new funds. Working paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004268>.
- Zitzewitz, E. W. (2006). How widespread was late trading in mutual funds? *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, 96(2):284–289.
- Zitzewitz, E. W. (2009). Prosecutorial discretion in mutual fund settlement negotiations, 2003-7. *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*, 9(1):Article 24.