
COSC362 Assignment

Logan Beard 85676783 Matt Belworthy Lewthwaite 11030423

> Agreed contribution: Logan - 50% Matt - 50%


3.1.1 - Use OpenVAS for Vulnerability Scanning

Windows XP 'full and fast' OpenVAS scan result




A total of 19 vulnerabilities were found on the Windows XP virtual machine using the OpenVAS 'fast and full'. Of these vulnerabilities 5 were classified as high severity and the remaining 14 were classified in the log severity class.


Metasploitable 'full and fast' OpenVAS scan result



A total of 148 vulnerabilities were found on the MetaSploitable virtual machine when using OpenVAS 'fast and full'. Of these vulnerabilities 22 were classified as high severity, 42 as medium severity, 4 as low severity and 80 as log severity.



A total of 149 vulnerabilities were found on the MetaSploitable virtual machine when using OpenVAS 'full and very deep ultimate' scan. Of these vulnerabilities 22 were classified as high severity, 43 as medium severity, 4 as low severity and 80 as log. It was found that the 'full and very deep ultimate' scan uncovered one more medium severity vulnerability.



A total of 20 vulnerabilities were found on the Windows XP virtual machine when using OpenVAS 'full and very deep ultimate scan'. Of these vulnerabilities 5 were classified as high severity, and 15 as 'log' severity. It was found that the 'full and very deep ultimate scan' uncovered one more log severity vulnerability.

Full and fast is the default option and is usually the best to start with. Full and fast is based on the information gathered in the prior port scan and uses nearly all of the Network Vulnerability Tests. This option requires little effort, while the other configurations provide more value in few cases but with much more effort required.

Full and very deep requires more effort and thus is quite a bit slower due to the port scan results not having an impact on the selection of the Network Vulnerability Tests, therefore Network Vulnerability Tests will be used that will be forced to wait for a timeout.


3.1.2 - Use Nessus For Vulnerability Scanning

Metasploitable Nessus Scan Results



The Nessus Scan of the Metasploitable machine turned up 147 vulnerabilities, of which 113 (76.9%) were 'info' severity (comparable to 'log' in OpenVAS), 7 (4.8%) were low severity, 20 (13.6%) were medium severity, 2 (1.4%) were high severity, and the remaining 5 (3.4%) were of critical severity.


Windows XP Nessus Scan Results



The Nessus Scan of the Windows XP machine turned up 36 vulnerabilities, of which 26 (72%) were 'info' severity, 2 (5.6%) were low severity, 4 (11.1%) were medium severity, 1 (2.8%) was high severity, and the remaining 3 (8.3%) were of critical severity.

3.1.3 - Compare OpenVAS and Nessus

When comparing the quantity of vulnerabilities found it is hard to say what scan which scan was better, especially due to the large overlap in discovered vulnerabilities. All scans showed common severe Metasploitable vulnerabilities such as vsftpd_234_backdoor, java_rmi_server and postgres_payload, and severe Windows XP vulnerabilities such as ms08_067_netapi. It was also found that as the degree of severity decreased, the amount of overlap in the findings increased. This is likely due to the plugins that Nessus and OpenVAS share. The OpenVAS Full and Very Deep Ultimate scan discovered overall 7 more Metasploitable vulnerabilities than the Nessus scan, 10 more of high severity, 23 more of medium severity, 3 fewer low severity and 33 fewer info/log vulnerabilities. Nessus scan discovered overall 13 more Windows XP Vulnerabilities than the OpenVAS Full and Very Deep Ultimate Scan, 4 fewer of high severity, 4 more of medium severity, 2 more of low severity and 11 more info/log vulnerabilities. The quality of detection differs for the different scans across the different machines, however Nessus has more plugins and so it potentially offers more.



The Nessus scan took the least amount of time, being 4 minutes, and was 14 minutes faster than the OpenVAS Full and Fast scan, that took 16 minutes. Regarding computer security 14 minutes isn't too much of a difference, though overtime with multiple scans the time difference will accumulate considerable amount.

Nessus and OpenVAS both generated scan reports that included a summaries followed by the analysis of discovered vulnerabilities. The report generated by the Nessus scan seemed to be more detailed. It offered

further information like ports and plugin information (which includes supported algorithms for things such as Cipher Block Chaining). On topic of the reports generated, the report generated by the Nessus scan is better for ease of translation into applicable, real-world results.


It is hard to come to a conclusion on what scan is better because there are so many factors to consider and it also depends on what machine the scan is going to be used on, though on a whole the Nessus scan was more impressive due to the analysis of the exploits in the report.

3.2.1 - Setting Up Metasploit and Armitage


We set up a Metasploit session by launching Armitage - a GUI based implementation of Metasploit, which can be easily navigated and used to exploit hosts.

3.2.2 - Importing Scan Results into Metasploit Database

The reports generated by Nessus were imported into Armitage, and the Windows XP and Metasploitable hosts appeared in the GUI.



In order to be able to use exploits on these hosts the 'find attacks' script needed to be run. After running this script from the 'Attacks' menu a number of OS-specific attacks that the two hosts may be vulnerable to were listed under the 'Attack' right-click option shown below.




3.2.3 - Exploiting Metasploitable

In order to exploit the Metasploitable machine so that we gain access to a shell we systematically launched attacks from the 'Attacks' list (using a reverse TCP connection where possible, and inputting any extra parameters if needed) and noted the result of each script. The following attacks succeeded and granted access to a shell on the attacker machine:


vsftpd 234 backdoor (ftp)

This attack exploits a backdoor which was added to the VSFTPD archive on linux machines. The exploit was first noted on June 30th 2011, and was removed from the software just 4 days later. Upon execution the attack exploits this backdoor and finds a shell which is opened as root and returned on the attacker machine.




unreal ircd 3281 backdoor (irc)

This attack works by exploiting a backdoor in the Internet Relay Chat daemon (IRCD) discovered in 2009 in order to access a shell as root. Upon successful execution the shell is passed back to the attacker machine.




distcc exec

Machines which run 'distccd' - a program for sharing and compiling code - are vulnerable to being exploited and running arbitrary code. In the case of this attack, it harnesses this ability to execute code to open a shell and give the attacker access to this shell.




java rmi server

This attack exploits the ability for Java RMI to load classes from any remote HTTP URL. When launched successfully against a vulnerable machine, this exploit has the ability to render a Meterpreter shell which is extremely useful to attackers as it allows greater exploitation capabilities.




postgres payload (postgres)

Due to the fact that on some Linux distributions of PostgreSQL, the postgres service may write-to and read-from the /tmp/ directory in a manner which allows arbitrary code execution, this attack will initiate a shell as the root user for the attacker when executed successfully.



usermap script (samba)

On older versions of Samba, when using the "username map script" configuration option, shell commands can be executed by supplying them as usernames. This allows for shell commands to be run on the victim as root, from the attacker machine when the exploit is instantiated successfully.



3.2.4 - Harvesting Credentials from Metasploitable

Metasploitable credentials were harvested from the victim machine with the following process:

- 1. The 'java rmi server' exploit was used to make the meterpreter shell available.
- 2. From the meterpreter shell file explorer, two of the Metasploitable machine's files were downloaded /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.
- 3. The shadow file was unshadowed with the command unshadow passwd shadow > mypasswd.
- 4. John the Ripper was to launch a dictionary attack on the unshadowed password file (mypasswd). This attack used the default wordlist 'password.lst'.

Upon completion of the dictionary attack three passwords were cracked:

- '123456789' for the 'klog' user
- 'service' for the 'service' user
- 'batman' for the 'sys' user/group


Another more comprehensive wordlist 'rockyou.txt' was also used in John the Ripper to attempt to obtain more password cracks. However, this yielded no more passwords than the initial dictionary attack. John the Ripper is also capable of cracking passwords in ways other than dictionary attacks. We attempted to crack the passwords using 'iterative mode' where essentially all possible combinations of password characters are brute-forced. This type of attack was left running for over 7 hours to no avail, however.

3.2.5 - Exploiting Vulnerabilities In Windows XP

Attacks for the Windows XP machine were discovered in a similar systematic way to that carried out for the Metasploitable machine. However, it was clear that successful attacks were much harder to come by for Windows XP as the operating system, while insecure, is not intentionally exploitable like Metasploitable. The following exploits are those that we managed to successfully launch on the Windows XP machine:


ms08 067 netapi (smb)

This attack is a well known Windows exploit which targets a parsing flaw in the code of 'NetAPI32.dll' in order to gain access to a shell on the attacker machine. Upon successful execution in metasploit a meterpreter shell is opened - giving the attacker a vast amount of control of the Windows XP machine (shown in screenshot below). The full capabilities of this shell are explored later in this report.



ms12 020 maxchannelids (rdp)


The ms12_020_maxchennelids exploit leverages a vulnerability in the way that the T.125 ConnectMCSPDU packet (under the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)) is handled in regard to it's MaxChannelID's field - resulting in an invalid pointer being used, and the system immediately crashing. When this DoS attack is successfully carried out, the Windows XP machine 'blue-screens' almost instantly, and reboots. This attack is different to those carried out so far as it does not give access to a shell, but DoS attacks such as these can be just as devastating when used in the right context.




ms11 006 createsizeddibsection (fileformat)

This attack generates a Word document with some code embedded within. The file must be transferred by some means to the victim's machine, and when the file is viewed in the Windows Explorer in 'Thumbnails' view mode the entire Windows XP GUI/Explorer will crash and have to be reset. In our case, we already had access to a meterpreter shell from the previous 'ms08_067_netapi' attack, so this was used to transfer the file to the victim's machine. This could also be done by compressing and emailing in the real world, or other means of transfer like FTP. Screenshots of the attack process are shown below.


The exploit generating the bad Word document in Kali Linux:



Using the meterpreter shell to upload the file to the victim machine:




Changing the Windows XP file explorer view mode to 'Thumbnails' in the directory the bad file is located in, which will trigger the crashes:



The message given by Windows XP when the GUI crashes:




3.2.6 - Exploring Post Exploitation Capabilities in Windows XP




The 'ms08_067_netapi' exploit enabled the Meterpreter menu and from there it was astonishing how much havoc could be inflicted on the XP machine. Gaining access to the Meterpreter allowed us as the attack to almost have complete reign of the victims PC. The Meterpreter offered a range of different attacks such as:


• Dumping password hashes:



• Browsing the Windows XP machine's files:




• Uploading malicious files:



• Logging the user's keystrokes:

```
you need to connect to the Internet in order to activate
all be done automatically-defined foregroundes, but you record
in the done automatically-defined foregroundes, but you record in the property of the first of the Internet in order to activate
all be done automatically-defined foregroundes, but you record in the property of the first of the Internet in order to activate
all be done automatically-defined foregroundes, but you record in the property of the Internet in order to activate
all be done automatically-defined foregroundes, but you record in the property of the Internet in order to activate
all be done automatically-defined foregroundes, but you record in the property of the Internet in order to activate
and a property of the Internet in order to activate
all be done automatically-defined foregroundes. A well-of the exploit X exploi
```

• Viewing the victim's screen, which can be used in conjunction with keyloggers to easily steal passwords:



[+] Keystrokes captured password
[+] Keystrokes captured <CR>

• Show the victim machine's processes, which can be used to more accurately launch attacks, or more accurately target user credentials:



• Using cmd remotely:

```
Log Keystrokes X
                                                                                                   Screenshot 5 X
                                                                                                                                                                    Processes 5 X cmd.exe 224@5 X
                                                                                           36 vb.ini
37 vbaddin.ini
10/12/2012 01:41 PM
10/12/2012 01:41 PM
 11/06/2013 02:40 PM
                                                                                  13,555 vmgcoinstall.log
11/66/2013 02:40 PM

11/06/2013 02:40 PM

11/06/2013 02:40 PM

04/14/2008 05:00 AM

11/03/2013 04:07 AM

11/06/2013 02:38 PM

10/12/2012 06:39 AM

10/12/2012 06:39 AM

10/12/2012 06:43 PM

10/12/2012 06:43 PM
                                                                             5,778 vmguestsetup.log
414,328 vmguestsetup.msi.log
18,944 vmmreg32.dll
wBEM
4,129 Wdf01009Inst.log
4,225 Wdf01009Inst.log
401 wiadebug.log
50 wiaservc.log
477 win.ini
342,035 Windowslpdate.log
256,192 winhelp.exe
283,648 winhlp32.exe
WinSXS
936 wmsetup.log
                                                                                   5,778 vmguestsetup.log
                                                             <DIR>
                                                             <DIR>
 10/12/2012
                              01:43 PM
10/12/2012 01:43 PM

10/06/2018 09:33 PM

04/14/2008 05:00 AM

04/14/2008 05:00 AM


10/12/2012 06:36 AM

10/12/2012 01:47 PM

10/12/2012 01:43 PM

10/12/2012 01:43 PM
                                                             <DIR>
                                                                               936 wmsetup.log
316,640 WMSysPr9.prx
9,522 Zapotec.bmp
 04/14/2008
                              05:00 AM
                             85:00 AM 707 _default.pif
88 File(s) 7,667,516 bytes
39 Dir(s) 133,691,244,544 bytes free
 04/14/2008
 C:\WINDOWS> del system32
```

• Attempting to make the meterpreter shell persistent:



3.3.1 - Perform a Port Scan With Nmap

To carry out a manual port scan of the Windows XP and Metasploitable machines we used the 'nmap' command on the attacker machine. We tried this using multiple scan type flags including 'sS' (TCP SYN Stealth scan), 'sT' (TCP connect() scan), 'sF' (FIN scan), 'sN' (Null scan), 'sX' (Xmas Tree scan), and finally 'sU' (UDP scan). The two TCP scan types generated identical results, the UDP scan turned up different results that the TCP scans, while the FIN, Null, and Xmas Tree scans did not give any usable results. Because of this, only the TCP and UDP Nmap scan outputs are shown below.

The additional flags that were used in the Nmap scan were -sS, -sV, -O and -oN.

Flag used	Flag information
-sS	The TCP (Stealth) SYN flag is more stealthy than the connect scan and it works against function TCP stacks.
-sV	Enables service/version detection.
-O	Enables OS detection.
-oN	Enables output normal format to a file.

Metasploitable TCP NMAP Scan

```
# Nmap 7.50 scan initiated Mon Oct 8 16:33:38 2018 as: nmap -sS -sV -O -oN
/root/Desktop/nmapmetasploitable.txt 192.168.56.102
mass_dns: warning: Unable to open /etc/resolv.conf. Try using --system-dns or specify valid
servers with --dns-servers
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using
--system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.102
Host is up (0.00012s latency).
Not shown: 977 closed ports
PORT
        STATE SERVICE
                          VERSION
21/tcp
        open ftp
                          vsftpd 2.3.4
22/tcp
        open ssh
                          OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1 (protocol 2.0)
        open telnet
                          Linux telnetd
23/tcp
25/tcp
        open smtp
                          Postfix smtpd
53/tcp
        open domain
                          ISC BIND 9.4.2
                          Apache httpd 2.2.8 ((Ubuntu) DAV/2)
80/tcp
        open http
111/tcp
        open rpcbind
                          2 (RPC #100000)
        open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
139/tcp
        open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp
512/tcp
        open exec
                          netkit-rsh rexecd
                          OpenBSD or Solaris rlogind
513/tcp
        open login
514/tcp open shell
                          Netkit rshd
1099/tcp open
              rmiregistry GNU Classpath grmiregistry
1524/tcp open
              shell
                          Metasploitable root shell
```

```
2049/tcp open nfs
                           2-4 (RPC #100003)
2121/tcp open ftp
                           ProFTPD 1.3.1
3306/tcp open mysql
                          MySQL 5.0.51a-3ubuntu5
5432/tcp open postgresql PostgreSQL DB 8.3.0 - 8.3.7
5900/tcp open vnc
                          VNC (protocol 3.3)
6000/tcp open X11
                           (access denied)
6667/tcp open irc
                          UnrealIRCd
8009/tcp open ajp13
                          Apache Jserv (Protocol v1.3)
8180/tcp open http
                          Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine 1.1
MAC Address: 08:00:27:8A:E1:4C (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.6.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6
OS details: Linux 2.6.9 - 2.6.33
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: Hosts: metasploitable.localdomain, localhost, irc.Metasploitable.LAN; OSs:
Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Mon Oct 8 16:33:53 2018 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.69 seconds
```

Windows XP TCP NMAP scan

```
# Nmap 7.50 scan initiated Mon Oct 8 16:34:48 2018 as: nmap -sS -sV -O -oN
/root/Desktop/nmapwinxp.txt 192.168.56.104
mass dns: warning: Unable to open /etc/resolv.conf. Try using --system-dns or specify valid
servers with --dns-servers
mass dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using
--system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.104
Host is up (0.00021s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed ports
        STATE SERVICE
PORT
                            VERSION
135/tcp open msrpc
                           Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows XP microsoft-ds
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Service
MAC Address: 08:00:27:68:30:14 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Microsoft Windows XP
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp2 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp3
OS details: Microsoft Windows XP SP2 or SP3
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows XP; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows,
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Mon Oct 8 16:35:43 2018 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 55.08 seconds
```

Metasploitable UDP NMAP Scan

```
# Nmap 7.50 scan initiated Mon Oct 8 16:43:59 2018 as: nmap -sU -O -oN
/root/Desktop/nmapmetasploitableUDP.txt 192.168.56.102
mass_dns: warning: Unable to open /etc/resolv.conf. Try using --system-dns or specify valid
servers with --dns-servers
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using
--system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.102
Host is up (0.00042s latency).
Not shown: 993 closed ports
PORT
        STATE
                      SERVICE
53/udp
                       domain
        open
68/udp
        open filtered dhcpc
69/udp
        open filtered tftp
111/udp open
                      rpcbind
137/udp open
                      netbios-ns
138/udp open filtered netbios-dgm
2049/udp open
                      nfs
MAC Address: 08:00:27:8A:E1:4C (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Too many fingerprints match this host to give specific OS details
Network Distance: 1 hop
OS detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Mon Oct 8 17:01:53 2018 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1074.03
seconds
```

Windows XP UDP NMAP Scan

```
# Nmap 7.50 scan initiated Mon Oct 8 17:03:39 2018 as: nmap -sU -A -sV -oN
/root/Desktop/winxpUDP.txt 192.168.56.104
mass dns: warning: Unable to open /etc/resolv.conf. Try using --system-dns or specify valid
servers with --dns-servers
mass dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using
--system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192,168,56,104
Host is up (0.00018s latency).
Not shown: 993 closed ports
PORT
        STATE
                      SERVICE
                                   VERSION
123/udp open
                      ntp
                                   Microsoft NTP
ntp-info:
137/udp open
                      netbios-ns Microsoft Windows netbios-ns (workgroup: MSHOME)
138/udp open filtered netbios-dgm
445/udp open filtered microsoft-ds
500/udp open filtered isakmp
1900/udp open filtered upnp
4500/udp open filtered nat-t-ike
MAC Address: 08:00:27:68:30:14 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Too many fingerprints match this host to give specific OS details
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: Host: IE8WINXP; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
_clock-skew: mean: 6s, deviation: 0s, median: 6s
| nbstat: NetBIOS name: IE8WINXP, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 08:00:27:68:30:14
```

```
(Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 0.18 ms 192.168.56.104

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
# Nmap done at Mon Oct 8 17:05:38 2018 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 119.57 seconds
```

3.3.2 - Mitigate Port Scanning With Snort

In order to mitigate port scanning, we used Snort to detect port scan attempts being launched across the network. In order to do this a rule was added to the local rules as follows:

```
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.105 any (msg: "NMAP TCP Scan"; sid:10000005; rev:2;)
```

Snort was then run using the following command:

```
snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -A console -k none -d
```

When a TCP Nmap scan was then run, Snort detected the port scan attempted based on the rule that we added to the snort configuration:

```
root@kali: /etc/snort
                                                                                        0 0 Q
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
10/08-18:40:38.313834 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:33224 -> 192.168.56.104:13783
10/08-18:40:38.313845 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:54228 -> 192.168.56.104:163
10/08-18:40:38.313856 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:44674 -> 192.168.56.104:211
10/08-18:40:38.313867 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:35780 -> 192.168.56.104:1046
10/08-18:40:38.313878 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:46946 -> 192.168.56.104:2710
10/08-18:40:38.313889 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:36362 -> 192.168.56.104:11110
10/08-18:40:38.313900 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:38556 -> 192.168.56.104:5051
10/08-18:40:38.313912 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:48926 -> 192.168.56.104:6000
10/08-18:40:38.313923 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:41340 -> 192.168.56.104:406
10/08-18:40:38.313934 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:45010 -> 192.168.56.104:1071
10/08-18:40:38.313957 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:47136 -> 192.168.56.104:5298
10/08-18:40:38.313967 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102
:42770 -> 192.168.56.104:2288
```

Because Snort detected the port scan, the result of the Nmap scan returned no open ports:

```
nmap -sS 192.168.56.104

Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-10-08 18:42 NZDT

mass_dns: warning: Unable to open /etc/resolv.conf. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers

mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers

Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.104

Host is up (0.00018s latency).

All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.56.104 are closed

MAC Address: 08:00:27:64:92:9E (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.62 seconds
```

3.3.3 - Mitigate Exploitation With Snort

Snort can detect more than just Nmap scans when used with the correct rules. We took the configuration of Snort a step further to attempt to detect attacks launched across the network targeting the Windows XP machine. To do this, we launched the attacks individually, and recorded the packets sent to the victim machine using Wireshark. By analysing the packet payload for packets sent over the protocol that relates the attack, we could notice some distinct patterns of bytes, or ASCII text derived from the bytes which related to the attack. The byte signature of these payload portions were then added into a Snort rule which detects packets with that same payload.

To detect the 'ms08_067_netapi' attack, we analysed the packets of the exploit in Wireshark and noticed packets being sent to the victim repeatedly contained ASCII text saying '\BROWSER'. We took the byte string which represents this text (5c 42 52 4f 57 53 45 52 00) and added it as a Snort rule in the local rules file:

```
alert tcp any any -> any any (content:"|5c 42 52 4f 57 53 45 52 00|"; sid:10000006; msg:
"Detected ms08_067_netapi attack";)
```

Snort was run using the same command as before, and with this new rule, when the attack was launched against the victim, Snort detected it, and output the following:

```
10/10-16:20:14.177535 [**] [1:1917:6] SCAN UPNP service discover attempt [**] [Classification: Detection of a Network Scan] [Priority: 3] {UD 10/10-16:20:22.947349 [**] [1:10000006:0] Detected ms08_067_netapi attack [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102:35043 -> 192.168.56.105:445 10/10-16:20:23.020944 [**] [1:10000006:0] Detected ms08_067_netapi attack [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102:35043 -> 192.168.56.105:445 10/10-16:20:23.020944 [**] [1:10000006:0] Detected ms08_067_netapi attack [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 192.168.56.102:35043 -> 192.168.56.105:445
```

A similar process was used to identify malicious packets being sent to the victim machine when a 'ms12_020_maxchannelids' attack was launched against the Windows XP machine. After analysis of the packets we noticed a distinct recurring pattern of bytes in a number of packets, which looked like the following:

We took the byte string of one of these repeated lines (00 00 08 02 f0 80 28 03 00 00 08 28 03) and created another Snort rule to detect these packets:

```
alert tcp any any -> any any (content:"|00 00 08 02 f0 80 28 03 00 00 08 28 03|";
sid:10000006; msg: "Detected ms12_020_maxchannelids attack";)
```


When the attack was launched again after Snort was running with this new rule, the following was output:

```
10/10-16:30:38:084297 0[**] [1:10000006:0] Detected ms12_020_maxchannelids attack [**] [Priority: 0] {TC
P} 192.168056:102:458232-> 192.168.56.105:3389 00 00 03
```

3.3.4 - Installing Host Based Protections

Snort has been demonstrated to successfully detect intrusions when specific rules were applied, however in order to catch more than just the attacks rules have been created for, a more holistic detection and prevention system must be utilized. We downloaded a release of Norton Antivirus for the Windows XP machine and tested its detection capabilities, and also tested the built-in Windows Firewall.

When Norton was running in its strictest mode, and the 'ms08_067_netapi' attack was launched against the Windows machine, Norton detected a program 'svchost.exe' had attempted to make contact with other machines (the attacker in this case). Curiously, Norton classified this as a low-risk alert, and even suggested we allow the program to continue running instead of blocking it:




Until the program is allowed to run, on the Attacker machine the exploit in Metasploit hangs:

```
msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > exploit -j
[*] Exploit running as background job.
[*] Started bind handler
[*] 192.168.56.101:445 - Automatically detecting the target...
[*] 192.168.56.101:445 - Fingerprint: Windows XP - Service Pack 3 - lang:English
[*] 192.168.56.101:445 - Selected Target: Windows XP SP3 English (Alwayson NX)
[*] 192.168.56.101:445 - Attempting to trigger the vulnerability...
msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) >
```

When the victim's user manually allows this program to run (which would be allowed automatically if Norton was not running with strict settings) the exploit succeeds, and a meterpreter shell is instantiated in the Attacker machine. If the rule is blocked instead of being allowed, the exploit eventually times out and fails.

However, Norton did not manage to detect the 'ms12_020_maxchannelids' attack in any way before it crashed the operating system. The exploit ran as smoothly as it did when run without any host-based detection systems. The same can be said for the 'ms11_006_createsizeddibsection' attack, where the malicious Word document is allowed to be viewed in the manner which triggers the GUI crash without any sort of warning that one may expect an Antivirus program to render when viewing/opening bad files.

After testing Norton with the Windows XP attacks, we disabled it completely, and enabled the Windows Firewall, with the additional setting of 'Don't allow exceptions'.



The exploits that we tested under Norton were tested again in the same manner with the Windows Firewall. Firstly, when the 'ms08_067_netapi' attack is launched against the victim, the firewall automatically seems to deny the attack, as it times out instantly:

```
msf exploit(ms08_067_netapi) > exploit -j
[*] Exploit running as background job.
[*] Started bind handler
[-] 192.168.56.101:445 - Exploit failed [unreachable]: Rex::ConnectionTimeout The connection timed out (192.168.56.101:445).
```

When the 'ms12_020_maxchannelids' attack was initiated, unlike Norton, the Windows Firewall seems to block the attack before it causes the operating system to crash by denying the Attacker access to the Remote Desktop Protocol service that is used to execute the malformed packet:

```
msf auxiliary(ms12_020_maxchannelids) > run -j
[*] Auxiliary module running as background job
[*] 192.168.56.101:3389 - 192.168.56.101:3389 - Sending MS12-020 Microsoft Remote Desktop Use-After-Free DoS
[*] 192.168.56.101:3389 - 192.168.56.101:3389 - 210 bytes sent
[*] 192.168.56.101:3389 - 192.168.56.101:3389 - Checking RDP status...
[-] 192.168.56.101:3389 - 192.168.56.101:3389 - RDP Service Unreachable
```

Similarly to Norton, there was nothing that the firewall did to prevent the malicious Word document from the 'ms11_006_createsizeddibsection' attack being viewed and crashing the GUI. However this is to be expected, as the firewall does not protect against malicious files that are already on the victim's storage.

Interestingly, while we were testing norton we were also running a Nessus scan of the Windows machine and noticed that the scan returned far less vulnerabilities than normal, and upon checking the Norton log we noticed that it had detected the Nessus port scan and blocked it:



3.3.5 - Discuss the Pros and Cons of Snort

Snort is a powerful network intrusion detection system, though like all software, it has its strengths and weaknesses. It can detect a variety of attacks due to the versatility allowed in writing its rules. Snort employs a clear rule language and so that makes rules easier to write but it still requires manual analysis of packets and further investigation of the exploits to identify content that should be blocked. Simple rules are easy to write while rules to detect more elaborate attacks might require a more in-depth knowledge of the system, though it is also achievable with the help of the actively updated repository. When regarding Snort, rules are the best way to define the content of packets that should be removed.

We were able to write snort rules for 2 of the 3 Windows XP exploits and we came across a problem when writing/finding a rule for the third exploit. The third exploit (ms11_006_createsizeddibsection) required the file to be manually transferred, and so writing a Snort command for that was too difficult. While Testing the snort rules against the 2 Windows XP exploits we found that a major weakness in Snort is that it cannot prevent/stop attacks that are in currently progress, but rather only alert us to the fact that these attacks are taking place.

3.3.6 - Discuss Other Countermeasures and Mitigations

There are many potential security enhancement mitigation methods that can help out in the Windows XP environment, and it all depends on what the machine is going to be used for.

If the Windows XP machine is only needed for its hardware and data then it would be beneficial to disconnect it from the computer network. Manually transferring acquired data to and from the Windows XP machine (i.e. by USB stick) would evade potential network threats.

Locking down the XP machines by restricting the applications it uses so it can't execute any arbitrary and potentially lethal code is another mitigation tactic. This will make it so only known/trusted apps can be run. This can be achieved through a host-based intrusion-prevention structure, or through the use of Microsoft's Group Policy object software restriction policies.

Some of the exploits found earlier threaten the computer's memory, and so activating Windows XP's Data Execution Protection, with further protection coming from EMET or the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit would be a feasible countermeasure to some of these vulnerabilities.

Avoiding having excessive users with administrator privileges being logged into the system is another security-conscious action that users can take. Many vulnerabilities require the user to be logged into an account with admin rights and so restricting user privileges from having admin rights unless absolutely necessary would further mitigate the threat. It is also an option to obtain privilege management software to control accounts and delegate privileges when necessary.

Changing/updating to a more secure operating system could be an extremely beneficial countermeasure. Windows XP is not being actively maintained and so any vulnerabilities discovered are not going to be patched. A more recent and secure operating system would offer more intricate security measures.

All mitigations could further be used in unison to provide network security layering. Layering provides a more in-depth and intricate security system that will be harder to exploit.