

# **Digital Signature Server Report**

Foundations of Cybersecurity Project

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# 1 Introduction

The project implements a **Digital Signature Service (DSS)**, a trusted third-party system that manages cryptographic key pairs to generate digital signatures on the behalf of users (organization employees).

## 1.1 Tools

The system was developed using the following tools and technologies:

- **Python 3.12**: primary programming language used for both client and server implementation.
- **cryptography package**: used to implement key exchanges, encryption/decryption, digital signatures and session key derivation.
- **bcrypt package**: used to provide hashing and secure password verification.
- **mysql-connector-python package**: used for MySQL database connectivity.
- **MySQL Server**: used to store permanent data.

# 2 Project Specifications

The DSS provides the following functionalities:

- Create a user and log into the service.
- Generate and store an asymmetric key pair.
- Digitally sign documents.
- Retrieve user public key.
- Delete key pair.

Users authenticate via passwords and interact with the DSS through a secure channel that ensures **Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)**, **data integrity**, **replay attack protection** and **non-malleability**.

## 2.1 Design choices

**Mutual Authentication** The authentication protocol consists of:

- **Initial Handshake**:
  1. The client generates an ephemeral **Elliptic-Curve-Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)** key pair and sends the public one,  $epkC$ , along with a **nonce**,  $nonceC$ , to the server.
  2. The server generates its ephemeral ECDH key pair and responds with:  $epkS$ ,  $nonceS$ , and an **Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)** signature over  $(epkS || epkC || nonceC || nonceS)$  using the server private key stored in the file `dss_private.pem`
  3. The client verifies the signature using the **DSS public key**.

4. A session key that will be used with **Advanced Encryption Standard Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM)** is derived using **HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF)**

- **User Authentication:**

1. The users sends *username* and *password* encrypted with AES-GCM using the session key established.
2. If it is the first login, the user must change their password.

**CreateKeys generation** The service checks whether the user already has a key pair or if they have deleted them. If this is not the case, generates a new **Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC)** key pair and saves them in the database (private key encrypted with a **passphrase** using AES-256, public key in plaintext).

**SignDoc operation** The service attempts to retrieve the user's private key from the database. If the key is found, decrypts it using the passphrase and then signs the documents using ECDSA-SHA256.

**DeleteKeys function** Key pairs erasure happens setting the keys values to *null* and updating the *key\_del* flag inside the DB.

**User registration** To register a new user, the service generates a temporary password in the format "*username*tempXXXX" where "XXXX" is a random number. Then, computes the **bcrypt** hash of the password and stores the username and hash in the database, along with setting *is\_new* = 1. Once logged in, the user will be asked to update his password and requested to perform a "regular" login.

**Perfect Forward Secrecy** Each session uses a unique ephemeral ECDHE key.

**Nonce and session keys** Nonces and session keys expire after 30 minutes to prevent replay attacks.

**Message format** After the handshake, all messages are sent in JSON format and encrypted with AES-GCM using the session key established.

## 2.2 Exchanged messages format

Initial Handshake	
Direction	Data
Client → Server	epkC (client's ECDH public key) + nonceC (16 random bytes)
Server → Client	epkS (server's ECDH public key) + nonceS (16 random bytes) + ECDSA signature (skDSS, epkS    epkC    nonceC    nonceS)

Table 1: Initial handshake process messages format

Login	
Direction	Data (AES-GCM encrypted using session key)
Client → Server	{"username": str, "password": str, "nonceC": hex}
Server → Client	{"login_result": bool, "change_pwd": bool, "nonceS": hex}

Table 2: Login operation messages format

Generic DSS Operations	
Direction	Data (AES-GCM encrypted using session key)
Client → Server	{ "service": int, "username": str, "nonceC": hex, //Additional fields per service }
Server → Client	{ "status": bool, "nonceS": hex, //Additional fields }

Table 3: Other DSS operations messages format

### 2.3 Communication protocol sequence diagrams




Figure 1: Handshake sequence diagram




Figure 2: Login sequence diagram




Figure 3: CreateKeys sequence diagram




Figure 4: SignDoc sequence diagram






Figure 5: GetPublicKey sequence diagram




Figure 6: DeleteKeys sequence diagram