

Malware Behavior

Malware Analysis CSCI 4976 - Fall 2015 Branden Clark

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Overview

- Section 1 review & Project 1
- Downloaders and Launchers
- Backdoors
- Credential Stealers
- Persistence Mechanisms
- Privilege Escalation

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

What we've learned so far...

- Basic Analysis

- Quickly glean information from the sample(s)
- Help guide and focus Advanced Analysis

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

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push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
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```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
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```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
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```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

What we've learned so far...

- Advanced Analysis - Static
 - Used to see what is going on
 - Confirm suspicions aroused during basic analysis
 - Identify functionality
- Advanced Analysis - Dynamic
 - Control the program
 - Take new code paths
 - Change data
 - See what is really going on
 - Encoded data?
 - Polymorphic code?

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
mov     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

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loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
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```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
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loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
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call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
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```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
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```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

What we've learned so far...

- Windows API and systems
 - How does malware interact with Windows?
 - How does Windows make malware author's lives easier?
 - How does it make their lives harder?

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
mov     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
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```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
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```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
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loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
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call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
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loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
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call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
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```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Apply that knowledge!

- Project 1

- Due TWO weeks from today (10/13 11:59PM)
- Like a larger lab, but without questions
- You will write a report on the sample
 - Analysis, things found, difficulties, conclusion, etc
 - You will be given an official guide and an example report

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
```

```
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
push    esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    [ebp+arg_0]
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```


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- Backdoors
- Credential Stealers
- Persistence Mechanisms
- Privilege Escalation

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
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```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Downloaders and Launchers

- Names are pretty self explanatory
 - Downloaders
 - **Downloads** a (probably) more complex sample and installs/runs it
 - Launchers
 - **Unpacks/Decrypts/Drops** a (probably) more complex sample and installs/runs it

- PMA Lab11-01.exe

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```


Overview

- Section 1 review & Project 1
- Downloaders and Launchers
- **Backdoors**
- Credential Stealers
- Persistence Mechanisms
- Privilege Escalation
- User-mode rootkits

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Backdoors

- **Remote** access to or control of a system
 - RAT - Remote Access Trojan
- We've seen a couple of these
- Class lab lab03b.malware
 - APT1 SEASALT

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+var_70], eax
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F

loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C

; -----
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

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- **Credential Stealers**
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```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Credential Stealers

- GINA - Graphical Identification and Authentication (Win XP & earlier)
 - A framework for getting all authentication attempts
 - Similar to the networking stack, several modules get the packet and can handle accordingly
 - Microsoft - It has uses, we promise
 - side note: [Lenovo rootkit](#)
- Credential Provider (Now used)
 - Basically the same thing
 - [Great write-up by Tyler Wrightson](#)

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
```

```
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
push    esi
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_313080: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Credential Stealers - Background

- Windows Authentication (Long ago)
 - Type your password **EVERY** time you access a resource
 - Quickly became **annoying**
 - **The solution?**

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jz      short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```


Credential Stealers - Background

- Windows Authentication
 - SSO - Single Sign-On
 - Type your password **ONCE**, Windows keeps the **hash** around
 - When Windows needs to access a resource it just passes the hash around

Problem? So can you!
(Pass-the-Hash Attack)

Credential Stealers - Background

- Windows Authentication
 - SSO - Single Sign-On
 - Type your password **ONCE**, Windows keeps the **hash** around
 - When Windows needs to access a resource it just passes the hash around

Problem? So can you!
(Pass-the-Hash Attack)
What do we do now?

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jz      short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314613
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Credential Stealers

- Windows Authentication
 - SSO - Single Sign-On
 - Type your password **ONCE**, Windows keeps **encrypted** password around
 - No more passing hashes, since **we have the password** now!
 - wait a minute...

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Credential Stealers

- Windows Authentication
 - SSO - Single Sign-On
 - Type your password ONCE, Windows keeps **encrypted** password around
 - No more passing hashes, since we have the password now!
 - wait a minute...

Ciphertext is in memory
Encryption keys are in memory

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_313070:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Credential Stealers

- Windows Authentication
 - SSO - Single Sign-On
 - Type your password ONCE, Windows keeps encrypted password around
 - No more passing hashes, since we have the password now!
 - wait a minute...

Open Sesame...or something

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
xor     eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Credential Stealers

Amplia Security - Windows Credentials Editor

```
C:\Users\IEUser\Desktop>wce.exe -w
WCE v1.42beta (Windows Credentials Editor) - (c) 2010-2013 Amplia Security - by
Hernan Ochoa (hernan@ampliasecurity.com)
Use -h for help.
```

```
User\MALWARE:infected
MALWARE$\WORKGROUP:
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
        push    0Dh
        call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
        call    sub_3140F3
        test    eax, eax
        jg      short loc_31307D
        call    sub_3140F3
        jmp     short loc_31308C

; -----
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
        call    sub_3140F3
        and     eax, 0FFFFh
        or      eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
        mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```


Credential Stealers

mimikatz

```
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
```

```
Authentication Id : 0 ; 97373 (00000000:00017c5d)
```

```
Session : Interactive from 1
```

```
User Name : User
```

```
Domain : MALWARE
```

```
Logon Server : MALWARE
```

```
Logon Time : 9/25/2015 6:59:47 PM
```

```
SID : S-1-5-21-3463664321-2923530833-3546627382-1000
```

```
msv :
```

```
[00010000] CredentialKeys
```

```
* NTLM : 4eb0bb4f55b0b9546e70a1c51ed2d5d7
```

```
* SHA1 : c44ee7da4bafd211025586a158d1b4f3dce851a7
```

```
[00000003] Primary
```

```
* Username : User
```

```
* Domain : MALWARE
```

```
* NTLM : 4eb0bb4f55b0b9546e70a1c51ed2d5d7
```

```
* SHA1 : c44ee7da4bafd211025586a158d1b4f3dce851a7
```

```
tspkg :
```

```
wdigest :
```

```
* Username : User
```

```
* Domain : MALWARE
```

```
* Password : infected
```

```
kerberos :
```

```
* Username : User
```

```
* Domain : MALWARE
```

```
* Password : (null)
```

```
ssp :
```

```
credman :
```

```
[00000000]
```

```
* Username : IE8Win7\IEUser
```

```
* Domain : IE8Win7\IEUser
```

```
* Password : Password!
```

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
t loc_31306D
```

```
[ebp+arg_0]
```

```
1D0h
```

```
+arg_4]
```

```
314623
```

```
eax
```

```
t loc_31306D
```

```
+arg_0], esi
```

```
t loc_31308F
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
31411B
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
3140F3
```

```
eax
```

```
t loc_31307D
```

```
3140F3
```

```
t loc_31308C
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```


Overview

- Section 1 review & Project 1
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- Backdoors
- Credential Stealers
- Persistence Mechanisms
- Privilege Escalation

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Persistence Mechanisms

- Things we've seen so far
 - A few registry keys
 - Startup folder
 - BHO - Browser Helper Objects
 - Services

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Persistence Mechanisms

- Things we've seen so far
 - A few registry keys
 - Startup folder
 - BHO - Browser Helper Objects
 - Services

Now go run **SysInternalsSuite/Autoruns.exe**

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+55 ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+49 ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Persistence Mechanisms

- APPIInit_DLLs
 - “...a mechanism that allows an arbitrary list of DLLs to be loaded into each user mode process on the system” - MSDN
- SvcHost DLLs
 - svchost.exe runs legitimate Microsoft services, and use for any other purpose is unsupported.
 - Trojan a legitimate service, now it looks legit!

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_313066
push esi
mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
sub [ebp+arg_0], eax
loc_31306D:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Persistence Mechanisms

- DLL Load-Order Hijacking
 - Microsoft's loader looks for DLLs in specific places
 - So stick your own DLL higher in the load-order and give it the same name
 - Problem identified ~15 yrs ago, marked WNF

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     eax, [eax]
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

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```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```


Privilege Escalation

- Some of the previously mentioned techniques work
- So do Windows exploits
 - Why is it this easy

```
meterpreter > getsystem
...got system (via technique 1).
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter >
```

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
[ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
[ebp+arg_0], esi
short loc_31308F
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
0Dh
sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Privilege Escalation

- There's a little more to it
 - An Administrator on Windows doesn't have ALL the permissions...

| Privilege | Flags |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| SeBackupPrivilege | Disabled |
| SeChangeNotifyPrivilege | Default Enabled |
| SeCreateGlobalPrivilege | Default Enabled |
| SeCreatePagefilePrivilege | Disabled |
| SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege | Disabled |
| SeDebugPrivilege | Disabled |
| SeImpersonatePrivilege | Default Enabled |
| SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege | Disabled |

- right away.
 - AdjustTokenPrivileges(...)

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push eax
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Review

- Section 1 review & Project 1
- Downloaders and Launchers
- Backdoors
- Credential Stealers
- Persistence Mechanisms
- Privilege Escalation

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Lab on Friday! (10/03)

- Same place
- Same time
- Same idea

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

References

1. Sikorski, Michael, and Andrew Honig. Practical Malware Analysis the Hands-on Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software. San Francisco: No Starch, 2012. Print.

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
```

```
push    esi
push    eax
push    esi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                              ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```