Populism and Radicalism

Past Questions
1. "Populists catalyse voter frustrations but do not provide governance solutions". Discuss [TT23]
2. "The similarities between different strands of populism outweigh the differences." Discuss [TT22]
3. Is populism too vague a concept to be analytically useful? [LV22]
4. What factors best account for the global rise of populism? [TT21]
5. What factor best accounts for the Euroscepticism of radical parties of the right? [LV21]

Category 1: Definition of Populism
Proposed definitions of Populism

Sartori's notion of concepts
- Sartori emphasised precise and well-demarcated categories
  - Ladder of abstraction: from the most general to specific categories such as democracies
  - There must be a set of unifying properties (intension) that binds all the examples it applies to (extension) → the more the number of properties, the fewer the number of examples it applies to
- Warned against "concept-stretching" because if a concept is too vague and applies to too many examples, then it become inherently useless
- Dahl's minimalist conception → we cannot define terms via their substantive outcomes (such as economic growth) → we must have a minimalist, procedural concepts for notions of democracy and populism
  - The upshot of this is that we may want to stray away from value-laden definitions (presupposing populism is bad for instance as Muller clearly does)

Definition of Populism
- Most scholars define populism in what could be characterised by Mudde and Kaltwasser as a "thin-centered ideology"
  - In the sense that populism is compatible with both the Left (the USA's People's Party or Germany's Party of Democratic Socialists) and the Right (Turkey's Erdogan or USA's Trump)
  - What characterises populism, as most scholars agree on, is the "internal logic" (Muller) or a "mentality" (Albertazzi and McDonnell) in the sense of how ideas are organised and structured
  - Muller: populism is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior

- Characteristic #1: Antielitist – very critical of the elites, often painting them as enemies
  - Take Modi and Erdogan where they attack the mainstream media when the media are highly critical of their rule
  - It shows that populists can remain antielitist even as they become leaders → Thatcher's notion of "enemies within" even as she was the Prime Minister
- Characteristic #2: Antipluralist – the populists tend to identify "the people" in an exclusionary sense → they claim that a part of the people is the people and only the populist authentically identifies and represents the true people
  - George Wallace claimed to speak "in the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth" → the true people were the white people in Southern USA → and Wallace claimed that these people were Americans proper; not the Kennedy administration and everyone else working to end segregation
  - The core claim of populism is only that some of the people are really the people
    - And these people are usually homogenous in some respect i.e. holding conservative or traditional values (in Italy for instance)
  - Constructs an "Us-them" rhetoric
- Characteristic #3: Moralised Claim to the general will and representation of the people
  - Populist pit the "pure, innocent, always hardworking people against a corrupt elite who do not work for the people"
  - Usually against representative democracy → the idea that the polity should no longer be split and the idea that it is possible for the people to be one and directly represented through a single, true representative
    - A moralised form of antipluralism
    - But Muller argues that populist are okay with a particular form of representation as long as the right representatives represent the right people to make the right judgement and do the right thing
  - The upshot of this moralised claim is that there is no tolerance for opposing views; the populist must delegitimise their opponents (by calling them the "other people" or the "corrupt elites")
    - There must be some way to distinguish between the moral and the immoral/the pure and corrupt
  - There is often no empirical basis to their claim that they represent "the people" but simply a moral one

What Populism is not
- Populism is not specifically pertaining to or organised around some socio-economic group

- ○ While it is true that many voters who support populist parties share a certain income and educational profile especially in Europe as those who vote for right-wing populist parties make less and are less educated (they are also overwhelmingly male but this holds mainly for the United States and less in Latin America), once we turn to Germany, according to Priester, economically successful citizens adopt an essentially Social Darwinist attitude by asking "I have made it – why can't they"
    - ■ Populist parties in France and Austria have become so large that they capture voters from all walks of life beyond just blue collared workers
- Populism cannot just be explained in terms of "frustration", "anger" and "resentment"
    - ○ There are reasons for anger and frustration within the populist supporters that can be clearly articulated; anger and frustration by themselves are not always articulate in nature
        - ■ Voters and populism is not simply social psychology, but takes place in democratic settings
- We should not simply conflate a structure and organisation of political beliefs with the socioeconomic positions and the psychological states of its supporters
    - ○ Lipset claimed that populism was simply a helpless articulation of anxieties and anger by those longing for a simpler, premodern life → "the disgruntled and the psychologically homeless,...the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and authoritarian personalities."

Operationalisation of Populism
Inglehart and Norris method of operationalisation
- Conceptualising populism and authoritarianism
    - ○ Populism: (i) the only legitimate democratic authority flows directly from the people and (ii) establishment elites are corrupt, out of touch, and self-serving, betraying the public trust and thwarting the popular will
        - ■ Challenges the legitimacy of intermediate power structures linking citizens and the state in liberal democracies
        - ■ Populism, beyond the rhetoric, does not present a concrete roadmap prescribing any consistent set of substantive programmatic policies or provide a coherent set of beliefs about what governments should do → it is how this narrative is used in conjunction with alternative ideologies
    - ○ Authoritarian values: (i) advocate conformity with conventional moral norms and traditions within a group, expressing intolerance of out-groups perceived to threaten accepted group mores, (ii) expect deference and loyalty to group

and its leaders, being intolerant of dissent, and (iii) seek to strengthen collective security against perceived group threats
- ■ Reject individuality, free-spiritedness and personal liberation
- How does populism link to ideology? Practical difficulties
  - ○ Populist parties around the world range across the ideological spectrum from market-oriented neoliberalism (advocated by Alberto Fujimoro) to state socialism (advocated by Hugo Chavez) → the left-wing combination particularly prevalent in Latin America; where Chavez railed against 'predatory' political elites, economic austerity measures, and the neo-colonial foreign policies of the US, while inspiring a social revolution in Venezuela
    - ■ Studies comparing the Americas, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia have identified many populist parties and leaders that favour state economic management and wealth redistribution, and social justice → populist left
    - ■ Examples: Bernie Sanders, Podemos in Spain, Five Star Movement in Italy → make claims about the "good people" and not just appealing to the working class
  - ○ Ambiguity in programmatic appeals → hard to classify along right-left spectrum → populist rhetoric concerns first order principles about legitimate government, concerning vague anti-establishment appeals, simplistic slogans and sweeping promises to fight for the 'silent majority' and end corruption
    - ■ But the discourse typically glosses over policy prescriptions about the second-order policy programmes about what governments should do
    - ■ There is no consensus even within parties about the appropriate level of investment in welfare protection, public sector spending, taxation etc
    - ■ Example: Trump → usually exemplifies populist right through his advocacy of economic prioritises such as supporting small state laissez faire economic policy and seeking to repeal Obamacare + rolling back corporate taxes; but Trump's policies favour the rich and yet he adopts economic protectionism for the American industry, imposing tariffs on trade, seeking to restore coal mining jobs
- How to operationalise populism-pluralism? (in addition to authoritarian-libertarian vs left-right spectrums)
  - ○ Party Affiliations: what parties are affiliated with tends to signify their ideologies and where they place on the populist-pluralist spectrum → for instance, several parties in the European Parliament are currently associated with the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group which is a populist association (attacking immigration and alarmist about falling cultural values), loose alliance for the populist Austrian Freedom Party, the Flemish Vlaams

Belang, the French National Front, the Alternative for Germany, Dutch Party for Freedom etc
- Is this circular? How to define what associations are populist first? Surely, we can directly use such metrics to assess the parties themselves
- Limited because not all populist parties in the EU belong to these two groupings → the Danish People's Party and the FInnis Party are members of the center-right European Conservatives and Reformists
- Party Names: Newer populist parties adopt sui generis names to avoid being associated with traditional party labels such as "Labour", "Conservatives" etc
- Italian Five Star Movement, the Greek Golden Dawn, and the Spanish Podemos
- But this seems to make the parties static i.e. Republicans can never be measured to be populist on this respect
- Rhetorical and Discourse analysis: content analysis of text and visual images → populism as a style of communication and language claiming 'power to the people' and a critique of the establishment, rather than a set of ideological beliefs about substantive public policies on issues
- Good because populism is not just by political parties but by any public actor or broadcast news such as Fox TV or websites such as Breitbart news or tabloid news in Italy which adopt a populist style of language and vernacular
- We can analyse the content of populist leaders' speeches in terms of ethos (focusing leadership character and credibility), pathos (using emotions such as patriotism and anger) → scrutinised in terms of the focus on anti-elitism and the appeals to people
- For example, Bart Bonikowski and Noam Gidron examined the discourse used in over 2000 US presidential speeches from 1952 to 1996 and found that populist language was used by both Democrats and Republicans but especially by challengers and outsiders
- Many have used it on Trump's campaign speeches too
- Visual cues from Le Pen's national front campaign materials have been deconstructed fortis meaning and also rhetorical speeches by chief executives in Latin America
- Summary: when measuring populism-pluralism, the crucial element is the importance of appeals calling for power to the people and critiquing the corrupt power of the establishment
- Two proxy indicators used from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data set
- The importance of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric
- Salience of anti-corruption

- ○ CHES does not yet gauge importance of populist claims regarding moral legitimacy of the voice of the people or elected representatives

Link between ideology and Populism (strands of populism)
Affinity between Right-wing and Populism
- Empirical examples

Country and Summary	Elaboration of populism
Italy Main populists: Berlusconi administration, composed of Forza Italia (FI), Alleanza Nazionale (AN), the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (UDC), and the Lega Nord (LN)	Berlusconi and his allies, both in opposition and in government, have 1. Claimed for themselves an extraordinary and instant capacity to interpret and articulate the needs of the people 2. The impatience with formal rules of liberal democracy which get in the way of their mission to promote the public good 3. The repeated references to the common sense of 'ordinary people' and the traditions shared by the majority of the community 4. The attacks on professional politicians and their long drawn-out procedures, and those on intellectuals and trade unionists, accused of wishing to divide people along class lines Lega based its appeal on a notion of the people as both ethnos and demos → interlinked its denunciation of the political system with references to ethno-cultural and territorial identities, the other populists have sought to give exclusive voice to the mass of citizens, supposedly neglected by indifferent and selfish elites, by concentrating on an anti-political, anti-party messages - Distinguish clearly between Lega and Forza Italia → For LN, it is the entire party which endorses the populist mentality, but in FI, the anti-populism is entirely delegated to the leader Berlusconi who has made it a **trademark of his political style but not a source of ideological inspiration** Context: Christian Democratic-dominated party system collapsed due to fraud and corruption - Vacuum for this conservative vote Why populism spread in Italy during the 1990s - Structural factors facilitating this sudden growth: widespread and deep distrust of the political class

- The actions of individuals who have deployed populist arguments and stereotypes, with the aim of building a new electoral space or extending an already-existing one

Widespread and deep distrust
- Surveys by Putnam showed that there was dissatisfaction with the political class and the party-politicisation of institutions throughout the country but particularly in the North where the social capital of civic spirit was the strongest
- A decline in the attraction of ideology following the end of the class between the capitalist West and the socialist East which diminished the capacity of existing parties to mobilise and put disillusioned voters onto the market
- The progressive secularisation of society due to crises of traditional catholic associationalism which weakened the links between Church institutions and public opinion in areas like Veneto and part of Lombardy → gaping hole in the traditional bank of Christian Democratic votes
- Economic crisis following the golden age of the 1980s → shifted the epicenter of the economy from large industrial productive system to small and medium enterprises which opposed the imposition of taxes to fund the Welfare State and was intolerant of the hurdles posed by red tape and the trade unions
- Significant increase in immigrants from poorer countries and the clandestine arrivals on the Italian coast of large numbers of African and Asian immigrants → 4.2% of workforce to 10% in the last 20 years

How Lega won support
- Populist praise for the 'hard working little man' characterised as the guardian of traditional ways of life who is tired of the machinations of a political class which has broken its promises and its suspicious of progressive intellectual sermonising – gained a swift and positive welcome in various sectors of Northern society
- Bolstered by proportional representation which permitted Lega to run alone and therefore highlight the most radical elements of its programme → increasing number of candidates elected to municipal and provincial councils in the

| | North
● Spontaneous and aggressive language of its representatives → almost always new to politics and lacking education in good institutional manners
● Others formed coalitions to block these representatives, but Lega used it to its advantage to paint itself as interpreters of a "real country" at war against an arrogant "legal country" → anti establishment
Turn of proportional representation to majoritarian first past the post system
● Most parties willing to form a coalition
● Lega need to form an alliance with Silvio Berlusconi
Distinct forms of populism by Lega and Berlusconi
● Lega: a populist movement with protest and identitarian features – the party depicts itself as fighting to free its people both from the ills which afflict it from within and from external aggression
   ○ Emphasised issues of security (against crime and immigration), morality (against corruption and homosexuality, defence of natural family and native traditions)
   ○ Wanted to make the voice of the people heard, and defend them from dangers that threaten them all around, defend their rights against the arrogance and fraudulence of the powerful + preserve their genuine attributes and traditions which serve as the basis for their identity
   ○ Because it was obliged to remain a party of continual struggle, Albertazzi and McDonnell highlight that during its time in power, it ran the constant risk of destabilising the administration it was a part of by disagreeing with government decisions, such as its agreement with the EU's decision to offer membership to Turkey, a country seen by Lega as a menace to Europe's cultural identity and another source of mass migration
● Berlusconi's Forza Italia: populism of the 'common man' manifesting itself via the leader rather than the party itself
   ○ Albertazzi and McDonnell highlight that |

	populism is an attribute of the mentality of Beluscani rather than Forza Italia itself ○ Berlusconi constantly portrays himself as a typical successful self-made man who has never severed his links with the middle class from which he emerged → works hard to appear as one of the common people → often says "I am one of you", and declares himself the interpreter and defender of the popular will ○ Berlusconi's ideal stage is not a rally but the television screen which he owns three of the most popular networks ○ Constantly portrays himself as an outsider: "temporary loan" to politics and will return to business once he has saved the country; not motivated by professional or party politicking; constantly declares his own party as not a "party" but a movement → he seems rather independent of FI as a whole ○ Rhetoric aimed at the weak, the abandoned and the unemployed and the elderly – most disadvantage of the 'common people' whom the parties and unions of the Left have abandoned in order to defend the interests of the elites and insiders ○ Considerable media resources at his disposal → enabled him to win over a large part of the electorate hostile to the Left Diamanti: common points between these two variants of populism to attract different sympathies of different sectors of public opinion (identitarian vs a 'compassionate conservatism') ● Personality of the leader, the appeal to the people, the direct communication between the leader and grass-roots supporters, and radical criticisms of the traditional structures of representation Effects and policy implications: some of the issues held dear by the populist electorate were tackled, but in much more moderate terms than suggested by either parties' manifestos especially LN

	- Immigration: the Bossi-Fini law introduced more stringent procedures for checking up on and expelling foreigners but also led to the regularisation of hundreds of thousands of clandestine immigrants already residents in the country + an annual quota for immigrants from countries outside Europe with employment contracts, betraying Bossi's promise to send as many immigrants home as possible - Anti-globalisation: government still continued to support free international trade and involved itself directly in the drafting of a European Constitution despite calls to rebel against the EU Overall, populism in Italy has hardly achieved any of its objectives which its standard bearers had set themselves - But the populist style of communication has reached new heights
Switzerland Main populist: The SVP/UDC – the Swiss People's Party (largest populist party in Europe relative to competitors) → doubled its national vote share and government delegation to become the country's largest party	Rise of populism in Switzerland (1990s where populism affected mainstream politics, cumulating in SVP/UDC victory of an extra federal executive seat) - SVP/UDC doubled the vote share from 1995 to 2003 - Increased voter turnout of 3% and a campaigned marked by aggressive tones and a high level of personalisation - More young people bothered a vote (in SVP/UDC's favour) - Far from levelling out, participation gap between men and women in elections increased, advantaging SVP/UCP's advantage - Attracts from all parts of the social classes especially from the poorly educated → shedding its image as a rural party; support for them has increased among blue-collared workers - Opportunity structures: consociationalism and direct democracy → referendum and the initiative - The Swiss can call for an initiative if they reach 100,000 signatures → becoming more successful + reminds them of who is sovereign - Sometimes parliament is pressured by the initiative to act on the very thing that is being disputed - Disruptive potential of the initiative that

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power sharing and negotiation become absolutely necessary → Kriesi, "By forcing all the participants at every stage in the decision-making process to anticipate the possible popular veto at its very end…[referendums]...have stimulated the integration into the decision-making process of all powerful interested associations capable of launching a referendum and/or winning a popular vote

- ○ Such practices of direct democracy provide fertile group for the populist anti-system rhetoric of the SVP/UDC → a party is ready to stand up alone and defend the rights of the people against a political system where all major political actors are basically the same is the populist rhetoric

- Consociationalism makes it impossible for an opposition to offer a clear alternative to the electorate since there is no chance that parties will alternate in power and then pursue their own programmes → role of the opposition is taken over by direct democracy
    - ○ SVP/UDC broke the rule of government solidarity and exploited these mechanisms
    - ○ SVP/UDC has sponsored or launched several referendums on foreign policy, illegal immigration and asylum, and in doing so, has reinforced its image as the 'odd one out' → similar to the Lega Nord in Italy
    - ○ Allows for anti-system propaganda and also makes it inevitable that a large party will participate in government even when it is very critical of its allies; direct democracy which makes power-sharing a necessity, provides populists with invaluable tools to create an adversarial climate and tap into people's resentment, without even endangering the government's survival (double personality)
- Capitalise on the issue of immigration → arrival of Muslims upset the balance further between Protestants and Catholics but also further of integration, acceptance and racism
- Capitalisation of the losers of modernisation

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	○ Unemployment went up from 0.6% to 5.2% between 1990-1997 and casual and part time work increased, exports suffered + economic stagnation caused the closure of companies which symbolised Swiss success ○ Push for growth manifested in terms of greater modernisation and liberalisation which meant less job security ○ SVP/UDC wants to preserve Swiss exceptionalism ● Media → incentive structures in order to boost readership = attract larger readerships in order to survive → simplification of messages, personalisation of reporting (focus on personal lives of candidates) and dramatisation of reporting where every piece of news is reduced to a clash between easily identifiable entities of good and bad ○ Blocher → self-made man, exemplifying Swiss virtues of determination and hardwork, who managed to become the major shareholder of a company that employed him Overall, direct democracy and power-sharing provides the most important opportunity structure of all for the emergence of populism in Switzerland SVP/UDC key platform ● Criticism of a political system (the elite, political class) which Blocher depicts as self-serving if not outright corrupt and conspiring behind the backs of the people → Switzerland does not 'belong' to this elite as the progress of the nation is owed to the process generated 'from below' ● People are sovereign + should not be limited by international treaties/conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights ● Identitarian politics: anti-immigration and opposition to 'bogus' asylum seekers → blaming them for crime with crime statistics used to highlight the dangers of the melting pot ● Defence of Sonderfall, the alleged uniqueness, isolation, prosperity and neutrality of Switzerland

	coupled with a stance against the EU and other international institutions and associations ● Marked conservatism in social affairs alongside fight for tax cuts and public expenditure reductions Basically hypermodernism and yet desire to protect traditional cultures + the perceived need for immigrant labour on one hand and the schizophrenic desire not to see and have to deal with foreigners on the other

Left-wing Populism (historical examples)
- Historical example of the Russian narodniki in the late nineteenth century and their ideology of Narodnichestvo, which is usually translated as "populism"
  - The narodniki were intellectuals who idealised the Russian peasants and saw the village commune as a political model for the country as a whole
  - They advocated "going to the people" for political advice and guidance
- McCarthyism: American populism
- People's Party and Farmers Alliance: emerged in the late nineteenth century and believed that the farmers and agricultural worker was the moral model of the American citizen
  - They constituted the "real Americans" and were critical of the industrialised elites

Populism based on different cleavages

Cleavage	Example
Agrarian Populism	Two key examples (emergence of populism itself too) were the US People's Party and the Russian Narodniki ● The Russian Narodniki: a relatively small group of urban middle class intellectuals, who believed that the peasantry were biologically and morally the most healthy people, and that society should be based on an agricultural economy of rural cooperatives of small farm ● US's People's Party: emerged from a true mass movement in the American heartland; the American Populists also considered the peasantry as the authentic people, connected to the earth and living virtuously, and rightfully saw industrialisation as threatening their values and economic power; combined both progressive and reactionary ideas, and became a powerful regional and even national

	political force
Socioeconomic Populism	Most prominent in Latin America, where excluded groups of people started entering the political arena; populists were able to mobilise diverse popular constituencies and develop multi-class movements and parties while fostering a transformation of the state-civil society relation, particularly in terms of the incorporation of social groups that had been excluded from the political community ● Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina: as Minister of Labour he forged networks with trade unions in general and the poor in particular ● Government promoted a vast nationalisation of the economy and established several social rights, but also extended the suffrage to women → the radical impetus of Peron's government polarised Argentine society → ousted by a coup Diverse manifestation of Latin American populism differed in many aspects, it is also true that they shared a particular view on the role of the state in the economy ● All of them had a preference for the 'import-substituting industrialisation' model which meant that Latin American countries should become more self-sufficient through the local production of industrialised goods ● This economic model was quite successful in the short but in the long run it fostered growing state expansion, and thus fiscal deficit, it paved the way for severe financial crises → irresponsible and damaging economic policy approach Rise of new kind of populist figure who followed a neoliberal approach in 1990s ● Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil, 1990-2002), Alberto Fujimori (Peru, 1990-2000) and Carlos Menem (Argentina, 1989-1999) employed populism and implemented reforms in favour of the free market with the aim of controlling inflation and generating growth Contemporary populism in Latin America criticises neoliberalism and favours a greater state involvement in the economy ● Evo Morales (Bolivia, 2006); Hugo Chavez (Venezuela, 1998-2013) claim to be 'socialist'

	leaders
Xenophobic populism	In the 1980s, populist radical parties start to establish themselves as a consequence of social transformations such as mass migration ● Parties like the French National Front gained significant electoral results in the mid 1980s ● Italian Northern League (1994), and the Austrian Freedom Party (2000) Rise of populist radical right parties is closely related to the growing importance of post-materialistic values in European societies; while the 'silent revolution' to post-materialist focuses created Green Parties, the 'silent counter-revolution' of the 1980s gave way to te populist radical right parties → cultural backlash ● Nationalistic and authoritarian tendencies vs libertarian and multicultural inclinations Prioritise sociocultural issues and post-materialist identity values (perhaps more conservative values), instead of being like traditional party families which rely on socioeconomic issues and materialistic values

Category 2: Determinants of Populism

Frameworks

Inglehart and Norris's Cultural Backlash Theory

Demand-side values → Supply side institutions → Eventual outcome
- Demand-side values characterised by
    - Silent revolution in socially liberal attitudes, accentuated by immigration and diversity and economic grievances → these cumulate into threats to social conservatives which trigger a populist (and authoritarian) reflex
- Supply-side institutions
    - Electoral rules and party competition translate the populist's launch of the campaign into whether it will actually become successful

Tilly and Tarrow's Contentious Politics: Political Opportunities and Threats
- Political opportunities: the prospect of success for the campaign
    - Depends on voter support, access to resources, donor support etc
- Threats: the cost of action
    - Reputational costs etc
- Concepts of repertoires and modularity
    - Certain tactics which prove successful may be adopted i.e. the exploitation of social media

Albertazzi and McDonnell's theory of populism

- Ideological conditions
    - Rejection of politics
        - Preliminary condition for the unconditional delegation of authority to the populist leader
        - Against the prestige and power that politics holds
    - Rejection of parties (anti-parties sentiment)
        - Party politicians are an obstacle to the expression of the 'true' will of the people
- Social conditions
    - Individuals and psycho-sociological conditions
        - Suffer from political isolation and alienation
        - Passivity of members who are not members of any kinds of associations or organisations and are unable to retain any social ties
        - Inability to retain any social tie
- Political conditions
    - Mediatisation of politics and personalisation of political power
    - Crisis of the structures of political intermediation

Demand-side determinants
Cultural Transformations

- Establishing existence through Inglehart: the movement of Materialist values to Post-Materialist values → post-materialist concerns such as on environmental policy, open-mindedness and inclusivity are more common in younger, educated individuals; this is because according to Inglehart, such post-materialist values tend to foster under conditions of economic prosperity and existential security
    - Increasing liberalisation in values: over the years 2001-2017, social values have exhibited on average a 10% increase in liberality such as Gay/lesbian relations, divorce etc
    - As generations have progressed, the difference between people who identify themselves as socially conservative vs liberal has decreased sharply
- This is what Norris and Inglehart call the 'silent cultural revolution'
    - Direction of ideological change is consistent across nations
    - As the future generations become more and more liberal, the long term cultural changes have reached a tipping point where members of the former cultural majority, who still adhere to traditional norms, have come to feel like strangers in their own lands
    - People with such values have lost their cultural hegemony which activates feelings of resentments towards groups blamed for change

- - - These tend to be minority groups such as foreigners, immigrants or LGBTQ activists etc
  - Corroborated by the increasing divide between party values
    - The gap between Democrats and the Republicans on issues such as immigration, government aiding the poor, racial discrimination etc have widened and the party polarisation on social values has become greater than gaps by race, religion, education, and age
  - Look to other countries for examples?
    - Inglehart constructed a theory of value change regarding the shifting priorities from Materalist to Post-Materialist values across Western, advanced democracies
      - Showed that the younger cohorts tend to be far more liberal due to conditions of existential security and economic prosperity
      - This is particularly prevalent in the post-war generation which Inglehart analysed, who collectively exhibited a huge spike in post-materialist prioritises vs the preceding cohorts
    - His theory is supported by analysing period effects: people became less materialistic as the same cohort grew older due to the economic prosperity and security they faced as countries became more developed and affluent
      - The upshot of this is that it is wrong to say that older people are more materialist by virtue of them being older; rather, it is the conditions of economic prosperity and existential security in which they live under

Structural Transformation/Globalisation/Immigration
- Economic Grievance: economic grievance theory states that the least prosperous citizens – the losers from globalisation – provide the strongest support for authoritarian and populist values
  - Classic account by Lipset and Bell to explain the appeal of Facism in Weimar Germany, Poujadism in France and McCarthyism in the US: authoritarian reactions against modernity stemming from small entrepreneurs, shop-keepers, self-employed artisans and farmers → squeezed between the power of big businesses and organised labour
    - Falling social status and fear of downward mobility among those who lost out on industrialisation → Lipset argues that extremist movements appeal to the disgruntled and psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated and the economically insecure + uneducated, unsophisticated and authoritarian persons
  - Similar concerns about working class authoritarianism and populism today stimulated by the emergence of a poorly educated, underclass in Western societies

- Growing electoral success of Authoritarian-Populist parties and leaders are attributed to several related economic developments during the 20th century → advanced globalisation of labour, finance, investment, trade and goods flowing across national borders, coupled with economic liberalisation and deregulation, deteriorating job security for unskilled workers, the loss of manufacturing industries, and growing economic inequality
    - The less educated population in advanced industrialised economies have been losers from the global markets; essentially 'left-behinds' who suffer from sluggish job growth, stagnant wages → vulnerable to call of authoritarian populism
    - Governments unable to control international markets and MNCs and unable to implement social policies which provide a sense of security for the unemployed and under-privileged who have lost from globalisation → many blue collar workers turn to Trump and Sanders who campaigned for trade barriers designed to protect workers from foreign competition + seen in Britain through the withdrawal from the EU which was especially supported by the less-educated, poorer and older voters
- The losers of globalisation are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries; they perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat for their social status and their social security → life chances and action spaces are being reduced
    - Those who win from globalisation tend to be more mobile people; while those who lose out tend to be more rooted in loyalty to particular groups such as local communities and would not move even as opportunity calls elsewhere
    - People in these sectors, particularly older white men and non-graduates, feel marginalised economically and urban elites look down on them for holding archaic views about flag, faith and community that are no longer politically correct → resentment of the establishment + adherence to traditional norms flourish among the left-behinds
- Traditional parties are unable to respond properly to these grievances → populist demagogues blame foreigners and immigrants for much of their grievances through "exclusionary nationalism" → UKIP campaigned by promising the limit free access to the NHS to legal residents
- Empirical verification: those who support populist parties should be those who have lost the most from economic globalisation
    - Populist attitudes (mistrust of politicians, parliaments and parties) are predicated slightly more strongly by subjective economic

characteristics – feelings of economic insecurity and especially approval of the state of the national economy – than by birth cohort
- ■ Households struggling to live comfortably are much more mistrustful of politics than those living more comfortable lives
  - ● Most important was how people felt about the national economy → most dissatisfied = least trust in institutions
- ■ Clear link because objective economic indicators do not matter → it is about how certain people feel about how they are doing/fared as a result of globalisation
- ○ Problem: cannot establish direction of causality in cross-sectional data
  - ■ Is it the lack of trust in institutions that depress our views on the economy, or the other way round?
    - ● Do we judge performance of the economy through our prior political lens of political mistrust?
- ● Immigration
  - ○ Rising levels of immigration: help tide countries with an aging population, a shortage of skilled labour and declining fertility rates like Germany to expand the working age population and productivity through successful young migrants
    - ■ Many level immigrants are successful and highly educated but there are also those with little education employed in highly manual intensive occupations → the willingness of immigrants to do these jobs involving hard physical labour also fills in the avoid
  - ○ Rapid influx into Europe from poorer societies: refugee crisis with the number of people seeking asylum in the EU peaking at 1.26 million in 2015 including many from Muslim-majority societies
    - ■ Migrant inflows and growing multicultural diversity has been drastic → countries like Germany and UK are the largest recipients and objects of such an increase
    - ■ Number of migrants living outside their country of birth has doubled from 1960 to 2015 and they move predominantly to high income European societies → Europe hosts the most migrants compared to any other region while the US is the country with the most number of migrants
  - ○ Also affected by policy: Angela Merkel adopted an 'open border' policy which led to the highest number of formal applications for political asylum in 2015
    - ■ Conditions in Northern Europe much more attractive than South Eastern Europe → but most people enter through SE Europe (reason for anti-European Union positions)
  - ○ Basically, affected by countries pre-existing prosperity: the countries with the largest proportion of foreign born residents are small, high-income European

states with a high demand for skilled labour such as Luxembourg and Switzerland

- What matters is not just number of migrants but also public perceptions of them which are affected by personal experiences and media accounts
    - Social tensions due to influx of refugees as Angela Merkel decided to open Germany's borders: not just Germany affected, but neighbouring states receiving boatloads of refugees who wished to enter Germany via these countries like Greece and Italy
    - Exacerbated by language used by populists such as identifying immigrants as scapegoats for 'our' problems and legitimating US/THEM exclusion + Trump's derogatory language against diverse minorities with his nationalistic and nativist tendencies
- Examples of such radical right-wing populism:
    - In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom wanted to launch programs to end immigration from Islamic countries and close all mosques and hold a referendum on Dutch membership in the Eu → Wilders' utilised xenophobic and racist language in his electoral campaigns
    - Danish People's Party which ran a platform hostile to uncontrolled immigration: tighten border controls and for immigrants to follow Danish values and laws, as well as supporting traditional Danish institutions such as the monarchy, Christianity and cultural heritage; the leader, Kristian Dahl, seeks to withdraw from the EU's Schengen free-movement area and reinstate border controls with Germany and Sweden, opposing further EU integration
- Theories of Instrumental Interest, Cultural Identities, and Terrorist Fears: why people react adversely to immigration
    - Instrumental concerns (concerns around immigration due to instrumental consequences regarding immigrant entry): immigration → competition over scarce resources and threats to material well-being → threats to jobs and wages + also increasing crime, taking away school places and welfare programmes
        - Should be the native population which has contributed to these schemes that has priority access to public services.
        - Foreigners accused of 'jumping the queue'
    - Cultural anxieties: holds that anti-immigrant feelings are generated by inherent nativism, white resentment, racial prejudice, and Islamophobia, xenophobia etc → beyond simply material but identity-based concerns

- Blumer theorised that such feelings arise among dominant groups of a society as a response to concerns about losing privileges to subordinate groups
- Similar to the tipping point thesis: cultural grievances strongest when previously dominant groups are threatened by major value shifts in public opinion, as when the older generations of less educated Europeans and Americans continue to endorse conservative values, the balance tipped towards liberal values
- Muslim communities are seen as culturally distant, and hence people fear that they aspire to create separate communities from the mainstream
- Empirically supported: support for Leave outcome in Brexit referendum was heavily linked to prejudice against foreigners; negative attitudes towards immigrants, refugees and multiculturalism linked with voting for populist right in West European countries

- Fears of terrorism: intensified after integration of Muslim immigrants and risks of mass violence by ISIS
  - After bombings in Madrid, London and Paris → people scared of such individuals who have the capacity to threaten security even if they seem harmless (well-educated and good job prospects who carried out the 2005 London bombings)
  - Driving fears of Muslim extremism and thus aversion towards a the significantly muslim immigrations

- Link between populism and anti-immigrant stance: elites tend to be more tolerant on issues regarding diversity and multiculturalism, given that elite education is one of the best predictors for social tolerance of this kind; so, this gives rise to populist mistrust of elites given that the elite liberal consensus on these issues makes mainstream parties reluctant to respond to genuine public concerns about growing diversity and globalism, deepening the lack of confidence in political elites

- Immigration most pervasive: Ivarsflaten finds that while not all populist right parties manage to capitalise on economic grievances or elite corruption, all successful populist parties manage to gain support on the immigration issue
  - Support for parties such as the National Front was driven by resentment against immigrants: the emergence and rise of radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe coincided with the growing tide of immigrants and refugees
    - Outburst of xenophobia and open racism in a majority of West European countries → relatively easy for radical populist Right to

evoke, focus, and reinforce preexisting xenophobic sentiments for political gain

Mediatisation and personalisation of Politics
- Focus is that the populist leader needs to both create the conditions of fear and anxiety and exploit these political opportunities
    - Analogous to social movements and the limits of Tilly's and Tarrow's political threats and opportunities framework → requires a leader to be able to leverage the opportunities and resources effectively
- Theoretical framework (Ganz's leader's strategic capacity): The tenor of Ganz's argument is that the success of a social movement is not simply based on environmental factors such as the political opportunities in the form of resources etc. They also depend on the movement themselves through the actors → because there are clearly cross-campaign variations even if we control for resources and opportunities
    - So strategic capacity is essentially an actor's ability to transform our resources to achieve their purposes → to act under uncertainty to yield the best outcomes
    - Focus on framing, timing and tactics
- Mazzoleni: process of media representation and the symbolic construction of favourable opinion climates and of populist leadership, credo and action → media provides significant support
    - 2 types of media
    - Mainstream media: established news media tend to be seen as mouthpieces of the ruling class and thus are seen as 'elites' to be antagonised against; this is why populist leaders such as Turkey's Erdogan and India's Modi have attacked the fourth estate in their respective countries, as trying to undermine their agenda
    - Tabloid news: follow incentive structures to increase attention via controversial figures → these tend to be populist leaders which attack the status quo and elites
        - So they are given more airtime and thus are able to build their reputation and deliver their messages
        - Exaggerate stories for maximum engagement
    - Personalisation of politics: the politician, as a result of media, has become much more salient in the political arena + the media has far more interest in real people than abstract issues → populists such as Trump tend to have strong personalities that fit the media's desires
        - In Italy, Silvio Berlusconi has run his 'personal party' Forza Italia since 1994 with strong personalised leadership while parties such as French

Front National or Belgium's Vlaams Blok have always strongly identified with their leader

- Mazzoleni's analysis is limited to his time – he seems to think that the television has become increasingly central to the political process and has also led to the personalisation of politics, since the politician/leader is now much more salient in the political arena + exacerbated by dramatisation
  - This is definitely accentuated by the uprising of social media in politics → we can see how Trump's Twitter account features so heavily in his political campaigns
  - Social media has given the platform of media exposure to the populist directly – no longer is an intermediary such as tabloid news needed. Because of such complete control over one's messages, the populist is now enabled to mobilise those people who are anxious and fearful, and grant them a way to engage in cultural backlash against the "morally corrupt" elites → almost like Ganz's "tactics" and strategic capacity

Supply-side (institutional) determinants
Electoral System/Consensus-majoritarian typology

Electoral Rules/Country	Outcome
Proportional Representation • Freedom Party in Austria • PVV in Netherlands	Freedom Party: successful with 26% of the vote under PR system PVV in Netherlands: ranked 2nd largest party due to PR and influenced mainstream parties to adopt similar stances such as tightening immigration policy (policy successes without outright electoral victory)
Mixed Member electoral system where citizens cast two ballots in the same contests (one for member for your district and one for party lists) • Alternative for Germany • Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungry	
Majoritarian-plurality FTFP • National Front in France • UKIP in Britain	France had successive contests in which the NF party improved its performance dramatically • Lost to Macron's new party • Good performance in 1986, when they changed to PR (but changed back afterwards)

	UKIP remained on the fringe of politics, made significant breakthroughs in the 2013 local and 2014 European Parliament elections
	- The electoral system used for the European parliament was regional party list proportional representation; allowed UKIP to make gains in 2004 elections → 16% of votes for 15% of UK members in EP - Strong performance repeated due to the PR system - In national elections, 2015 → UKIP rose from 3.1% to 12.6% in the nation wide vote but only won 1 seat due to FPTP - Surge of popularity fell Decisive impact of vote threshold hurdles in preventing support from minor parties from translating into seats

From essay:

It is also important to analyse how institutional factors, particularly the electoral system, helps push or inhibit populism. We can immediately see this through the comparison of Switzerland and Britain – the two opposing ends of Lijphart's consensus-majoritarian typology. Crucially, Albertazzi and McDonnell call Switzerland a "populist haven", while notes the failures of the British National Party to make any headway in the British elections – this is because Switzerland's proportional representation intending to allow for even the small parties to gain some representation, would allow fringe far-right parties to be represented in the legislature, while the disproportionate British "First-Past-The-Post" system penalises small parties heavily. Notably, Andeweg observes such a correlation between consensus democracies and electoral support for the extreme right.

But I think we need to question just *how* important these electoral systems are. I am going to push the point that while populist parties gain representation more regularly in consensus democracies, when populist parties gain representation in majoritarian democracies, they do so decisively and disrupt the entire political environment. Consider

how the Far-Right parties in Switzerland (SVP/UDC) have about 30% representation in the National Council. Alternatively, populists have two types of effects in majoritarian democracies if successful. Either they infect mainstream parties with their anti-immigration rhetoric such as the Conservative Party adopting BNP's Euro-sceptic, anti-immigration stance because these mainstream parties do not want to lose voters to these parties (and risk losing to its main contender), or the populist conducts a hostile takeover of a mainstream party – i.e. Trump for the USA's Republican Party. We can see that if populist parties are successful under a majoritarian regime, they almost always lead to decisive transformations of the political landscape, while consensus democracies have more gradual inclusions of populist and radical ideologues and parties. And clearly, given the two effects, the majoritarian system neither stems out the possibility of a populist taking power, or the transmission of ideologies from the radical/populist party to the mainstream one. So, once we take into account the intensities of the success of populism across different countries with different democratic institutions and systems, we realise that there are 'cross-effects' for both majoritarian and consensus democracies with respect to the inclusion of populist parties.

Examples of populism

Category 3: Effects of Populism

Is Populism a 'corrective force' for democracy?

- Basically the point that it allows for people to truly express their will → in the direct democratic sense
  - As democracy become too 'elite-driven' and focused → need to return to the common man
  - Inclusive forms of populism that seek to expand participation among historically excluded social groups such as Bolivian President Evo Morales and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
- Call attention to genuine problems, populist movements can spur grassroots pressures for much-needed democratic reforms, such as re-energising American initiative designed to strengthen electoral integrity, restoring voter rights, clean up campaign funding and eradicate gerrymandering
  - Expanding party competition and electoral choices on the ballot, populism may service as a useful corrective to engage disenchanted citizens and strengthen turnout

- - - Force representatives to listen more carefully to genuine public concerns about the rapid pace of social change, the economic disruptions caused by globalisation, and the negative consequences of migration
    - Can combat elite corruption
  - Objection: antipluralist nature of populism
    - Seeks to arbitrarily demarcate who the 'true people' are → by excluding minority groups such as immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities etc
      - This seeks to answer the unanswerable for democracy: impossible to demarcate the people by asking the people themselves since it presupposes who the people are
    - But since it is exclusionary, does not really accord with the ethos of democracy → political equality
  - Objection: single interpretation of the general will
    - The populist leader advances an outline of the general will which is not empirically founded; instead, it is based on moralistic claims regarding what is right → the populist leader claims the initiative to interpret the general will of the "pure people"
    - Since it is not rationally or empirically founded, also does not align with the Rousseauean democracy of locating the general will through direct democracy
      - Rather, elections are meant to simply ratify the populist leader's single-minded interpretation of what the general will is without consultation
      - Not to mention it is a general will of a subset of people
  - Regardless, objection (2) more potent since objection (1) is empirically contingent on the nature of the populist leader
    - We have exclusionary populists such as France's La Pen and US's Trump but we also have inclusive populists such as Venezuela's Chavez and Bolivia's Morales
    - High correlation between populism and right-wing exclusiveness/anti-immigration stances

Is Populism dangerous for democracy?
Irresponsible policy
Basic points
- Euroscepticism in Germany would likely lead to tightening of borders → but objectively, such open borders helps Germany deal with its ageing population and its demand for skilled labour as well as physical manual labour that it requires
- Creating economic dependency

- ○ Erdogan combined reductions in state administered welfare services with an appeal to economically disadvantaged sections of society which the AKP receives the majority of its votes
  - ■ Social assistance programmes mostly supplied by Islamic oriented charity groups and philanthropic associations [act] as a substitute for welfare state functions → exclusionary in nature but also creating dependency by privileging the 'people' defined as traditionalist and Muslims
- ● Destructive policy through Modi's Neoliberal developmentalism
  - ○ Privisation, reductions of labour rights, environmental regulation and state intervention
  - ○ Irresponsible in the sense that they strived to create dependency of the entrepreneurial Hindu "people" on the realisation of the development vision instead of trying to actually use the empirically best policies
  - ○ Populists intend to secure their bases and support since the platform they run on is inherently transitory → soon, the populist must be expected to vanquish the "enemies" but the populist must construct the enemy to continue existing (via conspiracies) while also making individuals dependent on them
- ● Norris and Inglehart: creates a contagion on the right in policy agenda, pulling moderate right parties to become more extreme
  - ○ Radical right populists heighten public concern about race relations, immigration policy, welfare reform and law and order → pull the moderate right further extreme
  - ○ Bornschier argues that where Authoritarian-Populist parties have succeeded in expanding their share of the popular vote, as in France and Switzerland, this has generated a new cultural cleavage in party politics, heightening the salience of issues such as the EU or immigration
    - ■ Where mainstream parties have been successful in preventing serious threats from such parties, by absorbing these issues, this has weakened support for minor parties
  - ○ Schain suggests that in France, the center-right parties such as the RPR and UDF adopted the National Front anti-immigrant rhetoric after 1986
    - ■ Pettigrew argued that Austria implemented more restrictive policies toward refugees after Jorg Haider's FPO entered coalition government with center-right OVP, who in turn adopted far more hardline language against immigrants, legitimising tough xenophobic policies as mainstream → rising to first place in the polls
  - ○ Would this have happened regardless of populist parties? Could just be parties reacting to populist concerns
    - ■ Likely that parties contributed towards the process by challenging the liberal consensus among mainstream parties and altering the

boundaries of public debate, heightening the salience and polarisation of the immigration issue on the legislative agenda and legitimating policies founded on racism and intolerance

- Content analysis of party manifestos in Norway and Denmark since the early 1970s suggests that policies platforms of the moderate conservative parties moved rightwards in response to the electoral challenge of authoritarian-populist rivals on their extreme flank
- Evaluation: but as scholars note, there is no concrete reason for thinking that populists engage in irresponsible policy
  - It could simply be an ideological difference

Democratic Backsliding and Authoritarian values
- Muller argues that populism is a threat to democracy itself
  - According to Muller, populists need to continue to polarise the people (as Trump did) in order to preserve the conditions in which they gain support → prepare for apocalyptic confrontation
    - They cannot merely be protest parties as protest parties cannot protest themselves
  - Continual construction of enemies: for Chavez, George W. Bush was the devil himself → they seem to continually interpret the state of affairs as a state of crisis/existential threat (completely subjective)
  - Populists always fall back on the argument that only they can be morally legitimate representatives of the people and that furthermore, only some of the people are actually the real, authentic people who are deserving of support and good government
    - Manifests itself via (i) a kind of colonisation of the state, (ii) mass clientelism or "discriminatory legalism", and (iii) the systematic repression of civil society
  - Colonisation of the state: Hungary and Poland
    - Orban and his Fidesz party introduced a civil service law to enable party to place loyalists in what should be nonpartisan bureaucratic positions
    - Moved against independence of the courts → procedures of existing courts amended and new judges appointed → strategic to consolidate and perpetuate power
  - Mass clientelism: exchange of material and immaterial favours by elites for mass political support
    - Jorg Haider in Austria who handed out 100 euro bills to "his people" on the streets
      - Engage in it with moral justification and openly

- - - ■ Assert that only some people should enjoy the full protection of the laws and full benefit of welfare systems (see Erdogan and his welfare reductions for non-Muslims)
      - ■ Create a social strata that conforms to their ideal of the people → Hungary's Orban constructed a vision of a group that combines economic success, family values and religious devotion
    - ○ Repression of civil society (particularly through NGOs that criticise them)
      - ■ NGOs represents competitors for their claim to exclusive moral legitimacy and representation of the people
      - ■ They must prove that civil society is not civil society at all and popular opposition has nothing to do with the proper people
      - ■ Orban in Hungary has gone out of his way to discredit NGOs being controlled by outside powers, declaring them "foreign agents"
        - ● Silence those who dissent from the populist leader's construal of the people
  - ● Norris and Inglehart's link between support for populists and authoritarian values: the common cause phenomena → variables seem to measure support for both populist and authoritarian values especially today; less a conceptual argument than an empirical one, especially in light of increased far-right populism
    - ○ Example: anti-immigrant attitudes

Specific examples of populist leaders engaging in authoritarian activities

Country/leader	Policy effects
Turkey's Erdogan ● Divide is between the traditional, conservative Muslims who subscribe to traditional family structures and values vs those who do not	Economic Policy (clientelistic): created economic dependency by singling out non-muslims as non-deserving of social welfare services; service provision conditional on membership of the conservative and religiously devout "people" ● Erdogan combined reductions in state-administered welfare services with an appeal to economically disadvantaged sections of society from which the AKP receive most of its votes ● Social assistance programmes are placed outside the formal state structure and framed around an emergent, conservative, Islamist and nationalist "common sense" with Turkey → placed under the charge of Islamic-oriented charity groups which substitute welfare state functions ● Effectively excluding secular and non-muslims from state welfare functions

- Privileging certain individuals who conform to Erdogan's ideal of the "people" who prioritise family values and family structures over women contemplating abortion etc
- In light of a debilitated welfare system, this alternative services offering nurtures a dependency between "the people" and the AKP affiliated organisations → undermines citizen loyalty to democratic institutions as jobs and benefits are tied to membership of an AKP supporting "people" → rest are economically disenfranchised
- Further exacerbated in 2016 after a failed coup attempt, where Erdogan used a state of emergency to seize all businesses and organisations from the "people's enemies"
  - He sold these seized businesses to AKP loyalist → clientelism and dependence on Erdogan while excluding "the enemies" from welfare and benefits

Religious sectarianism: symbolic struggles over religious symbols, capture of state religious authority, crackdown on non-loyal civil society, state of emergency legislation → de facto exclusion of secularists, white Turks, and religious minorities from the political community
- Exacerbated the cleavage which translated into confrontations between the electorally dominant AKP and secularist-dominated state institutions → Erdogan portrayed political and institutional opponents as corrupted by military interference against the "people"
- Since 2011, Erdogan increasingly used the Directorate of religious affairs to entrench his own political narratives in mosques, religious and educational institutions → capture of non-partisan state institutions to mobilise religious segments of society in support of Erdogan and to suppress dissent using a religious mandate
- Religious polarisation reached its height in 2016 where enemies extended to Muslims supportive of Fethullah Gulen
  - They were dismissed from their jobs, arrested or detained as terrorists and

	members of a criminal cult
	Undermining the fourth estate: Firing of AK-critical editors and journalists at major newspapers and barring their owners from state tenders → framed independent media as the people's enemies ● Repression of independent journalism coincided with efforts to nurture loyal pro-government media, both by developing narrative control over the public broadcaster TRT and the state-run Anadolu news agency ● Encouraging AKP loyalists to fund media outlets, publishing houses and creative agencies staffed with government supporters ● Residual opposition outlets were emasculated by severe funding disparities and a culture of self-censorship among journalists accentuated by frequent media blackouts ● During state of emergency in 2016, there were overt censorship, arrests of hundreds of journalists and closure of media outlets →mass exodus of journalists out of the country, playing into Erdogan's narrative that they were external to the national political community
India's Modi ● Divide is between newly urbanised and middle class Hindus framed by the BJP as the good, deserving "people", threatened by a "secular, anti-national liberal elite" who are deemed corrupt because they monopolise resources and pander to non-Hindu minority groups ● This corrupt "elite" is discursively associated with meddling by foreign NGOs, allegedly seeking to halt India's development through advocacy for minority rights and environmental causes	Economic Policy (developmental): Privatisations, PPP-projects, reductions of labour rights and environmental regulation, state intervention; dependency of the entrepreneurial Hindu "people" on the realisation of the developmental vision ● Many infrastructure projects such as the 3.3 trillion infrastructure programme for India ● Subordinates welfare rights to particularistic top down development schemes benefitting specified groups within the "people" ● Modi unilaterally invalidated more than 80% of India's paper currency overnight and defamed opponents of this radical assault on the informal sector as anti-national enemies of the people → in order to push India towards a cashless society ○ Articulates notions of citizen sacrifices with promises to advance the long-term interests of "the people" while striking out against the elite ● Exclusionary definition of the people serves to

	justify an assault on minorities and "elitist" democratic institutions
	Religious sectarianism: Revocation of minority rights, tacit support for moral panics and vigilante violence, citizenship reform → de facto and de jure exclusion of Muslim minorities from democracy and political power • Modi's BJP considers the Hindu religion and culture superior to that of India's religious minorities → overt animosity towards Muslims • Funding cuts for minority development programmes + endorsing moral panics against Islam and terrorism post-9/11 attacks • BJP disseminated conspiracy theories that frame COVID-19 as a "Muslim virus" spread as part of a "Corona Jihad" • BJP trying to erode Muslim's collective rights in Jammu and Kashmir and the detention of thousands of Muslim Kashmiris around the revocation of the region's special status ○ Illiberal erosion of minority rights Undermining the fourth estate: Modi utilised technology and social media, websites etc to an unprecedented level in Indian politics → world's most followed leader on social media • Widespread dissemination of Modi-selfies, Modi-masks and Modi-paraphernalia by his followers to allow Modi to construct a mythical claim to personate the "people" • Discredited independent media → attacking elite media as corrupt "paid news" • Since 2016, resorted to prolonged blackouts of NDTV, a news channel that frequently criticised his administration, restrictive media licensing, smearing and imprisonment of journalists to undermine journalism's accountability function, including in its coverage of the COVID-19 response
Israel's Netanyahu • Netanyahu's enemies of the people were labelled burdens on Israel's economy, part of the	Economic Policy: Privatisations, deregulation, cutting social services, weakening of labour unions, subsidies for settlers; "Welfare state" for Jewish settlers and neoliberal state for the rest • Neoliberal policies as taken on behalf of

allegedly "anti-patriotic" left which favours Israel's enemies over the people
- 2015 elections: Netayanhu's ads showcasing unionists, public broadcasters and Hamas terrorists comfort one another against Netanyahu and Netanyahu enters the frame with the slogan "It is Us or Them"

economically disadvantaged Jewish masses i.e. the people and as revenge against "corrupt" public sector, workers' unions and welfare state
- Soften the charity or social assistance programmes to the ultra-orthodox sector
  - 2015 bill guaranteed tax benefits to 60 settlements in the West Bank and four Likud strongholds
  - Similar to Erdogan's clientelism
  - Fosters the people's reliance on the populist leader
- Ultimate form of clientelism in Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank
  - Although settlers amount to only 4.6% of Israelis, their parliamentary representation approaches twice their proportion of the population
  - As the Likud and their allies view settlers as an important electoral constituency, a welfare state was established de facto in the West Bank, spanning housing subsidies, integration into public education, and support for settlers' organisations with close ties to the Likud and Yamina parties, shielding the settlers from the government's neoliberalisation including severe housing shortages and overburdened schools
- Nurtured a relationship of mutual dependency in which loyalty to non-partisan state institutions are circumvented in favour of allegiance to Netanyahu, Likud and their allies

Religious sectarianism: Incitement against non-Jewish minorities and their allies, Nation-State law, religionising the national conflict → de facto discrimination of Arab Israelis at the expense of the Jewish collective rights, delegitimisation of minorities and political opponents
- Netanyahu blurs religion and nationalism to define the Jewish claim to Israel in Biblical terms, deny Palestinian's national identity and frame a civilisational struggle between the

	Judeo-Christian world and "murderous Islamism" ○ Ethnoreligious discourse nurtures a dichotomy between an exclusively defined "Jewish people" and their enemies i.e. Israeli Arabs ● Questions the Jewishness of their opponents and thus monopolises Jewishness and Israeli-ness → creating new moralised ruptures within Israeli society ● Label Arab Israelis as collaborators of the Palestinians and thus propagate the existential threat of the Jewish people ● Undermine status of Arabic language previously considered one of Israel's official languages ● 2018 enactment of the semi-constitutional Nation State Law which formally elevates Jewish collective rights over individual political rights conferred as a matter of citizenship Undermining the fourth estate: use of executive power, lawsuits and media regulation to intimidate journalists, exert narrative control over state owned media and weaken institutional news outlets

Eroding Civic Democratic Virtues
- Attacks on human rights values → claims of unfettered majoritarianism, and the attacks on the checks and balances that constrain governmental power by the Human Rights Watch
- Corrosion of the unwritten rules that make formal institutions work, mutual toleration and confidence in representative institutions → weakening of democratic institutions by rejecting the democratic rules of the game, denying the legitimacy of political opponents, tolerating violence, and curtailing civil liberties
    - Leaders such as Hugo Chavez, Victor Orban, Erdogan have destroyed basic human rights and liberal freedoms
    - In Venezuela, there has been a crackdown on dissent, brutality and political persecution of opponents with pro-democracy protests repressed by security forces

- Facing a reverse trend of democratisation: according to the V-Dem trends in liberal democracy worldwide, the mean liberal democracy index has steadily increased since 1950 to 2010, but is at a turning point, falling noticeably in 2015
    - Norris and Inglehart argue that we are facing challenges similar to the reverse waves experienced during 1930s and again in 1970s
- Corroborated by the Freedom House Index, that the level of democracy worldwide has fallen since 2005
    - These trends have reversed due to the emergence of Authoritarian-Populist leaders in hybrid states
    - In Hungary, Orban was able to form a one party government in 2010 when the Fidesz Party won just 52% of the vote but swept up two-thirds of the seats in parliament → the opposition Hungarian Socialist party was left in disarray; with a super-majority, the government was able to push through a new electoral system and a series of constitutional reforms which dismantled checks and balances on executive powers, limited by the constitutional power of the court and undermined the multiparty composition of the electoral commission
        - Formal democratic institutions had been undermined by clientelism and other informal practices
        - Retained its supermajority even when the party dropped its vote share from 52% to 44% + entrenched many of its social and economic policies into the constitution so that these become entrenched even if Fidesz lost power
    - In the Philippines, Duterte's antidrug campaign led to violations of human rights → threatened to kill all the drug pushers without trial → thousands had been murdered by police, killed without trials

Evaluating the impact of populism
- Effect of populism: is populism to blame for the deterioration of democracy and authoritarian rule in these countries or would it have happened anyway because it reflects an authoritarian culture in mass society?
    - Mudde argues that concerns regarding populism has been largely overblown especially in Western democracies because the rise of the populist radical right has had far less serious political consequences than many pessimistic prophecies had long predicted
    - Mudde noted that the average share of the vote for radical right populists in Western European Parliamentary elections has grown but it remains limited
        - Norris and Inglehart estimated from 56 parties in 27 European societies, that the mean share of the vote for Authoritarian-Populist

parties doubled from around 5% during the 1960s to 12% in the last decade → highest level since WW2

- But even in Proportional Representation electoral systems, fringe and minor parties often face formidable challenges in surmounting vote thresholds and then translating popular votes into parliamentary policy agenda across a wide range of issues

- Is populism a transitory phenomenon: the more they hold on to power, the more difficult it is for them to hold onto their credentials as outsiders
  - Populists typically attract disproportionate support among disillusioned citizens distrusting parliament, parties and politicians
    - Problem campaigning as radical outsiders fighting mainstream elites once they join governing coalitions or hold executive offices → this is why Erdogan and Modi attack the fourth estate
  - Popular support for the Austrian Freedom Party fell dramatically once they entered the OVP-led government, from 26.9% in 1999 legislative elections to 10% in 2002 → governing takes a toll on populist support because they maintain their support in opposition

- To assess the impact on whether populist parties are the root cause or the fundamental problem, we have to loom at whether there has been long term erosion of support for the political system → Linz and Stephan's concept of regime consolidation and whether democracy is the only game in town → depends on (i) whether people believe that democracy is the best form of government, (ii) constitutionally, all the major actors and organs of the state reflect democratic norms and practices, (iii) behaviourally, no significant groups actively seek to overthrow the regime or secede from the state
  - Public Support for Democratic principles: overwhelming consensus among republicans and democrats that democracy was a very good way of governing America but polarisation regarding this has widened the gap
    - In 2017, 96% of Democrats endorsed democracy compared to 80% of Republicans → gap increased from 6% to 16% from 2011 to 2017
    - Support for alternative forms of governance has been increasing such as governance by experts
    - Party polarisation was clearest on approval of a strong leader without elections: 2011-2017, partisans switched positions and almost one third of republicans supported strongman rule without elections compared to one fifth of democrats
      - Clearest indicators that Trump's appeal to his supporters has influenced their notions of democratic principles
  - Public satisfaction with democratic performance: democratic satisfaction across a wide range of European societies through the Eurobarometer

- - ■ Democratic satisfaction was consistently low in Italy and satisfaction fell across the Mediterranean countries
    - ■ High satisfaction persists in the Nordic Countries
    - ■ Italian case as exemplifying an alienated political culture → emerged from unrelieved political alienation and distrust
      - ● Lijphart claims that the satisfaction of democracy is a result of whether one adopts a consensus or majoritarian system → Nordic countries and PR
    - ■ Only a weak link between contemporary levels of democratic satisfaction in European societies and the electoral strength of Authoritarian-populist parties; thus, the strong populist tradition in Italy, reflected through the electoral success of Berlosconi's Forza Italia could be potentially attributed to the persistent lack of public confidence in Italian democracy rather than causing it
    - ■ However, Nordic countries have high levels of democratic satisfaction but its populist parties such as the True Finns, the Sweden Democrats have been electorally successful
    - ■ Inglehart and Norris' analysis of birth cohort vs approval of principles of democratic governance → falling importance of living in a democratic country as birth cohorts increased in generation especially among the UK, US, Switzerland etc
  - ○ Public Trust in Representative Institutions: impact on populism on trust on core democratic institutions → erosion of trust in political parties, parliament and governments
    - ■ Trust in government and national governance and political parties have not fluctuated significantly from 2000 to 2017
      - ● Trust in political parties have always been persistently low
    - ■ Slight fall in the proportion of people who have 'very negative' opinions towards EU immigration → far from rising social intolerance, attitudes towards immigration reflect the actual crisis, widely reported in the news media, more than a steadily growing hostility toward immigration and social intolerance stirred up by authoritarian-populist rhetoric
  - ○ Crisis of legitimacy is unduly alarmist → not as severe as we think despite populist attacks on legitimacy of the core channels linking the citizens and the state in Western societies