

Knowledge

Category 1: Theory of Knowledge

Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Is Justification central to Knowledge?

Justification is not necessary in knowledge

- Gettier problem and Nozickian/Goldman revisions that excludes justification
 - Goldman's causal theory of knowing is externalist → the reasons for one's belief being 'justified' are now entirely outside one's ken
 - And because Nozick's theory has counterfactual conditions, S would not be able to access the scenario where p were false, to determine whether S would still believe that p
- Why such externalist criterion of justification cannot be counted as justification
 - Bonjour's reasoning that it violates our intuitions
 - Depends on the concept of justification as epistemic duty
 - Also violates our reasonableness condition

Williamson' Unanalysability of Knowledge

- Williamson purports that knowledge is fundamentally unanalysable or irreducible into individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions; instead, it is sui generis.
 - Knowledge, for Williamson, is the most general factive mental state and our concepts of justification, belief and rationality should be analysed in terms of knowledge
 - So, this is a 'knowledge-first' approach, which seeks to emplace knowledge as part of the conditions to analyse something, rather than something that is to be analysed
- Argument is essentially: (i) Knowing is a mental state; (ii) the view of knowing as a factive mental state and standard analyses of the concept knows as a conjunction of the concepts believes and true and of other concepts is incompatible. Hence, we cannot expect a standard analysis of knowledge
- Knowing as a factive mental state
 - A state of mind is a mental state of a subject
 - Includes attitudes to propositions: believing something is so, conceiving that it is so, intending it is so
 - William's claim is that it includes propositional knowledge
 - Knowledge consists of the claim that I am not simply acquainted with p but that I know something that is so, and something that is so if and only if p is true
 - Knowing is a factive attitude: one knows p only if p is true, although one can be acquainted with p even if it is false
 - Other factive attitudes involve perception or memory

- If attitudes are relations of subjects to propositions, then the claim is that knowing itself is a mental relation such that, for every proposition p, having the relation to p is a mental state. Thus, for some mental state S, being in S is necessary and sufficient for knowing p
- William's claim is that not merely that a mental state (belief) is necessary for knowing p, but that a mental state S is sufficient for knowing p; that is, **knowing p is just a mental state**
 - The standard view is that believing is merely a state of mind but that since truth is a non-mental component of knowing, knowledge is not since is factive
- Why should factive attitudes constitute mental states?
 - Reason 1: similarity to non-factive mental states → there is a mental state of imagining so it would be strange if there is no mental state of remembering
 - Remembering is a factive attitude in the sense that I must remember something that actually happened
- Eliminating reasons to demote factive attitudes to being non-mental states (William acknowledges that this sort of reasoning is not a proof of being in the same category)
 - The supposed disqualifications of factive and non-factive attitudes that disqualify knowing as a mental states concern: (i) constitutive dependence on the environment, (ii) first person accessibility and (iii) causal efficacy
 - Constitutive dependency on the environment: one's belief about whether one knows p is defeasible by new information in a way which one's belief about whether one believes p is not → so it is dependent on external environment
 - New information may show that p is false → but is our belief that we believe p indefeasible by new information? → someone might believe that he believes that the world will end next year, because he has joined a religious sect in which there is a strong pressure to believe that the world will end next year, but his unwillingness to cash in his pension forces him to reflect and realise that he does not actually believe that the world will end next year
 - Our mental states such as being alert or thinking clearly about a problem is defeasible by new information, for example about what drugs had been slipped into one's drink
 - My belief that I am in a mental state of alertness → once I know that I was drugged, I no longer believe that I am in a mental state of alertness
 - First-person accessibility: one may deny that knowing is a mental state on the basis of the assumption that one must always be in a position to know whether one is in a mental state

- One is surely not always in a position to know whether one knows p; case when S believes p falsely
- Consider a well-informed citizen S who has not yet heard that President Lincoln was assassinated; since Lincoln is dead, S no longer knows that Lincoln is the president. However, S is in no position to know that anything is amiss and reasonably believes that Lincoln is President and continues to reasonably believe that he knows that Lincoln is president. Although S does not know that Lincoln is President, he is in no position to know that he does not know that Lincoln is President
- But it is not the case that one must always be in a position to know whether one is in a mental state: for instance, one is sometimes in no position to know whether one is in the mental state of hoping p or imagining p in a dream
 - I can be conscious of nothing but indifference
 - Such consciousness of a mental state of being in pain is also doubtful → one may mistake an itch for being in pain and one may mistake a pain for an itch
- The assumption that one must always be in a position to know whether one is in a mental state clearly fails for some mental states, and thus is not necessary
- Knowing as a factive mental state and incompatibility with traditional analysis
 - Contrast between non-examples of mental states (believing truly) and a factive mental state (knowing): Believing p truly is not a mental state, at least, not when p is an ordinary contingent proposition about the external environment
 - Intuitively, for example, there is no mental state being in which is necessary and sufficient for believing truly that it is raining (that is, for believing while it is raining that it is raining), just as there is no mental state being in which is necessary and sufficient for believing while Rome burns that it is raining
 - The conceptual contrast is that the concept knows is a mental concept while the concept believes truly is not a mental contrast; the metaphysical contrast is that knowing is a mental state while believing truly is not a mental state
 - In essence, **truly believing is not a mental state because it involves the conjunction of a non-mental component and a mental component**; this is why if knowledge is a mental state, it cannot be reduced into a conjunction of non-mental and mental components → it is an irreducible concept that connects one's mental state with the truth, and therefore is not simply a conjunction of the condition of truth with some other conditions

- The fact is that there is no mental state S which is sufficient and necessary for one to believe truly, since believing truly consists in the conjunction of a mental state believing, and a non-mental state of truly
 - The single non-mental conjunct of “truly” believing is sufficient to make the concept of truly believing non-mental since there is now no mental state S* such that one is in S* if and only if one is in S and C obtains
- This reasoning applies to the concept “has a justified true belief”
 - The argument can be generalised to analyses where there is a non-mental component
 - In particular, the conjunctive concept “true” → rendering the consequent concept non-mental
 - Given the concept knows is mental, every analysis of it of the standard kind is therefore incorrect as a claim of concept identity, for the analysing concept is distinct from the concept to be analysed
- So what distinguishes knowing from true belief? Further, how can knowing p be conditioned on p being true and be a mental state given that it is for this reason that believing truly that p is non-mental?
 - The difference consists of “believing truly” being a conjunct of “truth” and “believing” while Williamson thinks that knowing that not consist of such a conjunct
 - The upshot of “believing truly” being a conjunct is that one can believe truly that p when p is accidentally true → I can hold a belief that is accidentally true
 - But knowing p involves a mental state that simply cannot be divorced from the truth of the proposition, and that knowing in some special sense guarantees the truth of its proposition
 - Believing truly and knowing then differ in their connection to the truth
 - Believing truly that p can entail holding a proposition that happens to be true; it does not guarantee the connection to the truth in the same sense as knowledge
 - And because multiple analyses from Gettier and counter-Gettier cases have shown that the reductive conception of knowledge has repeatedly failed, the principal reason for such failure of analysis is a category mistake: that we overlook knowledge as simply a factive mental state
 - It is not that knowing p is dependent on p being true → rather, knowing p just cannot be divorced from p being true
- The concept knows cannot be analysed into more basic concepts

- Our expectation to reach a necessary and sufficient condition by adding whatever knowing has which believing truly may lack is based on a fallacy
 - If G is necessary for F, there need not be no further condition H specifiable independent of F such that the conjunction of G and H is necessary and sufficient for it
 - Consider: being coloured is sufficient for a ball being red, but there is no other conjunctive condition specifiable independent of “red” for the ball to be red

Category 2: The Gettier Problem

The Gettier Problem and solutions

Gettier's Essay on the joint insufficiency of Justified True Belief

What is Knowledge

- S knows that P iff
 - P is true
 - S believes that P
 - S is justified in believing that P (Chisholm specifies this to be S has adequate evidence for P; Ayer calls this S has the right to be sure that P is true)
- One of the classes of adequate evidence or justification is deduction
 - For Gettier writes, “for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q”

Classical counterexample: Smith and Jones

- Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:
 - (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket
- Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones' pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:
 - (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket
- Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true
- But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true
- For (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of

the coins in Jones' pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job

Classic counterexample 2: Barcelona

- Imagine that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition: (f) Jones owns a Ford
 - Evidence: Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford etc
- Imagine that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant and he makes the following proposition
 - (g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona
- (g) is entailed by (f) and Smith realises the entailment of this proposition he has constructed by (f) and accepts (g). Smith has correctly inferred (g) from (f), a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is completely justified in believing each of these three propositions and Smith has no idea where Brown is
 - Suppose that (1) Jones does not actually own a Ford but drives a rented car and (2) Brown is actually in Barcelona by pure coincidence
 - Given this, Smith cannot possibly be said to know that (g) is true, even though (g) is true, Smith does believe that (g) is true, and Smith is justified in believing that (g) is true

Goldman's causal connection as an additional criterion

Goldman's identification of the problem in Gettier's case

- In the Barcelona case, S cannot be said to know that p because "what makes p true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but this fact has nothing to do with Smith's believing p"
 - There is no causal connection between the fact that Brown is in Barcelona and Smith's believing p

Goldman's Causal Model and Applications

- Goldman's model of knowledge essentially replaces justification with a causal connection between the fact that makes p true (or the fact that p) and Smith's belief of p + that S must correctly reconstruct the causal chain. Knowledge is therefore:
 - S believes that P
 - P is true
 - There is a causal connection between the fact that makes p true
 - S must be able to correctly reconstruct the causal chain
- Why the Gettier case is not considered knowledge
 - Suppose that S sees that there is a vase in front of him, but unbeknownst to him, two conditions hold: (1) there is a hologram of a vase, that makes him think that there actually is a vase there and (2) there is a real vase hidden behind the hologram of the vase

- Here, we deny that S sees that there is a vase in front of him, for his view of the real vase is completely blocked, so that it has no causal role in his formation of his belief. So S cannot be said to know that there was a vase in front of him, purely on the basis of perception (someone could have told him that there was a vase)
- Volcano example: Suppose that S perceives that there is solidified lava in various parts of the countryside. On the basis of this belief, plus various “background” beliefs about the production of lava, S concludes that a nearby mountain erupted many centuries ago. Let us assume that this is a highly warranted inductive inference, one which gives S adequate evidence for believing that the mountain did erupt many centuries ago. Assuming this proposition is true, does S know it?
 - Goldman: depends on the nature of the causal process that induced his belief. Knowing requires a continuous causal chain of the sort he envisages connecting the fact that the mountain erupted with his belief of this fact, then S knows it
- Suppose that the mountain erupts, leaving lava around the countryside. The lava remains there until S perceives it and infers that the mountain erupted. Then S does know that the mountain erupted. But suppose that after the mountain erupted, a man removes all the lava and a century later, a different man (not knowing of the real volcano) decides to make it look as if there had been a volcano, and therefore puts lava in appropriate places. Still later, S comes across this lava and concludes that the mountain erupted centuries ago. In this case, S cannot be said to know the proposition because the fact that the mountain did erupt is not a cause of S’s believing that it erupted. A necessary condition of S’s knowing p is that his believing p be connected by a causal chain
- Reconstruction of the causal chain
 - Correct reconstruction as a necessary condition of knowledge based on inference: Consider a newspaper reporter observes p and reports it to his newspaper. When printed, however, the story contains a typographical error so that it asserts not-p. S, when reading the paper, fails to see the word ‘not’ and takes the paper to have asserted p. Trusting the newspaper, he infers that p is true. Here we have a continuous causal chain leading from p to S’s believing p; yet S does not know p. S thinks that p resulted in a report to the newspaper about p and that this report resulted in printing the statement p
 - Thus, his reconstruction of the causal chain is mistaken and to know p requires his reconstruction to contain no mistakes → note that Goldman likely does not think that the reconstruction is an explicit, internal process
 - The important links must be reconstructed correctly at minimum

- Note: it is not that S must be able to reconstruct the causal chain at anytime; it is more that if S was able to access the reasons for his belief, he would correctly construct the causal chain
- Nature of causal connection: only requires that there be a causal connection between p and S's belief, not necessarily that p be a cause of S's belief
 - The fact that p and S's belief of p can also be causally connected in a way that yields knowledge is both p and S's belief of p have a common cause
 - Consider: I know that smoke was coming out of my chimney last night. I know this because I remember perceiving a fire in my fireplace last night and I infer that the fire caused smoke to rise out of the chimney. The smoke rising out of the chimney is not a causal factor of my belief, but the fact that there was a fire in the fireplace was a cause both of my belief that smoke was coming out of the chimney and of the fact that smoke was coming out of the chimney
- This allows us to avoid the 'knowledge about the future' worry: that if p causes S's belief that p, then cause cannot precede effect and so we cannot have any knowledge of the future
 - Suppose T has an intention to go shopping, and this intention causes him to tell me that he is going to shop. So I believe that he is going shopping and this intention causes T to go shopping. So there is a causal connection between my belief and T going shopping
- Applications
 - Memory: Remembering, like perceiving, must be regarded as a causal process. S remembers p at time t only if S's believing p at an earlier time is a cause of his believing p at t
 - If I forgot p at t1 and relearned it at t2 because someone told me p at t2 but you have no memory impression of p at t2, you cannot be said to remember p because my believing p at t0 has no causal connection with me believing p at t2
 - Testimony: P causes a person T to believe p, by perception. T's belief of p gives rise to (causes) his asserting p. T's asserting p causes S, by auditory perception, to believe that T is asserting p. S infers that T believes p, and from this, in turn, infers that p is a fact
 - Appropriate knowledge producing causal processes include: perception, memory, a causal chain either exemplifying a continuous causal chain or a common cause which is correctly reconstructed by inferences, each of which is warranted (background propositions help warrant an inference only if they are true) + combinations
- Goldman's externalism
 - Goldman's criteria are stronger than JTB in certain respects of causal requirement and correct-reconstruction requirement

- Weaker in that traditional analysis requires: For S to know p at t, S must be able to, at t, to state his justification for believing p, or his grounds for p.
 - Goldman makes no such requirement, that one need not be able to state his reasons for believing that p
 - Example: Suppose I know that Abraham Lincoln was born in 1809. I originally came to know this fact, let us suppose, by reading an encyclopaedia article. I believed that this encyclopaedia was trustworthy and that its saying Lincoln was born in 1809 must have resulted from the fact that Lincoln was indeed born in 1809. Thus my original knowledge of this fact was founded on a warranted inference. But now, I no longer remember this inference but I remember p. Nevertheless, I know that p still because my original knowledge of it was preserved until now by the causal process of memory

Nozick's counterfactual conditions

Nozick's conditional theory of knowledge

- Normal conditions:
 - S believes that p
 - P is true
- Additional subjunctives (conditional in the counterfactual sense)
 - If p was not true, then S would not have believed that p
 - If p was true, then S would have believed that p
- Overall motivation
 - Nozick wants to increase the sensitivity of belief to the truth
 - Gettier problems of not knowing arise when "[my belief] is caused by the fact that is its content" but "[my belief] is not sensitive to that fact"
- Motivation for addition #1
 - Resolves the traditional Gettier case. Suppose the Ford and Smith example. If Smith did not own a Ford, I would still believe that Smith owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona
 - This is why it fails to be counted as knowledge
 - Further resolves the traditional Gettier cases against Goldman like the Barn case, for if the Barn I saw was fake, I would still believe that the Barn was there and hence does not count as knowledge
- Motivation for addition #2
 - What it essentially says is that "the subjunctive is true when (roughly) all those worlds in which p holds true that are closest to the actual world, q also is true"
 - Whether or not q is true in p worlds that are still farther away from the actual world is irrelevant to the truth of the subjunctive

- We consider only the closest group of possible worlds
- The truth of the antecedent (that p) and consequent (S believes that p) is not sufficient for the truth of a subjunctive → so it says more than S believes that p and that p is true
 - Key is in the imagined *will*
 - In the “close” worlds where p is true, he also believes it; not just in the current world where he actually truly believes p
- This further subjunctive helps to close the insufficiency of the 3rd condition
 - Consider: A person in a tank is brought to believe, by direct electrical and chemical stimulation of his brain, that he is in the tank and is being brought to believe things in this way; he does not know this is true. However, the subjunctive condition is satisfied: if he weren’t floating in the tank, he wouldn’t believe that it was
 - The person in the tank does not know that he is there, because his belief is not sensitive to the truth; although my belief is caused by the fact that is its content, it is not sensitive to that fact
 - The operators of the tank could have produced any belief, including the false belief that he wasn’t in the tank; if they had, he would have believed that
- This second subjunctive provides additional sensitivity
 - The person in the tank does not satisfy it: Imagine as actual a world in which he is in the tank and is stimulated to what he believes he is. It is not true of him there that if he were in the tank he would believe it; for in the close world to his own where he is in the tank but they don’t give him the belief that he is, he doesn’t believe he is in the tank
 - Another case: The dictator of a country is killed; in their first edition, newspapers print the story but later all the country’s newspapers and other media deny the story, falsely. Everyone who encounters the denial believes it. Only one person in the country fails to hear any denial and he continues to believe the truth. He satisfies conditions 1-3 (if p was false, he would not believe that p), yet intuitively he doesn’t know that p.
 - If he had heard about the denials, he too would have believed them (this is the closest world)
 - His belief is not sensitively tuned to the truth and thus does not satisfy the condition that if it were true, he would believe it
- How this differs from Goldman’s causal theory of knowledge
 - Dancy claims that the two subjunctives are actually a generalisation of Goldman’s causal theory of knowledge because it handles additional cases +

also S believing p being caused by p is a special case of (if not p) then (S wouldn't believe that p) since p wouldn't have caused that belief

- More robust
- Refining condition 4: Ways and methods of knowing
 - Suppose S believes that p through one method of arriving at p, but if p were false he wouldn't use this method but another one instead, whose application would lead him to mistakenly to believe p
 - If only one method M is actually or subjunctively relevant to S's belief that p, then, simply, S knows that p (according to our ordinary notion) if and only if that method M is such that S knows that p via M
 - Suppose a father believes his son innocent of committing a particular crime because of both faith in his son and because he has seen presented in the courtroom a conclusive demonstration of his son's innocence
 - His belief via the method of courtroom demonstration satisfies 1-4 but his faith-based belief does not. If his son were guilty, he would still believe him innocent, on the basis of faith in his son. Thus his belief via faith in his son violates condition 3. Looking at his belief alone, without mention of method, his belief that p violates the third condition, which made no mention of method
 - So, Nozick proposes that S knows that p if there is some method via which S believes that p which satisfies conditions 1-4, and that method is not outweighed by any other method(s), via which S actually believes that p, that fail to satisfy conditions 3-4
 - Nozick asks us to consider if M1 recommends p and M2 recommends not-p which would we believe to evaluate
- Counter Gettier Case
 - Consider that there is a hidden machine in the room that illuminates a hologram of the vase when there is a vase pressing down a button. This hologram of the vase blocks any possible sighting of the actual vase in the room. Then, S believes that 'there is a vase in the room', which is true. If p were false, then S would not believe that p (since no vase would be pressing down on the button to activate the hologram). If p were true, then in the closest possible worlds, S would have believed that p.

Inescapability of the Gettier Problem: Zagzebski's inescapability of the Gettier Problem
Gettier cases arise due to the case of double luck, and the fact that the justification condition does not directly link to the truth condition

- Vulnerability of internalism and externalism to the Gettier cases
 - Internalism: On internalist theories, the grounds for justification are accessible to the consciousness of the believer, and Gettier problems arise when there is nothing wrong with the internally accessible aspects of the

cognitive situation, but there is a mishap in something inaccessible to the believer

- Since justification does not guarantee truth, it is possible for there to be a break in the connection between justification and truth, but for that connection to be regained by chance
- Smith and Barcelona case is one example
 - The problem arises because in spite of the fact that you have done everything to reach the truth from your point of view and everything that anyone could expect of you, your efforts do not lead you to the truth
 - It is mere bad luck that you are the unwitting victim of Smith's lies (that he has a Ford) and only an accident that a procedure that usually leads you to the truth leads you to falsehood; similarly, you end up with a truth belief by a second accident that has nothing to do with your cognitive activity
 - It is an accident of bad luck cancelled out by an accident of good luck
- Externalism: Consider how the problem arises from reliabilism where believers are justified when their beliefs are formed in a reliable, or truth-conducive, manner.
 - On this account there is also no guarantee that justified beliefs are true, and a breakdown in the connection between a reliable belief forming process and the truth is possible
 - Fake Barns Case (Against Goldman): Imagine you are driving through a region which, unknown to you, the inhabitants have erected three barn facades for each real barn in an effort to make themselves look more prosperous. Your eyesight is normal and reliable enough in an ordinary circumstance to spot a barn from the road. But in this case, the fake barns are indistinguishable from the real barns at such a distinction. As you look at a real barn you form the belief 'That's a fine barn.' The belief is true and justified, but is not knowledge
 - 2 accidental features that cancel one another out: (i) an accident that visual faculties normally reliable in this sort of situation are not reliable in this particular situation, and (ii) it is another accident that you happened to be looking at a real barn and hit on the truth anyway.
- The reason for the Gettier problem arising is due to a relatively minor failure of the cognitive situation to connect to the truth. **As long as the property that putatively converts true belief into knowledge is analysed in such a way that it is strongly linked with the truth, but does not guarantee it, it will always be possible to devise**

cases in which the link between such a property and the truth is broken but regained by accident

- As long as there is a small degree of independence between some particular element of knowledge that is added and truth, we can construct Gettier cases by using the following procedure:
 - Start with a case of justified false belief. Make the element of justification strong enough for knowledge but the belief false. The falsity of the belief will not be due to any systematically describable element of the situation, for if it were, such a feature could be used in the analysis of the components of knowledge other than true belief, and then truth would be entailed by the other components of knowledge, contrary to the hypothesis. The falsity of the belief is therefore due to some element of luck. Now emend the case by adding another element of luck which makes the belief true after all in a way that is independent of the element of justification/warrant so that the degree of justification/warrant is unchanged
 - Essentially one element of luck counteracting another
- Insofar as the concept of knowledge closely connects the justification component and the truth component but permits some degree of independence between them, justified true belief will never be sufficient for knowledge
- Dilemma: either, we are vulnerable to the Gettier cases, or we threaten the independence between justification and truth of knowledge
 - Defeasibility conditions adds to the requirement that knowledge be justified true belief the restriction that the belief in question must also be justified in certain counterfactual situations
 - Levy's definition of a defeasibility condition as a "requirement to the effect that for S to know that p there must be no other evidence against p strong enough to undermine S's belief that p, should this evidence come to S's attention"
 - Clearly, your belief that Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is undermined if you find out Smith does not own a Ford; your belief that this is a barn is undermined if you discover most objects are fake barns + same for Mary if she discovers the person sitting in the chair is not her husband
 - If S discovered the falsity of the underlying belief, S would retract her belief under discussion
 - Strong defeasibility conditions put a strain on the independence of the justification/defeasibility conditions and the truth condition
 - If S's belief that p is false, there will obviously be many other propositions which are logically or evidentially connected to p which

are false also → should S be aware of any of such propositions, it may easily undermine S's belief that p, assuming S is rational

- This means that the falsehood of p is incompatible with a strong defeasibility condition, contrary to the hypothesis that the justification and defeasibility condition do not entail the truth condition
- Gettier cases for Weak Defeasibility conditions
 - Suppose Dr Jones, a physician, has very good inductive evidence that her patient, Smith, is suffering from virus X. Smith exhibits all of the symptoms of this virus, and a blood test has shown that his antibody levels against virus X are extremely high. In addition, let us suppose that the symptoms are not compatible with any other known virus, all of the evidence upon which Jones bases her diagnosis is true, and there is no evidence accessible to her which counts significantly against the conclusion. The proposition that Smith is suffering from virus X really is extremely probable on the evidence.
 - In this case there is nothing defective in the justification of Dr Jones' belief that Smith has virus X and no false belief figures causally or evidentially in her justification, nor is there any false belief in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, she would have believed that Smith has virus X in a wide range of counterfactual situations.
 - Nonetheless, let us suppose that the belief is false. Smith's symptoms are due to a distinct and unknown virus and the fact that he exhibits high antibody levels to virus X is due to idiosyncratic features of his biochemistry which cause him to maintain unusually high antibody levels long after a past infection.
 - In this case Dr Jones' belief that Smith is presently suffering from virus X is false, but it is both justified and undefeated. Of course, given that the belief is false, there must be some evidence against it accessible to her in some counterfactual circumstances, so if defeasibility conditions are strong enough, no false empirical belief passes the test. But as said above, that is to impose an unreasonably strong defeasibility condition, one that makes the justification/defeasibility condition entail truth. The most reasonable conclusion to draw in this case, then, is that Jones' belief is justified and undefeated, but false.
 - Now to construct a Gettier-style example we simply add the feature that Smith has very recently contracted virus X, but so recently that he does not yet exhibit symptoms caused by X, nor has there been time for a change in the antibody levels due to this recent infection. So while the evidence upon which Dr Jones bases her diagnosis does

make it highly probable that Smith has X, the fact that Smith has X has nothing to do with that evidence. In this case, then, DrJones' belief that Smith has virus X is true, justified and undefeated, but it is not knowledge

- Unappealing ways to avoid the Gettier Problem
 - Justification as very weak condition of being the best possible way to achieve truth: justification and truth become almost completely independent. Justification now only puts the subject in the best position available for getting the truth, but if the best position is not very good, most justified beliefs will be false
 - Most justified scientific hypotheses since the world began have been false → but many theorists were justified. Even if one of them randomly were true, some theorists might be willing to call it knowledge
 - Gettier cases would just be accepted as knowledge
 - Adding the element of luck to the analysis: JTB + x + luck
 - Acknowledgement that the additional condition for X ought to be one that has a strong general connection with the acquisition of truth, but that an inviolable connection would be unreasonable.

Category 3: Theories of Justification (Externalism vs Internalism)

What Justification is

The Concept of Justification

- Naive conception of justification and infinite regress
 - Naive conception of justification is to show that a belief follows inferentially from some other belief → but now we require further justification with respect to the premises of this new justificatory argument
 - Occurs recursively and we are threatened by an infinite and seemingly vicious regress of epistemic justification → scepticism as outcome
- Foundationalism
 - Proposes that regress terminates by reaching empirical beliefs that (a) are genuinely justified, but (b) whose justification is not inferentially dependent on that of any further empirical belief(s), so that no further issue of empirical justification is thereby raised
 - These are called non-inferential, or basic beliefs → foundation upon which the edifice of empirical knowledge rests
 - Central argument is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress lead inexorably to scepticism
 - How are basic beliefs possible? How is it possible for there to be an empirical belief that is epistemically justified in a way completely independent of any believed premises that might provide reasons for accepting it

- Chisholm suggests a basic belief seems to be in effect an epistemologically unmoved (or self-moved) mover
- Nature of justification
 - Epistemic justification: distinguishing characteristic is its internal relationship to the cognitive goal of truth
 - A cognitive act is epistemically justified, on this conception, only if and to the extent that is aimed at this goal – which means at minimum that one accepts only beliefs that there is adequate reason to think are true
 - **Normativity of epistemic justification:** it has to do with what one has a duty of obligation to do, from an epistemic or intellectual standpoint
 - Chisholm suggests that one's purely intellectual duty is to accept beliefs that are (likely to be) true and reject beliefs that are (likely to be) false
 - To accept beliefs on some other basis is to violate one's epistemic duty – to be epistemically irresponsible – even if such acceptance might be desirable from some other, non-epistemic standpoint
 - As Bonjour goes on to suggest, this normativity of justification entails that I must subjectively have good reasons to rationally accept the belief that p. That is, justification is not agent-neutral but agent-relative
- Problems with Foundationalism through rationally accepting basic beliefs requiring other beliefs for justification (as a motivation for externalist variants of foundationalism)
 - If basic beliefs are to provide a suitable foundation for empirical knowledge, if inference from them is to be the sole basis for the justification of other empirical beliefs, then that feature, whatever it may be, in virtue of which an empirical belief qualifies as basic, must also constitute an adequate reason for thinking that the belief is true.
 - And now if we assume plausibly enough, that the person for whom a belief is basic must himself possess the justification for that belief if his acceptance of it is to be epistemically rational or responsible, and thus apparently that he must believe with justification both (a) that the belief has the feature in question and (b) that beliefs having that feature are likely to be true, then we get the result that this belief is not basic after all, since its justification depends on that of these other beliefs.
 - If this is correct, then foundationalism is untenable as a solution to the regress problem

Internalism and externalism for knowledge

- Can be characterised by whether I am in a position to know that I know

- So solutions to Gettier cases are usually externalist theories of knowledge such as Nozick or
- Whether justification is essential therefore depends on whether we are an internalist or externalist about justification

A statement of internalism and externalism of justification

- Externalism: In general, the person for whom the belief is basic need not have any cognitive grasp of any kind of this reason or of the relation that is the basis for it in order for this basic belief to be justified; all these matters may be external to the person's subjective conception of the situation
 - Hence, the justification of a basic belief need not involve any further beliefs (or other cognitive states) so that no further regress of justification is generated
 - So, externalism is not just about basic beliefs (see Goldman's own argument for an application beyond basic beliefs), but is especially relevant to basic beliefs because it is a way to show how the justification of such beliefs do not depend on other beliefs (which are subjectively tethered to the believer)
- Internalism: an internalist says that epistemic justification is a matter of one's epistemic reasons or how things look from one's own perspective on the world
 - Whether I can state my reasons or access these reasons

Typology of internalist-externalist with respect to justification and knowledge

Internalist for both justification and knowledge	BonJour
Internalist for justification but externalist for knowledge	Goldman → denies that his theory of knowledge is JTB
Externalist for both	If we count Nozick and Goldman as some JTB Process reliabilism

Types of internalism

Type of internalism	Characterisation
Access Internalism	Strong access internalism: For our beliefs to be justified, we should not only be aware of their justifying factors or grounds, but also of their adequacy, that is, of how those factors support the justification of the beliefs in question

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This upholds a truth-conducive conception of justification • For example, to know that there is a plant in front of me requires me to know (perhaps somewhat generally) how my eyesight works and how adequate or probable it is that my eyesight is accurate
Mental State Internalism	<p>The most natural interpretation of the general internalist thesis is, perhaps, one according to which only the internal states of an agent at a given time determine whether her beliefs are justified. These internal states are usually identified with the relevant mental states of the agent. Thus, the mentalist claims that one's justification in holding a belief supervenes on one's mental states so that no two people can be in identical mental states while one is, but the other is not, justified in holding a particular belief. An externalist, on this account, is someone who maintains that two people can be in the same present mental states while one has a justified belief and the other does not. Since mentalism remains neutral on the question whether these mental states need be accessible to an agent if they are to confer justification on her beliefs it does not seem to do justice to the intuitions that drive paradigm internalist positions. Consequently, many epistemologists are disinclined to view it as a genuine form of internalism</p>

Varieties of externalism

Type of externalism	Characterisation
Process reliabilism (Goldman initially thought that his causal theory of knowing excluded justification (because he held an internalist view of justification), which fell out of favour; so he sought to construct a theory that was externalist for both knowledge and justification)	<p>Justification arises from reliable cognitive processes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Known as a "historical" theory • Process reliabilism makes positive epistemic status of a belief a function of its history and of how it has been formed → the cogniser does not need to know or be aware that his belief-forming processes are reliable • As long as the belief is formed by a reliable process it is justified
<p>Problems with this sort of externalism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes the subject matter of epistemology 	

- Philosophers say that what is interesting about epistemology and the concept of justification is from the first-person perspective, how justification provides us with an assurance for truth
- For the externalist, all that matters for justification is the satisfaction of certain conditions that may be inaccessible to us on reflection
- Thus, possessing externalist knowledge and justification does not seem relevant to our understanding of how we know the things we know and providing assurance for our beliefs
- Must incorporate some internalism
 - Bonjour highlights that if Norman was in possession of strong negative reasons against beliefs being reliably produced through clairvoyance, then Norman's beliefs are intuitively unjustified despite being reliably produced
 - So, externalist qualify reliabilism to include the "no-defeater" condition; that is, the agent is not in possession of any negative reason against the reliability of the relevant cognitive process
 - However, such a "no-defeater" condition is internalist in nature so reliabilism is not purely externalist
 - The more pressing point is that what lies behind the intuitive obviousness of the added clause is actually the internalist intuition that it is epistemically irrational and irresponsible to hold beliefs that are, from an agent's perspective, unlikely to be true
 - So, if the externalists are willing to incorporate a negative internalist requirement into their account of epistemic justification, there is no reason why they should not let the same intuitions motivate positive internalist requirements

For Internalism

Lawrence Bonjour's Clairvoyance thought-experiments

- How to counter externalism: We cannot simply directly refute the externalist by begging the question: we cannot say that such a relation could only play a justificatory role only if the believer possessed adequate reason for thinking that it obtained
 - This is precisely what the externalist denies and is insulated from
 - Bonjour instead shows how externalism violates our fundamental intuitions about epistemic rationality
- Armstrong's externalism
 - Armstrong makes the acceptability of a basic belief depend on an external relation between the believer and his belief, on the one hand, and the world, on the other, specifically a law-like connection: "there must be a law-like connection between the state of affairs Bap [i.e. a's believing that p] and the state of affairs which makes p true such that, given Bap, it must be the case that p"

- The “thermometer-model” of non-inferential knowledge: just as the readings of a reliable thermometer lawfully reflect the temperature, so one’s basic beliefs lawfully reflect the state of affairs that make them true.
- A person whose beliefs satisfy this condition is in effect a reliable cognitive instrument; that it is, according to Armstrong, precisely in virtue of this reliability that these basic beliefs are justified
- Schematic formulation incorporating the fact that the law linking the having of the belief with the state of affairs that makes it true will have to mention properties, including relational properties, of the believer beyond his merely having that belief:
 - a non-inferential belief is justified if and only if there is some property H of the believer, such that it is a law of nature that whenever a person satisfies H and has that belief, then the belief is true
 - H may be as complicated as one likes and may include facts about the believer’s mental processes, sensory apparatus etc
- Additional requirements
 - The nomological connection between the belief and the state of affairs that makes it true is to be restricted to “that of completely reliable sign to thing signified” i.e. my belief cannot itself be the cause of the state of affairs that makes it true
 - The property H of the believer which is involved in the law of nature must not be “too specific”; there must be a “real possibility” of a recurrence of the situation described by the law → prevents the possibility of a “veridical hallucination” where it happens to be correct
- Bonjour’s revision of Armstrong’s conception
 - Main concern of the view is obviously those non-inferential beliefs arising from ordinary sources like sense-perception and introspection
 - The intuitive difficulty, according to Bonjour, is that “on the externalist view, a person may be ever so irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the situation, may still turn out to be epistemically justified, i.e. may still turn out to satisfy Armstrong’s general criterion of reliability
 - The belief may be reliable even if the person has no reason for thinking that it is reliable or even has good contrary reasons
 - A person who accepts such a belief is thought to be epistemically irresponsible and hence not justified, contrary to externalism

- Basic point is that all these individuals are epistemically irresponsible and irrational in some way despite satisfying Armstrong's criterion of property H being reliable
- Case 1: Adding to Armstrong's condition that one must have no cogent reasons for thinking that the belief in question is false
 - Example: Samantha believes herself to have the power of clairvoyance, though she has no reasons for or against this belief. One day she comes to believe, for no apparent reason, that the President is in New York City. She maintains this belief, appealing to her alleged clairvoyant power, even though she is at the same time aware of a massive amount of apparently cogent evidence, consisting of news reports, press releases, allegedly live television pictures, etc., indicating that the President is at that time in Washington, D.C. Now the President is in fact in New York City, the evidence to the contrary being part of a massive official hoax mounted in the face of an assassination threat. Moreover, Samantha does in fact have completely reliable clairvoyant power, under the conditions that were then satisfied, and her belief about the President did result from the operation of that power.
 - Samantha is being thoroughly irrational and irresponsible in disregarding cogent evidence that the President is not in New York City on the basis of a clairvoyant power which she has no reason at all to think she possesses
- Case 2: Cannot have cogent reasons for thinking that he does not possess a property H/cognitive power
 - Casper believes himself to have the power of clairvoyance, though he has no reasons for this belief. He maintains his belief despite the fact that on the numerous occasions on which he has attempted to confirm one of his allegedly clairvoyant beliefs, it has always turned out apparently to be false. One day Casper comes to believe, for no apparent reason, that the President is in New York City, and he maintains this belief, appealing to his alleged clairvoyant power. Now in fact the President is in New York City; and Casper does, under the conditions that were then satisfied, have completely reliable clairvoyant power, from which this belief in fact resulted. The apparent falsity of his other clairvoyant beliefs was due in some cases to his being in the wrong conditions for the operation of his power and in other cases to deception and misinformation.
- Case 3: Cannot have good reasons for thinking in general that there could be no such cognitive ability either

- Maud believes herself to have the power of clairvoyance, though she has no reasons for this belief. She maintains her belief despite being inundated by her embarrassed friends and relatives with massive quantities of apparently cogent scientific evidence that no such power is possible. One day Maud comes to believe, for no apparent reason, that the President is in New York City, and she maintains this belief, despite the lack of any independent evidence, appealing to her alleged clairvoyant power. Now in fact the President is in New York City, and Maud does, under the conditions then satisfied, have completely reliable clairvoyant power. Moreover, her belief about the President did result from the operation of that power.
 - Again, Armstrong's criterion of reliability seems to be satisfied. But it also seems to me that Maud, like Casper, is not justified in her belief about the President and does not have knowledge. Maud has excellent reasons for thinking that no cognitive power such as she believes herself to possess is possible, and it is irrational and irresponsible of her to maintain her belief in that power in the face of that evidence and to continue to accept and maintain beliefs on this dubious basis.
- Summary: in addition to the law-like connection between belief and truth and the absence of any reasons against the particular belief in question, it must also be the case that the believer in question has no cogent reasons, either relative to his own case, or in general, for thinking that such a law-like connection does not exist, i.e. that beliefs of that kind are not reliable
 - Essentially, the modifications suggest a basic intuitive objection to externalism: external or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality
 - If the acceptance of a belief is seriously unreasonable or unwarranted from the believer's own standpoint, then the mere fact that unbeknownst to the believer its existence in those circumstances lawfully guarantees its truth will not suffice to render the belief epistemically justified and thereby an instance of knowledge
- Criticising externalism: the Norman Case
 - Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable.

- Why can we still charge Norman with subjective irrationality to prevent his being epistemically justified: Norman has no justification for the belief that he himself has clairvoyant power → completely irrational to accept something on the basis of him having no reasons at all for thinking such a power is possible; his belief about his clairvoyance fails after all to possess even an externalist justification
- An additional revision is that: the believer would not even believe that the law-like connection in question obtains, since such a belief will not in general be justified (or at least that his continued acceptance of the particular belief that is at issue not depend on his acceptance of such a general belief)
 - But this makes it more puzzling to understand what Norman thinks is going on → there is no way for him to know about the President's whereabouts
- The key criticism: why should the mere fact that such an external relation obtains mean that S's belief is epistemically justified, when the relation in question is entirely outside his ken?
 - If Norman has property H, then he holds the belief in question only if it is true; Norman does have the property H and does hold the belief in question; therefore, the belief is true
 - But Norman himself is not in a position to employ this argument, and it is unclear why the mere fact that it is potentially available in the situation should justify the acceptance of the belief
 - Precisely what generates the regress problem is the requirement for a belief to be justified for a particular person, not only is it necessary that there be true premises somehow available in the situation which could in principle provide a basis for a justification, but also that the believer in question know or at least justifiably believe some such set of premises and thus be in a position to employ the corresponding argument
 - The plausibility of externalism lies in the fact that it is not, in a sense, an accident that Norman accepts the true belief → but it is an accident from his subjective perspective
 - None of Armstrong's external reliable reasons can justify Norman's own acceptance of the belief, for Norman, unlike the hypothetical external observer, has no reason at all for thinking that the belief is true
- Bonjour therefore argues that externalism violates our reasonableness condition and our condition of epistemic duty
 - Epistemic Duty: Bonjour constructs an analogy with moral philosophy
 - Suppose we have an objective, external moral theory such as utilitarianism

- Suppose an agent S chooses a path p that does in fact produces the best outcome, but he anticipates it to produce terrible consequences
 - Objectively speaking, he is morally right; but from his subjective perspective, it is consistent to say that his action was morally unjustified and reprehensible given his subjective consequences of the likely consequences
 - Holds even if the agent S has no conception of the likely consequences of his path p → his duty is to do what will lead to the best consequences, but this duty is not satisfied by the fact that he produces this result willy-nilly without any idea that he is doing so
 - Similarly, the fact that a given sort of belief is objectively reliable, and thus that accepting it is in fact conducive to arriving at the truth, need not prevent our judging that the epistemic agent who accepts it without any inkling that this is the case violates his epistemic duty and is epistemically responsible and unjustified in doing so
- Reasonableness condition: I would bet on a belief that whose reasons for me believing it are internally accessible but do not meet the standard for justification, than a belief that is externally justified
 - Suppose that Norman, in addition to having clairvoyant beliefs, also believes that the AG is in Chicago, but has good reasons to believe so but not strong enough evidence to satisfy the requirement for knowledge
 - If Norman is pressed to make a decision betting who is where because his life is dependent on it, he would bet on the AG rather than the President because it is more reasonable for him to bet that the AG is in Chicago than the President being in New York
 - The result is paradoxical that from the externalist standpoint, it is more rational to act on a merely reasonable belief than to act on one that is adequately justified to qualify as knowledge
 - The purported greater epistemic reasonableness of externalism does not carry with it greater reasonableness of action
- Criticisms against Bonjour (My own): Bonjour begs the question against externalist views of justification
 - As Bonjour notes, externalism, by its very assumption, insulates itself against the objection that “a relation could play a justificatory role only if the believer possessed adequate reason for thinking that it obtained.”
 - But in arguing that epistemic justification depends on one being epistemically responsible, that is, having rational basis for accepting one’s belief, is Bonjour

not precisely making the same objection he criticises as begging the question?

- What else could having a rational basis for accepting one's belief entail, other than (1) having good reasons for believing that the process through which I obtain my true belief is reliable or (2) having other good reasons that my belief is true?
- It seems that by pegging the qualification test for what counts as justification to epistemic responsibility denies the very assumption of externalism that justification depends only on the relation between one's belief and the state of affairs that make the belief true, regardless of one's access to such reasons. The same assumption that, as we have just seen, is not at all too unconvincing.
- Criticisms against Bonjour: counterexamples
 - Perfect Pitch → I might not have positive or negative reasons against my belief that I have perfect pitch nor do I think that it is possible to have perfect pitch. But suppose that I do and I hear the note A sharp → would I not be said to know that I hear the note A sharp?
 - Can connect this to the problem of non-sophisticated epistemic agents

Other criticisms against internalism

- Sellarsian Dilemma: infinite regress for internalism
 - According to strong access internalism, S's belief p is justified only if he justifiably believes that (i) the ground (e) of his belief obtains, and that (ii) e adequately supports p
 - Alston notes that the second requirement of SAI engenders infinite regress: for if in order to be justified in believing that p, I must be justified in believing that my evidence e adequately supports p, the justification of this latter belief would require that it is based on further evidence e1 and that e1 adequately supports my belief that e and ad infinitum
 - The only way out is to drop condition (ii) and be satisfied with a weak version of internalism and only requires an agent to be aware of the grounds of his belief and recognise them as such (without justifiably believing their adequacy)
 - But then, it may simply collapse into externalism as the resulting position is too weak to be called a species of internalism
 - For instance, is simply saying "I can see the plant because of my eyesight" sufficient to be characterised as stating my reasons for my belief, if I do not have any justifiable belief in its adequacy?
 - Seems to violate Bonjour's normativity condition as well since I would have no positive reasons or negative reasons for or against my eyesight's adequacy

- Problem of unsophisticated epistemic agents
 - We would think that young children and individuals with limited cognitive abilities do have knowledge and justified beliefs about the world and their environment
 - But by hypothesis, they lack the resources to follow the type of arguments and complicated reasoning that the internalist take to constitute good reasons for the obtaining of such knowledge and beliefs
- Problem of over-intellectualisation and non-reflective justification
 - Not even obvious that even ordinary cognisers are in possession of any acceptable internalist justification
 - Our basic beliefs about the environment: if any of our perceptual beliefs are to be justified, this will presumably be because they are grounded in our justified beliefs about how things appear to us in perception
 - On the internalist account of justification, knowing how one is justified in holding such beliefs is tantamount to knowing the mechanism through which facts about the world can be derived from facts about perceptual appearances
 - The root cause of the problem is that the internalist approach in epistemology seems to suggest an over-intellectualisation and deliberative picture of our belief-forming activities → we think we are in full control of the choices that we make vis-a-vis our epistemic resources; that is, we are free to decide which body of evidence to ignore and what grounds to take as justification conferring but many of our beliefs are not formed in such a deliberative manner

For Externalism

Goldman's Causal Theory of Knowing

As per above

Srinivasan's Counterintuitions to Bonjour

- Assume that we accept Bonjour's key premise of normative epistemic justification, Srinivasan's example of the "Racist Dinner Table" to shows how externalism may not be so unintuitive.
 - Consider Nour, a young British woman of Arab descent, being invited to dinner at the home of a white friend. The host is welcoming and polite and everyone is friendly. However, Nour is unable to shake the feeling that the host is racist against Arabs – she is unable to locate precisely which actions could be construed as racist. Nour "just knows" that her host is racist. In fact, the host

is racist and sent off subtle cues that Nour subconsciously registered. This led to Nour's belief that her host is racist.

- According to Srinivasan, this example is analogous to Bonjour's Norman case in that her belief and the truth of her belief has some external "law-like connection" because her subconscious sensitivity to racism is reliable. Likewise, suppose that Nour has no reason to believe in the existence of such sensitivity. However, our intuitions suggest the opposite to Norman's case: that Nour could be said to know that her host was racist. The reason for such intuitive attraction of the externalist verdict, Srinivasan posits, is that in "bad ideology cases" what matters is how the agent relates to "the epistemically distorting systems in which they are embedded" – that is, for reasons external to Nour, Nour is endowed with the ability to see through the ideological veil that distorts a normal agent's view of the world. So, not only does externalist verdicts no longer seem always unintuitive, but there are positive reasons for why the externalist account is appealing. That is, despite my endowment to pierce through the ideological veil being external to me, it is what matters in me attaining the true belief of the world.
- However, I want to suggest that we cannot overstate the force of Srinivasan's argument.
 - Note that Srinivasan's positive reason regarding bad ideology cannot possibly apply to basic external processes such as perception. What her example does show is that, *prima facie*, externalism is not completely unintuitive.
 - And it further opens the way for our intuitions regarding us knowing non-inferential beliefs through commonplace processes like perception and introspection being valid.
 - It is not, as Bonjour suggests, to be merely "ad hoc" changes, but that these processes allow us to relate to the epistemic system in a way that obtains truth, in ways parallel to that of "bad ideology cases."
- Also only weakens the case against externalism, but does not nullify Bonjour's intuitions

Resolving the controversy: epistemic pluralism

- We can see this through Goldman's qualified reliabilism
- Sosa's theory of virtue perspectivism that is intended to improve on simple or pure reliabilism
 - Distinction between aptness and justification
 - An apt belief is one that is produced by a reliable or virtuous faculty in the environment in which it is operating
 - A justified belief is construed in terms of the notion of an "epistemic perspective" which is, in turn, cashed out as consisting of meta-beliefs concerning the faculty responsible for producing the target belief and its reliability

- According to Sosa, it is in virtue of this epistemic perspective that a body of belief is rendered justified (rather than merely apt)
 - This seems to suggest that justification is a matter of having reasons for one's belief and an internal concept, and it can plausibly be seen as a way of accommodating internalist concerns
- Commensurate with this distinction, Sosa makes another distinction between animal knowledge (which requires only apt belief), for example "I see a tree in front of me", and reflective knowledge (requiring both apt and justified belief), for example having proven the Completeness theorem of propositional logic
 - Given the pluralist framework, an internalist may have no qualms about attributing such "animal knowledge" to unsophisticated epistemic agents while preserving "reflective knowledge" to other agents who are more sophisticated cognisers