



Risk Analysis on Goal Models


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


Building models for RE


Goals




Risks



Conceptual objects



Agents






Risk analysis as seen in “Requirements Evaluation” lecture




- **Risk** = uncertain factor whose occurrence may result in loss of satisfaction of corresponding objective
 - has likelihood & consequences (each having likelihood, severity)
- Poor risk management is a major cause of software failure
- Early risk analysis at RE time:





Risk analysis can be anchored on goal models





Risk analysis on goal models: outline

- Goal obstruction by obstacles
 - What are obstacles?
 - Completeness of a set of obstacles
 - Obstacle categories
- Modeling obstacles
 - Obstacle diagrams
 - Obstacle refinement
 - Bottom-up propagation of obstructions in goal AND-refinements
 - Annotating obstacle diagrams
- Obstacle analysis for a more robust goal model
 - Identifying obstacles
 - Evaluating obstacles
 - Resolving obstacles in a modified goal model



What are obstacles ?



- Motivation: goals in refinement graph are often too ideal, likely to be violated under abnormal conditions
 - (unintentional or intentional agent behaviors)
- **Obstacle** = condition on system for violation of corresponding assertion (generally a goal)
 - Obstruction: $\{O, Dom\} \models \text{not } G$
 - Domain consistency: $\{O, Dom\} \models \text{false}$
 - Feasibility: O can be satisfied by some system behavior
- e.g.
 - G: TrainStoppedAtBlockSignal **If** StopSignal
 - Dom: **If** TrainStopsAtStopSignal **then** DriverResponsive
 - O: DriverUnresponsive
- For behavioral goal: existential property capturing unadmissible behavior (negative scenario)



Completeness of a set of obstacles



- Ideally, a set of obstacles to G should be complete
 - Domain completeness: $\{\text{not } O_1, \dots, \text{not } O_n, \text{ Dom } \} \models G$
 - e.g.
**If not DriverUnresponsive and not BrakeSystemDown and StopSignal
then TrainStoppedAtBlockSignal ???**
- Completeness is highly desirable for mission-critical goals ...
- ... but bounded by what we know about the domain!
- Obstacle analysis may help elicit relevant domain properties






Obstacle categories for heuristic identification



Correspond to goal categories & their refinement:

- **Hazard** obstacles obstruct Safety goals
- **Threat** obstacles obstruct Security goals
 - Disclosure, Corruption, DenialOfService, ...
- **Inaccuracy** obstacles obstruct Accuracy goals
- **Misinformation** obstacles obstruct Information goals
 - NonInformation, WrongInformation, TooLateInformation, ...
- **Dissatisfaction** obstacles obstruct Satisfaction goals
 - NonSatisfaction, PartialSatisfaction, TooLateSatisfaction, ...
- **Unusability** obstacles obstruct Usability goals
- ...






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
Obstacle diagrams as AND/OR refinement trees

- Anchored on leafgoals in goal model (unlike risk trees)
 - root = **not** G
 - obstacle **AND**-refinement, **OR**-refinement: same semantics as goals
 - **leaf** obstacles: feasibility, likelihood, resolution easier to determine






Obstacle diagrams as AND/OR refinement trees





Obstructions propagate bottom-up in goal AND-refinement trees

- De Morgan's law: $\text{not } (G1 \text{ and } G2)$ equivalent to $(\text{not } G1) \text{ or } (\text{not } G2)$



=> Severity of consequences of an obstacle can be assessed
in terms of higher-level goals obstructed



Annotating obstacle diagrams

DriverUnresponsive

annotation

Obstacle DriverUnresponsive

Def *Situation of a train driver failing to react to a command and take appropriate action according to that command*

precise definition

[FormalSpec ... in temporal logic for analysis, **not** in this lecture ...]

[Category Hazard]

[Likelihood likely]

[Criticality catastrophic]

features




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Obstacle analysis for increased system robustness



Anticipate obstacles:


- ⇒ more realistic goals, new goals as countermeasures to abnormal conditions
- ⇒ more complete, realistic goal model

Obstacle analysis:

- For selected goals in the goal model:
 - identify as many obstacles to it as possible;
 - assess their likelihood & severity;
 - resolve them according to likelihood & severity
 - => new goals as countermeasures in the goal model



Obstacle analysis and goal model elaboration are intertwined



- Goal-obstacle analysis loop terminates when remaining obstacles can be tolerated
 - unlikely or acceptable consequences
- Which goals to consider in the goal model?
 - **leafgoals** (requirements or expectations): easier to refine what is wanted than what is not wanted (+ up-propagation in goal model)
 - based on annotated Priority & Category (Hazard, Security, ...)



Identifying obstacles

- For obstacle to selected assertion G
 - G can be goal, hypothesis, suspect dom prop ...
 - negate G ; {=> root obstacle}
 - find AND/OR refinements of $\text{not } G$ in view of valid domain properties
 - according to desired extensiveness
 - until reaching obstruction preconditions whose feasibility, likelihood, severity, resolvability is easy to assess
- = goal-anchored construction of risk-tree





Identifying obstacles: tautology-based refinement



- Goal negation as root => use tautologies to drive refinements


e.g.

- **not(A and B)** amounts to **not A or not B**
- **not(A or B)** amounts to **not A and not B**
- **not(if A then B)** amounts to **A and not B**
- **not(A iff B)** amounts to
(A and not B) or (not A and B)

=> complete OR-refinements when or-connective gets in




Identifying obstacles by tautology-based refinement






Identifying obstacles by tautology-based refinement






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


Identifying obstacles by tautology-based refinement






Obstacle identification: another example






Obstacle identification: another example






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


Identifying obstacles from necessary conditions for obstructed target





Identifying obstacles from necessary conditions for obstructed target




Can also be used for eliciting relevant domain properties

- “what are necessary conditions for TargetCondition?”




Obstacle models as goal-anchored fault trees





Obstacle models as goal-anchored fault trees






Evaluating obstacles

- Check *domain-consistency & feasibility* conditions
 - satisfying scenario ?
- Assess *Likelihood* and *Criticality*
 - with domain experts
 - rough estimates can be obtained from propagation rules:
 - Likelihood (O) = \min_i (Likelihood (sO_i)) if O is **AND**-refined to sO_i ,
 - Likelihood (O) = \max_i (Likelihood (sO_i)) if O is **OR**-refined to sO_i
 - severity of consequences can be estimated from *number & Priority* of higher-level goals obstructed by up-propagation in goal trees





Resolving obstacles



- Resolution through countermeasures
 - new or modified goals in goal model
 - often to be refined
- For every identified obstacle ...
 - explore alternative resolutions
 - select “best” resolution based on ...
 - likelihood/severity of obstacle
 - non-functional/quality goals in goal model






Exploring alternative countermeasures

By use of **model transformation operators**

- encode resolution tactics
- **Goal substitution:** consider alternative refinement of parent goal to avoid obstruction of child goal




e.g. ~~MotorReversed Iff WheelsTurning~~

→ MotorReversed Iff PlaneWeightSensed



Exploring alternative countermeasures

- **Agent substitution:** consider alternative responsibilities for obstructed goal so as to make obstacle unfeasible



e.g. Maintain [SafeAccelerationComputed]
obstructed by ComputedAccelerationNotSafe
—~~OnBoardTrainController~~ → VitalStationComputer





Exploring alternative countermeasures

- **Goal weakening:** weaken the obstructed goal's formulation so that it no longer gets obstructed
 - for **if-then** goal specs: add conjunct in **if-part** or disjunct in **then-part**
- e.g. Maintain [TrafficControllerOnDutyOnSector]
obstructed by NoSectorControllerOnDuty
→ goal weakening:
TrafficControllerOnDutyOnSector or WarningToNextSector





Exploring alternative countermeasures

- **Obstacle prevention:** introduce new goal *Avoid [obstacle]*
 - e.g. AccelerationCommandCorrupted
 - Avoid [AccelerationCommandCorrupted]
 - to be further refined
 - standard resolution tactics for security threats
- **Goal restoration:** enforce target condition as obstacle occurs
 - => new goal: **if O then sooner-or-later TargetCondition**
 - e.g. ResourceNotReturnedInTime → ReminderSent
 - WheelsNotOut → WheelsAlarmGenerated






Exploring alternative countermeasures



- **Obstacle reduction:** reduce obstacle likelihood by ad-hoc countermeasure





Exploring alternative countermeasures

Obstacle mitigation: introduce new goal to mitigate consequences of obstacle:

- **Weak mitigation:** new goal ensures weaker version of goal when obstructed
 - e.g. Achieve [AttendanceIfInformedAndMeetingConvenient]
 - Achieve [ImpedimentNotified]
- **Strong mitigation:** new goal ensures parent of goal when obstructed
 - e.g. OutdatedSpeed/PositionEstimates
 - Avoid [TrainCollisionWhenOutDatedTrainInfo]
- Resolution goals must then be further refined in the goal model



Selecting best resolution

- Evaluation criteria for comparing alternative resolutions:
 - number of obstacles resolved by the alternative
 - their likelihood & criticality
 - the resolution's contribution to soft goals
 - its cost
- If obstacle not eliminated, multiple alternatives may be taken
 - e.g. **FineCharged** + **ReminderSent** (for book copies not returned in time)
- Selected alternative => new/weakened goal in goal model
 - resolution link to obstacle for traceability
 - weakening may need to be propagated in goal model
 - to be refined & checked for conflicts & new obstacles (identify-assess-resolve cycle)