

| System and Scope | | | | | |
|--|---|-----------|-------------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| Overview | Scope | Inputs | Outputs | Ownership | Supervisor |
| LLM-Powered Incident response Assistant for SMEs: Ingests network logs from IDS, passes it to LLM for summarisation, Outputs into a DB, Displays on a Web Dashboard. | Local Deployment on VM for testing., evaluates how LLMs can assist SMEs during incident response. | JSON logs | LLM-generated dashboard data. | Matthew Fish | Nathan Clarke |

| Data Flow | | | | |
|---------------|-------------------------|--|------------|---|
| Source | Type | Flow | PII Risk | Notes |
| Network logs | Structured JSON | JSON Network logs to LLM | Low–Medium | IP addresses may indirectly identify individuals. |
| LLM | JSON input/ Text output | Receives JSON, Returns summarised data | Low | Model runs locally so no external data transfer. |
| Database | Structured | Stores processes data | Medium | Must ensure encryption and restricted access. |
| Web dashboard | Structured | Displays processed data | Low | User authentication needed to prevent exposure. |
| Test VMs | Unstructured | Simulated attacks | None | Used for testing only |

Potential Risk Categories

| Category | Description |
|---------------------------|--|
| Bias & Fairness | LLM may dramatise risk scores. |
| Privacy Violations | Logs could contain identifiable IPs or metadata. |
| Explainability | LLM output may be unclear or untraceable to specific log evidence. |
| Security | Exposure of database, API endpoints, or LLM prompt injection, User tampering. |
| Regulatory / Compliance | Data handling must align with GDPR. |
| Operational / Reliability | LLM, IDS, API or Dashboard downtime may stop attacks from being prevented. |
| Data Integrity | Corrupted or manipulated logs could cause false insights. |
| Supply Chain | Third party risks (docker images, pre-trained LLM) |
| People | Lack of user training and lack of incident response plan for if the tool got compromised |

| Likelihood and Impact | | | | | Rules | |
|--|------------|--------|--------------|--|---------|--------------------------------|
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Overall Risk | Rationale | 1 to 10 | Low, Medium, High, Significant |
| Model bias in classification | 5 | 7 | High | Depends on the data the LLM has been trained with. Will use a RAG to reduce bias as much as possible. | | |
| Privacy leak via IP data | 4 | 8 | High | Rare but could have a serious impact. Will try to anonymise IPs where possible. | | |
| Model hallucination / misinterpretation | 5 | 7 | High | Will implement a way to check the processed data. | | |
| Database compromise | 2 | 10 | Medium | Huge affect on the company as an attacker could do a ransomware attack or use the logs for other attacks. | | |
| LLM prompt injection or misuse | 2 | 7 | Medium | Stored locally so very unlikely and an implemented check on the data would help with security and outputs. | | |
| Unauthorised access to dashboard, llm or IDS | 2 | 10 | Medium/High | Will all be deployed locally and auth access will be required for dashboard. Access controls would be implemented for only admin to access llm or IDS. | | |
| Data loss / corruption | 2 | 5 | Medium | Could use backups of data but requires further storage and security. | | |
| System downtime | 5 | 8 | High | Downtime for updates, internet loss, power loss affects the whole system. | | |

| | | | | |
|--|---|----|--------|---|
| Non-compliance with GDPR and computer misuse for users | 2 | 10 | Medium | Implment secure handling of data, access controls and systems in place to prevent tool being misused. |
| Supply chain risks | 4 | 6 | High | Dependencies on third-party vendors or libraries could fail or be compromised, affecting system stability and security. |
| Insufficient Logging | 3 | 6 | Medium | Limited logging makes it harder to detect, investigate, or respond to issues |
| User Error or misconfig | 4 | 5 | Medium | Misconfigurations or mistakes by users can cause outages or security issues |
| Ethical Misuse of tools | 2 | 8 | Medium | Tools could be used unethically (e.g., privacy violations) |

Existing Mitigation Control

| Control | Description | Effectiveness | Enforced? | Works as intended? |
|-----------------------------------|---|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Docker container isolation | Each service runs in its own container. | High | To be configured | To be Verified |
| Everything run locally | No public exposure to data. | High | To be configured | To be Verified |
| Basic auth on API/dashboard | Restricts access. | Medium | To be configured | To be Tested |
| Access Control | RBAC for system access. Principle of least privilege. | Medium | To be configured | To be Tested |
| Pseudonymisation of IPs | Truncate or hash IP addresses before storing. | Medium | To be configured | To be Tested |
| Database Security | Least-privilege accounts , encryption at rest | Medium | To be configured | To be tested |
| System updates | Patch Docker images regularly, IDS, LLM, Python. | High | Ongoing | Yes |
| Input Sanitisation and validation | Validate and sanitise all logs before entering LLM. | Medium | To be configured | To be verified |
| Logging and monitoring | System healthchecks and logs for user actions. | Medium | To be configured | To be Verified |
| Backup and Recovery | Regular backups of database and critical files | High | To be configured | To be Verified |

| Risk Register | | | | | | | |
|---|------------|--------|--------------|--|---------|--|----------|
| Risk Description | Likelihood | Impact | Overall Risk | Controls | Owner | Mitigation / Plan | Timeline |
| LLM produces biased or inconsistent | 5 | 7 | High | Will review it manually. | Matthew | Validate LLM outputs vs. known threats. RAG | By Feb |
| IP data exposes personal info | 4 | 8 | High | IP anonymisation, stored locally. | Matthew | Hash IPs | Jan |
| Unauthorised LLM, IDS, dashboard, db access | 2 | 10 | High | Auth / Access Controls, docker isolation | Matthew | Implement JWT/API-key login. Access controls | Jan |
| Prompt injection or malicious input | 2 | 7 | Medium | Sanitise model inputs. | Matthew | Validate all logs before / after LLM processing | Jan |
| Data loss or | 2 | 5 | Medium | Backups | Matthew | Backups | Feb |
| Downtime or service failure | 5 | 8 | High | Monitoring, healthchecks | Matthew | Monitor uptime, add healthchecks, updates scheduled at low volume times. | Feb |
| Non-compliance with GDPR / Computer Misuse | 2 | 10 | Medium | Ethical review, documentation | Matthew | Ethical review, Document compliance steps. | Ongoing |
| Supply chain risks | 4 | 6 | High | System updates, vulnerability scanning | Matthew | Trusted docker images, regular scans. | Ongoing |
| Insufficient Logging | 3 | 6 | Medium | Audit Logging | Matthew | Limited logging makes it harder to detect, investigate, or respond to issues. Access to tools are logged | Ongoing |
| User Error or misconfig | 4 | 5 | Medium | Training and documentation | Matthew | Clear documentation for setup and use. Configuration to avoid manual | Ongoing |
| Ethical Misuse of tools | 2 | 8 | Medium | Access controls, policies | Matthew | Restrict tool access to authorised users. Define and communicate acceptable use | Ongoing |