

Master Thesis - Model draft n°4

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1 Introduction

1.1 Approach

We replicate Galí and Monacelli (2008) in a two-country setup.
We add features to the model

- We relax the function form assumptions
- We add a country size parameter
- We add a labor disutility shock

1.2 References

Below are the references we used to build the model:

- ENSAE MiE 2 course : AE332, Monetary Economics, Olivier Loisel
- Galí and Monacelli, Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union, *Journal of International Economics*, 2008
- Marcos Antonio C. da Silveira, Two-country new Keynesian DSGE model : a small open economy as limit case, *Ipea*, 2006
- Cole et al., One EMU fiscal policy for the Euro, *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 2019
- Forlatti, Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in the EMU : does fiscal policy coordination matter?, *Center for Fiscal Policy, EPFL, Chair of International Finance (CFI) Working Paper No. 2009-04*, 2009
- Schäfer, Monetary union with sticky prices and direct spillover channels, *Journal of Macroeconomics*, 2016

2 A currency union model

We model a currency union as a closed system made up of two economies : *Home* and *Foreign*.

Variables without asterix (e.g. X) denote *Home* variables and variables with an asterix (e.g. X_t^*) denote *Foreign* variables.

Home is inhabited by a continuum of identical households indexed by j where $j \in [0, h]$ with $0 \leq h \leq 1$. *Foreign* is inhabited by a continuum of identical households indexed by j where $j \in (h, 1]$.

2.1 Households

2.1.1 Objective

Home j -th household seeks to maximize

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U \left(C_t^j, N_t^{sj}, \frac{G_t}{h} \right),$$

where U is the instantaneous utility function, N_t^{sj} is the number of work hours supplied by *Home* j -th household, C_t^j is a composite index of *Home* j -th household's consumption, and G_t is an index of *Home*'s government consumption.

2.1.2 Aggregate composite consumption index

More precisely, C_t^j is given by

$$C_t^j \equiv \left[(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{H,t}^j)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{F,t}^j)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}},$$

where

- $C_{H,t}^j$ is an index of *Home* j -th household's consumption of *Home*-made goods,
- $C_{F,t}^j$ is an index of *Home* j -th household's consumption of *Foreign*-made goods,
- $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is a measure of *Home*'s **openness** and $1 - \alpha$ is a measure of *Home*'s **home bias**,
- η is *Home*'s elasticity of substitution between *Home*-made goods and *Foreign*-made goods.

2.1.3 Regional consumption indexes

$C_{H,t}^j$ is defined by the CES function

$$C_{H,t}^j \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h C_{H,t}^j(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}},$$

where

- $C_{H,t}^j(i)$ is *Home* j -th household's consumption of *Home*-made good $i \in [0, h]$,
- $\varepsilon > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution between *Home*-made goods.

Similarly, $C_{F,t}^j$ is defined by the CES function

$$C_{F,t}^j \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{1-h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_h^1 C_{F,t}^j(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}},$$

where

- $C_{F,t}^j(i)$ is *Home* j -th household's consumption of *Foreign*-made good $i \in (h, 1]$,
- $\varepsilon > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution between *Foreign*-made goods.

2.1.4 Household budget constraints

Home j -th household faces a sequence of budget constraints

$$\forall t \geq 0, \int_0^h P_{H,t}(i) C_{H,t}^j(i) di + \int_h^1 P_{F,t}(i) C_{F,t}^j(i) di + \mathbb{E}_t\{Q_{t,t+1} D_{t+1}^j\} \leq D_t^j + W_t N_t^{sj} + \frac{T_t}{h},$$

where

- $P_{H,t}(i)$ is *Home*'s price of *Home*-made good i ,
- $P_{F,t}(i)$ is *Home*'s price of *Foreign*-made good i ,
- D_{t+1}^j is the quantity of one-period nominal bonds held by *Home* j -th household,
- W_t is *Home*'s nominal wage,
- T_t denotes *Home*'s lump sum taxes.

2.1.5 Optimal allocation of consumption across goods

Given $C_{H,t}^j$ and $C_{F,t}^j$, a first step is to find the optimal allocations $(C_{H,t}^j(i))_{i \in [0, h]}$ and $(C_{F,t}^j(i))_{i \in (h, 1]}$ that minimize the regional expenditures.

Home j -th household's optimal consumption of *Home*-made good $i \in [0, h]$ is given by

$$C_{H,t}^j(i) = \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{H,t}^j,$$

where $P_{H,t} \equiv \left[\frac{1}{h} \int_0^h P_{H,t}(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$ is *Home*'s price index of *Home*-made goods.

Similarly, *Home* j -th household's optimal consumption of *Foreign*-made good $i \in (h, 1]$ is given by

$$C_{F,t}^j(i) = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{F,t}(i)}{P_{F,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{F,t}^j,$$

where $P_{F,t} \equiv \left[\frac{1}{1-h} \int_h^1 P_{F,t}(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$ is *Home*'s price index of *Foreign*-made goods.

2.1.6 Optimal allocation of consumption across regions

Given C_t^j , a second step is to find the optimal allocation $(C_{H,t}^j, C_{F,t}^j)$ that minimizes total expenditures.

Home j -th household's optimal consumption of *Home*-made goods is given by

$$C_{H,t}^j = (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^j,$$

and *Home* j -th household's optimal consumption of *Foreign*-made goods is given by

$$C_{F,t}^j = \alpha \left(\frac{P_{F,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^j,$$

where $P_t \equiv \left[(1 - \alpha)(P_{H,t})^{1-\eta} + \alpha(P_{F,t})^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$ is *Home*'s consumer price index (CPI).

2.1.7 Rewrite household's budget constraints

Combining all the previous results, *Home* j -th household's expenditures in *Home*-made goods writes

$$\int_0^h P_{H,t}(i) C_{H,t}^j(i) di = C_{H,t}^j P_{H,t}^\varepsilon \frac{1}{h} \int_0^h P_{H,t}(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di = P_{H,t} C_{H,t}^j.$$

The same formula applies to *Home* j -th household's expenditures in *Foreign*-made goods.

We can write *Home* j -th household's total expenditures as

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^h P_{H,t}(i) C_{H,t}^j(i) di + \int_h^1 P_{H,t}(i) C_{F,t}^j(i) di &= P_{H,t} C_{H,t}^j + P_{F,t} C_{F,t}^j \\ &= (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} P_{H,t} C_t^j + \alpha \left(\frac{P_{F,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^j \\ &= P_t C_t^j \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, conditional on an optimal allocation across goods and regions, *Home* j -th household's budget constraints can be rewritten as

$$\forall t \geq 0, P_t C_t^j + \mathbb{E}_t \{ Q_{t,t+1} D_{t+1}^j \} \leq D_t^j + W_t N_t^{sj} + \frac{T_t}{h}.$$

2.1.8 Household's intratemporal and intertemporal FOCs

Now, we can derive the first order conditions for *Home* j -th household's optimal consumption level C_t^j as well as for *Home* j -th household's optimal number of hours worked N_t^{sj} .

Home j -th household's **intratemporal** FOC is

$$-\frac{U_{n,t}^j}{U_{c,t}^j} = \frac{W_t}{P_t},$$

and *Home* j -th household's **intertemporal** FOC is

$$\mathbb{E}_t\{Q_{t,t+1}\} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t\left\{\frac{U_{c,t+1}^j}{U_{c,t}^j} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}\right\},$$

where $U_{n,t}^j \equiv \frac{\partial U}{\partial N_t^{sj}}\left(C_t^j, N_t^{sj}, \frac{G_t}{h}\right)$ and $U_{c,t}^j \equiv \frac{\partial U}{\partial C_t^j}\left(C_t^j, N_t^{sj}, \frac{G_t}{h}\right)$.

2.1.9 Functional form of the instantaneous utility function

We assume that the instantaneous utility takes the specific form

$$U(C_t^j, N_t^{sj}, G_t/h) = \chi_C \frac{(C_t^j)^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} + \chi_G \frac{(G_t/h)^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} - \frac{(N_t^{sj})^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi}$$

where $\varphi > 0$ while χ_G and χ_C are used to calibrate the steady state of the economy.

2.1.10 Rewrite household's intratemporal and intertemporal FOCs under the functional form assumptions

Under the functional form assumptions, *Home* j -th household **intratemporal** FOC becomes

$$(N_t^{sj})^\varphi \frac{(C_t^j)^\sigma}{\chi_C} = \frac{W_t}{P_t},$$

and *Home* j -th household's **intertemporal** FOC becomes

$$\mathbb{E}_t\{Q_{t,t+1}\} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t\left\{\left(\frac{C_{t+1}^j}{C_t^j}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}\right\}.$$

2.2 Aggregating optimal allocation

Home's optimal consumption of *Home*-made good $i \in [0, h]$ and of *Foreign*-made good $i \in (h, 1]$ are given by

$$\begin{aligned} C_{H,t}(i) &\equiv \int_0^h C_{H,t}^j(i) dj = \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}}\right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{H,t}, \\ C_{F,t}(i) &\equiv \int_0^h C_{F,t}^j(i) dj = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{F,t}(i)}{P_{F,t}}\right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{F,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where *Home*'s optimal consumption of *Home*-made goods and of *Foreign*-made goods are given by

$$\begin{aligned} C_{H,t} &\equiv \int_0^h C_{H,t}^j dj = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t}\right)^{-\eta} C_t, \\ C_{F,t} &\equiv \int_0^h C_{F,t}^j dj = \alpha \left(\frac{P_{F,t}}{P_t}\right)^{-\eta} C_t, \end{aligned}$$

while the composite index of *Home*'s consumption is given by

$$C_t \equiv \int_0^h C_t^j dj = h C_t^j,$$

since all *Home* households are identical.

Similarly, we define the number of work hours supplied by *Home* households by

$$N_t^s \equiv \int_0^h N_t^{sj} dj = h N_t^{sj}.$$

2.3 Aggregating optimal intratemporal and intertemporal FOCs

Using the previous results, we can write the intratemporal and intertemporal choices at the aggregate level.

At the aggregate level, **intratemporal** FOC becomes

$$\frac{1}{h^{\varphi+\sigma}} (N_t^s)^\varphi \frac{C_t^\sigma}{\chi_C} = \frac{W_t}{P_t},$$

and **intertemporal** FOC becomes

$$\mathbb{E}_t\{Q_{t,t+1}\} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t\left\{\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}\right\}.$$

2.3.1 Aggregate FOCs in log-linearized form

Home RH's **intratemporal** FOC in log form is

$$w_t - p_t = -(\varphi + \sigma) \log(h) + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t^s - \log(\chi_C),$$

and *Home* RH's **intertemporal** FOC in log form is

$$c_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{c_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \bar{i}),$$

where $i_t \equiv \log\left(\frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_t\{Q_{t,t+1}\}}\right)$ is referred to as the **short-term nominal interest rate**, $\pi_t \equiv p_t - p_{t-1}$ is **CPI inflation**, and $\bar{i} \equiv -\log(\beta)$.

2.3.2 Summary of household's optimal allocation

Analogous results hold for the *Foreign* country. Similarly, we denote α^* the measure of *Foreign*'s degree of openness.

Table 1: Summary optimal allocation at the household level

Variable	Home	Foreign
j -th household's composite consumption index	$C_t^j \equiv \left[(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{H,t}^j)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{F,t}^j)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$	$C_t^{j*} \equiv \left[(\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{H,t}^{j*})^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + (1 - \alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{F,t}^{j*})^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$
j -th household's composite consumption of <i>Home</i> -made good	$C_{H,t}^j \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h C_{H,t}^j(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$	$C_{H,t}^{j*} \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h C_{H,t}^{j*}(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$
j -th household's composite consumption of <i>Foreign</i> -made good	$C_{F,t}^j \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{1-h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_h^1 C_{F,t}^j(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$	$C_{F,t}^{j*} \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{1-h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_h^1 C_{F,t}^{j*}(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$
j -th household's optimal consumption of <i>Home</i> -made good $i \in [0, h]$	$C_{H,t}^j(i) = \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{H,t}^j$	$C_{H,t}^{j*}(i) = \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*(i)}{P_{H,t}^*} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{H,t}^{j*}$
Price index of <i>Home</i> -made goods	$P_{H,t} \equiv \left[\frac{1}{h} \int_0^h P_{H,t}(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$	$P_{H,t}^* \equiv \left[\frac{1}{h} \int_0^h P_{H,t}^*(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$
j -th household's optimal consumption of <i>Foreign</i> -made good $i \in (h, 1]$	$C_{F,t}^j(i) = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{F,t}(i)}{P_{F,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{F,t}^j$	$C_{F,t}^{j*}(i) = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{F,t}^*(i)}{P_{F,t}^*} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{F,t}^{j*}$
Price index of <i>Foreign</i> -made goods	$P_{F,t} \equiv \left[\frac{1}{1-h} \int_h^1 P_{F,t}(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$	$P_{F,t}^* \equiv \left[\frac{1}{1-h} \int_h^1 P_{F,t}^*(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$
j -th household's optimal consumption of <i>Home</i> -made goods	$C_{H,t}^j = (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^j$	$C_{H,t}^{j*} = \alpha^* \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^{j*}$
j -th household's optimal consumption of <i>Foreign</i> -made goods	$C_{F,t}^j = \alpha \left(\frac{P_{F,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^j$	$C_{F,t}^{j*} = (1 - \alpha^*) \left(\frac{P_{F,t}^*}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^{j*}$
Consumer price index (CPI)	$P_t \equiv \left[(1 - \alpha)(P_{H,t})^{1-\eta} + \alpha(P_{F,t})^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$	$P_t^* \equiv \left[\alpha^*(P_{H,t}^*)^{1-\eta} + (1 - \alpha^*)(P_{F,t}^*)^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$

Table 2: Summary optimal allocation at the aggregate level

Variable	Home	Foreign
Optimal consumption of <i>Home</i> -made good $i \in [0, h]$	$C_{H,t}(i) \equiv \int_0^h C_{H,t}^j(i) dj = \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{H,t}$	$C_{H,t}^*(i) \equiv \int_h^1 C_{H,t}^{j*}(i) dj = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*(i)}{P_{H,t}^*} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{H,t}^*$
Optimal consumption of <i>Foreign</i> -made good $i \in (h, 1]$	$C_{F,t}(i) \equiv \int_0^h C_{F,t}^j(i) dj = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{F,t}(i)}{P_{F,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{F,t}$	$C_{F,t}^*(i) \equiv \int_h^1 C_{F,t}^{j*}(i) dj = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{F,t}^*(i)}{P_{F,t}^*} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{F,t}^*$
Optimal consumption of <i>Home</i> -made goods	$C_{H,t} \equiv \int_0^h C_{H,t}^j dj = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t$	$C_{H,t}^* \equiv \int_h^1 C_{H,t}^{j*} dj = \alpha^* \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^*$
Optimal consumption of <i>Foreign</i> -made goods	$C_{F,t} \equiv \int_0^h C_{F,t}^j dj = \alpha \left(\frac{P_{F,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t$	$C_{F,t}^* \equiv \int_h^1 C_{F,t}^{j*} dj = (1-\alpha^*) \left(\frac{P_{F,t}^*}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^*$
Composite consumption index	$C_t \equiv \int_0^h C_t^j dj = h C_t^j$	$C_t^* \equiv \int_h^1 C_t^{j*} dj = h C_t^{j*}$
Number of work hours supplied	$N_t^s \equiv \int_0^h N_t^{sj} dj = h N_t^{sj}$	$N_t^{s*} \equiv \int_h^1 N_t^{sj*} dj = h N_t^{sj*}$
Intratemporal FOC	$w_t - p_t = -(\varphi + \sigma) \log(h) + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t^s - \log(\chi_C)$	$w_t^* - p_t^* = -(\varphi + \sigma) \log(1-h) + \sigma c_t^* + \varphi n_t^{s*} - \log(\chi_C)$
Intertemporal FOC	$c_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{c_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \bar{i})$	$c_t^* = \mathbb{E}_t\{c_{t+1}^*\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t^* - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{t+1}^*\} - \bar{i})$

2.4 Definitions, identities and international risk sharing

2.4.1 The law of one price

Since we are in a currency union, the exchange rate is equal to 1. Therefore, the law of one price (LOP) states that $P_{H,t}(i) = P_{H,t}^*(i)$ and $P_{F,t}(i) = P_{F,t}^*(i)$ which imply $P_{H,t} = P_{H,t}^*$ and $P_{F,t} = P_{F,t}^*$.

2.4.2 Terms of trade

We derive the relationship between inflation, terms of trade and real exchange rate. *Home*'s terms of trade is defined as

$$S_t \equiv \frac{P_{F,t}}{P_{H,t}},$$

and *Foreign*'s terms of trade is defined as

$$S_t^* \equiv \frac{P_{H,t}^*}{P_{F,t}^*}.$$

The terms of trade is simply the relative price of imported goods in terms of domestic goods.

Using the LOP, we have

$$S_t^* = \frac{1}{S_t}.$$

2.4.3 Home bias (not detailed)

It is crucial to understand the role of the parameter α which is *Home*'s degree of openness to *Foreign*. We follow Da Silveira (2006) and assume that α and α^* are linked to h by

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha &= \bar{\alpha}(1 - h) \\ \alpha^* &= \bar{\alpha}h\end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{\alpha}$ is the degree of openness of a small open economy. When *Home* is a big economy (i.e. h is big), the degree of openness α is moved down from $\bar{\alpha}$ so that *Home*'s home bias increases. See Da Silveira page 16.

2.4.4 Price level and inflation identities

Using the definitions of P_t , P_t^* , S_t , and S_t^* , we get

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{P_t}{P_{H,t}} &= \left[(1 - \alpha) + \alpha(S_t)^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \equiv g(S_t) \\ \frac{P_t}{P_{F,t}} &= \frac{P_t}{P_{H,t}} \frac{P_{H,t}}{P_{F,t}} = \frac{g(S_t)}{S_t} \equiv h(S_t) \\ \frac{P_t^*}{P_{H,t}^*} &= \left[\alpha^* + (1 - \alpha^*)(S_t)^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \equiv g^*(S_t) \\ \frac{P_t^*}{P_{F,t}^*} &= \frac{P_t^*}{P_{H,t}^*} \frac{P_{H,t}^*}{P_{F,t}^*} = \frac{g^*(S_t)}{S_t} \equiv h^*(S_t).\end{aligned}$$

Log-linearizing $g(S_t)$, $h(S_t)$, $g^*(S_t)$ and $h^*(S_t)$ around $S_t = 1$, we get

$$\begin{aligned}p_t - p_{H,t} &= \alpha s_t \\ p_t - p_{F,t} &= -(1 - \alpha)s_t \\ p_t^* - p_{H,t}^* &= (1 - \alpha^*)s_t \\ p_t^* - p_{F,t}^* &= -\alpha^* s_t.\end{aligned}$$

Using the expression of home bias as a function of $\bar{\alpha}$ and h , we get

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_t &= \pi_{H,t} + \bar{\alpha}(1 - h)\Delta s_t \\ \pi_t^* &= \pi_{F,t}^* - \bar{\alpha}h\Delta s_t,\end{aligned}$$

where *Home* and *Foreign* inflation of domestic price indexes are respectively given by $\pi_{H,t} = p_{H,t} - p_{H,t-1}$ and $\pi_{F,t}^* = p_{F,t}^* - p_{F,t-1}^*$.

2.4.5 Real exchange rate

Using the LOP, *Home*'s real exchange rate denoted \mathcal{Q}_t is given by

$$\mathcal{Q}_t \equiv \frac{P_t^*}{P_t} = \frac{g^*(S_t)}{g(S_t)}.$$

A first order approximation around $S_t = 1$ gives

$$\mathcal{Q}_t \simeq 1 + (1 - \alpha^* - \alpha)(S_t - 1).$$

Therefore, around $S_t = 1$ (which implies $\mathcal{Q}_t = 1$), we have

$$q_t = (1 - \bar{\alpha})s_t.$$

since $\alpha^* + \alpha = \bar{\alpha}$.

2.4.6 International risk sharing (not detailed)

The international risk sharing (IRS) condition implies that

$$C_t = \frac{h}{1-h} \vartheta \mathcal{Q}_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} C_t^*.$$

We assume the same initial conditions for *Home* and *Foreign* households, so that $\vartheta = 1$. In log form, the IRS condition writes

$$c_t = \log\left(\frac{h}{1-h}\right) + \frac{1}{\sigma} q_t + c_t^*.$$

2.5 Government

2.5.1 Government consumption index

Home's public consumption index is given by the CES function

$$G_t \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h G_t(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}},$$

where $G_t(i)$ is the quantity of *Home*-made good i purchased *Home*'s government.

2.5.2 Government demand schedules

For any level of public consumption G_t , the government demand schedules are analogous to those obtain for private consumption, namely

$$G_t(i) = \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} G_t.$$

2.5.3 Summary government results

Table 3: Summary government

Variable	Home	Foreign
Government consumption index	$G_t \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h G_t(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$	$G_t^* \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{1-h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_h^1 G_t^*(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$
Optimal government consumption of domestically made good	$G_t(i) = \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} G_t$	$G_t^*(i) = \frac{1}{1-h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*(i)}{P_{H,t}^*} \right)^{-\varepsilon} G_t^*$

2.6 Firms

Each country has a continuum of firms represented by the interval $[0, h]$ for *Home* and by the interval $(h, 1]$ for *Foreign*. Each firm produces a differentiated good.

2.6.1 Technology

All *Home* firms use the same technology, represented by the production function

$$Y_t(i) = A_t N_t(i),$$

where A_t is *Home*'s productivity.

2.6.2 Labor demand

The technology constraint implies that *Home* i -th firm's labor demand is given by

$$N_t(i) = \frac{Y_t(i)}{A_t}.$$

2.6.3 Aggregate labor demand

Home's aggregate labor demand is defined as

$$N_t \equiv \int_0^h N_t(i) di = \frac{Y_t Z_t}{A_t},$$

where

$$Y_t \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h Y_t(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

is the aggregate production index while $Z_t \equiv \int_0^h \frac{Y_t(i)}{Y_t} di$ is a measure of the dispersion of *Home* firms' output.

2.6.4 Aggregate production function

In log form, we have a relationship between *Home*'s aggregate employment and *Home*'s output

$$y_t = a_t + n_t,$$

because the variation of $z_t \equiv \log(Z_t)$ around the steady state are of second order. (Admitted for now)

2.6.5 Marginal cost

Home's nominal marginal cost is given by

$$MC_t^n = \frac{(1 - \tau)W_t}{MPN_t},$$

where MPN_t is *Home*'s average marginal product of labor at t defined as

$$MPN_t \equiv \frac{1}{h} \int_0^h \frac{\partial Y_t(i)}{\partial N_t(i)} di = A_t,$$

and where τ is *Home*'s (constant) employment subsidy. This subsidy will be used latter to offset the monopolistic distortion at steady state.

The real marginal cost (express in terms of domestic goods) is the same across firms in any given country.

Home firms' real marginal cost is given by

$$MC_t \equiv \frac{MC_t^n}{P_{H,t}} = \frac{(1-\tau)W_t}{A_t P_{H,t}}.$$

In log form, we get

$$mc_t = \log(1-\tau) + w_t - p_{H,t} - a_t.$$

2.6.6 Firm's problem : price setting

We assume a price setting *à la Calvo*. At each date t , all *Home* firms resetting their prices will choose the same price denoted $\bar{P}_{H,t}$ because they face the same problem.

Home firms' resetting price problem is

$$\max_{\bar{P}_{H,t}} \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} \theta^k \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ Q_{t,t+k} \left[\bar{P}_{H,t} Y_{t+k|t} - \Psi_{t+k}(Y_{t+k|t}) \right] \right\},$$

where

- $Q_{t,t+k} \equiv \beta^k \frac{C_t}{C_{t+k}} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}}$ is *Home* firms' stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs between t and $t+k$,
- $Y_{t+k|t}$ is output at $t+k$ for a firm that last resetted its price at t ,
- $\Psi_t(\cdot)$ is *Home*'s nominal cost function at t ,

subject to $Y_{t+k|t} = \left(\frac{\bar{P}_{H,t}}{P_{H,t+k}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} (C_{H,t+k} + C_{H,t+k}^* + G_{t+k})$ for $k \in \mathbb{N}$, taking $(C_{t+k})_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $(P_{t+k})_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ as given.

2.6.7 Firm's FOC

Noticing that $\frac{\partial Y_{t+k|t}}{\partial \bar{P}_{H,t}} = -\varepsilon \frac{Y_{t+k|t}}{\bar{P}_{H,t}}$, *Home* firms' FOC is

$$\max_{\bar{P}_{H,t}} \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} \theta^k \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ Q_{t,t+k} Y_{t+k|t} \left[\bar{P}_{H,t} - \mathcal{M} \psi_{t+k|t} \right] \right\} = 0,$$

where $\psi_{t+k|t} \equiv \Psi'_{t+k}(Y_{t+k|t})$ denotes the nominal marginal cost at $t+k$ for a firm that last reset its price at t , and $\mathcal{M} \equiv \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}$. Under flexible prices ($\theta = 0$), *Home* firms' FOC collapses to $\bar{P}_{H,t} = \mathcal{M} \psi_{t|t}$, so that \mathcal{M} is the "desired" (or frictionless) markup.

Dividing by $P_{H,t-1}$, we get

$$\max_{\bar{P}_{H,t}} \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} \theta^k \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ Q_{t,t+k} Y_{t+k|t} \left[\frac{\bar{P}_{H,t}}{P_{H,t-1}} - \mathcal{M} MC_{t+k|t} \Pi_{t-1,t+k} \right] \right\} = 0,$$

where $\Pi_{t-1,t+k} \equiv \frac{P_{H,t+k}}{P_{H,t-1}}$ and $MC_{t+k|t} \equiv \frac{\psi_{t+k|t}}{P_{H,t+k}}$ is the real marginal cost at $t+k$ for a *Home* firm whose price was last set at t .

2.6.8 Zero-inflation steady state

At the zero-inflation-rate steady state (ZIRSS),

- $\bar{P}_{H,t}$ and $P_{H,t}$ are equal to each other and constant over time,
- therefore, all *Home* firms produce the same quantity of output,
- this quantity is constant over time, as the model features no deterministic trend,
- therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\bar{P}_{H,t}}{P_{H,t}} &= 1, & \Pi_{t-1,t+k} &= 1, \\ Q_{t,t+k} &= \beta^k, & Y_{t+k|t} &= Y, \\ MC_{t+k|t} &= MC = \frac{1}{\mathcal{M}}.\end{aligned}$$

2.6.9 Log-linearized firm's FOC

Log-linearization of *Home* firms' FOC around the ZIRSS yields

$$\bar{p}_{H,t} = (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \mu + mc_{t+k|t} + p_{H,t+k} \},$$

where $\bar{p}_{H,t}$ denotes the (log) of newly set prices in *Home* (same for all firms reoptimizing), and $\mu \equiv \log(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1})$.

2.6.10 Aggregate price level dynamics

As only a fraction $1 - \theta$ of firms adjusts price each period, we have

$$P_{H,t} = \left[\theta (P_{H,t-1})^{1-\varepsilon} + (1 - \theta) (\bar{P}_{H,t})^{1-\varepsilon} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}.$$

Log-linearizing around the ZIRSS, we get

$$\pi_{H,t} = (1 - \theta)(\bar{p}_{H,t} - p_{H,t}).$$

2.6.11 Rewrite log-linearized firms' FOC

Because of the constant returns to scale, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\forall k \in \mathbb{N}, mc_{t+k|t} &= \log(1 - \tau) + (w_{t+k} - p_{H,t+k}) - mpn_{t+k|t} \\ &= \log(1 - \tau) + (w_{t+k} - p_{H,t+k}) - a_{t+k} \\ &= mc_{t+k}.\end{aligned}$$

Note also that we have

$$\begin{aligned}
(1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ p_{H,t+k} - p_{H,t-1} \} &= (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \sum_{s=0}^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+s} \} \\
&= \sum_{s=0}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+s} \} (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=s}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \\
&= \sum_{s=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^s \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+s} \}.
\end{aligned}$$

Using the previous result, *Home* firms' FOC can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{p}_{H,t} - p_{H,t-1} &= (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \mu + mc_{t+k} + (p_{H,t+k} - p_{H,t-1}) \} \\
&= (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \mu + mc_{t+k} \} + \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+k} \} \\
&= (1 - \beta\theta)(\mu + mc_t) + \pi_{H,t} + (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=1}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \mu + mc_{t+k} \} + \sum_{k=1}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+k} \} \\
&= (1 - \beta\theta)(\mu + mc_t) + \pi_{H,t} + \beta\theta \left[(1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \mu + mc_{t+1+k} \} + \sum_{k=1}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+1+k} \} \right] \\
&= (1 - \beta\theta)(\mu + mc_t) + \pi_{H,t} + \beta\theta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \{ \mu + mc_{t+1+k} \} + \right. \\
&\quad \left. \sum_{k=1}^{+\infty} (\beta\theta)^k \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \{ \pi_{H,t+1+k} \} \right\} \\
&= (1 - \beta\theta)(\mu + mc_t) + \pi_{H,t} + \beta\theta \mathbb{E}_t \{ \bar{p}_{H,t+1} - p_{H,t} \}
\end{aligned}$$

Using the aggregate price level dynamics equation, we get

$$\pi_{H,t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+1} \} + \lambda(\mu + mc_t)$$

where $\lambda \equiv \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta}$.

2.6.12 Summary firm results

Table 4: Firm results

Variable	Home	Foreign
i-th firm's production function	$Y_t(i) = A_t N_t(i)$	$Y_t^*(i) = A_t^* N_t^*(i)$
i-th firm's labor demand	$N_t(i) = \frac{Y_t(i)}{A_t}$	$N_t^*(i) = \frac{Y_t^*(i)}{A_t^*}$
Aggregate labor demand	$N_t \equiv \int_0^h N_t(i) di = \frac{Y_t Z_t}{A_t}$	$N_t^* \equiv \int_h^1 N_t^*(i) di = \frac{Y_t^* Z_t^*}{A_t^*}$
Aggregate production index	$Y_t \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h Y_t(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$	$Y_t^* \equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{1-h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_h^1 Y_t^*(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$
Output dispersion	$Z_t \equiv \int_0^h \frac{Y_t(i)}{Y_t} di$	$Z_t \equiv \int_h^1 \frac{Y_t^*(i)}{Y_t^*} di$
Aggregate production function	$y_t = a_t + n_t$	$y_t^* = a_t^* + n_t^*$
Real marginal cost	$mc_t = \log(1 - \tau) + w_t - p_{H,t} - a_t$	$mc_t^* = \log(1 - \tau) + w_t^* - p_{F,t}^* - a_t^*$
Aggregate price level dynamics	$\pi_{H,t} = (1 - \theta)(\bar{p}_{H,t} - p_{H,t})$	$\pi_{F,t}^* = (1 - \theta^*)(\bar{p}_{F,t}^* - p_{F,t}^*)$
Firms' FOC	$\pi_{H,t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{H,t+1} \} + \lambda(\mu + mc_t)$ where $\lambda \equiv \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta}$	$\pi_{F,t}^* = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \{ \pi_{F,t+1}^* \} + \lambda^*(\mu + mc_t^*)$ where $\lambda^* \equiv \frac{(1-\theta^*)(1-\beta\theta^*)}{\theta^*}$

3 Equilibrium dynamics

3.1 Aggregate demand and output determination

3.1.1 Labor market

At equilibrium, labor supply equals labor demand

$$N_t^s = N_t \Rightarrow n_t^s = n_t.$$

3.1.2 Good markets

The world demand of *Home*-made good i is given by

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t^d(i) &\equiv C_{H,t}(i) + C_{H,t}^*(i) + G_t(i) \\ &= \frac{1}{h} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} (C_{H,t} + C_{H,t}^* + G_t). \end{aligned}$$

The market of all *Home* and *Foreign* goods clear in equilibrium so that

$$Y_t(i) = Y_t^d(i), \forall i \in [0, 1].$$

Using *Home* RH's optimal allocations, identities and the international risk condition, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_t &\equiv \left[\left(\frac{1}{h} \right)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \int_0^h Y_t(i)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}} \\
&= \left[\frac{1}{h} \int_0^h \left(\frac{P_{H,t}(i)}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}} (C_{H,t} + C_{H,t}^* + G_t) \\
&= C_{H,t} + C_{H,t}^* + G_t \\
&= (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} C_t + \alpha^* \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^* + G_t \\
&\stackrel{LOP}{=} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} \left[(1-\alpha) C_t + \alpha^* \left(\frac{P_t}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\eta} C_t^* \right] + G_t \\
&\stackrel{IRS}{=} \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} \left[(1-\alpha) + \alpha^* \left(\frac{P_t}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\eta} \frac{1-h}{h} \mathcal{Q}_t^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right] C_t + G_t \\
&= \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} \left[(1-\alpha) + \alpha^* \frac{1-h}{h} \mathcal{Q}_t^{\eta-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right] C_t + G_t.
\end{aligned}$$

Because $\alpha^* = \frac{h}{1-h}\alpha$, we have

$$Y_t = \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta} \left[(1-\alpha) + \alpha \mathcal{Q}_t^{\eta-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right] C_t + G_t.$$

3.1.3 Log-linearization of the good-market clearing conditions

We define $\hat{x}_t \equiv x_t - x$ the log-deviation of the variable x_t from its steady state value. Also, $\delta \equiv \frac{G}{Y}$ be the steady state share of government spending.

Log-linearizing the good-market clearing conditions around $S_t = 1$ (or $\mathcal{Q}_t = 1$), we get

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{1}{1-\delta}(\hat{y}_t - \delta \hat{g}_t) &= \hat{c}_t + \frac{\bar{\alpha}(1-h)w_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\sigma} s_t, \\
\frac{1}{1-\delta}(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta \hat{g}_t^*) &= \hat{c}_t^* - \frac{\bar{\alpha}h w_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\sigma} s_t,
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$w_{\bar{\alpha}} = 1 + (2 - \bar{\alpha})(\sigma\eta - 1) > 0.$$

Equivalently the good market clearing conditions write

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t - \delta \hat{g}_t) &= \sigma \hat{c}_t + \bar{\alpha}(1-h)w_{\bar{\alpha}} s_t, \\
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta \hat{g}_t^*) &= \sigma \hat{c}_t^* - \bar{\alpha}h w_{\bar{\alpha}} s_t,
\end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{\sigma} \equiv \frac{\sigma}{1-\delta}$.

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3.1.4 IRS condition at equilibrium

We can use the good-market clearing conditions to re-write the IRS condition as

$$\begin{aligned}
c_t &= \log\left(\frac{h}{1-h}\right) + \frac{1}{\sigma}q_t + c_t^* \Rightarrow \hat{c}_t = \frac{1}{\sigma}q_t + \hat{c}_t^* \\
&\Rightarrow (1 - \bar{\alpha})s_t = \sigma(\hat{c}_t - \hat{c}_t^*) \\
&\Rightarrow (1 - \bar{\alpha})s_t = \tilde{\sigma}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)] - \bar{\alpha}(1-h)w_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t - \bar{\alpha}hw_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t \\
&\Rightarrow (1 - \bar{\alpha})s_t = \tilde{\sigma}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)] - \bar{\alpha}w_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t \\
&\Rightarrow (1 + \bar{\alpha}(w_{\bar{\alpha}} - 1))s_t = \tilde{\sigma}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)] \\
&\Rightarrow s_t = \frac{\tilde{\sigma}}{1 + \bar{\alpha}\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)] \\
&\Rightarrow s_t = \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)]
\end{aligned}$$

where $\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} \equiv w_{\bar{\alpha}} - 1$ and $\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} \equiv \frac{\tilde{\sigma}}{1 + \bar{\alpha}\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}$.

Also, note that

$$\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta s_{t+1}\} = \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \hat{y}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}\} + \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}^*\}],$$

or

$$\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta s_{t+1}\} = \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} + \hat{y}_t^* - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}\} + \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}^*\}].$$

3.1.5 IS equations in log-deviation form

Combining the intratemporal household condition, the inflation identities and the *Home's* good-market clearing condition, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
c_t &= \mathbb{E}_t\{c_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \bar{i}) \\
&\Rightarrow \sigma\hat{c}_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{\sigma\hat{c}_{t+1}\} - (\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{t+1}\}) \\
&\Rightarrow \sigma\hat{c}_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{\sigma\hat{c}_{t+1}\} - (\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{H,t+1} + \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Delta s_{t+1}\}) \\
&\Rightarrow \sigma\hat{c}_t = \mathbb{E}_t\{\sigma\hat{c}_{t+1}\} - (\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{H,t+1}\}) + \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta s_{t+1}\} \\
&\Rightarrow \tilde{\sigma}\hat{y}_t = \tilde{\sigma}\mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - (\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{H,t+1}\}) - \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta s_{t+1}\} - \tilde{\sigma}\delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}\}.
\end{aligned}$$

Using the expression of $\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta s_{t+1}\}$, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{y}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}(1 + \bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}})}(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{H,t+1}\}) - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}\} \\
&\quad + \frac{\bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}{1 + \bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}^*\}].
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{y}_t^* &= \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}(1 + \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}})}(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{F,t+1}^*\}) - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}^*\} \\
&\quad + \frac{\bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}{1 + \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta \hat{g}_{t+1}\}].
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{y}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}}(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{H,t+1}\}) - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}\} + \frac{\bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}}[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}^*\}], \\ \hat{y}_t^* &= \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}}(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{F,t+1}^*\}) - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}^*\} + \frac{\bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}}[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}\}],\end{aligned}$$

where $\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h} \equiv 1 + \bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}$.

We obtain a version of the IS equations in log-deviation form

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{y}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}}(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{H,t+1}\}) - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}\} + \left(\frac{1 + \bar{\alpha}\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}} - 1\right)[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}^*\}], \\ \hat{y}_t^* &= \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}}(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{F,t+1}^*\}) - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}^*\} + \left(\frac{1 + \bar{\alpha}\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}} - 1\right)[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}\}].\end{aligned}$$

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3.1.6 IS equation when *Foreign* is a small open economy

In the limit case where *Foreign* is a small open economy (i.e. $1 - h = 0$), we have $\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h} = 1$ and *Foreign*'s IS equation becomes

$$\hat{y}_t^* = \mathbb{E}_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}^*\} - \frac{1}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}}(\hat{i}_t - \mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{F,t+1}^*\}) - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}^*\} + \bar{\alpha}\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}[\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{y}_{t+1}\} - \delta\mathbb{E}_t\{\Delta\hat{g}_{t+1}\}].$$

In addition, when $\delta = 0$ we recover the equation of a small open economy without government spending.

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3.2 The supply side: marginal cost and inflation dynamics

3.2.1 Marginal cost

Using *Home* RH's intratemporal FOC, *Home*'s aggregate production function and *Home*'s price level identities, we have

$$\begin{aligned}mc_t &= w_t - p_{H,t} - a_t + \log(1 - \tau) \\ &= w_t - p_t + (p_t - p_{H,t}) - a_t + \log(1 - \tau) \\ &= -(\varphi + \sigma)\log(h) + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t - \log(\chi_C) + (p_t - p_{H,t}) - a_t + \log(1 - \tau) \\ &= \sigma c_t + \varphi(y_t - a_t) + (p_t - p_{H,t}) - a_t + \log(1 - \tau) - (\varphi + \sigma)\log(h) - \log(\chi_C) \\ &= \sigma c_t + \varphi y_t + (p_t - p_{H,t}) - (1 + \varphi)a_t + \log(1 - \tau) - (\varphi + \sigma)\log(h) - \log(\chi_C) \\ &= \sigma c_t + \varphi y_t + \alpha s_t - (1 + \varphi)a_t + \log(1 - \tau) - (\varphi + \sigma)\log(h) - \log(\chi_C).\end{aligned}$$

Re-expressing in log-deviation form, we get

$$\hat{m}c_t = \sigma\hat{c}_t + \varphi\hat{y}_t + \alpha\hat{s}_t - (1 + \varphi)\hat{a}_t$$

where $\hat{m}c_t = mc_t + \mu$.

Using *Home*'s good-market clearing condition, we get

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{m}c_t &= \tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t - \delta\hat{g}_t) - \bar{\alpha}(1-h)w_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t + \varphi\hat{y}_t + \alpha s_t - (1+\varphi)a_t \\ &= (\tilde{\sigma} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t - \tilde{\sigma}\delta\hat{g}_t + (\alpha - \bar{\alpha}(1-h)w_{\bar{\alpha}})s_t - (1+\varphi)a_t \\ &= (\tilde{\sigma} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t - \tilde{\sigma}\delta\hat{g}_t - \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t - (1+\varphi)a_t\end{aligned}$$

since $\alpha = \bar{\alpha}(1-h)$.

Similarly,

$$\hat{m}c_t^* = (\tilde{\sigma} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t^* - \tilde{\sigma}\delta\hat{g}_t^* + \bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t - (1+\varphi)a_t^*.$$

Note that we have

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\sigma} - \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}(1 + \bar{\alpha}\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} - \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}) \\ &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}(1 + \bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}) \\ &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\sigma} - \bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}(1 + \bar{\alpha}\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} - \bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}) \\ &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}(1 + \bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}}) \\ &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}\end{aligned}$$

Using the IRS condition, we get

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{m}c_t &= (\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}\delta\hat{g}_t + (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h})(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta\hat{g}_t^*) - (1+\varphi)a_t, \\ \hat{m}c_t^* &= (\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t^* - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}\delta\hat{g}_t^* + (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h})(\hat{y}_t - \delta\hat{g}_t) - (1+\varphi)a_t^*.\end{aligned}$$

3.2.2 NKPCs in log-deviation form

Combining the previous results with *Home* and *Foreign* firms' FOCs, we obtain the New Keynesian Phillips Curves in log-deviation form

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{H,t} &= \beta\mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{H,t+1}\} + \lambda[(\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}\delta\hat{g}_t + (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h})(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta\hat{g}_t^*) - (1+\varphi)a_t], \\ \pi_{F,t}^* &= \beta\mathbb{E}_t\{\pi_{F,t+1}^*\} + \lambda^*[(\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t^* - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}\delta\hat{g}_t^* + (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h})(\hat{y}_t - \delta\hat{g}_t) - (1+\varphi)a_t^*].\end{aligned}$$

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3.2.3 NKPCs when *Foreign* is a small open economy

In the limit case where *Foreign* is a small open economy (i.e. $1-h=0$), we have $\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}=1$ and *Foreign*'s nominal marginal cost becomes

$$\hat{m}c_t^* = (\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t^* - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\delta\hat{g}_t^* + (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}})(\hat{y}_t - \delta\hat{g}_t) - (1+\varphi)a_t^*.$$

In addition, when $\delta=0$ we recover the results of a small open economy without government spending.

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3.3 Summary sticky price equilibrium OLD

Given the exogenous sequence $(a_t, a_t^*)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ and the sequence $(i_t, i_t^*, \hat{g}_t, \hat{g}_t^*)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$, the endogenous sequence $(\hat{y}_t, \pi_{H,t}; \hat{y}_t^*, \pi_{F,t}^*; s_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ is given by

- *Home* and *Foreign* IS equations in log-deviation form,
- *Home* and *Foreign* NKPC in log-deviation form,
- the IRS condition at equilibrium in log-deviation form.

3.4 National accounting identities

We check that national accounting identities hold.

We must have

$$\text{GDP}_t = P_t C_t + P_{H,t} G_t + \text{EX}_t - \text{IM}_t,$$

where GDP_t , IM_t and EX_t are respectively *Home*'s gross domestic product, *Home*'s imports and *Home*'s exports.

In the model, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{GDP}_t &= P_{H,t} Y_t \\ \text{EX}_t &= P_{H,t}^* C_{H,t}^* = P_{H,t} C_{H,t}^* \\ \text{IM}_t &= P_{F,t} C_{F,t}. \end{aligned}$$

We must have

$$Y_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{H,t}} C_t - \frac{P_{F,t}}{P_{H,t}} C_{F,t} + C_{H,t}^* + G_t.$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} C_{H,t} + \frac{P_{F,t}}{P_{H,t}} C_{F,t} &= (1 - \alpha) g(S_t)^{\eta-1} C_t + \alpha g(S_t)^{\eta-1} S_t^{1-\eta} C_t \\ &= \frac{(1 - \alpha) + \alpha S_t^{1-\eta}}{g(S_t)^{1-\eta}} C_t \\ &= C_t. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{P_t}{P_{H,t}} C_t - \frac{P_{F,t}}{P_{H,t}} C_{F,t} = C_{H,t}.$$

As a consequence

$$\begin{aligned} \text{GDP}_t &= P_t C_t + P_{H,t} G_t + \text{EX}_t - \text{IM}_t \\ &= Y_t. \end{aligned}$$

4 The efficient allocation

4.1 The social planner's problem

4.1.1 Planner's objective

In this section, we characterize the efficient allocation chosen by a benevolent social planner.

The benevolent social planner seeks to maximize

$$\max_{C_{H,t}^j, C_{F,t}^j, N_t^j, \frac{G_t}{h}, C_{H,t}^{j*}, C_{F,t}^{j*}, N_t^{j*}, \frac{G_t^*}{1-h}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\int_0^h U(C_t^j, N_t^j, \frac{G_t}{h}) dj + \int_h^1 U(C_t^{j*}, N_t^{j*}, \frac{G_t^*}{1-h}) dj \right]$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} C_t^j &\equiv \left[(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{H,t}^j)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{F,t}^j)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} & C_t^{j*} &\equiv \left[(\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{H,t}^{j*})^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + (1-\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_{F,t}^{j*})^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \\ C_{H,t} + C_{H,t}^* + G_t - A_t N_t &\leq 0 & C_{F,t} + C_{F,t}^* + G_t^* - A_t^* N_t^* &\leq 0 \\ C_{H,t} &= h C_{H,t}^j & C_{F,t} &= h C_{F,t}^j \\ C_{H,t}^* &= (1-h) C_{H,t}^{j*} & C_{F,t}^* &= (1-h) C_{F,t}^{j*} \\ N_t &= h N_t^j & N_t^* &= (1-h) N_t^{j*} \\ C_t &= h C_t^j & C_t^* &= (1-h) C_t^{j*}. \end{aligned}$$

Equivalently, the benevolent social planner seeks to maximize

$$\max_{\frac{C_{H,t}}{h}, \frac{C_{F,t}}{h}, \frac{N_t}{h}, \frac{G_t}{h}, \frac{C_{H,t}^*}{1-h}, \frac{C_{F,t}^*}{1-h}, \frac{N_t^*}{1-h}, \frac{G_t^*}{1-h}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[h U\left(\frac{C_t}{h}, \frac{N_t}{h}, \frac{G_t}{h}\right) + (1-h) U\left(\frac{C_t}{1-h}, \frac{N_t}{1-h}, \frac{G_t^*}{1-h}\right) \right]$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{C_t}{h} &= \left[(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left(\frac{C_{H,t}}{h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left(\frac{C_{F,t}}{h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}, & \frac{C_t^*}{1-h} &= \left[(\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left(\frac{C_{H,t}^*}{1-h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + (1-\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left(\frac{C_{F,t}^*}{1-h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}, \\ \frac{C_{H,t}}{h} + \frac{1-h}{h} \frac{C_{H,t}^*}{1-h} + \frac{G_t}{h} - A_t \frac{N_t}{h} &\leq 0, & \frac{h}{1-h} \frac{C_{F,t}}{h} + \frac{C_{F,t}^*}{1-h} + \frac{G_t^*}{1-h} - A_t^* \frac{N_t^*}{1-h} &\leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

4.1.2 Planner's FOCs

The FOCs of the planner problem write

$$\begin{aligned}
\chi_C(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_{H,t}}{h}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_t}{h}\right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G_t}{h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\chi_C(\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_{F,t}}{h}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_t}{h}\right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G_t^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\chi_C(1-\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_{F,t}^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_t^*}{1-h}\right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G_t^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\chi_C(\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_{H,t}^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_t^*}{1-h}\right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G_t}{h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\left(\frac{N_t}{h}\right)^{\varphi} &= A_t\chi_G\left(\frac{G_t}{h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\left(\frac{N_t^*}{1-h}\right)^{\varphi} &= A_t^*\chi_G\left(\frac{G_t^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\gamma}
\end{aligned}$$

where we used the fact that $\alpha = \frac{1-h}{h}\alpha^*$.

4.1.3 The efficient steady state

Evaluated at steady state, planner's FOCs and constraints become

$$\begin{aligned}
\chi_C\left[\frac{(1-\alpha)C}{C_H}\right]^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C}{h}\right)^{-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G}{h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\chi_C\left[\frac{\alpha C}{C_F}\right]^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C}{h}\right)^{-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\chi_C\left[\frac{(1-\alpha^*)C^*}{C_F^*}\right]^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\chi_C\left[\frac{\alpha^*C^*}{C_H^*}\right]^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\sigma} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G}{h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\left(\frac{N}{h}\right)^{\varphi} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G}{h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\left(\frac{N^*}{1-h}\right)^{\varphi} &= \chi_G\left(\frac{G^*}{1-h}\right)^{-\gamma} \\
\frac{C}{h} &= \left[(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_H}{h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_F}{h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}\right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \\
\frac{C^*}{1-h} &= \left[(\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_H^*}{1-h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + (1-\alpha^*)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\left(\frac{C_F^*}{1-h}\right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}\right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \\
C_H + C_H^* + G - N &\leq 0 \\
C_F + C_F^* + G^* - N^* &\leq 0.
\end{aligned}$$

For a given value of $\delta \equiv \frac{G}{Y}$, we set

$$\chi_C = (1-\delta)^{\sigma} \text{ and } \chi_G = \delta^{\gamma},$$

so that the static efficient equilibrium is solved by

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{N}{h} &= 1, & \frac{N^*}{1-h} &= 1, & Y &= N, & Y &= N^*, \\ C &= (1-\delta)Y, & C^* &= (1-\delta)Y^*, & G &= \delta Y, & G^* &= \delta Y^*, \\ C_H &= (1-\alpha)C, & C_F &= \alpha C, & C_F^* &= (1-\alpha^*)C^*, & C_H^* &= \alpha^*C^*. \end{aligned}$$

4.1.4 Planner's FOCs log-linearized

Log-linearizing planner's FOCs, the resource constraints and the composite indexes around the efficient steady state gives a system of 10 equations that summarizes the efficient allocation in log-deviation form

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{c}_{H,t} &= \eta\gamma\hat{g}_t - (1-\sigma\eta)\hat{c}_t \\ \hat{c}_{F,t} &= \eta\gamma\hat{g}_t^* - (1-\sigma\eta)\hat{c}_t \\ \hat{c}_{F,t}^* &= \eta\gamma\hat{g}_t^* - (1-\sigma\eta)\hat{c}_t^* \\ \hat{c}_{H,t}^* &= \eta\gamma\hat{g}_t - (1-\sigma\eta)\hat{c}_t^* \\ \varphi\hat{y}_t &= (1+\varphi)a_t - \gamma\hat{g}_t \\ \varphi\hat{y}_t^* &= (1+\varphi)a_t^* - \gamma\hat{g}_t^* \\ \hat{y}_t &= (1-\alpha)(1-\delta)\hat{c}_{H,t} + \alpha(1-\delta)\hat{c}_{H,t}^* + \delta\hat{g}_t \\ \hat{y}_t^* &= \alpha^*(1-\delta)\hat{c}_{F,t} + (1-\alpha^*)(1-\delta)\hat{c}_{F,t}^* + \delta\hat{g}_t^* \\ \hat{c}_t &= (1-\alpha)\hat{c}_{H,t} + \alpha\hat{c}_{F,t} \\ \hat{c}_t^* &= \alpha^*\hat{c}_{H,t}^* + (1-\alpha^*)\hat{c}_{F,t}^* \end{aligned}$$

4.2 Decentralization of the efficient allocation under flexible prices

4.2.1 Steady state and monopolistic distortion

The economy will reach a steady state where there is no price dispersion across goods and across regions ($S = 1$). Therefore, the only source of distortion at steady state comes from the monopolistic competition in the goods market.

If the economy reaches the efficient steady state, we must have

$$\begin{aligned} 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon} &= MC \\ &= (1-\tau)\frac{W}{P_H} \\ &= (1-\tau)\frac{W}{P}\frac{P_H}{P} \\ &= (1-\tau)\frac{W}{P} \\ &= \frac{1-\tau}{\chi_C}\left(\frac{N}{h}\right)^\varphi\left(\frac{C}{h}\right)^\sigma \\ &= \frac{1-\tau}{\chi_C}(1-\delta)^\sigma \\ &= 1-\tau \end{aligned}$$

since $\chi_C = (1 - \delta)^\sigma$.

Therefore, the condition $1 - \tau = 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}$ is necessary for the economy's steady state to reach the efficient steady state.

Therefore, if $\tau = \frac{1}{\epsilon}$ and if governments behave efficiently at steady state (i.e. $(\frac{N}{h})^\varphi \frac{1}{\chi_C} (\frac{C}{h})^\sigma = 1$), the steady state of the economy coincides with the efficient steady state.

We denote \bar{x}_t the log natural level of the variable X_t . Also \hat{x}_t denotes the natural log deviations of the variable X_t from its steady state value X . Natural values are the values taken by variables under flexible prices (i.e. $\theta \Rightarrow 0$).

4.2.2 Marginal cost under flexible prices

When prices are fully flexible, we have

$$\bar{m}c_t = \bar{m}c_t^* = -\mu.$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} -\mu &= \sigma \bar{c}_t + \varphi \bar{y}_t + \alpha \bar{s}_t - (1 + \varphi)a_t + \log(1 - \tau) - (\varphi + \sigma) \log(h) \\ -\mu &= \sigma \bar{c}_t^* + \varphi \bar{y}_t^* - \alpha^* \bar{s}_t - (1 + \varphi)a_t + \log(1 - \tau) - (\varphi + \sigma) \log(1 - h). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, log-deviation of the natural variables must satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \sigma \hat{c}_t + \varphi \hat{y}_t + \alpha \bar{s}_t - (1 + \varphi)a_t, \\ 0 &= \sigma \hat{c}_t^* + \varphi \hat{y}_t^* - \alpha^* \bar{s}_t - (1 + \varphi)a_t^*, \end{aligned}$$

and the good-market clearing conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t - \delta \hat{g}_t) &= \sigma \hat{c}_t + \bar{\alpha}(1 - h)w_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t, \\ \tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta \hat{g}_t^*) &= \sigma \hat{c}_t^* - \bar{\alpha}hw_{\bar{\alpha}}s_t, \end{aligned}$$

and the IRS condition at equilibrium

$$\bar{s}_t = \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)].$$

Given the exogeneous sequence $(a_t, a_t^*)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$, we have a system of 5 equations and 7 unknowns. The system lacks two expressions.

4.2.3 Government spending under flexible prices

In the previous section, we showed that the economy will reach the efficient steady state for $\tau = \frac{1}{\epsilon}$. Therefore, we made sure that the log-deviation chosen by the planner are comparable to the log-deviation of the economy. Now, we need to define natural log-deviation of government spending so that the efficient equilibrium is decentralize in the flexible price economy.

Let \hat{g}_t and \hat{g}_t^* be defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma \hat{g}_t &= \sigma \hat{c}_t + \alpha \bar{s}_t, \\ \gamma \hat{g}_t^* &= \sigma \hat{c}_t^* - \alpha^* \bar{s}_t. \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to show that these definitions are necessary and sufficient for the flexible price equilibrium to be equivalent to the efficient equilibrium.

4.2.4 Summary of the flexible price equilibrium

Given the exogeneous sequence $(a_t, a_t^*)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$, the endogeneous sequence $(\hat{y}_t, \hat{c}_t, \hat{g}_t; \hat{y}_t^*, \hat{c}_t^*, \hat{g}_t^*; \bar{s}_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ is given by

- *Home* and *Foreign* conditions on marginal cost in log-deviation form,
- *Home* and *Foreign* good-market clearing conditions in log-deviation form,
- the IRS condition at equilibrium in log-deviation form,
- *Home* and *Foreign* conditions on government spending in log-deviation form.

4.2.5 Formula for the natural level of output

The flexible price equilibrium is

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \sigma \hat{c}_t + \varphi \hat{y}_t + \alpha \bar{s}_t - (1 + \varphi) a_t, \\
0 &= \sigma \hat{c}_t^* + \varphi \hat{y}_t^* - \alpha^* \bar{s}_t - (1 + \varphi) a_t^*, \\
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t - \delta \hat{g}_t) &= \sigma \hat{c}_t + \bar{\alpha}(1 - h) w_{\bar{\alpha}} s_t, \\
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta \hat{g}_t^*) &= \sigma \hat{c}_t^* - \bar{\alpha} h w_{\bar{\alpha}} s_t, \\
\bar{s}_t &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)], \\
\gamma \hat{g}_t &= \sigma \hat{c}_t + \alpha \bar{s}_t, \\
\gamma \hat{g}_t^* &= \sigma \hat{c}_t^* - \alpha^* \bar{s}_t.
\end{aligned}$$

Using the last two equations to remove \hat{c}_t and \hat{c}_t^* , we get

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \gamma \hat{g}_t + \varphi \hat{y}_t - (1 + \varphi) a_t \\
0 &= \gamma \hat{g}_t^* + \varphi \hat{y}_t^* - (1 + \varphi) a_t^* \\
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t - \delta \hat{g}_t) &= \gamma \hat{g}_t + \bar{\alpha}(1 - h) \Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} \bar{s}_t \\
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta \hat{g}_t^*) &= \gamma \hat{g}_t^* - \bar{\alpha} h \Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} \bar{s}_t \\
\bar{s}_t &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)]
\end{aligned}$$

Replacing $\gamma \hat{g}_t$ and $\gamma \hat{g}_t^*$ given the first two equations, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t - \delta \hat{g}_t) &= -\varphi \hat{y}_t + (1 + \varphi) a_t + \bar{\alpha}(1 - h) \Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} \bar{s}_t \\
\tilde{\sigma}(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta \hat{g}_t^*) &= -\varphi \hat{y}_t^* + (1 + \varphi) a_t^* - \bar{\alpha} h \Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} \bar{s}_t \\
\bar{s}_t &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)]
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
(\tilde{\sigma} + \varphi) \hat{y}_t &= \tilde{\sigma} \delta \hat{g}_t + \bar{\alpha}(1 - h) \Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} \bar{s}_t + (1 + \varphi) a_t \\
(\tilde{\sigma} + \varphi) \hat{y}_t^* &= \tilde{\sigma} \delta \hat{g}_t^* - \bar{\alpha} h \Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} \bar{s}_t + (1 + \varphi) a_t^* \\
\bar{s}_t &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)]
\end{aligned}$$

Replacing the terms of trade,

$$\begin{aligned}
(\tilde{\sigma} + \varphi) \hat{y}_t &= \tilde{\sigma} \delta \hat{g}_t + (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} \Omega_{\bar{\alpha}, h})[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)] + (1 + \varphi) a_t \\
(\tilde{\sigma} + \varphi) \hat{y}_t^* &= \tilde{\sigma} \delta \hat{g}_t^* + (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} \Omega_{\bar{\alpha}, 1-h})[\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^* - \delta(\hat{g}_t - \hat{g}_t^*)] + (1 + \varphi) a_t^*
\end{aligned}$$

Using the fact that $\bar{\alpha}(1-h)\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} = \tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}$ and $\bar{\alpha}h\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}} = \tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}$, we can write

$$\begin{aligned}(\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}\delta\hat{g}_t + (1+\varphi)a_t - (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h})(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta\hat{g}_t^*) \\ (\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h} + \varphi)\hat{y}_t^* &= \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}\delta\hat{g}_t^* + (1+\varphi)a_t^* - (\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h})(\hat{y}_t - \delta\hat{g}_t)\end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{y}_t &= \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},h}^g \delta\hat{g}_t + \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},h}^a a_t + \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},h}(\hat{y}_t^* - \delta\hat{g}_t^*) \\ \hat{y}_t^* &= \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}^g \delta\hat{g}_t^* + \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}^a a_t^* + \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}(\hat{y}_t - \delta\hat{g}_t)\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}\Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},h}^g &= \frac{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h} + \varphi} \\ \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},h}^a &= \frac{1+\varphi}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h} + \varphi} \\ \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},h} &= -\frac{\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h}}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},h} + \varphi}.\end{aligned}$$

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4.2.6 Natural output when *Foreign* is a small open economy

In the limit case where *Foreign* is a small open economy (i.e. $1-h=0$), we have $\Omega_{\bar{\alpha},1-h}=1$ and the coefficients entering *Foreign*'s natural output expression become

$$\begin{aligned}\Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},0}^g &= \frac{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} + \varphi} \\ \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},0}^a &= \frac{1+\varphi}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} + \varphi} \\ \Gamma_{\bar{\alpha},0} &= -\frac{\tilde{\sigma} - \tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}}}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\bar{\alpha}} + \varphi}.\end{aligned}$$

With $\delta=0$, we replicate the results of Galí and Monacelli (2005).

INTERPRET LIMIT CASE.

5 Simulations

5.1 Regional welfare loss

For simplicity we adapt the welfare loss function of Forlati (2006) to our model.

We define the *Home*'s welfare loss function at time t as

$$\mathcal{L}_t = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau-t} \left[\frac{\varepsilon}{\lambda} \pi_{H,\tau}^2 + \varphi \tilde{y}_{\tau}^2 + \gamma \delta \tilde{g}_{\tau}^2 + \sigma(1-\delta)\tilde{c}_{\tau}^2 + (1-\delta)\xi_H(\tilde{c}_{\tau} - \tilde{c}_{\tau}^{cu})^2 \right] \right\},$$

and *Foreign*'s welfare loss function at time t as

$$\mathcal{L}_t^* = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau-t} \left[\frac{\varepsilon}{\lambda} \pi_{F,\tau}^{*2} + \varphi \tilde{y}_{\tau}^{*2} + \gamma \delta \tilde{g}_{\tau}^{*2} + \sigma(1-\delta)\tilde{c}_{\tau}^{*2} + (1-\delta)\xi_F(\tilde{c}_{\tau}^* - \tilde{c}_{\tau}^{cu})^2 \right] \right\}.$$

where

$$\xi_H \equiv \frac{\alpha\eta\sigma(\sigma - \alpha\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}})}{(1 - \alpha)^2},$$

$$\xi_F \equiv \frac{\alpha^*\eta\sigma(\sigma - \alpha^*\Theta_{\bar{\alpha}})}{(1 - \alpha^*)^2}.$$

INTERPRET.

5.2 Union welfare loss

Currency union's welfare loss at time t is defined as a weighted sum of *Home* and *Foreign* welfare loss functions

$$\mathcal{L}_t^{cu} = w_H \mathcal{L}_t + w_F \mathcal{L}_t^*$$

where $w_H \geq 0$ and $w_F \geq 0$ are the weight attached to *Home*'s welfare and *Foreign*'s respectively, and are such that $w_H + w_F = 1$.

The relevant measure of currency union's welfare is $w_H = h$ and $w_F = 1 - h$.

Outside the model, there may have reason to modify the welfare weight. Indeed, one could argue that fluctuations in one area are more detrimental for the currency union than fluctuations in the other area.

5.3 Calibration

Table 5: Baseline Calibration - Symmetric Union

Parameter	Value
Elasticity of substitution among goods produced in the same country	$\varepsilon = 6$
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the private goods	$\sigma^{-1} = 1/3$
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the public goods	$\gamma^{-1} = 1$
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign private goods	$\eta = 4.5$
Elasticity of substitution of labor	$\varphi = 1$
Preferences discount factor	$\beta = 0.98$
Degree of openness for a small open economy	$\bar{\alpha} = 0.2$
<i>Home</i> 's size	$h = 0.5$
Steady state government spending share	$\delta = 0.2$

5.4 Government spending and monetary policy

5.4.1 Optimal policies

Under optimal fiscal and monetary policies, \tilde{g}_t , g_t^* and \hat{i}_t are obtained by minimizing \mathcal{L}_0 .

5.4.2 Optimal simple rule

TO BE DONE.

5.5 Natural allocation IRFs




Figure 1: Negative Foreign productivity shock - Natural allocation Home




Figure 2: Negative Foreign productivity shock - Natural allocation Foreign

When *Foreign* is affected by a negative productivity shock

\Rightarrow *Home*-made goods become more competitive than *Foreign*-made goods
 \Rightarrow Consumption baskets shift towards *Home*-made goods but consumption falls on aggregate \Rightarrow *Home*'s output rises and *Foreign*'s drops and government spending falls to equalize the MRS between private and public consumption.

5.6 Sticky price IRFs - Optimal policies




Figure 3: Negative Foreign productivity shock - Sticky price allocation Home




Figure 4: Negative Foreign productivity shock - Sticky price allocation Foreign




Figure 5: Negative Foreign productivity shock - Sticky price allocation Currency Union

When prices are sticky, the terms of trade do not instantaneously reach the natural level. Output gap is therefore positive in *Foreign* and negative in *Home*. Governments face a tradeoff between closing the different gaps.

The optimal policy is to raise the interest rate. However, because prices are sticky in *Home*, the rise is limited so that the impact on \tilde{y}_t is limited.

We define $\tilde{f}_t = \tilde{g}_t - \tilde{y}_t = \frac{\delta_t - \bar{\delta}_t}{\bar{\delta}_t}$ where $\delta_t \equiv \frac{G_t}{Y_t}$ and $\bar{\delta}_t \equiv \frac{\bar{G}_t}{\bar{Y}_t}$. Therefore, \tilde{f}_t is the relative fiscal stance : the % deviation of government share relative to the natural allocation. Government policy are countercyclical with respect to output gap. When output gap is negative, government gap is positive and bigger in absolute value. Therefore, government spending gaps help to close the output gaps and consumption gaps.