Credit Subsidy, rel. Pareto weight 1/2

December 22, 2017

1 Tables with Results

| | No cred sub | Optimal policy | Optimal SS cred sub | Optimal Flat cred sul |
|--------------------------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| $\overline{\varsigma_0}$ | 0.00000 | 1.00000 | 0.04211 | -0.37778 |
| $\bar{\zeta}$ | 0.00000 | -0.70000 | 0.04211 | -0.37778 |
| Half life | - | 7.00000 | - | - |
| Welfare (weighted) | -8.52094 | -8.08137 | -8.57519 | -8.33168 |
| Welfare workers | -5.86691 | -5.37733 | -5.98215 | -5.25293 |
| Welfare entrepreneurs | -19.13709 | -18.89753 | -18.94735 | -20.64669 |

| | Constant ς_0 | Constant $\bar{\zeta}$ |
|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| <u> </u> | 1.00000 | -0.70000 |
| $\bar{\zeta}$ | 1.00000 | -0.70000 |
| Half life | - | _ |
| Welfare (weighted) | -32.80864 | -8.41534 |
| Welfare workers | -37.98101 | -5.08870 |
| Welfare entrepreneurs | -12.11917 | -21.72190 |

| Experiment | Total welfare | Worker welfare | Entrepreneur welfare |
|------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Optimal policy | 0.01533 | 0.01480 | 0.01205 |
| Optimal flat cred sub | 0.00657 | 0.01859 | -0.07270 |
| Constant ς_0 | -0.60006 | -0.65100 | 0.42034 |
| Constant $\bar{\zeta}$ | 0.00366 | 0.02362 | -0.12124 |

2 Parameters and functional forms

2.1 Functional forms etc.

- Occupational choice: No
- Workers save: No
- Decreasing returns to scale: Yes
- Productivity process: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, $d \log(z) = -\nu \log(z) dt + \sigma dW$
- Period utility function:

$$u(c,l) = (1-\gamma)^{-1}c^{1-\gamma} - \nu(l), \quad \nu(l) = (1+1/\chi)^{-1}l^{1+1/\chi}$$

- Production function: $y = F(z, k, n) = zA((k f_k)^+)^{\alpha}((n f_n)^+)^{\beta}$
- Credit subsidy schedule: $\varsigma_k(t) = \bar{\varsigma}_k + e^{-\gamma t}(\varsigma_{k,0} \bar{\varsigma}_k)$

2.2 Parameter values


| Pareto weight workers | | 0.800 |
|--|------------------|-------|
| Population share of workers | popshare | 0.667 |
| Total population | popmass | 1.000 |
| Discount rate entrepreneurs | $ ho_e$ | 0.050 |
| Discount rate workers | $ ho_w$ | 0.030 |
| Relative risk aversion | γ | 1.000 |
| Inverse Frisch elasticity | arphi | 1.000 |
| Depreciation rate | δ | 0.000 |
| Death rate | θ | 0.000 |
| Fixed cost capital | f_k | 0.000 |
| Fixed cost labor | f_n | 0.000 |
| Financial constraint parameter | λ | 2.000 |
| Common TFP parameter | A | 1.000 |
| Capital share | α | 0.297 |
| Labor share | β | 0.603 |
| Returns to scale | $\alpha + \beta$ | 0.900 |
| Interest rate | r^* | 0.030 |
| Effect of productivity on effective labor supply | η | 0.000 |
| Productivity drift parameter | ν | 0.163 |
| Productivity yearly autocorrelation | $e^{-\nu}$ | 0.850 |
| Productivity standard deviation parameter | σ | 0.300 |
| Productivity mean | $ar{z}$ | 1.148 |
| Poisson arrival rate | | 0.100 |
| Parameter of Pareto distribution of Poisson shocks | | 1.100 |
| Contraction of initial distribution | χ | 0.100 |


2.3 Iteration parameters


| Number of grid points assets | | 200.000 |
|---|--|-----------------|
| Number of grid points productivity | | 30.000 |
| Number of grid points time | | 150.000 |
| Number of time periods | | 150.000 |
| Max assets | | 350.000 |
| Mean wealth relative to steady state | | 0.100 |
| Range of initial credit subsidy rate tested | | [0.900, 1.000] |
| Range of final credit subsidy rate tested | | [-0.800,-0.700] |


3 Figures

Optimal steady state credit subsidy rate = 0.042












Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8





Figure 9






Figure 10




Figure 11






Figure 12





 ${\bf Figure}~{\bf 14}-{\bf Proportional~deviations~of~optimal~credit~subsidy~equilibrium~from~the~laissez-faire~equilibrium}$





Figure 15



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






Figure 17





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


Figure 24






Figure 25









Figure 28



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