



# **Smart Contract Security Assassment**

**Final Report** 

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The audit report has made all reasonable attempts to provide clear and articulate recommendations to the Project team with respect to the rectification, amendment and/or revision of any highlighted issues, vulnerabilities or exploits within the contracts provided. It is the sole responsibility of the Project team to sufficiently test and perform checks, ensuring that the contracts are functioning as intended, specifically that the functions therein contained within said contracts have the desired intended effects, functionalities and outcomes of the Project team.



# 1 Overview

This report has been prepared for Assara on the Binance Smart Chain (BSC). Maxloop provides a user-centred examination of the smart contracts to look for vulnerabilities, logic errors or other issues from both an internal and external perspective.

# 1.1 Summary

Project Name	Assara
URL	https:// Assara.finance/
Platform	Binance Smart Chain
Language	Solidity

### 1.2 Contracts Assessed

Name	Contract	Live Code
Assara	0x2a988E52baC4D22F3adbe1d5191CF3D240F01876	Match
Assara.sol	4accd3383d7166dd5ff8499ef2fa0d0903443d3d406c	<b>✓</b> MATCH



# **Audit Summary**

Delivery Date	April. 11th, 2022
Method of Audit	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Consultants Engaged	2
Timeline	April. 8, 2022 - April. 11, 2022

# 1.3 Findings Summary

Severity	Found	Resolved	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged (no change made)
High	0	-	-	-
Medium	0	-	-	-
Low	3	1	-	2
Informational	1	-	-	1
Total	4	1	-	3

### Classification of Issues

Severity	Description
High	Exploits, vulnerabilities or errors that will certainly or probabilistically lead towards loss of funds, control, or impairment of the contract and its functions. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed with utmost urgency.



Medium	Bugs or issues with that may be subject to exploit, though their impact is somewhat limited. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed as soon as possible.
Low	Effects are minimal in isolation and do not pose a significant danger to the project or its users. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed nonetheless.
Informational	Consistency, syntax or style best practices. Generally pose a negligible level of risk, if any.

# 1.3.1 AssaraToken

ID	Severity Summary	Status
01	Mint function can be used to pre-mint large amounts of tokens before Ownership is transferred to the <b>Masterchef</b>	RESOLVED

# 1.3.2 AssaraMasterChef

ID	Severity Summary	Status
01	Low Inconsistency between deposit fee cap in add and set	ACKNOWLEDGED
02	PendingMondo will show inaccurate pending harvests on the dapp frontend If the pending rewards causes totalSupply to be exceed MAXSUPPLYCAP	ACKNOWLEDGED
03	Total token supply might not be minted due to try and catch pattern	ACKNOWLEDGED



# 2 Findings

# 2.1 AssaraToken

The Assara token is a simple BEP-20 token which will be used as the main reward token for the Masterchef. The contract allows for Assara tokens to be minted when the mint function is called by the contract Owner, who at the time of deployment would be the deployer. Ownership is generally transferred to the Masterchef via the transferOwnership function for emission rewards to be minted and distributed to users staking in the Masterchef. The token has a max supply cap of 100,000,000,000.

Address	0x2a988E52baC4D22F3adbe1d5191CF3D240F01876
Token Supply	100,000,000,000
<b>Decimal Places</b>	18
Pancakeswap Liquidity	32.5%
Listing in Exchanges	17.5%
Burn	15%
Marketing Team	11%
Project Sustainability ets.	10%
Charity	10%
Airdrop	4%



### 2.1.2 Privileges

The following functions can be called by the owner of the contract:

- mint
- renounceOwnership
- transferOwnership

#### 2.1.3 Issues & Recommendations

#### Issue #01

mint function can be used to pre-mint large amounts of tokens before ownership is transferred to the Masterchef

#### Severity



#### Description

The mint function could be used to pre-mint tokens for legitimate uses including, but not limited to, the injection of initial liquidity, token presale, or airdrops; however, this function may also be used to pre-mint and dump tokens when the token contract has been deployed but before ownership is set to the Masterchef contract.

This risk is prevalent amongst less-reputable projects, and any premints can be prominently seen on the Blockchain.

#### Recommendation

Consider being forthright if this mint function is to be used by letting your community know how much was minted, where they are currently stored, if a vesting contract was used for token unlocking, and finally the purpose of the mints.

#### Resolution



tokens were pre-minted and ownership has been transferred to the Masterchef.



# 2.2.1 Privileges

The following functions can be called by the owner of the Masterchef:

- add
- set
- updateEmissionRate
- updateStartTimestamp
- transferOwnership
- renounceOwnership

The following functions can be called by the DevAddr of the Masterchef:

setDevAddress


The following functions can be called by the FeeAddr of the Masterchef:

setFeeAddress

### 2.2.2 Issues & Recommendations

Issue #02 Inconsistency between deposit fee cap in add and set

Severity LOW SEVERITY



#### Description

For deposit fees, while add has a max cap of 8%, set has a max cap of 4%.

add: Line 1136 require(\_depositFeeBP <= 800, "add: invalid deposit fee basis points");

set: Line 1159 require(\_depositFeeBP <= 400, "set: invalid deposit fee basis points");

This behavior is inconsistent, and could allow the owner to add a pool with 8% fee, even if 4% is the expected maximum cap.

#### Recommendation

The Assara team should clarify what their maximum cap on the deposit fee is, and ensure that checks in both add and set use the same value. It is encouraged to use the lower value as the cap.

#### Resolution

ACKNOWLEDGED

#### Issue #03

pendingAssara will show inaccurate pending harvests on the dapp frontend if the pending rewards causes totalSupply to be exceed MAXSUPPLYCAP

#### Severity

LOW SEVERITY



#### Location

Similarly to updatePool, pendingAssara does not check if the pending rewards will cause the total supply to exceed the MAXSUPPLYCAP.

This can cause inaccurate pending harvests to be shown towards the end of token emissions.


#### Description

Resolution

Issue #04

Consider factoring in the MAXSUPPLYCAP, and set the pending reward to be the difference between MAXSUPPLYCAP and totalSupply if the pending reward causes totalSupply to exceed MAXSUPPLYCAP.

uint256 AssaraReward = multiplier.mul(AssaraPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(total AllocPoint);



Total token supply might not be minted due to try and catch pattern







#### Description

As there is a MAXCAPSUPPLY for the Assara token, minting the reward and causing the maximum cap to exceed would result in a revert.

```
AssaraToken::Line 814: require(_totalSupply.add(amount) <= MAXCAPSUPPLY, "Max supply reached");
```

To prevent this, the following try and catch pattern is done in updatePool.

```
Line 1209~
```

In the case where totalSupply + amount does exceed MAXCAPSUPPLY, the mint will not be done. This means that the token supply could be capped at an amount slightly lower than MAXCAPSUPPLY.

#### Recommendation

Consider minting the difference between MAXCAPSUPPLY and totalSupply, if any.

```
uint256 AssaraReward =
```

```
multiplier.mul(AssaraPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(total AllocPoint);

uint256 devReward = AssaraReward.div(10); uint256 totalRewards =

Assara.totalSupply().add(devReward).add(AssaraReward);
```



#### Resolution

ACKNOWLEDGED



