

Other Regarding Preferences - CES

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1 Introduction

1.1 Budget

$$p = \frac{p_x}{p_y} = \frac{m_y}{m_x}; m_y = \frac{M}{p_y}; m_x = \frac{M}{p_x} \text{ (if } m_y = m_x \text{ we denote both by } m).$$

1.2 CES Preferences

$$u(x, y) = [\alpha \times x^\rho + (1 - \alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \text{ where } \alpha \in [0, 1].^1$$

¹The definition of elasticity of substitution is $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{\frac{\Delta \frac{x}{y}}{\frac{x}{y}}}{\frac{\Delta \frac{p_x}{p_y}}{\frac{p_x}{p_y}}}$. If the DM maximizes utility and the chosen bundle is interior then at this bundle the price ratio equals the MRS. Therefore, $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{\frac{\Delta \frac{x}{y}}{\frac{x}{y}}}{\frac{\Delta \frac{p_x}{p_y}}{\frac{p_x}{p_y}}}$. Next, we take advantage of the equality $d \ln(f(x)) = \frac{df(x)}{f(x)}$ and we write $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{d \ln(\frac{x}{y})}{d \ln(\frac{p_x}{p_y})} = -\frac{d \ln(\frac{x}{y})}{d \ln(MRS_{xy})}$. For an interior optimal choice in a standard case ($\alpha \in (0, 1)$, $x > 0$, $y > 0$, $\rho \notin \{-\infty, 0, 1, \infty\}$): $MRS_{xy} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^{\rho-1}$. Now, denote $MRS_{xy} = \theta$. Then, $\theta = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^{\rho-1}$ and therefore $\frac{x}{y} = (\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}$. By the expression we found above, $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{d \ln((\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}})}{d \ln(\theta)}$. Hence, we get, $\sigma_{xy} = -\frac{\frac{d((\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}})}{(\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}}}{\frac{d\theta}{\theta}} = -\frac{d((\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}})}{d\theta} \times \frac{\theta}{(\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}} = -\frac{1}{\rho-1} \times (\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}-1} \times \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \times \frac{\theta}{(\theta \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}} = \frac{1}{1-\rho}$. Hence, the elasticity of substitution is constant since it does not depend on the chosen bundle. As ρ increases ($\rho \leq 1$) the elasticity of substitution increases, meaning that the DM is more sensitive to changes in the relative price.

2 Utility Maximization Problem

Case 1 (Extreme Altruism). $\alpha = 0$ means that $u(x, y) = y$ and the chosen bundle is $(0, m_y)$.

Case 2 (Extreme Selfishness). $\alpha = 1$ means that $u(x, y) = x$ and the chosen bundle is $(m_x, 0)$.

Case 3 ($\sigma_{xy} = 0$). If $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ then $\rho \rightarrow -\infty$ means that $u(x, y) = \min\{x, y\}$ and the chosen bundle is $(\frac{m_y}{1+p}, \frac{m_y}{1+p})$.²

Case 4 ($\sigma_{xy} = 1$). If $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ then $\rho = 0$ means that the DM has Cobb-Douglas preferences, $u(x, y) = x^\alpha \times y^{1-\alpha}$ and the chosen bundle is $(\alpha m_x, (1-\alpha)m_y)$.³

Case 5 ($\sigma_{xy} \rightarrow \infty$). If $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ then $\rho = 1$ means that $u(x, y) = \alpha \times x + (1-\alpha) \times y$. Therefore, the indifference curves are linear with the slope $\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$. Thus, the chosen bundle is,

$$\begin{array}{ll} (0, m_y) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} < p \\ \{(x, y) | p_x x + p_y y = M\} & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} = p \\ (m_x, 0) & \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} > p \end{array}$$

Case 6. If $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, $\rho \in (-\infty, 1)$ and $\rho \neq 0$, the CES utility function

²The Leontief function is due to the fact that the lower quantity is the dominant quantity when raised to the power of minus infinity.

³When $\rho = 0$ the value of the utility cannot be determined. To recover the utility function consider,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} u(x, y) &= \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} [\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} e^{\frac{\ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]}{\rho}} \\ &= e^{\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]}{\rho}} = e^{\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]}{\rho}} \end{aligned}$$

By L'Hopital rule,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\ln[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]}{\rho} &= \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\frac{\alpha \times x^\rho \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho \times \ln y}{\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho}}{1} \\ &= \lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} \frac{\alpha \times x^\rho \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho \times \ln y}{\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho} \\ &= \alpha \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times \ln y \end{aligned}$$

Hence, $\lim_{\rho \rightarrow 0} u(x, y) = e^{\alpha \times \ln x + (1-\alpha) \times \ln y} = x^\alpha \times y^{1-\alpha}$.

represents monotonic⁴ and convex⁵ preferences. Therefore, the chosen bundle is interior and it satisfies $MRS_{xy} = p$ and $p_x x + p_y y = M$. Hence, the chosen bundle is $\left(\frac{m_y}{p + [p \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}}, \frac{m_y}{1 + \frac{p}{[p \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}}} \right)$.

Case 7. If $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, $\rho \in (1, \infty)$, the CES utility function represents monotonic and concave preferences. Therefore, the chosen bundle is

$$\begin{aligned} (0, m_y) & \quad \text{if } \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} < p \\ \{(0, m_y), (m_x, 0)\} & \quad \text{if } \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = p \\ (m_x, 0) & \quad \text{if } \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} > p \end{aligned}$$

Remark 1. Case 7 demonstrates that when $\rho > 1$, ρ and α can only be partially identified. Cases 1 and 2 demonstrate that when $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}$, ρ also cannot be identified. Therefore, ρ is completely identified only when $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $\rho \leq 1$.

3 Expenditure Minimization Problem

Case 8 (Extreme Altruism). $\alpha = 0 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = p_y \times y_0$.

Case 9 (Extreme Selfishness). $\alpha = 1 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = p_x \times x_0$.

Case 10 ($\sigma_{xy} = 0$). $\rho \rightarrow -\infty : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = (p_x + p_y) \times \min\{x_0, y_0\}$.

Case 11 ($\sigma_{xy} = 1$). $\rho = 0 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) = \left[\frac{p_x x_0}{\alpha} \right]^\alpha \times \left[\frac{p_y y_0}{1-\alpha} \right]^{1-\alpha}$.

Case 12 ($\sigma_{xy} \rightarrow \infty$). $\rho = 1 : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) =$

$$\begin{aligned} p_y \times (y_0 + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} x_0) & \quad \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} < p \\ p_x \times x_0 + p_y \times y_0 & \quad \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} = p \\ p_x \times (x_0 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} y_0) & \quad \text{if } \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} > p \end{aligned}$$

⁴Consider the case where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $\rho \in (-\infty, \infty)$ and $\rho \notin \{0, 1\}$. Then, $u_x = \alpha[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}-1} x^{\rho-1} \geq 0$ and $u_y = (1-\alpha)[\alpha \times x^\rho + (1-\alpha) \times y^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}-1} y^{\rho-1} \geq 0$. Hence, the CES preferences are monotonic.

⁵Consider the case where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $\rho \in (-\infty, \infty)$ and $\rho \notin \{0, 1\}$. Then, $MRS_{xy} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{x}{y} \right)^{\rho-1}$. If $\rho < 1$ then when $\frac{x}{y}$ increases the MRS decreases while if $\rho > 1$ then when $\frac{x}{y}$ increases the MRS increases. Since the CES preferences are monotonic, when $\rho < 1$ the CES preferences are convex while when $\rho > 1$ the CES preferences are concave.

Case 13. $\rho < 1, \rho \neq 0, \alpha \in (0, 1) : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) =$

$$u(x_0, y_0) \times \left[\frac{p_x}{\left[\alpha + \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}}{(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} p^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} + \frac{p_y}{\left[(1-\alpha) + \frac{(1-\alpha)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} p^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}}{\alpha^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} \right]$$

Case 14. *If* $\alpha \in (0, 1), \rho \in (1, \infty) : e(p_x, p_y, (x_0, y_0)) =$

$$\begin{aligned} & p_y \left[\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \times x_0^\rho + y_0^\rho \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \quad \text{if} \quad \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \leq p \\ & p_x \left[x_0^\rho + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \times y_0^\rho \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \quad \text{if} \quad \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} > p \end{aligned}$$