

PAV Proof

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Definitions

- PAV = Proportional Approval Voting. Among all subsets $T \subseteq S$ with $|T| = k$, PAV returns a subset that maximizes the PAV score.
- V = set of n agents (voters).
- S = set of m projects, indexed $1, \dots, m$.
- Each voter i casts an approval ballot $A_i \subseteq S$, i.i.d. from other voters.
- For each project $j \in S$ there is a “true” quality level (ℓ_j) .
- For each project $j \in S$, random voter $i \in V$ let

$$p_j = \Pr(j \in A_i)$$

Assume $p_j = f(\ell_j)$ for some strictly increasing f – ie, better-quality projects have larger p_j .

- For a subset $T \subseteq S$ define the per-voter PAV contribution:

$$\phi_T(A_i) = \sum_{t=1}^{|T \cap A_i|} \frac{1}{t}.$$

(Harmonic-vector weight: a voter who approves r chosen projects contributes $1 + 1/2 + \dots + 1/r$ to the PAV score.)

- The empirical (total) PAV score of a set T on the n ballots is

$$\text{Score}_n(T) = \sum_{i=1}^n \phi_T(A_i).$$

- The expected per-voter PAV score of T is

$$s(T) = \mathbb{E}[\phi_T(A_i)],$$

and the population (expected total) score is $ns(T)$.

- Let $\mathcal{T}_k := \{T \subseteq S : |T| = k\}$ denote all size- k subsets. Define the minimal difference between any chosen and any non-chosen projects' PAV scores:

$$D_s := \min_{T \in \mathcal{T}_k, T' \in \mathcal{T}_k, T' \neq T} (s(T) - s(T'))$$

Proposition. Assume $D_s > 0$. Then

$$\Pr(PAV(V) \in \arg \max_{T \in \mathcal{T}_k} \text{Score}_n(T) \text{ equals a maximizer of } s(\cdot)) \geq 1 - \binom{m}{k} \exp\left(-\frac{2nD_s^2}{(H_k)^2}\right),$$

where $H_k := 1 + \frac{1}{2} + \dots + \frac{1}{k}$.

Proof.

Per-voter contribution. For any set T we have $|T \cap A_i| \leq k$, hence the per-voter contribution

$$0 \leq \phi_T(A_i) \leq H_k := \sum_{t=1}^k \frac{1}{t}.$$

So each random variable $\phi_T(A_i)$ is bounded in the interval $[0, H_k]$.

Concentration for a fixed set T . For fixed $T \in \mathcal{T}_k$, the n terms $\phi_T(A_1), \dots, \phi_T(A_n)$ are i.i.d. with mean $s(T)$ and range at most H_k . By Hoeffding's inequality, for any $\varepsilon > 0$,

$$\Pr(|\text{Score}_n(T) - ns(T)| \geq n\varepsilon) = \Pr\left(\left|\sum_{i=1}^n (\phi_T(A_i) - s(T))\right| \geq n\varepsilon\right) \leq 2 \exp\left(-\frac{2n^2\varepsilon^2}{n(H_k)^2}\right) = 2 \exp\left(-\frac{2n\varepsilon^2}{(H_k)^2}\right).$$

Concentration over all size- k sets. There are $\binom{m}{k}$ sets in \mathcal{T}_k . Using Union Bound, with probability at least

$$1 - 2 \binom{m}{k} \exp\left(-\frac{2n\varepsilon^2}{(H_k)^2}\right)$$

for every $T \in \mathcal{T}_k$:

$$|\text{Score}_n(T) - ns(T)| < n\varepsilon.$$

Choose ε as half the population gap. By definition, $D_s > 0$ is the minimal positive gap. Then,

$$\varepsilon = \frac{D_s}{2}.$$

Then for any maximizer T^* of $s(\cdot)$ and any other set $T \neq T^*$,

$$\text{Score}_n(T^*) \geq ns(T^*) - n\varepsilon = n(s(T^*) - \varepsilon) = n(s(T) - \varepsilon + (s(T^*) - s(T))) \geq n(s(T) + D_s - \varepsilon - \varepsilon) = n(s(T)).$$

Since $s(T^*) - s(T) \geq D_s$ and both empirical scores are within $n\varepsilon$ of their means:

$$\text{Score}_n(T^*) - \text{Score}_n(T) \geq n((s(T^*) - \varepsilon) - (s(T) + \varepsilon)) = n(s(T^*) - s(T) - 2\varepsilon) \geq 0.$$

Since $\varepsilon = D_s/2$, the last difference is ≥ 0 . Thus, under the uniform concentration event, the empirical maximizers coincide with the population maximizers.

Probability bound. Using the union bound estimate with $\varepsilon = D_s/2$, we get

$$\Pr(\text{empirical maximizer equals population maximizer}) \geq 1 - 2 \binom{m}{k} \exp\left(-\frac{2n(D_s/2)^2}{(H_k)^2}\right).$$

Simplifying:

$$\frac{2n(D_s/2)^2}{(H_k)^2} = \frac{nD_s^2}{2(H_k)^2}.$$

$$\Pr(PAV(V) \text{ is a maximizer of } s(\cdot)) \geq 1 - \binom{m}{k} \exp\left(-\frac{2nD_s^2}{(H_k)^2}\right)$$

Hence the probability tends to 1 exponentially fast in n whenever $D_s > 0$. \square