

# secure report

This report outlines the vulnerabilities in using naive constructions of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) with concatenated secrets and messages , and recommends HMAC as a secure alternative.

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## Identified Security Issue

### Vulnerable Construction:

$MAC = \text{hash}(\text{secret} \parallel \text{message})$

### Why This Is Insecure:

- Allows **length extension attacks**.
- If a hacker knows  $\text{hash}(\text{secret} \parallel \text{message})$ , they can:
  - **Guess the length** of the secret.
  - **Append additional data** to the original message.
  - **Forge a valid MAC** that bypasses authentication checks.

### Underlying Problem:

- Most hash functions (e.g., MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) process input in blocks.
- The internal state can be extended with attacker-controlled input, producing a valid hash without knowing the secret.

## Recommended Mitigation

### Use HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code)

### Advantages of HMAC:

- Designed to withstand length extension attacks.
- Properly mixes the key and message using:
  - Inner hash:  $\text{hash}((\text{key} \oplus \text{ipad}) \parallel \text{message})$   
-Here, the secret key is combined with the

**inner padding** , then concatenated with the message, and hashed.

- Outer hash:  $\text{hash}((\text{key} \oplus \text{opad}) \parallel \text{inner\_hash})$   
-Then, the result of the inner hash is concatenated with the secret key combined with  
**outer padding** and hashed again.

- Remains secure even if the underlying hash function is weak.

### Why use inner and outer padding?

- The two different paddings (ipad and opad) ensure the key is mixed with the message in **two distinct ways**, preventing attackers from manipulating or extending the hash.
- This double hashing **hides the internal hash state** so attackers cannot perform length extension attacks.
- It also **strengthens security** by making it difficult to reverse-engineer the key or forge a valid MAC.

### Conclusion:

Simply hashing a secret with a message is unsafe because attackers can change the message and still create a valid hash. HMAC fixes this by mixing the key and message in two steps, making it secure against these attacks. Always use HMAC for strong message protection.