Title: A Critical Analysis of Patriotism As an Ethical Concept
A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 1, 1918

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Release Date: March 9, 2022 [eBook #67599]

Language: English

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A Critical Analysis of Patriotism As an Ethical Concept

BY
CLARENCE REIDENBACH

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PREFACE

Patriotism is a live issue. It is almost impossible for any one to be neutral about it. All men seem to feel that the issue involved is one that touches the fundamental interests of their lives. Patriotism is an important concept.

But not all men take the same stand regarding patriotism. There is hot disagreement upon the question of its moral value. Some champion it as one of the noblest of all virtues; others spurn it as one of the basest. Therefore it is highly desirable to arrive at a fair judgment of the ethical value of patriotism.

One of the chief reasons for the radical disagreement about the morality of patriotism is that there are widely different assumptions as to its nature. It is a sentiment of manifold varieties, and the word patriotism may carry quite different implications to different minds. The first necessary step, then, before one can pass an ethical judgment upon it, is to find out what the core of patriotism is.

This dissertation begins, therefore, by undertaking to determine the nature of patriotism, and with no more of a clue in hand than the one that it is “the love of country” tries, by an inductive investigation of what has actually been called patriotism, to bring together the important facts in which patriotism is manifested. Hence, while the main purpose of the essay is an ethical one, a large portion of it is given to inductive analysis. The first three parts are mainly analytical. The fourth part endeavors to unify in a central concept the data gathered together in the preceding parts, and, in the light of that concept and all the facts, to evaluate patriotism as an ethical ideal. It may be noted here that the first three parts are printed as they were in the typewritten form presented to Yale University as

a thesis, but that part four has undergone much rearrangement and revision. Chapter eight has been largely rewritten; chapter nine is entirely new; and what here appears as chapter ten has been somewhat changed.

Acknowledgement is hereby made to the members of the faculty of the department of philosophy in Yale University for many helpful criticisms. Especially is a debt owed to Professor Charles A. Bennett, who suggested the field of patriotism as a fruitful one for investigation, under whose direction the work was done, and whose criticisms and suggestions have made more definite than would otherwise have been the case, the problems involved. Thanks are due to Professor Luther A. Weigle, who read the manuscript, and helped to clarify and make accurate the expression of the ideas. And my gratitude is given to my wife, whose assistance in the final preparation of the manuscript was invaluable, and who by her constant helpfulness and loyalty made it possible for the whole work to be brought to completion.

Indianapolis, January, 1920.

PART I

THE IMPULSES OF PATRIOTISM

CHAPTER I

THE IMPULSES OF ATTACHMENT

When in 1914 the great war broke out, the world was astounded. There were forces at work which men were confident would make another war between first-class powers impossible. International relations and groupings, such as those of commerce, labor, art, science, and learning, had increased in strength and number. The terribleness and waste of war were deemed to be so fully realized that modern nations would have no taste for armed conflict. But the war came on, and there must have been mighty causes to be able to produce so gigantic a result. What were they? What could be the nature of such tremendous causes, that yet remained concealed and in their issuance so took men by surprise? The factors were various, and some, of course, had been noted, but one factor which was unnoticed by the general public and yet which is one of fundamental importance is the rôle taken in patriotism by men’s unreasoned dispositions of character. If the phenomenon of patriotism is to be fully understood, it must be analyzed with a view of discovering what are these deeply ingrained sets of mind and character which are its raw material and which make it so powerful.[1]

Patriotism is a complex sentiment. There is, in other words, no single instinctive response in all human beings to the stimulus, country. What, then, are some of the dispositions of which patriotism is composed? There are impulses which make primarily for attachment, and there are those that make primarily for antipathy. One of the most important of the impulses of attachment is the disposition of gregariousness. Hobbes, indeed, and others after him, built their theories of the state upon the doctrine that man would have been able to live alone had not the company of others been forced upon him, but that there is an impulse of gregariousness seems indisputable. It is simply an observable fact that there are species of animals that not only live in herds, packs, or flocks, but which also show uneasiness

and distress at being separated from their fellows. James cites the observation of Galton on the gregariousness of the South African cattle.[2] If an individual of this species were separated from the herd it would direct its whole activity towards getting back once more, and when its object was attained, would plunge into the heart of the herd as if to bathe its very body in contact with its fellows. Now man, as well as other animals, lives a group life, and it seems almost inevitable that he should develop an impulse parallel to the outward facts of his existence, even were it not probable that he has inherited gregariousness as a psychical disposition from his animal ancestors. That the impulse is actually present in the human species is shown by the fact that there is in man a strong abhorrence of prolonged solitude. Professor James' words on this point have come to be almost classical: "To be alone is one of the greatest evils for him [the normal man]. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilized countries to adopt. To one long pent up on a desert island the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences."[3] But the impulse is also apparent in more normal experiences. So much do men desire the company of others that it is not only an element of recreation usually, but the more serious tasks of life often derive their value not more because of the ostensible end sought after than because of the human association which is involved.

Wilfred Trotter[4] has made gregariousness central in his study of society. He begins by approving of the method of those who have come at the study from the standpoint of the instincts, but expresses dissatisfaction with the limits of their results, that is, dissatisfaction with the kind of analysis that would explain man by referring the whole of his conduct to the instincts of self-preservation, nutrition, and sex. Such an explanation, he finds, has been historically attempted, but after it has gone as far as it could, there has always been left over an unexplained X. Trotter accepts self-preservation, nutrition, and sex as fundamental instincts, but completes the list by bringing forward the instinct of the herd which he offers as the explanation of all human activity which was left unexplained by the other three instincts mentioned above. To Trotter there have been two great epoch-making forward steps in the evolution of life. The first came with the change from unicellular to multicellular organisms, the great advantage of which was to make the _group_ of cells the unit of selection, thus to some extent relieving the single cell of the burden of the struggle for existence, and permitting it a greater chance for variability without running a greater risk of extinction. This arrangement, says Trotter, had important influences upon all the cells comprised in the organism. The second great evolutionary advance came with the change from solitary to gregarious animals, and was attended by modifications just as profound as had accompanied the advance from unicellular to multicellular organisms. Here again the power of natural evolution operated upon the group as a unit, thus permitting once more greater variability on the part of the individual. Association in the herd became increasingly valuable in the struggle for existence, and tended to become more and more strongly fixed as a disposition of animal nature, a fact which had fundamental influence upon the mental characteristics of the individual. There are psychological traits which would not exist but for the fact of gregariousness. Shyness, embarrassment, fear, anger, love, sympathy, sorrow, and gratitude would be devoid of meaning apart from their connection with social relations.

The first important result of the instinct of gregariousness is that it makes for homogeneity. That is, it is an impulse making primarily for attachment. Each individual tends to become thoroughly assimilated in the life of the group; the group's ways have a vital meaning to him. Sensitiveness to the behavior of his fellows is heightened, and resistiveness to the suggestions of the herd is lowered. A suggestion

from outside is likely to be rejected, and direct experience tends to have little meaning, if its teachings are at variance with the beliefs of the group. Altruism arises; it is a natural product of the situation where the conditions of life are such that each individual is of necessity constantly in the habit of regarding the welfare of others as well as that of himself. Danger from the outside stimulates each individual, and spreads fear through the whole group. The herd huddles together, and each shares in the panic of all. Loneliness at such a time is unbearable.

Now man is a social creature, and has the characteristics that result from herd instinct. He tends to become solidified with those of his own kind, and feel uncomfortable when out of touch with them; to be suggestible to the influences of his group, and resistive to the influences of other groups; to feel altruism towards those of his own herd and aversion towards those of other herds; to be aroused when the nation is threatened, and huddle in the group in the face of danger. All these characteristics under the proper stimuli are manifested by patriotism. A definition of patriotism from the standpoint of attachment to the group is that of Sumner: “Patriotism is loyalty to the civic group to which one belongs by birth or other group bond. It is a sentiment of fellowship and coöperation in all the hopes, work, and sufferings of the group.[5]

The herd is not tolerant of the nonconformist. The nonconformist has in a way become a stranger. He has put himself out of touch with the group. The group knows him and his ways, but he has not permitted himself to be thoroughly assimilated by it. And the very thing that the herd desires and insists upon is homogeneity. In the words of one writer, “The crowd not only needs to make adherents and thus maintain its existence and increase in volume and power; it needs no less to assimilate, to digest, the individuals which it swallows up.”[6] The individual, then, cannot be too insistent upon the expression of his own personality. His life, even his inner life, must conform to that of the group. His emotions will not be a matter merely of his own concern. “Herd-union does not intensify all emotions. It intensifies those which are felt in common, but it actually deadens and shuts down those which are only felt by the individual.”[7] And independent thought is even more taboo. “Thought ... is markedly individual and personal.... Thought is critical, and the Herd wants unanimity, not criticism. Consequently Herd-union deadens thought.”[8] Hence the nonconformist gets himself disliked, and the outcome of the situation has usually been to submerge the individual, and assimilate him to the group. The moral of the tale is that patriotism acts in that way. “Patriotism, which is the crowd-emotion of a Nation, makes at times supreme claims on every citizen and enforces them by public opinion so powerful that few can or desire to evade them.”[9]

These observations throw light upon the question whether patriotism is a _political_ or _national_ emotion. Is patriotism attachment to the government or state, or is it love of one’s national group? There can be no doubt that it is the latter rather than the former. It is an outgrowth of tribal feeling. Bertrand Russell is only overstating a truth when he says that “Tribal feeling, which always underlay loyalty to the sovereign, has remained as strong as it ever was, and is now the chief support for the power of the State.”[10]

There is an egoistic element in the attachment of patriotism. It is an adhesion to one’s own, and one’s own is but an extension of himself. Patriotism is a personal matter. That is, it is based upon a personal relationship. One cleaves to his group not on account of its intrinsic worth simply but because of what it is worth _to him_. The majority of men are most loyal to what is nearest themselves. Each one of them seems to himself to be the center of his sphere, and things vary in importance in direct ratio to their nearness to the center. This fact

gives the key to a very common kind of patriotism. It is simply the loyalty that men feel to the extension of their own ego.

“One’s own” includes the people of his group, _i. e._, the people who are most like himself. These people share many things in common with himself. They have similar habits and customs, and all this conduces to render them one’s own. “One’s own” also includes the soil. It is that which is beneath one’s very feet; it sustains one; it nourishes one. Furthermore, one knows it as he cannot know any strange land, and as no stranger can know his land. He lives in it throughout the whole year, and knows it intimately in all its peculiarities and changing moods. Consequently, his patriotism has in it a love of the “land where his fathers died.” Virgil understood the meaning of this love of the soil. He himself felt it keenly, and because of it refused to accept the old home estate of a Roman sent into exile. It was characteristic that he made Æneas lament Troy even when he was going out to establish Rome itself. It was because of this understanding, in part at least, that he was led to urge the Romans to get back to the soil, realizing that from a love of _the soil_ to a love of _our soil_ is but a step.[11]

However, what one has been used to should not be taken as the only kind of the patriotism of attachment that there is. If adhesion to one’s own could not be overcome, loyalty to one’s earliest home would quite uniformly be stronger than patriotism. But sometimes one begins to feel that his childhood was spent in cramped quarters, and that his early opinions were inadequate. The emotion that he may be very likely to feel under such conditions is not that of affection but that of contempt and disgust. Quite often when there is a conflict between loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the community, loyalty to the nation proves the stronger. Another indication that men are not inseparably bound to what they have been used to is that they change their nation, adopt another country, and side with it even against the country of their birth. Some time ago there appeared in one of the large newspapers a letter from a naturalized German in which was this sentence: “Perhaps you would appreciate your American citizenship better if, like me, you had been born and brought up in Germany.”[12]

A reason for this attachment to one’s own is the impulse which impels one to want to feel at home in his world. It is an impulse which craves order; and it shows itself in a desire for a unified world. There seems to be an esthetic element in it; the normal mind with a sense of beauty cannot endure chaos. It represents a rational demand; it is, for instance, a driving force in philosophy. It finds another root in the desire for safety. One wants a friendly world in which he feels sure of himself and where he can live freely without being troubled by the strange or unknown. Now one’s country presents a world that he knows and can find his way in; consequently, it satisfies this demand for a unified world organized about one’s own life, and by virtue of this character it is able to furnish an additional item in the stimuli to patriotism.

Man is attached to his country very much as he is attached to himself; he could not very well help the one any more than he could help the other. But what is in one way a mere expression of egoism becomes also an affection. Unless there is some special reason for the contrary, one is likely to cherish a real affection for that with which he has long been associated, and especially so, if it has been of use to him. This fact gives justification for the popular definition of patriotism as “the _love_ of country.” This affection even may be selfish, but it may also take on a more altruistic character. Altruism naturally and perforce develops in a gregarious society. And, moreover, the parental instinct adds its strength. The protection of the home is a strong sentiment in patriotism. And the tender emotion of the parental instinct may be extended to others besides offspring. Patriotism gets colored by it, and becomes very much like it. McDougall says

that, “Like the fully developed parental sentiment, the patriotism of many men is a fusion of this quasi-altruistic extension of the self-regarding sentiment with the truly altruistic sentiment of love.”[13] Patriotism is, then, in part egoistic and in part altruistic. In a nation beset with enemies it will indeed take the form of animosity toward the enemy, but in a prosperous nation will direct itself very frequently to internal improvement. And it may be said that it retains something of altruism as well as egoism even in war. It is, even while being combative towards the _out-group_, altruistic towards the _in-group_.[14]

The spirit of attachment in patriotism may even go so far as to become a worship. Religious impulse has frequently been an element in patriotism. Religion and patriotism were almost the same thing in Israel. But there are modern parallels. A clergyman not long ago was reported to have said that the men who died upon the field of battle (he was thinking of men of his own nation) would straightway reach heaven, since they had died for their fellow men. It is evident that being a patriot held something of a religious fervor for that clergyman. Probably the Kaiser feels a religious exaltation which sustains him in the belief that he is the instrument of God.

Alfred Loisy[15] opposes Christianity and patriotism to one another, much to the credit of patriotism. According to Loisy, the teachings of Christianity and patriotism are incompatible, and those of Christianity are quite inadequate for the present crisis. Therefore patriotism is much nobler and not only should but will supplant Christianity. The only living faith, so he says, is that of devotion to one’s country. For that men will sacrifice. “Certainly,” says Loisy, “it is an august life for which a man will sacrifice his own without grudging it; but it is not for a blessed immortality in the company of Christ and the saints; it is for the life of the country.”[16] This account of what Loisy says is set down here not so much because it gives an idea of patriotism, but because through it Loisy passionately expresses his own ideal. In his book there breathes a most intense love for France. This love, he says, is the absorbing passion of the people of France, and is what unites them. Again we quote his own words: “There are a faith and love in which it [the army] is unanimous [as against the lack of unanimity in Christianity]: the love of our country, and an imperishable belief in her future; over these sentiments, all are in communion, and the whole country agrees with the army. Here is our common religion: one which has no unbelievers; in which those who are faithful to the old creed may fraternize indiscriminately with the adherents of the newer principles.... Differences [of religion] count no longer in face of the absorbing interest, the burning passion, the true religion, both of this and of every moment, namely devotion to the immortality of France.”[17] “So long as we live, we are determined to live in our own way; and that which gives us our vigour now against the invader is neither a lust of conquest, nor the hate which an unjust, cruel, and fanatical enemy deserves, but the love of our ancient France, who is our all, whom we yearn to preserve, and whom we are vowed to save.”[18] Here is a devotion which amounts to a religion, and it furnishes an example of the working of the religious impulse in patriotism.

It is not yet time to draw final conclusions, but it is not out of place to note in passing that patriotism was not condemned by its egoistic ingredients, and is not now justified by its elements of altruism. Viewed as a religion, one may say that it is too likely to become fanatical. The willingness to die upon the battlefield, rather than goodness, becomes the final test of the desirable citizen. Moreover, the injury worked upon others is apt to be overlooked. As a religion, patriotism has the strength, but not the necessary universality. What it does is wrongly to elevate _a good_ to the standard of _the Good_.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPULSES OF ANTIPATHY

The impulses of antipathy have played an important role in the development of patriotism. When one becomes aware of the existence of other peoples unlike himself, the sense of difference which arises is liable to take on the character of a strong and active aversion to and depreciation of them. Nothing is more common than the feeling that one's own people is a kind of chosen race, and that all other races are inferior. A speaker who had lived many years among the Navajo Indians once said that they regarded and called themselves "The People." They were at the top of mankind; the Mexicans ranked next to them; the Americans came third and last. This was their arrangement of all the peoples that they knew. The same attitude appears in civilized man. He is characterized by self-satisfaction, and the peculiarities of others, even of dialect and pronunciation, are enough to call forth contempt and ridicule. It follows that strangers can easily be enemies. In Latin, the word _hostis_ which at first meant simply _stranger_ or _foreigner_ came later to mean _enemy_. The words of Loisy are again appropriate: "In the lower stages of human evolution, a foreigner is not far from being an enemy, if he be not one actually. In the higher stages of our evolution, among people who think they are really civilized, he still seems in practice to be of another species, because he has a different mentality, and unusual ways. Each separate human group has thus a fashion of collective egoism, whence comes self-satisfaction, a pride which may possess dignity, which may be a power, but which also may become a source of blindness and wickedness."[19] This antipathy to foreigners has been strong even when other forces appeared to be in the ascendancy. Such was the case, for instance, when religion seemed to have the center of the stage; nationalistic jealousy was a factor in the movements which centered about Wiclif, Huss, Luther, Henry VIII, and John Knox. These men could all count upon antipathy to foreigners. And the same antipathy shows itself today in the fact that the peoples of different nations not only hate the enemy, but also show a lack of solicitude about their allies. In the outcry for increased production in the spring of 1917, some individuals expressed themselves as being ready to plant for American consumption, but unwilling that any of the products should go to foreigners. And the "foreigners" that were in mind in some instances were the Canadians, our next-door neighbors. It may be added, however, that it does not seem as if there is in race hatred any insurmountable obstacles to overcoming it. Races which are thrown into contact become accustomed to one another, and are able to live in harmony.

The form assumed by the general impulse of aversion or antipathy may be either defensive or aggressive, and may tend toward either self-preservation or self-assertion. There are nations which of their own motion will not be warlike, but in which the warlike temper will flare up when they are once attacked. In such nations patriotism has been associated with the fight for freedom. Sometimes it seems as if the definition of the patriot was that he was one who defended his country's liberty. This love of freedom is featured in American expressions of patriotism. A verse from "Hail, Columbia," will serve as an example:

"Immortal patriots! rise once more:
Defend your rights, defend your shore:
Let no rude foe with impious hand
Let no rude foe with impious hand

Invade the shrine where sacred lies
Of toil and blood the well-earned prize."

The call in this verse is that for defense.

There is an instinct that attends this impulse to self-preservation that strikes one forcibly as being prominent in the patriotism of the present time, and that is fear. It is an impulse that manifests itself when one's existence or vital interests are threatened. The peoples of the world today are in an excitement of fear because each one of them believes that national existence and the personal values that depend upon it are endangered. There is a reason why it is easy for nations, while trusting in their own good intentions, to be suspicious of one another. When the individual looks at his own country, he is likely to see the common people who are all about him and are like himself. And, since he feels that his own purposes are good, he can easily credit good motives to his fellow-citizens. But when, on the other hand, he looks into another country, he is likely to see the governing class looming up, since that is the class that figures most prominently in the newspapers. And it is this class which is likely to be most aggressively nationalistic, and is, moreover, the object of very little understanding by the ordinary man. Hence, while he thinks that all the good people that he knows cannot comprise anything that is inhuman, he can believe that there may very well be foreign monsters. The result is fear, fear of other countries, a fear that breaks out into a panic when danger arises, and drives men to seek the safety of the fatherland. Now the present is a time of panic, and the impulse of fear has put its impress deep upon current patriotism.

But what is feared tends to become hated too, and so patriotism gets tinged with hate. Examples of it are at hand. This war has produced its "Hymn of Hate," so labeled, and others not so labeled. Many of the Psalms are expressions of patriotic hate, and since the war began have been read as such. J. M. Robertson[20] contends that patriotism is nothing else but fear and hatred. To his mind patriotism is not love or affection at all, and the only apparent affection there may be, is that which is compelled by the necessity for common action against an enemy. Fear itself, Robertson points out, implies a hostile impulse; love and hate, cohesion and repulsion, are to him strictly correlative terms; there is no love which is not linked with hate. "It is not," he says, "brotherhood, or sympathy, or goodwill that unites the general population in a flush of passion against another population: the ostensible brotherhood of the moment is merely a passing product of the union of egoisms."[21]

It is certain that in great measure Robertson is right. But one may well doubt the truth of the assertion that it is necessary to hate in order to love. It is not necessary to hate one woman in order to love another, or to have an enemy in order to possess a friend. Neither does it seem essential in the nature of things to hate one country in order to be able to love another. Moreover, hatred is not unqualifiedly a term of opprobrium. How can one rightly care for anything without in some way resenting attacks upon it? There are such things as righteous wrath and righteous hatred if they be directed against what is evil.

These remarks upon fear and hatred throw further light upon some of the phenomena of patriotism already touched upon. One can better understand now the frantic excitement that often attends a national crisis; fear "more than ... any other instinct, tends to bring to an end at once all other mental activity, riveting the attention upon its object to the exclusion of all others."[22] New light is thrown upon the solidarity the group shows. Under the stimulus of fear, the herd instinctively unites. Unity is the basis of morale. And the individual subordinates himself to the group; his normal intolerance of isolation is heightened in the presence of fear. And a corollary of all this is that the

patriotism of fear is destructive of thought, but is prolific in unity of emotion and action.

Self-assertion is an attitude which under the conflict of interests with others may be induced. And in the external affairs of nations, it may be brought to triumph over the motive of security. The means by which this is done is through the argument that only by taking an aggressive part can one defend himself, the argument in other words, that the best defense is a good offense. The result is that the distinction between defensive and offensive warfare is liable to be obliterated, a fact which adds to the perplexities of the problem of war. “The feeling that war is always defensive wrecks the peace propaganda. The word defensive is capable of being stretched indefinitely. It is not confined necessarily to preventing an invasion. A people will feel that it is fighting a defensive war if it attacks a nation which may attack it in the future.... Or the people may feel that what it regards as its legitimate expansion is being thwarted.... So by imperceptible gradations every war can be justified, and, as a matter of fact, is justified as defensive.”[23] When once a war is started, a people will support it, even if it is aggressive, and if one couples with this the fact that when a nation arms in self-defense, it acquires the means of aggression, he can understand how easily a patriotism which supports only a policy of self-preservation can be brought to support a policy of self-assertion.

One way in which the will to self-assertion is likely to manifest itself is as an impulse to expansion. A stationary condition is not satisfactory to the group; it desires to reach out. This impulse shows itself in churches and orders of all kinds by the constant demand for new members. The group wants to see itself grow. But if nations grow, they are apt to think that they need more land. And when this occurs their patriotism will attach itself to the desire for expansion, and become imperialism. J. M. Robertson couples the words _Patriotism and Empire_ in the title of a book, and in that book he says, “Patriotism conventionally defined as the love of country, ... turns out rather obviously to stand for love of more country.”[24] And where there is coupled with this the impulse of acquisition, it becomes plain why the economic rivalry of nations has been so important in bringing about the situation out of which war arises.

The impulse of expansion undergoes but a slight change to become the will to domination. This latter is a primitive impulse. The Indian was taught to despise manual labor, but to glory in the overcoming and plundering of other tribes. It is still dominant in the race. What men desire, at least in the Western world, is power, and they would rather exercise dominion over others than be free themselves. Goethe puts the idea in poetical form:

> “How often has it arisen! Yes, and it will arise
> Ever and evermore! No man yields sovereignty
> Unto his fellow: none will yield to him
> Who won the power by force, and by force keeps his hold.
> For man, who cannot rule his own unruly heart,
> Is hot to rule his neighbor, bind him to his will.”[25]

The desire for dominion was awakened by the Napoleonic aggressions, and has played a great part in fanning the flame of nationalism in the nineteenth century. It has given nationalism an aggressive and militant character. And the people of a democratic country are not immune from the virus; they as well as kings sometimes give themselves up to the thirst for domination, a fact which has at least some bearing upon whether or not democracy will make the world safe. The citizen rarely disputes the external sovereignty of his country. Consequently the fact of internal democracy by no means gives assurance that a country will uniformly abstain from assuming the attitude of a dynastic state when

it faces the world. Democracy often ceases at the water's edge.

Pride is a part of patriotism. Men walk with heads up and chests out at the consciousness of belonging to a conquering or respected nation. The triumphal processions of the Romans were a spectacle that no doubt stirred patriotism of this variety in noble Roman hearts. They could "point with pride" to their glory. And a little touch of glory makes the whole world kin; modern men in their swelling national pride are of the same stock as the ancient men of Rome. Men now identify themselves with their group, and feel that along with it, they themselves rise or fall in importance. If the country submits to another's will, they hang their heads in shame; if it imposes upon another its own will, they hold their heads high. An important practical consequence of national pride is that no people now would voluntarily consent to peace without honor, which is food for thought in the planning of peace.

The patriotism of pride is not loath to meet its adversary upon the field of honor. When nations have a lively sense of power and prestige, a situation is created which furnishes admirable fuel for trouble. For insecure pride will induce fear, and fearful pride will allow no nation to do other than to resent insults, real or supposed, promptly and bitterly. Material interests need not clash in order that a war be provoked. If the patriot says to himself that the country's honor has been assailed, the fight is on, no matter what the insult may consist in; it may have to do with only a matter of mere punctilio. An insult has been offered, and injured pride does not enjoy itself until it reaps revenge. Of course the crime is that the insult is a public one. "The act that, more certainly than any other, provokes vengeful emotion is the public insult, which, if not immediately resented, lowers one in the eyes of one's fellows. Such an insult calls out one's positive self-feeling, with its impulse to assert oneself and to make good one's value and power in the public eye."[26]

But it does not happen that any one country is allowed to assert itself without opposition. Others will follow the example, attempt to assert themselves, and make good their prestige. What then happens is that there is a race for power, and patriotism becomes a spirit of rivalry or emulation.[27] The fact is that what most of us desire is not only well-being but prestige, not only the _Good_, but the _Better_ or the _Best_. Athletic contests are invested with such great interest not only because they may be good games, but because they are _contests_, contests perhaps between traditional rivals, or are for the championship of this, that, or the other. It is likewise with countries. National welfare is viewed at the present time very largely as a competitive success. And affairs have come to such a condition that no one country dares to let up in its vigilance in the universal competition. Individually it is helpless. If it relaxes, its competitor will monopolize all the advantages, its own prestige will be lowered, and it will be inviting aggression in which it will be preyed upon. There doesn't seem to be much help for the situation except in the concerted action of nations. But in the meanwhile the struggle goes on, and patriots throw themselves into the spirit of it with abandon.

It should be said that it is not inevitable that the impulse of rivalry should issue exclusively in destructive conflict. One does not need to destroy his competitor in order that he himself should be benefited, and in fact enlightened competition does desire the preservation and welfare of the competitors. One way in which the emulative impulse differs from the combative impulse, for instance, is just this, that it does seek to preserve a defeated competitor. The possibility is, then, that patriotism may be sublimated into a higher and more innocent form of rivalry than what we have at present.

We have, however, to deal with the present fact that the rivalry of nations is likely to issue in war. And hence it becomes necessary to

take into consideration the impulse of pugnacity. The plain fact is that war has a fascination. Even if one's own country be not involved, one turns eagerly to the war news in the daily papers. History is the history of wars. The attractiveness of war is expressed in the following verse of Richard Le Gallienne:

> "War
> I abhor
> And yet how sweet
> The sound along the marching street
> Of drum and fife! and I forget
> Wet eyes of widows, and forget
> Broken old mothers, and the whole
> Dark butchery without a soul."

There is that about the martial life which excites enthusiasm, and that enthusiasm gets connected with patriotism. Patriotism runs at high tide in war times.[28]

And now, does the presence of the instinct of pugnacity compel at once an unfavorable verdict on patriotism? There is no doubt that pugnacity may lead to what is undesirable; it does become "dark butchery without a soul." Is patriotism for that to be condemned? In answer to this two things may be said. To begin with, militancy may be a good, and can no more be condemned in the abstract than can pacifism. There is no ground for saying that pacifism is a virtue in itself. One might be pacifistic simply because he did not care about his fellow men, or simply because he was afraid to fight. Nonresistance is indeed under some conditions a good, and so is the impulse of pugnacity. Totally devoid of it, neither the individual nor the nation can live in other than pusillanimous cowardice; their ideals will not be much, and from them shall be taken even the little that they have. In the second place, patriotism does not issue exclusively in war. It has already been shown that it has a positive character of attachment, and may develop without reference to war, but wholly with reference to the pursuits of peace.

The analysis of the impulses of patriotism has emphasized the truth of a proposition that was stated at the beginning; patriotism is a complex phenomenon. It is, as it actually appears, composed of a wide variety of impulses, which appear in shifting combinations,