IS893: Advanced Software Security

9. Constraint-based Analysis

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Constraint-based Analysis

- A specialized framework: static analysis by monotonic closure
- Static analysis = setting up initial facts + collecting new facts by rules
- Assumption 1: there are only a finite number of facts
 - E.g., Points-to, dynamic jump targets
- Assumption 2: the abstract domain is the power set of facts
 - E.g., Set of pointers, set of target addresses

Case Study 1: Pointer Analysis

- Goal: the set of locations that each pointer may store globally
 - Computing "points-to" facts between two variables
 - $a \rightarrow b$: "a points to b"
- Example:

$$C \rightarrow L := R$$
 $\mid C; C$
 $\mid \text{while } B C$
 $L \rightarrow x \mid *x$
 $R \rightarrow x \mid *x \mid \&x$
 $B \quad \text{boolean expressions}$

```
x = &a;
y = &x;
while (*) {
   *y = &b;
}
*x = *y
```

All possible points-to facts

$$\{x\rightarrow a, y\rightarrow x, x\rightarrow b, a\rightarrow a, b\rightarrow b, a\rightarrow b, b\rightarrow a\}$$

Inference Rules

- Methods to derive new facts from known facts (i.e., derivable = provable)
- Notation of inference rule:

$$\frac{P_1 \cdots P_n}{P} \text{ premise(s)} \qquad \frac{human(x) \Longrightarrow mortal(x)}{mortal(s)}$$

- Inference rule with zero premise is called an axiom
- Examples: inference rules of propositional logic

$$\frac{A}{\text{true}} \quad \frac{A}{A \wedge B} \quad \frac{B}{A} \quad \frac{A \wedge B}{A} \quad \frac{A \wedge B}{B} \quad \frac{A}{A \vee B} \quad \frac{B}{A \vee B} \quad \frac{A}{B} \quad \frac{B}{B} \quad \frac{A}{B} \quad \frac{B}{B} \quad \frac{A}{B} \quad \frac{B}{B} \quad \frac{B}{B}$$

Rules for Pointer Analysis

- The rule has the following form $\frac{C \quad i_1 \cdots i_k}{j}$
 - Premises: the program has component C and the current set has $i_1 \cdots i_k$
 - Conclusion: j is derivable (so, add j to the set)

Base case (collecting initial facts)

$$\frac{x := \& y}{x \to y}$$

Inductive cases (deriving new facts)

Closure

- Static analysis result = a closure of rules = a fixed point of rules
- Fixed point iteration:
 - 1. Start from the initial facts
 - 2. Apply rules and collect more facts
 - 3. Repeat until no more new facts are generated

```
x = &a;
y = &x;
white (*) {
   *y = &b;
}
*x = *y
```

$$\frac{x := \& y}{x \to y}$$

$$\{x\rightarrow a, y\rightarrow x\}$$

Apply the rules to the known facts

$$\{x\rightarrow a, y\rightarrow x, x\rightarrow b\}$$

$$\frac{x := \& y}{x \to y}$$

$$\frac{x := y \quad y \to z}{x \to z} \qquad \frac{*x := y \quad x \to w \quad y \to z}{w \to z} \qquad \frac{*x := \&y \quad x \to w}{w \to y}$$

$$\frac{x := *y \quad y \to z \quad z \to w}{x \to w} \qquad \frac{*x := *y \quad x \to w \quad y \to z \quad z \to v}{w \to v}$$

Repeat until reaching a fixed point

$$\{x\rightarrow a, y\rightarrow x, x\rightarrow b, a\rightarrow a, b\rightarrow b, a\rightarrow b, b\rightarrow a\}$$

Case Study 2: Taint Analysis

- Goal: find an unsanitized information flow from a source point to a sink point
 - Source: read untrustworthy inputs (taint)
 - Sanitizer: neutralize malicious inputs
 - Sink: safety- / security-critical points
- Compute def-use facts between two variables
 - $a \rightarrow b$: "the value of a is used to define the value of b w/o sanitization"
- Applications: format string attack, code injection attack, etc

Rules for Taint Analysis

Base cases (collecting initial facts)

Inductive cases (deriving new facts)

```
1: x = source();
2: y = x;
3: if(*) {
4:    z = sanitize(y);
5: } else {
6:    sink(y);
7: }
8: sink(z);
```

$$\frac{l:x:=E}{\mathsf{Def}(l,x)} \ \frac{l:E:=y}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)} \ \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{source}()}{\mathsf{Src}(l)}$$

$$\frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{San}(l)} \ \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)}$$

$$\frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Sink}(l)} \ \frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,x)}$$

{
$$Def(1,x)$$
, $Src(1,x)$, $Def(2,y)$, $Use(2,x)$ }

$$\frac{l:x:=E}{\mathsf{Def}(l,x)} \ \frac{l:E:=y}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)} \ \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{source}()}{\mathsf{Src}(l)}$$

$$\frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{San}(l)} \ \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)}$$

$$\frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Sink}(l)} \ \frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,x)}$$

{
$$Def(1,x)$$
, $Src(1,x)$, $Def(2,y)$, $Use(2,x)$, $Def(4,z)$, $Use(4,y)$, $San(4)$ }

```
1: x = source();
2: y = x;
3: if(*) {
4: z = sanitize(y);
5: } else {
6: (sink(y);
7: }
8: sink(z);
```

$$\frac{l:x:=E}{\mathsf{Def}(l,x)} \frac{l:E:=y}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)} \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{source}()}{\mathsf{Src}(l)}$$

$$\frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{San}(l)} \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)}$$

$$\frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Sink}(l)} \frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,x)}$$

```
1: x = source();
2: y = x;
3: if(*) {
4: z = sanitize(y);
5: } else {
6: sink(y);
7: }
8: sink(z);
```

$$\frac{l:x:=E}{\mathsf{Def}(l,x)} \frac{l:E:=y}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)} \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{source}()}{\mathsf{Src}(l)}$$

$$\frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{San}(l)} \frac{l:x:=\mathsf{sanitize}(\mathsf{y})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,y)}$$

$$\frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Sink}(l)} \frac{l:sink(\mathsf{x})}{\mathsf{Use}(l,x)}$$

```
1: x = source();
2: y = x;
                                               \mathsf{Def}(l_1,x) \quad \mathsf{Use}(l_2,x)
                                                                                   \mathsf{Src}(l_1) \quad \mathsf{Edge}(l_1, l_2)
                                                                                                                     \mathsf{Path}(l_1, l_2) \quad \neg \mathsf{San}(l_2)
                                                                                                                                                        \mathsf{Edge}(l_2, l_3)
3: if(*) {
                                                                                                                                       \mathsf{Path}(l_1, l_3)
                                                       \mathsf{Edge}(l_1, l_2)
                                                                                          \mathsf{Path}(l_1, l_2)
4: z = sanitize(y);
5: } else {
6:
         sink(y);
                                                                                          \mathsf{Path}(l_1, l_2) \quad \mathsf{Sink}(l_2)
7: }
                                                                                                 Alarm(l_1, l_2)
8: sink(z);
```

Apply the rules to the known facts

```
{ Def(1,x), Src(1), Def(2,y), Use(2,x), Def(4,z), Use(4,y), San(4), Sink(6), Use(6,y), Sink(8), Use(8,z), Edge(1,2), Edge(2,4), Edge(2,6)}
```

```
1: x = source();

2: y = x;

3: if(*) \{

4: z = sanitize(y);

5: } else \{

6: sink(y);

7: }


8: sink(z);
```

Repeat until reaching a fixed point

```
{ Def(1,x), Src(1), Def(2,y), Use(2,x), Def(4,z), Use(4,y), San(4), Sink(6), Use(6,y), Sink(8), Use(8,z), Edge(1,2), Edge(2,4), Edge(2,6), ... Alarm(1,6)}
```

Implementation

- Static analyzer = constraint specification + constraint solving
 - Specification ("what"): distinct rules depending on different purposes
 - Solving ("how"): generic fixed point iteration algorithm (boilerplate)



A Constraint Language: Datalog

- A declarative logic programming language
- Not Turing-complete: Datalog = a subset of Prolog = SQL + recursion
 - Always terminate
 - Efficient algorithm to evaluate Datalog programs
- Application: static analysis, DB, network, etc
- Popular solvers: Z3, Souffle, etc

Syntax

- A Datalog program consists of three parts:
 - Input relations: the form of the input to the Datalog program
 - Output relations: the form of the output to the Datalog program
 - Rules: the inference rules that compute the outputs from the inputs

Example: Taint Analysis (1)

Input relations:

```
Def(l: Location, x: Variable)
Use(l: Location, x: Variable)
Src(l: Location)
San(l: Location)
Sink(l: Location)
```

Output relations:

```
Edge(l<sub>1</sub>: Location, l<sub>2</sub>: Location)
Path(l<sub>1</sub>: Location, l<sub>2</sub>: Location)
Alarm(l<sub>1</sub>: Location, l<sub>2</sub>: Location)
```


Rules:

```
Edge(l_1, l_2) :- Def(l_1, x), Use(l_2, x).


Path(l_1, l_2) :- Src(l_1), Edge(l_1, l_2).

Path(l_1, l_3) :- Path(l_1, l_2), !San(l_2), Edge(l_3, l_3).

Alarm(l_1, l_2) :- Path(l_1, l_2), Sink(l_2).
```



Example: Taint Analysis (2)



Conclusion

- Constraint-based analysis: a specialized framework of static analysis
- Static analysis by monotonic closure
 - Static analysis = setting up initial facts + collecting new facts by rules
- Datalog: a practical domain-specific language for constraint solving
- Limited but powerful enough for simple properties