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Spotlight Series

Entrepreneurship

Do Entrepreneurs Need a Strategy?

STRATEGY FOR START-UPS

ROMASTUDIO/DREAMSTIME

BY JOSHUA GANS, ERIN L. SCOTT, AND SCOTT STERN

As a start-up, RapidSOS was an easy sell: It would bring 911 calls into the smartphone age. Emergency-response systems had evolved in a premobile era, which meant that few of them could accurately identify the location of callers who were using mobile phones, compromising response times and medical outcomes. The founders of RapidSOS—Michael Martin, an HBS graduate, and Nick Horelik, an MIT engineer—had developed a way to transmit mobile phone locations to existing 911 systems that would require only minimal adaptation on the part of other players in the emergency-services sector. After attracting early-stage financing at business plan competitions, Martin and Horelik reached a crossroads: How should they take their technology to market?

The answer wasn't straightforward—in fact, they identified four possible paths. (See the exhibit "The Entrepreneurial Strategy Compass.") They could be wildly ambitious and attempt to replace the emergency-response system altogether—creating an "Uber for ambulances." They could try a classic disruption strategy—initially targeting poorly served populations, such as people with epilepsy, with the intention of eventually expanding to a wider swath of customers. They could avoid direct competition altogether, either by helping incumbents modernize their operations—perhaps working with 911 equipment suppliers such as Motorola—or by partnering with insurance companies, which ultimately cover the cost of ambulance service.

Many entrepreneurs, operating in the fog of uncertainty, worry that exploration will delay commercialization. They go, therefore, with the first practical strategy that comes to mind, deriding the deliberation and planning that accompany careful strategizing. As Richard Branson has famously claimed, "In the end you [have] to say, 'Screw it, just do it' and get on and try it."

There are times when that approach works, of course. But usually such ad hoc experimentation should be avoided, even when it requires few resources. Entrepreneurs who commit to the first promising route they see leave their start-ups vulnerable to competitors that take a less obvious but ultimately more powerful route to commercialization and customers. Shai Agassi, for example, spent almost $1 billion building an ecosystem to support Better Place, his "swappable battery" approach to the electric car business. Elon Musk's more deliberative, stepwise approach to developing an integrated, highly reliable Tesla turned out to be a smarter strategy.

And that's not the only problem with an action-first philosophy. Founders are both more confident and more persuasive to investors, employees, and partners when they can demonstrate an idea's potential across multiple strategies, validating the underlying assumptions and strength of the idea itself.

Is there a way to think through your strategic options without slowing down the process too much? After working with and studying hundreds of start-ups over the past 20 years, we have developed a framework, which we call the entrepreneurial strategy compass, that allows company founders to approach the critical choices they face in a practical and clarifying way. It delineates four generic go-to-market strategies they should consider as they move from an idea to the launch stage, each of which offers a distinct way for the venture to create and capture value.

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGY COMPASS

At the heart of our approach is the recognition that a go-to-market strategy for any innovation involves making choices about which customers to target, what technologies to apply, what organizational identity to assume, and how to position the company against which competitors. (See the sidebar "The Four Decisions.")

IN BRIEF

THE PROBLEM
In their haste to get to market, entrepreneurs often run with the first plausible strategy they identify. As a result, they end up losing out to second or even third movers with superior strategies.

WHY IT HAPPENS
In the innovation space it's easy to get overwhelmed by the apparent range of opportunities. Entrepreneurs fear that spending too much time weighing the alternatives will delay commercialization. The strategic commitments they make in moving forward limit their ability to pivot.

THE SOLUTION
Start-ups can improve their chances of picking the right path by investigating four generic go-to-market strategies, articulating multiple plausible versions of those strategies, and choosing the one that aligns most closely with their founders' values and motivations.

> **Many entrepreneurs worry that exploration will delay commercialization. So they go with the first practical strategy that comes to mind.**

To complicate matters, the decisions are interdependent—the choice of customers influences the company's organizational identity and its technology options.

For corporations with resources, the four decisions involve analyzing data they probably already have. They can also quite often afford to engage in market research and experimentation along multiple fronts. And they can draw on prior experience. A start-up on a shoestring, in contrast, lacks a history and the knowledge it brings. However, that can actually be an advantage, because prior experience, historical data, and commitments that drive existing practices may create blind spots for established corporations, possibly even causing them to overlook innovations that pose an existential threat. Nevertheless, start-ups may ultimately face competition when incumbents wake up to new innovations, and they will definitely face pressure from other start-ups trying to beat them to market.

Entrepreneurs may feel overwhelmed by the vast number of choices they face, even though some paths can be dismissed as impractical, and some won't coherently mesh. Our research suggests, however, that the four categories of the compass make the process manageable, getting young companies to workable go-to-market strategies quickly and laying bare the assumptions that inform choices.

To sort through potential strategies, every new venture must consider two specific competitive trade-offs:

Collaborate or compete? Working with established players provides access to resources and supply chains that may enable the start-up to enter a larger and better-established market more quickly. Then again, the venture may encounter significant delays owing to the bureaucratic nature of large organizations and may also capture a smaller fraction of that potentially larger pie. (The incumbent is likely to hold greater bargaining power in the relationship—particularly if it can appropriate key elements of the start-up's idea.)

The alternative, too, has pluses and minuses. Competing against established players in an industry means the start-up has more freedom to build the value chain it envisions, to work with customers that the incumbents may have overlooked, and to bring innovations to market that enhance value for customers while displacing otherwise successful products. However, it means taking on competitors that have greater financial resources and an established business infrastructure.

Build a moat or storm a hill? Some companies believe that they have more to gain from maintaining tight control over a product or a technology and that imitation will leave them vulnerable. Thus they invest in protecting intellectual property. Formal IP protection, though expensive, can allow a technology-driven start-up to exclude others from direct competition or to wield significant bargaining power in negotiations with a supply chain partner. But prioritizing control raises the transaction costs and challenges of bringing an innovation to market and working with customers and partners.

In contrast, concentrating on quickly getting to market speeds up commercialization and development, which typically occurs in close collaboration with partners and customers. Start-ups that choose to pursue this route prioritize the ability to experiment and iterate on their ideas directly in the marketplace. Whereas a strategy built on control can delay entry, start-ups focused on getting to market expect competition and use their agility to respond when competitive threats arise. They move fast and break things.

Zeroing in on these two questions greatly simplifies the process of strategic reflection. Rather than seek to identify an á la carte combination of choices that are "right" for a given idea, a founding team can consider the potential for value creation and value capture from the various options that might be crafted within each of the four strategies.

Let's now consider the four.

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY

In this quadrant of the compass, the company collaborates with incumbents and retains control of its product or technology. The start-up focuses on idea generation and development and avoids the costs of downstream, customer-facing activities. The core idea must be of value

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGY COMPASS

Strategic opportunities for new ventures can be categorized along two dimensions: attitude toward incumbents (collaborate or compete?) and attitude toward the innovation (build a moat or storm a hill?). This produces four distinct strategies that will guide a venture's decisions regarding customers, technologies, identity, and competitive space. The emergency-services provider RapidSOS used the compass to explore its strategic options.



Maintain control of the innovation and find a way to create value within the existing marketplace. Focus on being an idea factory.

For example, Dolby is the global standard setter for sound technology; it licenses proprietary technology to Sony, Bose, Apple, and others.

RapidSOS could keep the technology proprietary and work with existing 911 equipment suppliers such as Motorola to modernize operations.

Create and control a new value chain, often using a platform business. Protect intellectual property.

For example, OpenTable developed a proprietary platform that allowed diners to make reservations efficiently and in so doing established influence over customer flow to restaurants.

RapidSOS could replace the existing emergency response system altogether.

Focus on creating value for partners in the existing value chain. Execute quickly.

For example, Peapod became the leading U.S. internet grocer by fitting into—and improving—the grocery industry.

RapidSOS could partner with insurance companies (which ultimately pay for ambulance services); the product might take the form of a smartphone app.

Compete directly with incumbents. Take them by surprise with fast execution.

For example, Rent the Runway challenged high-end retailers by offering aspiring fashion-oriented women the ability to rent rather than buy designer clothes.

RapidSOS could first target poorly served populations (such as epilepsy patients) and later serve a larger swath of customers.

to the customers of incumbents; therefore, development choices concerning it will dictate which incumbents are the most suitable partners for the venture.

In addition, because cooperation requires alignment with the incumbents' activities, the start-up will probably choose generalizable technology investments compatible with existing systems. Finally, the start-up's identity—as a kind of idea factory—will be reflected in its development of innovations that can be brought to market through chosen incumbents. But it will see itself as developing a small number of modular technologies that can make a decisive difference for the industry and it won't engage in unstructured experimentation with every potential new technology.

The sound company Dolby provides a quintessential example. Anyone in the market for a stereo system or watching a movie in a theater is guaranteed to come across the Dolby name. Dolby Laboratories' patented noise-reduction technologies, invented by Ray Dolby in 1965, became a global standard, retaining market leadership for 50 years. Dolby technologies have been credited with elevating the emotional intensity of iconic films such as Stanley Kubrick's *A Clockwork Orange* and George Lucas's *Star Wars*. Yet Dolby's multibillion-dollar valuation was achieved with only limited interaction with film directors, music producers, and audiophiles. The company has licensed its proprietary technology to many product developers and manufacturers, including Sony, Bose, Apple, and Yamaha.

Entrepreneurs that pursue a strategy like Dolby's take maintaining and protecting their intellectual property very seriously. Carefully conceived patents and trademarks, managed in combination with solid R&D, can create powerful defenses that allow a start-up to preserve bargaining power over long periods of time. This strategy dictates culture and capability choices: The start-up needs to invest not only in relevant R&D skills but also in smart and committed legal minds. The IP strategy has proved powerful not only in narrow cases like Dolby's but across whole industries, such as biotechnology; with leading technology platform players, including Qualcomm; and for market intermediaries, such as Getty Images.

THE DISRUPTION STRATEGY

This strategy is the polar opposite of an IP strategy. It involves a decision to compete directly with incumbents, emphasizing commercialization of the idea and the rapid growth of market share rather than control of the idea's development. Disruption entrepreneurs aim to redefine established value chains and the companies that dominate those chains. But the very nature of disruption permits others to follow. Thus the heart of this strategy is the ability to get ahead and stay ahead.

Although the word "disruption" connotes chaos, the entrepreneur's initial goal is in fact to avoid poking the beast and provoking a strong (and potentially fatal) response. The start-up strives to quickly build capabilities, resources, and customer loyalty so that when the incumbents finally wake up, the start-up is too far ahead for imitators to catch up.

For this reason, the initial choice of customers is usually a niche segment—typically one poorly served by incumbents and off their radar screen. This allows the start-up to establish credibility and explore (before anyone notices) new technologies that may have initial flaws but solid prospects for dramatic improvement. If they prove viable, these technologies are usually difficult for incumbents—whose capabilities and commitments are built around established technologies—to adopt.

The disruptive entrepreneur's identity projects hustle and verve. The start-up is staffed by the young and the hungry (and not just for ramen noodles). It doesn't fear the competitive war to come; rather, it's eager to engage. It must be lean and quick to respond. And it is intensely focused on growth.

Netflix is a poster child for this quadrant. Frustrated by movie-rental overdue fines, its founders, Marc Randolph and Reed Hastings, envisioned a solution that would leverage the then-emergent technology of DVDs. After testing their concept by sending a disc through the U.S. mail, they created a service in the late 1990s that allowed cinephiles—rather than mainstream consumers who simply wanted to watch the latest blockbuster—to receive and return DVDs that way. Netflix's strategy was to take advantage of the "long tail" of (low-cost) content and build a recommendation engine that would reinforce customer relationships, enabling the development of a new method of movie rental that would render the brick-and-mortar Blockbuster model obsolete. (Blockbuster initially dismissed Netflix as not serving mainstream customers in a timely manner but then saw the profitability of its stores drop and ultimately disappear.)

Rent the Runway is using the disruption playbook in its drive to reshape the women's high-end clothing market. Two Harvard MBAs, Jennifer Hyman and Jennifer Fleiss, founded the company in 2009 after identifying the challenge that fashion-oriented women faced in having to buy dresses that they might wear only once. Rent the Runway developed an online site offering aspirational women the option of renting rather than buying designer clothing and focused on solving the operational and logistical challenges of shipping dresses back and forth. Although the company has yet to displace Neiman Marcus and other more traditional players, whose focus is on wealthy haute couture customers seeking a personalized in-store experience, it has created a dedicated customer base that evangelizes the brand across social networks. Its extraordinary growth is testament to the power of execution in the face of less nimble incumbents.

THE VALUE CHAIN STRATEGY

Disruption is exciting; by comparison, a value chain strategy seems somewhat pedestrian. The start-up invests in commercialization and day-to-day competitive strength, rather than in controlling the new product and erecting entry barriers, but its focus is on fitting into the existing value chain rather than upending it.

A pedestrian approach can nevertheless create very lucrative businesses. Consider Foxconn, the Chinese electronics manufacturer, which is one of the few global companies that can bring new products from Apple and others to market at scale and on time. The identity of such corporations arises from competence rather than aggressive competition. And although value chain entrepreneurs are driven by the customers and technology of other companies, they focus on developing scarce talent and unique capabilities to become preferred partners.

The value chain strategy is available to most start-ups. While the online grocery business Webvan, founded in 1996, was trying to disrupt the supermarket industry, Peapod became the leading U.S. internet grocer by serving as a value-added complement to traditional retailers. (Webvan went bankrupt in 2001.)

An early partnership with a Chicago-area food supplier, Jewel-Osco, allowed Peapod to clarify who its ideal customers were (professional women) and what they valued (the ability to repeat an order on a regular basis and to schedule deliveries for certain times, among other things). Whereas Webvan's disruption strategy required reconceptualizing the entire grocery-shopping experience, Peapod's more-focused approach allowed it to develop a meaningful value proposition for customers who were willing to pay a premium for automated ordering and delivery, resulting in a profitable partnership with the supermarket chain Stop & Shop. Peapod gained the knowledge and developed the specialized capabilities with which it has led the online grocery business for nearly 20 years.

Entrepreneurs who adopt Peapod's approach create and capture value by focusing on a single "horizontal" layer of the value chain in which their expertise and capabilities are unrivaled. In probably no other entrepreneurial strategy does the founder's team play a more important role. In addition to hiring salespeople who are focused on final customers, or engineers who can improve the technical functioning of the product, it must be able to integrate innovators, business development leaders, and supply chain partners.

THE FOUR DECISIONS

At least four domains of decision making are crucial for every venture. Although any company will face additional choices that are particular to its context, a start-up that has not wrestled with at least these four decisions is unlikely to create and capture value on a sustainable basis. Amazon's story is illustrative.

CUSTOMERS

Identifying customers and understanding their needs is usually the first step in any go-to-market strategy. But the target customer is not necessarily the first customer—and it is important that you understand the relationship between the two. You validate your product by getting the right early adopters. Amazon's decision to initially target book readers was a strategic choice. Its leadership recognized that books were a beachhead from which the company could expand into other retail categories.

TECHNOLOGY

Technology and customer choices are interrelated. Amazon could have built a simple online ordering system to service existing stores. Instead its goal was to let consumers buy the long tail of books that could not be stocked physically at the local mall. Thus the company had to invest beyond transaction services to build a database and a search engine capable of guiding readers through millions rather than thousands of books.

IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND CAPABILITIES

Choices in this category should both create a narrative about what the company will stand for and communicate to all stakeholders what behavior to expect and what capabilities it will develop. Readers loved Amazon's offer, and Wall Street quickly saw how much money the company could make. But Amazon's founder, Jeff Bezos, wasn't building a bookstore. He wanted to create the "everything store." That would require that ordinary consumers trust they were getting a good deal, which meant that Amazon would focus relentlessly on lowering prices, despite pressure from investors for early returns.

COMPETITORS

Amazon defined its competition as other retailers and chose to compete aggressively by offering consumers more choice, greater reliability, and lower prices. In its early days it could easily have chosen to work with existing retailers—perhaps even defining them as customers. Competitors would have been other search and logistics service providers, and the company could have established itself as a premium service provider by adding more value for booksellers.

The start-up's capabilities must translate into enhanced differentiation or cost advantage for the established companies. And even if the innovation does enhance the competitive position of the overall value chain, the new venture can prevail only if other players in the chain are unable to replicate the value it has created.

THE ARCHITECTURAL STRATEGY

Whereas the value chain strategy is the domain of quiet achievers, entrepreneurs who choose and succeed with an architectural strategy tend to have very high public profiles. This strategy allows start-ups to both compete and achieve control, but it is out of reach for many if not most ideas and incredibly risky when it is feasible. This is the domain of Facebook and Google.

Entrepreneurs who follow an architectural strategy design an entirely new value chain and then control the key bottlenecks in it. They may not be the originators of an underlying innovation—search engines existed prior to Google, and social networks prior to Facebook—but they bring it to a mass market through careful alignment of customer, technology, and identity choices. Facebook committed early to not charging users, even though the dynamics of social media would lock them into the platform. Google adopted the motto "Don't Be Evil" so that it could achieve dominance without the pushback that had plagued other digital firms such as IBM and Microsoft. But in each case pivots were taken off the table. In other words, the risks for architectural entrepreneurs come from the fact that they may have only one shot at glory. (Remember the much-lamented Segway.)

It is perhaps not surprising that architectural entrepreneurs often end up trying to build platforms rather than products. Although platforms can be commercialized through the other strategies, if the core of a platform is closed, the entrepreneur may be able to control a new value chain.

Consider OpenTable, an online restaurant-reservation service founded in 1998 by Chuck Templeton. Motivated by the challenge of making a simple dinner reservation over the phone, Templeton hypothesized that in addition to offering a reservation platform, a successful online intermediary would have to solve the problem of restaurant-seating management. He decided to build systems that combined restaurant reservations with seating and management software, putting him in direct competition with established point-of-sale vendors such as IBM and NCR.

As Templeton recalls, OpenTable in its earliest days was "the one running wire through the rafters to get power and connectivity." To tip the market toward his start-up, he targeted the most influential restaurants first. "We were able to get the top 20 restaurants [in San Francisco]," he says, "and the next 50 would all want to be where those top 20 were. There began to be a critical mass on the website." Templeton reorganized the value chain of the dining industry so that the internal operations of restaurants were integrated into customers' first engagement with them: the reservation phase. OpenTable achieved control over valuable proprietary data on customer preferences and demand and established a hard-to-dislodge platform that is "table stakes" for a new restaurateur. This dominance underlay its $2.6 billion acquisition by Priceline in 2014.

Let's look now at how entrepreneurs can use the strategy compass to decide among the four basic approaches.

MAKING THE CHOICE

The first step is to fill as many of the quadrants of the compass as possible with strategic options. This is no simple task. It involves gathering additional information and experimenting to some degree (but commitments should be modest until a choice is made).

Particularly effective approaches for start-ups can be found in Eric Ries's *The Lean Startup,* Alexander Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur's *Business Model Generation,* and Bill Aulet's *Disciplined Entrepreneurship.* Whatever framework is chosen, however, it should involve an explicit process of hypothesis building and testing—an observation that was nicely made in "Bringing Science to the Art of Strategy," by A.G. Lafley, Roger L. Martin, Jan W. Rivkin, and Nicolaj Siggelkow (HBR, September 2012).

This process at a minimum yields crucial insight into stumbling blocks associated with particular paths within the compass. Some alternatives can be dismissed owing to lack of feasibility or lack of alignment with the capabilities of the founding team. In other cases, the requirements—in terms of capital, commitment, and momentum—will be clear, allowing the start-up to focus on them to make the chosen strategy work.

Once the alternatives have been identified, how should the entrepreneur actually make a choice? Let's go back to RapidSOS. As the founders debated the next steps for their idea—mobile-centric emergency-response systems—they used the compass to identify four strategies. As noted earlier, they could use an architectural strategy to replace the existing 911 system with an "Uber for ambulances." They could use an IP strategy to collaborate with existing players in the emergency-response sector. They could use a value chain strategy to work with insurance companies and other consumer-facing partners, becoming a feature for a corporate smartphone app. Or they could use a disruption strategy to focus on a narrow customer segment for whom emergency response is a priority—such as epileptics—and partner with patient advocacy groups to meet its needs.

For each compass quadrant the company identified which customers to target, which technologies to focus on, what identity to assume, and whom to compete with and how. All four paths looked plausible, which was a striking validation of the founders' idea. If only one viable vision of the future exists, the entrepreneur probably doesn't have much of a business to begin with.

Having several good options need not be paralyzing. Quite simply, entrepreneurs should choose the strategy that aligns best with the purpose they originally brought to the venture. The RapidSOS mission to improve services for specific patient groups led the team to focus with a high level of conviction on a disruption strategy. This commitment—which Martin and Horelik could communicate with passion and purpose—allowed them to win over patient groups and stakeholders throughout the emergency-response sector, enabling RapidSOS to roll out its technology to the broader market over two years.

The founding team does not just make the choice; it has to live the choice. Alignment between strategy and purpose is crucial for motivating founders and persuading early stakeholders to travel the chosen path. To be clear, making a choice requires commitment but does not foreclose all other paths forward. RapidSOS's decision to engage with both patient advocates and the emergency-response community meant that the start-up was unlikely to bypass traditional 911 systems—at least in the medium term. But the focus on patient advocacy groups encouraged end-user engagement, which over time generated meaningful collaboration opportunities and attracted investment from more-established players, including Motorola.

Still, every strategy affects possible future pivots, removing some and opening up others. A venture must be mindful of this so that it doesn't raise future costs but does enable opportunities to move from the start-up to the scale-up phase.

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGY compass does not eliminate or minimize the uncertainty inherent in launching a start-up. What it does is provide a coherent framework for escaping the perceived realities of the existing environment and defining possible new environments to choose from. The word "choose" is critical here: When a start-up is competing with new products in the absence of a significant innovation, its success is largely determined by how its strategic choices are informed by the environment. Among established businesses, the winner is usually the company that understands the environment better. But entrepreneurs offering something significantly new have an opportunity to reshape the environment—perhaps, as with Dolby, to create a part of it that they will own or, as with Amazon, to create an altogether different reality. Which they choose is largely up to them. Our framework is designed to help them make that choice successfully and channel imagination and commitment toward the realization of their ideas.

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JOSHUA GANS is the Jeffrey S. Skoll Chair of Technical Innovation and Entrepreneurship at the University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management and serves as chief economist in the Creative Destruction Lab. **ERIN L. SCOTT** is a senior lecturer in the Technological Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Strategic Management Group at the MIT Sloan School of Management. **SCOTT STERN** is the David Sarnoff Professor of Management at the Sloan School and serves as faculty director of the Martin Trust Center for MIT Entrepreneurship. Scott and Stern gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Jean Hammond (1986) & Michael Krasner (1974) Entrepreneurship Fund, the Edward B. Roberts (1957) Entrepreneurship Fund, and the MIT Sloan School of Management.

COUNTERPOINT

IT'S NOT ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK

WHAT MANY BUSINESS SCHOOLS TEACH HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS.

BY CARL SCHRAMM

Imagine that you're an entrepreneur at a crossroads. You've worked hard to develop a new platform, and you feel that it's time to take it to market. But the VC on your board says that your product needs at least three more months of development and that he will recommend further investment only if you define a clear go-to-market strategy and present a plan for implementing it. Should you follow his advice? Without empirical data on the track record of ventures similar to yours, it's impossible to know which course of action would be better for your start-up.

In his book *The Lean Startup,* drawn from his experience birthing a software company, Eric Ries tells readers that codesigning products with customers is a better path to success than writing a business plan. That complements a thesis proposed by Steve Blank and Bob Dorf in *The Startup Owner's Manual*: that every start-up's principal task is to search for a scalable opportunity—an entirely experiential learning process that is not amenable to a prearticulated strategy. Both books advise entrepreneurs to develop a "minimally viable product" in order to obtain customer feedback as early as possible.

Joshua Gans, Erin Scott, and Scott Stern argue that following the advice of Ries, Blank, and Dorf would usually be wrong, because the absence of a strategic framework for evaluating options leads to uninformed strategic choices. I disagree.

To explain why, I'll start by reflecting on how the study of entrepreneurship began.

THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP INDUSTRY

Until the 1980s no one really taught entrepreneurship, and business academics had no apparent interest in how companies actually came into existence. They focused on preparing students for careers in giant banking, manufacturing, transportation, and consumer products enterprises. Then came Bill Gates and Steve Jobs. Eager to emulate their success, a growing number of MBA students insisted on getting instruction in what was soon called entrepreneurship. (The word "entrepreneur" was just coming into common usage.)

The resulting curriculum, drawn from the disciplines of strategy and finance (venture capital was a new investment class), crystallized around a novel pedagogical exercise—namely, writing a business plan for an imagined start-up. Soon a format with common elements, reflecting the criteria applied by potential investors, emerged. Universities had found a new and popular area of instruction and one that allowed intercollegiate competitions of a sort. Today Rice University is home to the annual Super Bowl of business plans, which offers a purse of more than $3 million.

It's easy to understand the appeal of this approach. All of us, by nature, seek to reduce the risk of future events—an impulse that grows with the complexity of a project and the potential cost of failure. Developing a strategy and an action plan makes starting a business look more predictable and certain. What's more, it's not hard to argue that experimenting your way to success isn't applicable to most new ventures: Although the software and technology companies that inspired the lean start-up movement get a lot of attention, they account for no more than 3% of all start-ups. Launching a retail outfit to sell skateboards requires a store (or the digital infrastructure to support online sales), fixtures, inventory, a sales force, and advertising. It seems obvious that a venture like that requires a strategy and a plan.

If only it were that simple.

THE PROBLEM WITH PLANS

A deeply flawed assumption underlies the discipline of entrepreneurship as taught in many business schools. It is that a uniform logic can be applied to the process of starting a business—a logic that can be described and, if followed, will increase the likelihood of success for the start-up. But that assumption has never been properly tested: Although business historians have described the early years of a number of today's large companies, business academics never developed longitudinal data regarding how new ones come into being, detailed the common characteristics of start-ups, or described entrepreneurial behavior that could be replicated. Only recently have economists started to build such records.

Instead entrepreneurship scholars rely on case studies of successful start-ups. But those accounts are often highly suspect. Entrepreneurs don't commonly keep diaries and orderly documentary trails in real time, which means we must rely on ex post facto recitals that are riddled with confirmation and other biases. Furthermore, failed start-ups leave few records, and despite lore to the contrary, failed entrepreneurs are less likely to succeed with subsequent attempts. Thus we cannot establish in any credibly empirical way what some experts refer to as a "science of start-ups."

The evidence we do have suggests that business school orthodoxy is at best questionable. None of the companies for which MBAs traditionally trained, including Alcoa, Disney, GE, IBM, PepsiCo, P&G, Macy's, United Airlines, and Walmart, started with plans. Nor did iconic younger companies—Apple, Cisco, Facebook, Google, Nike, Uber, and Yahoo—to which today's entrepreneurs look. Research by Anthony K. Tjan and by

IAN STUART/ALAMY

Julian Lange and colleagues suggests that plans make no statistical difference in start-ups' success. That may explain why only a few winners of business-plan competitions ever actually start companies. A student who had won $125,000 in three contests, along with a tuition-free MBA, once told me that the only business he would probably ever start was writing business plans.

Nor do I buy the argument that a "real" venture (as opposed to a digital one) can significantly reduce risk by simply having a business plan. Gans, Scott, and Stern suggest that Elon Musk's Tesla was a more successful launch than Shai Agassi's Better Place because the former involved more "deliberative, stepwise" planning. But the Tesla project was really a very risky "fat start-up," requiring enormous amounts of capital. The product couldn't be tested incrementally. Apart from a huge investment in engineering, Musk had to build a complex supply chain, an assembly facility, a dealership network, and a public-private partnership to ensure that the necessary charging stations existed. To do all that, he needed a plan of action. But the plan's existence would not have made a material difference to the basic gamble. It might have made his launch smoother but would not have made it much likelier to succeed.

THE NON-PLAN PLAN

The traditional business plan familiar to students in the 1990s and 2000s has ceded ground to other approaches. But these newer alternatives don't, it seems to me, represent much of an advance. Efforts by Alan Gleeson and Steve Blank to rebaptize business plans as "models" rest on a very fine distinction. And in *Business Model Generation,* Alexander Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur propose a process that has would-be founders creating a visual canvas of their imagined enterprise. They compare the process to composing a successful painting, in which a set of specified and necessary components are in balance—in this case, infrastructure, customer needs, channels, and finances. Another framework, Bill Aulet's "disciplined entrepreneurship," prescribes a path composed of 24 discrete steps that, if carefully followed, will increase the likelihood of a successful start. In the end, none of these efforts escape the linearity of the planning process; one or more steps serve as required precedents of others.

The entrepreneurial strategy compass advocated by Gans, Scott, and Stern is more of the same. The authors argue that newly forming businesses will benefit from a systematic evaluation of four competing go-to-market strategies: protecting the start-up's intellectual property, disrupting competitors, working within the existing value chain, or creating an entirely new value chain. It is sad that 30 years into a period we might consider "the entrepreneurial revolution," the advice academics hand out has progressed no further than this.

LEARNING BY DOING

In the absence of data permitting prescriptive advice, the entrepreneur really has no alternative but to learn by doing—a practice rooted in phenomenology, the school of philosophical thought that claims as proponents the likes of Hegel, Heidegger, and Derrida. Phenomenology is a reaction to the Cartesian assumptions that underlie conventional strategic analysis—and the linear way we think about business.

According to phenomenology, people learn about the world through their experiences of it. Rather than analyze past data, they create new data of their own, and on the basis of what they discover they engage in new experiences, building up an understanding of their world as they proceed. It's an approach taken by one of the world's most successful businesses, Apple, which uses a learning-by-doing process called challenge-based learning in its Classrooms of Tomorrow project. This trial-and-error format has been particularly effective in starting app-based businesses.

It is also the only practical way for an entrepreneur to proceed. Predicting consumer reaction, a key determinant of success, is nearly impossible without trial and error, because expert opinion on what is likely to catch on consistently fails. How else to explain the 1:7 ratio of successful investments in venture capital funds, many of which have four or five decades' worth of experience on which to draw? When the Segway was unveiled on national television, in 2001, experts hailed it as a revolution in personal transportation that would change cities by, among other things, making parking garages obsolete. Venture investors showered the idea with money. Today the innovation they declared would be "bigger than the Internet" is used mostly by security guards in shopping malls.

Ultimately, entrepreneurs know that starting a business is fraught with risk only they can manage. Their task is to make decision after decision in unforeseeable circumstances. As events (often determined by earlier decisions) unfold, they present opportunities or dangers that cannot be evaluated before making a choice. Launching and managing a start-up will never be reducible to a strategic framework, let alone run smoothly according to a preestablished plan. Ted Farnsworth, a serial entrepreneur who is now the chairman of Helios and Matheson, which owns the discount theater-subscription service MoviePass, told me, "For any new company there is only one thing to do: devise a new product and just put it out there. Then you can answer the only two questions that count: Are there customers? How much will they pay? As an entrepreneur, I'm constantly relearning the answers to these questions."

Recall your dilemma as a hypothetical entrepreneur at the beginning of this essay. In 1998 Michael Levin, who had built Titan Steel into a global leader in the buying and selling of metals, launched a digital B2B trading platform. Before the launch he was forced by top-shelf venture investors to write a business plan for his start-up. But at a certain point the business began to struggle, and Levin decided he needed to pivot from the plan. He met such stiff resistance that he decided to buy out the investors to rescue his company. He wryly concluded, "Making a successful company requires an intimate tango with customers, not a tight grip on a business plan."

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CARL SCHRAMM is a University Professor at Syracuse University, where he teaches innovation. An active venture investor, he was the CEO of the Kauffman Foundation for 10 years. His new book is *Burn the Business Plan: What Great Entrepreneurs Really Do* (Simon & Schuster, 2018).

ROUNDTABLE

A CONVERSATION WITH NIRAJ SHAH, BIJAN SABET, AND JENNIFER LUM

"CREATE SOMETHING AND START SELLING IT"

Over the past decade, lean start-up methodology, which prizes early customer feedback, experimentation, and iteration—has emerged as the approach of choice. To get a sense of how entrepreneurs and venture capitalists view the framework offered in "Strategy for Start-Ups," which recommends a more formal approach to strategy development, the HBR senior editors Daniel McGinn and Walter Frick discussed these ideas with three start-up veterans. Niraj Shah is a cofounder of the online furniture retailer Wayfair, which was launched in 2002 and had its IPO in 2014. Bijan Sabet is a cofounder of Spark Capital and an early investor in Twitter, Tumblr, Foursquare, and Trello. Jennifer Lum is building her fifth start-up (four have been acquired by public companies) and is the COO of Forge.AI, a company that structures data for intelligent machines. Edited excerpts follow.

PHOTOCOLLAGE; PHOTOGRAPHY BY ØYVIND HOLMSTAD

HBR: How important is it for an entrepreneur to think through and nail down the major strategic choices before getting too far along in execution?

SHAH: The problem is that time is not your friend when you're trying to be innovative. You need to create something that's sellable to someone and start selling it. From that you'll gain some momentum, learn what the market actually wants, and start iterating toward more sales in that segment or additional segments, or more features, products, and so forth. For example, my cofounder and I started a website that sold only TV and stereo stands. We got some early traction and then began expanding into other lines of furniture. Setting out to build a full-line furniture website would have been much harder. So instead of doing excessive planning, you're better off getting something accomplished and building on that momentum.

SABET: I agree with that. The four-part framework described in "Strategy for Start-Ups" is not how most start-ups that we see approach the process. Successful start-ups come from the vision of founders and their insatiable drive to build something they want to see in the world. The path to get there is delighting the customer. Focusing on strategy can lead to a kind of rudderless analysis of which path to take. I don't mean that approach can't succeed—it's just rare that it does succeed.

Do VCs sometimes force start-ups to choose a strategy too quickly?

LUM: Start-ups are resource constrained, even if they're venture backed. They need to pick a starting point and strive for aggressive growth. It's unwise for them to keep searching for the best possible strategy, because they may never land on it. When entrepreneurs and investors work together, it's common for them to agree on milestones—for a quarter, for the year, or before the next round of funding. Both sides want to see the start-up hitting or beating those milestones. There is time pressure to demonstrate growth and progress, but I don't believe it drives start-ups to permanently close strategic doors.

Do founders pay too little attention to partnering with incumbents or exploiting intellectual property?

SHAH: The only reason that many start-ups have an opportunity is that incumbents are slow to do something. And often what you have on day one is not incredibly hard for an incumbent to copy if it's so inclined. So I'm not convinced that a partnering strategy will work for many start-ups—at least not those in IT.

SABET: The only early-stage start-ups I've seen successfully partnering with incumbents are government-oriented technology companies—such as iRobot, which found success working with the military.

SHAH: Another example is Big Pharma's licensing deals with biotech start-ups. But in those industries incumbents have outsourced entire functions, such as R&D.

SABET: The IP strategy would also be very challenging for early-stage start-ups, which can't deal with the expense of patent litigation. Companies that get venture funding have 18 to 24 months of initial runway, and every equity dollar is precious. Simply applying for a patent costs $10,000 to $20,000 if you're lucky—and that's just the legal work. Defending a patent or creating a business around one costs millions of dollars. When we meet a founder whose slide deck says his strategic advantage is intellectual property, that's a negative indicator.

Do entrepreneurs and VCs sometimes follow fads in business models and strategies?

LUM: There is some faddishness. For instance, breakout hits in consumer tech (such as ephemeral messaging or live video) can cause frenzied activity among VCs and entrepreneurs, and if a VC firm hasn't yet made a bet in a hot category, it may feel pressure to do so. But more broadly, I think what you're describing is awareness of the model companies and their performance metrics. If your start-up is in social networking or the sharing economy, investors want to see that you're on a believable, scalable path like that of the established giants, Facebook and Airbnb—and that once you've scaled, you can establish moats to defend the business.

Do start-ups spend too little time thinking about moats?

LUM: You need to ask, If our business gets to scale, what will be the most valuable proprietary parts of the company? The novelty of the technology? The unique way we acquire customers? The unique data assets we have and can monetize? Most entrepreneurs and VCs do think hard about the best way to create enterprise value and whether it will be defensible several years out.

Is it a valid criticism that the lean start-up movement overemphasized experimentation and iteration? Should founders spend more time planning?

SABET: You have to look at the movement in context. It was a reaction to the wildly dysfunctional Web 1.0 ecosystem. VCs were investing tens of millions of dollars in start-ups that hadn't received any customer feedback. Companies were spending their entire first rounds on infrastructure and web stack development. Against that backdrop, the lean start-up message—that you need to begin getting customer feedback quickly—was extremely useful. It's the right approach for most IT start-ups. But even today lean start-up isn't right for some companies. We've backed one called Cruise Automation, which has the leading technology for autonomous vehicles. That didn't yet have a market, so we knew it would be a very slow build. We believe in the team and the vision, but the technology was very immature when we backed it, and there was no market to test it. So the company requires a different approach.

Jennifer, can you describe how the strategy evolved at one of your start-ups?

LUM: The last company I started was called Adelphic. We formed it with the idea of creating a platform that could add value to both sides of the advertising market, the supply side and the demand side. When we started engaging with customers, we gained traction much more rapidly on the demand side. Since we had limited resources and had to demonstrate success as rapidly as possible, we decided to focus exclusively on the demand side. We didn't abandon our hopes to someday service the other side, but we needed to allocate resources appropriately. Today the company has a robust platform in the market, and it's still focused on the demand side.

Has pivoting to a new strategy become so commonplace that entrepreneurs underestimate its costs?

LUM: Pivots aren't easy, and they shouldn't always be celebrated. In the best cases, after spending time in the market you land on something even better than your original idea and you can successfully pivot to that. In other cases, the company may have started with a lack of customer development, the wrong team, or poor market timing. Pivoting out of challenging situations can require a complete recapitalization of your company and reconfiguration of your team—it's almost like shutting down your business and moving forward with a brand-new idea. That's tough and expensive.

SABET: I agree that a pivot is never pain-free. But if you backed the founder for a good reason, you often see the benefits of one. When we backed Warby Parker, it was going to be an online eyeglass company. After a year or so it began experimenting with physical stores. That worked really well, so now it's opening up stores very quickly. If the company had pitched us originally with plans for brick-and-mortar stores, we would have been less likely to back it. Twitter, another company we backed, started out as a podcasting company. Probably the hardest pivot we've seen is Slack. Stewart Butterfield raised more than $10 million to build an online gaming company, but it wasn't working. Meanwhile, the company had built this internal communication tool, so he pivoted toward that, and we're grateful he did. Deciding to pivot is hard, but when a founder says, "We're going in the wrong direction," we never dismiss that conversation.

But wouldn't Twitter have been better if it focused on 140-character social messages at the outset, or Slack if it hadn't wasted years building games?

SHAH: In my view, you often have to do the first thing to get to the second thing.

Are too many start-ups focused on disruption as a strategy?

SHAH: People describe Wayfair as disruptive, but I tend not to use that term. What is a disruption? It can come from anywhere—from an incumbent, from a new entry. The only question is whether you're offering more value to the person buying your good or service. "Disruption" is too much of a buzzword.

SABET: We tend to think about "market creation" versus "market disruption," and new experiences—the former—tend to get our imagination spinning. Using an app to hail a ride with your phone. Donning a headset and going into a virtual world. It's more interesting to think about businesses that deliver experiences that haven't been possible before.

What else do you wish founders knew about strategy?

SHAH: Being strategic is important, but it's best done with a very small allocation of your time. Maybe put 1% into strategy and 99% into execution. When you're early-stage, you'll learn the most by just being out there. Go do something. Have a conversation. Try to sell something. I guarantee you will have nothing to show for it if you just sit there. For start-ups, being prone to action is good.

LUM: When founders work on customer development, it's important that they focus not only on the current state of the market but also on how it may evolve. This is especially true if they aren't domain experts or don't have experience in their target market. Don't just get feedback from customers about current pain points and how your solution can address their immediate needs. Try to gain a sense of where the market is moving so that you can develop a point of view about how it and the competition may look five years down the road. That crucial information can help inform your strategy and product road map.

SABET: I'd suggest that founders think not only about *how* but also about *why*. There's a gravitational pull toward starting companies right now. The one question I often ask first-time founders is, Why are you starting this company? For me, that opens a really interesting conversation—one that's far more instructive than whether their strategy is B2B, B2C, IP, or whatever. A start-up has some tough days ahead, so it's useful to do some soul-searching, think about purpose, and reflect on why you want to do this.

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BIJAN SABET

NIRAJ SHAH

JENNIFER LUM

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