

Authentication and Access Control

Professor Stephen S. Yau

Authentication

- Authentication is validation of a user's identity
- Four general ways for authentication:
  - What an entity ***knows*** (passwords, secret information)
  - What an entity ***has*** (badge, card)
  - ***Who*** an entity is (fingerprints, retinal characteristics)
  - ***Where*** an entity is (in front of a particular terminal)



Passwords

- A password is information associated with an entity that confirms the entity's identity
- Password storage
  - Store in file
  - Store in encrypted file
    - How to store the encryption key and decryption key
  - Store with one-way hashes
    - The shadow password file in Unix systems
- Dictionary attacks
- Password counterattack

One-Time Passwords

- Password that can be used exactly *once*
  - After each use, it is immediately invalidated
- Generation mechanisms
  - Time-synchronization
    - Using a synchronized time between client and server
    - Example

      Let t_x be a current synchronized time,

      $f(t_x)=p_x$ The passwords in the order of use are

      $p_1, p_2 \cdots p_x \cdots$

One-Time Passwords (cont.)

- Challenge-response
  - Using a challenge from server
  - Example: Let c_n be the current challenge from server,

    $f(c_n) = p_n$ The passwords p in the order of use are

    $p_1, p_2 \cdots p_n$
- Hash chain
  - Using a chain of hash functions
  - Example: h is the one-way hash function, p is the OTP and an initial seed s

    $h(s)=p_1$, $h(p_1)=p_2$, …, $h(p_{n-1})=p_n$

    The passwords in the order of use are

    $p_n, p_{n-1}, \ldots, p_2, p_1$

Biometric Authentication

- Fingerprints: scan fingerprints as graphs
- Voices: speaker verification or recognition
- Eyes: irises
- Faces: image, or specific characteristics like distance from nose to chin
- Keystroke dynamics: keystroke intervals, pressure, duration of stroke, where key is struck
- Combinations of the above

Effectiveness of Biometrics

- Evaluated on three basic criteria
  - ***False reject rate:*** Rate at which supplicants (authentic users) are denied or prevented from accessing authorized areas due to failure detected by biometric device ***(Type I error).***
  - ***False accept rate:*** Rate at which supplicants who are not legitimate users are allowed access to systems or areas due to failure detected by biometric device ***(Type II error).***
  - ***Crossover error rate:*** Level at which the number of false rejections equals the number of false acceptances, (equal error rate). This is the most common and important overall measure of the accuracy of biometric systems.

Acceptability of Biometrics

- Balance between how acceptable the security system to users and its effectiveness in maintaining the security
  - Many biometric systems that are highly reliable and effective are ***invasive***
  - Many information security professionals, in an effort to avoid confrontation and possible user boycott of biometric controls, do not use them

Ranking of Biometric Effectiveness and Acceptance [1]

Biometrics	Universality	Uniqueness	Permanence	Collectability	Performance	Acceptability	Circumvention
Face	H	L	M	H	L	H	L
Fingerprint	M	H	H	M	H	M	H
Keystroke Dynamics	L	L	L	M	L	M	M
Iris	H	H	H	M	H	L	H
Retina	H	H	M	L	H	L	H
Signature	L	L	L	H	L	H	L
Voice	M	L	L	M	L	H	L
DNA	H	H	H	L	H	L	L

H=High, M=Medium, L=Low

Access Control Matrix

- Access control matrix is simplest framework for describing rights of users over files in a matrix

	File 1	File 2	File 3	File 4
User 1	R, W, O	R	R, W, X, O	W
User 2	R	R, O	R	R, W, X, O

Access Control List

- A variant of the access control matrix
- Store each column with the object it represents

ACL(file 1) = {(user 1, RWO), (user 2, R)}

ACL(file 2) = {(user 1, R), (user 2, RO)}

ACL(file 3) = {(user 1, RWXO), (user 2, R)}

ACL(file 4) = {(user 1, W), (user 2, RWXO)}

Creation and Maintenance of Access Control List

- Which subjects can modify an object's ACL?
  - Possessors with the "own" right can modify the ACL
- Do the ACLs apply to privileged users?
  - ACLs are applied in ***a limited fashion*** to privileged users, like root on UNIX and administrator on Windows
- Does the ACL support groups and wildcards?
  - Groups and wildcards are used to limit the size of the ACLs
- Conflicts?
  - When there is conflict between two ACLs, the resolution resolved by the rules in the system
- ACLs and default permissions?
  - If no appropriate ACL entry exists, the default permission is applied



Capabilities

- Another variant of the access control matrix
- Store each row with the subject it represents

CAP(user 1) = {(file 1, RWO), (file 2, R), (file 3, RWXO), (file 4, W)}

CAP(user 2) = {(file 1, R), (file 2, RO), (file 3, R), (file 4, RWXO)}



ACL vs. Capabilities

- Two different questions
  - Given an object, which subjects can access it, and how?
  - Given a subject, which objects can it access, and how?
- ACL is easy to answer the first question
- Capabilities is easy to answer the second question
- Which question is more important?

ACL vs. Capabilities (cont.)

- Authentication
  - Given a process that wishes to perform an operation on an object
  - ACL needs to authenticate the process's identity
  - Capabilities do not require authentication, but require unforgeability
- Least Privilege
  - Capabilities provide finer grained least privilege control
- Revocation
  - ACL can remove a group of users from the list, and those users can no longer gain access to the object
  - Capabilities have no equivalent operation

Access Control Models

- ***Discretionary Access Control (DAC)***
  - Restricting access to objects based on identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong
- ***Mandatory Access Control (MAC)***
  - Restrict access to objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e. clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity

Access Control Models (cont.)

- ***Role based access control (RBAC)***
  - Began in 1970s
  - To facilitate the ***security management in multi-user , multi-application systems***
  - Minimum requirements:
    - Associate roles with each individual.
    - Each role defines a specific set of operations that the individual acting in that role may perform.
    - An individual needs to be authenticated, chooses a role assigned to the individual, and accesses information according to operations needed for the role.

RBAC [4,5]

- Users: human beings
- Roles: job function (title)
- Permissions: approval of a mode of access
  - Always positive
  - Abstract representation
  - Can apply to single object or to many



RBAC Family


RBAC3 consolidated model
RBAC1
role hierarchy
RBAC2
constraints
RBAC0 base model

RBAC Family (cont.)

- $RBAC_0$: the base model indicating that it is the minimum requirement for RBAC
- $RBAC_1$: include $RBAC_0$ and support of role hierarchy
  - Inheritance among roles
  - Inheritance of permission from junior role (bottom) to senior role (top)
- $RBAC_2$: include $RBAC_0$ and support of constraints
  - Enforces high-level organizational policies, such as mutually exclusive roles
- $RBAC_3$: combine $RBAC_1$ and $RBAC_2$

Situation-Aware Access Control [6]

- Situation-aware access control model incorporates situation-awareness into RBAC

  For example, only when the user with the role of a teacher in the Smart Classroom during the class time, the user can create a group discussion



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