

In his name



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HW 1

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## 5. Part 5

### 5.1 Theory Questions

#### 5.1.1 Access Control

1. The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model is designed to maintain data confidentiality by imposing two primary access control rules:
  - **No Read Up:** A subject at a lower security level cannot read data at a higher security level (e.g., a user with 'unclassified' clearance cannot read 'secret' files).
  - **No Write Down:** A subject at a higher security level cannot write data to a lower security level (e.g., a user with 'secret' clearance cannot write to 'unclassified' files).




Figure 1: BLP model

In Unix-like systems, the permissions are presented in the format `rw-rw-rwx`, where the first `rw` is for the *user* (*owner*), the second `rw` is for the *group*, and the third `rwx` is for *others*.

<code>rw</code>	<code>rw</code>	<code>rwx</code>
user	group	other

Considering the BLP model and that the `secret` group is higher than the `unclassified` group, the permissions for the `secret` and `unclassified` files would be as follows:

permissions	owner	group	file name
<code>rw-rw--w-</code>	root	secret	secret_file
<code>rw-rw-r--</code>	root	unclassified	unclassified_file

2.

- The Linux system uses the `/etc/shadow` file to store encrypted user password information. The permissions for the `/etc/shadow` file should be set so that only the root user has read and write access.
- Users can change their passwords using the `/usr/bin/passwd` command. The `passwd` program needs to interact with the `/etc/shadow` file to update passwords. To do this securely, it is equipped with the `setuid` bit. The `setuid` (`set user ID`) bit is a special permission that allows users to run an executable with the file **owner's** privileges, which in this case, would be the **root** user's privileges.
- The `passwd` program should have permissions such as `rwsr-xr-x`. The **s** in the user's execute permission place (**rws**) indicates that the `setuid` bit is set. This means when any user runs the `passwd` command, it operates with **root** level permissions, allowing it to modify the `/etc/shadow` file. When a user wants to change their password using the `passwd` command, a process is created with the **user's** privileges. But because of the `setuid` bit, this process executes with **root** privileges, allowing it to write to the `/etc/shadow` file.
- The user invokes this process by typing `passwd` in the command line, and if they have `sudo` privileges and need to change another **user's** password, they would precede it with `sudo` as in `sudo passwd username`.
- The `setuid` bit contains a security risk. If there is a vulnerability in a program with the `setuid` bit set, such as the `passwd` program, it could potentially be exploited to gain elevated privileges, in this case, **root** access.

3. Here's some methods that SELinux can help address the vulnerability:

- **Restrict passwd Execution Context:** SELinux can restrict the execution of the `passwd` command to certain contexts. For example, we could create a policy where the `passwd` command can only be executed by users in a specific role or with specific types, which would require `sudo` to run the command and deactivates the usual command execution without using `sudo` privileges.
- **Limit passwd Capabilities:** SELinux can control which capabilities a process gets. Even if a program has the `setuid` bit set, SELinux can override this and prevent the process from getting full **root** capabilities.

- **Define Strict Domains:** By defining strict domains, **SELinux** restricts the files and resources that a process can access, even if it is running with **root** privileges. For example, if the **passwd** command is compromised, it wouldn't necessarily have access to other critical system files.
  - **Role Transition:** We can use **SELinux** to force a role transition when a user attempts to execute the **passwd** command. The user would have to have the proper role that is allowed to transition to the **passwd\_t** type, and we could enforce that only users in a **sudo** or **admin** role can make this transition.
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## Resources

- How to Set File Permissions in Linux - Geeks for Geeks
- Bell-LaPadula Model - Ilahia College of Engineering and Technology
- Using SELinux - RedHat
- Privilege escalation using setuid - Creekorful
- Linux Privilege Escalation - Bordergate
- ...