

**THE KUOMINTANG LEFT IN OPPOSITION,
1928-1931: THE LEFTIST ALTERNATIVE
IN CHINESE POLITICS**

by

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work.

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ABSTRACT

The debacle of the Kuomintang regime in Mainland China in 1949 showed that the political course pursued by Chiang Kai-shek had completely failed to meet the challenges of the time. Since then there has been much speculation on whether the Kuomintang regime would have survived in China if a different political course had been pursued by the party. This kind of curiosity has now drawn historians' attention to the Kuomintang Left, which during 1928-31 had initiated an opposition movement against Chiang Kai-shek's regime in Nanking; it had expounded its own ideological stand and offered an alternative programme to the official policy line. This thesis is a study of the opposition movement of the Kuomintang Left in 1928-31 and attempts to answer the question of whether the Kuomintang Left had propounded a *viable* alternative to Chiang's course within the political context of the time.

The opposition movement led by the Kuomintang Left started in late 1928 when the Leftist leadership was displaced from the Party Central in Nanking and its positions in the party at regional level were being challenged. The Leftist opposition movement against Nanking can be divided into two important phases. The first phase began with the "Party-Defending and National Salvation Movement" in mid-1929 and culminated in the Enlarged Party Conference in Peiping in July 1930. The second phase started with the summoning of the Extraordinary Party Conference in Canton in May 1931 and ended with the beginning of the "Wang-Chiang cooperation" in January 1932. In these two phases of opposition movement, the Kuomintang Left not only had obtained support from other opposition groups in the party but, more importantly, also had secured alliances with major regional militarists who launched several large-scale military campaigns against Nanking. In the end the opposition movement failed to bring down Chiang Kai-shek's regime in Nanking; ironically its only notable result was to usher in an era of "Wang-Chiang cooperation" in the Nanking regime which on the whole lasted until Wang's defection to the Japanese side during the Sino-Japanese War.

The detailed investigation into the Leftist opposition movement during 1928-31 has led this study to conclude that the Leftist alternative was not viable within the political context of the time. In the first place, the quality of the Leftist leadership left much to be desired. There were remarkable differences in ideological orientation at the top level of the leadership and a lack of firm political will was evident among Leftist leaders. In particular, Wang Ching-wei's ever readiness to make compromises in the

long run had undermined the Leftist appeal to the party's rank and file and to the masses in general. Furthermore, though for a time the Left did enlist significant support of the party's ranks and build a constituency among certain sections of the population, its strength in the party could not withstand the onslaught from the Nanking Government and its social constituency was at most marginal. Eventually Wang Ching-wei decided to end the Leftist opposition movement and came to terms with Chiang Kai-shek shortly after the Manchurian Incident. An absence of leadership and inadequate political strength of the Kuomintang Left rendered the Leftist alternative not viable in Chinese Republican history.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NOTES

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| <i>CC</i> | <i>Ch'ien-chin.</i> |
| <i>CCWH</i> | <i>Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh.</i> |
| <i>KMPL</i> | <i>Ko-ming p'ing-lun.</i> |
| <i>KMWH</i> | <i>Ko-ming wen-hsien.</i> |
| <i>K'u-hsiao lu</i> | Lee Ngok, et al., ed. <i>K'u-hsiao lu: Ch'en Kung-po hui-i</i> . Hong Kong, 1979. |
| <i>NHPL</i> | <i>Nan-hua p'ing-lun.</i> |
| "TPK" | "Kuan-yü kai-tsu p'ai ti tsung-pao-kao." Comp. Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi chü. Handwritten document. No pagination. |
| <i>WCWC</i> | Wang Ching-wei. <i>Wang Ching-wei chi</i> , 4 vols. Shanghai, 1932. |
| <i>YLC</i> | <i>Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng tsui-chin yen-lun chi</i> . Ed. Nan-hua jih-pao she. Hong Kong, 1930. |
| <i>YHSA</i> | Yen Hsi-shan Archives, Academia Historica. |

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INTRODUCTION

The Concept of the Kuomintang Left

The completion of the Northern Expedition brought about a semblance of unity in China under the Kuomintang (KMT) rule. Admittedly the unification was more apparent than real for regionalism still persisted in a disguised form. Nevertheless a semblance of unity was at last achieved in China after more than a decade of civil war and the KMT Government in Nanking was officially recognized by foreign powers and regional militarists as the legitimate government of China. It was also the first time that a revolutionary party was able to unify China and shape her destiny. However, it soon became clear that the party had divided opinions on how to put its ideology and platform into practice. The most radical wing of the party, popularly known as the KMT Left, was at loggerheads with the official leadership led by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking over the interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine and the official policy line laid down at that time. The Left expounded its own version of the Three People's Principles, propounded a programmatic alternative to the official line and appealed to the party and the people for support. From 1928 to 1931 it staged an opposition which aimed at the overthrow of the official leadership in Nanking.

As the title indicates, this is a study of the Leftist opposition movement in the KMT against the official party leadership during 1928-1931. To begin with, the concept of the KMT Left, in my opinion, needs clarification. As is well known, the term KMT Left was as popularly used in 1928-31 to denote the radical wing of the party as was in 1924-28. Historians nowadays often do not see the need to distinguish the KMT Left before and after 1928.¹ They tend to assume that the KMT Left in 1928-31 was more or less the same as the Leftist group in the party in 1924-27. Indeed, many leaders of the KMT Left in post-1927 were often leading Leftists in the earlier period, and the same is more or less true of the Leftist rank and file. However, despite this obvious link between the two, it is suggested here that conceptual clarity will be gained if we distinguish the KMT Left in the post-purge period from that of the pre-purge period. As a matter of fact, the KMT Left of 1928-31 was significantly different in ideological and organizational respects from the earlier Leftist group of the party. To have a clear grasp of the differences between the two, here I shall elucidate the essential features of the Left wing KMT in 1924-27 and show how different it was from the later KMT Left in 1928-31.

The origins of the KMT Left can be traced back to the Reorganization in 1924. After endless failures to achieve his revolutionary goals, Sun Yat-sen looked to the Bolshevik party as a revolutionary model for his own party. Guided by Soviet adviser, Borodin, a new political orientation of the KMT was achieved in the First National Party Congress held in January 1924. This new political orientation, officially known as the Reorganization (*kai-tsü*), had the following notable results: the party structure was reorganized on the Bolshevik party model; anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism were listed as the important tasks of the National Revolution; the *lien-O yung-kung* (alliance with Soviet Russia and admission of communists into the KMT) and mass movement policies were officially endorsed. No doubt the Reorganization of 1924 was a monumental landmark for the KMT as it signified a new phase of development for the party. Yet, inadvertently it also sowed the seeds of the internecine conflicts within the party. A strong undercurrent against the Reorganization was generated within the party and began to assert itself forcefully after the death of Sun Yat-sen. Two hostile camps gradually crystallized -- those who supported the new orientation of the party and those who opposed it. Terms like "the Left" and "the Right" were then employed at that time to depict the factional struggles in the party. For a time the two terms were used by various factions in the party in such a way that no distinct and unified meaning could be readily discerned. The communists and ranking KMT leaders in fact defined the two terms in different ways.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was the most enthusiastic and probably the first in employing the terms Left and Right to describe factional relations in the KMT. Merely three months after the First National Party Congress of the KMT, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the leader of the CCP, predicted that a division in the KMT into the Right and the Left was "unavoidable". In the article contributed to the *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* in April 1924, Ch'en argued that:

In the future when the KMT has acquired rich political experience, inevitably it will divide into the Left and the Right. ... What, then, will be the fundamental difference between the Left and the Right? We can say that those who adopt the revolutionary method will be the Left while those who adopt the conciliatory method will be the Right.

He went on depicting that the Left were those who would firmly uphold nationalism and rely upon the masses in the uncompromising struggle against foreign powers and warlords; and the Right were those who would compromise with foreign powers and warlords, rely upon military forces and use political manoeuvrings in order to obtain power.² This was the communist definition of the two terms in early 1924. It is clear that Ch'en only predicted that the KMT would inevitably polarize into these two camps

and did not as yet think that the Left and the Right had already existed in the party.³ However, it was shortly interpreted that the KMT had already been divided into these two camps. Following the lead of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, communist publicists began to employ the terms Left and Right to describe factionalism in the KMT and both of these terms gradually acquired more definite meaning after the death of Sun Yat-sen.⁴ By December 1925 Ch'en argued in the *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* that "for some time the Left and the Right have already formed in the KMT." Sun Yat-sen's splits with Huang Hsing and Ch'en Chiung-ming in earlier times were cited by Ch'en as manifestations of the struggles between the Left and the Right in the party. After the First National Party Congress, Ch'en continued, the Right gathered themselves in the KMT Comrades Club and recently the movement of the Right culminated into the Tai Chi-t'ao group.⁵ To Ch'en, the meaning of the Left and the Right in late 1925 was more complex than the one he had given in early 1924. He coined the term "the new Right" to depict the Right at this time. The new Right, like the Left, did profess to uphold the Three People's Principles and oppose imperialism and warlords, but in reality, Ch'en contended, the two held contrary views. He pointed out that anti-imperialism to the Left meant opposing "international imperialism" whereas to the Right it meant merely the opposition against those foreign powers which now subjugated China. The Right even cherished that China would develop into an "imperialist power". Furthermore, anti-warlordism to the Left was to wipe out the warlords and to build democracy in China; whereas to the Right it was to establish a "benevolent government". As to policy measures, too, the Left and the Right were different. The Left, Ch'en stated, supported unswervingly the alliance with Soviet Russia and the CCP and strove for the interests of the workers and the peasants; in contrast, all these measures were deprecated by the Right. To Ch'en, the definition of the Left and the Right could simply be summarized as that "the Left is revolutionary" while "the Right is not revolutionary."⁶ These standpoints became the standard communist view on the Left and the Right in the KMT.⁷

KMT leaders on the whole refrained from applying the terms Left and Right to the factional struggles within their party. Of course occasional references to the Left and the Right by ranking party figures were not lacking. Wang Ching-wei, Kan Nai-kuang and Tai Chi-t'ao were the three eminent party leaders who had touched upon this subject before the break with the CCP. The best known statement on this subject to KMT members was the speech given by Wang in August 1925 in commemoration of Liao Chung-k'ai who was allegedly assassinated by the Right. In the speech Wang declared in an emotional vein that:

Our comrades who are really opposed to imperialism shall go to the Left.

Those who want to live under the unequal treaties, to keep China permanently as a semi-colony and to promote the enduring influence of imperialism over the world shall go to the Right.⁸

A more precise definition of the Left and the Right was given by Wang in the preface to the *Tso-hsiang* weekly on March 1 1926. He asserted that from the “revolutionary standpoint,” only “the revolutionaries are the Left” and “the non-revolutionaries are the Right.” Revolutionaries in China at that time, Wang stated, meant those who worked diligently for the overthrow of imperialism and warlords and promoted the peasant-worker movements, while the anti-revolutionaries were those who colluded with imperialism and warlords and repressed the peasant-worker movements.⁹ Here Wang shared some of the standpoints of the CCP on the definition of the Left and Right. Few other KMT leaders touched upon this subject in such clear-cut manner. Kan Nai-kuang, a well-known party Leftist of the time, had different ideas. He observed that people often thought that the KMT was divided into the Left and the Right and that the Leftists were those who supported the communists while the Rightists were opposed to them. To him, the KMT did not have any Leftists or Rightists but only revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries. Kan did not give a definition of these two terms and proceeded to note that party members who were not revolutionary were not worthy of being party members. He saw no need to differentiate them into the Left and the Right.¹⁰ Still another party leader, Tai Chi-t'ao, popularly counted among the party Rightists, defined the Left and the Right in his own way. In his well-known work *The National Revolution and the Chinese Kuomintang*, Tai regarded the Left and the Right as “diseases” in the party. However, Tai only gave a vague idea of what he meant by these two terms. For him the Leftists were those who believed that “historical materialism” was the fundamental guiding theory in the Revolution and the Rightists were those who used anti-communist slogans to mask their disbelief in the Three People’s Principles.¹¹ Defined as such, those who really upheld Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine but who questioned the wisdom of the various policies adopted after the Reorganization were not necessarily the Rightists. Obviously his notion of the Left and the Right was different from those of Wang Ching-wei and Kan Nai-kuang.

In the official pronouncements and documents, the KMT avoided any reference to the Left and the Right in the party. Intra-party struggles were not described in terms of a Left-Right struggle, rather, what the KMT admitted was that there was a conflict of opinions on the *yung-kung* issue and a few resolutions dealing with this question were adopted on various occasions.¹² Hence, after the break with the CCP, conservatives in the party like Wu Chih-hui could claim that the terms Left and Right were manufactured by the communists merely as a tactic to divide the KMT.¹³

Despite all the ambiguities and varying meanings of the terms Left and Right during 1924-27, there is no doubt that they gained currency in the party's ranks and in the news media to describe factional struggles in the KMT.¹⁴ In due course, a handy criterion to differentiate the Left and the Right did emerge. As we have noted, the Reorganization of 1924 was viewed with reservations and disapproval from certain quarters of the party and a strong opposition undercurrent against the Reorganization was brewing in the party after the death of Sun. Shortly it turned out that the *yung-kung* policy, one of the essential features of the Reorganization, was singled out as the very target of attack by the opposition for two main reasons. First, the opposition was clearly on solid ground to question the wisdom of recruiting party members from another party with a different ideology. In addition, the opposition was really afraid that the KMT might turn "radical" because of the alliance with the CCP. In such a political context the *yung-kung* policy inevitably became the focus of attention for all those in the party who shared varying degree of doubts about the Reorganization of 1924. In Sun Yat-sen's times, the opposition against the *yung-kung* policy had already compelled Sun to explain at length why such a policy was necessary.¹⁵ After his death conflicts over the *yung-kung* policy intensified and led to the secession of a number of party members, known as the Western Hills Group, from the party. They even set up a rival Party Central in Shanghai in early 1926.¹⁶ The March Twentieth Incident of 1926, again showed that the *yung-kung* policy was the root cause for it. Chiang Kai-shek's suspicion of a growing communist threat to him motivated him to take preventive actions against them and declared curfew in Canton on March 20. The Incident was later brought to a peaceful conclusion with the communists agreeing to restrain themselves and toe the KMT line.¹⁷ Yet, this did not prevent the continued dispute on the *yung-kung* policy in the KMT. As the policy always occupied the centre stage in the numerous party disputes, a popular conception was formed that those in the KMT who supported the *yung-kung* policy were the Left and those who opposed were the Right. Subsequent events solidified this popular usage of the two terms. In April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek started to weed out the communists in the area under his control, he was immediately branded as representing the Right wing of the party, while the Wuhan authorities under Wang Ching-wei who denounced the move was at once looked upon as the Left wing of the party. Whether one belonged to the Left or the Right largely depended on one's attitude towards the *yung-kung* policy. The heated controversies in the KMT on the *yung-kung* policy forged this popular conception of the Left and the Right.

From these contemporaries' opinions we may discern that the KMT Left in 1924-27 was just an amorphous factional group. One's attitude towards the *yung-kung* policy determined whether one was the Left or the Right. Of course, in a strict sense,

this was not necessarily a sufficient condition to distinguish the Left from the Right, for other policy measures adopted since the Reorganization and issues of ideological nature were also in dispute between them. Yet, in the process the popular conception of the Left and the Right had become the handy criterion to differentiate the two. Based on such a criterion, the size of the Left wing KMT could be highly flexible. One could change from the Left to the Right overnight simply because one had changed to an anti-communist posture. Chiang Kai-shek was an illustrative case. At first the CCP grouped him among the Leftists, later, because of his carrying out of a party purge, he was branded as a Rightist outright. An ambiguity in the definition of the KMT Left in 1924-27 was always there. This was compounded by the fact that even Leftists themselves did not want to claim they were the Left. Wang Ching-wei and Kan Nai-kuang, the Leftist exemplars of the time, never tried to inculcate the idea that they were Leftists. Kan argued in late 1926 that he was labelled by the press as a Leftist but he himself did not know he was one of them.¹⁸ Even Wang Ching-wei as late as April 1927 made a rhetorical remark in a letter to a veteran party leader, Li Shih-tseng, that he did not have any idea where and who the KMT left were.¹⁹ In the light of these facts, unquestionably the so-called KMT Left in the period of 1924-27 was never an actively organized political force, nor did it possess an ideology of its own and pursue a concerted policy line. In short, the KMT Left during this period was not a faction organized by itself, rather it was an amorphous group which took shape because many party members, who shared some common political views, were labelled as such by their contemporaries.

The disorganized and amorphous nature of the KMT Left in this period was further demonstrated in the "Wuhan Government" period. Prior to the party purge, the only time when a group of Leftist party leaders seems to have coalesced together was in March 1927 when the party's Third Plenum was held in Wuhan. Of the 33 Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committee members who were present in the plenum, as many as 14 were well within the category of the KMT Left as defined by their contemporaries; and of the remainder 9 were communists.²⁰ Not surprisingly the Third Plenum endorsed a "radical" line for the KMT and passed resolutions to curb the power of Chiang Kai-shek who was suspected of "lapsing" into the Rightist camp. For the first time a core of Leftist leaders was formed in Wuhan. They were soon joined by Wang Ching-wei who ended his self-imposed exile in Europe and returned to China in April 1927. Because of his preeminent official positions and seniority in the party and his unswerving support for the *yung-kung* policy and the Reorganization, Wang became the undisputed leader of the Leftist Central Committee members in Wuhan which now comprised 15 members. When Chiang Kai-shek started the party purge and established a rival Party Central in Nanking at this moment, the Wuhan Party Central vehemently

denounced Chiang's move. From April to July Wuhan was virtually the headquarters of the KMT Left. But even at the height of its influence, the KMT Left was only loosely bound together by the only common platform of supporting the *yung-kung* policy. Their lack of unity, organization and a common programme was fully revealed in July 1927 when the Wuhan authorities, confronted by the unrest of its army and the growing power of the communists, carried out a party purge and effectively removed the common ground which held them together.²¹ Overnight this group of Leftists melted away. Out of the 15 Leftist Central Committee members, only 6 -- Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü, Wang Fa-ch'in, Wang Lo-p'ing and Ho Hsiang-ning -- continued to play an active part in the party and formed the nucleus out of which the post-1927 KMT Left developed. The other 9 Leftist Central Committee members either retired from active party politics or were expelled from the party. Soong Ch'ing-ling, widow of Sun Yat-sen, denounced the purge and shortly left for Moscow. From then onwards she played no significant role in the KMT. Teng Yen-ta, the prominent Leftist in the Wuhan Party Central, founded the Third Party to advocate a radical revolutionary line. He and P'eng Tse-min, because of their support for the communists, were expelled by the KMT. Chan Ta-pei, Ch'en Ch'i-yüan, Hsu Ch'ien and Teng Mou-hsiu, owing to their suspected allegiance to the communists, were suspended from party work and henceforward they never assumed an important role in the KMT. Ching Heng-i and Eugene Ch'en also kept a low political profile after the purge and they did not join the post-1927 KMT Left.²² The rapid disintegration of the Leftist group in Wuhan testified to the lack of organizational unity of the KMT Left as a whole and demonstrated beyond dispute that the so-called KMT Left in 1924-27 was never an organized political faction closely bound together by an ideology of its own.

The KMT Left in the period of 1928-31, which is the subject matter of the present study, differed from its predecessors in significant ways. To be sure, the leaders of the KMT Left in 1928-31 came from the leadership of the previous Leftist group. At that time the total break with the CCP did not bring unity to the KMT but ushered in a period of factional power struggles. By late 1928 Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters emerged as the dominant group in the Party Central in Nanking and thereupon imposed their political line on the party. A "deradicalization" policy line and the preservation of status quo were very much the political outlook of this new leadership in Nanking. However, led by Wang Ching-wei, a group of old Leftist leaders seriously questioned the political orientation of the Nanking leadership. These Leftist leaders were too steeped in the pre-1927 revolutionary ideals to be willing to swallow the conservative policies of the Nanking leadership. In their view, the revolutionary heritage of the Reorganization was now in danger and it was their mission to salvage the heritage. Amidst this political atmosphere the new KMT Left took shape. Its leadership was formed in November 1927

when 9 Leftist Central Committee members gathered in Canton in opposition to the then Nanking Party Central. We shall deal with this episode in Chapter 1. It suffices here to note that these party leaders were nicknamed *yüeh-fang wei-yuan* (Central Committee members in Kwangtung) and from which the later Leftist leadership developed. Wang Ching-wei was still the undisputed leader of the new KMT Left.

But this new KMT Left should be distinguished from its predecessor. In the first place, the political climate before and after 1927 was entirely different. Before the purge, the *yung-kung* policy was the central issue of dispute among party members. After that it no longer was the focus of attention as the whole party turned anti-communist. What was at stake now between the new KMT Left and the official leadership in Nanking was the future course of the National Revolution. This became the case as the Left at this time had expounded its own version of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine which challenged the official position of the Nanking leadership. A detailed discussion of this Leftist ideology will be provided in Chapters 2 and 3. Suffice here to note that the new KMT Left armed with a systematic ideology of its own was a sharp contrast to its predecessor which never attempted to define its ideological position. In terms of organization, the new KMT Left was also distinctly different from the previous one, in that it had established an organization of its own in the party, the Reorganization Comrades Association. As will be shown in Chapter 4, it was through the Reorganization Comrades Association that the new KMT Left organized its supporters within and without the party in challenging the Nanking regime. It became the most actively organized political force in the party striving for its cause, an attribute which was never found in the old KMT Left of 1924-27. Indicative of this difference was the attitude of the new Leftist leaders towards the term KMT Left. In the period 1928-31, these Leftist leaders did not shrink from professing to be the Left wing of the party; on the contrary, they proudly declared themselves the Leftists of the KMT, a practice which was rarely found among the leaders of the old KMT Left. Thus, despite the visible link that the core members of the new KMT Left evolved out of the old KMT Left and that Wang Ching-wei was the recognized leader of the Left throughout the two periods, all the differences mentioned above are ample grounds to justify a differentiation between the KMT Left of 1928-31 from its predecessor. For this reason the present study starts the discussion of the KMT Left in the year 1927 immediately after the party purge rather than the year 1924 which first witnessed the emergence of a Left wing in the KMT.

The Issues

In the years 1928-31 the KMT Left constituted the largest opposition group in the party against the official leadership in Nanking. It questioned the official interpretation of the Three People's Principles and was opposed to the policy line pursued by Nanking at that time. In due course it developed its own ideological stand and propounded an alternative programme. In short, at that historical moment there existed a Leftist alternative which was distinctly unlike the official policy course of the Nanking leadership. The choice between the two determined the future course of the Chinese National Revolution and the character of the KMT rule in China. Yet, despite this significant bearing on Chinese Republican history, it was not until the historian, Lloyd Eastman, pointing out the importance of the KMT left in this period that the Leftist alternative has begun to draw attention from historians working in this field.²³ The neglect of the Leftist alternative has not been confined to the present generation of historians alone. Immediately after the failure of the Leftist opposition movement in late 1931, nothing was in fact heard of the Leftist alternative in the KMT again, nor was it discussed in public. The neglect certainly calls for some explanation. Probably the major reason is that, the Leftist alternative programme, as it largely remained on paper and was not put into execution, paled in importance before the tumultuous political events in China in the 1930s and 1940s. The Japanese invasion of China and the communist challenge to the KMT regime dominated the political scene. Besides, in 1932 when Wang Ching-wei decided to ally with Chiang Kai-shek and ended the Leftist opposition movement, suspicions about the ultimate motive of the KMT Left in propounding the Leftist alternative arose. The Leftist leaders were viewed more as ordinary politicians struggling for their own interests than anything else. Moreover, Wang Ching-wei's defection to the Japanese side in 1938 entirely damaged the remaining credibility his faction still had in the party and among the people. No wonder the Chinese in general has accorded no special place of importance to the Leftist alternative since. Yet, in view of the debacle of Chiang Kai-shek's rule in China in 1949, an interest in the Leftist alternative in Chinese Republican history was bound to set in. Now a new assessment of the historical importance of the KMT Left during 1928-31 has begun under the auspices of Lloyd Eastman. The question of how different the KMT regime in China might have been had the Leftist programme been implemented will continue to exercise historians for years to come.

The deficiency of research on the KMT Left in 1928-31 is evident. The few articles that touch upon this subject either give a superficial account of the KMT Left in this period or deal with only partial aspects of the Leftist movement.²⁴ The only two book-length studies of the KMT Left produced by Yamada Tatsuo and Chang

T'ung-hsin also have grave limitations. Chang's work is more a study of the history of the KMT and its relations with regional militarists in 1928-31 than of the KMT Left itself;²⁵ and Yamada's work only gives a general history of the KMT Left from 1924 to 1930 and has left many important aspects of its activities unexplored.²⁶ No doubt a more thoroughly researched and in-depth study of the KMT Left in 1928-31 is needed. With this in mind, the present study is undertaken. More worthy of note is that the idea that the Leftist alternative might have changed the recent course of Chinese history has inspired the present study. As the Leftist alternative has completely fallen into oblivion in Chinese Republican history, one of the major aims of this study is to present in a comprehensive way what this Leftist alternative was. I shall primarily endeavour to let the Leftist ideas speak for themselves; thus I shall present the Leftist alternative in such a way that it is not mainly a critique of the Leftist ideas nor a normative judgement as to the desirability of the Leftist alternative in that period of Republican history. The other major aim of the study is to answer the question that most historians are tempted to ask: could the Leftist programme be implemented? or, was the Leftist alternative viable in the political context of the time? In spite of a lack of thorough research on the KMT Left in 1928-31, historians have not been hesitant in suggesting answers. Hitherto two contrary views have been formed. One view represented by Lloyd Eastman and Arif Dirlik expresses a sympathetic assessment of the Leftist alternative. Eastman suggests that "the suppression of the Left-wing of the Kuomintang by the Chiang Kai-shek faction during 1928-1931 fundamentally altered the character of the Nationalist regime,"²⁷ and that:

What is clear, however, is that Chiang, in silencing the leftist's advocacy of autonomous mass organizations, land reform, democratic procedures within the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang control of the government and army, rejected measures that might possibly have created a sound basis for a popular and efficient government.²⁸

Arif Dirlik, in his discussion about the mass movement policy of the KMT Left, also holds the view that:

Had Wang Jing-wei and his group retained power after 1927, it is possible that the Kuomintang would have been spared its isolation from society and enabled to serve as a more effective force for change.²⁹

These favourable assessments of the Leftist programme indicate that both Eastman and Dirlik are inclined to the view that the Leftist alternative was a viable alternative to the official policy line. Other historians have not been prepared to take the Leftist alternative seriously. In his discussion about the attitude of the KMT Left towards imperialism, Edmund Fung does not seem to think that the Leftist alternative was a

viable one. In particular, he states that "the Left failed to present a real alternative to the government's foreign policy" and in the aspect of anti-imperialism, there was a "lack of fundamental doctrinal differences with the party leadership."³⁰ Still, another historian, Bradley Geisert, in his study of the KMT rule in Kiangsu, ventures to argue that the KMT radicals, that is, the KMT Left, "had no coordinated social strategy, offered no real promise of eliminating burdensome old social and economic institutions, and displayed no less inclination than more conservative leaders to foist an extensive elite stratum on top of society." Thus, "while the radicals constituted a fascinating leavening for an increasingly staid and irrelevant party, their unprogrammatic approach precluded creative problem solving on their part." He concludes that any sorrow at the Rightist victory over the Leftists is ill-considered "because the KMT leftists' policies were unworkable and unpromising."³¹

The question whether the Leftist alternative was a viable one in the political context of the time has no ready convincing answer. One may argue that, if communism could adapt itself to the political situation of the time and "communist" policies were implemented in Soviet areas in China, there is little reason to assert that the Leftist ideology and its programme, being less "radical" than communist policy course, could not be implemented during that time. In this study, I do not propose to show that the Leftist alternative was viable simply because of this reason. I think that the argument takes no account of the concrete political situation of the time and therefore, it does not by itself offer a convincing answer to the "viability" question. I believe that a host of other basic questions must be clarified before the larger "viability" question can have a convincing answer. Hence, I propose to approach the question by examining two aspects of the KMT Left -- the political will of the Leftist leaders and the political strength of the KMT Left in the party and in society. The dedication and the perseverance of the leadership to its cause, the force of will of these leaders to achieve their programme, are in my opinion of decisive importance to a political faction in opposition to achieve its goals. For this reason, the quality of the Leftist leadership, the relationships between the three most important leaders of the KMT Left, Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü, and their political thinking, will be examined in detail in this study. Of course the political will of a group of leaders is hardly a sufficient condition for a political faction to implement its programme; of utmost importance is its strength in relation to the competing political forces of the time. This study will attempt to show the extent of support given to the KMT Left in the party and the kind of social support received by the Left from different sections of the population. It will try to answer the question whether the Leftist opposition movement was an opposition of a few dissident party leaders or was an opposition with a strong support in the party and from the

people. With a clearer picture about the political will of the Leftist leadership and the political strength of the Left as a whole, a convincing answer to the question whether the Leftist alternative was a viable one can hopefully emerge in the analysis.

Finally the study has a general purpose of exploring the relatively neglected history of the KMT. Recent scholarly works on Republican history tend to neglect the history of the ruling party -- the KMT itself. This is a serious lacuna in Republican China studies in view of the enormous power wielded by the KMT over political, economic and social life in China during 1928-49. It is my belief that without constructing a solid history of the KMT to serve as a groundwork for republican studies, intellectual, economic and social studies of this period will be built on a shaky foundation. With this in mind the present study attempts to unravel a segment of KMT history through an examination of the KMT Left in 1928-31. It is hoped that the study will constitute a preliminary step towards the construction of a detailed history of the KMT in the Chinese Republican period.

Notes

1. One illustrative case is the book-length study of the KMT Left from 1924 to 1930 by the Japanese scholar, Yamada Tatsuo. See Yamada Tatsuo, *Chūgoku kokumintō saha no kenkyū*. Western scholars in their discussions of the KMT Left also do not distinguish the KMT Left before and after 1927. See, for example, Arif Dirlik, "Mass Movements and the Left Kuomintang," *Modern China*, 1.1:46-74 (January 1975); Bradley K. Geisert, "Power and Society: the Kuomintang and local elites in Kiangsu Province, China, 1924-1937," Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, pp.262-265.
2. Tu-hsiu, "Ko-min-tang tso-yu-p'ai chih chen-i-i," *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, 62:495-496 (April 23 1924).
3. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, an eminent CCP leader in the 1920s and 1930s, Borodin was the first one in making the remark that the KMT was divided into the Left and the Right. Borodin made this remark in a speech delivered to the First National Party Congress of the KMT in 1924. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, *Wo-ti hui-i*, vol. 1, p.329.
4. See, for example, Shu Chih, "Kuo-min-tang yu-p'ai fan ko-ming ti ching-chi pei-ching," *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, 82:665-666 (September 10 1924); Ho Sheng, "Ho-wei kuo-min-tang tso-p'ai," *ibid.*, 113:1045-1046 (May 3 1925).
5. For the political activities of the KMT Comrades Club and Tai Chi-t'ao during this period, see Li Yü-han, *Ts'ung yung-kung tao ch'ing-tang*, vol. 1, pp.355, 398-412; Wang Chien-min, *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang shih-kao*, vol. 1, pp.129-131.
6. Tu-hsiu, "Shen-mo shih kuo-min-tang tso-yu p'ai," *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, 137:1247-1248 (December 3 1925). See also Tu-hsiu, "Kuo-min-tang hsin-yu-p'ai chih fan-tung ch'ing-hsiang," *ibid.*, 139:1265-1267 (December 20 1925).
7. Tu-hsiu, "Kuo-min-tang yu-p'ai chih kuo-ch'ü hsien-tsai chi chiang-lai," *ibid.*, 148:1377-1378 (April 3 1926); Tu-hsiu, "Kuo-min-tang yu-p'ai ta-hui," *ibid.*, 150: 1412-1415 (April 23 1926).
8. Wang Ching-wei, "Tao Liao Chung-k'ai t'ung-chih hsu chu t'ung-chih," in *Wang Ching-wei wen-hsüan*, ed. Shao Hou, p.220. Wang's saying was later quoted and popularized as "Revolutionaries shall go to the Left, non-revolutionaries shall immediately get out." See Wu Chih-hui, "Chu i chen-p'ing shih-chü yü Wang Ching-wei shang-ch'üeh shu," in *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, p.874.

9. Wang Ching-wei, "Tso-hsiang chou-k'an hsu," in *Wang Ching-wei wen-ts'un*, p.368. In this preface Wang traced the origins of the Left and the Right to the parliament. He noted that in parliament Left and Right were frequently employed to denote respectively radicals and moderates. These meanings were then extended to apply to political parties and groupings within party.

10. Kan Nai-kuang, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chi-ko keng-pen wen-t'i*, p.72.

11. Tai Chi-t'ao, *Kuo-min ko-ming yü chung-kuo kuo-min-tang*, pp.52-53, 56-58.

12. Two important resolutions on the *yung-kung* issue were adopted by the KMT's Second and Third Plenums in August 1924 and May 1925 respectively. For the two resolutions, see *KMWH*, vol. 79, pp.15-19, 25-29.

13. Wu Chih-hui, "Tsai i chen-p'ing shih-chü yü Wang Ching-wei shang-ch'üeh shu," in *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, p.898. See also Liu Lu Yin, "Ko-ming yü fan ko-ming," in Lang Hsing-shih ed., *Ko-ming yü fan ko-ming*, pp.475-476; Tai Chi-t'ao, *Ch'ing-nien chi-lu*, pp.48-51.

14. For example, the terms Left and Right were frequently used by the non-KMT journal, *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, to describe power struggle in the KMT. See "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 3.3:23 (January 17 1926), 4.9:4 (March 13 1927).

15. See, for example, Sun Yat-sen, "Chih chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui wang t'ung-chih pu-te tsai-ch'i an-ch'ao han," in *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang wei-yuan-hui tang-shih shih-liao pien-hsüan wei-yuan-hui*, ed., *Kuo-fu ch'üan-chi*, vol. 3, p.640.

16. For a history of the Western Hills Group, see So Wai-chor, "The Western Hills Group in the National Revolution (1924-1928): A study of ideology and politics within the Kuomintang," M.Phil. Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1981.

17. For a discussion of the March Twentieth Incident, see Wu Tien-wei, "Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth coup d'état of 1926," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 27.3:585-602 (May 1968); Lee Ngok and Waung Sui-king, "Chiang Kai-shek, Ch'en Kung-po and the Communists, 1925-26," *Asian Thought & Society*, 3.7:87-92; Hsiao Ch'ao-jan, "Chung-shan-chien shih-chien ti ch'ien-ch'ien hou-hou," in She-hui k'o-hsüeh chan-hsien pien-ch'i pu, ed., *Chung-kuo chin-tai shih yen-chiu lun-ts'ung*, pp.265-288; Chiang Yung-ching, "San-yüeh erh-shih shih-chien chih yen-chiu," in Kuo-fang-pu shih-cheng pien-i chü, ed., *Huang-pu chien-hsiao liu-shih chou-nien lun-wen chi*, pp.115-153.

18. Kan Nai-kuang, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chi-ko ken-pen wen t'i*, p.72.

19. In a letter dated April 6 1927 to Li Shih-tseng, Wang Ching-wei made a remark: "Where are the Left? Who are the Left? I earnestly try hard to find them." For the letter, see "Ssu-yüeh liu-jih chih Li Shih-tseng," in *WCWC*, vol. 4, pp.1-6.

20. For Central Committee members who attended the Third Plenum, see "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-san-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu," handwritten copy, not paged, in Sun Yat-sen Library, Taipei, S/O 36.1, 1:1-3. See also Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung yung-kung tao ch'ing-tang*, vol. 2, p.543. The 14 Leftist leaders who came to the Third Plenum were: Chan Ta-pei, Ch'en Ch'i-yuan, Ch'en Kung-po, Eugene Ch'en, Ching Heng-i, Hsu Ch'ien, Ho Hsiang-ning, Ku Meng-yü, P'eng Tse-min, Soong Ch'ing-ling, Teng Mou-hsiu, Teng Yen-ta, Wang Fa-ch'in and Wang Lo-p'ing.

21. For an analysis of why the Wuhan Government broke with the CCP, see Chiang Yung-ching, *Pao-lo-t'ing yü Wu-han cheng-ch'üan*, passim; Wu Tien-wei, "A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-Communist split of 1927," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 29.1:125-143 (November 1970).

22. For the disciplinary actions taken by the KMT's Party Central against these Central Committee members, see George E. Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," *China Yearbook* (1929/30), p.1161. On February 3 1928, the Fourth Plenum of the KMT passed a resolution to reaffirm the disciplinary actions meted out to these party members. For the resolution, see *KMWH*, vol. 79, pp.72-73.

23. In the Symposium on the Nanking Decade held in University of Hong Kong in August 1983, the issue of whether the Leftist alternative was a real and viable alternative aroused active discussion among participants. Lloyd E. Eastman contributed a paper to the Symposium touching upon this subject. See Lloyd E. Eastman, "New Insights to the Nature of the Nationalist Regime," Paper presented to the Symposium on the Nanking Decade, University of Hong Kong, August 1983.

24. See Liu Chien-kao, "Kai-ts' u p'ai ch'u-t'an," *Li-shih yen-chiu*, 6:153-170 (1981); Arif Dirlik, "Mass Movements and the Left Kuomintang," *Modern China*, 1.1:46-74 (January 1975); Lin Te-lung, "T'an t'an kai-ts' u p'ai ti chi-ko wen-t'i," *Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih*, 13:63-72 (1982); Wang ke-wen, "The Left Guomindang in opposition, 1927-1931," Paper presented to the Symposium on the Nanking Decade, University of Hong Kong, August 1983. Up to now only Edmund Fung has produced a more detailed examination of the Left's anti-imperialism stand during 1928-31. See Edmund Fung, "Anti-Imperialism and the Left Guomintang," *Modern China*, 11.1:39-76 (January 1985).

25. Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*.

26. Yamada Tatsuo, *Chūgoku kokumintō saha no kenkyū*.
27. Lloyd E. Eastman, "New Insights to the Nature of the Nationalist Regime," Paper presented to the Symposium on the Nanking Decade, University of Hong Kong, August 1983, pp.1-2.
28. Lloyd E. Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in war and revolution, 1937-1949*, p.218.
29. Arif Dirlik, "Mass Movements and the Left Kuomintang," *Modern China*, 11.1:69 (January 1975).
30. Edmund Fung, "Anti-Imperialism and the Left Guomintang," *Modern China*, 11.1:40 (January 1985).
31. Bradley Geisert, "Power and Society: The Kuomintang and local elites in Kiangsu Province, China, 1924-1937," Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1979, pp.262-264.

CHAPTER 1

POLARIZATION IN THE PARTY: THE KUOMINTANG LEFT AND THE NANKING LEADERSHIP

On July 16 1927, when the Wuhan Government broke with the CCP, the question of how to bring unity to the whole KMT became the immediate concern of party leaders. To clear the way for unification, Chiang Kai-shek, under pressure from the Wuhan Government, stepped down on August 13 and subsequently went to Japan. Most of the ranking party leaders in Nanking, including Hu Han-min, followed in the steps of Chiang and resigned from the Government. Negotiations between Nanking and Wuhan on the unification of the party were then actively conducted in Shanghai. The Western Hills Group, which earlier had set up a rival Party Central in Shanghai, were also invited to participate in the negotiations. On September 11-12, the majority of party leaders agreed on the establishment of a new unified Party Central -- the Central Special Committee (*Chung-yang t'e-pieh wei-yuan hui*) comprising members from Nanking, Wuhan and the Western Hills Group. It superseded the old Central Executive Committee (CEC) and Central Supervisory Committee (CSC) of the party and was entrusted with the task to summon the Third National Party Congress in order to elect a new Party Central. In the event the Special Committee did not achieve its avowed aim; the KMT remained divided and the intra-party struggle among various factions intensified in the following months.

The struggle for the control of the Party Central was the issue which dominated party politics from the establishment of the Special Committee in September 1927 to the formation of a new Nanking leadership in the last months of 1928. It was a period which was marked by a series of intrigues and manoeuvrings in the party. Three main political currents were at work in party politics during this time. The first was the understanding reached by Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek in late 1927 which aimed at the overthrow of the Special Committee and the establishment of a Wang-Chiang leadership in the party. The second was the continued strife between the Left and Right wing of the party. Personal animosities dated since the Northern Expedition, coupled with the power struggle for the control of the party, precluded unity between the two groups of party members even after the break with the CCP. The third

was the growing tension between the party and its military allies. The completion of the Northern Expedition eventually brought out the conflicting interests between the party and regional militarists in sharp relief. The interaction among these three political currents constituted the pattern of events in the party up to the formation of the Nanking leadership in late 1928. In the end, a joint leadership under Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek did not come about; in its place was a duumvirate consisting of Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min and the KMT Left was displaced from the Party Central. A polarization of the party into the Nanking leadership and a Leftist group under Wang Ching-wei resulted.

The Genesis of the New Kuomintang Left in Canton

When the Special Committee was officially inaugurated on September 15, it not only failed to draw the support from Chiang Kai-shek and many of his followers but also failed to secure allegiance from the Left wing of the party. Shortly before the inauguration of the Special Committee, Wang Ching-wei had withdrawn from the negotiations in Shanghai as a silent protest against the setting up of such a Committee. He later claimed that he was strongly opposed to the establishment of the Special Committee when it was raised during the negotiations in Shanghai. His refusal to endorse such an idea, Wang argued, was due to the fact that the Committee had no legal right to supersede the old CEC and CSC which were properly elected by the Second Party Congress.¹ A more likely reason for his refusal to support the Special Committee was that the power distribution in the new Party Central was unfavourable to the Left. Members from Nanking and the Western Hills Group sitting on the Committee shared a similar political outlook and they outnumbered those Leftists on the Committee.² Negotiations in Shanghai in fact had foreshadowed an alliance of conservative forces in the party against the Left -- the Special Committee solution which the Leftist leaders held some reservations was enthusiastically endorsed by the Western Hills Group, the Kwangsi Clique and a number of leading party figures in Nanking. Therefore, Wang decided not to recognize the Committee; by default, the Western Hills Group, backed by Li Tsung-jen, the leader of the Kwangsi Clique, moved in and dominated the new Party Central. But their dominant position in Nanking was by no means secure because the two powerful party and army leaders, Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek, refrained from declaring allegiance to the Special Committee. In fact Wang had already started to work for its overthrow. Two regional militarists, T'ang Sheng-chih in Wuhan and Chang Fa-k'uei in Canton, both of whom were staunch Leftist military supporters since the Northern Expedition, were prepared to back Wang with their forces.³ In late September, having withdrawn from the negotiations in Shanghai, Wang immediately

went to Wuhan to enlist the support from T'ang in the opposition against the Special Committee. At the same time, Ch'en Kung-po, Wang Ching-wei's right-hand man, arrived in Canton for the purpose of winning over Kwangtung against the Special Committee.⁴ From September to October the Left was prepared to make use of the troops commanded by T'ang Sheng-chih in Wuhan and Chang Fa-k'uei in Canton to force the Special Committee to its knees. However, the whole scheme failed to materialize because T'ang's army was speedily disposed of by Nanking's forces in late October.⁵ As a last resource Wang quickly moved to Canton on October 28 to continue his opposition against the Special Committee, and a cluster of Leftist party leaders subsequently gathered there. Altogether 9 Leftist Central Committee members -- Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'en Shu-jen, Ho Hsiang-ning, P'an Yün-ch'ao, Wang Fa-ch'in and Wang Lo-p'ing -- were present in Canton. They were nicknamed *yüeh-fang wei-yuan* and formed the core from which the new KMT Left's leadership developed.⁶ These Leftist leaders in Canton made it clear that they were opposed to the Special Committee for it had no legal right to supersede the old CEC and CSC. They suggested that the party should summon a plenary meeting -- the Fourth Plenum -- to deal with party disputes and bring unity to the whole party.⁷ It was clear that the Left demanded no less than the liquidation of the Special Committee.

Personal animosities and power rivalries, particularly against the Western Hills Group, explained why the Left was resolved to bring down the Special Committee. Besides, ideological differences between the two sides also set them against each other. In fact, the break with the CCP did not bring ideological unity to the KMT. When Nanking and Wuhan had turned against the communists in April and July 1927 respectively, a thorough reexamination of the party's ideological stand and policy measures ensued. The very fact that the party needed a surgical purge was fully exploited by the Right to support the accusation that the party had pursued the "wrong" course in the National Revolution. Emerging then was a powerful backlash against the policy course laid down since the Reorganization of 1924. In the regions controlled by Chiang Kai-shek where the conservative minds were in the ascendant, a complete turnaround in the party's stand was effected. All policy measures which smacked of communist tinge came under close scrutiny. As a result, anti-imperialism was considerably toned down and mass movements were practically suspended. It seemed that all the revolutionary ideals and policies adopted since the Reorganization had been discredited in the light of the party purge and thus would be entirely discarded by the party. However, the Left wing of the party led by Wang Ching-wei held contrary views. It agreed that the *yung-kung* policy should be repudiated but it vigorously defended the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27.

Immediately after the purge was carried out by the Wuhan Government in July 1927, Wang Ching-wei did confess that such a surgical action demonstrated something had gone wrong in the party. But he confined the mistakes perpetrated by the party to one area: the misunderstanding of Sun Yat-sen's *yung-kung* policy. In a speech given on August 6 1927 Wang spelt out what he thought was the grave mistake committed by the party:

Have we committed any mistake? Yes, our single and biggest mistake is the misunderstanding of the Late Leader's *yung-kung* policy. [The essence of] the Late Leader's *yung-kung* policy is to admit communist members to the KMT for a concerted effort to achieve the National Revolution. If the communists do not intend to stand with us to achieve the National Revolution, then we should at once expel them [from the party]. Yet we have procrastinated and delayed action to purge the communists until the moment when they had nearly destroyed the National Revolution. This is our biggest mistake.⁸

Because of this mistake he admitted that before the purge the party had turned too radical and was in danger of being "Bolshevized" by the communists. Hence the *yung-kung* policy had to be discarded. However, the repudiation of the *yung-kung* policy undesirably also brought about a conservative backlash against other policy measures adopted by the party since the Reorganization. Wang saw no reason why this should be the case. He tried every effort to salvage and justify the policy line pursued by the party since the Reorganization which he termed the Spirit of the Reorganization. He was well aware that to save the heritage of the Reorganization from being discredited, he had to dissociate it from the *yung-kung* policy. On numerous occasions after the purge Wang argued that the *yung-kung* policy did not symbolize the Reorganization. This idea was best expressed in his letter to the Overseas Party Branch in France on April 7 1928:

In early 1924 when the Late Leader carried out the Reorganization of the party the *yung-kung* policy was at the same time adopted. But the *yung-kung* policy was only a temporary measure and should not be regarded as the manifestation of the Spirit of the Reorganization. The Spirit of the Reorganization of our party, is manifested in the recognition that: the Three People's Principles is the only means to save the nation; to achieve the Three People's Principles in China, its propagation to the masses is necessary; to propagate it to the masses, party members should be trained to strive for the attainment of the doctrine; to urge party members to do so and to coordinate them to struggle for a common goal, organization and discipline of the party should be strengthened. These are the real manifestations of the Spirit of the Reorganization. Imbued with this Spirit our party is given a new lease of life. Thus, the Spirit of the Reorganization has nothing to do with the *yung-kung* policy. To say that the *yung-kung* policy is part of the Spirit of the Reorganization is undoubtedly a mistake. But it is a much graver mistake if the denunciation of the *yung-kung* policy should lead to the repudiation of the Spirit of the Reorganization. This is my conviction all along and I would like to make it known to comrades.⁹

To Wang, no logical connection had ever existed between the *yung-kung* policy and the revolutionary heritage of the Reorganization; and this was a “fundamental concept (*i-ko ken-pen kuan-nien*)” which he wanted all party members to bear in mind. In another article written in July 1928 he expounded his ideas further and enumerated six main policy measures which were enshrined as the concrete manifestations of the Spirit of the Reorganization:

First, after the publication of the Late Leader’s Three People’s Principles, the ideology of the party is set forth in a substantiated and lucid form. Secondly, after the publication of the Late Leader’s *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, the implementation of the party’s ideology is worked out in detail. Thirdly, the necessity for a National Revolution and its minimum platform are laid down in the Manifesto of the First National Party Congress. Fourthly, the party becomes more organized and disciplined after the promulgation of a new constitution for the party. Fifthly, the awakening of the masses is emphasized and two slogans, ‘Unite together Peasants, Workers, Merchants and Students’ and ‘Help Peasants and Workers’ are raised. Sixthly, imperialism and warlords are explicitly identified as the enemies of the National Revolution. This enables the people to realize who are their enemies and how to liberate themselves.¹⁰

This Spirit of the Reorganization, Wang contended, accounted for the spectacular success of the Northern Expedition achieved by the KMT so far. Any changes in the party’s stand which were detrimental to the Spirit of the Reorganization were, to Wang, a total mistake. He regarded the then powerful conservative backlash in the party against the policies adopted since the Reorganization as intending to stifle the Spirit of the Reorganization. In his opinion such a tendency would strip the party of its revolutionary spirit and eventually destroy the party. He labelled it as a kind of “degenerate force (*fu-hua*)” and put his finger on the presence of “degenerate elements” in the party, by which he meant those party members who had leaned to the Right as well as those “opportunists” who had sneaked into the party. In the post-purge period, the “degenerate elements,” like the communists, which Wang branded as a kind of “malignant force (*e-hua*),” posed the same deadly threat to the KMT.¹¹ He vehemently called on party members “to struggle against the encirclement by these two forces.”¹²

Amidst the atmosphere of “degeneration” in the KMT, Wang Ching-wei acutely felt the need to distinguish the revolutionaries from the anti-revolutionaries in the party. He now carved out a revolutionary role for the KMT Left. For the first time since the Reorganization Wang in his speeches delivered in August 1927 openly stated that there was a Left wing in the party and tried to justify its place in the revolution. In some quarters, he noted, it was believed that the KMT did not have any real Leftists apart from the communists. On the contrary, he pointed out, there was a Leftist group in the KMT. The revolutionaries in the KMT were the Left while the anti-revolutionaries were

the Right. Party members who supported anti-imperialism and the mass movement were the revolutionaries (the Left) and those who opposed them were the anti-revolutionaries (the Right).¹³ In other words, Wang stated that the Left were those who defended the Spirit of the Reorganization while the Right were opposed to it.¹⁴ Clearly Wang Ching-wei was intent on salvaging the policy measures (with the obvious exception of the *yung-kung* policy) and revolutionary ideals adopted since the Reorganization from being overwhelmed by the deradicalization process unleashed after the party purge. He aspired to be the living embodiment of the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27.

Wang Ching-wei's views were shared by the group of *yüeh-fang wei-yuan* who gathered in Canton at this time. Like many party's rank and file members, these Leftist leaders were confounded by the *volte-face* in the party's stand after the purge. They still cherished the revolutionary ideals and policies of 1924-27 and believed that the only major mistake committed by the party was to uphold the *yung-kung* policy for too long while the political situation had changed. They agreed that the *yung-kung* policy should be repudiated but such a policy change should not lead to the rejection of the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27. Their ideological stand made themselves different from other factions in the party. At the time a majority of KMT leaders had turned cautious and conservative after the party purge; an ideological division between the Left and other factions in the party thus existed even after the break with the CCP. This ideological factor certainly played a part in the dispute over the Special Committee -- it strengthened the determination of the Left to bring down the Committee which was dominated by the Western Hills Group, a right-wing faction which had been denounced by the party's Second National Congress in January 1926. The Leftist Central Committee members in Canton thus represented a faction in the party with its own distinct ideological stand.

The "Wang-Chiang Understanding" and Party Politics in Late 1927

On November 14 1927 T'ang Sheng-chih stepped down from his command and shortly left for Japan after his troops were routed by Nanking's forces. Yet Nanking's success failed to paralyse Wang Ching-wei's opposition movement. For now Wang not only had secured support from Chang Fa-k'uei's army in Canton but also had reached an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek who was determined to stage a political come-back. As early as October 20 when Wang Ching-wei was in Wuhan, he divulged to T'ang Sheng-chih that a plan to ally with Chang Fa-k'uei and Chiang Kai-shek against the Special Committee was being conceived.¹⁵ Indeed, in early October Wang and

Chiang had corresponded on party affairs. Chiang praised Wang as the only party leader who could save the situation and urged him "to lead" the party again.¹⁶ Besides, T.V. Soong was sent by Chiang to Canton to contact Wang on the question of forming a political alliance. An understanding between Wang and Chiang was apparently reached in about October.¹⁷

Only a few months earlier Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek had quarrelled bitterly over the communist issue and Chiang's resignation from the Government in August was in fact at the insistence of Wang. Their understanding at this time of course had deeper reasons which overrode their past differences. To be sure, it was not an understanding built on a common ideological ground -- Chiang and Wang were almost poles apart in their attitudes towards the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27 and in mapping out the future course for the KMT. We have discussed Wang's ideological stand after the party purge; as to Chiang's political outlook at this time, it was best reflected in his various proposals for the Fourth Plenum which was held in February 1928. Like all party leaders, he was well aware that the KMT had to be rebuilt after the break with the communists. He endorsed plans laying down detailed procedures for the reconstruction of the party and various steps to be taken to expunge communist ideas from the party.¹⁸ Yet nothing was mentioned in Chiang's proposals about the importance of the Spirit of the Reorganization on which Wang Ching-wei had laid such a heavy emphasis. On the contrary, Chiang pointed out in one of his proposals that all organization work and party activities which smacked of communist influence should be abolished in order to accomplish a fundamental rebuilding of the party, an idea which could mean a reversal of policies implemented during and after the Reorganization.¹⁹ In addition, anti-imperialism and the mass movement were considerably toned down by Chiang. He proposed to open negotiations with foreign powers in a "peaceful and uncompromising spirit" in order to abolish unequal treaties. The mass movement against imperialism was not to be encouraged and Chiang stressed that it should be put under the absolute control by the party. Similarly, mass movements in general should be suspended pending the party working out a new guideline and theory.²⁰ Both Chiang and Wang of course knew only too well how different their ideological stands were, but they overcame these differences because they shared the immediate common interest -- the overthrow of the Special Committee. To Wang, the Western Hills Group were given too much power in the Special Committee. They had been his inveterate political and ideological opponents since 1925 and he certainly would like to see the power of the Group in the party reduced. Moreover, his relations with the Kwangsi Clique turned sour after the defeat of T'ang Sheng-chih. Ever since the break with the CCP by the Wuhan Government, the Kwangsi Clique professed to support Wang.²¹ However, this turned out to be merely lip service when the Kwangsi Clique initiated the military

campaign to oust T'ang Sheng-chih from Wuhan. This episode decisively alienated Wang from the Kwangsi Clique as T'ang was his major military ally at this time. To embarrass the Kwangsi Clique Wang was determined to bring down the Special Committee which was backed by it. To do this, he had to rely heavily on Chiang's influence in the army to overwhelm the Kwangsi Clique. For Chiang's part, his major concern was to curb the military power of the Kwangsi Clique which had expanded enormously after he stepped down in August. Wang's interest in overthrowing the Special Committee served his purpose. His alliance with Wang enabled him to use Wang's influence in the party to stage his political come-back and also he could rely on Wang's close relations with Chang Fa-k'uei to bring pressure to bear on the Kwangsi Clique.²² All these calculations brought about the "Wang-Chiang understanding" in October 1927 which eventually compelled Nanking to accede to Wang's idea of summoning a Fourth Plenum to settle party disputes. The Western Hills Group alone held out against this decision but to no avail. The Kwangsi Clique and leading party figures in Nanking had already made up their mind to back away from the Western Hills Group and established a dialogue with Wang and Chiang; they were fully aware that the KMT could do without the Western Hills Group but not without Wang and Chiang.²³ On November 1 Nanking cabled Wang agreeing to convene a Fourth Plenum. Subsequently it was decided that a preliminary meeting of party leaders should be held in Shanghai prior to the summoning of the Fourth Plenum. On November 9 Chiang ended his retired life and returned to Shanghai where he publicly endorsed the idea of summoning a party plenum. Seven days later Wang Ching-wei proceeded from Canton to Shanghai for the preliminary party meeting.²⁴ At this juncture, a succession of political events in Kwangtung exacerbated the factional struggle in the KMT to a high pitch.

In their original plan Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek had intended to make use of T'ang Sheng-chih's forces in Wuhan, Chang Fa-k'uei's forces in Canton and Chiang's own forces in Nanking to curb the growing power of the Kwangsi Clique.²⁵ As we have noted, the plan failed to materialize as T'ang's army was soon defeated by Nanking. Now the KMT Left had its last hope pinned on Kwangtung, a region where the political situation was complicated. At the time the Left's trusted military ally in Canton, Chang Fa-k'uei, did not exercise a complete control there. During the Northern Expedition Chang's army was always on the battle-fronts and it was not until late September 1927 that, in pursuing communist forces, Chang directed his army back to Canton. Before that Kwangtung was under the control of a militarist Li Chi-shen, who had been assigned to station in Canton since the beginning of the Northern Expedition. Li was never associated with the KMT Left and he was the one who enthusiastically supported the party purge carried out by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927.²⁶ Because of

Li's attitude the Left had virtually no influence in Canton during this time. After Chang's army was back in Canton, the power configuration in Kwangtung changed and now Li had to share power with Chang. As Kwangtung became all the more important to the Left after the fall of Wuhan to the Kwangsi Clique, a plot to seize complete control of Kwangtung was conceived by the Leftist leaders. To the Left, Li Chi-shen was never a reliable military ally. It was true that Li did not have a history of rivalry with the Left in the past, and that Li had openly advocated a joint leadership under Wang and Chiang in the party,²⁷ but all these did not impress the Left much. Li in fact was popularly regarded by contemporaries as belonging to the Kwangsi Clique.²⁸ Not surprisingly he and Chang Fa-k'uei held different attitudes towards Nanking. Chang was against the Special Committee whereas Li showed no such attitude. The military campaign conducted by Nanking against T'ang Sheng-chih again demonstrated their divergent opinions. Chang, in line with the thinking of the Leftist leaders, was opposed to the campaign while Li openly assented to it. Differences in attitude towards Nanking, added with power rivalries between the two men in Canton, made the political situation there highly volatile. Wang Ching-wei's arrival in Canton did help to mitigate the tensions temporarily as both Li and Chang declared their allegiance to Wang.²⁹ Nevertheless, it was clear that Li Chi-shen was too independent a military figure to take his cue from the Left. Distrust between the two sides culminated in a Leftist plot to uproot Li's power in Kwangtung completely. On November 17, merely one day after Li Chi-shen accompanied Wang Ching-wei to attend the impending plenum in Shanghai, Chang Fa-k'uei's army, instigated by the Left, staged a successful coup d'état in Canton and wiped out Li's influence there.³⁰ The Left now had Kwangtung in its pocket, but it faced a mounting tide of attack from its opponents. Shortly after the coup, Li Chi-shen passionately denounced the coup and the Left. Li claimed that Chang Fa-k'uei had allowed the communists to remain in his army and they were fully involved in the coup. He also minced no words in his attack on Wang Ching-wei and other Leftist Central Committee members who were condemned by him as power-seekers in the KMT. Their failure to control the Special Committee, he asserted, had motivated them to oppose it.³¹ Li Chi-shen easily enlisted strong support from the Kwangsi Clique and he also found out that the conservative minds in the party were ready to lend a sympathetic ear to his case. In particular, a group of party elders, Chang Ching-chiang, Li Shih-tseng, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Wu Chih-hui, all were CSC members, stood firmly on his side. These party elders had a moderate and conservative political view and they long frowned upon the "radical" tendency in the party. When Chiang Kai-shek carried out the party purge, they were his strongest supporters in the party. The radical posture assumed by the Left after the party purge was of course disturbing to them; obviously it was their political interest to prevent the formation of a "Wang-Chiang cooperation" in

the party. Thus, they eagerly spoke for Li's case against the Left and put forward an impeachment against Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü who were held responsible for the coup.³² The Nanking Government under the Kwangsi Clique also ordered a punitive expedition against Chang Fa-k'uei's army in Kwangtung. When the preliminary meeting of the party, attended by 39 Central Committee members, assembled on December 3,³³ polemics broke out between the Left and Li Chi-shen's supporters over the Canton coup. Only with Chiang Kai-shek's mediations could the meeting continue and hastily draw to a close on December 10.³⁴

Important decisions reached by the preliminary meeting included the abolition of the Special Committee and the summoning of the Fourth Plenum in Nanking. The Western Hills Group who dominated the Special Committee were forced to step down; besides, Chiang Kai-shek was reinstated as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army.³⁵ On the whole the Left had achieved its immediate goals; what remained unsolved was the coup in Canton. A final showdown between the Left and Li Chi-shen's supporters was expected in the impending Fourth Plenum in Nanking.

Yet, an unexpected turn of events completely discredited the Left in the eyes of the party. On December 11, the communists instigated an insurrection in Canton and took over the city, the very region which was recently brought under the control of the Left. Although the insurrection was quickly suppressed by Chang Fa-k'uei's army on December 14, the incident supplied the much needed ammunition for Li Chi-shen's supporters to inveigh against the Left and accuse Chang Fa-k'uei of having secret ties with the communists.³⁶ It also brought about a powerful swing of opinions in the party and the government against the Left and the National Government had to commission an investigation into whether the Leftist Central Committee members were involved in the communist insurrection.³⁷ Overwhelmed by the hostile atmosphere Wang Ching-wei decided to retire from active politics and shortly retreated to Europe. Leading commanders of Chang Fa-k'uei's army, disgraced by the insurrection, as well left Canton and went into exile.³⁸ Kwangtung then reverted to the control of Li Chi-shen.

Wang Ching-wei's retirement did not mitigate the vehement attack on the Leftist leaders. On December 31 the National Government's investigation commission into the incident established that the *yüeh-fang wei-yuan* were the prime movers behind the coup on November 17 and should be held responsible for the consequent communist insurrection on December 11.³⁹ Party elders in the CSC then proposed to suspend their rights to attend the Fourth Plenum.⁴⁰ Driven to a corner, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü and Kan Nai-kuang, the leading figures implicated in the coup, decided on their accord not to attend the plenum. The remaining Leftist leaders, Ch'en Shu-jen, Ho Hsiang-ning, P'an Yün-ch'ao, Wang Fa-ch'in and Wang Lo-p'ing were later acquitted of

any charges by a joint meeting of the CEC and CSC and hence could resume their duties in the impending plenum.⁴¹ Unquestionably, the communist insurrection in Canton had unexpectedly shattered the Leftist leadership. As a result the Left came to the Fourth Plenum with a seriously depleted strength and made a weak showing in it.

The series of intra-party struggles during September to December were for the most part a struggle for the control of the Party Central. Two major rival groups were directly involved -- the KMT Left and an assorted group of conservatives who were mainly composed of the Kwangtung-Kwangsi militarists and a cluster of party elders. Chiang Kai-shek managed to play the mediator between the two groups; he wanted to maintain his alliance with the Left and at the same time made an effort not to alienate the conservative minds in the party, particularly the party elders group. Personal animosities, power rivalries and ideological differences between the Left and this assorted group of conservatives accounted for the fierce polemics over the issues of the Special Committee and the Canton coup. Behind the facade of all these struggles also lay the crucial question of whether Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek could successfully form a duumvirate in the party or not. The struggle between the two groups continued to characterize the history of the KMT from the Fourth Plenum until the formation of a new Nanking leadership in the last months of 1928.

The Fourth Plenum: the Official Endorsement of a Deradicalization Line

After a series of mediations behind the scenes, the long-awaited Fourth Plenum eventually assembled on February 3 and ended on February 7. It was the first Central Committee plenary meeting after the party purge and as such had a decisive bearing on the future course of the party. Yet the KMT Left was ill prepared for it. After the communist insurrection in Canton the Left was completely discredited and had no prospect of legislating a Leftist course for the whole party. Their four most preeminent leaders, Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü and Kan Nai-kuang, who carried significant weight in the party, had to absent themselves from the plenum. Without them the Left was virtually leaderless and no wonder they made no coordinated proposal during the meeting.⁴² Moreover, in numerical terms the Left was outnumbered in the plenum. Of the 31 CEC and CSC members who came to the plenum, only the 5 *yüeh-fang wei-yuan* were closely associated with Wang Ching-wei and imbued with Leftist ideas. At most they could enlist support from 5 other Central Committee members, Chu Chi-ch'ing, Kuo Ch'un-t'ao and Pai Yün-t'i, who after mid-1928 joined the Wang Ching-wei group, and Ching Heng-i and Po Wen-wei, long regarded as Leftists before the purge but did not play an active role in party politics after 1928.⁴³

Altogether the Left had the support of 10 members in the plenum; but it had to face the Central Committee majority (21 members) who had become conservative after the break with the CCP and were suspicious of Leftist ideas. This foreshadowed the outcome of the plenum. Furthermore, little came of the "Wang-Chiang understanding." At this time Chiang's attitude underwent a subtle change. No doubt he still much cherished the understanding with Wang Ching-wei. Shortly after the communist insurrection broke out in Canton, Chiang had come to the fore and dismissed the conservatives' charges that Wang Ching-wei and Chang Fa-k'uei were communists;⁴⁴ and he did defend the rights of Leftist leaders to attend the Fourth Plenum and indeed publicly called on them to do so.⁴⁵ Wang's influence in the party induced Chiang to maintain the political alliance with him. Yet the political situation had changed that Chiang began to consider his alliance with Wang in a new light. After the routing of T'ang Sheng-chih's and Chang Fa-k'uei's armies, and Chiang having been reinstated as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, Wang had lost much of his bargaining power with Chiang. Now Chiang decided not to confront the Kwangsi Clique as he judged that his own army was not powerful enough to deal with it singlehanded. His tactic was to conciliate the Clique first and bide his time; and he urged Wang to come round to his view.⁴⁶ Besides, Chiang did not wish to see that his understanding with Wang would alienate the party elders group who shared with him the same ideological stand and were his most loyal supporters in the party during the purge.⁴⁷ Chiang was clearly situated in an unenviable position, and he finally decided to assume a mediating role between contending factions. Faced with a majority of Central Committee members who were averse to Leftist ideas, and Chiang's unwillingness to confront the Kwangsi Clique and to alienate the conservative opinions in the party, the Left was isolated in the Fourth Plenum.

The Fourth Plenum mainly concerned itself with the rebuilding of the party, formulating a new foreign policy and a new policy on mass movements. It opened with a consensus among all contending factions that there was an imperative need for the rebuilding of the party at various levels. A "Resolution on the rebuilding of the party" was passed which empowered the Party Central to send officials down to local level for the reorganization of party branches and the re-registration of all party members. Two other resolutions to strengthen party discipline and to enforce training of party members were also enacted. And all previous resolutions in connection with the *lien-O yung-kung* policy were rescinded and measures to curb communist subversions in the party were also agreed upon.⁴⁸ However, when the plenum came to discuss foreign policy and the policy of mass movement, heated debates at once broke out between the Left and the majority of Central Committee members. In fact it was the party conservatives who were on the offensive and tried to impose their views on the party. Their views were

expressed in the proposals on foreign policy and on the mass movement drawn up by a CEC member, MiaoPin. In the proposal on foreign policy, Miao took the communists to task for the spreading of anti-imperialism ideas and asserted that China's weaknesses were the cause for being oppressed by foreign powers. He used the imagery that China was in the infant stage and argued that before a child could fight for his rights, he should first grow up and strengthen himself. Based on this point Miao reasoned that at the present stage China should first concern herself with self-strengthening and national reconstruction but not with the anti-imperialism movement or world revolution. If China could strengthen herself, foreign powers would then change their attitudes towards her. In the proposal on the mass movement, Miao made it clear that class struggle should not be allowed in the mass movement. In his view, the objective of the mass movement at the present stage was national reconstruction under the direction of the KMT. All existing mass organizations should be dissolved and replaced by new ones supervised by the party with the above objective in mind.⁴⁹ In a broader sense Miao's proposal was identical with Chiang Kai-shek's view. Both readily agreed in principle and in practice that the party should adopt a peaceful attitude towards foreign powers and the mass movement should for the time being be suspended. This became the majority's opinion in the plenum and the Left did try their best to argue against it but without effect.⁵⁰

Although no formal resolutions on foreign policy and on the mass movement were adopted, the deliberations and other resolutions of the Fourth Plenum indicated clearly which side had carried the day. A commission on foreign policy set up during the plenary session later reported to the plenum that "peaceful diplomacy" should be adopted towards foreign powers.⁵¹ And in the restructuring of the Party Central enacted by the plenum, all former departments handling affairs with peasants, workers, merchants, youth and women were abolished and replaced by a mass training committee.⁵² It strengthened the party's direct control over the mass movement as well as downgraded the importance of the mass movement in the party's programme as a whole. A tacit endorsement of the suspension of the mass movement was also given by the plenum.⁵³

The majority's opinion in the plenum was finally embodied in the Manifesto issued on February 8 1928. It proclaimed that the Chinese National Revolution had gradually proceeded from the "propaganda and military period" to the "political and economic reconstruction period." Hence national reconstruction in domestic affairs, education and economy were underlined and dealt with at length by the Manifesto. The purging of the party from communist influence and the continuation of the Northern Expedition were also mentioned. When the manifesto came to grips with the issues on imperialism and

the mass movement, deradicalization was the underlying theme. The Manifesto stated clearly that national self-strengthening was the effective means to confront imperialism:

The fundamental goal of our National Revolution is racial equality and national independence, with the abrogation of unequal treaties being the concrete means of realizing this goal. At present though our people do not employ powerful military forces to confront imperialism throughout the world, yet our vigorous national reconstruction effort in the end will provide our nation the necessary means to achieve this fundamental goal. Our people should know that national reconstruction is the real and efficacious means of opposing imperialism. The tactic used by the communists [against imperialism] will only render our weak nation a battleground between white imperialism and red imperialism and bring about our extinction. National reconstruction is the basis for independence and self-strengthening, both of which are also the fundamentals for achieving equality among the nations. This lesson is what History has bequeathed us.⁵⁴

In the same vein the goals of the mass movement were redefined. The Manifesto enunciated that national economic reconstruction was the most important goal of the National Revolution. It lamented that the Chinese people had lived in a veritable wretched condition and to improve the living conditions of the people oppressed by "imperialist powers," economic reconstruction should be the top priority. Based on this reason, the mass movement of the past few years was strongly condemned. The communists in the past had directed the mass movement towards class struggle and as a result China's industry and agriculture were brought to bankruptcy. The people not only failed to achieve their liberation but they suffered more. The Manifesto then proclaimed what it thought should be the proper goals for the mass movement:

The fundamental goals of our effort to awaken the people and those of the uprisings of revolutionary people are the saving of the whole nation, not the self-destruction of the means of survival; the development of our economy, not the sabotage of our economy; the establishment of a stable system of economic production, not the subversion of it.

The task of the party was to lead the people towards the goals of developing economy and enriching the nation.⁵⁵ The mass movement now aimed at national reconstruction and economic development. One social group -- the youth -- was prohibited from participating in the mass movement and politics. The Manifesto regarded it as the most grievous mistake to allow the youth to participate in political and social movements:

To participate in such affairs, one must possess accurate perception, competent judgement, and be cognizant of what is good and bad. Our immature youths, not yet fully developed physically and mentally, without sufficient knowledge and experience, are still unable to cut themselves loose from the support of their elders who have to look after their interests. How can they, therefore, be allowed freely to meddle with the weighty affairs of state and society? To

permit them such freedom is not only to sacrifice to no purposes the precious and cherished existence of our nation, but also to allow them to treat the entire nation and human society as playthings.⁵⁶

The plenum's decisions were tested to their utmost when the Chinan Incident broke out on May 3 1928. As the National Revolutionary Army advanced to Chinan in Shantung province, Japan on the ground that her subjects were endangered by the war, sent troops into the city. Conflicts soon took place between the two sides which consequently inflamed nationalist feelings in China. True to the spirit of the Fourth Plenum, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a conciliatory attitude throughout the Incident. Negotiations with Japan were conducted and Chinese troops were withdrawn from Chinan to avoid further skirmishes with Japan. For fear of provoking Japan into further actions the party also advised the people not to take extreme measures.⁵⁷

To the Leftists in the KMT the Incident simply demonstrated that the plenum's decisions on foreign policy and the mass movement policy were basically "wrong." They were all outraged by the Incident and invariably exhibited a very strong anti-imperialism sentiment. The party's conciliatory foreign policy, they argued in their journals, would lead nowhere in the face of "Japanese imperialism." An intransigent stand was the proper course of action. Citing successful cases of anti-imperialism struggles in the past, the Leftists asserted that the mass movement was the only effective means to stand up against foreign powers and thus should be restored at once.⁵⁸ Leftist party leaders, P'an Yün-ch'ao, Wang Fa-ch'in and Wang Lo-p'ing seized the chance to send an address to the Party Central urging the restoration of the mass movement which in their view was the backbone of the Government's foreign policy.⁵⁹

The Left's expostulations were ignored by the Party Central which continued to display a conciliatory attitude towards Japan. Negotiations to settle the Chinan Incident were finally concluded on February 28 1929 and Japan finally agreed to withdraw her troops from Shantung. The Chinan Incident reflected how firmly the Party Central under Chiang Kai-shek would adhere to the spirit and letter of the Fourth Plenum's decisions.

The outcome of the Fourth Plenum certainly was disappointing to the Left. Discontent with the plenum was revealed in Leftist journals published in mid-1928. Articles contributed by middle-ranking Leftists were full of attacks on the Fourth Plenum. They claimed that "many revolutionary comrades" were disillusioned by the plenum's decisions and some even labelled it as a "reactionary" party meeting.⁶⁰ The gist of their arguments was that the plenum had violated the principles and policies adopted by the First and Second National Party Congresses, in other words, it acted contrary to the Spirit of the Reorganization. Obvious deviations from the Spirit of the

Reorganization were the decisions to suspend the mass movement and adopt a "peaceful diplomatic posture" towards foreign powers. To them, "awakening the masses" during the revolution and an "uncompromising militant stand" towards foreign powers were the basic policies enshrined by Sun Yat-sen for the party. The mass movement should not be dispensed with because it was the basis for the party and was the efficacious weapon against imperialism. Apart from these criticisms on ideological grounds, the Leftists were also disappointed with the plenum's failure to deal with the "degeneration" in the KMT. They noted that the party after the plenum was increasingly infested with the "degenerate and opportunist;" it had been corrupted and lost its revolutionary spirit.⁶¹ Obviously the Left was dissatisfied with the present Party Central, which in its eyes had been controlled by its opponents. But it could not change the power balance in the party. The outcome of the Fourth Plenum demonstrated clearly that the Left simply lacked the power in the Party Central to legislate a Leftist course for the party and prevent the party from embarking upon a conservative course. By this time the Leftist leaders probably realized that they had lost the first round of power struggle in the Party Central, and they now decided to put their case before the party's rank and file. As we shall see in Chapter 2, while taking refuge in Shanghai after the Canton debacle, the Leftist leaders led by Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü launched journals to advocate their views to party members and to the masses. And a secret organization, the Reorganization Comrades Association (RCA), was founded in the party. To be sure, at this time they still hoped to recoup their lost ground in the next plenum, scheduled to be convened in August, while they were waiting for a political situation to develop so that a joint leadership under Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek could be formed in the party.

The Fifth Plenum: the Consolidation of the Deradicalization Line

In early June the National Revolutionary Army captured Peking and Tientsin and North China soon came under its control. On July 6 the four National Revolutionary Army Commanders, Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Li Tsung-jen gathered in Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum in Peiping to declare the successful conclusion of the Northern Expedition. But it was not until December 29 1928 that the whole country was nominally unified under the KMT when Manchuria, which was under the rule of Chang Hsüeh-liang, proclaimed her allegiance to the Central Government in Nanking.

By July as the Northern Expedition had drawn to a close, the KMT resolved to summon the Fifth Plenum on August 1 1928.⁶² At that time the power configuration in the party remained unchanged since the last plenum. The party was still faced with a

division between the Left on the one hand and the Kwangtung-Kwangsi militarists and the party elders group on the other. Though Wang Ching-wei had retired to Europe, he still engaged in polemics with the leading party spokesman in Nanking, Wu Chih-hui. In the letter to the Overseas Party Branch in France dated April 7 1928, Wang openly named Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen, Wu Chih-hui, Chang Ching-chiang, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Li Shih-tseng as the enemies of the party. Alleging that the Kwangsi Clique, with the support of the party elders, had adopted a recalcitrant attitude towards the Party Central, Wang charged them with violating Sun Yat-sen's teachings -- they aimed at the promotion of regional power against the Central Government. More than this, Wang continued, this group of people had tried their best to stifle the Spirit of the Reorganization and branded those who supported the Reorganization as communist fellow travellers. Wang warned that the party would only ruin itself if it continued to be swayed by them.⁶³ This at once provoked several pieces of retort from Wu Chih-hui who advised Wang to toe the party line and not to dally with the communists.⁶⁴ When the Fifth Plenum was about to convene, both sides began to jockey for position in the party. The party elders took the initiative by trying to obstruct Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü and Kan Nai-kuang from attending the meeting. As we have noted, these four Leftist leaders, with the other five *yüeh-fang wei-yuan*, were impeached by the CSC on the ground that they were responsible for the communist insurrection in Canton. The Party Central later cleared the charges of the other five *yüeh-fang wei-yuan*, but it did not pass judgement on Wang, Ch'en, Ku and Kan. Taking advantage of this ambiguity, Wu Chih-hui argued in public that these four Leftist leaders who were impeached by the CSC had no right to attend the Fifth Plenum. A vigorous debate then took place between Wu and Ch'en Kung-po over the right of attendance.⁶⁵ Eventually, Wang, Ch'en, Ku and Kan decided to stay away and only the other five *yüeh-fang wei-yuan*, urged by Chiang Kai-shek, came to the plenum.⁶⁶ On August 8 1928, the Fifth Plenum was officially summoned in Nanking.

Again, as in the Fourth Plenum, the Left attended the new plenum with a depleted strength and were outnumbered. In numerical terms, out of 36 CEC and CSC members who assembled there, only 7 were close followers of Wang Ching-wei.⁶⁷ Sympathetic support might also be enlisted from 3 other party leaders, Ching Heng-i, Li Fu-lin and Po Wen-wei. At any rate, the Left did not have enough clout to influence the decisions of the plenum. However, this time the Leftist Central Committee members managed to present the plenum a policy statement -- the "Proposal to reestablish the Party Basis" submitted on August 1.

In the proposal, the Leftist leaders set down in detail their view on four important issues: (i) the policy line of the party; (ii) the organization of the party; (iii) the

relationship between the party and the government; (iv) the relationship between the party and the army. They first expounded what they thought should be the correct line for the party:

The Chinese National Revolution undertaken by our party has the aims to lead the oppressed masses of the whole country to struggle against imperialism and to save China from being a semi-colonial country. At the same time it is to harness mass organizations as the basis for the building of democratic forces. These are the aims of the mass movement and anti-imperialism. The Manifestoes of the First and Second National Party Congresses and the resolutions on the mass movement and on peasants and workers have spelt out the situation faced by our people and the responsibility and urgent tasks shouldered by our party. There is no reason to object to these guidelines. On the contrary, they should be faithfully followed so that concrete result can be achieved and the nature of this revolution will not be misinterpreted.

They took the Fourth Plenum to task for its failure to weed out "corrupt officials (*t'an-kuan wu-li*)" and its decision to suspend the mass movement. In their view, corrupt officials, like warlords, constituted a barrier to the establishment of a democratic government in China; and the mass movement should not be suspended because it had the ultimate aims of achieving national independence and protecting people's rights. In fact, anti-imperialism and the mass movement had nothing to do with the communists and should not be discarded. They then came to address the question of party organization and discipline. The Party Central, they believed, had not yet been strengthened after the Fourth Plenum. It failed to lead local party branches and often was disregarded by them; besides, local party branches were often financially dependent on local governments and this resulted in their being controlled by them. All these defects had to be redressed. Furthermore, they advocated the restoration of election in the party as a means to democratize the party and eliminate factional activities. In the remaining part of the proposal, the importance of upholding party authority over the government and the army was heavily emphasized by the Leftist leaders. The concept of "party rule (*i-tang chih-kuo*)" was underlined. In particular, the abolition of Branch Political Councils (*cheng-chih fen-hui*), which provoked impassioned debates in the Fifth Plenum, was listed as an important means of strengthening party rule.⁶⁸

The proposal was a bold pronouncement by the KMT Left on the party issues. It was a veiled condemnation of the deradicalization line pursued by the party after the Fourth Plenum and an explicit affirmation of the policy course adopted by the First and Second National Party Congresses. In short, it aimed to salvage the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27 which was largely abandoned after the party purge. The proposal was not well received in the plenum as the majority of Central Committee members were not prepared to affirm the revolutionary line of 1924-27 after the party purge. The

party conservatives and Chiang Kai-shek reportedly regarded the proposal as "a bit radical."⁶⁹ Only on two issues -- the restoration of the mass movement and the abolition of Branch Political Councils -- did the Left find itself in line with the majority's thinking.

The two issues were the centre of controversies in the Fifth Plenum and reflected how complicated the factional relationships in the KMT had become. Not only factional struggles in the party were involved, power rivalries between the party and regional militarists for the first time since the Northern Expedition erupted into the open. On the mass movement the KMT as a whole agreed that it could not be suspended forever. As the party was committed to "awakening the people," a principle which was unchallenged even during the purge, it was thought that sooner or later the party had to restore the mass movement. The majority in the plenum agreed with the Left that the mass movement should be restored. Accordingly, on August 11 the plenum resolved that "subject to the limits laid down by the laws, the people have the right to form organizations of their own. They should be guided by the party and supervised by the government. The government should immediately legislate the requisite laws for its implementation."⁷⁰ With this resolution the mass movement was endorsed by the party again. However, divisions of opinion about the nature of the mass movement were still discernible. The youth movement which the Left would like to restore was not tackled by the plenum.⁷¹ Unresolved was also the question as to whether mass organizations should have a hierarchical structure from national down to local levels.⁷² More importantly, the political goals of the mass movement were not defined by the plenum. On the whole three different opinions on this question were voiced during the meeting. The Leftists held that the mass movement should be guided by resolutions passed by the First and Second National Party Congresses.⁷³ It seems that they would go to the limit in supporting a politically-oriented and radical mass movement comparable to those practised in the Northern Expedition but without being guided by communist theory. Another opinion presented by Miu Pin and Li Tsung-jen typified the view of the conservative minds which saw the mass movement at that stage was entirely for economic reconstruction and development. They laid stress on the absolute control over the mass movement by the party and devised institutional restraints on mass organizations.⁷⁴ On this question the Standing Committee of the CEC occupied the middle ground between the Left and the conservative opinions in the party.⁷⁵ They did not agree with the Left that the mass movement should be guided by resolutions of the two previous Congresses, nor did they share the view of Miu Pin and Li Tsung-jen that the scope of activities and organizations of the masses should be narrowly delimited. As was indicated in their proposal, the mass movement in the military period was for

"destructive" purpose with the political mission of opposing imperialism and feudalism. But in the Political Tutelage period which the Chinese National Revolution had now entered, the mass movement was mainly for the political training of the people and the economic reconstruction of the country. The proposal envisaged a wider part for the mass movement to play in the National Revolution than Miu Pin and Li Tsung-jen had conceived. And in contrast with the Left, a cautious and reserved note informed the whole proposal.⁷⁶ The failure of the plenum to come to an agreement on the political goals of the mass movement exactly mirrored the divergent opinions in the party.

Furthermore, the bitter controversies over the Branch Political Council issue revealed the serious power rivalries between the party and regional militarists after the Northern Expedition. Actually the plenum turned out to be a showdown between supporters and opponents of regional power with the Branch Political Councils as the focus of the struggles between the two sides. During the Northern Expedition, for administrative convenience various Branch Political Councils were set up in Canton, Wuhan, Kaifeng, Taiyuan and Peiping to handle regional affairs. Except for the Branch Political Council in Peiping which was headed by a party elder Li Shih-tseng, all other branches were under the control of regional militarists: Canton by Li Chi-shen, Wuhan Li Tsung-jen, Kaifeng Feng Yü-hsiang, and Taiyuan Yen Hsi-shan. At the Fourth Plenum the power and domain of these Political Councils were delineated. It also decided that the Third National Party Congress would come to review whether these Political Councils should be abolished or not.⁷⁷ After the completion of the Northern Expedition, regional militarists retained their power on regional affairs through control over Branch Political Councils. Chiang Kai-shek was very much concerned with this state of affairs and from June to August 1928, put forward proposals for military rehabilitation and reorganization which aimed to reduce the number of troops and curb the power of regional militarists. Nothing of course came out of these proposals as regional militarists were unresponsive.⁷⁸ The summoning of the Fifth Plenum in August provided another occasion for Chiang to come to grips with regionalism. He indeed received sympathetic and widespread support in the party to curb regional power. Numerous proposals were submitted from various quarters of the party for the abolition of Branch Political Councils which in their view were the symbol of regionalism.⁷⁹ Chiang also found the Leftist leaders stood firmly on his side. They, like Chiang, perceived that their interest lay in the upholding of the power of the party over regional militarists. Moreover, the Branch Political Council issue offered them a good opportunity to embarrass their major political opponent -- the Kwangtung-Kwangsi militarists. Therefore, the Leftist leaders, too, put forward proposals to the plenum advocating the abolition of all Branch Political Councils.⁸⁰ Certainly all these proposals

met with stiff resistance from regional militarists. Li Chi-shen took up the cudgels for the militarists and argued against the abolition of the Councils. He stated that the Fourth Plenum had already resolved to refer the issue to the Third Party Congress, there was no need for the Fifth Plenum to deal with the issue now. Besides, the abolition of Branch Political Councils would only weaken the power of the regional governments to deal with the communists and remaining warlords, and it also violated Sun Yat-sen's principle of "equality of power (*chün-ch'üan chu-i*) between Central and regional governments.⁸¹ Li's view was backed by the party elders who thought that it was unwise to tread on the toes of the regional militarists immediately after the Northern Expedition. They advocated "decentralized administration and cooperation between Central and regional governments (*fen-chih ho-tso*)," a suggestion which in practice meant that regional militarists would retain their power over regional affairs.⁸² Both Li Shih-tseng and Chang Ching-chiang also approached Chiang and implored him not to abolish these councils.⁸³ Li even called for another round of party purge which clearly took the Leftists as the possible target of attack for they were commonly regarded as communist fellow travellers.⁸⁴ Chiang was unmoved by these suggestions because he was determined to curb regional power and hence much needed the support of the Left. Stormy exchanges ensued between various factions which eventually fragmented the KMT leadership. Li Tsung-jen absented himself from the plenum after August 4 and Li Chi-shen, Li Shih-tseng and Chang Ching-chiang followed suit after August 8.⁸⁵ Even the five *yüeh-fang wei-yuan* decided to withdraw from the meeting after August 11 and were not present in the August 14 session which passed a resolution to abolish the Branch Political Councils by the end of 1928.⁸⁶ With the diminishing attendance the plenum hastily drew to a close on August 15.

The Fifth Plenum revealed how complicated the factional struggles in the KMT had become. The struggle between the Left and the assorted group of party conservatives now intertwined with the power rivalry between the Party Central and its military allies. The battle for the control of the Party Central had not been brought to an end by the Fifth Plenum; no single faction or factional coalition could claim to be in control of the Party Central. Although Chiang Kai-shek and the Left scored a victory over the Branch Political Council issue, yet the power of the regional militarists, particularly the Kwangsi Clique which had its influence extended from Kwangsi through Wuhan to Peiping, remained intact. And the continued rivalry between the Left and the Kwangsi Clique rendered a joint leadership of Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek in the party impossible to achieve. Now Chiang still thought that he could not confront the Kwangsi Clique alone and had to conciliate it at the moment. Therefore, he did not think that it was the time for Wang to come back to China and cooperate with him because this could only provoke bitter opposition from the Kwangsi Clique. Moreover,

his attitude towards the Branch Political Council issue had irritated the party elders;⁸⁷ he did not want to alienate them further by openly allying with the Left. Hence Wang remained in Europe and waited for a clear call which never came;⁸⁸ the party conservatives could claim a partial victory as they succeeded in blocking a Wang-Chiang leadership in the party. As the prospect for "Wang-Chiang cooperation" remained dim, and as the Left was deprived of a strong voice in the Party Central, its leadership underwent a subtle change. Kan Nai-kuang, who had been a prominent Leftist since the Northern Expedition and a key figure in plotting the Canton coup, lost interest in politics and went to Europe after the Fourth Plenum. He never took part in Leftist activities again.⁸⁹ And after the Fifth Plenum, Ch'en Shu-jen and Ho Hsiang-ning decided to maintain a low political profile and were not actively involved in the Leftist affairs afterwards.⁹⁰ Of the original nine *yüeh-fang wei-yuan*, only six remained active in political arena by late 1928.

Although the Fifth Plenum failed to settle party disputes, one thing was obvious, the deradicalization line adopted by the Fourth Plenum was not questioned but was reaffirmed. The Manifesto of the Fifth Plenum cited approvingly the Manifesto of the Fourth Plenum.⁹¹ The idea of anti-imperialism which the Left upheld as the guiding principle of China's foreign policy was not discussed in the plenum and not mentioned in the Manifesto.⁹² And, though the mass movement was restored by the plenum, it fell short of the aims of the Left. The plenum did not define the political goals of the mass movement, nor did it decide upon the structure of mass organizations, the two aspects which the Left deemed important to the mass movement. Middle-ranking Leftists expressed disappointment with the failure of the plenum to remove the "corrupt and degenerate" from the party. In their view the prestige of the party was tarnished because of the disappointing result of the plenum. Disillusionment with the Party Central was more obvious among the Leftists at this time. In their publications some Leftist writers openly called on party members to "start anew" for a "fundamental reorganization" in order to save the revolution and the party.⁹³ They seem to be prepared to break with the Party Central; these sentiments later fostered a Leftist opposition movement against Nanking in early 1929. Meanwhile, Hu Han-min had returned from Europe to Nanking, a political move which changed the power configuration in the KMT radically.

The Formation of the Nanking Leadership

The lull in the KMT after the Fifth Plenum was short-lived. In August Hu Han-min who had been in Europe ever since late 1927 decided to come back to the

political arena. His importance in the party was reflected in the fact that he, with Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek, were popularly regarded as the three most preeminent leaders in the party from the late 1920s to the 1930s. Hu's credentials as a close associate of Sun Yat-sen were impeccable. His seniority in the party dated back to the T'ung Meng Hui's time and he was so trusted by Sun Yat-sen that he was appointed as Acting Generalissimo (a virtual head of the party and the government) in Kwangtung when Sun started the mission to the North to negotiate with the then Peking Government in late 1924. During the Northern Expedition Hu was identified as an unavowed Rightist, an image which enabled him to win much support from the party conservatives after the purge.⁹⁴ Hu's coming back in August 1928 gradually led to the formation of the Chiang-Hu duumvirate in Nanking and caused the dissolution of Wang-Chiang understanding. Ever since the KMT had turned against the CCP in July 1927, unity in the party was much hoped for and from some quarters in the party the idea of establishing a triumvirate consisting of Wang, Chiang and Hu was privately entertained.⁹⁵ But the idea was unrealistic at that time. Hu Han-min's retreat to Europe in late 1927 had everything to do with Wang Ching-wei. Since the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 the two men were on bad terms as they had conflicting views on the *yung-kung* policy. Animosities generated during this time did not subside even after the party purge. In September 1927 when Wang made an overture to reconcile with Hu, Hu simply refused to see Wang. Hu always suspected that Wang was imbued with communist ideas, and that his right-hand men, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü, were communist fellow travellers. The November 17 coup in Canton engineered by the Left further deepened Hu's distrust of Wang.⁹⁶ Ideologically speaking, Chiang stood nearer to Hu than to Wang. Basically Hu and Chiang shared a conservative political outlook and were averse to Leftist ideas. Their coming together after the April purge in Nanking evinced the ideological affinities between the two men. For a time the cooperation between them was so close that when Chiang resigned his offices in August Hu also followed suit. However, in late 1927 it was Chiang and Wang who first came to ally with each other because they found themselves sharing the same immediate political interest in bringing down the Special Committee and curbing the power of the Kwangsi Clique. When Hu learned that Chiang had allied with Wang, he was bitterly disappointed. As he was not prepared to work with Wang, he decided to retire from the political scene. When the Fourth Plenum was summoned in Nanking, Hu retreated to Europe.⁹⁷ A number of leading party figures such as Sun Fo accompanied him and it was reported that they were politically active in Europe -- they turned much attention to diplomacy and overseas party affairs. At the time there were two options which Hu Han-min was turning over in his mind. First, if the political development turned out to be unfavourable to Nanking, he was prepared to overthrow the Nanking Government

under Chiang. On the other hand, if everything went well with Nanking, Hu would not rule out the possibility of cooperating with Nanking.⁹⁸ The unfolding of political events in 1928 saw the successful completion of the Northern Expedition and the legitimate position of the Nanking Government recognized; and it did not bring both Wang and Chiang to power in Nanking. The hostile atmosphere generated against the Left after the December communist insurrection in Canton had compelled Wang to go into exile in Europe; Hu saw it was a propitious moment for him to come back to China and to ally with Chiang.

The first sign that Hu intended to revive his political activities was in June 1928 when he proposed an "Outline of Political Tutelage" to the coming Fifth Plenum for consideration.⁹⁹ It was favourably received and a resolution on the structure of the National Government was adopted by the plenum in accordance with Hu's suggestion.¹⁰⁰ By this time Hu had started his journey back to China and on September 3 he arrived in Shanghai and held a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and party elders like Chang Ching-chiang, Li Shih-tseng and Wu Chih-hui. They seem to have arrived at an understanding and on September 18 both Chiang and Hu were present in Nanking. Hu was soon appointed as a member of the Standing Committee of the CEC and later President of the Legislative Yuan. The "Outline of Political Tutelage" which was penned by Hu was accordingly passed by the Standing Committee of the CEC on October 3 and became the guiding principle for the national reconstruction in China.¹⁰¹ A duumvirate consisting of Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min was formed in Nanking.

Subtle political considerations were behind the formation of the new duumvirate. At the outset when Hu Han-min was about to set foot on China, Chiang Kai-shek was afraid that Hu would try to make use of his connections in Kwangtung to stage an opposition against him in order to seize power.¹⁰² Hu's attitude soon dispelled Chiang's apprehension. To Hu, his return to China was in a way to fill the power vacuum left by Wang Ching-wei. More importantly, he realized that Chiang's position in the party had now been consolidated and he was eager to come to terms with Chiang. He once told some party leaders that Chiang was "China's Kemal" and he was willing to serve Chiang in the reconstruction of China.¹⁰³ Hu's assumption of the Presidency of the Legislative Yuan and subsequent legislative work carried out during 1928-30 all testified that he was ready to work with Chiang in the national reconstruction. For Chiang Kai-shek, a political alliance with Hu at this juncture served his interests. Chiang's major concern during and after the Northern Expedition was the growing power of regional militarists in general and the Kwangsi Clique in particular. As we have noted, Chiang had intended to use his alliance with Wang Ching-wei to forge an unity in the party and to bring pressure to bear on the Kwangsi Clique. However, after the Fifth

Plenum it was clear to Chiang that there was little prospect for Wang to return to China to ally with him in view of the vehement opposition from the Kwangtung-Kwangsi militarists and the party elders group.¹⁰⁴ A political alliance with Hu at this time, Chiang calculated, would produce the same desirable results as the alliance with Wang. First, Hu was openly against regionalism. In a speech given shortly after his arrival in Hong Kong on August 29, Hu spoke for the abolition of Branch Political Councils, which in his view were "no longer needed" during the Political Tutelage period.¹⁰⁵ This was clearly in the interest of Chiang who laboured hard to circumscribe regional power.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, Hu's strong connections with the party and government officials in Kwangtung would be a political asset to Chiang. Through his intimate associate, Ku Ying-fen, Hu maintained close relations with Li Chi-shen's military subordinates such as Ch'en Chi-t'ang. An alliance with Hu might lessen the tension between Kwangtung-Kwangsi militarists and the Nanking Government. In the event, when war broke out between Nanking and Kwangsi in March 1929, Hu did play a part in inducing Kwangtung to stand on the side of Nanking rather than Kwangsi.¹⁰⁷ In addition, Chiang found that an alliance with Hu could bring a strong coalition of conservative forces together in Nanking. The alliance with Hu, unlike that with Wang, was strongly favoured by most of Central Committee members, specifically the party elders group, which shared with Hu the same political outlook and were averse to Leftist ideas. These political considerations finally brought Chiang and Hu to form a joint leadership in the KMT.

The official leadership in Nanking was largely composed of a coalition of conservative forces in the party. Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min, Sun Fo, the party elders group, some Western Hills members like Chang Chi and a number of eminent party figures like T'an Yen-k'ai and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei constituted the official leadership in Nanking. Not a single Leftist leader was represented in the highest policy-making body -- the Standing Committee of the CEC, nor in the five Yuan of the new National Government inaugurated on October 10 1928.¹⁰⁸ No doubt, the KMT Left had lost the power struggle in the Party Central. Not only the conservative forces in the party had frustrated the attempt at the formation of a "Wang-Chiang cooperation" in the party, it also had succeeded in displacing the Left from the Party Central. Although by late 1928 Chiang probably did not rule out the possibility of inviting the Leftist leaders back to the party at an opportune moment,¹⁰⁹ the trend against the Left had already set in within the Party Central when he came to terms with Hu. This eventually led to a polarization of the party into the Left and the Nanking leadership. As the Left wing of the party under Wang Ching-wei was not merely a small group of dissident party leaders, the formation of the Nanking leadership did not bring stability to the party but only ushered in a new phase of factional struggle in the KMT.

Notes

1. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.143-144. A number of KMT officials such as Li Tsung-jen, Sun Fo, Tsou Lu and Wu Chih-hui claimed that during the negotiations in Shanghai Wang Ching-wei had agreed to the setting up of a Special Committee. Of course, Wang vehemently denied this. For a discussion of the dispute over this point, see So Wai-chor, "The Western Hills Group in the National Revolution (1924-1928): A study of ideology and politics within the Kuomintang," pp.237-238.
2. According to the agreement reached in the negotiations, a roughly equal number of party members from Wuhan, Nanking and Shanghai (the Headquarters of the Western Hills Group) would be selected to become members of the Special Committee. For the list of Special Committee members, see Li Yün-han, *Ts'ung yung-kung tao ch'ing-tang*, vol. 2, pp.768-769.
3. During the Northern Expedition, Chang Fa-k'uei and T'ang Sheng-chih were the two major army commanders who unwaveringly supported the "radical" policies of the party. And, since early 1927 T'ang's army in Wuhan provided the major military backup for the Leftist Wuhan Government to challenge Chiang Kai-shek's power base in Nanking. Hence, Wang Ching-wei's trip to Wuhan to seek T'ang's support against the Special Committee was not an unexpected move. For the political attitude of Chang Fa-k'uei in 1927, see *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.137-138. For the close cooperation between T'ang Sheng-chih and Wang Ching-wei, see Li P'in-hsien, *Li P'in-hsien hui-i lu*, pp.92-94.
4. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.157 160; *Ti-ssu-chün chi-shih*, comp. Ti-ssu-chün chi-shih pien-hsüan wei-yuan-hui, p.178.
5. When Wang Ching-wei went to Wuhan, the Special Committee in Nanking made several attempts to come to terms with him. Negotiations between Wang and the Special Committee started in October and a tentative agreement was reached which embodied Wang's idea of summoning the Fourth Plenum to settle party disputes. However, factional struggles among military leaders scuttled the agreement. Military leaders in Nanking such as Li Tsung-jen had long bore personal grudges against T'ang Sheng-chih. The recent expansion of T'ang's army in Wuhan was in their eyes a threat to their own interests. Therefore, they concurred with each other to launch a preemptive strike against T'ang. By late October they put T'ang's forces to flight. See

K'u-hsiao lu, pp.157-159; Li P'in-hsien, *Li P'in-hsien hui-i lu*, p.97; Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, pp.238-240.

6. The commander of the Fifth Army in Kwangtung, Li Fu-lin, who was also a CSC candidate member, was sympathetic to the Leftist cause. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.166.

7. For the political activities of the KMT Left in Canton, see *Kuang-chou shih-pien yü Shang-hai hui-i*, comp. Kuang-chou p'ing-she, part 1, pp.20-21. At that time Wang Ching-wei entertained the idea of setting another Party Central in Canton, see *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.162.

8. Wang Ching-wei, "Ts'o-wu yü chiu-cheng," in *WCWC*, vol. 3, p.169.

9. Wang Ching-wei, "Fu chu-fa tsung-chih-pu han," *KMPL*, 2:25-26 (May 14 1928). See also "I-ko ken-pen kuan-nien," *ibid.*, 12:1 (July 23 1928).

10. *Ibid.*, 12:1-2.

11. "Wang Ching-wei tsai lin-shih hsüan-ch'uan ta-hui k'ai-hui shih chih yen-shuo," Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 436/160.1; "Fang-chih fu-hua," Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 436/160; Wang Ching-wei, "Shen-mo shih fu-hua," in *Wang Ching-wei wen-ts'un*, pp.266-272.

12. Wang Ching-wei, "Chia-kung chung chih fen-tou," in *WCWC*, vol. 3, pp.165-167.

13. Wang Ching-wei, "Shen-mo shih fan ko-ming," in *Wang Ching-wei wen-ts'un*, pp.272-275; "Wang Ching-wei tsai lin-shin hsüan-ch'uan ta-hui k'ai-hui shih chih yeh-shuo," Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 436/160.1; "Fang-chih fu-hua," Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 436/160.

14. Wang Ching-wei, "Kuan-yü ti-san-tang ti wen-ta," in *Chi-hui chu-i ti ti-san-tang*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Ho-pei-sheng tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan-hui hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.152-154.

15. T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, pp.307-308.

16. For Chiang Kai-shek's letter, see "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 4.42:2-3 (October 30 1927). See also T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p.309; Chang Ch'ün, *Wo yü Jih-pen ch'i-shih nien*, p.31

17. Wang Ching-wei's letter dated October 19 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:59 (November 1984); *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.162; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p.309. The Communist leader, Chou En-lai, had noted the close relationship between Wang Ching-wei and Wang Mou-kung during the

Northern Expedition. Wang Ching-wei's letters to Wang Mou-kung, now published in *Li-shih tang-an*, are thus a reliable source for the reconstruction of Wang Ching-wei's political calculations during 1928-29. For the close relationship between Wang Ching-wei and Wang Mou-kung, see Chou En-lai, "Kuan-yü i-chiu erh-ssu chih erh-liu nien tang tui kuo-min-tang ti kuan-hsi," in *Chou En-lai hsüan-chi*, vol. pp.116, 119.

18. Chiang Kai-shek, with Ting Wei-fen and Ch'en Kuo-fu, drew up two proposals on the restructuring of the Party Central and the reorganization of the whole party. See "Cheng Kuo-fu teng t'i-an," in *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.102-113; "Ting Wei-fen teng t'i-an," in *ibid.*, pp.113-127. Chiang alone also submitted a proposal on the ideology, organization and propaganda of the party. See "Chiang Chung-cheng t'i-an," in *ibid.*, pp.135-142. He as well worked out another proposal dealing with party affairs, mass movements, foreign policy and domestic affairs, see "Chiang Chung-cheng t'i-an," in *ibid.*, pp.127-135.

19. *Ibid.*, p.132.

20. *Ibid.*, pp.132-135.

21. Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p.210.

22. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated October 19 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shin tang-an*, 4:58-59 (November 1984). See also Wang's letter, dated June 15 1929, to Wang Mou-kung, in *ibid.*, 4:62; Huang Shao-hsiung, "I-chiu erh-pa nien yüeh-kuei chan chen," p.39.

23. For the relationship between the Kwangsi Clique and the Western Hills Group in the Special Committee, see So Wai-chor, "The Western Hills Group in the National Revolution (1924-1928): A study of ideology and politics within the Kuomintang," Chapter 5.

24. For the exchange of views between Nanking and Wang Ching-wei, see "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen shou-pao*, 4.43:3-4 (November 6 1927), 4.45:1-2 (November 20 1927). For Chiang Kai-shek's endorsement of summoning the Fourth Plenum, see *ibid.*, 4.45:1 (November 20 1928). For Wang Ching-wei's decision to attend the meeting in Shanghai, see *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.162; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p.310; *Kuang-chou shih-pien yü Shang-hai hui-i*, comp. Kuang-chou p'ing-she, part 1, pp.25-26.

25. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated October 19 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:58-59 (November 1984).

26. Li Chi-shen, "Li Chi-shen hsien-sheng lüeh-li," pp.137-138; Huang Shao-hsiung, *Wu-shih hui-i*, pp.175-177.

27. On September 19 1927, Li Chi-shen declared that he supported "Wang-Chiang cooperation" in the party. For Li's declaration, see Chi-che, "Ning-han kuo-min cheng-fu yü tang-pu ho-ping hou chung-yao wen-chien," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 4.40:4-5 (October 16 1927).

28. Li Chi-shen, "Li Chi-shen hsien-sheng lüeh-li," p.140; Huang Shao-hsiung, "I-chiu erh-pa nien yüeh-kuei chan-chen," pp.36-39; Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p.268.

29. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.161; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, pp.308-309; See also "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pai*, 4.43:1-9 (November 6 1927); Huang Shao-hsiung, "I-chiu erh-pa nien yüeh-kuei chan-chen," p.45.

30. In his memoirs Ch'en Kung-po claimed that both Chang Fa-k'uei and Chiang Kai-shek strongly favoured a Leftist coup in Canton. Chang was in serious rivalry with Li Chi-shen in Canton and intended to get rid of Li. As to Chiang, he hoped that the KMT Left could secure a power base in Kwangtung so as to strengthen their bargaining power with the Special Committee in Nanking. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.162. For Li Chi-shen's account of the Canton coup, see *Kuang-chou shih-pien yü Shang-hai hui-i*, comp. Kuang-chou p'ing-she, part 2, pp.88-93. For Chang Fa-k'uei's account, see *KMWH*, vol. 17, pp.3116-3119.

31. *Kuang-chou shih-pien yü Shang-hai hui-i*, comp. Kuang-chou p'ing-she, part 2, pp.88-92. Ch'en Kung-po did admit that the communists were still present in Chang Fa-k'uei's army after the party purge. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.163. See also Huang Shao-hsiung, "I-chiu erh-pa nien yüeh-kuei chan-chen," p.47.

32. The party elders proposed that Wang, Ch'en and Ku be deprived of their right to attend the Fourth Plenum, see "Chung-yang chien-cha wei-yuan-hui chien-chü san-wei-yuan wen," in *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, pp.959-961.

33. For the list of CEC and CSC members who attended the preliminary meeting in Shanghai, see *ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, p.1.

34. After the two sessions on December 3 and December 4, the preliminary meeting was suspended for three days because of the fierce controversies over the coup in Canton. See *Kuang-chou shih-pien yü Shang-hai hui-i*, comp. Kuang-chou p'ing-she, part 1, pp.113-114. At this juncture Chiang Kai-shek circulated a letter to Central Committee members entreating them to close their ranks for the purpose of convening the Fourth Plenum. For Chiang's letter, see *ibid.*, part 2, pp.144-149.

35. See *ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.1-9. By the end of 1927 the Western

Hills Group no longer had any political allies in the party after they had been completely discredited by the November 22 Incident in Nanking. For a discussion of the Incident, see So Wai-chor, "The Western Hills Group in the National Revolution (1924-1928): A study of ideology and politics within the Kuomintang," pp.257-263.

36. Wu Chih-hui was the leading party elder who put out polemical articles against the KMT Left over the Canton coup and the communist insurrection. For these articles, see *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 8, pp.595-599, 615-622, vol. 9, pp.867-872, 902-915.

37. *KMWH*, vol. 17, pp.3135-3136.

38. *Ibid.*, vol. 17, pp.3134-3135; *Ti-ssu-chün chi-shih*, comp. Ti-ssu-chün chi-shih pien-hsüan wei-yuan-hui, pp.190-191.

39. "Teng Ku cha-pan Wang Chao-ming teng chih ch'eng-fu," in *Kuang-chou shih-pien yü Shang-hai hui-i*, comp. Kuang-chou p'ing-she, part 2, pp.227-236.

40. *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 8, pp.631-632, vol. 9, 927-928.

41. The decision was made on January 31 1928, merely 3 days before the official summoning of the Fourth Plenum. See *ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, p.13.

42. Only one proposal drawn up by Ho Hsiang-ning to the Fourth Plenum contained elements of Leftist ideas. The proposal was forwarded by the plenum to the Standing Committee of the CEC for further deliberation. See "Ho Hsiang-ning t'i-an," in *ibid.*, pp.158-161.

43. Ching Heng-i and Po Wen-wei were both branded by their contemporaries as KMT Leftists during the Northern Expedition. After the break with the CCP, Ching was not involved in the opposition movement staged by the KMT Left, though he remained inclined to the Left. In 1930 and 1931 he did participate in the Enlarged Party Conference in Peiping and in the Extraordinary Party Conference in Canton, both of which were summoned by the KMT Left in its opposition to Nanking. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.232; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts'ui p'ai," p.216; *Min-kuo jen-wu hsiao-chuan*, ed. Liu Shao-t'ang, vol. 1, pp.238-239. Po Wen-wei did join the Leftist opposition movement in the years 1929-31 but he took no active part in it. He was not a member of the Reorganization Comrades Association, a Leftist secret organization in the party which we shall discuss later. See Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts'ui," p.216.

44. Chiang Kai-shek, "Tui-yü shih-chü chih t'an-hua," in *KMWH*, vol. 16, pp.2880-2885.

45. On December 24 1927, Chiang Kai-shek and Ho Hsiang-ning sent a telegram to Leftist Central Committee members requesting them to attend the Fourth Plenum, see *ibid.*, vol. 17, p.3136.

46. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated October 19 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:58-59 (November 1984).

47. In December 1927, party elders such as Chang Ching-chiang, Wu Chih-hui and Li Shih-tseng had all expressed disappointment with Chiang when he allied with Wang Ching-wei. See *Li-shih tang-an*, 1:63 (February 1984).

48. *KMWH*, vol. 79, pp.74-78. The Fourth Plenum also resolved to summon the Third National Party Congress on August 1 1928. See *ti-ssu-t'zu ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.41-42, 50. However, it was not until March 29 1929 that the Third National Party Congress was eventually convened.

49. *Ibid.*, pp.169-173, 175-179. It should be noted that MiaoPin's proposals were forwarded by the plenum to the Standing Committee of the CEC for further deliberation. Subsequent events showed that the spirit of the proposals became the official line of the KMT.

50. See "Ho Hsiang-ning t'i-an," in *ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.158-161. See also "Wang Fa-ch'in Wang Lo-p'ing P'an Yün-ch'ao chu hsien-sheng chih chung-yang han," *CC*, 1.1:73 (June 1 1928); Kuan Fu, "Wai-chiao cheng-ts'e yü tsui-chin wai-chiao shih-chien," *CC*, 1.1:17-34 (June 1 1928).

51. *Ibid.*, 1:17-34 (May 12 1928); *ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, p.20.

52. This was justified on the ground that the party should "unite all oppressed masses to work for the revolution and forge cooperation among the people." If mass movements were directed by different departments and not centralized in one single party's machinery, then they would be fragmented into movements with conflicting interests. This in turn would weaken the party's control over mass movements, undermine the peasant-worker-merchant-student united front and give rise to class struggle. See "Ch'en Kuo-fu teng t'i-an," in *ibid.*, pp.102-112.

53. *KMWH*, vol. 79, p.88. After the party purge in April 1927, the mass movement was suspended in the areas under Nanking's military control. This practice gradually became the norm when the whole party turned against the CCP in July 1927. In a press interview given in Shanghai on December 13 1927, Chiang declared that all mass movements should be suspended for the time being pending a decision from the party. In his view, the continuation of mass movements at this critical time would only give the communists an opportunity to disrupt social order and sabotage the National Revolution. See Chiang Kai-shek, "Tui-yü shih-chü chi t'an-hua," in *ibid.*, vol. 16, pp.2883-2884.

54. *Ibid.*, vol. 16, pp.2889-2890.

55. *Ibid.*, vol. 16, p.2893.
56. *Ibid.*, vol. 16, p.2892.
57. For an account of the Chinan Incident, see Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.108-123; Keiji Furuya, *Chiang Kai-shek: his life and time*, pp.239-249.
58. Two major Leftist journals, *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin*, were full of articles urging the party to take an intransigent stand in the Chinan Incident. See issue no. 3 of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*. See also Kuan Fu, "Wai-chiao cheng-ts'e yü tsui-chin wai-chiao shih-chien," *CC*, 1.1:17-34 (June 1 1928); P'an Yün-ch'ao, "Tsui-chin t'an wai-chiao ti chi-ko ts'o-wu i-chien," *ibid.*, 1.2:27-35 (June 16 1928).
59. "Wang Fa-ch'in Wang Lo-p'ing P'an Yün-ch'ao chu hsien-sheng chih chung-yang han," *ibid.*, 1.1:72-74 (June 1 1928).
60. Liu K'an-yuan, "Wo-men tang tsen-yang yung-hu ti-wu-tz'u hui-i," *KMPL*, 15:8 (August 13 1928); I Tzu, "Ti-wu-tz'u hui-i ti ch'ien-tu," *CC*, 1.3:1 (July 1 1928); Lang Yen, "Ti-wu-tz'u hui-i mien-mien kuan," *Kuan-ch'e*, 2:5-10 (June 24 1928).
61. Liu K'an-yuan, "Wo-men tang tsen-yang yung-hu ti-wu-tz'u hui-i," *KMPL*, 15:8-9 (August 13 1928); I Tzu, "Ti-wu-tz'u hui-i ti ch'ien-tu," *CC*, 1.3:1-6 (July 1 1928); I Ai, "Wu-tz'u hui-i sheng chung hui-hsiang tao ssu-tz'u hui-i," *ibid.*, 1.3:1-22; Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Wo-men tui-yü ti-wu-tz'u hui-i tsui-hsiao hsien-tu ti yao-chiao," *ibid.*, 1.3:1-6 (July 1 1928); Ch'en Keng-sheng, "Wei chu-hsi wen-t'i kao ko-ming ti wei-yuan," *Kuan-ch'e*, 9:1-3 (August 5 1928).
62. In June 1928 the Standing Committee of the CEC passed a resolution to convene the Fifth Plenum on July 15. On July 9 the Standing Committee agreed to postpone the plenum until August 1. A preliminary meeting of the Fifth Plenum assembled on August 1 but the official opening of the Plenum was on August 8 and it lasted until August 15. See "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.23:1 (June 17 1928), 5.28:1-2 (July 22 1928), 5.30:1 (August 5 1928).
63. "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng fu chu-fa tsung-chih-pu han," *KMPL*, 2:32-35 (May 14 1928).
64. See, for example, Wu Chih-hui, "Shu Wang Ching-wei tsui-chin yen-lun chi," in *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, pp.928-959; Wang Ching-wei, "I-ko ken-pen kuan-nien," *KMPL*, 12:1-2 (July 23 1928).
65. For the heated polemic between Wu Chih-hui and Ch'en Kung-po over the question of attendance, see *KMPL*, 15:51-52 (August 13 1928), 17:44-48 (August 27 1928), 18:59-69 (September 3 1928).

66. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.31:1 (August 12 1928).

67. The seven Leftist leaders who attended the Fifth Plenum were: Chu Chi-ch'ing, Ch'en Shu-jen, Ho Hsiang-ning, Kuo Ch'un-t'ao, P'an Yün-ch'ao, Wang Fa-ch'in, Wang Lo-p'ing. Pai Yün-t'i, a Leftist CEC member who was being impeached by the CSC for his suspected communist connections, did not attend the plenum. For the list of CEC and CSC members who came to the plenum, see *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 2:facing 16 (September 1928).

68. "Ch'ung-hsin ch'üeh-li tang ti chi-ch'u an," in *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.77-83. The proposal was signed by Wang Fa-ch'in, Li Fu-lin, Ch'en Shu-jen, Ho Hsiang-ning, P'an Yün-ch'ao, Ch'en Kung-po, Wang Lo-p'ing and Ku Meng-yü.

69. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.30:2 (August 5 1928).

70. *KMWH*, vol. 79, pp.88-95. In fact, as early as June 4 the Standing Committee of the CEC had drawn up an outline for the mass movement. See *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 1:plan 1-8 (August 1928). The outline was amended on July 8 by the same Committee. See *ibid.*, 2:plan 1-16 (September 1928).

71. During the meeting an intense debate did take place on whether the youth movement should be restored and whether students should be organized into student unions. The party's Mass Training Committee and Ch'en Kuo-fu spoke for the restoration of the youth movement and the establishment of student organizations, whereas Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei was strongly opposed to these views. The Fifth Plenum did not pronounce any judgement on the issue, though it adopted the resolution that the people had the right to form mass organizations. See *ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.43-45. For Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei's view on the youth movement, see "Tui-yü ch'ing-nien yün-tung wen-t'i an," in *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i t'i-an hui-lu*, pp.4-8. For the Mass Training Committee's stand on the youth movement, see *ibid.*, pp.155-157. See also Chi-che, "Ti-wu-tz'u chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ch'üan-t'i ta-hui chi," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.32:3 (August 19 1928). For the KMT Left's stand on the issue, see Ts'un-t'ung, "Lun ch'ing-nien yün-tung," *KMPL*, 15:3-8 (August 13 1928).

72. Chi-che, "Ti-wu-tz'u chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ch'üan-t'i ta-hui chi," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.33:3 (August 26 1928).

73. The KMT Left view on the mass movements was expressed in the "Proposal to reestablish the Party Basis," see *ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i t'i-an hui-lu*, pp.77-83. See also "Shen-ch'a wei-yuan-hui ti-i-ts Shen-ch'a pao-kao," in *ibid.*, p.40.

74. For Miu Pin's and Li Tsung-jen's proposals, see *ibid.*, pp.127-134; and *ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.46-48.

75. The proposal was worked out by the Standing Committee of the CEC which was composed of Chiang Kai-shek, Ting Wei-fen, Tai Chi-t'ao, T'an Yen-k'ai and Yü Yu-jen.

76. "Min-chung yün-tung fang-an an," in *KMWH*, vol. 79, p.90.

77. "Cheng-chih wei-yuan-hui kai-tsuan-an," in *ibid.*, vol. 79, pp.78-79.

78. For a discussion of political manoeuvrings of Chiang Kai-shek and regional militarists from June to August 1928, see Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.162-170.

79. "Cheng-chih fen-hui ts'un-fei an," in *KMWH*, vol. 79, p.101.

80. Apart from the "Proposal to reestablish the Party Basis," two other proposals signed by leading Leftist Central Committee members were put forward to the Fifth Plenum espousing the abolition of Branch Political Councils. See "Ch'ü-hsiao cheng-chih fen-hui an," in *ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i t'i-an hui-lu*, pp.117-118; "Ch'ü-hsiao cheng-chih fen-hui she-li ko-chung chuan-men wei-yuan-hui an," in *ibid.*, pp.96-98.

81. Li Chi-shen, "Tui-yü cheng-chih fen-hui ts'un-fei wen-t'i an," in *ibid.*, pp.77-79.

82. In late 1927 Li Shih-tseng penned an article favouring "decentralized administration and cooperation between Central and regional governments." See *Li Shih-tseng hsien-sheng wen-chi*, pp.251-254. In April 1928, in the letter to the Overseas Party Branch in France, Wang Ching-wei was highly critical of the concept of "decentralized administration and cooperation between Central and regional governments." See "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng fu chu-fa tsung-chih-pu han," *KMPL*, 2:34-35 (May 14 1928). For a collection of articles written by KMT leaders on the subject, see *Fen-chih ho-tso wen-t'i t'ao-lun chi*, ed. Shang-hai chou-pao she.

83. Liu K'an-yuan, "Wu-chung hui-i ti wei-chi yü wo-men ti yao-ch'iu," *KMPL*, 16:3-7 (August 20, 1928).

84. *Ibid.*, Ch'en Kung-po, "Wang-tang ti liang-ta cheng-ts'e," *ibid.*, 17:1-2 (August 27 1928); Hsu Te-heng, "Ch'ing-tang yü? ch'ü wu yü?" *ibid.*, 17:3-6 (August 27 1928). For the Rightist justification of continuing the purge in the KMT, see Huang Chi-lu, "Tuan-chieh tang ti nei-pu yü kuan-ch'e ch'ing-tang," *Tsai-tsao*, 20:10-17 (September 22 1928).

85. Chi-che, "Ti-wu-tz'u chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ch'üan-t'i ta-hui chi," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.32:4 (August 19 1928), 5.33:4 (August 26 1928).

86. For the attendance record of Central Committee members, see *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 2:facing 16 (August 1928).
87. Chi-che, "Ti-wu-tz'u chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ch'üan-t'i ta-hui chi," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.32:4 (August 19 1928), 5.33:4 (August 26 1928).
88. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated October 19 1929, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:59 (November 1984). Actually, in late 1927, the Kwangsi Clique had set down a condition that they would agree to the summoning of the Fourth Plenum only if Chiang did not come to ally with Wang. See Wang Ching-wei's letter dated August 15 1929, to Wang Mou-kung, in *ibid.*, 4:58 (November 1984). See also *Pai Ch'ung-hsi hsien-sheng fan-wen chi-lu*, vol. 2, p.942.
89. For Kan Nai-kuang's dissociation from the KMT Left, see *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.208. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsu p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.279; *She-hui hsin-wen*, 2.14:184 (February 10 1933).
90. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsu p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.279. For Ho Hsiang-ning's resigned attitude towards party affairs after the Fifth Plenum, see Ku Ying, "Tu-pa le Ho Hsiang-ning hsien-sheng hui-tien ti kan-hsiang," *Chih-nan chen*, 2:19-21 (November 15 1928).
91. *KMWH*, vol. 21, pp.4100-4101.
92. Chi-che, "Ti-wu-tz'u chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ch'üan-t'i ta-hui chi," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.33:6 (August 26 1928). Before the Fifth Plenum drew to a close, numerous articles appeared in Leftist journals advocating, among other things, the continuation of the anti-imperialism movement. See for example, Ch'en Kung-po, "Hsi-wang shih-hsien ti ssu-chien shih pu-hui shih-hsien ti i-chien shih," *KMPL*, 14:5-7 (August 8 1928); Liu K'an-yuan, "Wo-men tang tsen-yang yung-hu ti-wu-tz'u hui-i," *ibid.*, 14:7-10; I Ai, "Wu-tz'u hui-i sheng-chung hui-hsiang tao ssu-tz'u hui-i," *CC*, 13:1-22 (July 1 1928); I Tzu, "Ti-wu-tz'u hui-i ti ch'i'en-tu," *ibid.*, 1.3:1-6 (July 1 1928).
93. Wang Wei-min, "Wu-chung ch'üan-hui chih wei-chi," *Kuan-ch'e*, 10:4-6 (August 25 1928); Hsiao Shu-yü, "Hsiang chung-yang ch'eng-ch'ing erh-shih," *KMPL*, 17:7 (August 27 1928); Liu K'an-yuan, "Hsien-shih ti huan-mieh yü tou-cheng chih chi-lieh hua," *ibid.*, 17:7-9 (August 27 1928). Hsiao Shu-yü and Liu K'an-yuan, as we shall discuss in the next chapter, were closely associated with Ch'en Kung-po; Ku Meng-yü and his coterie did not publish any comment on the outcome of the Fifth Plenum.
94. For a brief account of Hu Han-min's political role during the Northern Expedition, see David P. Barrett, "The Role of Hu Hanmin in the 'First United Front': 1922-27," *China Quarterly*, 89:34-64 (March 1982).

95. See, for example, Chao Hui-mo, "Sui-shih wo-men ti ko-ming ling-hsiu," in *Chia-kung chung chih fen-tou*, ed. Chang Pei-hai, pp.12-20; Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, p.409. See also Chiang Kai-shek's speech to a party gathering in Shanghai on November 16 1927, in "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 4.45:1 (November 20 1927).
96. Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, pp.408-412.
97. *Ibid.*, p.404.
98. See Li Shih-tseng's letter, dated May 1 1928 to Chang Ching-chiang, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 2:67-68 (May 1984).
99. Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, p.427.
100. "Hsün-cheng k'ai-shih ying-fou she-li wu-yuan an," in *KMWH*, vol. 79, pp.99-100.
101. Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, pp.431-435.
102. As we have noted, when Hu Han-min was in Europe, he was active in politics and it was reported that he might entertain a plan to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. See Li Shih-tseng's letters to Chang Ching-chiang, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 2:66-70 (May 1984). Hence, when Chiang got wind that Hu Han-min would return to China, he suspected that Hu would ally with the Kwangsi Clique and stage an opposition movement against him. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.182-183.
103. In his reminiscences written in 1933, Hu Han-min claimed that his motive to participate in the Nanking Government in September 1928 was to assist Chiang Kai-shek in the national reconstruction of China. See Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung chih chi-chien shih-shih," *San-min chu-i yüeh-k'an*, 2.6:106-107 (December 15 1933).
104. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated October 19 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:59 (November 1984).
105. Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, pp.431-432.
106. In January 1929, the Nanking Government convened a Disarmament and Rehabilitation Conference to discuss ways to disband troops. Hu Han-min unreservedly supported Chiang Kai-shek in calling for the reduction of the number of troops and urged Li Chi-shen and Li Tsung-jen to agree to such an idea. See *ibid.*, pp.441-444.
107. For the military conflict between the Nanking Government and the Kwangsi Clique in March 1929, see Chapter 4. At the time when war broke out between Nanking and Kwangsi, Li Chi-shen, who was in Nanking to attend the Third National Party

Congress, was detained by Chiang Kai-shek. Through Ku Ying-fen, Hu Han-min's intimate associate in Canton, the Nanking Government was able to secure the support of Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Li's subordinate in Kwangtung. See Li Chi-shen, "Li Chi-shen hsien-sheng lüeh-li," pp.141-142; Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, pp.268-270; Ch'en Chi-t'ang, *Ch'en Chi-t'ang tzu-chuan kao*, pp.32-34.

108. In September 1928, there were seven full members on the Standing Committee of the CEC: Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min, Sun Fo, Tai Chi-t'ao, T'an Yen-k'ai, Ting Wei-fen, and Yü Yu-jen. In the new National Government in Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek was Chairman of its Government Council; T'an Yen-k'ai was President of the Executive Yuan; Hu Han-min, President of the Legislative Yuan; Wang Ch'ung-hui, President of the Judicial Yuan, Tai Chi-t'ao, President of the Examination Yuan, and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, President of the Control Yuan. See "Chiang wei-yuan chung-cheng tui ti-san-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui chi tang-wu pao-kao," in *KMWH*, vol. 76, pp.122, 126.

109. In December 1928 Yen Hsi-shan's man in Nanking reported that Chiang Kai-shek had allied with Hu Han-min in public, but behind the scenes he was still closely associated with the KMT Left. See YHSA, Pei-fa hou chih chung-yang cheng-chü, Chang T'ien-shu to Yen Hsi-shan, December 4 1928.

CHAPTER 2

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE KUOMINTANG LEFT: THE FORMULATION OF THE LEFTIST ALTERNATIVE

The year 1928 witnessed a period of heated ideological debates in the history of the KMT. The future course of the National Revolution and the party was at stake. The KMT now had to grope for a new orientation after the purge in 1927 had brought in its train ideological confusion among party members. Various factions in the party began to speak out their views in earnest. As a result, a spate of journals affiliated with these factions sprang up in 1928, among which the best known were the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* (Revolutionary Critic), *Ch'ien-chin* (Advance), *Tsai-tsao* (Reconstruction), *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng* (Call of the Youth) and *Hsin sheng-ming* (New Life).¹ Meanwhile, three important works by Nanking's theoreticians, Hu Han-min's *The Circular Nature of the Three People's Principles*, Tai Chi-t'ao's *The Way for the Youth* and Chou Fo-hai's *The Theoretical System of the Three People's Principles*, went to press to justify the official course of the party.² The whole KMT was enveloped in an atmosphere of ideological fermentation.

In the Leftist camp Ch'en Kung-po became the leading figure in articulating the Left's views after the retirement of Wang Ching-wei to Europe. The break with the communists and the deradicalization line imposed by the Fourth Plenum provoked Ch'en to rethink Sun Yat-sen's doctrine and the future of the National Revolution. His two celebrated pamphlet-treatises, *What does the KMT represent?* (first appeared in October 1927) and *The Crisis of the National Revolution and Our Mistakes* (published in successive issues of the journal *Kung-hsien* from March to April 1928), were attempts to give a sense of direction to the KMT after the party purge. They were enthusiastically received by the party's rank and file and the youth. To appeal to this mass constituency, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü then decided to launch Leftist journals in Shanghai where they had taken refuge after the Canton debacle in December 1927. Eventually two Leftist journals were published, the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* under the editorship of Ch'en and the *Ch'ien-chin* under Ku.³ As many as 40 other Leftist journals emerged about the same time echoing the views expressed in the two journals.⁴

An important fact to note is that Wang Ching-wei was not involved in this

enterprise to build a Leftist ideology, though no doubt he did follow the events from afar. Since December 1927 he had publicly announced his retirement from politics and retreated to Europe. Thereafter he wrote several articles on the party disputes of 1924-27 with an eye to settle scores with Nanking's leading spokesman, Wu chih-hui;⁵ and occasionally he intervened behind the scenes to reconcile a few ideological disputes between Ch'en and Ku.⁶ But he kept a discreet political distance from them and gave a free hand to them in interpreting Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. In these circumstances, both Ch'en and Ku became identified as the two undisputed theoreticians of the KMT Left in 1928. Of the two Ch'en stood out as the man who armed the Left with an ideology which in many significant ways differed from the official doctrine of the Nanking leadership. He succeeded in raising the Leftist ideology to a new dimension and outgrowing the theoretical framework provided by Wang Ching-wei. The much talked about Leftist alternative was formulated at this time.

The Intellectual Orientation of Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü

The Leftist ideology developed by Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü did not spring from the same intellectual source. Ch'en Kung-po was Marxist-oriented in his thinking while Ku Meng-yü was anti-Marxist. Differences of intellectual orientation between the two men resulted in a bifurcated Leftist ideology. In the early period of Ch'en Kung-po's career, we find that he had a close association with the communists. In the early 1920s, he was once a leading figure in the communist organization in Kwangtung and a founding member of the CCP. From 1922 to 1924 before he joined the KMT in Canton, he studied in the United States and took a great interest in Marxism.⁷ It was during this period that he was influenced by Marxist ideas and at the time when he launched the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, he was not hesitant in employing them in ideological discussions.⁸ Indeed, Ch'en showed no pretence of his views in public. In *What does the KMT represent?* he stated that he had borrowed communist terms in expounding his theory. He added that he would not refrain from using them even if they originated from the communists. He would use these terms so long as they were in accord with "scientific usage" and "facts."⁹ Moreover, his conception of history and his philosophical outlook bore indelible marks of Marxist influence. In his pamphlet *Revolutions in Chinese history* published in December 1928, Ch'en professed to believe in "historicism (*li-shih p'ai*),"¹⁰ an euphemism for Marx's historical materialism. Like all orthodox Marxists, Ch'en held that "politics and institutions are merely the reflections of economic structure."¹¹ He applied economic interpretation of history to various periods of Chinese history and claimed to have proved its validity. Ch'en was fully aware that his economic interpretation of history would be labelled as being more

or less identical with historical materialism. Yet he declared that he would not mind being branded as such. On the contrary he regretted that as yet no one had employed economic factors to analyse Chinese history and looked forward to seeing that this kind of approach to history would be adopted by scholars in reexamining Chinese history.¹² As to his philosophical outlook, Ch'en took a "materialist point of view (*wu-kuan*)."¹³ He did not elaborate upon this concept in 1928 and it was only in 1936 with the publication of his work, *Revolution and Thought*, that his philosophical outlook was systematically set out.¹⁴ He coined the expression "dynamic materialism (*tung-ti wu-kuan*)" to describe his Weltanschauung -- "matter (*wu*)" and "motion (*tung*)" were the two key philosophical categories in his thinking. This "dynamic materialism" which held "matter" and "motion" as the basic constituents in the world, had an obvious linkage with Engels' dialectical materialism. Unquestionably, Marxist ideas had stamped their mark on Ch'en Kung-po's thinking.

Yet Ch'en could not be counted as a Marxist. As a matter of fact he never professed to be a Marxist and he minced no words about what he believed to be Marx's erroneous ideas. In *What does the KMT represent?* he pointed out that Marx's prognosis of the development of capitalism was not borne out by facts. Marx had predicted that the petite bourgeoisie would be phased out as capitalism developed to its zenith. But, Ch'en noted, statistics showed that in the past 20 years the petite bourgeoisie was on the increase in Britain and the United States. Furthermore, Marx's assertion that the development of capitalism would inexorably lead to its own destruction was proved incorrect by recent events. In spite of the war in 1914-18, capitalism in Britain and the United States survived and sustained itself. The exploitation of colonies by capitalist countries and the increase in the size of the peasantry and the middle class were cited by Ch'en as factors which strengthened capitalism and which were never anticipated by Marx.¹⁵ Indeed, in his later writings Ch'en Kung-po continued to take issue with several aspects of Marx's tenets.¹⁶ This attitude makes one hesitate to regard him as a Marxist. Moreover, though his philosophical standpoint and his conception of history had their origins in dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Ch'en did not altogether embrace the essential concepts in these two doctrines. The three celebrated laws of dialectics (the negation of the negation, the transformation of quantity into quality, the interpenetration of opposites), which are an inalienable and vital part of dialectical materialism, were hardly touched upon in Ch'en's philosophical discourse, not to mention of assimilating them in his thought. The same was true of historical materialism. The essential features of historical materialism -- conceptual frameworks like productive forces, relationships of production, the inherent nature of class struggle in "pre-scientific" society, and all the elaborations about the relationships between superstructure and

infrastructure -- were all lost on him. All these hardly qualified him as a Marxist; at one time Ch'en described himself as an eclectic.¹⁶ Nonetheless, as the essence of Ch'en's weltanschauung was originally inspired by Marx's and Engels' ideas, and as his dynamic materialism and conception of history were filiations from dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Ch'en Kung-po's intellectual orientation perhaps can best be described as Marxist-oriented.

In contrast, Ku Meng-yü was never a Marxist-oriented intellectual. Before joining the KMT in early 1925, Ku was registrar and head of the economics department of Peking University. He had a good grasp of Marxism and once wrote an article refuting Marx's diagnosis on capitalism.¹⁷ Ku never showed any belief in materialism, nor did he think that economic structure was the indispensable underlying factor in understanding history. In his articles contributed to the *Ch'ien-chin*, there is not a scintilla of evidence that Marx's ideas had left any imprint on Ku's thinking. His views on Marx's doctrine were best stated in the article "On Historical Materialism" written in May 1930 in which he disputed the validity of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. In his opinion, although dialectical materialism is the core of Marxism, Marxists in general fail to define it in "scientific terms." Their dialectical materialism, Ku noted, means no more than that all entities in this world have contradictions within themselves and the resolution of which will then bring progress. Several pieces of evidence presented by Marx and Engels in support for dialectical materialism were dismissed by Ku as "metaphysical" and "inscrutable." Ku's main argument was that dialectical materialism which aims at unlocking the logic of nature is simply another kind of metaphysics because it is not based on scientific and empirical grounds. As to historical materialism, Ku did not think that economic structure or technological forces, as believed by Marxists, are the ultimate determinant for superstructure. What he admitted was that economic structure is one of the multifarious factors in shaping social, political and spiritual life. Several historical events were adduced to demonstrate that political institutions, more often than not, had exerted a decisive influence on economic structure. Human knowledge, science, education and ethics, as much as economic factors, play an important role in promoting economic development. Finally, Ku summed up his views by asserting that "after Marx and Engels historical materialism has lapsed into a kind of religious doctrine and is entirely deprived of analytical power."¹⁸ The thrust of the article shows that Ku had tried to refute Marxist ideas from a "scientific" and "empirical" point of view. Viewing through this perspective Ku can be regarded as a crude "positivist" in his outlook.

Differences in intellectual orientation between Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü were bound to be reflected in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and the *Ch'ien-chin*. Ch'en

enlisted a group of Marxist-oriented intellectuals, Hsiao Shu-yü, Hsu Te-heng, Liu K'an-yuan, Ma Chün and Shih Ts'un-t'ung, as regular and principal contributors to the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*.¹⁹ Not much was known about Ma Chün's background, while the rest had received further education abroad and had been old friends of Ch'en's. During the Northern Expedition they were all closely associated with the then Leftist Government in Wuhan.²⁰ Except Hsiao Shu-yü who was not in any way identified with the communists, the other three contributors evinced sympathy with the CCP and its ideology.²¹ Even Ch'en Kung-po had to admit in his memoirs that Shih Ts'un-t'ung and Hsu Te-heng were virtually communist fellow travellers.²² Ideologically speaking, Hsu, Liu and Shih were deeply swayed by Marxist ideas, as was shown in their articles in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and elsewhere. They openly espoused materialism and advocated a "materialist interpretation of the Three People's Principles." Marxist terms like "contradiction (*mao-tun*)," "supersession (*fei-yo*)," "totality (*ch'üan-t'i hsing*)," "superstructure (*shang-ts'eng tsu-chih*)," and "economic infrastructure (*ching-chi tsu-chih wei chi-ch'u*)" appeared in their writings. A case in point was their methodology of grasping "reality" and "social and economic problems." In their view, to understand a fact or phenomenon, "it is necessary to grasp (i) the interconnectedness between various phenomena, (ii) the totality of the phenomenon, (iii) the ever changing and developing process of the phenomenon and (iv) the contradictions within the phenomenon and the conflicts with its opposites."²³ These four principles were simply a paraphrase of Engels' exposition of dialectical materialism in *Anti-Duhring*. That Ch'en Kung-po had gathered around himself a coterie of followers who were Marxist-oriented in their outlook was not disputed. In contrast, this mode of thinking was conspicuously absent in the *Ch'ien-chin*. Of the three identified regular contributors to the *Ch'ien-chin*, Ku Meng-yü, P'an Yün-ch'ao and Wang Lo-p'ing, they exhibited no signs of being influenced by Marxist ideas.²⁴ As a result the ideology of the KMT Left at this time was bifurcated, the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* represented the radical wing of the Left whereas the *Ch'ien-chin* represented the moderate wing.

Despite the division the mainstream of the ideology of the KMT Left can be readily identified. Chou Fo-hai, a leading party member on the Nanking side, and Ho Han-wen, a middle-ranking Leftist, all testified in their recollections that the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* wielded more significant support and influence than the *Ch'ien-chin*.²⁵ Ch'en Kung-po also remarked in his memories that foreign journalists were particularly impressed by the wide circulation enjoyed by his journal.²⁶ Two main factors may account for this widespread support to the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*. First, as a theoretician Ch'en Kung-po was much more eminent than Ku Meng-yü. Ch'en's capacity as a prolific writer and his polemical style were qualities that Ku could not rival to. His two

controversial and penetrating pamphlet-treatises, *What does the KMT represent?* and *The Crisis of the National Revolution and Our Mistakes*, secured his popularity among the party's ranks and established his reputation as the foremost Leftist theoretician. All these were not found in Ku whose inadequacies in these respects could hardly place him on the same footing as Ch'en. Moreover, the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* had set out Sun Yat-sen's doctrine in a radical way which gave expression to the temper and feelings of a large number of rank and file members. After the break with the CCP the party leadership and its rank and file members were actually in two minds with regard to the future course of the party. The majority of the party leadership favoured a deradicalization line and imposed its will on the whole party in the Fourth Plenum. Yet, a significant number of party members were too imbued with revolutionary ideals and slogans of the Northern Expedition to accept such a political line without question. The radical thinking of Ch'en Kung-po and the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* coterie which professed to salvage the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27 thus made a great appeal to them;²⁷ whereas the moderate stand taken by the *Ch'ien-chin* was not in tune with the revolutionary mood of the time and was comparatively far weaker in its appeal. In the shaping of the Leftist ideology, Ch'en Kung-po and his followers played the predominant part and typified the ideological mainstream of the KMT Left.

At the time when the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin* started publication, the "Wang-Chiang understanding" was still in the air and the two journals did receive subsidies from Chiang Kai-shek. Yet the polemical and critical style of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* irked the Nanking authorities; subsequently as the Chiang-Hu duumvirate was formed in late 1928, the Nanking leadership suppressed the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* in September 1928.²⁸ A new journal *Min-chung hsien-feng* (People's Vanguard) was published as a sequel in January and lasted to February 1929. Contributors to the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* continued to write for the *Min-chung hsien-feng*; only Ch'en Kung-po did not regularly write for it because, under pressure from Chiang Kai-shek, he left for Europe to join Wang Ching-wei in January 1929.²⁹ Ku Meng-yü's *Ch'ien-chin* with its moderate views was tolerated by Nanking and continued publication until January 1929. It is not exactly known why the *Min-chung hsien-feng* and *Ch'ien-chin* stopped publication in early 1929.³⁰ Taking their places were new journals like *Min-i* (published from March to May 1929), *Min-hsin* (June 1929) and *Min-chu* (July 1929 - January 1930) which became the main propaganda organs of the Left in 1929 to early 1930.

In the short publication history of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, *Min-chung hsien-feng* and *Ch'ien-chin*, a well-recognized body of Leftist ideology took shape. As these three journals were intended to provide a free forum for Leftist theoreticians to propagate

their views, no effort was ever made by them during this period to systematize their various strands of ideas. Articles written for the journals sometimes reflected the individual views of the contributor rather than the KMT Left as a whole. However, the three journals certainly were rich in ideas and taken as a whole they propounded a Leftist alternative to the official line pursued by Nanking. In the main this diverse and rich corpus of Leftist writings revolved upon four important ideological issues: (i) a new reorganization of the KMT; (ii) the class base of the KMT, (iii) the nature and direction of the National Revolution and (iv) anti-imperialism, mass movements and land policies. Accordingly these four main issues will constitute the framework for our exposition of the KMT Left's ideology in 1928.

A New Reorganization of the Kuomintang

After the KMT had turned against the communists and embarked upon a deradicalization course, there was a widespread belief among party members that the National Revolution was aborted. Journals published by various factions in the party often echoed this view.³¹ Yet, it was the KMT Left who pounded this point home. Taking the lead in this direction was Ch'en Kung-po whose work *The Crisis of the National Revolution and Our Mistakes* forcibly argued that the revolution had aborted and it presented a detailed analysis of why it failed. His views were repeated in his articles contributed to the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and finally in *The Future of the Chinese Revolution* published in March 1929.³² Treading in Ch'en's footsteps were other Leftist theoreticians like Hsu Te-heng, Ma Chün and Shih Ts'un-t'ung who also offered various theories to account for the failure of the National Revolution. In their opinions, the world-wide stabilization of capitalist system, the sabotage of the Chinese Revolution by "imperialist powers, the Third International and domestic feudal forces," the disunity of revolutionary leadership and a weakened KMT infiltrated by the "degenerates and the anti-revolutionaries" were the main reasons for the failure of the Chinese National Revolution.³³ These opinions were also shared by Ku Meng-yü's coterie. That the National Revolution had aborted became an article of faith among the Left. The question now was how to revive the revolution.

Reorganizing (*kai-tsü*) the party was the answer given to this question by the Left.³⁴ The rationale for a new reorganization of the party was systematically expounded by Ch'en Kung-po.³⁵ Basically his arguments for a reorganization boiled down to two main points. In the first place, the KMT after the purge was in a shattered state -- "regionalism," "individualism," "leftist deviation," "rightist deviation," "corruption" and "degeneration" had permeated the whole party.³⁶ As Ch'en explained:

My idea [for a new reorganization of the party], in short, is due to the fact that the party has been pervaded with regionalism and individualism and its organization has been almost non-existent. At present, the party, to say the least, has been dominated by several regional groups and its members have formed numerous factions. The Party Central cannot exercise control over these regional groups and the party branches have been forced to comply with the wishes of regional military forces. Within the numerous factions, division of opinions abounds and personal enmities preclude bringing unity [to the whole party]. Under these circumstances, we not only cannot achieve the Three People's Principles, the future of the party is also in serious danger.³⁷

Thus, a reorganization of the party was needed. Moreover, in Ch'en's revolutionary schema, he assigned a pivotal role for the party in the revolution. Ch'en envisaged that the KMT should take upon its shoulders three important revolutionary missions: the National Revolution to attain liberty and equality for China; the World Revolution to lead the peoples of the East to struggle against imperialism; the Cultural Revolution to weed out feudal system and thoughts.³⁸ These broad visions apart, the party was also the indispensable vehicle to realize two other important revolutionary goals which Ch'en always emphasized -- the realization of the Principle of People's Livelihood and the elimination of class differences. The logic behind this argument was set forth by him in detail. Ch'en stated that the ultimate goal to which China should evolve was the Principle of People's Livelihood and not capitalism. Yet both big and middle capitalists were against this ultimate goal. To realize this Principle, the KMT played a crucial role. It had the tasks to build up state capital and to rally the support of the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie. It had to guide these classes to achieve democracy, then to reconcile their class differences and ultimately to merge them together to become "economic producers in society." Only in this way could the building of a People's Livelihood country be achieved. As the party assumed such a crucial role in revolution, it was a logical step for Ch'en to assert that "party rule (*i-tang chih-kuo*)," or as he sometimes put it, "the dictatorship of the party (*tang-ti chuan-cheng*)," was necessary during the revolutionary period. For him, the KMT should be the only party to direct and carry out the National Revolution; otherwise the revolution would become abortive.³⁹ Ch'en's elaborations on the missions and tasks of the party revealed how important the KMT was to him during the revolution. Only a well-organized and highly disciplined party could fulfil his visions. The then disorganized and divided party could never achieve the revolutionary tasks which were entrusted to the KMT.⁴⁰ Hence, Ch'en concluded, the reorganization of the party was the only solution:

Because we have the Principle of People's Livelihood as our ultimate goal, so we advocate the dicatorship of the party. Because we advocate the dictatorship of the party, so we have to strengthen the organziation of the Chinese Kuomintang. Because we want to strengthen the organization of the

Chinese Kuomintang, so we advocate a reorganization of the party and the wiping out of regionalism and individualism which are the bane of the party.⁴¹

Following the same logic Ku Meng-yü also argued that the party needed strengthening because it played a crucial role in the revolution. Unlike Ch'en Kung-po, Ku did not touch upon the importance of party rule, nor did he elaborate on the revolutionary missions placed upon the shoulders of the KMT. However, similar to Ch'en, Ku did explicitly state that a strengthened party was a prerequisite to solve current political and military issues.⁴² This agreement between the two sides was fully revealed when the Left submitted the "Proposal to reestablish the Party Basis" to the Fifth Plenum which placed its heavy emphasis on the strengthening of the party.⁴³

In fact, it was a general consensus among party members that their party needed strengthening.⁴⁴ Different factions in the party used different terms to denote this common idea. To "rebuild (*tsai-tsao*)" the party was the term employed by Sun Fo's followers and the Western Hills Group;⁴⁵ to "reform (*cheng-li*)" the party was a term popularized by Wu Chih-hui and was the official expression of the Nanking leadership;⁴⁶ while to "reorganize (*kai-tsu*)" the party was advocated by the KMT Left. Although they all aimed at the strengthening of the party, their means to achieve it were somehow different. According to the Nanking leadership, to "reform" the party had already been carried out after the Fourth Plenum which had passed several resolutions to revamp and strengthen the party. A reregistration of party members was then underway and was considered by Nanking to be an effective means to strengthen the party.⁴⁷ As to followers of Sun Fo and the Western Hills Group, their methods to "rebuild" the party were the summoning of a new Party Congress and the setting up of a Provisional Party Central to oversee all the rebuilding work.⁴⁸ The Leftist idea of a reorganization of the party, Ch'en Kung-po vehemently pointed out, was completely different from "reforming" or "rebuilding" the party.⁴⁹ What, then, was the meaning of "*kai-tsu*"?

The leadership of the Left agreed that a new reorganization of the party should be based upon the Spirit of the 1924 Reorganization. Drawing on Wang Ching-wei's writings in late 1927, both the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin* gave a concrete definition of this abstract Spirit of the Reorganization. For them, concrete manifestations of this spirit consisted of the following: the party adopted a non-compromising revolutionary stand and affirmed that only by revolutionary means could China be saved; the extirpation of "imperialism, feudalism and warlord-bureaucratic regime" became the goals of the revolution; the policies of "awakening of the people" and "helping the peasants and workers" were endorsed; a well-organized, disciplined and democratic party backed by mass support was established. This spirit of the Reorganization, claimed the Left, enabled the party to pursue a correct political line

and consequently brought about the success of the Northern Expedition. Yet, after the purge this Spirit was lost to the party as it was increasingly dominated by reactionary forces. The restoration of the Spirit of the Reorganization in the KMT now became the urgent task for party members.⁵⁰

In the opinions of Ch'en Kung-po and Shih Ts'un-t'ung, the new reorganization was not merely a recapture of the Spirit of the 1924 Reorganization, it was also to take a new form. Ch'en stated that in a new reorganized party the quality and financial conditions of party members should be paid attention to. He suggested that party members should meet the requirement of understanding and supporting the Three People's Principles and party's platforms, manifestoes and resolutions. Besides, he expected that party members should lead an ascetic life and was strongly opposed to recruiting "anti-revolutionaries" into the party, a practice which he noted had already rendered the party "degenerate" and "reactionary". Ch'en also proposed to establish economic cooperatives for both urban and rural party members. In his scheme, urban party members should establish various kinds of cooperatives at the *chü* level while rural members should lump their land and labour together into economic cooperatives. They could transform small-scale farming into large-scale farming, accumulate capital and set up self-government units in the rural areas which could become the basis for the building of democracy in China. More importantly, under such a scheme Ch'en conceived that a strong economic link could be forged between the party and its members -- it would strengthen *esprit de corps* of the KMT.⁵¹ Likewise, in his conception of a new reorganized party, Shih Ts'un-t'ung laid stress on the quality of party members and a tight party organization.⁵² In particular, Shih singled out two important measures to be carried out for a reorganized party. He advocated that the party should be democratized and be linked up with the masses. Democratizing the party meant that elections should be reinstated at every level of party hierarchy and all policies should be decided by democratic procedures. Shih opined that it was the party leadership, not the rank and file, who was responsible for the degeneration of the party. The restoration of election, in Shih's calculation, could enable the party's rank and file to check the degeneration of the party leadership and ultimately expel the "degenerates" in the party. Furthermore, the party should be integrated with the masses by recruiting its members from the masses, reflecting their interests and being supervised by them. In this way, the party would then link up with "revolutionary masses" and its "revolutionary spirit" be fostered. Besides, Shih did not scruple to propound ideas which obviously went beyond the Spirit of the Reorganization. He suggested that a "new revolutionary platform" going beyond the ideological stands of the First and Second Party Congresses was now necessary in view of the new revolutionary situation. More striking was his other suggestion that a "revolutionary Three People's Principles" should be the ideology

of the KMT, by which he meant a "materialist interpretation of the Three People's Principles."⁵³ This was a significant ideological stride in its attempt to wed Sun Yat-sen's doctrine to materialism. The idea remained only in its nascent form and no further attempt at elaborating it was undertaken.

More than anything, however, it was Ch'en Kung-po's conception of the composition of the party that distinguished the Leftist idea of reorganization from those of the rest of the party. In his *What does the KMT represent?*, Ch'en declared that:

I always think that whether a party is well-organized and well-trained does not entirely depend on whether its discipline and organization is tight or loose. It also depends on the composition of the party. If we think that the Chinese National Revolution is a movement uniting the oppressed classes in the country against imperialism and warlordism, if we think that the forces for National Revolution are composed of the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie, in particular, with the peasantry and the working class as its main forces, then the party should be composed of the following:

| | % of party members |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| peasantry | 50% |
| working class | 30% |
| petite bourgeoisie | 20% |

Ch'en thought that with this composition the KMT would then turn into a well-organized and well-trained party, otherwise it could never become an efficiently organized party.⁵⁴ The underlying assumption behind this conception was that the revolutionary classes in the National Revolution were composed of the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie (an idea which we will deal with in the following section). Thus only a party recruiting its members entirely from these "revolutionary classes" could ensure its leadership to be revolutionary and its hierarchy well-organized. Conversely, a party without such a composition would surely lose its revolutionary spirit, its organizational structure would become lax and the party would degenerate into a "power-holders' club."⁵⁵ Ch'en's conception of the composition of the party naturally startled the Nanking leadership as it boldly raised the sensitive class issue to the open. It was obviously inspired by communist theory⁵⁶ and went beyond the pronouncements of Wang Ching-wei. Hence the idea was not endorsed by the *Ch'ien-chin* group which firmly stuck to the ideological framework of Wang. However, Ch'en's conception was well received in the party's ranks and it became the centrepiece of the Leftist idea of reorganization.

The Class Base of the Kuomintang

The class base of the KMT was never at issue in the party before the purge. At the time it was commonly agreed that the KMT represented "the people," "the general populace" or "the oppressed people" during the National Revolution and there was no urges to define these vague concepts in class terms.⁵⁷ However, after the purge the rethinking of the party's doctrine led to the eruption of the class issue. Again it was Ch'en Kung-po who took the lead in opening the question. In his *What does the KMT represent?*, he propounded that the KMT should represent and be based on the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie.⁵⁸ This immediately provoked hectic responses in the party and led to the crystallization of two other different lines of thinking.

The official line was represented by Wu Chih-hui and P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei (a middle ranking party member who made himself a name by challenging the theses in *What does the KMT represent?*) who argued that the KMT should represent "the whole people (*ch'üan-min*)" during the National Revolution. Wu reasoned that the Chinese National Revolution was for "the whole people;" any individual, including the landlord and gentry, should be welcomed to participate in the revolution. Only warlords, local bullies and evil gentry by their very nature should be banished from the revolution.⁵⁹ P'eng shared the same view and in particular took issue with Ch'en Kung-po's opinion that the Chinese bourgeoisie should not be counted among revolutionary forces.⁶⁰ The official thinking had in fact been expressed in the Manifesto of the Fourth Plenum which declared that the KMT represented the interests of the people and not any specific class.⁶¹ The other line of thinking was set forth by an obscure party member, Ching P'o, who advocated that the KMT was to represent the interests of "all oppressed revolutionary masses" and not any particular class or group. In Ching Po's view, the common enemies of the "oppressed masses" were "imperialism and feudalism." Any class, including the bourgeoisie, which opposed the common enemies should be included in the revolutionary forces and represented by the KMT. He saw no reason why so much emphasis should be placed on the class concept. He suggested that the KMT should be a party above all classes in order to reconcile different interests of the people.⁶² Vehement polemics for a time were waged in the party's journals over the issue.⁶³ It not only sharply divided the KMT Left from the Nanking leadership but was also the most controversial subject among the Leftists themselves.

The issue over the class base of the KMT centred around three aspects: the class structure and class struggle in China; the class base of the KMT; the attitude of each class towards the National Revolution. Ch'en Kung-po's *What does the KMT represent?* set the stage for the thinking of his followers in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* coterie.

In response to the prevailing atmosphere in the KMT which almost made discussions on class a taboo, Ch'en Kung-po followers manifestly stated that class as such did exist in China. In the article "The Problems of the Chinese Revolution," Shih Ts'un-t'ung best summarized the position of the Left:

[History] shows that the revolutions are linked up with class relationships. Without the existence of class, there will be no revolution. Class is the most important question in revolution. It is ludicrous to see that people refrain from talking about class because they are afraid of inciting class struggle. In fact, the existence of class does not depend on our subjective thinking; instead it depends on objective facts. At the present time the existence of class in Chinese society is an objective fact.

After noting numerous strikes by Shanghai workers and riots by peasants in Hunan and Hupei during the Northern Expedition, Shih contended that class struggle had occurred in China and asserted that:

We should know that in a class society, class struggle can never be abolished. It will only be abolished when revolution has succeeded and abolished classes.⁶⁴

That Chinese society was a class society was the accepted fact among the writers for the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*.⁶⁵ Yet Ch'en Kung-po was more cautious than Shih on the question of class struggle in China. He used the expression "disorderly struggles among classes (*to chieh-chi ti hun-tou*)" to describe class conflict in China and used it as a substitute for the term "class struggle (*chieh-chi tou-cheng*)."⁶⁶ To Ch'en, China was still a backward country and did not have any independent and organized classes such as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in advanced countries. Without a well-defined class structure, Chen stated, "class struggle" in the sense used by "scientific socialists" could not happen in China. And in an indistinct class structure society, only "disorderly struggles among classes" would occur.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, despite this finer shade of differences in Ch'en's coterie, the existence of class struggle in Chinese society was on the whole accepted by them.

On the question of the class base of the KMT, Ch'en Kung-po audaciously propounded that the party should represent and be based on the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie. He supported his theory mainly in a negative manner -- he argued that the bourgeoisie would not support the National Revolution and hence only the above three classes remained the "revolutionary classes" in China. Three main reasons were put forward to explain why the bourgeoisie could not be a revolutionary ally. First, the KMT could not arouse the support from the bourgeoisie. Ch'en argued that the urban bourgeoisie was a by-product of imperialism and its future was dependent on it. The overthrow of imperialism inevitably would bring about its collapse and hence

it would not support the National Revolution which was against imperialism. As regards the rural bourgeoisie, it was a product of the feudal system and therefore would not join the National Revolution which had anti-feudalism as its aim. In this way only the peasants, the workers and the petite bourgeoisie supported the National Revolution and the KMT had no other forces to turn to except these three classes. Secondly, the ideology and platform of the party did not represent the interests of the bourgeoisie. The principles of "restriction of private capital" and "equalization of land rights," the domestic platform and various resolutions of the party were cited by Ch'en as evidence that the KMT promoted the interests of the peasantry and the working class but not the bourgeoisie. How could the party, Ch'en asked rhetorically, expect support from the bourgeoisie? Lastly, only an insignificant number of party members came from the bourgeoisie. Ch'en quoted some statistical figures compiled by the party which showed that the composition of the party was as follows: 60% came from the peasants, 35% from the workers and the remainder from the petite bourgeoisie. The big bourgeoisie perhaps constituted no more than 0.04% of the party membership. Based on these figures, the party should realize in which classes its mass support lay. Besides, Ch'en added, Sun Yat-sen once said that the Chinese National Revolution should accomplish social revolution in order to forestall the rise of the bourgeoisie. This thinking further demonstrated that the KMT should not represent the interests of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, the underlying assumption as to why the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie were the main revolutionary forces in the National Revolution was that these three classes were the most oppressed in Chinese society. Thus Ch'en confidently concluded that the KMT could only represent these three classes but not the bourgeoisie in the National Revolution.⁶⁷

Elaborating on Ch'en's thesis was the other leading Leftist theoretician, Shih Ts'un-t'ung. Mainly he contributed two things to the discussions on the class base of the party. First, he refined the concept of petite bourgeoisie. This concept as used by Ch'en was rather vague; it included small landlords, small merchants, the professionals, the handicraft factory workers, the majority of the peasants and the students.⁶⁸ To give a more clear-cut concept, Shih instead used the term urban petite bourgeoisie which comprised small merchants, handicraft factory owners and intellectuals, excluding the peasantry from the petite bourgeoisie category.⁶⁹ To this refinement Ch'en Kung-po gave his consent.⁷⁰ Secondly, Shih Ts'un-t'ung gave a detailed analysis of the attitude of each major class in Chinese society towards the National Revolution and explained why the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie were the revolutionary classes in China.⁷¹ According to Shih, Chinese society at that time as a "patriarchal and feudal (*tsung-fa feng-chien*) society" dominated by imperialism. He discerned a division of Chinese society into two parts: the anti-revolutionary classes (i.e. the feudal

class and the bourgeoisie) and the revolutionary classes (i.e. the working class, the peasantry and the urban petite bourgeoisie). The feudal class, "the ruling class in Chinese society," was further subdivided by Shih into two groups: the warlord-bureaucrats and the landlords. For Shih, warlords and bureaucrats had established a symbiotic relationship and they supported each other in order to buttress their feudal control over China. They collaborated with imperialism and sold out the country for their self-interest. The landlords, especially the big landlords, or the so-called "local bullies and bad gentry," were the tools of both imperialism and warlord-bureaucrats in the exploitation of the peasantry. In short, the feudal class was the main force and the core of the anti-revolutionaries in China. As regards the bourgeoisie, Shih divided them into two distinct parts: the compradors and the national bourgeoisie. The compradors were economically subservient to imperialism and as such they would not support the revolution. The national bourgeoisie, oppressed by imperialism and warlords, had once participated in the National Revolution. Yet the lack of strength of this class and the fact that most of it originated from the compradors prevented this class from earnestly joining the revolution. Shih thought that the bourgeoisie as a class had already withdrawn from the revolutionary front and sided with imperialism and feudal class. "At present, the reactionary situation in China," concluded Shih, "hinges upon the domestic feudal class and its accomplice -- the bourgeoisie."⁷²

Shih then came to examine the situation of the revolutionary classes. To him, the working class was composed of the proletariat and the handicraft workers. The May Thirtieth Movement and the Canton-Hong Kong strike demonstrated that the workers had stood on "the forefront of the revolutionary movement" and were "the most revolutionary among the people." Like Ch'en Kung-po, Shih noted that the working class was not yet strong enough to carry out the revolution by itself, nonetheless, it could be organized into the most effective revolutionary force. Turning to the peasantry, Shih regarded it as a heterogeneous group and divided it into the rich peasants, the owner-farmers, the part owner-farmers, the tenants and the farm labourers. In his view, the rich peasants were the exploiters in the rural areas and they would not join the revolution. The owner-farmers were inclined to keeping the status quo and probably would not espouse the revolutionary cause. Only the part owner-farmers, tenants and particularly farm labourers who led a hard life and were exploited by landlords, would earnestly support the revolution. The other revolutionary class was the urban petite bourgeoisie which was composed of the handicraft factory owners, the small merchants and intellectuals (including students). In Shih's view, the handicraft factory owners and small merchants, oppressed by imperialism and the bourgeoisie, were clearly "at the end of their resources" and the only alternative open to them was to join the revolution. Intellectuals, except the upper strata of them which

had compromised with the ruling class, were largely unemployed and dissatisfied with political and economic situations. For some time they had been well acquainted with the revolutionary movement in China and would constitute an important revolutionary force. Shih saw that the three revolutionary classes had identical interests:

These three revolutionary classes are now all oppressed by imperialism, the feudal class and bourgeoisie. Hence, they strive for their liberation from these oppressors. ... At present, the aim of these three classes is the realization of the revolutionary Three People's Principles. They demand the overthrow of imperialism in order to liberate the nation (the Principle of nationalism), they demand the extermination of feudal forces in order to build a revolutionary democratic government (the Principle of democracy), and they demand the building of state capital, restriction of private capital, equalization of landlords' land and socialist reconstruction in order to exterminate the bourgeoisie (the Principle of People's Livelihood). They aim to realize the Three People's Principles by bringing about 'equality among the nations,' 'political equality,' 'economic equality' and a non-capitalist society.

Finally, Shih advocated "a revolutionary alliance of the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie" in order to achieve the "revolutionary Three People's Principles."⁷³

That the KMT should represent the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie, that its class base should be built upon these three classes and that the party should forge a revolutionary alliance of these three classes became the cornerstone of the Leftist writings on this subject. Both Ch'en Kung-po and Shih Ts'un-t'ung succeeded in bringing the majority of the KMT Left to accept these propositions. However, it was these ideas to which Ku Meng-yü's coterie raised vehement objections.

As early as August 1927, responding to the communist assertion that the CCP represented the proletariat, Ku Meng-yü repeated the then accepted doctrine that "the KMT represents all oppressed people in the country"⁷⁴ and made it clear that "the KMT does not need and cannot have a class base."⁷⁵ When *What does the KMT represent?* was published, no ideological debate immediately broke out between Ch'en and Ku. But these latent differences finally came to the open when on July 1 1928, a writer with the pen-name Kuan Fu, published an article "The KMT and the petite bourgeoisie" in the *Ch'ien-chin* which challenged Ch'en's ideas. The class base of the KMT then became an issue sharply divided Ch'en's and Ku's followers.

The central argument advanced by Ku Meng-yü and Kuan Fu in demolishing Ch'en Kung-po's views was that class on the whole did not exist in Chinese society. Ku Meng-yü, followed by Kuan Fu, divided society into two types: the "occupational society (*chih-yeh she-hui*)" and the "class society (*chieh-chi she-hui*)."⁷⁶ Division of labour resulted in the creation of different occupations in society and this type of society

was termed by them an "occupational society." In the "occupational society," they noted, "economic interests of different sections of people vary. And because of these varied economic interests, differences in social status, ideology and opinions arise." Under such a system, somehow a social division between "the exploiter and the exploited" would gradually emerge. With the widespread proliferation of this kind of division, a "class society" would finally be formed. Yet, Chinese society, they believed, was still at the stage of "occupational society" and it had not developed into a "class society." To Ku Meng-yü and Kuan Fu, the concept of class should be used in a strictly defined way. Ku thought that class could only exist in two historical periods: first the Middle Ages with the feudal class and the serfdom; then the Modern Age with the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Chinese society at the time fitted neither into these two periods. The feudal class, feudal system and serfdom presently did not exist in China; neither were the bourgeoisie and the proletariat well developed. Without a distinct class structure in Chinese society, Ku saw no reason why the KMT should need and could have a class base.⁷⁶ Echoing Ku's views, Kuan Fu suggested that "class society" could only be formed "under certain developed economic conditions" and surely could not be "invented by subjective thinking." "As China has not yet undergone industrial revolution, certainly there is no division into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat." And "without the formation of a big bourgeoisie," Kuan Fu asked rhetorically, "how can the petite bourgeoisie be identified?" He also pointedly added that the communists always emphasized the differentiation of classes because they believed in class struggle and wanted to fulfil their ambition of establishing a "proletarian dictatorship." And to give his arguments an official endorsement, Kuan Fu cited the Manifestoes of the First and Second Congresses and the accompanying resolutions as evidence to show that "the majority of the people," "the general populace," "the oppressed masses," but not any particular classes, were entrusted to carry out the National Revolution. Ch'en Kung-po's theory of the class base of the KMT, "though praiseworthy in its attempt to prevent the National Revolution from becoming a bourgeois revolution," was "not properly expressed." Kuan Fu concluded that the KMT should only represent "the majority of the people," "the general populace" and the "oppressed masses." It was practically impossible and theoretically unnecessary to differentiate between classes during the Chinese National Revolution.⁷⁷

This serious ideological division within the KMT Left in the end brought Wang Ching-wei to mediate between the two sides. Wang himself had his own opinion about the class base of the KMT. On November 11 1927, in a speech given to party members in Canton, Wang asserted that there was no distinct class in China as she was still economically backward with no big industry, capital and commercial activities.

Moreover, "from a broader social context," imperialism was the "biggest oppressor class" over entire Chinese society and all social classes in China were simply the "oppressed class." For that reason the Chinese National Revolution should be undertaken by an alliance of all Chinese people against imperialism. In fact, Wang made it clear that "the KMT is not a party of any single class, rather it is a party of all oppressed people."⁷⁸ This line of thinking reappeared in May 1928. In a letter to his close associate Lin Po-sheng, Wang embraced Lin's suggestion that the KMT should be composed of the most revolutionary elements from all classes in China. The party did not represent any single class, nor was it an alliance of all classes; rather it should be "a revolutionary party above all classes."⁷⁹ This idea was deprecated by Ch'en Kung-po as it belittled the importance of class issue.⁸⁰ On this question, the ideological gap between Wang and Ch'en for the first time became evident. On the whole Wang's idea was nearer to the Ku Meng-yü group which took the stand that the KMT should represent "the oppressed people."

Wang Ching-wei's mediation finally brought about a compromise between Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü in about November 1928. Ch'en agreed to substitute "common citizens (*hsiao shih-min*)," a term favoured by Ku, for "petite bourgeoisie."⁸¹ Ku also made concessions. In an article published in the *Ch'ien-chin* on November 1 1928, Ku explicitly admitted that class and class struggle did exist and could not be denied. He also agreed that many hidden casual relationships could be discovered when history was analysed in class terms. However, he did caution against the view that all history was just a history of class struggle and that all important historical phenomena were just the reflections of class divisions. Two more significant ideological points were tacitly admitted by Ku. First, he was prepared to admit that class existed in China. In the article, Ku divided the concept of class into two kinds: "class defined in a strict sense (*hsia-i ti chieh-chi*)" and "class defined in a broad sense (*kuang-i ti chieh-chi*)". To Ku, "class defined in a strict sense" was the concept used by Marx and it implied the presence of exploitation and social relationships, whereas "class defined in a broad sense" had no such implication and denoted only "a group of people with the same social status." Ku conceded that "class in a broad sense" existed in China. In addition, he was prepared to yield ground to Ch'en that a peasant-worker-common citizen revolutionary alliance should be formed. Ku advocated that these three classes could ally into a "producer class (*sheng-ch'an chieh-chi*)" directing a democratic revolution against imperialism, the compradors and feudal forces and leading China to realize the Principle of People's Livelihood.⁸² As we shall see, the successful reconciliation between Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü on the most controversial subject within the Left paved the way for bringing ideological unity to the Leftists in early 1929.

The Nature and Direction of the National Revolution

The rethinking of the party's ideology inevitably prompted the Left to tackle the crucial question which confounded many party members after the purge -- what was the direction and ultimate goal of the National Revolution? On this question, the men gathered around Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü evinced opposite inclinations. Ku and his associates were always disinclined to move beyond the political lines laid down by the First and Second National Party Congresses, whereas Ch'en's followers, influenced by Marxist ideas, were not content with the old interpretation of the party's doctrine. No wonder Ch'en's men were keen on expressing their views about the future of the National Revolution while Ku's followers remained reticent on the subject.

It was Ch'en Kung-po who first attempted to map out the future of the revolution for the KMT. In October 1927, three months after the break with the communists by the Wuhan Government, Ch'en had already set out his thinking on the topic in *What does the KMT represent?*. In his opinion, the Chinese National Revolution differed from national revolutions in other countries in two distinct respects. Ch'en asserted that "all national revolutions in history is led by the bourgeoisie; whereas the Chinese National Revolution is led by the peasantry and the working class." Furthermore, the "ultimate goal of all national revolutions in history is capitalism; whereas the ultimate goal of the Chinese National Revolution is the Principle of People's Livelihood -- a socialist goal." To Ch'en, the Chinese National Revolution was a revolution in its own peculiar way -- it was a "socialist National Revolution." By this term, Ch'en meant that "the Chinese National Revolution should accomplish social revolution, employ the power of the party -- the party rule -- to annihilate capitalism and to build a People's Livelihood country."⁸³ Ch'en did not define the term "social revolution." But it was clear he tried to impart a radical tone to the Principle of People's Livelihood by reidentifying it with socialism. A future China would be a People's Livelihood, or socialist, country; it would not become a capitalist state.

Ch'en set forth at length why the Chinese National Revolution by its very nature could not lead to the establishment of a capitalist state. In the first place, as the National Revolution was led by the peasantry and the working class, it was unthinkable that these two classes would aim at the establishment of a capitalist state. Moreover, the bourgeoisie in China having not yet coalesced into a distinct class, was too weak to dominate the political and economic scene. Besides, China was economically backward and her economy was entirely controlled by imperialist powers. There was as yet not much native capital formation and large-scale industrial production was not in sight. Under these circumstances, to establish an independent country, the state had to play an important role to build capital and to assist industrial development. As the state played

such a dominant role in the economy, how could China not develop into a People's Livelihood country? Finally, the Chinese National Revolution, according to Sun Yat-sen, had the objective of attaining the Principle of People's Livelihood, not the establishment of a capitalist state. The KMT surely would not abandon the teachings of Sun on this aspect.⁸⁴ Other Leftist theoreticians, too, supported Ch'en Kung-po's theory,⁸⁵ among them Shih Ts'un-t'ung was the most eminent.

Shih Ts'un-t'ung's views on the subject first appeared in an article "The Crisis of the Revolution and its Future Road" published in October 1927. Like Ch'en, Shih asserted that the Chinese National Revolution was neither a bourgeois nor a proletarian revolution; instead it was a revolution to achieve the Three People's Principles. The ultimate goal was to set up a "non-capitalist democratic country guided by the Three People's Principles."⁸⁶ This view was further elaborated by Shih in the article "Issues of the Chinese Revolution" written in late 1928. Shih regarded the present stage of the Chinese Revolution as a democratic one (a view which we shall shortly return to) and maintained that the revolution would not go along a capitalist road but towards a "non-capitalist goal -- socialism (the Principle of People's Livelihood)." He then went on to justify his standpoint. Like Ch'en, Shih stated that the Chinese bourgeoisie was too weak to bring about a bourgeois democratic revolution and establish a capitalist state. As a matter of fact, for fear of revolution from below, the bourgeoisie had betrayed the democratic revolution and thrown in its lots with feudal warlords. The Chinese Revolution, which aimed at the overthrow of the feudal class, would only undermine the power of the bourgeoisie and prevent it from installing a bourgeois regime. Furthermore, reiterating Ch'en's idea that the revolutionary classes in China were mainly the peasantry and the working class, he remarked: "If they have the strength to overthrow the feudal class, they certainly can establish a democratic government under their alliance and will not allow political power to be passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie or be overthrown by it." Hence, how could China develop into a capitalist state? Shih also posited that the Chinese National Revolution was part of the anti-imperialism movement throughout the world. Its success would consequently "weaken the imperialist rule over the world and precipitate the collapse of capitalism." Before the collapse of imperialist powers, Chinese native capitalism had no way to develop because of the complete control exercised by imperialist powers. And after the collapse of imperialist powers and the founding of socialist countries along the borders of China, there was no necessity and no breeding ground for Chinese capitalism to develop. A non-capitalist country was what China would inexorably evolve to.⁸⁷

Shih Ts'un-t'ung was a leading theoretician in his own right and did not just recapitulate Ch'en Kung-po's doctrine. In particular, he advanced the idea that the

present stage of the Chinese Revolution was a democratic revolution. In the article "Issues of the Chinese Revolution," Shih declared that "the goal of the Chinese Revolution is to realize the whole revolutionary Three People's Principles so as to achieve equality among the nations, political equality and economic equality." It was a long revolutionary process in which two main revolutionary stages could be identified. First was the stage of democratic revolution (i.e. a revolution to achieve democracy) and second was a social revolution (i.e. a revolution to achieve the Principle of People's Livelihood). In Shih's view, "the present stage of the Chinese Revolution is a democratic revolution." He lamented that revolutionaries often took no notice of this fact and concentrated their work on anti-imperialism while ignoring anti-feudalism. They were only cognizant of the fact that China was a "semi-colonial country" and overlooked that it was also a "semi-feudal society." No doubt, Shih continued, imperialism was the "biggest enemy" to the Chinese Revolution. Yet, revolutionaries should not forget that feudal forces were the "fiercest enemy." On the international scene imperialism had completely dominated China; but, on the domestic scene it was the feudal class which was the true ruling class in China. It was not simply a tool of imperialism; it was also a dominant ruling force on its own. In the eyes of Shih, the feudal class which consisted of bureaucrats and warlords in the urban areas and local bullies, evil gentry and landlords in the rural areas was the most reactionary social force. To overthrow the feudal class was the prerequisite to attain the ultimate goal of the revolution. Obviously Shih equated the overthrow of the feudal class as the democratic revolution and envisaged a revolutionary alliance of democratic forces (i.e. the peasantry, the working class and the urban petite bourgeoisie) to achieve this goal.⁸⁸ By early 1929 Shih's theory was widely embraced by Leftist theoreticians and articles in the *Min-chung hsien-feng* often echoed his view.⁸⁹ Ch'en Kung-po and Shih Ts'un-t'ung became the two theoreticians who equipped the Left with the most systematic and well-argued theories on the nature and direction of the Chinese National Revolution.

Though the Left conceived of a "non-capitalist socialist China" -- the Principle of People's Livelihood as the ultimate goal -- it rarely speculated about an economic blueprint to achieve such a goal. Only Ch'en Kung-po in the article "How to build State Capital at the present time" (ran through four successive numbers of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*), gave an outline of the economic development programme the Left would likely to pursue if they came to power.⁹⁰ In the article Ch'en affirmed that the Principle of People's Livelihood was the ultimate goal of the National Revolution. His understanding of this Principle comprised two significant economic components: "the Principle of People's Livelihood is not laissez-faire policy, it is state intervention policy; the Principle of People's Livelihood not only attempts to restrict private capital and equalize land rights, it also actively encourages the building of state capital." These two

ideas had their origins in Sun Yat-sen's doctrine, nonetheless, new elements in Ch'en's thinking can be discerned. More explicit than Sun, Ch'en emphasized that China should not "go along a capitalist road" and should actively develop "state capital." These ideas were central to his economic blueprint for a future China. To build state capital, Ch'en agreed with Sun that the state should nationalize railways, big enterprises and the mining industry. However, he saw one more lucrative economic sphere that should be put under the control of the state -- foreign trade. Ch'en advocated that the state should monopolize foreign trade which would be an additional means to build state capital. But he did not exclude private capital in the economic development of China. He always stressed the complementary role of private capital to help building a future China as he rightly observed that the state did not have enough capital to transform the economy single-handed. In his scheme to monopolize foreign trade, he conceded that the state had not yet accumulated enough capital to regulate foreign trade and therefore proposed the establishment of joint government and merchant enterprises or chartered companies to control and tap the profits of foreign trade. And in his scheme for the development of urban and rural areas, private capital was also allowed to play an important part. For instance, in the development of urban areas, he suggested that all public utilities could be privately owned for a certain period of time (20-30 years) and after that should unconditionally revert to government control. And in the development of rural areas, "producer-cooperatives" should be promoted at the village level as the first step towards large-scale agricultural production. Chartered private-owned companies applying modern techniques to agriculture should also be formed in order to help the peasantry to increase production. A question inevitably arose: would the utilization of private capital in developing the economy lead China to capitalism and stifle the development of state capital? To this question Ch'en answered in the negative. For him, the capitalist class (*fu-hao*), such as those in the United States, Germany and France, often derived their wealth from the monopoly of economic production, consumption and transport system, from speculation on land and control over foreign trade. All these did not happen in China and would not develop in future. The KMT's policy of building state capital would prevent the development of monopoly capitalism, its land laws would check land speculation and the proposed state monopoly of foreign trade could help curb the growth of the capitalist class. Coupled with the taxation system (i.e. profit tax, income tax and inheritance tax), the growth of private capital would be much restricted. Thus, though the party would harness private capital to develop China's economy, the capitalist class would not prosper in strength. Certainly some capitalists would get rich in the process of harnessing private capital, nevertheless, Ch'en believed, they would not develop sufficient strength to subvert the economic system of the Three People's Principles. Moreover, they would be gradually peeled off if

state capital prospered. In short, the policies of the party and the virtual control over the economy by the state would be sufficient guarantees against the increasing growth of the capitalist class in China. Ch'en's economic blueprint unmistakably indicated that capitalism would not be the goal for China to develop to. This was further borne out in his idea of integrating the working class and the peasantry into the orbit of the state-controlled economy in the near future. Ch'en hoped that in the course of time state industry would be rapidly expanded so as to embrace the majority of the working class under its roof and save them from being exploited by private capital. In the same vein the state should use its resources and capital to put agricultural production under its total control so that private peasant agriculture could be gradually superseded. By integrating the working class and the peasantry into the state-controlled economy, their class distinctions would be blurred and they would simply become the "producers in society." The same held true for the petite bourgeoisie. At the present moment, Ch'en acknowledged, the petite bourgeoisie assumed an important "auxiliary role" in economic production. However, he envisaged that the "exploitative nature" of the petite bourgeoisie would somehow be eliminated in due course so that it would only function as the "producers in society" similar to the role of the working class and the peasantry.⁹¹ To Ch'en, an ultimate reconciliation and merging of class interests would be a significant objective of this state-controlled economy.

Taken as a whole two distinct characteristics came out of Ch'en's economic blueprint. First, the future economic system in China would be a state-controlled economy. Secondly, under this state-controlled economy private capital would be allowed to play a secondary role in China's economic development and at the same time it would be put under the tight rein of the state. In other words, China was to evolve into a kind of state capitalism with the state enjoying the "commanding heights" of the economy while permitting the existence of small-scale private capital. Ch'en's blueprint smacked strongly of New Economic Policy practised in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. He once asserted that "at present, China has entered a stage which demands the implementation of 'New Economic Policy.'" This New Economic Policy, in his opinion, would not lead to capitalism but would only augment the revolutionary forces.⁹² Ch'en's usage of the term "New Economic Policy" was indicative of his full awareness of New Economic Policy of the Soviet Union in the 1920s. His economic blueprint exhibited an indelible mark of its influence.

Anti-imperialism, Mass Movements and Land Policies

Since the First National Party Congress in 1924, anti-imperialism and the

promotion of the mass movement had been officially adopted as the revolutionary goals for the KMT. The Principle of Nationalism was construed by the Congress as aiming at the wiping out of "imperialist powers" which, with the collusion of "regional warlords and capitalists," had subjected China to their control. For the liberation of China from the imperialist yoke, the Congress enunciated that the party had to rely on the support of the majority of the people -- intellectuals, peasants, workers and merchants. Perceiving an interdependence between anti-imperialism and the mass movement, it stated that "in order to demonstrate that nationalism is able to quell imperialism, we ought to assist in the organization of the masses and in the development of their abilities."⁹³ The Second National Party Congress held in January 1926 affirmed these ideas and stated that the tactics to defeat imperialism were "to align with the advanced nations in world revolution, to align with all oppressed nations of the world and to align with the majority of oppressed peoples in the imperialist countries." "The Chinese National Revolution is part of the world revolution" and "its goal is to overthrow imperialism." The Congress identified four social groups, warlords, bureaucrats, compradors and local despots as "imperialist accomplices in China" and it was these social groups which perpetuated imperialist control over China. They were "tools of imperialist powers" pure and simple and should be extirpated. The Congress then reiterated Sun Yat-sen's will that "we must bring about a thorough awakening of our own people and ally ourselves in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals" as the means to save the country,⁹⁴ Anti-imperialism and the promotion of the mass movement were henceforth enshrined as the official policies of the KMT.

However, during the Northern Expedition these two policies were increasingly identified as "communist" policies because the CCP obviously had ideological and practical interests in supporting them. The KMT was gravely troubled when conflict with foreign powers escalated and the mass movement bordered on social revolution. It is not astonishing to see that when the party broke with the CCP, a deradicalization backlash set in which resulted in the suspension of the anti-imperialism movement in particular and the mass movement in general. The only strong dissentient voice in the party to the official line came from the Left.

As will be recalled, after the break with the CCP, Wang Ching-wei lost no time in pointing out that the KMT should resolutely continue the anti-imperialism movement and mass movement. The central importance of these two policies were never doubted by the Left and both the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin* were filled with articles pleading for the upholding of these two policies. Among the Leftist theoreticians, Ch'en Kung-po was the leading Leftist who tackled the issue of imperialism in China at some

length. Ch'en opined that after World War I the capitalist system not only did not collapse but also began to regain its strength under the leadership of Britain, a country which he thought still dominated the international scene. Under these circumstances, China could not but remain under the yoke of imperialist powers, among which Britain, Japan and the United States were the most important.⁹⁵ Ch'en lamented that China simply had become an "international colony" and suffered a considerable loss of sovereignty in territorial, judicial and financial areas. No doubt the Chinese Revolution was to achieve national independence and to exterminate imperialist powers. How to realize this goal was the cardinal question to which Ch'en tried to provide an answer. He propounded that the KMT should ally with the oppressed classes in imperialist countries so that imperialism could be rooted out at its source. But a greater vision was conceived by him. Obviously influenced by the communists, Ch'en claimed that "nowadays all economists have agreed that when capitalism develops to its zenith, it will bring its own downfall." The reason "why capitalism has not yet collapsed is due to its control of colonies." Imperialist powers had derived profits from their colonies and therefore were able to sustain their capitalist system and conciliate their working class. Without the independence of the colonies, Ch'en contended, imperialism would never be swept away. Besides, Ch'en noted an important fact that all countries east of Suez canal, except Japan, had become colonies of the West -- the 800 million peoples of the East were oppressed and exploited by the 200 million peoples of the West. Here he perceived a potential force to subvert imperialist rule. Relating these ideas together, Ch'en advocated that the KMT should lead the colonial peoples in the East to national independence and to overthrow imperialism. The Chinese National Revolution was indissolubly linked up with the world revolution against imperialism and the KMT should take upon its shoulders the responsibility of promoting a world revolution.⁹⁶

Four main reasons were adduced by Ch'en why China could be the leader of the colonial peoples of the East for national independence. First, more than any other colonial countries in the East, China was a unified state and was imbued with nationalist feelings. She was in a better position than any other colonial countries to lead the peoples of the East to fight against imperialism. Moreover, "China is the most important market in the East" and "the Far Eastern Question no doubt hinges upon China." Other colonial countries in the East were just secondary in importance to China in the eyes of imperialist powers. If China was to be partitioned by imperialist powers, then there would be no prospects for colonial countries to achieve their independence. But if China could attain national independence, then it would be a severe blow to imperialism and could stimulate independence movements in the East. The paramount importance of China in the East qualified her to be the leader of the peoples of the East. Thirdly, the economic situation and history of the oppressed

peoples in the East were similar to those of China. Like China, they would not develop into either capitalist or Soviet systems; their ultimate goal was to set up "People's Livelihood countries." The KMT should seize the opportunity to unite them on this common ground to fight against imperialism externally and to forge an economic alliance internally. Finally, about one-fifth of the population of the East (excluding the Indians), Ch'en stated, were ethnically Chinese and all these colonial peoples had been under the influence of Chinese culture. For this reason the attainment of national independence by China could usher in a new era for the peoples of the East and inspire them to form a strong alliance against imperialism. Ch'en envisaged that China should be "the headquarters of anti-imperialism movement" and should unite with the peoples of the East to establish a "Great racial and economic community."⁹⁷

As a logical step from his theory of anti-imperialism, Ch'en further suggested that an "International of the East (*tung-fang kuo-chi*)" or an "International of the Three People's Principles (*San-min chu-i kuo-chi*)" should be created as a countervailing force against "the League of Nations of the capitalists" and "the Third International of the communists." Without the establishment of an "International of the East," Ch'en predicted, the Chinese National Revolution would ultimately succumb to either imperialist powers or the Third International.⁹⁸

On anti-imperialism other Leftist theoreticians never excelled the analysis propounded by Ch'en Kung-po.⁹⁹ The *Ch'ien-chin* coterie generally agreed with Ch'en's views and in particular they emphasized that "awakening and forging an united front of the oppressed peoples of the East" was essential for China's independence.¹⁰⁰ Ch'en Kung-po's theory of anti-imperialism fashioned the mind of the Left on the issue.

On the policy of the mass movement, the Left differed from the Nanking leadership in one important respect -- it argued for the restoration of the mass movement. As we have noted, after the break with the communists, the mass movement was immediately suspended. This measure became the official policy when the Fourth Plenum endorsed it in February 1928. That the mass movement before the purge had been manipulated by the communists for their own interests and had gone beyond the proper limits were facts admitted not only by the Nanking leadership but also by the Left. Indeed, one-third of Ch'en Kung-po's pamphlet-treatise, *The Crisis of the National Revolution and Our Mistakes*, was devoted to the enumeration of the mistakes perpetrated by the KMT in the mass movement during the Northern Expedition. However, the Left did not think the "excesses" committed by the mass movement before the purge should be a sufficient reason for its suspension. The *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin* were vehement in their advocacy of the restoration of the mass movement. It was when the Fifth Plenum was convened in August 1928 that this fundamental difference between the two sides

evaporated as the party resolved to restore the mass movement. To be sure, this did not mean that the Left and the Nanking leadership had no different conceptions about the function of mass organizations and political objectives of the mass movement, it only meant that the fundamental difference on the mass movement that once existed between the two sides since the purge had now been papered over.

Before this reconciliation took place in the Fifth Plenum, naturally the central concern of the Left was the restoration of the mass movement which constituted a major theme in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin*. From the Left's writings we can discern the three aspects of the rationale on which the Left argued for the restoration of the mass movement. First, in the eyes of the Left, the importance of the mass movement should not be doubted as it was closely related to the anti-imperialism movement. This opinion was most clearly expressed during the Chinan Incident (May 1928) when the Leftist theoreticians passionately contended that the mass movement was the efficacious means to fight against imperialism.¹⁰¹ Shih Ts'un-t'ung best typified the attitude of the Left in an article published in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* when he related the recent success of China's foreign policy to the support of the masses. He cited the May Fourth Movement, the May Thirtieth Movement, the Canton-Hong Kong Strike, and the take-over of British concessions in Hankow as evidence that the masses were a powerful force in supporting the anti-imperialism foreign policy. He perfectly reflected the sentiments of the Left when he declared that "if the 400 million people of the whole country are to be organized, they not only can defeat Japanese imperialism, they are also an invincible force and can easily destroy all imperialist powers."¹⁰² Secondly, the mass movement was indispensable for a strong and reorganized KMT. Here, both Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü, however different they were in intellectual orientation, were of one mind that the party should be built on the support of the masses. Ch'en's conceptions of a new party reorganization and of a class base for the party had presupposed the existence of the mass movement. In fact these conceptions would be theoretically inconsequential and meaningless if the party was not linked up with the mass movement. Writing for the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, Ch'en had pointed out that without the mass support, the party would fail to respond to the needs of the people. And if the party was detached from the masses, no matter how revolutionary it was at one time, it would gradually dissipate its revolutionary ardour. Ch'en observed that the people had already begun to lose faith in the KMT; this made the restoration of the mass movement all the more urgent.¹⁰³ Likewise, Ku Meng-yü was fully aware of the necessity for the party to build upon a mass base. To him, the mass movement was not a "magic weapon" created by the communists, it was the lifeline for the KMT. "If the KMT wants to accomplish the National Revolution," Ku stated, "it should become a people's party."¹⁰⁴ Thirdly, the mass movement was needed for national reconstruction.

In their "Proposal to reestablish the Party Basis" submitted to the Fifth Plenum, Leftist leaders not only emphasized that the mass movement played an important role in revolution, they also carved an essential role for mass organizations during the national reconstruction period. The programmes laid down by Sun Yat-sen in his *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* (*chien-kuo ta-kang*), these Leftist leaders stated, had to be undertaken by the mass organizations.¹⁰⁵ These were the three underlying theoretical assumptions behind the Left's advocacy for the restoration of the mass movement during 1928.

To complete the discussion of the Leftist ideology, the Left's stand on the land issue should be mentioned. In *What does the KMT represent?* Ch'en Kung-po made it clear that he was among those people who believed that "without solving the land problem, the peasant problem will not be solved. And without solving the peasant problem, the revolution will be endangered."¹⁰⁶ Ku Meng-yü bore the same view as he argued in one of his articles to the *Ch'ien-chin* that the peasant problem was the central issue in the Chinese Revolution and the land issue was an important part of the peasant problem.¹⁰⁷ In fact, the land issue had never been neglected in the KMT's ideology. "Equalization of land rights" and "land to the tillers" were long prescribed by Sun Yat-sen in the party's platform. The First National Party Congress further proclaimed that "equalization of land rights" was one of the two essential components of the Principle of People's Livelihood (the other component was "restriction of private capital"). A land law, a law for the utilization of land, a land expropriation law and a land taxation law were promised to be enacted by the party.¹⁰⁸ During the Northern Expedition the party's policies towards the peasantry were announced and in some areas rent reduction campaigns were vigorously conducted. Nevertheless, "equalization of land rights" did not make much headway during this period. After the break with the communists, the party's deradicalization line in effect suspended any enactments relating to the land issue. Again the Left disagreed with the official policy. Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü stood out as the two Leftist theoreticians who called on the party to solve the land issue and proposed solutions to carry it out. Both men favoured a peaceful and legal way to solve the land issue, but there were subtle differences in their solutions. In the article, "The Chinese peasant problem" contributed to the *Ch'ien-chin*, Ku showed his grave concern about the high land rent and abject poverty suffered by the peasantry. But he did not think that "land redistribution through peasant uprisings" would solve the peasant problem in general and the land issue in particular. To him, the landowners in Chinese society were not a minority group but were a heterogeneous entity comprising diverse social groups in China. Any uprisings by the peasantry to achieve land redistribution would only engender widespread opposition from various social groups and

bring about the isolation of the peasantry in society. Moreover, the shortage of land in China would render a fair redistribution of land among the peasantry impracticable. The alternative Ku suggested was that the revolutionary government should pursue an "active interventionist policy" on the land issue. The government should first organize the peasantry into peasant associations for the purpose of achieving economic improvements (e.g. rent-reduction campaigns) and establish self-government machinery at the village level to exercise political power. After that the government could approach the land issue by purchasing land from the landowners (the small landowners were exempted) and selling them to the land tillers. It could issue government bonds in purchasing land and the peasantry could pay back the land price to the government by instalments. Ku's solution was a peaceful and legal approach to the land issue and was consonant with Sun Yat-sen's pronouncements on the topic.¹⁰⁹ This kind of approach to the land issue was also articulated by two other contributors to the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*.¹¹⁰ Ch'en Kung-po did not raise objection to such an approach, yet his solution differed from Ku's in some significant aspects. To Ch'en, the ultimate goal of the KMT on the land issue was no less than a nationalization of the farm land, a goal which was never mentioned by Ku. In Ch'en's view, there were two different approaches to carry out nationalization of land. The first approach was by "political means" by which he meant that the government should pass some land laws which by degrees empowered the government to take possession of land in a legal manner. This approach was favoured by Ch'en. Second was by "land confiscation" by which he meant that the landowners' land should be confiscated by the peasants during the peasant uprisings. Ch'en did not think that this was an effective way to nationalize land because "land confiscation by the peasants" would mean that the land remained in the hands of the private peasantry. The state still faced the problem of how to nationalize all the peasants' land.¹¹¹ Besides, he noted that land redistribution among the peasantry would not solve the peasant problem. He pointed out that in North China it was not uneven land distribution but lack of capital which plagued the peasantry, whereas in South China rural overpopulation would render any land redistribution policy ineffectual to solve the peasant problem. Nevertheless, despite Ch'en's reservations about the second approach, he did not oppose the confiscation of "big landowners' land." What should not be confiscated was the land of "small and middle landowners" who were the very social group within the peasant-worker-petite bourgeois revolutionary alliance advocated by Ch'en.¹¹²

On the land issue Ch'en Kung-po placed his emphasis on the nationalization of farmland as the final goal of the KMT's land policy whereas Ku Meng-yü centred his attention on the employment of legal methods by the state to achieve the programme of "land to the tillers." On this issue not much controversy was generated

within the party at that time. Ku wrote only one article on the land issue while Ch'en's opinions on the subject were scattered in his writings. Few other Leftist leaders devoted their attention to the issue.¹¹³ In spite of all their assertions, the land issue was not uppermost in the minds of the Leftist leaders in their ideological struggles with the Nanking leadership.

The Platform of the Kuomintang Left January 1929

The whole corpus of the Leftist writings in the latter half of 1928 equipped the KMT Left with an ideology of its own which was distinct from the official doctrine of the Nanking leadership. But although this was the case, the Left was by no means resolved to pit its forces against Nanking. For the time being political considerations took priority over ideological differences. The Left still hoped that the tacit understanding between Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek in late 1927 eventually would bring about a "Wang-Chiang cooperation." Its chances of coming to power in the Party Central were not slim, as indicated by events of the time. Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü maintained contact with Chiang Kai-shek and Leftist journals continued to receive subsidies from him.¹¹⁴ Obviously the Left was not yet prepared to mobilize its supporters against the Party Central. Thus, when the theoretical question of how to execute a new reorganization of the KMT was raised by some party members, Ch'en Kung-po could only equivocate.¹¹⁵ He did not call for any open break with the Nanking leadership and only remarked that time was not yet ripe for reorganization.¹¹⁶ Ch'en apparently hoped that the "Wang-Chiang cooperation" would somehow come true. However, as the year 1928 drew to its close, a serious breach between the Left and the Nanking leadership erupted into the open.

The consolidation of the Chiang-Hu coalition largely accounted for the breach between the two sides. When the duumvirate gradually took shape, it was evident that Chiang became increasingly detached from the Left. He ordered the suppression of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and forced Ch'en Kung-po, the leading spokesman of the Left, to leave for Europe.¹¹⁷ More significantly, Hu Han-min and Chiang Kai-shek began to collaborate with each other in the attempt to consolidate their hold on the party at the expense of the Left. On October 25, 1928, the Nanking Party Central passed two resolutions on party affairs which seriously threatened the interests of the Left in the party. The first resolution empowered the Party Central to handpick the majority of the representatives to the Third National Party Congress which was to be summoned in early 1929. With the adoption of this resolution, the Left was virtually at the mercy of the Nanking leadership in the impending Party Congress. The second resolution

formulated a "special registration scheme" to permit former party members who did not join the party during the Reorganization to rejoin the party now. This aroused the Left's suspicion that "reactionary elements" opposing the Reorganization were welcomed by Nanking into the party.¹¹⁸ Hu Han-min was said to have been the main architect of these two resolutions.¹¹⁹ Yet, it was clear that the two resolutions also served Chiang's interests and they could not have been adopted without his explicit support.¹²⁰ At any rate the episode helped to consolidate their alliance in Nanking and posed a great threat to the interests of the Left. Now the Left was not only being excluded from the Party Central, its position in the party would be irreparably undermined if the Third Party Congress was to be packed by Nanking. A shift of its political position resulted.

By January 1929 it became obvious that the Left had adopted a hostile attitude towards the Nanking leadership. Numerous articles in the *Min-chung hsien-feng* mirrored this change. Shih Ts'un-t'ung's article "How to reorganize the Kuomintang" best expressed the new stand of the Left. The KMT, Shih wrote, had degenerated to such an extent that "not only it cannot accomplish the Chinese revolution, but that it has hindered and smothered the revolution." The only way to save the KMT was to effect a "fundamental reorganization (*ken-pen kai-ts'u*)" in the party. Shih stressed that to implement such a reorganization by legal means (that is, through the Party Central or the Third National Party Congress) was now utterly unfeasible because the party had been controlled by the military and the bureaucrats. The only alternative open to "revolutionary cadres," Shih openly stated, was to employ "revolutionary means" to carry out a "fundamental reorganization of the party."¹²¹ Other Leftist contributors to the *Min-chung hsien-feng* shared Shih's views.¹²² Although they did not specify what they meant by "revolutionary means," their readiness to confront the Nanking leadership was now beyond question.

The change of stand on the part of the Left prompted it to lay down its official ideological stand. So far the various strands of ideological themes set forth in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin* had not yet been systematized into a coherent platform and given an official blessing by the leadership of the Left. To work this out, the Leftist secret organization, the RCA, convened its First National Congress in January 1929.¹²³ The Congress succeeded in synthesizing and translating the numerous ideas expressed by leading Leftist theoreticians into a Leftist platform which could be regarded as a programmatic alternative to the official policies of Nanking. A reconciliation of ideological differences between the followers of Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü was brought about in the Congress and now the Left was armed with an unified platform.¹²⁴ This official Leftist platform covers wide-ranging policy issues which include: the reorganization of the KMT; foreign policy; the building of a

democratic government; the curbing of military power; land policy; policy of the mass movement; the future economic system for China. Here we shall examine what this Leftist alternative was about.

A new reorganization of the party remained central to the Leftist platform. To the Left, the Chinese Revolution could not do without the KMT. Yet the party had already become degenerated and the revolution had aborted. "Warlords, bureaucrats, wicked politicians, compradors, evil gentry and local bullies" had infiltrated and controlled the KMT. The Three People's Principles was distorted and the platforms of the First and Second National Party Congress were abandoned. For the first time the Left spelt out that the Nanking leadership was the centre of "reactionary forces":

[At present] the Party Central in Nanking has become the centre of all reactionary forces. [It has adopted] a capitulating policy towards imperialism and a submissive policy towards feudal forces. [Within the party] we can only find several conflicting feudal-military groups as well as bureaucrats, wicked politicians, compradors, local bullies and evil gentry who are subservient to feudal warlords. We cannot see any implementation of the Three People's Principles, nor can we find any traces of the Chinese Kuomintang.

To save the revolution, the Party Central should be reformed. The Left entreated party members to oppose the "reactionary Party Central in Nanking" and the impending Third National Congress. It called for a new reorganization of the party based upon the platforms of the First and Second National Party Congresses and the restoration of the Spirit of the 1924 Reorganization.¹²⁵ And it affirmed that only "by revolutionary means" could a party reorganization be successfully realized.¹²⁶

On external affairs the Left expressed grave concern about the stand taken by the Nanking leadership. The Left accused the Nanking leadership of not having an overall principle to deal with foreign powers -- its foreign policy was just a "personal foreign policy," not a policy decided by the party or the government. Nanking professed to revise "unequal treaties," yet in practice it simply recognized them. The recent agreements concluded with foreign powers were the evidence that the Nanking leadership had pursued a "foreign policy full of compromises and capitulations." Nanking's adoption of such a foreign policy, the Left argued, was due to two reasons. The position of the Nanking Government was often threatened by warlords. It had to seek compromises with foreign powers so as to secure its international position and strengthen domestic rule vis-à-vis the warlords and the people. Besides, foreign loans were much sought after by the Nanking leadership to solve financial problems. It had to appease foreign powers in order to obtain foreign loans. The Left proposed to revise Nanking's foreign policy. It viewed Britain, the United States, Japan and Soviet Russia as the four major powers which dominated China after World War I; in particular,

Japan, followed by Britain, were regarded as the arch-enemies of the Chinese Revolution. China should take “the offensive against Japan” and “the defensive towards Britain.” The United States, the Left believed, was a lesser threat to China, therefore China should secure her neutrality. Soviet Russia as a potential anti-imperialist country was still in the minds of the Left. It suggested that if Soviet Russia stopped propagating Communism in China, then China should restore diplomatic relations with her and together form an “anti-imperialist bloc.” For other allies in the anti-imperialism movement, China should turn to nationalist movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries such as those in Egypt and India. The Left envisaged the setting up of an “International of the oppressed nations” with China as the vanguard of their liberation movements. In addition, it saw the need to align the Chinese Revolution with “the oppressed classes in imperialist countries” in order to disseminate the Three People’s Principles throughout the world.¹²⁷

Central to the Leftist formulation of China’s foreign policy was the idea of anti-imperialism. Since the Reorganization of 1924, the Left wing of the KMT had vigorously affirmed the importance of anti-imperialism movement. The break with the CCP did not alter the Left’s view and, as we have noted, the KMT Left under Wang Ching-wei continued to advocate the expansion of anti-imperialism movement. The Left’s perception of international politics of the time was decisively shaped by this idea. It visualized that there were two significant political trends in the world at that time. The first was the increasing rivalries among imperialist powers which had made the world situation similar to that in pre-World War I Europe and was likely to lead to a new world war. The second was the burgeoning nationalist movement in colonies ruled by imperialist powers. The movement itself had now been aligned with the labour movement in Western Europe and this could pose a deadly threat to imperialist powers. In this anti-imperialism movement, China had already assumed an important role. Although the Chinese Revolution up to now was a failure, yet it had aroused the Chinese people to strive for national independence and inspired the oppressed nations of the East to do the same.¹²⁸ Such a perception of international politics explains why the Left advocated the creation of an “International of the oppressed nations” in which China would be the leader. This linking up of the Chinese Revolution with the anti-imperialism movement throughout the world was of course frowned upon by the Nanking leadership. Since the Fourth Plenum, the Nanking leadership had deliberately played down the idea of anti-imperialism in the KMT’s ideology. Nanking’s Third National Party Congress concentrated itself on the importance of domestic national reconstruction and avoided the mentioning of fostering anti-imperialism movement in China, not to say of coupling Chinese National Revolution with the world revolution.¹²⁹ For the Nanking leadership, national reconstruction was the foremost task for China at

present; to achieve such a task political stability should be maintained at all costs. The anti-imperialism movement which would disrupt the political status quo should be discouraged. The Left did not dispute that national reconstruction was an important task for China at the present moment. It differed from the Nanking leadership on the point that national reconstruction, it insisted, could be achieved only when the anti-imperialism movement was carried out at the same time and fostered to its logical conclusion -- the breaking of the imperialist powers' domination over China. On this point the Left and the Nanking leadership were poles apart.

Another substantive difference on foreign policy between the two sides was their attitudes towards Soviet Russia. The Nanking leadership treated Soviet Russia and its Third International on the same par with "White Imperialism" of the Western powers. It labelled Soviet Russia as "Red Imperialism" which in its view was a hundred times more wicked and despotic than "White Imperialism."¹³⁰ The Left, too, had expressed disappointments with Soviet diplomacy. It accused Soviet Russia of using the communist parties of the Third International to subvert other nations in the world and charged the Third International with failing to win over the working class in developed countries as well as nationalist movements in colonial countries. Moreover, it imputed to the Third International the intention of sabotaging the Chinese Revolution.¹³¹ However, despite all these accusations the Left apparently still regarded Soviet Russia as a potential ally in the anti-imperialism movement. This explains why it advocated the restoration of diplomatic relations and the setting up of an "anti-imperialism bloc" with her if she agreed to withhold spreading communism into China. An united front against imperialism with Soviet Russia was central to the Left's foreign policy.¹³²

In the domestic sphere the Nanking Government announced the inauguration of the Political Tutelage period in October 1928 in which the groundwork of a constitutional government was to be laid. Subsequently, the Third Party Congress endorsed a plan to implement local self-government as the first step towards the establishment of a democratic form of government in China. Meantime, a Disarmament and Rehabilitation Conference was held in Nanking with a view to curbing military power. All these new domestic measures failed to impress the Left which decried them as merely for cosmetic purpose. It propounded its own programme of building a democratic government in China. In essence, the Left's programme heavily drew on Sun Yat-sen's *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* and hence most of the features of the programme were similar to those adopted by Nanking. What distinguished the Left's programme from Nanking's was its emphasis on promoting domestic democratic forces, as expressed in the dictum: "to establish a democratic government, democratic forces should be fostered." The peasantry, the working class and the common citizens

were identified as the political constituency to build democracy in China. To strengthen the party, to implement local self-government, to train the people exercising political rights, to promote the mass movement and the setting up of mass organizations were laid down as the requisites to foster democratic forces in China. The Left contended that the Nanking Government was not capable of carrying out these programmes and achieving democracy in China because the power of the Nanking Party Central and Government was actually in the hands of warlords, bureaucrats and wicked politicians, a group of people who never cared about democracy at all. Seeing from this perspective, the rule exercised by Nanking was neither a "party rule" nor a "democratic rule," it was simply an "oligarchical-bureaucratic rule (*kua-t'ou ti kuan-liao cheng-chih*)."¹³³ In other words, to achieve democracy in China necessitated the overthrow of the Nanking leadership.¹³³ Another major obstacle to build democracy at that time was the excessive power enjoyed by the military in Chinese politics, an issue which was a major concern to the KMT since the Fifth Plenum. The Left unavoidably had to grapple with the issue and propose its solution. It denounced the Army Disarmament Conference convened by Nanking as a conference to redistribute the spoils among the militarists and not really to curb military power. To convert the existing "personal and feudal armies" into "revolutionary and people's armies," two proposals were put forward. The "reactionary tendency" of the army, the Left asserted, was due to the fact that the KMT was preoccupied with the training of the cadres and failed to enforce political training in the soldiers. To remedy the deficiency, party members should go to the rank and file and imbue the soldiers with revolutionary ideals and make them understand their own "revolutionary demands." When this was done, hopefully the army could be transformed into a "revolutionary army." In addition to this political indoctrination, the building of a new army was needed. The Left stressed that the new army should recruit the rank and file from the revolutionary classes -- the peasantry, the working class and the common citizens -- but not from the "urban and rural hooligans." Apparently, the Left believed that these two proposals would be efficacious in circumscribing the predominant power of the army in Chinese politics.¹³⁴

The land issue also received its due attention in the First National Congress of the RCA. A land policy was adopted in the Congress which had the following objectives: to raise agricultural production in order to save Chinese agriculture and economy as a whole; to overthrow feudal forces which was the prerequisite for the success of the Chinese Revolution; to prevent capitalism from developing in rural areas so as to ward off any forms of exploitation there. In particular, the Left perceived a close relationship between land and feudal forces. Based on its analysis of China's rural economy, the Left claimed that the economic basis of Chinese feudal forces lay in the rural areas. Land in the rural areas was the coveted prize of the feudal forces and it attracted the lion's share

of their investments. To deal with the land issue was thus to strike at the very roots of the feudal forces. The land policy proposed by the Left was to achieve this objective. It flatly rejected indiscriminate confiscation of all land and instead advocated a “conditional land confiscation scheme.” To the Left, the Chinese landowners often came from various social strata and if all land was indiscriminately expropriated by the government, these diverse social groups would be alienated from the revolution. A revolutionary alliance would become utterly unfeasible. For this reason, only big landowners’ land would be expropriated under the “conditional land confiscation scheme.” In addition, the Left proposed to set limits to land rent and land taxation, to decree that all wasteland belonged to the state and to install state farms in the rural areas. All these measures, according to the Left, had the ultimate purpose of realizing Sun Yat-sen’s idea of “land to the tillers.”¹³⁵ Such a land policy was the last thing the Nanking leadership would entertain at that time. As we have noted, preserving the political and social status quo and concentrating on national reconstruction were the topmost political tasks of the Nanking leadership. It would not contemplate any land confiscation measure, nor was it inclined to implement reformist programmes in dealing with the land issue. This was explicitly demonstrated in April 1929 when Nanking abrogated the rent reduction law in Chekiang province.¹³⁶ Programmatic differences in tackling the land issue existed between the Left and the Nanking leadership.

As regards the policy of mass movement, the Left shared some common ground with the Nanking leadership. In the Fifth Plenum both groups had supported the proposal for the restoration of the mass movement. Furthermore, the minimum demands of the mass movement drawn up by the First Congress of the RCA bore striking similarities to that adopted by the Party Central in July 1928. Both listed similar planks to improve the economic and living conditions of the masses and deprecated those mass movements which verged on social revolution.¹³⁷ However, all these agreements cannot conceal substantive differences between the two sides. A significant difference concerned the goal of the mass movement during the Political Tutelage period. The Left continued to place heavy emphasis on the political objectives of the mass movement in this period. It posited that the Chinese Revolution at the present stage still aimed at the overthrow of imperialism and feudalism, hence the mass movement should be directed to this goal. And, notwithstanding the fact that there were excesses committed by the mass movement before the party purge, the Left affirmed the relevancy of the resolutions on mass movements adopted by the First and Second Party Congresses.¹³⁸ In this way it tried to preserve the radical tone of the mass movement during the Political Tutelage period. It reiterated that the mass movement should play an active political part in the National Revolution. In sharp contrast, the Nanking leadership completely repudiated the tactics employed by the

mass movement before the party purge and came to the view that all previous resolutions on mass movements were now irrelevant to the present needs. It declared that China had gone through the "destructive period" of the revolution and entered the "construction period" -- the Political Tutelage period. In this period the mass movement should aim at the promotion of national reconstruction, that is, the training of the people in exercising political rights and the fostering of economic production.¹³⁹ The political objectives -- anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism -- were considerably toned down by Nanking.

As the Left still emphasized the political objectives of the mass movement, invariably it paid much attention to the structure of mass organizations. The Left noted that the activities of the mass organizations had now been entirely subjected to the will of the militarists and local governments. It accused the Nanking leadership of "permitting the compradors to control merchant associations, the rascals to control trade unions, the local bullies to control mass organizations; and perverting youth and women's movements." Furthermore, it claimed that the Nanking leadership had actually aimed at the dissolution of mass organizations and prohibited the formation of organizations with hierarchical structures from national down to local levels. In the Leftist scheme, all mass organizations should have structures from national down to local levels and should organize their own forces. Its ultimate aim was to harness the organized forces of the mass movement for the political struggle against imperialism and feudalism. Besides, it favoured the spontaneity of the masses in pursuit of their interests. Although the Left made it explicit that the mass organizations should be supervised by the KMT, it also supported the idea that they should be granted "autonomy" and be allowed to pursue their own interests independently.¹⁴⁰ The Nanking leadership could never again allow "autonomous" mass organizations in view of the excesses committed by the mass movement during the Northern Expedition; a complete control over mass organizations by the KMT was the basic stand of Nanking. One more substantive difference between the two sides was on the issue of whether the mass movement should be perceived in class terms. The Left always viewed the mass movement in terms of class differentiation, an attitude which was not shared by the Nanking leadership. For instance, the Left regarded the peasantry as a heterogeneous group and divided it into landowners, owner-farmers, part owner-farmers, tenants and farm labourers. It proscribed landowners from the peasantry and did not think they should form their own associations. Similarly, the merchants were divided into those who were subservient to imperialist powers and those not. The former group was labelled as anti-revolutionary and the latter group revolutionary. Only the latter had the right to form merchants' associations, thus foreign merchants and comparadors were excluded from them. This kind of class differentiation was not found on the Nanking

side. More typical of the Leftist view was its unshakeable conviction that the peasantry, the working class and the common citizens were the main force of the mass movement. It laid down in its mass movement programme that the mass movement should promote the individual and common interests of these three classes and a revolutionary alliance of these three classes should be forged by the party.¹⁴¹ This was a great contrast to Nanking's position which insisted that the mass movement was for the "whole people" of China and not any particular classes.

On the future economic system of China, the Left again differed substantially from the Nanking leadership. From the Fourth Plenum to the Third National Party Congress, the Nanking leadership had postulated that national reconstruction was the urgent task of the moment and the Three People's Principles was the final goal of the Chinese Revolution. It enumerated various practical tasks of the day but refrained from outlining the future economic system in China. In contrast to this pragmatic attitude of Nanking, the Left put down in writing its sketch of the future economic system of China. It proclaimed that the building of a "People's Livelihood country" was the ultimate goal of the KMT¹⁴² and charged that the Nanking leadership did not intend to put the Principle of People's Livelihood into execution; in fact Nanking had simply abandoned the Principle. To build a "People's Livelihood country," the Left saw the necessity to restrict the growth of Chinese capitalism as well as to promote the building of state capital. It posited that "at present China is still a semi-colonial country dominated by international capitalism and imperialism." Its rural and urban economy was completely manipulated and exploited by them. Amidst this environment Chinese capitalism did manage to spring up and develop. Yet this kind of capitalism was only a kind of "parasitic capitalism" because it could never break away from the control of foreign capitalism and its development was fettered by unequal treaties, foreign concessions and settlements. Hence Chinese capitalism developed in an abnormal way -- its "mercantile and speculative capital" could never develop into "industrial capital" and most part of it was merely "bureaucratic capital." At present, this native capital often flew into two economic channels: part of it which was deposited at foreign banks became foreign capital and the other part entering the rural areas became "usury and monopoly capital." Viewing through this perspective, Chinese capitalism was entirely dependent on imperialism and feudal forces for its survival. As such the growth of Chinese capitalism in no way could undermine imperialist control and extirpate feudal forces. On the contrary, it would only constitute an obstacle to Chinese Revolution. Restriction of this type of capitalism was a must before the Principle of People's Livelihood would be realized. Furthermore, "equalization of land rights" and a "restriction of private capital," the Left argued, were simply inadequate for building a "People's Livelihood country." It stressed the importance of the building of state capital. Basically the Left

equated the building of a "People's Livelihood country" with the building of state capital. In its nation-building plan, nationalization was the watchword. Primary industry, major machinery industries, airways and railways were to be nationalized. Foreign trade would be monopolized by the state, financial institutions and banking would be "publicly owned (*kung-yu*)" and all public utilities would come under the management of local governments. As the state could not muster sufficient capital for national reconstruction at the initial stage of economic development, private capital was allowed to play a supplementary role in the economy.¹⁴³ Obviously the Principle of People's Livelihood as construed by the Left was a kind of state capitalism with the state playing the predominant part in the national economy and private capital serving no more than a supportive function. The Left's policy on China's economic system undoubtedly drew heavily upon Ch'en Kung-po's suggestions in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*.

Taking the whole corpus of Leftist writings and its platform into consideration, there is no doubt that the Left had developed a distinct and separate ideological point of view and propounded an alternative to the official line pursued by the Nanking leadership. By and large those fundamental differences between the Leftist alternative and the official course stemmed from their opposite views towards a significant part of Marxist doctrine and their different evaluations of the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27. That this Leftist alternative covered wide-ranging questions of the day shows that the whole political, economic and social system of the Nanking regime at that time was called into question by the Left. Insofar as the ideology of the Left was in many ways significantly different from the official version of the Three People's Principles, it is beyond dispute that by early 1929 there existed a Leftist alternative in Chinese politics.

The Manifesto and resolutions adopted by the First National Congress of the RCA reflected as well the triumph of Ch'en Kung-po's ideas over Ku's. For the most part the platform of the RCA was virtually identical with the thinking of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*. Of course Ch'en's followers did not score all ideological points in the Congress. Their favourite concepts like "class struggle" and "class base of the KMT" and other Marxist terms which filled the pages of their writings did not appear in the Leftist platform. Yet it was Ku Meng-yü who had to go a long way to accept the RCA's platform. He practically abandoned his moderate ideological stand and raised no objection to the Congress when it accepted the radical ideas of Ch'en Kung-po. Moreover, Ku also gave up his hope of forging a "Wang-Chiang cooperation" and agreed with Ch'en's followers that the Left should take a militant stand against Nanking. By early 1929 the Left had closed its ideological ranks, propounded a programmatic alternative and set about unseating the Nanking leadership.

Notes

1. Both the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin* were published by the KMT Left. The *Tsai-tsao* was the propaganda organ of the followers of Sun Fo and Hu Han-min. The *Hsin sheng-ming* was associated with Nanking's leading figures Tai Chi-t'ao and Chou Fo-hai. For a discussion of the political affiliations of *Tsai-tsao* and *Hsin sheng-ming*, see Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, pp.109-127; Chou Fo-hai, *Wang-i chi*, pp.195-196. As regards the *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng*, there were three different opinions about its political affiliation. One source suggests that it was published by the CC Clique, a faction in the KMT which was loyal to Chiang Kai-shek; another says that it was connected with the Practice Society of the Three People's Principles (*San-min chu-i shih-chien she*), a faction which once cooperated with the Left against Nanking; still another states that it was published by Leftist sympathisers. See Pai chih, "Ts'ung Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng ti t'ing-k'an shou tao hsiao-tsu-chih ti pa-hsi," *Chüeh-tou*, 1:10-13 (January 1 1929); Pai Yü, "Tao T'ung kuan hsien fan-lun pei-fa shih-ch'i fan-kung ch'ing-nien t'u-an-ti," *CCWH*, 14.5:90 (May 1 1981); Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts'ui p'ai," p.229.
2. See Hu Han-min, *San-min chu-i chih jen-shih*; Tai Chi-t'ao, *Ch'ing-nien chih-lu*; Chou Fo-hai, *San-min chu-i chih li-lun t'i-hsi*.
3. At first Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü intended to publish one journal only. Yet in the interim they came to differ on the question whether contributors to the journal should sign with their names or pen-names. Because of this difference two separate journals were then published.. Articles in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* were signed with writers' real names and those in the *Ch'ien-chin* with pen-names.
4. In a pamphlet written by a KMT Leftist, Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, as many as 40 Leftist journals published during 1928-29 in China were listed. See Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, pp.152-157.
5. For a collection of Wang Ching-wei's writings during his stay in Europe, see *Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng ch'ü-kuo hou chih yen-lun*, ed. Chung-kuo kuuo-min-tang Ho-pei sheng tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan-hui hsüan-ch'uan pu.
6. *K'u hsiao lu*, p.189.
7. For Ch'en Kung-po's political career in the early 1920s, see Martin C. Wilbur, ed., *The Communist Movement in China*, pp.3-13.

8. The following discussion on Ch'en Kung-po's thought is a condensed version of my article, "Ch'en Kung-po: A Marxist-oriented Kuomintang theoretician," A seminar paper given at the Department of Far Eastern History, Australian National University, July 3 1984. For a discussion of Ch'en Kung-po's weltanschauung, see also Lee Ngok, "The Guomindang Left and the National Revolution: Chen Gongbo and His Thought, 1928-1937." Paper presented to the International Symposium on the Nanking Decade, University of Hong Kong, August 1983.

9. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, (2nd edition), p.6.

10. *Ibid.*, p.2; Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo li-shih shang ti ko-ming*, p.2.

11. *Ibid.*, pp.3-7.

12. *Ibid.*, p.97. In his Master's thesis, "The Communist Movement in China" written in the early 1920s, Ch'en Kung-po explained the causes of the 1911 Chinese Revolution in terms of economic factors. See Martin C. Wilbur, ed., *The Communist Movement in China*, p.70.

13. In an article "Wu ti ken-chü ho chieh-shih" published in early 1930, Ch'en Kung-po had set forth his philosophical outlook. For the article, see *Gendai Shina no kiroku*, April 1930, comp. Hatano Ken'ichi, pp.368-381. But it was in the work *Revolution and Thought* that Ch'en expounded his philosophical outlook in the most systematic way.

14. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti shih shen-mo*, pp.111-112, 127-132.

15. Ch'en Kung-po, "Wu ti ken-chü ho chieh-shih," pp.376-377; *Ko-ming yü ssu-hsiang*, pp.1-8, 120-123; "Wo yü kung-ch'an tang," in *Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fo-hai hui-i lu ho-pien*, pp.48-50.

16. Ch'en Kung-po, *Ko-ming yü ssu-hsiang*, preface, pp.1-2.

17. See Li Shou-yung, "Ku hsien-sheng tsao-nien tsai Pei-ta ti i-hsieh hui-i," *CCWH*, 29.1:13-14 (July 1976). Ku Meng-yü, originally known as Ku Chao-hsiung, his name was on the black list issued by the Tuan Ch'i-jui Government.

18. Ku Meng-yü, "Lun wei-wu shih-kuan," in *YLC*, pp.162-178. The article was written on May 14 1930.

19. Liu K'an-yuan, Hsiao Shu-yü, Hsu Te-Heng and Shih Ts'un-t'ung were the only four contributors to the *ko-ming p'ing-lun* mentioned by Ch'en Kung-po in his memoirs and reminiscences. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.186-187; "Kai tsu-p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.281.

20. Before the total break with the CCP in July 1927, Hsiao Shu-yü and Liu K'an-yuan were respectively one-time general secretary and head of the propaganda department of the Kwangsi Provincial Party Branch which was under the control of the Wuhan Government. Shih Ts'un-t'ung worked as a political instructor in the Wuhan Branch of the Central Military and Political School and Hsu Te-heng served in the political department of the Military Commission in Wuhan whose director was Ch'en Kung-po. For the backgrounds of these four Leftist writers, see T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Ch'ao-liu yü tien-ti*, pp.100,103; *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.180, 186-187; "TPK," chapter 5, section 2.3; Ti Ta, "Shih Ts'un-t'ung shih-i hui Shang-hai," comp. Shang-hai chou-pao she, *Tang-tai shih-sheng*, pp.324-327; *CCWH*, 41.5:140-141 (November 1982).

21. An analysis of Hsiao Shu-yü's articles in the *Ko-ming p'ing lun* will give one the impression that he largely followed the political line of Ch'en Kung-po but was not specifically influenced by Marxist ideas.

22. Before the purge in 1927, Liu K'an-yuan was once accused of being a communist while Shih Ts'un-t'ung withdrew from the CCP only on August 30 1927. In the early 1930s these four intellectuals dissociated themselves from the KMT Left. Liu K'an-yuan, Hsu Te-heng and Shih Ts'un-t'ung took up teaching posts at various universities and they continued to show sympathy for the communists. Hsiao Shu-yü became a protégé of Sun Fo's and later was appointed as a member in the Legislative Yuan. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.186-187; T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Ch'ao-liu yü tien-ti*, pp.103, 129-131.

23. See, for example, Liu K'an-yuan, "I-chiu erh-pa nien yü wo-men," *KMPL*, 1:26-33 (May 7 1928); "Feng-chien she-hui yü tzu-pen chu-i ti kuan-hsi ti i-p'ieh," *ibid.*, 2:23 (May 14 1928); "Hsiang-an i-shih ti chen-tuan," *ibid.*, 12:19 (July 23 1928); Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Mu-ch'ien ti kai-tsü wen-t'i," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming*, pp.61-62; Ma Chün, "San-min chu-i ti ken-pen ching-sheng," *Hsien-tai chung-kuo*, 2.3:1-12 (September 16 1928).

24. The political attitudes of Ku Meng-yü, Wang Lo-p'ing and Pan Yün-ch'ao could be gauged by their numerous articles contributed to the *Ch'ien-chin*. A pamphlet put out by Wang Lo-p'ing in 1927 showed as well his moderate political viewpoint, See Wang Lo-p'ing, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tsu-chih yü hsün-lien*.

25. Ho Han-wen, "Kai tsu-p'ai hui-i lu," p.166; Chou Fo-hai, *Wang-i chi*, p.48.

26. George E. Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," *China Year Book*, p.1184 (1929/30). Two different figures of circulation of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* appeared in Ch'en Kung-po's "Kai-tsu p'ai ti shih-shih" and *K'u-hsiao lu*. In the former, Ch'en stated that the number of copies published was about 15,000, while in the latter a figure 35,000 was listed. See "Kai-tsu p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, pp.275-276; *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.181.

27. *Ibid.*, p.179.
28. The *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* lasted for about four months from May 7 1928 to September 3 1928. For an account of the closing down of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, see *ibid.*, pp.180-185; "Kai-tsu p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, pp.273-275.
29. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.185.
30. In early 1929 the KMT Left began to change their political tactics and decided to ally with discontented regional militarists in the opposition against the Nanking leadership. Major Leftist leaders busied themselves in making preparation for this change and this might be the reason why the two journals ceased publication at this time. Besides, contributors to the *Min-chung hsien-feng* such as Shih Ts'un-t'ung, Hsu Te-heng, Hsiao Shu-yü, Ma Chün and Liu K'an-yuan were involved in petty power struggles and later were alienated from the Leftist leadership, which perhaps can explain why the *Min-chung hsien-feng* stopped publication in February 1929. For the alienation of these writers from the Leftist leadership, see Chapter 5.
31. See, for example, Wang K'un-lun, "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti tsai-tsao yün-tung," *Tsai-tsao*, 1:1-2 (March 12 1928); "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chih tsai-tsao chi ch'i fang-an," *ibid.*, 35:1-30 (February 22 1929); Tung jen, "Chih tu-che," *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng*, 1:1 (May 13 1928); "Pen-k'an ch'uang-k'an hsüan-yen," *ibid.*, 1-16 (May 13 1928).
32. See Ch'en Kung-po, *Kuo-min ko-ming ti wei-chi ho wo-men ti ts'o-wu*; "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *KMPL*, 1:1-15 (May 7 1928); *Chung-kuo kuo-min ko-ming ti ch'ien-lu*.
33. Hsu Te-heng, "Chung-kuo ko-ming ti chiu-fen yü chiang-lai ti hsi-wang," *KMPL*, 1:42-49 (May 7 1928); Ma Chün, "Chung-kuo ko-ming chih chin-jih ho ming-jih," *ibid.*, 1:15-26 (May 7 1928); Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Tui-yü chin-hou ko-ming ti i-chien," *ibid.*, 1:36-42 (May 7 1928).
34. According to Ch'en Kung-po, as early as September 1927 he had broached the idea of carrying out a thorough reform (*kai-tsao*) in the party and in October of the same year he raised this idea in a party meeting. Nothing came out of it. It was not until April 15 1928 that the idea for a reorganization (*kai-tsu*) of the party was openly advocated by him. See Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo tui-yü ti-san-tang ti t'ai-tu," *Kung-hsien*, 2.5:24 (April 15 1928). Shih Ts'un-t'ung recalled that in about June 1927, Teng Yen-ta, later leader of the Third Party, had suggested another reorganization of the KMT. It seems that the idea for a new reorganization of the KMT was prevalent in certain quarters of the party. See Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Ti-san-tang wen-t'i," in *Chi-hui chu-i ti ti-san-tang*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Ho-pei sheng tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan-hui hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.14-15.

35. To carry out a new reorganization of the KMT was one of the important themes of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, see, for example, Hsu Te-heng, "Chung-kuo ko-ming ti chiu-fen yü chiang-lai ti hsi-wang," *KMPL*, 1:48; Hsiao Shu-yü, "Ju-ho shih-hsing tang ti kai-tsü," *ibid.*, 13:14-16 (July 30 1928); Ma Chün, "Chung-kuo ko-ming chih chin-jih ho ming-jih," *ibid.*, 1:25; Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Hui-fu shih-san-nien kuo-min-tang kai-tsü ching-shen," *ibid.*, 5:10 (June 4 1928). Ch'en Kung-po's idea for a reorganization was best expounded by him in *The Crisis of the National Revolution and Our Mistakes* and in two articles, "My attitude towards the Third Party" and "The KMT in the days to come," the former appeared in the *Kung-hsien* and the latter in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*.

36. See "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *KMPL*, 1:5-7; see also *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, pp.95-97.

37. Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo tui-yü ti-san-tang ti t'ai-tu," *Kung-hsien*, 2:5:25.

38. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, pp.38-88.

39. *Ibid.*, pp.119-135.

40. Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo tui-yü ti-san-tang ti t'ai-tu," *Kung-hsien*, 2.5:25.

41. *Ibid.*

42. Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Wei wu-tz'u hui-i tsai-chin i-yen," *CC*, 1.5:1.

43. For the resolution, see *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-wu tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.77-83.

44. In April 1928, Ch'en Kung-po noted that there was a consensus in the KMT that the party needed strengthening. See Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo tui-yü ti-san-tang ti t'ai-tu," *Kung-hsien*, 2.5:24-25.

45. In March 1928, Chung T'ien-hsin, Liang Han-ts'ao, Shen Hsiao-ts'en and Wang K'un-lun, all were followers of Sun Fo, launched a journal *Tsai-tsao* in Shanghai advocating a "rebuilding" of the KMT. Their rebuilding programme was eventually put down in a final form in February 1929. See "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chih tsai-tsao chi ch'i fang-an," *Tsai-tsao*, 35:1-30.

46. On February 4 1928, the Fourth Plenum of the KMT passed a resolution to reform (*cheng-li*) the party. For the resolution, see "Cheng-li ko-ti tang-wu chüeh-i an," *KMWH*, vol. 79, pp.74-75. Ch'en Kung-po claimed that Wu Chih-hui was in favour of the expression *cheng-li* rather than *kai-tsü*. See Ch'en Kung-po, "Tang ti kai-tsü yuan-tse," *KMPL*, 10:3 (July 9 1928).

47. "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang tsung teng-chih ti i-i," in *Cheng-li tang-wu ti li-lun*,

ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Che-kiang sheng tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan hui hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.72-78.

48. See Wang K'un-lun, "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti tsai-tsao yüntung," *Tsai-tsao*, 1:1-2; "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chih tsai-tsao chi ch'i fang-an," *ibid.*, 35:1-30. The *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng* had made several uncomplimentary remarks on the political stand of the *Tsai-tsao* coterie. It alleged that the *Tsai-tsao* coterie had the ulterior motive to disparage the spirit of the 1924 Reorganization and the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27. See "Pen k'an ch'uang-k'an hsüan-yen," *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng*, 1:6 (May 3 1928); Hsia t'ao, "Tsai-tsao p'ai ho ti-san-tang," *ibid.*, 3:12 (May 27 1928).

49. Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo tui-yü ti-san-tang ti t'ai-tu," *Kung-hsien*, 2.5:24; "Tang ti kai-tsue yuan-tse," *KMPL*, 10:3.

50. Ch'en Kung-po, *Kuo-min ko-ming ti wei-chi ho wo-men ti ts'o-wu*, p.134; Ts'un-t'ung, "Hui-fu shih-san nien kuo-min-tang kai-tsue ti ching-shen," *KMPL*, 5:10, 19; "Tang ti min-chu hua yü chün-chung hua," *ibid.*, 12:14-18 (July 23 1928); Hsu Te-heng, "Mu-ch'ien tang ti kai-tsue wen-t'i," *Min-chung hsien-feng*, 4:3 (January 26 1929); Chi che, "Na-li shih ch'u-lu," *CC*, 1.1:4-17 (June 1 1928); I Ai, "Wu-chung ch'üan-hui ying-tang chi-chiao ch'ing-ch'u ti i-ko wen-t'i," *ibid.*, 1.5:1-3 (August 1 1928); Yü Chih, "Tsen-yang tao liao hsien-tsue," *ibid.*, 1.1:54-60 (June 1 1928) and 2:6-12 (June 16 1928).

51. Ch'en Kung-po, "Tang ti kai-tsue yuan-tse," *KMPL*, 10:4-5.

52. In December 1926, Shih Ts'un-t'ung drew up six criteria required for a strong party. By early 1929 he still thought that these criteria were relevant to strengthening the KMT. They could be summarized as follows: (i) party members should really strive for the realization of party's ideology, obey party discipline and lead the masses in the revolution; (ii) party organization at the sub-branch (*chü*) level should be the centre of party activities and the training ground for its members; (iii) the party should be well integrated at every level; (iv) the party should elect the most experienced, competent, loyal, intrepid and popular members to form a strong and effective party leadership; (v) all revolutionaries should be recruited into the party; (vi) the party should work for the interests of the oppressed masses and be built on their support. See Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Tsen-yang tsao-ch'eng chien-ch'üan ti-tang," *Min-chung hsien-feng*, 4:18-20 (January 26 1929). For a similar viewpoint, see a pamphlet written by a middle-ranking Leftist, Li Chün-lung, *Chien-ch'üan tang ti chi-pen tsu-chih ho chi-chung tang ti ko-ming li-liang*, pp.1-29.

53. Ts'un-t'ung, "Tang ti min-chu hua yü chün-chung hua," *KMPL*, 12:14-18.

54. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, pp.97-98.

55. Ch'en Kung-po, "Tang ti kai-ts'u yuan-tse," *KMPL*, 10:3.
56. As early as December 16 1926, the Seventh Executive Committee of the Third International had advocated a theory of a revolutionary alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie in China. See "Extracts from the resolution of the Seventh ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Situation," in *The Communist International 1923-1928*, ed. Jane Degras, vol. 2, p.342. At the time the Nanking propaganda machinery also tried its best to relate Ch'en Kung-po's ideology with communist theories. See Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Pei-ping t'e-pieh shih tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan-hui, *Kai-ts'u p'ai chih tsung chien-ch'a*, pp.11-18.
57. Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, pp.143-145.
58. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, pp.1-23.
59. Wu Chih-hui, "Ch'üan-min ko-ming yü kuo-min ko-ming ti shang-ch'üeh," in *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 8, pp.641-642.
60. P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei, "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo", in *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chieh-chi chi-ch'u wen-t'i*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Ho-pei sheng tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan hui hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.34-49; "Kung-nung hsiao-tzu-ch'an chieh-chi wen-t'i," *ibid.*, pp.97-110.
61. *KMWH*, vol. 16, p.2895.
62. Ching-P'o, "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo", in *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chieh-chi chi-ch'u wen-t'i*, pp.111-126; "Tsai yü Ch'en Kung-po t'ao-lun kuo-min-tang tai-piao shen-mo," *ibid.*, pp.139-157.
63. For a collection of the articles on the class base of the KMT, see *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chieh-chi chi-ch'u wen-t'i*. See also Ch'en Kung-po, "Tui-yü 'p'ing kuo-min ko-ming ti wei-chi ho wo-men ti ts'o-wu' ti hui-ta," *KMPL*, 5:7 (June 4 1928); Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ying-tang tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo," in *Chung-kuo ko-ming yü San-min chu-i*, pp.36-44.
64. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Chung-kuo ko-min wen-t'i," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-min*, p.159. Similar views were also expressed by Shih in "Chung-kuo ko-min ti li-lun wen-t'i," *Hsien-tai chung-kuo*, 2.1:6 (July 16 1928).
65. See, for example, Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, (Third edition), preface, p.3; "Tui-yü 'p'ing kuo-min ko-ming ti wei-chi ho wo-men ti ts'o-wu' ti hui-ta," *KMPL*, 5:7; "Ta P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei hsien-sheng lun kuo-min-tang tai-piao shih shen-mo," *ibid.*, 13:1-3 (July 30 1928); "Ta Ching P'o hsien-sheng lun kuo-min-tang tai-piao shen-mo," *ibid.*, 16:27 (August 20 1928).

66. The struggles between handicraft workers and petite bourgeoisie in the urban areas and between tenant farmers and small landlords in the rural areas were depicted by Ch'en Kung-po as examples of the "disorderly struggles among various classes." See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, (Second edition), preface, p.3, and (Third edition), preface, pp.3-4.

67. *Ibid.*, pp.3-23, 114-119.

68. *Ibid.*, pp.110-111.

69. This term first appeared in one of Shih's articles written on October 30 1927, see Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Ko-ming ti wei-chi ho chin-hou ti ch'u-lu," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming*, p.12. Like Ch'en Kung-po, Shih also recognized the importance of the petite bourgeoisie in Chinese society. In his opinion, Chinese society was basically a petite bourgeois society. The feudal class and the petite bourgeoisie were the two main classes in Chinese society. See Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Ch'eng-shih hsiao-tzu-ch'an chieh-chih yü min-chu ko-ming," *KMPL*, 9:13 (July 2 1928); "Chung-kuo ko-ming ti li-lun wen-t'i," *Hsien-tai chung-kuo*, 2.1:7, 10 (July 16 1928).

70. See Ch'en Kung-po "Ta Ching P'o hsien-sheng lun kuo-min-tang tai-piao shen-mo," *KMPL*, 16:27.

71. Shih Ts'un-t'ung's views were set forth in an article "The theory of the Chinese Revolution" written on June 22 1928 and in a lecture "The Problems of the Chinese Revolution" given in the Leftist *Ta-lu* University in Shanghai. See "Chung-kuo ko-ming ti li-lun wen-t'i," *Hsien-tai chung-kuo*, 2.1:1-19; "Chung-kuo ko-ming wen t'i," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming*, pp.111-172.

72. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Chung-kuo ko-min ti li-lun wen-t'i," *Hsien-tai chung-kuo*, 2.1:6-11. See also "Chung-kuo ko-ming wen-t'i," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming*, pp.150-169; "Kuo-min tang ying-tang tai-piao ti shih shen-mo," in *Chung-kuo ko-ming yü San-min chu-i*, pp.45-55.

73. *Ibid.*

74. "Ku Meng-yü tsai lin-shih hsüan-ch'uan ta-tui k'ai-hui shih chi yen-shuo," *Chung-yang jih-pao*, August 19 1927, Newspaper clippings, KMT Archives, 436/160.2.

75. Ku Meng-yü, "Kuo-min-tang pi-hsu yu chieh-chi chi-ch'u ma?," *Chung-yang jih-pao*, August 10 1927, Newspaper clippings, KMT Archives, 436/160.2.

76. *Ibid.* It should be noted that Ku Meng-yü's article was published on August 10 1927 which had the main purpose of exposing misconceptions and fallacies of communist theories of class and class struggle. Thus, it contained many arguments not specifically retorting Ch'en Kung-po's thinking on the class base of the KMT. The article was

reprinted in the *Ch'ien-chin* on July 1 1928 which highlighted the differences in opinion between the *Ch'ien-chin* coterie and *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* coterie over the class issue.

77. Kuan Fu, "Kuo-min-tang yü hsiao-tzu-ch'an chieh-chi," *CC*, 1.3:1-6 (July 1 1928).

78. See Wang Ching-wei, "Fen-kung i-hou" in *WCWC*, vol. 3, pp.240-242; "Chia-kung chung chih fen-tou," *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp.166-167. Wang's standpoint on this issue was quite consistent. Before the break with the communists, Wang had maintained that the KMT was a party for various classes and that the National Revolution was a revolution undertaken by all classes. See "Tang yü min-chung yün-tung," *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp.143-144; "Wo-men yao chien-she tsen-yang ti kuo-chia," *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp.152-153; "Kuo-min ko-min ti i-i," *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp.65-66.

79. Wang Ching-wei's letter to Lin Po-sheng was dated May 18 1928, see "Fu Lin Po-sheng," *ibid.*, vol. 4, pp.51-65.

80. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.188-189.

81. Ch'en Kung-po made this change in the Third edition of *What does the KMT represent?* published in November 1928. See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, (Third edition), preface, p.6.

82. Ku Meng-yü, "Kuan-yü chieh-chi wen-t'i ti chi-chien shih-shih," *CC*, 1.9:1-13 (November 1 1928). In this article Ku devoted much space to refute communist theories of class and class struggle.

83. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, pp.2-3.

84. *Ibid.*, pp.3-23.

85. See, for example, Hsu Te-heng, "Chung-kuo ko-ming ti chiu-fen yü chiang-lai ti hsi-wang," *KMPL*, 1:48; Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Tui-yü chin-hou ko-ming ti i-chien," *ibid.*, 1:41.

86. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Ko-ming ti wei-chi ho chin-hou ti ch'u-lu," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming*, pp.12-14.

87. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Chung-kuo ko-ming wen-t'i," *ibid.*, pp.145-148.

88. Shih Ts'un-t'ung wrote a number of articles concerning the democratic nature of the present Chinese National Revolution, of which the most comprehensive and systematic was the article "Chung-kuo ko-ming wen-t'i", *ibid.*, pp.127-133. See also "Chung-kuo min-chu ko-ming ti hsing-chih yü ch'i pi-jan ti fa-chan," in *Chung-kuo ko-ming yü San-min chu-i*, pp.1-32; "Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming yün-tung," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming*, pp.17-23; "Tui-yü chin-hou ko-ming ti i-chien," *KMPL*, 1:36-42; "Ch'eng-shih hsiao-tzu-ch'an chieh-chi yü min-chu ko-ming," *ibid.*, 9:11-16.

89. See, for example, Ma Chün, "Cheng-chih chuan-huan ch'i ti yü-ts'e ho wo-men tou-cheng ti fang-chen," *Min-chung hsien-feng*, 1:23-24 (January 6 1929); Huang Wei-p'ing, "Pao-tung yü k'ung-pu," *ibid.*, 1:39-41 (January 6 1929); "Tao min-ch'üan chih-lu," *ibid.*, 5:17-22 (February 3 1929); Hsu Te-heng, "Hsin shih-tai ti yün-niang yü Chung-kuo ko-ming ti hsin chü-hsiang," *ibid.*, 1:4-6 (January 6 1929); I Tzu, "Ti-wu-t'zu hui-i ti ch'ien-tu," *CC*, 1.3:4; Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Wei wu-tz'u hui-i tsai-chin i-yen," *ibid.*, 1.5:2.

90. The article "Mu ch'ien tsen-yang chien-she kuo-chia tzu-pen," appeared in several issues of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*. See *KMPL*, 7:1-4 (June 18 1928); 8:22-26 (June 25 1928); 10:16-18 (July 9 1928); 12:9-14 (July 23 1928).

91. *Ibid.*

92. Ch'en Kung-po, "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *KMPL*, 1:11. See also "Mu-ch'ien tsen-yang chien-she kuo-chia tzu-pen, *ibid.*, 12:13-14.

93. *KMWH*, vol. 9, pp.89.

94. *Ibid.*, vol. 69, pp.161-166.

95. Ch'en Kung-po, "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *KMPL*, 1:1-4. A point worth noting was that in July 1928 when the National Revolutionary Army was about to unify the country, Ch'en Kung-po proposed that the new Government should adopt a "revolutionary foreign policy" guided by the following principles: the Government should actively oppose British and Japanese imperialism; provided that China's sovereignty was not infringed the Government should establish diplomatic relations with all countries in the world; in the near future diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia should be restored "if certain conditions were met." See "Tang ti kai-ts'u yuan-tse," *KMPL*, 10:1. In fact, Ch'en Kung-po held an ambivalent attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Third International. Unlike the official party stand, he did not regard the Soviet Union and the Third International as "Red imperialism." Nevertheless, he castigated the Soviet Union for attempting to reach an understanding with Japan and withdrawing support for national independence movements in China and Korea. He also charged the Third International with attempting to sabotage the Chinese Revolution. See *Kuo-min ko-min ti wei-chi ho wo-men ti ts'o-wu*, pp.22-24; "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *KMPL*, 1:4; "Tang ti kai-ts'u yuan-tse," *ibid.*, 10:2.

96. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, pp.62-80.

97. *Ibid.*, pp.77-80.

98. Ch'en Kung-po, "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *KMPL*, 1:8; "Tang ti kai-ts'u fang-fa ho shih-ch'i," *ibid.*, 18:3 (September 3 1928).

99. For the writings of these Leftist theoreticians, see, for example, Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Tui-yü chin-hou ko-ming ti i-chien," *ibid.*, 1:36-42; Ma Chün, "Chung-kuo ko-ming chih chin-jih ho ming-jih," *ibid.*, 1:15-16; Hsu Te-heng, "Pei-fa ti i-i yü chia-chih," *ibid.*, 4:9-13 (May 28 1928); Ma Chün, "Pei-fa yü fan-jih," *ibid.*, 4:3-6 (May 28 1928).

100. Chi Che, "Na-li shih ch'u-lu," *CC*, 1.1:4-17. See also I Ai, "Wu-tz'u hui-i sheng-chung hui-hsiang tao ssu-tz'u hui-i," *ibid.*, 1.3:14; Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Wo-men tui-yü ti-wu-tz'u hui-i tsui-hsiao hsien-tu ti yao-ch'iu," *ibid.*, 1.3:4-5; I Tzu, "Ti-wu-tz'u hui-i ti ch'ien-tu," *ibid.*, 1.3:3.

101. In issue no. 3 of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, all important Leftist writers such as Ch'en Kung-po, Hsiao Shu-yü, Hsu Te-heng, Ma Chün and Shih Ts'un-t'ung passionately argued for the immediate restoration of the mass movement. The *Ch'ien-chin* coterie, too, aired the same view. See Kuan Fu, "Wai-chiao cheng-ts'e yü tsui-chin wai-chiao shih-chien," *CC* 1.1:17-34; Pan Yün-ch'ao, "Tsui-chin t'an wai-chiao ti chi-ko ts'o-wu i-chien," *ibid.*, 1.2:27-35 (June 16 1928).

102. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Fan-jih yün-tung yü min-chung tsu-chih," *KMPL*, 3:38-39 (May 21 1928).

103. Ch'en Kung-po, "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *ibid.*, 1:8-9; "Tang ti kai-ts Fang-fa yü shih-ch'i," *ibid.*, 18:59.

104. Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Wo-men tui-yü ti-wu-tz'u hui-i tsui-hsiao hsien-tu ti yao-ch'iu," *CC*, 1.3:1-3. See also "Wei wu-tz'u hui-i tsai-chin i-yen," *ibid.*, 1.5:2-3.

105. For the proposal, see *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.79-80.

106. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, p.106.

107. Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Chung-kuo nung-min wen-t'i," *CC*, 1.4:1 (July 15 1928). See also Chang Pei-hai, "Ts'ung ch'ung-cheng ko-ming shih-li ti yün-tung chung t'an-tao tu-ti wen-t'i," *Min-chung hsien-feng*, 1:41-44 (January 6 1929).

108. *KMWH*, vol. 69, pp.90-91, 94.

109. Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Chung-kuo nung-min wen-t'i," *CC*, 1.4:1-11.

110. Huang Han-jui, "Nung-min pao-tung yü tu-ti wen-t'i," *KMPL*, 6:26-34 (July 11 1928); Lung Ting, "Chieh-chüeh tu-ti wen-t'i ti t'ao-lun," *ibid.*, 13:16-23 (July 30 1928).

111. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti-shih shen-mo*, pp.106-107.

112. *Ibid.*, pp.107-109; *Kuo-min ko-ming ti wei-chi ho wo-men ti ts'o-wu*, p.79; "Tsai lun ti-san-tang," *KMPL*, 8:2.

113. Three other articles dealing with the land issue appeared in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, *Min-chung hsien-feng* and *Ch'ien-chin*. See Chu Tui-yuan, "Chung-kuo nung-min wen-t'i yü pen-tang ti nung-min yün-tung," *KMPL*, 4:23-27 (May 28 1928); Chang Pei-hai, "Ts'ung ch'ung-cheng ko-min shih-li ti yün-tung chung t'an-tao tu-ti wen-t'i," *Min-chung hsien-feng*, 1:41-44; Ping Shan, "Chung-kuo t'ien-tsui kao-tu," *CC*, 19:14-15 (November 1 1928).

114. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.180. At the time Ku Meng-yü strongly favoured the idea of a "Wang-Chiang cooperation." See Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsui p'ai," p.210.

115. Shu-yü, "Ju-ho shih-hsing tang ti kai-tsui -- ta Chu Tung hsien-sheng," *KMPL*, 13:14 (July 30 1928). See also "Kai-tsui pen-tang ti chü-t'i fang-an," *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng*, 3:2 (May 27 1928).

116. In early May 1928, Ch'en Kung-po made a remark that it was not yet the time to carry out a new reorganization in the KMT. The time for a reorganization would come, Ch'en added, only when "political situation has corrupted beyond recovery." See Ch'en Kung-po, "Chin-hou ti kuo-min-tang," *KMPL*, 1:7. By September of the same year, in response to the mounting cry for a reorganization of the party, Ch'en stated that at least one more year was needed before any reorganization could be effectively implemented. See Ch'en Kung-po, "Tang ti kai-tsui fang-fa ho shih-ch'i," *ibid.*, 18:1-4.

117. According to Ch'en Kung-po, there were two reasons for his going abroad. First, after the formation of Chiang-Hu leadership in Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek, through T.V. Soong, urged him to leave China. At the same time Wang Ching-wei, who was in France, wired him to go to Paris for consultation. See *K'u hsiao lu*, pp.184-185. To be sure, by the end of 1928 Chiang Kai-shek did not seem to have totally broken his contact with the Left. Chang T'ien-shu, a Yen Hsi-shan's man in Nanking, reported to Yen in December 1928 that Chiang had publicly allied with Hu Han-min, but behind the scenes he was closely associated with the Left. See YHSA, *Pei-fa hou chih chung-yang cheng-chü*, Chang T'ien-shu to Yen Hsi-shan, December 4 1928.

118. Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, pp.137-139.

119. Fei Chien, "Wei Hu Han-min hsien-sheng t'ung-k'u," *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng*, 26:4-7 (November 11 1928); T'ao Sheng, "Hu Han-min yü san-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui chi t'e-chung teng-chi," *ibid.*, 27:4-11 (November 20 1928). The *Tsai-tsao* coterie which were Hu Han-min's supporters endorsed Nanking's methods of choosing Third Party Congress representatives, see Yuan Ch'en, "Ti-san-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui chih tai-piao jen-hsüan chi jen-wu," *Tsai-tsao*, 25:5-10 (November 20 1928).

120. Ch'en Kung-po alleged that the list of Third Congress representatives was prepared by the Organization Department of the party which was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek and not Hu Han-min. He claimed that Chiang Kai-shek was the master-mind behind Nanking's move to monopolize the seats of the Third National Party Congress. See Ch'en Kung-po, *So-wei san-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui chia-chih ti ku-liang*, pp.62-63.

121. Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Tsen-yang kai-ts'u kuo-min-tang," *Min-chung hsien-feng*, 3:5-10 (January 19 1928). A "revolutionary means" to carry out the reorganization of the KMT was first advocated by Shih on November 12 1928. See "Mu-ch'ien ti kai-ts'u wen-t'i," in *Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming* p.59.

122. Hsu Te-heng, "Mu-ch'ien tang ti kai-ts'u wen-t'i," *Min-chung hsien-feng*, 4:2 (January 26 1929); Ma Chun, "Cheng-chih chuan-huan ch'i ti yü-ts'e ho wo-men tou-cheng ti fang-chen," *ibid.*, 1:24 (January 6 1929).

123. The exact date of the summoning of the First National Congress of the RCA cannot be constructed from available evidence. In his memoirs, Ch'en Kung-po only mentioned that the RCA did convene a National Congress but did not say when it was held. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.189. An intelligence report compiled by the KMT's Bureau of Investigation also notes that a First National Congress of the RCA had been summoned. See "TPK," chapter 2, appendix 2. The communist leader, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, noted in 1930 that the First National Congress of the RCA was held in March 1929. See Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, "Chün-fa chang-chen ho Wang Ching-wei," *Pu-erh-sai-wei-k'o*, 3/2/3:28 (March 15 1930). Ch'ü probably was mistaken for a pamphlet containing the manifesto and resolutions of the First National Congress was issued by the RCA in February 1929. See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang kai-ts'u t'ung-chih-hui ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yan chi chüeh-i an* (n.p. 1929), Nanking Second History Archives, -(2)/217. The publication date of this pamphlet indicates that the First National Congress was probably convened in February 1929 or earlier. Fan Yü-sui, a leading cadre at the RCA's headquarters in Shanghai, recalled that the RCA did not convene any National Congress but had summoned a "working conference" in January 1929 attended by RCA's cadres coming from central to local levels. See Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts'u p'ai," p.217. Fan must be wrong in saying that the First National Party Congress was never convened because all other sources point to the contrary. Probably this working conference was the First National Congress of the RCA which was held in January 1929.

124. Not all the Leftists in the KMT accepted the ideological position of the RCA. For a discussion of such a division, see Chapter 5.

125. "Ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yen," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 1.
126. "Tang-wu pao-kao," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 2.
127. "Wai-chiao chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 7.
128. "Cheng-chih pao-kao," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 5.
129. See the Manifesto of the Third National Party Congress in *KMWH*, vol. 69, pp.201-207. See also the Manifesto of the Fourth Plenum, *ibid.*, vol. 69, pp.184-193.
130. *Ibid.*, vol. 69, p.185.
131. "Cheng-chih pao-kao," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 4.
132. It is worth noting that the KMT Left always harboured an ambivalent attitude towards the Soviet Union, as was reflected in the Chinese Eastern Railways Incident. In mid-1929 a localized military skirmish broke out between China and Soviet Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railways. The conflict arose when Chang Hsüeh-liang, the military ruler of Manchuria, staged a raid and arrested a number of Russian consular officers and Chinese communists when they held a meeting in Harbin on May 27 1929. In July, Chang, with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek, took over the Chinese Eastern Railways which for a long time had been under the control of the Russians. A localized military conflict soon took place between China and Soviet Russia. It was not until December 22 1929 that a protocol was signed between the two countries which provided for the restoration of status quo ante in the Chinese Eastern Railways. The Incident prompted the KMT Left to voice its opinions on Soviet Russia in its journals. The Left reaffirmed that it was against the communists and the Third International and the Soviet type of government was not suitable for China. It agreed with the Nanking Government that China had the right to take back the Chinese Eastern Railways and to repatriate the Russians involved in the communist conspiracy in Harbin back to their home country. But it argued that China should first concentrate her power against Japan which threatened the Chinese Revolution most. To the Left, the Chinese Eastern Railways Incident was exploited by Nanking to redirect the "revolutionary masses" from opposing Japan to opposing Soviet Russia. It was a means to mask Nanking's "capitulation policy" towards Japan. See T'ung Jen, "Chung-O wen-t'i yü kai-ts'p'ai," *Min-chu*, 2:1-9 (July 25 1929); T'ien Tzu, "Ko-ming ti wai-chiao cheng-ts'e," *ibid.*, 3:5-7 (August 1 1929); Ya Min, "Chiang cheng-fu ti tui-O wai-chiao," *ibid.*, 3:7-12 (August 1 1929).
133. "Cheng-chih chih-tu chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 4.
134. "Chün-shih chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 6.

135. "Keng-ti wen-t'i chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 8.
136. In April 1929, the Chekiang Provincial Government Council resolved to rescind the 25% rent reduction law. This immediately provoked criticisms not only from the KMT Left but also from the Chekiang Provincial Party Branch which favoured the promotion of rent reduction campaign. See Hsiao Cheng, *Tu-ti kai-ko wu-shih nien*, pp.27-30. For the Leftist criticisms, see Ping Shan, "Che-kiang erh-wu chien-tsü ti ching-kuo," *Min-i*, 7:9-12 (April 28 1929). See also *Min-i*, 8:24-26 (May 5 1925) and *ibid.*, 9:20-23 (May 12 1929). For a discussion of rent reduction campaign in Chekiang, see Noel Ray Miner, "Chekiang: The Nationalist effort in agrarian reform and construction, 1927-1937," Ph.D diss., Stanford University, 1973, pp.135-152.
137. For the Leftist programme on the mass movement, see "Min-chung yün-tung chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 9. The Nanking's "Programme for the mass training" was first passed by the Standing Committee of the CEC on June 4 and was later amended on July 9 1928. For the "Programme for the mass training," see *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 2.Plan:1-16 (September 1928).
138. "Min-chung yün-tung chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 9.
139. See the proposal on the mass movement composed by the Party Central to the Fifth Plenum, in *KMWH*, vol. 79, pp.88-95. Also see the Manifesto of the Fourth Plenum, in *ibid.*, vol. 69, pp.84-193, and the resolution on mass organizations adopted by Nanking in June 1929, in *ibid.*, vol. 79, pp.123-125.
140. "Min-chung yün-tung chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 9.
141. "TPK," chapter 2, section 9.
142. "Ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yen," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 1.
143. "Ching-chi chien-she chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 4b.

CHAPTER 3

THE LEFTIST ALTERNATIVE REDEFINED: WANG CHING-WEI'S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Although the KMT Left began to take a hostile attitude against the Nanking Government, for a time it did not see how it could effectively undermine the official leadership. Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Kung-po could do nothing but stay in Europe and bide their time. The day-to-day running of the RCA fell into the hands of Wang-Lo-p'ing instead of Ku Meng-yü as Ku was too ill at the time to actively take charge of the Leftist activities.¹ Other Leftist leaders were still in Shanghai attentively watching political developments in Nanking. They were not disappointed. Events of 1929 soon provided them an opportune occasion to challenge the Nanking leadership.

By early 1929 when the Chiang-Hu leadership was consolidated, Nanking felt confident to embark upon a course of centralization of power. Two conferences were held with this purpose in mind. The first was the convening of the Disarmament and Rehabilitation Conference in January 1929 to discuss ways to reduce the number of troops after the Northern Expedition. The second was the summoning of the Third National Party Congress in March 1929 which aimed at curbing the power of dissenting factions in the party. The Disarmament Conference sowed suspicions among regional militarists about the ulterior motive of the Nanking leadership, while the Third Party Congress provoked widespread discontent in the party on which the Leftist opposition began to thrive. By September 1929 regional militarists and the Left overcame their differences and joined hand in hand in an effort to overthrow the Nanking leadership. The common objective for this combined opposition was the liquidation of Nanking's "dictatorship government" and the establishment of a truly democratic state in China. Under this banner the combined opposition movement assumed an ostensibly democratic character and culminated in two phases of democratic movement. The first phase was from September 1929 till the dissolution of the Enlarged Party Conference in Taiyuan in November 1930. Major regional militarists, Chang Fa-k'uei, Feng Yü-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen, T'ang Sheng-chih and Yen Hsi-shan, joined forces with the Left in opposition against the Nanking leadership. Factional groups in the KMT like the Western Hills Group also participated. The Second phase of the democratic movement started with the Extraordinary Party Conference in Canton in May 1931 and ended in January 1932

when the "Wang-Chiang cooperation" was at long last realized. During this period regional militarists, Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Li Tsung-jen, provided the military backbone of the democratic movement and large factions in the party, such as the Left, the Western Hills Group and followers of Hu Han-min and Sun Fo, as well joined the movement. These two phases of democratic movement in the end failed dismally. Their history will be examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 6. The present chapter will concentrate on the exposition of the Left's ideology during this period of democratic movement from 1929 to 1931. It will try to show that a drastic shift in the Left's ideology was brought about during this time and the prime mover who initiated this shift was none other than Wang Ching-wei. He did violence to the whole corpus of the Leftist doctrine developed in 1928 and in effect put the Leftist platform as endorsed by the RCA in January 1929 on the shelf. In its place Wang developed his theory of democracy which became the ideological centrepiece of the Left in the years 1929-31.

The Third National Party Congress March 1929

The importance of the Third National Party Congress to the KMT cannot be overemphasized. It was the first party congress to be held after the break with the communists and was the highest party organ to which unsettled policy disputes would eventually refer. Furthermore, the political line adopted by the Fourth and Fifth Plenums awaited the official endorsement by the Congress. Naturally every single grouping within the KMT would strive for a voice in the Third Congress.

The struggle for the control of the Party Central had been fought out during the Fourth and Fifth Plenums. At the same time another struggle was actively conducted in the lower level party branches. During the Fourth Plenum, the KMT had passed a resolution to revamp all party branches in order to weed out the communists and "undesirable elements." Ch'en Kuo-fu, Chiang Kai-shek's henchman in the KMT, was then in charge of the Organization Department and made use of the resolution to extend the influence of the Nanking leadership to regional party branches. In the areas where party branches had not been set up, party officials were sent to establish Party Affairs Rectification Committees (*tang-wu cheng-li wei-yuan hui*) for the purpose of setting up party branches and conducting membership registration; while in those areas where party branches had already been established, party officials were sent to set up Party Affairs Directorates (*tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan hui*) supervising the reorganization of party branches. Besides, a new re-registration was carried out in the party to vet the loyalty and quality of party members.² The Party Central in October 1928 further passed a "special registration scheme" to permit old party members who failed to join

the party in the 1924 Reorganization to be readmitted into the party again. These measures on the whole succeeded in eliminating communist suspects but fell short of entrenching Nanking's powers in most regional party organizations. Because of the shortage of "reliable" personnel and the urgency of reforming the party, many party officials not yet moulded and trained by the Nanking leadership were appointed to oversee party branches. These party officials in Rectification Committees or Directorates often had clandestine ties with numerous cliques in the party. This was particularly true of party branches in North China which for a long time had been dominated by factions such as the Practice Society of the Three People's Principles (*San-min chu-i shih-chien she*), the Grand Alliance of the Three People's Principles (*San-min chu-i ta-t'ung-meng*) and the New China Association (*Hsin Chung-kuo hsüeh-hui*). Ch'en Kuo-fu found no way to dislodge them from power and just had to come to terms with them. In other words, the loyalty of a significant number of regional party branches to the Nanking leadership was still very much in question despite Ch'en Kuo-fu's efforts to build a power base in the party.³ To have Third Congress representatives elected by these party branches was the last thing the Nanking leadership wanted. Manipulations over the composition of Congress representatives quickly took place. Regulations for producing Congress representatives were decided upon by Nanking on October 25 1928 and were revised to their final form on February 22 1929.⁴ Three methods for choosing Congress representatives were set down: (i) elected by party branches; (ii) appointed by the Party Central; (iii) elected by party branches two times greater than the assigned quota and then selected by the Party Central. Based on these three methods, only representatives from Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Kwangtung and some overseas branches were directly elected by their own party members. Representatives from the other 34 Provincial and Municipal party branches, most overseas branches and all special party branches in the military and in the railways were either produced by election-selection method or appointed by the Party Central.⁵ As a result, among the 406 Congress representatives, 333 (81.2%) were either appointed or selected by the Party Central.⁶ A virtual control of the Nanking leadership over the composition of Congress representatives was secured.

This immediately provoked a flood of protests from various quarters of the party. A total of 5 Party Affairs Directorates (Liaoning, Honan, Hopei, Peiping and Szechwan) recently appointed by the Party Central declared their opposition against Nanking's methods of choosing Congress representatives. Five other provincial municipal and overseas party branches (Hankow, Harbin, Kirin, Shantung and France), followed by a number of lower echelon party organs in major cities like Canton, Nanking, Shanghai and Tientsin and in two provinces Chekiang and Fukien protested against Nanking's decisions.⁷ Representatives from Hankow, Hupei and Kiangsi boycotted the Congress

and a few representatives from Chekiang, Hopei, Peiping and Tientsin later walked out in protest.⁸ The most spectacular confrontation between the Nanking leadership and the opposition was the incident in Nanking on March 14 1929 when a general meeting of its municipal party branch resulted in bitter fightings between members of the rival sides.⁹ In the face of the mounting tides of opposition the Nanking leadership started a rapid series of reshuffling of regional party branches and replaced dissident party officials with "reliable" ones. Some party officials were also summoned to Nanking and admonished to toe the party line.¹⁰ Eventually, the Third National Party Congress was convened on March 18 1929. It lasted until March 28 and officially sanctioned the political line of the Nanking leadership. The legitimate and orthodox positions of the Nanking leadership were established and Nanking's power over regional party machinery was strengthened. Yet, opposition forces in the KMT remained undaunted. For more than two years they vehemently questioned the legality of the Third Congress and raised the demand for democracy in the party and in the country against the dictatorship of the Nanking leadership. The KMT Left was the protagonist behind this opposition movement.

The Reshaping of the Ideology of the Kuomintang Left

Shortly before the Congress was convened, Chiang Kai-shek made a last effort to conciliate the Leftist leadership by promising them their seats on the newly elected Third Central Committees (CEC and CSC). Not surprisingly this was flatly rejected by the Left.¹¹ On March 11 1929, fourteen Leftist Second Central Committee members headed by Wang Ching-wei issued a manifesto declaring their opposition to the Third Congress.¹² Thereafter a "United Office of Provincial, Municipal and Overseas Party Branches of the KMT (*Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ko-sheng-shih hai-wai tsung chih-pu lien-ho pan-shih ch'u*)" was created by the Leftist leadership on March 25 with a view to rallying those party branches which supported the idea of convening another Third Congress and opposed to the one held in Nanking.¹³ To augment the opposition forces, a "KMT Party Defending Revolutionary Alliance (*Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang hu-tang ko-ming ta-t'ung-meng*)" was formed under the auspices of the RCA two months later which aimed not only at rallying opposition forces in the party but also regional militarists who were at loggerheads with Nanking.¹⁴ In late June and early October, both Ch'en Kung-po and Wang Ching-wei returned from Europe to Hong Kong respectively personally taking charge of the opposition movement.¹⁵ On September 24 1929, another manifesto was issued by the Leftist Central Committee members calling for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial regime in Nanking.¹⁶ In retaliation, the Nanking Party Central in its meetings in October and December 1929 resolved to expel them from the party "forever."¹⁷ A total break between the two sides resulted.

The two manifestoes issued on March 11 and September 24 1929 indicated the new political direction the Left was heading for. The manifesto of March 11 1929 in the main called for the restoration of democracy in the party. It depicted the political struggle in China at the time as struggles between "feudal forces" and "democratic forces." The KMT had the mission to organize the people into "democratic forces" in order to weed out "feudal forces." However, the manifesto pointed out, the party after the Northern Expedition was infiltrated by "corrupt elements and opportunists" which made it represent only the interests of warlords and bureaucrats but not of the people. The Third National Party Congress was originally intended to remedy these defects and to reflect the will of the people; yet this hope was crushed by Nanking's regulations of choosing Congress representatives which completely corroded the spirit of democracy in the party and only succeeded in alienating the people more. As such the legitimacy of the Third Congress should be denied. The manifesto called for the unity of "revolutionary elements" in the party to foster the Spirit of the 1924 Reorganization and to observe strictly the "democratic centralism (*min-chu chi-ch'üan chih*)" of the party in order to make the Party Central reflect the will of party members. Only in this way could the KMT really represent the people and eventually exterminate "feudal forces."¹⁸ When the other manifesto was issued on September 24 1929, the Left went a step further and openly named Chiang Kai-shek and his "dictatorial regime" as enemies of the Chinese Revolution. The entire spectrum of Nanking's domestic and foreign policies came under the scathing criticism by the Left. Now it called on party members to sweep away Chiang's "dictatorial regime" and advocated the installment of a new government and the summoning of a new Third Party Congress.¹⁹ The opposition movement against Nanking became a struggle for the restoration of democracy in the party and in the country at large.

The two manifestoes were no doubt an important landmark in the history of the KMT Left. For the first time it publicly named Chiang Kai-shek as responsible for the "dictatorial regime" in Nanking and called on the party to overthrow it. More importantly, the manifestoes signified a remarkable shift in the ideology of the Left to the issue of democracy. Now, establishing democracy in the party and in the country overshadowed other ideological issues and became the central element and the predominant part of the Leftist ideology. This was certainly not the case in the original Leftist doctrine expounded in 1928. The shift in the Leftist ideological emphasis was due mainly to two reasons. First, Nanking's monopoly of the seats of the Third Party Congress not only threatened the interests of the Left but also of numerous factional groups in the party. Its high-handed way to secure a predominant position in the Congress startled the party. To exploit these sentiments and join forces with other factions in the party, the issue of democracy unavoidably became the central concern for

the Left. Moreover, the Left soon discovered that the issue of democracy could be a common ground to rally discontented regional militarists to its cause. These regional militarists had already been alarmed by Nanking's ulterior motives in the Disarmament and Rehabilitation Conference and so they readily threw in their lot with the Left when the banner fighting for democracy was raised. In this way the democracy issue overrode all the differences between various opposition forces in the party and in the army and brought them together against Nanking.²⁰ No wonder the Leftist leaders decided to shift their ideological emphasis to democracy. But the shift resulted in the eclipse of the Leftist doctrine developed in 1928. For this fundamental transformation of the ideological position of the Left, it required a leader of stature none other than Wang Ching-wei.

In fact, it was Wang Ching-wei who initiated and endorsed the shift in the Leftist ideology. Throughout the opposition movement against Nanking from 1929 to 1931, he practically ignored the Leftist doctrine expounded by Ch'en Kung-po's coterie in 1928. Wang basically did not share Ch'en's intellectual orientation. Ch'en's ideology was Marxist-oriented and Ch'en himself was not afraid of admitting he was strongly influenced by socialist ideas and was "materialist" in his philosophical outlook. All these elements of thought were not found in Wang's writings and speeches throughout his political career and they were obviously dissonant to his mode of thinking. Two episodes in 1928 illustrated clearly the ideological differences between the two men. As will be recalled, in the ideological disputes between Ch'en and Ku over the term "petite bourgeoisie," Wang came down on the side of Ku and pressed Ch'en to accept instead the term "common citizens." And in the discussion over the issue of what the KMT represented, again Wang was not ready to accept Ch'en's proposition that the KMT should represent the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie, instead he favoured the theory that the KMT was a "party above all classes." Unlike Ch'en, Wang was more cautious to let class concept creep into the KMT's ideology. Moreover, since 1928 Ch'en had been branded by the party Right as "the communist in the KMT"²¹ and by 1929 the Nanking propaganda machinery redoubled the force of its attack on Ch'en's ideology as communist inspired.²² Particularly his theory of the peasant-worker-petit bourgeois revolutionary alliance was said to have its origins in the resolutions of the Third International and Leninism. As a prominent leader of the KMT, Wang of course was discreet enough to shun Marxist-oriented ideas. After the break with the communists, Wang often had to prove that he was no communist supporter. For these reasons he never showed any open endorsement of the Leftist doctrine of 1928.²³ His keeping of a discreet political distance from Ch'en's followers was further illustrated by his ambivalent attitude towards the RCA. As a matter of fact, Wang refused to declare himself the leader of the RCA. He thought that it was beneath his dignity to become

merely the leader of a certain faction as he always professed to be the leader of the whole party.²⁴ Another subtler reason may be that he did not totally embrace the platform of the RCA which bore an unmistakable stamp of Ch'en Kung-po's thought. For a time Wang's relationship with the RCA was so ambiguous that the Nanking leadership tried to drive a wedge between the two. By mid-1929 rumours were circulated that Wang was still in correspondence with Chiang and he might go back to China to assist the Nanking leadership. Nanking's propaganda also had it that Wang did not have any tie with the RCA and he actually was opposed to its ideological stand. This kind of rumours was widely circulated in the party and even among Leftist supporters.²⁵ It reflected how ambiguous Wang's attitude was towards the RCA and its platform at this juncture. In actual fact, Wang was playing a shrewd political game. He was uncommitted to the Leftist ideology of 1928 because it was Marxist-oriented and was not in line with his thinking. At the same time he did not repudiate it because he knew that it did appeal to a large number of the party's rank and file and a wide section of the people. Indeed he had to rely on this mass support in challenging the Nanking leadership. In this way, Wang made the best out of the situation. Dissimilarities of intellectual outlook between Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Kung-po chiefly explain why Wang adopted an uncommitted attitude to the platform of the RCA and the Leftist doctrine developed in 1928. And as he remained uncommitted to the Ch'en school of thought, he felt no political or psychological inhibitions in shifting the ideological emphasis of the Left drastically when the political situation of the time favoured such a change. As Wang took the lead in singling out democracy as the central ideological issue in the struggle against Nanking, other Leftist leaders simply had to follow suit. The various ideological themes expounded by Ch'en Kung-po's coterie were gradually eclipsed and no longer captured the limelight in the Leftist writings.

Wang Ching-wei's Theory of Democracy

During his stay in Europe in 1928, the issue of democracy never preoccupied Wang Ching-wei. His writings at this time were mainly concerned with the following doctrinal issues: the spirit of the 1924 Reorganization; a well-organized and disciplined party; policies of anti-imperialism and mass movements; the struggle against the "degenerate and corrupt elements" in the KMT.²⁶ The manifesto of March 11 1929 which took democracy as the central concern of the Left marked the beginning of a new line of thinking to him. During the opposition movement against Nanking from 1929 to 1931, Wang developed a theory of democracy which became the ideological weapon of the Left in challenging the Nanking leadership. As this theory of democracy was gradually set forth by him in a period of three years (1929-31), inevitably there were some changes of

emphasis. From his return to China in October 1929 to the dissolution of the Enlarged Party Conference in November 1930, Wang busied himself in explaining the importance of "party's control over the army (*i-tang chih-chün*)" and the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution. In the later period during the Extraordinary Party Conference in 1931, he concentrated on expounding the relationship between "party rule" and local self-government. Despite these two phases of changing emphasis, there is always a basic unity in his thinking -- democracy was the linchpin of all his pronouncements and writings. In the process a theory of democracy took shape.

In the years 1929-31 democracy became so predominant an element in Wang Ching-wei's thinking that he was often accused by his opponents of advocating the Principle of Democracy at the expense of the other two Principles. A nagging question concerning his belief in the Three People's Principles as a whole was raised at times. Responding to this charge, Wang gave the best and eloquent defence in a speech to party members in Canton on July 3 1931:

In principle we certainly aim at the realization of the whole Three People's Principles. Yet at a particular time and in a particular situation, we should judge by the needs which part [of the Three People's Principles] should put into practice first. Today, in politics the most pernicious things to the country and to the people are the communist theory of a single class dictatorship and Chiang Kai-shek's *de facto* personal dictatorship. To oppose them we therefore advocate democracy. Based upon [the spirit of] the entire Three People's Principles we advocate democracy first [in order to deal with the present political situation]. It is analogous to medical treatment where, based upon the whole medical knowledge, a certain prescription is given for a certain illness.²⁷

Earlier on May 30 1930, he also rebutted a similar charge by contending that "to realize the Principle of Democracy, democratic forces are indispensable. Can the other two Principles of Nationalism and Livelihood be achieved without democratic forces? If democratic forces do not develop, the National Revolution simply will not succeed."²⁸ Wang consistently argued that the realization of democracy was the means to attain the entire Three People's Principles.

What kind of democracy should China follow? Basically Wang was opposed to what he called "bourgeois democracy" and "proletarian democracy."²⁹ For Wang, "bourgeois democracy" such as that practised in Europe and the United States only served the interests of the bourgeoisie and ignored the interests of the majority of the people; while "proletarian democracy" of the Soviet type only resulted in "proletarian dictatorship" or "one party-dictatorship" and was not suitable for China.³⁰ Wang defined true democracy as "to rally the majority of the oppressed people to participating in political affairs" and to strive for "equal opportunities" in political and economic spheres.³¹ But he did not reject Western democracy completely. He agreed that the

theory of democracy of course should mainly be based upon the Three People's Principles, nevertheless, democratic theories and institutions of Europe and the United States should also be imitated. Wang reminded party members not to be intimidated by the communist theory that Western democracy was "bourgeois" by nature, nor to accept the fascist idea that only Italian fascism could revive moribund democracy.³² In fact, when China entered the Constitutional Period, she would take a political form which might be similar to party politics in Europe and the United States.³³ Wang's writings on the subject show that he never quite reconciled the theoretical tension between rejecting "bourgeois democracy" on the one hand and emulating democratic theories and institutions of Europe and the United States on the other.

To build democracy in China, Wang stressed the need to rely on domestic "democratic forces (*min-chu shih-li*)."³⁴ The manifesto of March 11 1929 had underlined the theme that fostering democratic forces was of vital importance in the struggle against feudal forces and in establishing democracy in China. The question now was to ascertain which segments of the population constituted these democratic forces. Wang thought that democratic forces were not equivalent to what the Nanking leadership would like to call "the whole people," nor did they simply mean "the proletariat" in the sense defined by the communists. Democratic forces, in Wang's opinion, were composed of the "producer class (*sheng-ch'an chieh-chi*)" of the whole country.³⁵ The producer class, or "the producer (*sheng-ch'an fen-chih*)," was broadly defined by Wang as embracing not only those who were engaged in "material production (*wu-chih sheng-ch'an*)" but also those in "spiritual activites (*ching-shen sheng-ch'an*)."³⁶ In this sense, not only workers and peasants were counted as producer class, but also intellectuals, students and various types of professionals. The only social group explicitly excluded was that engaged in "speculative or monopoly enterprises." Wang further suggested that the term "producer class" should replace the old Leftist expression, "the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie." He said the latter expression should not be used because the concept of petite bourgeoisie was ambiguous and often created misunderstanding among the common people. To Wang, the only equivalent expression to "producer class" was the "majority of the oppressed people."³⁷ Obviously, the meaning of the producer class was intended by Wang to be highly flexible so that a large section of the people could be included in it.

Why was the producer class the democratic force in China? Wang offered a straightforward answer -- it was because the producer class was oppressed by feudal forces. He defined feudal forces in China as being composed of warlords, bureaucrats, local bullies and bad gentry and remarked that it was this group of people who dominated China's domestic scene. Under their rule the government had become

"authoritarian" and "dictatorial" and was plagued by corruption and violence. This system of government, Wang argued, hurt the interests of the producer class:

The major demand of the producer class is to maintain and develop its production activities. It is vehemently opposed to corruption and violence because these two things threaten its existence and destroy opportunities to maintain and develop its activities. Thus, with regard to its personal rights, [the producer class] demands that at least the safety of its life and property should be guaranteed under the law. And with regard to government structure, it demands that the power of the government should be circumscribed by laws so as to prevent [governmental] abuses. These demands indeed are the essence of democracy.³⁶

Thus the producer class for its own interests would strive for democracy and by this very nature could act as the democratic force in Chinese politics.

Three political measures -- the implementation of local self-government (*ti-fang tzu-chih*), the summoning of the National Convention (*kuo-min hui-i*) and the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution (*yüeh-fa*) -- were emphatically advocated by Wang as the *sine qua non* in the building of a democratic form of government in China. The concept of local self-government for a long time had been an important element in Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. Sun's *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, written in April 1924, gave an outline of the stages of implementing local self-government in China. It was embraced by Wang as the authoritative blueprint for local self-government. Only in two aspects did Wang elucidate Sun's ideas further. First, Wang stressed the close relationship between local self-government and the nurturing of democratic spirit. Since late 1929, Wang had pointed out that the means to foster democratic forces lay in the implementation of local self-government.³⁷ It developed into a catch phrase that "to foster democratic forces, the first step is to implement local self-government." The theme continued to receive much attention from him ever since and local self-government was enshrined as the basis for building democracy.³⁸ The assumption behind this idea was that in the implementation of local self-government, the people would be trained to exercise what Sun had termed the "four rights" -- election, recall, initiative and referendum. When the people were well-versed in exercising the "four rights," "people's rights" would then be established and democracy could be achieved.³⁹ The other aspect which Wang deemed important in the implementation of local self-government was to organize the people, as he wrote in March 1930: "to implement local self-government, the first step is to organize the people." For Wang, mass organizations would form the basic unit in preparation for local self-government and they should be set up along occupational categories -- the peasantry, the working class, merchants, teachers, students and various kinds of professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, reporters, etc.). These mass organizations, which he specifically called

"occupational organizations (*chih-yeh t'uan-t'i*)," were entrusted with the task to prepare for the setting up of local assemblies at village (*hsiang*), district (*hsien*) and provincial (*sheng*) levels. Several reasons were offered as to why occupational organizations should assume the pivotal role in preparation for local self-government. Wang pointed out that these occupational organizations were closely related to local affairs and could best reflect their own urgent needs in local areas. Through the participation on local assemblies, they could understand each other's interests and in turn could advance common interests together. Hopefully a spirit of close cooperation among them would be fostered which could enormously facilitate local developments. Moreover, with occupational organizations serving as the basic unit in preparation for local self-government, "local bullies," "bad gentry" and "hooligans" could be precluded from interfering in local affairs.⁴⁰ Wang seems to think that these occupational organizations, by virtue of their professions, had vested interests in society and so would ensure social stability and eschew social conflict. Thus they were considered to be the most suitable organized force in the preparation for local self-government.⁴¹ However, he reminded his readers that these mass organizations might be confronted by one serious problem -- they were susceptible of embroiling in class struggle. He pointed out in the past the merchant's corps were pitted against labour forces and the forces of the peasant associations often fought against local militia organized by landowners and gentry. All these should not be repeated otherwise the whole Chinese society would be torn apart and the National Revolution would be ruined. Wang vigorously advocated close cooperation between various occupational organizations to override their individual differences and strive for their common interests. Only through this way could local self-government be smoothly implemented.⁴²

The second measure to build a democratic form of government was the summoning of the National Convention.⁴³ The origin of the idea could be traced back to Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. In October 1923 when Sun went to North China to negotiate with the then Peking Government, he advocated the summoning of a National Convention composed of representatives from mass organizations, the army and various political parties. Sun intended to take the programmes and policies of the KMT to the Convention and was confident that they would be adopted; thereby the KMT could lay claim to popular mass support and political legitimacy and hopefully the power of regional militarists could be curbed. The Peking Government rejected Sun's proposal and the idea was shelved for a time. Wang resurrected the proposal as a means to build democracy in China. Drawing an analogy between the "Peiyang warlord government" in Sun Yat-sen's times and the Nanking Government in 1929, he obliquely labelled Chiang as a "new warlord."⁴⁴ And following the political tactics of Sun, he called for

the summoning of a National Convention with its representatives drawn from mass organizations as a means to extirpate the "new warlord."⁴⁵ He argued that Sun had intended the National Convention to be directly elected by various mass organizations and to use it "to rally democratic forces for the purpose of eliminating warlords." His calling for a National Convention, Wang added, was exactly for such a purpose and in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's teachings.⁴⁶ In short, Wang Ching-wei held that the National Convention could serve two functions: reinforcing democracy and wiping out warlords in China. The idea of summoning a National Convention became a constant refrain in his pronouncements from 1929 to 1931.⁴⁷

The third essential measure to build democracy in China was the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution during the Political Tutelage period. Wang first broached the idea in the article "On Provisional Constitution" written in April 1930 in which he tried to demolish the argument that Sun Yat-sen had abandoned the idea of promulgating a Provisional Constitution in his later years and quoted several passages of Sun's writings to prove otherwise.⁴⁸ Subsequent to the publication of this article, the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution increasingly preoccupied Wang. Eventually in the Enlarged Party Conference in November 1930, a draft Provisional Constitution was composed under his guidance.⁴⁹ By that time he had come to the view that domestic unrest could be ascribed to the fact that a Provisional Constitution had not been proclaimed, as he told a party meeting in Peiping on October 27 1930:

Since 1928 the Chinese Kuomintang has unified the country by military force. How can it happen that since that time the sufferings of the people have intensified and fragmentation of political power is still evident? The reason, in short, is that no Provisional Constitution has been promulgated. Because the Provisional Constitution has not been worked out, liberties and rights of the people are not in any way guaranteed. And because there is no Provisional Constitution, the demarcation between Central and regional powers is obscure. These two shortcomings are sufficient reasons for causing [recent domestic] upheavals.⁵⁰

He ridiculed Nanking's argument that there was no need to promulgate a Provisional Constitution during the Political Tutelage period because "Sun Yat-sen's teachings are a kind of Provisional Constitution." Wang agreed that the spirit of a Provisional Constitution was no doubt located in Sun's teachings. But these teachings could not be regarded as a Provisional Constitution which in Wang's mind should be a written constitution. He entreated party members to draw on *The Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* for the details of such a Constitution. Furthermore, he railed against Nanking's attitude towards democracy. The Nanking leadership claimed that the various statutes recently proclaimed could protect liberties and rights of the people. Wang contended otherwise. He made it clear that without the promulgation of a

Provisional Constitution, the people would not enjoy "political rights (*kung-ch'üan*)," and without these "political rights" the "civil rights (*ssu-ch'üan*)" guaranteed by those statutes would be useless. He also disputed Nanking's view that during the Political Tutelage period, political power should not immediately and completely be conferred on the people. Instead Wang reasoned that the meaning of the Political Tutelage was to train people to exercise political power. The difference between democracy and autocracy lay in whether political power would be vested in the people or not.⁵¹ Wang left no doubt that the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution was the crucial means to guarantee the real transference of political power to the people.

Apart from the implementation of local self-government, the summoning of a National Convention and the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution, Wang Ching-wei saw the urgent need to come to grips with the overwhelming power enjoyed by the army in Chinese politics and the exact role played by the KMT in the building of democracy in China.

Wang of course did not fail to notice that regional militarists were the major obstacle to implementing democratization process in China.⁵² He recognized that the arch-enemy of democratic forces was the "personal army (*ko-jen wu-li*)," that is, the army led personally by warlords. To redress this situation, Wang suggested that "party's control over the army" should be vigorously enforced.⁵³ In early 1930 the issue of "party's control over the army" drew much attention from Wang. In a letter dated March 13 1930 to a leading party member, T'an Chen, Wang maintained that without enforcing "*i-tang chih-chün*," other questions could not be solved. He judged it to be the fundamental question of the day.⁵⁴ During May-June 1930, three articles, "How to enforce *i-tang chih-chün*," "Impracticable," and "How to behave as a civilian," were successively published by Wang to expound his concept of "party's control over the army." To control the army, Wang suggested that the political commissariat system and political indoctrination in the army should be reviewed and restored. Of more importance was to establish a new system of command in the army separating administrative power from operational power. Operating power such as the training of the army and the drawing up of military strategy and tactics, should be vested in military officers; while administrative power such as the decisions to mobilize troops, should be under the complete control of the Party Central. Only with the approval of the Party Central could the troops be mobilized and any military officers who violated this basic law should be punished and arrested by their subordinates. To Wang, this new system might extinguish warfares among militarists.⁵⁵ But he was well aware that purely institutional measures would not effectively put the army under the control of the party. Two other fundamental problems -- the quality of the soldiers and the

relationship between the army and the people -- had to be tackled. To ensure the quality of the soldiers, Wang insisted that they should be recruited from the producer class. Only those who came from the producer class were conscious of "being oppressed" and thus would be ready to follow the party to achieve their "liberations" in the National Revolution. He also suggested that moral cultivation (*hsiu-yang*) of the soldiers should be promoted. For Wang, the soldiers should be so indoctrinated that they would be responsive and subservient to the people.⁵⁶ The objective was to unite the army with the people and transform it into the "party's army" and the "people's army."⁵⁷ He went to great lengths to expound how to establish the relationship between the army and the people. Political indoctrination, Wang proposed, should be enforced in the army in order to make them aware that "political legitimacy comes from the people (*chu-ch'üan tsai-min*)" and to whom they were merely "public servants (*kung-p'u*.) In addition, communications between the army and the people should be strengthened. The people should be encouraged to air their demands to the army so that the army could take notice of their grievances; and the people should be educated to understand that the living conditions of the soldiers were as hard as those of the peasantry and the working class. Wang hoped that through these communications the people and the army could develop "sympathy" with each other, which was the element to unite the people with the army. He also exhorted the people to actively show their support for the "people's army" and to be ready to fight with their might against the "wicked army," the elimination of which could facilitate the unity between the people and the army. Intellectuals (*wen-jen*) were as well urged by Wang to play a part in forging close communications between the people and the army.⁵⁸ With these various measures Wang thought that the excessive power of the army in Chinese politics would be much reduced.

One more central idea underlined the process of building democracy in China. Wang envisaged that "party rule (*i-tang chih-kuo*)" was essential in leading the nation to democracy. In a speech to party members in Canton in July 1931, Wang made a remark that:

The fact that we will summon the National Convention, implement local self-government and achieve democracy in political sphere does not mean that we will abandon the principle of party rule, nor the principle of national reconstruction guided by the party.⁵⁹

The idea that party rule was necessary in the building of democracy first appeared in Wang's article "How to achieve political democracy" written on November 20 1929 and was elaborated in many of his subsequent writings. Three major reasons were advanced to justify party rule as a necessary step in the development of democracy in China.

First, the success of the revolution hinged upon the power of the party. Wang believed that the party was the embodiment of the most awakened segment of the oppressed majority and as such was in a position to guide the people in political struggles. He singled out "concentration of forces (*li-liang chi-chung*)" and "centralization of power (*ling-tao ch'üan t'ung-i*)" as the two indispensable elements for the success of political struggles and in revolution. Only the party possessed these two qualities and thereby to ensure the success of the revolution, party rule was a must. Moreover, Wang believed that the party played a vital part in suppressing the anti-revolutionaries. He maintained that during the revolutionary period the revolutionaries should set up their own regime for the dual purposes of wiping out the anti-revolutionaries and awakening the lookers-on to join the revolution. Without party rule, the anti-revolutionaries might beguile the people to undermine the revolutionary regime. Thus, party rule should not be dispensed during the revolution.⁶⁰ Finally, the implementation of local self-government could not do without party rule. Wang argued that the people for a long time had accustomed themselves to autocratic rule and they would not quickly get familiarized with exercising political rights if local self-government was implemented. During the interim "local bullies and bad gentry" might easily usurp political power; only the party could prevent this from happening. Besides, different sections of the people had differing interests and "feudal ideas" and "feudal remnants" were still there in the rural areas. Without the party to guide the people, confusions and disorders would certainly arise in the implementation of local self-government.⁶¹ All these made party rule all the more indispensable.

Yet, a prevailing view at the time held that party rule as exercised by the Nanking leadership only resulted in the curtailment of civil rights.⁶² Unavoidably Wang had to grapple with this contention. He agreed that civil rights were trampled upon under the Nanking rule but he argued that the party rule as practised by the Nanking leadership was only a sham. A true party rule would not limit the rights of the people; on the contrary, it would enhance them. A fundamental point made by Wang was that the task of the party in the Political Tutelage period was to train the people to exercise political rights. Whether the Political Tutelage by the party was a success or not would depend on whether political rights were increasingly granted to the people or not.⁶³ No doubt the growth of the people's rights in a formal way would mean a decrease in the power of the party. But, Wang contended, this was what the party aimed at during the Political Tutelage period. In fact the party in an imperceptible way could enjoy more power because the more the political rights were granted to the people, the more the people would come to support the party. Wang confidently predicted that:

The ideology and policies of the Chinese Kuomintang are drawn up by the Late

Leader in accordance with the needs of the people. If we can really follow the teachings of the Late Leader and put the ideology and policies of the party into execution, then our party will enjoy the support of the majority of the people. Not only will the people be willing to follow the guidance of the party to alleviate their sufferings and to promote their welfare during the Political Tutelage period, the majority of them will still support our party in the Constitutional Period and uphold the Republic of China.

Indeed, in Wang's view, party rule and people's rights were not contradictory but were complementary to each other.⁶⁴

Furthermore, to dispel misgivings that party rule would only result in silencing the voice of representative institutions (*min-i chi-kuan*) and relegating them to merely window-dressing function, Wang agreed to delimit the power of the party in the democratization process. He stated that he was against the abuse of power by the party and affirmed a basic principle that "the party is not above the people," but "is within the people." Thus, the independence of all representative institutions, including all mass organizations, should be respected by the party. The party could use "persuasion" but not "coercion," in bringing mass organizations to toe the party line. The same was true with regard to the government organs. The party should only supervise the government but not usurp the power of the government. The Nanking Party Central, Wang alleged, acted to the contrary. Nanking regarded mass organizations as merely a political tool and manipulated them to serve its interests. Besides, the authorities of the party and the government often overlapped and were not defined clearly with the result that the party always usurped governmental powers. All these defects would be repaired if a true party rule was installed. Wang also believed that judicial institutions should be completely independent of outside control, a condition which was essential to protect life, liberties and properties of the people and other kinds of civil rights. Freedoms of assembly, publication and speech would be delineated by the following principles: the ideology and fundamental policies of the party should not be violated; all people outside the party were permitted to discuss and debate how to put the ideology and fundamental policies of the party into practice; criticism and supervision from the people were permitted to ensure that the party had carried out its ideology and fundamental policies.⁶⁵ With all these basic principles delimiting the power of the party Wang Ching-wei hoped that people's rights would not be overshadowed during party rule.

Of course the party which was to be the guardian in the building of democracy in China was not the kind of party then under the control of Nanking. The manifesto of March 11 1929 had already pointed to the wretched state of the KMT at that time and many of Wang Ching-wei's pronouncements also held the Nanking leadership responsible for its degeneration. Certainly the KMT had to be strengthened before it could take on

the pivotal function in the democratization process in China. Throughout the years 1929-31, Wang never deviated from his long-held view that the Spirit of the 1924 Reorganization should be upheld by the party, which to him would be a means to put the party back into the right ideological track as well as strengthen it.⁶⁶ A well-organized and disciplined party built upon the support of the masses was the kind of party which should be established after the overthrow of the Nanking leadership. This very idea, as will be recalled, had been a central theme in Wang's speeches and writings shortly after the break with the CCP. Nevertheless, a new element of thinking was added. Immediately after Wang Ching-wei ended his retired life in Europe and went back to China in October 1929, he issued a circular telegram to all "revolutionary comrades" making known his views on the party issue:

The organization of the party had originally been governed by the principle of democratic centralism. Even since Chiang Kai-shek has replaced it by personal dictatorship, the spirit of the party has completely been corroded. Now [we are going] to reformulate the proper relationships between the higher and lower hierarchy of the party and between party members and the party, [we have] to ensure that the will of party members shall be freely expressed and resolutions and discipline shall be unquestionably observed. Only in this way can the party act in unison and the whole party business be actively conducted. In short, if the organization and discipline of the party is not to be redefined, then the party will exist in name only but not in actuality.⁶⁷

To redefine and strengthen the organization and discipline of the party, Wang seized upon the new idea that democratic centralism should be restored and enforced in the KMT. The system of democratic centralism was modelled upon the Bolshevik party and was first adopted by the KMT in the First National Party Congress. Nanking's monopolization of the seats in the Third National Party Congress was construed by the Left as blatantly violating democracy in the party and was the reason why Wang Ching-wei laid such a heavy emphasis on restoring democratic centralism in the party.⁶⁸ It is no exaggeration to say that by this time Wang's thinking on the party revolved mainly upon the idea that democratic centralism in the party should be restored and with its restoration other problems faced by the party could then be solved. What Wang exactly meant by democratic centralism was revealed in an article "Reply" written on May 24 1930 in which he listed its two essential features. The first was the collective leadership system (*ho-i-chih*). Wang preferred to have a collective leadership rather than a supreme leader in the party. To him, a supreme leader in the party was almost tantamount to having a dictator because the supreme leader often acted more for his own interests than collective interests. This would necessarily engender discontents and divisions in the party. With a collective leadership system, policy decisions were collectively made. They reflected the will of the whole leadership and so would be

acceptable to them. Wang underlined the point that every decision should be thoroughly deliberated by the whole leadership and reflect their will. This was the fundamental difference between a collective leadership system and a supreme leader system. The second feature was the close communication between party members in the upper and lower hierarchy. Wang deprecated two types of leaders, those who ignored the opinions of their subordinates and those who just followed their subordinates with intent to win over their hearts. Wang stated that under a proper system of democratic centralism, opinions from the lower party level should reach the upper level and at the same time decisions reached by the upper level should be obeyed by the lower level. When this system of communication was established, the whole party would be energized.⁶⁹

Together with the restoration of democratic centralism in the party was the forging of contacts between the party and the masses. Again, this theme had frequently appeared in Wang's writings earlier on.⁷⁰ Now Wang linked up the idea with local self-government. He advocated that during the implementation of local self-government, the KMT should seize the opportunity to build its power base in the masses. The party should unite with the producer class and lead them to achieve local self-government. In due course the party could win the support of the masses.⁷¹

Thus, only a party governed by the principle of democratic centralism and forging contacts with the masses was well qualified to be the guardian in the building of democracy in China. To Wang, restoring democratic centralism in the party was the very thing to regenerate people's confidence in the party. A party with democratic centralism was a party armed with the will of its members, and it would not be a tool of any individual. This could tremendously raise prestige and power of the party which could then win allegiance from the army. And a party with mass support from the people was a party embodied with the will of the people and no army would dare to stand in its way.⁷² The success of party rule, "party's control over the army" and building democracy in China were ultimately dependent upon a strengthened KMT.

Taken as a whole, the writings of Wang Ching-wei during 1929-31 entirely revolved around the issue of democracy in the KMT and in the country at large.⁷³ His thinking can be aptly summarized in his favourite expression: "Democratic centralism should be restored in the party, democratic forces should be promoted in the country."⁷⁴ Despite two phases of changing emphasis, his theory of democracy on the whole was consistent and coherent. Profound theories, fine-drawn and complex intellectual arguments were obviously not his forte -- he was more versed in making eloquent speeches and elegant catchwords -- nevertheless, Wang succeeded in weaving various ideas of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine into a theory of democracy. Undeniably his theory

followed faithfully the ideological framework provided by Sun. The implementation of local self-government, the *raison d'être* for a National Convention and the necessity for the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution had their antecedents in Sun Yat-sen's works such as the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*. Even the idea of "party rule" in the Political Tutelage was first advocated by Sun. The only major contribution made by Wang was to synthesize these various notions into a theory of democracy. Unlike the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* coterie, Wang never attempted to move beyond the ideological track laid down by Sun, not to mention to interpret Sun's doctrine along a Marxist-oriented direction. In this sense he broke no new ideological ground.

Moreover, Wang's theory of democracy fails to show that he had really grasped the complexities of the issues he was tackling. In his view, the KMT which shouldered the responsibility of the democratization of China, had to be strengthened and reinvigorated. This was to be attained by the restoration of democratic centralism in the party. Yet, he was so obsessed with this idea that he underrated the complex nature of the party issue. All his writings tend to suggest that the restoration of democratic centralism in the KMT would be a panacea for all problems plaguing the party.⁷⁵ Here Wang's conception of strengthening the party was remarkably less elaborate than the Leftist theory set forth in the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* where a number of innovative ideas such as the social composition and the class base of the party were discussed at great length. In view of numerous deep-rooted problems faced by the party, it is questionable that the KMT could have been strengthened mainly by restoring its democratic centralism system. Leftist theoreticians must have been aware of the superficial side of Wang's arguments, but it was only in May 1931 when a new Leftist journal *Nan-hua p'ing-lun* was launched in Hong Kong that Ku Meng-yü and other lesser known Leftist writers contributed a number of articles supplementing Wang's views on the party issue. Generally they concurred with Wang that to strengthen the KMT it was necessary to democratize the party and to restore democratic centralism.⁷⁶ However, they thought that this was not enough to ensure that the party could be strengthened. Led by Ku Meng-yü, they turned their attention to the quality of party members.⁷⁷ Two lesser known Leftist writers, Wan Min-i and Ch'en K'ang-shih, recommended that party members should cultivate a good character and unselfishly be dedicated to revolution. They should be recruited from wider sections of the population, particularly from the economic and cultural sectors, to ensure that the party had a wider social base and its members were respected by the people in general. And party members were encouraged to participate in social activities in order to contribute to national reconstruction. Besides, group responsibilities to maintain party discipline at every level of the hierarchy should be instituted. Finally, the examination of the quality of party members should be regularly conducted.⁷⁸ Other Leftist writers, Huang Yen-tsuan and Shu Kuo-fan, saw

the need to strengthen the basic unit of the party -- the sub-branch (*chü fen pu*) -- as the first step to strengthen the party, while Lin Po-sheng, the chief editor of the *Nan-hua p'ing-lun*, called for the extermination of all factional organizations and the forging of an unified ideology in the party.⁷⁹ The issue of how to strengthen the KMT was far more complicated and difficult than Wang Ching-wei's theory suggested.

Wang also tended to underrate the difficulties of implementing local self-government and curbing the excessive political power of the militarists. In view of the vast territory of China, the implementation of local self-government from the district level upwards required time as well as political stability. At that time politics in China had become so militarized that it is questionable whether local self-government could be smoothly implemented. This difficulty did not go unnoticed by Ch'en Kung-po. Seeing that there was not a vestige of local self-government in China in late 1930, Ch'en wrote in his memoirs that Wang Ching-wei might underestimate the difficulties of building democracy in China.⁸⁰ In the same vein, supporters of Leftist democratic cause questioned whether "party's control over the army" could really be put into practice or not. A telling point advanced by them was that the Leftist opposition movement, as a matter of fact, was not hesitant in using regional militarists against the Nanking leadership. How, then, could the Left be sure that the power of these militarists would be properly reduced after the downfall of the Nanking leadership?⁸¹ Obviously, there is an inherent contradiction between the Leftist theory of upholding democracy and its practice of allying with regional militarists against Nanking. All these pointed to the complicated nature of implanting democracy into China.

Recent studies of democracy by social scientists have demonstrated that the durability of democracy in a country is often related to the stages of economic development in that country. A country with an "advanced" economy has a better chance of building democracy than a country with a "backward" economy.⁸² Given the backward stage of the economic development in China in the early 1930s, democracy did not seem to have stood a chance to take root in the country. Wang Ching-wei's theory of democracy never took account of the intimate relationship between the stages of economic development and the building of democracy in China, nor did Leftist theoreticians in general realize the significant relationship between the two. Only an obscure Leftist writer, Hsing Chüeh-fei, in an article contributed to the *Nan-hua p'ing-lun* published on July 11 1931, touched upon their correlation. He posited that the ripeness of a country for democracy was dependent upon certain political and economic conditions. In the first place, the people should be imbued with democratic ideas. Hsing was certain that if the people were fully conscious of their democratic rights, they would strive for them and thereby achieve democracy. Besides, the news media should be well

established. In a democratic state, Hsing noted, newspapers played an indispensable role by communicating and disseminating the views of the people. Thirdly, education should be promoted because the higher the education received by the people, the greater the demands for political participation and for building a democratic state. Fourthly, political parties should be formed. Hsing argued that political parties were an important vehicle to arouse and organize the people to participate in political affairs, which were a crucial element in a democratic form of government. In past times dictatorship in China prospered because political parties were suppressed and rendered powerless. Furthermore, industry and commerce should be promoted. Hsing acutely perceived the intimate relationship between economic development and democracy. He cited the French Revolution and the independence of the United States as examples to show that only in economically developed countries could democracy be firmly rooted. Finally, local self-government should be implemented. Hsing regarded local self-government as the basis for a democratic form of government. Only the people who were trained to manage their local affairs would be ready to participate in national politics. The failure of building democracy in the past, Hsing added, was ascribable to the lack of local self-government in China.⁸³ Hsing's article shows that he had appreciated the significant relationship between economic development and the building of democracy in a country. He grasped an essential condition for building democracy which Wang Ching-wei had neglected.

For all the weaknesses and inadequacies of Wang Ching-wei's theory of democracy, there is no doubt that he fashioned the mind of the Left from 1929-31 and armed the opposition movement against the Nanking leadership with a consistent and coherent political doctrine. At the same time, this theory of democracy gradually superseded the Leftist doctrine shaped by Ch'en Kung-po and his coterie of followers in 1928. The Leftist alternative propounded by Ch'en and the RCA was buried by Wang. Here we are going to examine how they responded to this drastic ideological change.

The Decline of Ch'en Kung-po's Ideological Influence

We have seen that in 1928 Ch'en Kung-po and the Leftist writers of the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* succeeded in propounding a Leftist interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine which posed a great challenge to the official ideology of the Nanking leadership. This Leftist doctrine was widely accepted by most of the KMT Left and became the official ideological position of the RCA. In due course the Ch'en Kung-po school of thought was formed. The hallmark of the Ch'en school was its Marxist-oriented interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. Ku Meng-yü and his associates, though they never wholly embraced

such an interpretation, had to recognize that the Ch'en school had captured the minds of a large section of the Left. This explained why the RCA had adopted Ch'en's ideas in its platform. However, from March 1929 onwards, when Wang Ching-wei began to take charge of the Leftist opposition movement, the Ch'en school of thought suffered a decline. Wang Ching-wei who never legitimatized Ch'en's interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine, developed his own theory of democracy which imperceptibly superseded the Leftist doctrine shaped by Ch'en. Given Wang's unrivalled position in the KMT Left, no wonder his theory of democracy had to be accepted and become the ideological weapon for the Left in their opposition movement against Nanking. The decline of the Ch'en school of thought was reflected both in the gradual shift in the ideological position of the RCA and in the changing emphasis of Ch'en Kung-po's thinking.

The subtle and gradual shift of the ideology of the RCA started in about mid-1929. At this juncture two articles published in the RCA's main propaganda organs, the *Min-i* and *Min-hsin*, stated emphatically that the major political issue in China at this stage was democracy -- the KMT should unite with democratic forces against feudal forces.⁸⁴ This was clearly in line with Wang Ching-wei's political stand at the time. A more obvious ideological shift was revealed in the RCA's affiliated organization, the "United Office of Provincial, Municipal and Overseas Party Branches of the KMT." Ever since its inception on March 25 1929, the struggle for democracy had been the central ideological stand for the organization. Journals published by the "United Office" directed their ideological discussions mainly to the overthrow of the "military dictatorship government" in Nanking and the establishment of democracy in the party and in the country.⁸⁵ However, the shift of the ideological position of the RCA was a gradual process. In the year 1929 the RCA was still reluctant to switch its ideological theme to democracy. Its main propaganda organs, the *Min-i*, *Min-hsin* and *Min-chu*, continued to propagate the ideological line approved by the First National Congress. Advocating a new reorganization of the party, the elimination of "reactionary elements" from the party and the building of party's base on the peasantry, the working class and the common citizens were the constant refrain in these journals.⁸⁶ An official platform of the Left published in the *Min-hsin* on June 30 1929 cited word for word the various resolutions on party and governmental affairs passed by the First Congress of the RCA.⁸⁷ Numerous other Leftist journals affiliated to the RCA remained faithful to the ideological line mapped out by Ch'en Kung-po and the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* coterie in 1928. The restoration of the Spirit of the 1924 Reorganization, the advocacy of a new reorganization of the party, the KMT representing the interests and forging a revolutionary alliance of the peasantry, the working class and the common citizens, and the Principle of People's Livelihood as the ultimate goal of the National Revolution,

were the main themes that filled the pages of these journals.⁸⁸ For a while, the RCA still toed Ch'en Kung-po's ideological line.

Yet, by early 1930 the RCA began to take the stand that democracy was the only significant ideological issue in the opposition against Nanking. At this time, the Left had already formed an alliance with Yen Hsi-shan, the powerful regional militarist in Shansi province. Henceforward the issue of democracy decisively took precedence over other ideological issues in the Leftist writings and pronouncements. The cessation of the publication of *Min-chu* conveniently marked the end of the old ideological stand of the RCA. When the alliance with Yen Hsi-shan culminated in the summoning of the Enlarged Party Conference in Peiping in July 1930, "the spirit and ideology" of the RCA, as pointed out by Ch'en Kung-po in his memoirs, had all been jettisoned for the sake of unity with Yen. The struggle for democracy and the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek became the only significant political goals for the RCA.⁸⁹ A conformity in ideological position was brought about in the KMT Left as a whole by 1930.

Likewise Ch'en Kung-po went with the ideological shift and a changing emphasis in his thinking was discernible. He tried to comply with the political line laid down by Wang Ching-wei. Ch'en produced fewer writings in 1929-31 than in 1927-28; mainly this was due to the eclipse of his position as a Leftist theoretician at the later period. His major writings during 1929 to 1931 included two treatises, *The Future of the Chinese National Revolution* and *An evaluation of the so-called Third National Party Congress*, and three articles, "The true meaning of party rule," "What is the meaning of the Left?" and "The bases and exposition of materialism."

The two major treatises written by Ch'en in 1929 nicely marked the changes in his thinking. In his treatise *The Future of the Chinese National Revolution* published in February 1929, the idea for a reorganization of the KMT was still the motif of the whole work. It was virtually a restatement of Ch'en's views in 1928.⁹⁰ Yet seven months later in another major treatise, *An evaluation of the so-called Third National Party Congress*, the idea for a reorganization of the KMT was not even mentioned, instead the issue of democracy in the party and in the country much troubled him. In this treatise he contended that the Nanking leadership represented no more than "a cluster of bureaucrats and warlords" and never cared about the interests of the peasantry, the working class, the common citizens and the national bourgeoisie. The monopoly of the Third National Party Congress by Nanking showed that Chiang Kai-shek intended to impose a personal dictatorship on China. However, Ch'en asserted, this kind of dictatorship could never last long as democratic forces and ideas in China had been much augmented in the past decades. After overthrowing Chiang's dictatorship, Ch'en suggested that three policy measures should be implemented immediately. The first and

second measures were the establishment of a "virtuous government (*lien-chieh cheng-fu*)" and the carrying out of economic reconstruction in the south of the Yangtze River. The third measure, which reflected the new element in Ch'en's thinking, was the building of a democratic base. Ch'en emphatically stated that under party rule, democratic spirit should simultaneously be implanted into the party and the people. Local self-government should be promoted, a National Party Congress and National Convention should be convened. Without the founding of local self-government and the building of a democratic rule, not only the warlords could not be wiped out but also the KMT would completely fail to attain its goals. In his conclusion Ch'en repeated the Leftist long-held views that the KMT had degenerated and the National Revolution had aborted. He called for the unity of the whole party and the entire nation to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek who was "an anti-revolutionary usurping the power of the party and the government and opposing the people."⁹¹ The treatise indicated that Ch'en had shifted with the political wind of the time and it was the first occasion he came to grips with the issue of democracy in his writings.

Since then, democracy became a crucial part of Ch'en Kung-po's thinking. In the article "The true meaning of party rule" written in early 1930, Ch'en imitated Wang's arguments and attempted to blend the concept of party rule with democracy. As will be recalled, the concept of party rule had first been developed by him in *What does the KMT represent?*. In the article Ch'en did recapitulate his previous views on party rule. The aims of party rule, he reiterated, were to lead the country to achieve the Three People's Principles as well as to reconcile different class interests so as to eliminate class struggle. "Equalization of land rights," "restriction of private capital" and "development of state capital," the three essential policies to achieve the Three People's Principles, were to be implemented under party rule. These elements of thought were not new to Ch'en. What was indicative of his ideological shift was that he related the concept of party rule with the current issue of democracy. Following the lead of Wang Ching-wei, he defended the importance of party rule and argued that in actual practice party rule and democracy were complementary to each other. The aim of a revolution, Ch'en stated, was to realize "all kinds of liberty." If the revolution could not attain liberty, then this revolution would not be a "true revolution" but was only a "sham revolution" or even a "counter-revolution." A "real party rule," like a "true revolution," Ch'en continued, would mean the granting of liberty to the people and the training of the people to exercise their political rights. Under Nanking's rule, the people in fact enjoyed less and less freedom and party members were even completely deprived of their freedom. As such the Nanking Party Central had never practised "real party rule" and this explained why the civil rights of the people were often trampled upon. To establish

"real party rule," Ch'en propounded that local self-government should immediately be put into practice in the area conquered by "revolutionary army." After one year of practising local self-government, the people should be granted the right to elect their own administrative head at the district level. When the people were able to exercise their political rights and participate in governmental affairs, democracy could then be fully established. Hence, the party's policies on mass movements should be directed to the goals of consolidating local self-government and granting political rights to the people. In addition, Ch'en proposed institutional measures to extend democracy in China. Six months after the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek, Ch'en insisted, a new Third National Party Congress should be convened and within another six months, a National Convention should be assembled. The Third National Party Congress would proclaim a three-year Provisional Constitution and after that the National Convention should promulgate a Constitution.⁹² The tone and arguments in the article faithfully replicated the ideas of Wang Ching-wei.

To be sure, Ch'en Kung-po was not that opportunistic to change his views to conform to Wang Ching-wei's political stand. His Weltanschauung remained the same. Materialism was still the basic philosophical outlook for him and in early 1930 he penned an article "The bases and exposition of materialism" setting out his conception of materialism in a systematic way.⁹³ And he was not hesitant in saying that he was a believer in *li-shih p'ai* (historical materialism).⁹⁴ Two other key ideological concepts were still much cherished by him. First of all, the idea of party rule was still regarded by him as indispensable for national reconstruction, reconciling diverse class interests and preventing class struggle. Furthermore, a "non-capitalist" (this time he shunned the word "socialist") development for China continued to be emphasized by him. He repeated his earlier view that the Chinese National Revolution was different from national revolutions in other countries. The Chinese National Revolution was not led by the bourgeoisie and it set up the goal of installing a "non-capitalist state;" whereas national revolutions in the United States, Britain and France were led by the bourgeoisie and aimed at the establishment of capitalist states.⁹⁵ Thus, the ultimate political goal of the Left, Ch'en continued, was neither communism nor capitalism. The Leftists were not communists; they protected both capital and labour in order to ensure full utilization of capital and full protection for the working class in China. In fact, on the theoretical plane, Ch'en did not see there was any possibility to put communism or capitalism into practice in China at that time. He argued that only in an "industrialized and well advanced society" would communism arise. As China was at the stage of backward rural economy, Ch'en thought that it was unthinkable for China to develop towards a communist state. The same held true for capitalist development in China. As

yet China had no economic basis for the development of capitalism and even if China aimed at such a goal, she would not succeed because she was not strong enough to break the predominant control imposed by "foreign capital" and "imperialism" over her. Based on the present socio-economic situation in China, Ch'en concluded that the proper goal for China to achieve was a "non-capitalist state."⁹⁶

By early 1930 Ch'en Kung-po had followed Wang Ching-wei in concentrating on the issue of democracy as the main ideological *raison d'être* for the Leftist opposition movement against the Nanking leadership. A marked shift from his old doctrine of 1928 was irrevocably made. On the whole Ch'en showed not much inhibition in following the new stream of Leftist ideological stand defined by Wang. The undisputed position of Wang in the Left and Ch'en's unquestioned loyalty to Wang were decisive factors for Ch'en to switch obediently to Wang's stand. No doubt, Ch'en carefully preserved some of his key ideas in the ideological shift: a "non-capitalist" development for China; the Principle of People's Livelihood as the core of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine; the importance of party rule; the conceptions of materialism and historical materialism.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, no matter how much effort Ch'en expended on preserving the essence of his school of thought, the shift had certainly done violence to the whole system of Leftist doctrine as expounded in 1928. By July 1930 when the Enlarged Party Conference was convened by the Leftist opposition movement, no one was more aware than Ch'en that the platform and ideology of the RCA had been abandoned for the sake of uniting opposition forces against Nanking. As time went by the issue of democracy was the only central element in the Leftist ideology. The eminent role of Ch'en Kung-po in shaping the ideology of the Left which he had acted so brilliantly in 1928 was lost forever. Wang Ching-wei resumed his role as the leader and the theoretician of the Left.

The Revival of Ku Meng-yü's Thought in 1931

Ku Meng-yü was the main beneficiary in the ideological shift of the Left. We have seen that Ku's intellectual orientation was basically different from Ch'en Kung-po's. In 1928 it was Ch'en who got the upper hand over Ku and represented the mainstream of the Leftist ideology. However, in one respect Ku gained an advantage over Ch'en -- Ku had a distaste for Marxist-oriented ideas and his thinking was congenial to Wang Ching-wei. When Wang began to take charge of the Leftist opposition movement in October 1929, Ku's intellectual affinity with Wang gradually revealed itself. Wang's notion of the "producer" as the democratic force in China probably had its intellectual antecedent in Ku's article "Some facts on the class issue" written in November 1928.⁹⁸ Wang's emphasis on democracy must have struck a responsive chord from Ku whose

Ch'ien chin had made the issue of democracy one of its underlying themes.⁹⁹ Their intellectual affinity was further demonstrated when a booklet which collected Wang Ching-wei's writings in 1929-30 (published by the Leftist main propaganda agency, the *Nan-hua jih-pao she* in 1930) included two articles written by Ku dwelling on the controversial subjects of class issue and historical materialism.¹⁰⁰ Based on this intellectual affinity with Wang, in 1931 Ku made an attempt to regain what he had lost to Ch'en in ideological field. In the following we will concentrate on showing how Ku asserted himself in the ideological field again which had the hidden purpose of demolishing the Ch'en Kung-po school of thought. A more detailed treatment about the relationships between Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü will be given in Chapter 5.

The first phase of the opposition movement against the Nanking leadership ended in November 1930 with the dissolution of the Enlarged Party Conference. Ch'en Kung-po decided to leave China for Europe as misunderstandings between himself and Wang Ching-wei somehow developed.¹⁰¹ In mid-1931 when the second phase of the opposition movement started with the summoning of an Extraordinary Party Conference in Canton, Ch'en was still in Europe. It was at this moment that Ku Meng-yü made a sly attempt to dispose of the ideas advanced by the Ch'en school. The journal, *Nan-hua p'ing-lun*, which was launched in Hong Kong on May 15 1931, became the forum for Ku to propound his views and in an oblique way to disparage Ch'en's ideas. Lin Po-sheng the chief editor of *Nan-hua p'ing-lun*, was on the side of Ku.¹⁰² The journal not only espoused the democratic cause against the Nanking leadership but also endeavoured to counteract the ideological influence of Ch'en Kung-po.

In the three major articles, "The belief the revolutionaries must have," "The disaster of theory and the disaster befallen to the Chinese," and "The rethinking of a revolutionary," written by Ku Meng-yü for *Nan-hua p'ing-lun*, a hidden attack on the Ch'en school started. Ku declared that he was against any undue emphasis on materialist or economic interpretation of history and tried to retort this view by attacking the statement that "I am but the reflection of my economic environment." To Ku, it was a kind of superstition which had to be eradicated before "one can become oneself and change society." Ku argued that "will (*i-chih*) is a force, especially will guided by intelligence."¹⁰³ He enunciated that will could change history as effectively as materialist environment:

History is made by man. Man is not swayed by mysterious and intangible "social forces." The genesis of social forces is by human will and any changes of social forces also depend on human will. All social and political problems are merely problems concerning man -- the problem of the relationship between men. This relationship between men in most cases can be improved by human

thought and intelligence, both of which can overcome countless difficulties [faced by men].¹⁰⁴

Obviously the conceptions of history held by Ku Meng-yü and Ch'en Kung-po were radically different. Ku emphasized that human will is not conditioned by social environment and it can often transcend social environment and change history; whereas Ch'en believed that social environment is in the final analysis the determinant in the evolution of history. Ku's conception of history led him to proclaim that the reason for the failure of the Chinese Revolution lay not in the "objective factors" -- the oppression by imperialism or because economic conditions were not ripe for revolution -- but in "subjective factor". He contended that the quality of the revolutionaries often determined the fate of the revolution and hinted that the failure of the Chinese Revolution was due to the "weaknesses" of the revolutionaries.¹⁰⁵ This analysis again differed from Ch'en's thinking which always saw the ultimate importance of objective factors in determining the outcome of the Chinese Revolution.¹⁰⁶

Marxism, in particular Soviet Marxism, came under violent attack from Ku Meng-yü. In Ku's opinion, Marxists inhabited "a limited world of thought" and were obsessed with "absurdly rigid formulae." According to Ku, there was an unbridgeable gap between himself and Marxists in general -- he believed that "theory must be based on facts and reality" while Marxists only blindly followed Marx's teachings which only brought about havoc:

Marxists, on the other hand, start with their dogma, and on the basis of what are merely conjectures they attempt to direct political affairs, with the result that they not only find themselves at odds with reality, but also that they get innocent people into trouble.¹⁰⁷

Ku showed grave concern that Soviet Marxism still exerted an influence among the KMT youth even in 1931. He paraphrased some theories advanced by KMT members during 1928-29 and branded them as products of Soviet Marxism. These theories were:

1. China cannot develop along a capitalist road because at present imperialism and world capitalism will not permit her, the semi-colonial country, to develop native industry. Thus, before capitalism is overthrown in the world, China can only remain a semi-colonial country.
2. Based on the above reasons, if China wants to accomplish the National Revolution, she has to pit herself against capitalism at the same time. In other words, the Chinese National Revolution, although it is by nature a democratic revolution, will radically turn into a socialist revolution because of the exigencies of the circumstances. In addition, capitalism in the world is now on the verge of collapse.

3. The bourgeoisie in China is impotent ... Thus, the Chinese Revolution has to be directed by the proletariat. At present, although the Revolution led by the proletariat is still democratic in nature, yet it will develop into a socialist revolution in the near future.¹⁰⁸

Although these theories did not reproduce word for word what had been put forward by Ch'en's coterie of followers in 1928, it is undeniable that they bore a close resemblance to their ideas. In paraphrasing these theories Ku tried in a subtle manner to link the Ch'en school of thought with Soviet Marxism and hence to discredit it. To Ku, Soviet Marxist theories on China issue were full of contradictions and Moscow only wanted to "exploit China for her political interests."¹⁰⁹

On two other aspects -- attitude towards the masses and the importance of organization -- Ku also tried to rebut Ch'en. Ku warned that revolutionaries should not blindly believe in the power of the masses, particularly in the "destructive power" of the masses. Revolution would not succeed merely by harnessing the masses to disrupt the existing political and social order. A blind belief in the power of the masses would only result in "reactionary situation" and provide opportunities for the "the warlord-bureaucrat to take advantage of." Moreover, democratic forces would be destroyed amidst social disturbances and reaction.¹¹⁰ As regards the function of organization in revolution Ku had this to say:

[Over-confidence] in the power of organization is harmful to the revolutionary cause. Organization is not a mysterious institution. It is only a device to facilitate division of labour. It generates no magical powers and produces no miracles. For one thing, organizational techniques and methods can only be perfected in the light of the accumulated knowledge and experience of the persons who compose the organization. In the last analysis, organization is conditioned by personality; no organization can be well established which is not composed of sharp-minded persons.¹¹¹

Ku's opinions on the power of the masses and the importance of organization were not merely intended as a caution to party members. He had an eye to counteract Ch'en's views. The writings of Ch'en in 1928 evinced that he had unbounded confidence in the masses to promote the revolution. Ku's cautious attitude towards the masses aimed to debunk the myth of the omnipotence of the mass movement created by Ch'en. The same was true of Ku's attitude towards organization. It was said that Ku was opposed to the setting up of a Leftist organization in 1928; but circumstances of the time favoured such an idea and Ku finally agreed with Ch'en that the RCA be established. In January 1931, with the dissolution of the first phase of the opposition movement, the RCA was also dissolved. Yet by mid-1931 some Leftists were keen to restore the organization. Ku's opinion on organization was as much to quench any idea to revive the RCA as to reassert his ideological influence over Ch'en.¹¹²

The second phase of the opposition movement in mid-1931 witnessed the revival of Ku Meng-yü's ideological influence. Ch'en's retirement from politics since late 1930 and the intellectual affinity between Wang Ching-wei and Ku Meng-yü accounted for the revival of Ku's thinking. But the revival no more than confirmed the ideological trend set in motion by Wang Ching-wei since he began to take charge of the Leftist opposition movement in October 1929. The Marxist-oriented nature of Ch'en's doctrine was rejected by Wang and superseded by his theory of democracy. By 1930 the Ch'en school of thought was in eclipse. No wonder Ku Meng-yü's coterie could reassert itself in the ideological field in mid 1931 without much difficulty.

Notes

1. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsü p'ai hui-i lu," pp.176-177.
2. Hu Meng-hua, "Kuo-min-tang CC chi-t'uan ti ch'ien-ch'ien hou-hou," pp.166-174; Liu Pu-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ti mo-ying -- 'CC' t'uan," pp.235-237; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.220-221.
3. Hu Meng-hua, pp.172-174; Pai Yü, "Tao T'ung Kuan-hsien fan-lun pei-fa shih-ch'i fan-kung ch'ing-nien t'uan-t'i," *CCWH*, 14.5:87-93; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh* pp.220-221.
4. On October 25 1928, the Standing Committee of the CEC passed a resolution on the methods of choosing Third National Party Congress representatives. See *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 5:Public notices 1 (December 1928). A detailed election regulation for Third Congress representatives was later approved by the Standing Committee. See *ibid.*, 6:laws 2-5 (January 1929). On February 22 1929, the Standing Committee finalized the regulations of choosing representatives to the Third Congress. See *ibid.*, 8:laws 2-3 (March 1929).
5. *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien* 1929, Chapter 2, passim; Ch'en Kung-po, *So-wei ti-san-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui chia-chih ti ku-liang*, pp.42-53.
6. *Ibid.*, p.60; George E. Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," *China Year Book* (1929/30), p.1202; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, p.223.
7. See *Min-i*, 2/3/4:45-62 (March 31 1929); 5/6:26-31 (April 20 1929); 7:27-30 (April 28 1929) and 9:23-25 (May 12 1929).
8. "O-kuei-han chi ko t'e-pieh tang-pu tai-piao t'uan pu ch'u-hsi san-ch'üan ta-hui hsüan-yen," *Hsiang-pao*, March 27 1929, p.1. Nanking Second History Archives, 9(2)/42; Hsiao Cheng, *Tu-ti kai-ko wu-shih nien*, pp.26-27.
9. *Min-i*, 2/3/4:34-44, and 5/6:26-31; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.228-230.
10. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.40:3 (October 14 1928); 5.46:1-3 (November 25 1928); 6.1:2-3 (December 30 1928) and 6.4:5-6 (January 20 1929). An extended treatment of the intra-party struggles during this period will be provided in Chapter 5.

11. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.207-208; Ch'en Kung-po, *So-wei ti-san-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui chia-chih ti ku-liang*, p.62.

12. These 14 Leftist leaders were composed of the original 8 *yüeh-fang wei-yuan*, Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü, Wang Fa-ch'in, Wang Lo-p'ing, Ho Hsiang-ning, Ch'en Shu-jen and P'an Yün-ch'ao, and six other Second Central Committee members, Po Wen-wei, Pai Yün-t'i, Ch'en Pi-chün, Chu Chi-ch'ing, En K'o Pa Tu and Kuo Ch'un-t'ao. Except for Ho Hsiang-ning and En K'o Pa Tu who soon withdrew from the Leftist cause, the other 12 Leftist leaders constituted the core of the Left's leadership in the opposition movement against Nanking in 1929-31.

13. The "United Office," too, issued a manifesto on March 26 1929 denouncing the Third National Party Congress held in Nanking as illegally constituted. See "TPK," chapter 3, section 1.2.

14. See "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ko-ming hu-tang ta-t'ung-meng ch'eng-li hsüan-yen," *Hu-tang chou-k'an*, 1:6-9 (May 15 1929).

15. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.211, 215.

16. Ho Hsiang-ning and En K'o Pa Tu did not sign their names in the Manifesto of September 24 1929. Ho remained politically inactive after 1928 and En K'o Pa Tu later rejoined the Nanking leadership and was elected as a CSC member by the Third National Party Congress in March 1929.

17. On October 28 1928 the Standing Committee of the CEC in Nanking passed a resolution to deprive "forever" the party memberships of Wang Fa-ch'in, Po Wen-wei, Chu Chi-ch'ing, Pai Yün-t'i, Wang Lo-p'ing, Ch'en Shu-jen, P'an Yün-ch'ao and Kuo Ch'un-t'ao. The same disciplinary action against Wang Ching-wei was meted out on December 8 1929. See *Kai-ts'u p'ai chih tsung chien-ch'a*, pp.1-2, 122-126. Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü had been expelled from the party by the Third National Party Congress because of their alleged involvements in the communist uprising in Canton in December 1927. See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien 1929*, pp.73-74. It is interesting to note that no disciplinary action was taken against Ch'en Pi-chün, who was Wang Ching-wei's wife and a CSC candidate member.

18. "Wang Ching-wei teng shih-ssu wei-yuan hsüan-yen," in "TPK," chapter 3, section 1.1.

19. For the Manifesto, see "TPK", chapter 4, section 1.2.

20. An account of how and why the Left reached an alliance with regional militarists will be given in Chapter 4.

21. For the KMT Right's criticisms of Ch'en Kung-po, see Hsing Han, "I-tsai

Ch'en Kung-po so-wei tang-ti kai-ts'u," *Ko-ming lun-t'an*, 1:27-30 (September 15 1928); Miu Pin, "Wo-men yao jen-ch'ing kuo-min-tang ti kung-ch'an chu-i che," *ibid.*, 1:35-42 (September 15 1928).

22. For Nanking's propaganda attacks on Ch'en Kung-po's ideology and the RCA, see *Kai-ts'u p'ai ti chen mien-mu*, Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui hsüan-ch'uan pu and *Kai-ts'u p'ai chih tsung chien-ch'a*, Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Pei-ping t'e-pieh-shih tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan-hui.

23. On one occasion to commemorate Sun Yat-sen in early 1929, Wang Ching-wei openly acknowledged the fruitful work done by "revolutionary comrades" in 1928. See WCWC, vol. 4, p.125. However, he never publicly endorsed the Leftist doctrine developed in 1928.

24. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.259. According to Ch'en Kung-po, Wang Ching-wei at times did set down the political strategy of the RCA and nominate cadres to RCA's branches in Europe. But in public Wang made it clear he was not a member of the RCA. See *ibid.*, p.259. On the whole Wang let Ch'en have a free hand in taking charge of the RCA affairs. When Wang Mou-kung, a leading Leftist and a friend of Wang's, raised questions concerning the RCA, Wang Ching-wei told him that he had to discuss them with Ch'en before giving a reply. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated April 10 1929, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:60-61 (November 1984).

25. See T'an Chih, "Kuan-yü Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng ti san-chung hsin-li," *Min-hsin*, 4:1-3 (June 23 1929); "Fan-tung hsüan-ch'uan chi wo-men ti t'ai-tu," *ibid.*, 5:8-10 (June 30 1929). On February 4 1929, in a speech given to the party in Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek deliberately stated that even if Wang Ching-wei was to return to China, he (Wang) would not become a puppet of any political grouping. For the speech, see *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 36:15-16 (February 11 1929).

26. For Wang Ching-wei's writings during his stay in Europe, see *Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng ch'ü-kuo hou chih yen-lun*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Ho-pei sheng tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan-hui hsüan-ch'uan pu.

27. Wang Ching-wei, Wang K'un-lun, "Kuan-yü min-chu cheng-chih chi-ko yao-tien ti t'ao-lun," *Chung-yang tao-pao*, 2:12 (July 8 1931). Also see "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng tsui-chin i-chou chien ti yen-chiang chi t'an-hua," *NHPL*, 1.9:8 (July 11 1931).

28. "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng hsu," in *YLC*, not paged.

29. "Tsai fei-ch'ang hui-i chao-tai hsin-wen chi-che hsi-shang yen-chiang," *NHPL*, 1.5/6:7 (June 11 1931).

30. *Ibid.*, p.7; "Hsün-cheng shih-ch'i ju-ho i-tang chih-kuo," *Chung-yang tao-pao*, 7:7 (September 9 1931); "Liang-chung mo-hsing hsin-li chih wa-chieh," in *YLC*, pp.128-132.
31. "Yü-hsing ti-fang tzu-chih hsu-tzu tsu-chih min-chung shih," *ibid.*, p.62; "Liang-chung mo-hsing hsin-li chih wa-chieh," *ibid.*, p.128.
32. Wang Ching-wei, "Ju-ho lien-ho ch'i-lai," *NHPL*, 1.1:3 (May 15 1931).
33. Wang Ching-wei, "Hsün-cheng shih-ch'i ju-ho i-tang chih-kuo," *Chung-yang tao-pao*, 7:7.
34. "Tsen-yang shih-hsien min-chu cheng-chih," in *YLC*, p.10. Ku Meng-yü was the first leading Leftist writer who favoured the expression "sheng-ch'an fen-tzu" in his ideological discourse. See, for example, Kung-sun Yü-chih, "Kuan-yü chieh-chi wen-t'i ti chi-chien shih-shih," *CC*, 1.9:12-13.
35. "Kuan-yü min-chu cheng-chih chi-ko yao-tien ti t'ao-lun," *Chung-yang tao-pao*, 2:12-13.
36. "Tsen-yang shih-hsien min-chu cheng-chi," in *YLC*, pp.10-13.
37. "Tsen-yang shu-li min-chu shih-li," *ibid.*, p.6.
38. See, for example, "Pen-tang Tsung-li Sun hsien-sheng shih-shih wu-chou-nien chi-nien kan-yen," *ibid.*, p.55; "Kuan-yü ti-fang tzu-chih chih san-yao tien," *NHPL*, 1.7:5-6 (June 27 1931); "Chü-pan ti-fang tzu-chih pi-yao," *ibid.*, 1.8:7 (July 4 1931); "Ch'ung-shih min-li," *ibid.*, 1.12:13 (August 8 1931).
39. "Tang-wu cheng-chih pao-kao," *ibid.*, 1.9:8-9 (July 11 1931).
40. "Yü-hsing ti-fang tzu-chih hsu tzu tsu-chih min-chung shih," in *YLC*, pp.63-68.
41. In a speech given to newspapermen on June 11 1931, Wang Ching-wei asserted that if every individual had a job and united with each other, then democratic forces could be formed and could oppose the communists. He claimed that the communist movement prospered only in the undemocratic countries and in the areas where the people suffered unemployment. See "Tsai fei-ch'ang hui-i chao-tai hsin-wen chi-che hsi-shang yen-chiang," *NHPL*, 1.5/6:7. Also see "Kuan yü lai-yüeh jen-wu chih t'an-hua," *ibid.*, 1.5/6:8.
42. "Kuan-yü ti-fang tzu-chih san-yao tien," *ibid.*, 1.7:6.
43. During the ideological debate in the KMT in 1928, few Leftists tackled this subject at length. Shih Ts'un-t'ung was one of the few Leftist writers in the party who wrote on the National Convention. See Shih Ts'un-t'ung, "Kuo-min hui-i wen-t'i," *Hsien-tai chung-kuo*, 2.2:1-10 (August 16 1928).

44. Wang Ching-wei, "Hsin chün-fa ti peng-hui chiao pei-yang chün-fa keng-k'uai," *Chien-t'ao*, 2:2-3 (May 15 1929).
45. "Pen-tang Tsung-li Sun hsien-sheng shih-shih wu-chou-nien chi-nien jih kan-yen," in *YLC*, p.58.
46. "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng tsai-fa chih t'an-hua," *Min-chu*, 1:38-39 (July 18 1929).
47. See, for example, "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng chih hai-nei-wai ko tang-pu ko t'ung-chih tung-tien," in *YLC*, p.218; and "Chih hai-nei-wai ko tang-pu ko t'ung-chih tien," *NHPL*, 1.1:2 (May 15 1931).
48. "Lun yüeh-fa," in *YLC*, pp.75-85.
49. For the draft Provisional Constitution, see *Chung-hua min-kuo yüeh-fa ts'ao-an*, ed. Nan-hua jih-pao she. On Wang Ching-wei's discussions about the technicalities of the draft Provisional Constitution, see "Tsai-lun yüeh-fa," in *Tsui-chin yüeh-fa lun-ts'ung*, pp.11-17, and "Kuan-yü yüeh-fa ti chi-ko wen-ta," *ibid.*, pp.92-97.
50. Wang Ching-wei, "Tsai chung-yang tang-pu chi-nien chou pao-kao," *ibid.*, p.22.
51. *Ibid.*
52. As early as August 1928, Wang Ching-wei had foreseen that Chinese politics would be gradually dominated by regional militarists. See his letter, dated August 15 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:58. Also see his letter, dated January 1 1929, to Wang Mou-kung, in *ibid.*, 4:59-60.
53. "I-jen chih-chün," in *YLC*, p.243.
54. "Wang chih T'an Chen shu," Nanking Second History Archives, 34/603. The letter was dated March 13 1930 and was published in *Ta-kung pao*, April 8 1930.
55. "Tsen-yang i-tang chih-chün," in *YLC*, pp.183-184; "Pu-ch'ieh shih-shih," *ibid.*, p.203. See also Wang Ching-wei, "Min-chu cheng-chih yü chün-tui," in *T'ao-Chiang yen-lun chih*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-chien wei-yuan-hui fei-ch'ang hui-i, pp.10-12.
56. "Tsen-yang i-tang chih-chün," in *YLC*, pp.186-187; "Pu-ch'ieh shih-shih," *ibid.*, p.203.
57. "Chung-yang tang-pu k'uuo-ta hui-i chih pi-yao," *ibid.*, p.210; "Kuo-min cheng-fu ch'eng-li liu-chou-nien chi-nien jih yen-shuo," *NHPL*, 1.9:5 (July 11 1931).
58. "Tsen-yang tso wen-jen," in *YLC*, pp.227-231.

59. "Tang-wu cheng-chih chün-shih pao-kao," *NHPL*, 1.12:10 (August 8 1931).
60. "Kuan-yü tang-chih chih t'an-hua," in *YLC*, pp.21-22.
61. "Ti-fang tzu-chih yü tang-chih," *NHPL*, 1.13:4 (August 15 1931).
62. See, for example, Hu Shih et al., *Jen-ch'üan lun-chi*.
63. "Kuan-yü tang-chih ti t'an-hua," in *YLC*, pp.23-24; "Ti-fang tzu-chih yü tang-chih," *NHPL*, 1.13:4-5.
64. "Hsün-cheng shih ch'i ju-ho i-tang chih-kuo," *Chung-ying tao-pao*, 1:8-9 (September 9 1931).
65. "Tang-chih ti i-i," in *YLC*, pp.35-36. An underlying theme related to freedoms of assembly, publication and speech was freedom of thought. Here Wang Ching-wei had this to say. He divided thought into two kinds: political and non-political. On "non-political thought," by which he meant religious, scientific, aesthetic and academic thought, Wang basically advocated an "absolute freedom (*chüeh-tui tzu-yu*)" for them. To him, any type of control over non-political thought would only restrict the growth of human knowledge and result in the decline of civilization. As to "political thought," he was more strict and stated that only "relative freedom (*hsiang-tui tzu-yu*)" should be allowed. In his view, there was no point of granting freedom to anti-revolutionaries during the revolutionary period. Indeed, "unity of thought (*ssu-hsiang tung-i*)" was necessary in the revolutionary party and among the people, otherwise it would only bring disunity to the revolutionaries and endanger the revolution. Only in the period of constitutional government the people as a whole could enjoy more political freedom. See Wang Ching-wei, "Lun ssu-hsiang tung-i," in *YLC*, pp.135-146. Concerning freedom of assembly, Wang Ching-wei made a significant remark in April 1931 when he declared that in accordance to Sun Yat-sen's doctrine, political parties other than the KMT would be allowed to exist in the Military and Political Tutelage periods. Wang did not elaborate further and so it is not known what would be the exact political role played by these parties during the Political Tutelage period under his scheme. Wang's view was in sharp contrast to Nanking's stand which had been succinctly expressed in Hu Han-min's favourite expression -- "*tang-wai wu-tang* (no political parties should exist other than the KMT)." For Wang Ching-wei's view on this subject, see Wang Ching-wei, "Political Parties in the Educative Period," *The People's Tribune*, 1.2:37-44 (April 1931).
66. See, for example, "Wang Ching-wei teng shih-ssu wei-yuan hsüan-yen," in "TPK," chapter 3, section 1.1; "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng chih hai-nei-wai ko tang-pu ko t'ung-chih t'ung-tien," in *YLC*, pp.215-216, 218.

67. "Wang Ching-wei hui-kuo chi ko-chih tang-pu ko ko-ming t'ung-chih t'ung-tien," in "TPK," chapter 4, section 3.1.

68. "Wang Ching-wei teng shih-ssu wei-yuan hsüan-yen," *ibid.*, chapter 3, section 1.1; "Kuan-yü hu-tang ti t'an-hua," on *YLC*, p.70; "Tsen-yang i-tang chih-chün," *ibid.*, p.183; "Erh-shih nien-lai min-ch'üan yün-tung chih hui-i," *ibid.*, p.101; "Chih hai-nei-wai ko tang-pu ko t'ung-chih tien," *NHPL*, 1.1:2.

69. "Ta wen," in *YLC*, pp.189-193.

70. See, for example, "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng hui-kuo chih ko-chi tang-pu ko ko-ming t'ung-chih t'ung-tien," in "TPK," chapter 4, section 3.1; "Chü-pan ti-fang tzu-chih ti pi-yao," *NHPL*, 1.8:6 (July 4 1931); "Tsai Kuang-tung sheng tang-wu kung-tso jen-yuan yang-ch'eng so yen-shuo tz'u," *ibid.*, 1.18:4 (September 19 1931).

71. *Ibid.*, 1.18:5.

72. "Tsen-yang i-tang chih-chün," in *YLC*, p.183; "Tsai Kuang-tung sheng tang-wu kung-tso jen-yuan yang-ch'eng so yen-shuo tz'u," *NHPL*, 1.18:4.

73. On one occasion Wang Ching-wei went beyond the democracy issue and put down in writing his ideas on economic and financial policies. On September 3 1930, he submitted a "Draft proposal on economic policy and financial policy" to the Enlarged Party Conference set up by the Leftist opposition movement in Peiping. In the Draft Wang emphasized that the major objective of the economic policy in China was to urge the people to engage in "full development of production (*fa-ta sheng-ch'an*)."¹ He advocated that the state should set up large-scale enterprises in production and communication sectors, build state capital and promote private enterprises. The state should also enact laws to protect the labour, promote agricultural development, implement "land to the tillers" policy, set up big state banks and encourage internal migration to the Northwest. To attract foreign investments, he suggested that the government could sign "concession" agreements with foreign capitalists, which the Soviet Union had done in the 1920s. In the financial policy, Wang's aim was to establish a sound financial system in China and he laid down financial programmes to be carried out in three different periods in order to achieve this objective. In particular, he stressed the need for the state to prevent the evil effects of capitalism from developing during the reconstruction period. See Wang Ching-wei, "Ching-chi cheng-ts'e chi ts'ai-cheng cheng-ts'e ts'ao-an," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 7.35:1-4 (September 8 1930). On the whole the "Draft proposal" was favourably greeted by the press. See *Ta-kung pao*, September 17 1930, Editorial, reprinted in *ibid.*, 7.37:editorials 7-8 (September 22 1930). In two important respects Wang Ching-wei's "Draft proposal" was different from the political platform of the RCA and Ch'en Kung-po's suggestions. First, Wang never favoured the

idea of confiscating big landowners' land, a programme which had been endorsed by the First National Congress of the RCA and Ch'en Kung-po. Secondly, Wang did not envisage a large-scale nationalization in industrial, financial, trade and communication sectors, a political plank which had been adopted by the First Congress of the RCA. Obviously the ideas in the "Draft proposal" were not abstracted from Ch'en Kung-po's writings or the RCA's platform.

74. The expression was first coined by Wang Ching-wei in an article written on April 12 1930, see "Erh-shih nien-lai min-ch'üan yün-tung chih hui-ku," in *YLC*, p.101. See also "Kuan-yü i-tang chih-chün chih t'an-hua," *ibid.*, p.123; "Ju-ho tsao-ch'eng i-ko ko-ming hsin huan-ching," *NHPL*, 1.9:12 (July 11 1931).

75. The idea for a reorganization of the party, which was the leitmotiv of the corpus of writings of the Ch'en Kung-po school, rarely appeared in Wang Ching-wei's writings during 1929-31. Only on one occasion in January 1929 did Wang write that the party should be "thoroughly reorganized." See "Tang-chih ti i-i," in *YLC*, p.34.

76. Wan Min-i, "Tang ti fu-hsing ho tang-yuan ti chien-yüeh," *NHPL*, 1.17:23 (September 12 1931); "Tsui yao-chin ti-shih tang ti min-chu hua," *ibid.*, 1.19:30-33 (September 26 1931); Ch'en K'ang-shih, "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti i-ko chuan-chi," *ibid.*, 1.23:5-6 (October 24 1931); Shu Kuo-fan, "Kuan-yü tsu-chih wen-t'i ti chi-tien i-chien," *ibid.*, 1.9:18 (July 11 1931).

77. For Ku Meng-yü's view on the quality of party members, see "Ko-ming che chin-jih ying-yu ti hsin-nien," *ibid.*, 1.3:3 (May 30 1931); "Ko-ming che chih nei-sheng," *ibid.*, 1.7:8 (June 27 1931).

78. Wan Min-i, "Tang ti fu-hsing ho tang-yuan ti chien-yüeh," *ibid.*, 1.17:21-23; Ch'en K'ang-shih, "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti i-ko chuan-chi," *ibid.*, 1.23:6.

79. Shu Kuo-fan, "Kuan-yü tsu-chih wen-t'i ti chi-tien i-chien," *ibid.*, 1.9:16; Huang Yen-tsuan, "Shih-hsing min-chu cheng-chih ti hao-shih," *ibid.*, 1.10:17 (July 18 1931).

80. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.247.

81. See, for example, "Hsu Liao-hsien chih T'an chen," Newpaper clippings on the discussion on "party's control over the army", Nanking Second History Archives, 34/603. The letter was originally published in *Ta-kung pao*, April 14 1930.

82. Seymour Martin Lipset is the first political scientist who emphasizes the close correlation between high levels of economic development and democratic political systems. See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 53:69-105

(1959). This view has gradually gained currency among scholars dealing with democracy issue, see, for example, Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 28:253-264 (April 1963). Some other scholars take Seymour M. Lipset's findings with reservations or even disagree with them. See, for example, Deane E. Neubauer, "Some conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 61.4:1002-1009 (December 1967) and Leslie Lipson, *The Democratic Civilization*, pp.241-246. Scholarly discussions on the issue of democracy has recently become more refined and sophisticated. However, Seymour Martin Lipset's view on the subject remains an influential one. For a recent article dwelling on democracy issue, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", *Political Science Quarterly*, 99.2:193-218 (1984).

83. Hsing Chüeh-fei, "Yang-ch'eng min-chu cheng-chih ti chi-ko ken-pen tiao-chien," *NHPL*, 1.9:18-21 (July 11 1931). Another Leftist writer, Huang Yen-tsuan, was also aware of the complicated problems involved in building democracy in China. See his article "Shih-hsing min-chu cheng-chi ti hao-shih," *ibid.*, 1.10:16-17 (July 18 1931).

84. T'ien Chi, "Peng-hui hu? wen-ting hu?" *Min-hsin*, 2:1-2 (June 9 1929); Chung P'eng, "Chün-fa chan-cheng chung wo-men ying-ch'ü ti t'ai-tu," *Min-i*, 9:1-2 (May 12 1929).

85. See, for example, *Ko-ming chan-hsien*, Issue No. 6 (November 1929).

86. Po Chien, "Kai-tsu yü i-tang chih-kuo," *Min-i*, 8:24 (May 5 1929); Huo Jan, "Kai-tsu p'ai ti li-ch'ang," *Min-chu*, 4:17-23 (August 8 1929); I Che, "Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming yü wo-men ying-ch'ü ti fang-lüeh ho so hsu-yao ti li-liang," *Ko-ming ch'u lu*, 1:10-16 (March 20 1929).

87. "Wo-men chieh-chüeh tang-cheng wen-t'i ti chu-chang," *Min-hsin*, 5:1-8 (June 30 1929).

88. See, for example, Tien Yuan, "Kuo-min-tang ko-ming ch'ing-nien tang-ch'ien ti jen-wu," *Chien-t'ao*, 2:20-22 (May 15 1929); Tuan Ping, "Hu-tang yü ch'ing-nien," *ibid.*, 2:23-24; Hsiao Feng, "T'ao-Chiang sheng-chung ti kai-tsu yün-tung," *Tso-feng*, 2:13-16 (September 20 1929); I Che "Fu-hsing Chung-kuo ko-ming yü wo-men ying-ch'ü ti fang-lüeh ho so hsu ti li-liang," *Ko-ming ch'u-lu*, 1:10-16; V, "Tsen-yang ch'ü chiu-tang," *Ko-ming ch'ien-lu*, 3:17-19 (April 5 1929); T'ien Chi, "Tang yü min-chung chi ch'i tui-yü cheng-fu chih ti-wei," *ibid.*, 17:29 (December 16 1929).

89. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.231; Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsu t'ung-chih hui shih-shih," part 1, p.280.

90. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min ko-ming chi ch'ien-lu*, p.83.
91. Ch'en Kung-po, *So-wei ti-san-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui chia-chih ti ku-liang*, pp.105-110, 114.
92. "Tang-chih ti chen i-i," in *Gendai Shina no kiroku*, April 1930, comp. Hatano Ken'ichi, pp.289-293.
93. "Wu ti ken-chü ho chieh-shih," in *ibid.*, pp.368-381. Materialism was still the basic philosophical standpoint in Ch'en Kung-po's later works, *Revolution and Thought* and "The Three People's Principles and Science." See Ch'en Kung-po, *Ko-ming yü ssu-hsiang*, and "San-min chu-i yü k'o-hsüeh" in *Ch'en Kung-po hsien-sheng erh-shih-chiu nien wen-ts'un*, ed. Hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.12-64.
94. "Tang-chih ti chen i-i," in *Gendai Shina no kiroku*, April 1930, comp. Hatano Ken'ichi, p.294.
95. *Ibid.*, pp.295-296.
96. "Tso-p'ai shih shen-mo," in *ibid.*, pp.211-215, 226-227.
97. The idea of a new reorganization of the KMT, which was a main idea of Ch'en Kung-po's in 1928, was relegated to a secondary place at this time. It was never vigorously advocated by him again, which was borne out by his article "What is the meaning of the Left" published in April 1930. In the article Ch'en recounted a history of the RCA and the reasons why he supported the idea of a reorganization of the party. However, he did not strongly put forward the view that such a reorganization was a must for the party now, as was the case in 1928. See "Tso-p'ai shih shen-mo," in *ibid.*, pp.230-231.
98. See Ku Meng-yü, "Kuan-yü chieh-chih wen-t'i ti chi-chien shih-shih," *CC*, 1.9:1-13 (November 1 1928).
99. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.188.
100. See *YLC*, pp.155-178.
101. An account of the misunderstandings between Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Kung-po in 1930 will be given in Chapter 4.
102. In an article contributed to the *Nan-hua p'ing-lun*, Lin Po-sheng was not hesitant to ridicule the idea of an "alliance of three classes" which in fact was an unavowed attack on Ch'en Kung-po's conception of "worker-peasant-common citizen" revolutionary alliance. See Lin Po-sheng, "Ju-ho fu-hsing Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang," *NHPL*, 1.4:13.
103. Ku Meng-yü, "Ko-ming che chin-jih ying-yu ti hsin-nien," *ibid.*, 1.3:2.

104. Ku Meng-yü, "Ko-ming che chih nei-sheng," *ibid.*, 1.7:8 (June 27 1931).
105. *Ibid.*
106. See, for example, Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min ko-ming ti ch'ien-lu*.
107. Ku Meng-yü, "Ko-ming che chin-jih ying-yu ti hsin-nien," *NHPL*, 1.3:2.
108. Ku Meng-yü, "Li-lun chih o-yün yü Chung-kuo jen chih o-yün," *ibid.*, 1.4:9-10 (June 6 1931).
109. *Ibid.*, 1.4:10-11.
110. Ku Meng-yü, "Ko-ming che chin-jih ying-yu ti hsin-nien," *ibid.*, 1.3:2.
111. *Ibid.*, 1.3:3.
112. On the dissolution of the RCA in January 1931 and the attempt to revive it in mid-1931, see Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

FROM THE PARTY-DEFENDING MOVEMENT TO THE ENLARGED CONFERENCE: THE ALLIANCE WITH REGIONAL MILITARISTS, 1929-30

The widespread opposition against the Third National Party Congress was not the only challenge faced by the Nanking leadership in early 1929. The other growing threat came from the regional militarists who were its military allies during the Northern Expedition. The Fifth Plenum of the KMT which had passed a resolution to abolish Branch Political Councils failed to put regional militarists under the control of the Central Government. The three Group Armies led by Feng Yü-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen and Yen Hsi-shan, well-entrenched in various parts of China after the Northern Expedition, constituted new sources of regionalism. The Second Group Army under Feng Yü-hsiang had extended its power from Shensi to Honan; the Third Group Army under Yen Hsi-shan from Shansi to Hopei while the Fourth Group Army under Li Tsung-jen achieved the most spectacular growth in power and had its influence expanded from Kwangsi via Wuhan to Peiping. The Army in Manchuria under Chang Hsüeh-liang which had recently declared its allegiance to the KMT, was only nominally under the control of the Nanking Government; and a number of regional armies such as those in Szechwan and in the Northwest remained largely independent of the KMT's control. The Northern Expedition achieved no more than a semblance of unity of the whole country and "warlordism" simply survived in another form. Chiang Kai-shek decided to put an end to this situation. Emboldened by the recent success of the Northern Expedition, he approved an ambitious plan, said to have been submitted by a then largely unknown party official, Yang Yung-t'ai, to circumscribe regional power.¹ In pursuance of this goal, a Disarmament and Rehabilitation Conference, under the auspices of the Nanking Government, was convened in Nanking in January 1929. However, Nanking did not attain its goal in the Conference; various proposals to disband troops were put forward but nothing definite was decided upon. Instead, the seeds of discontent were sowed among regional militarists who came to the Conference; in particular, estrangement between Feng Yü-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek came to light. Feng did not believe that Chiang was genuinely intent on implementing the disarmament plan in Nanking's own army. Moreover, he was irritated by Chiang's

proposal to level out the strength of each Group Army which in practice meant that his Second Group Army, the largest among regional militarists, would be the most affected. In protest, Feng left Nanking secretly; the Conference reached no definite decision and was hastily concluded.²

Centralization of power, however, remained the immediate political goal for Chiang Kai-shek. Two months after the Disarmament Conference, Chiang was given an opportunity to challenge the Kwangsi Clique. Ever since the party purge in 1927, he was fully aware that Li Tsung-jen was a serious rival to him in terms of military power. This kind of apprehension, as already noted in Chapter 1, accounted partly for the conclusion of a "Wang-Chiang understanding" in late 1927. After the Northern Expedition, the Kwangsi Clique posed the most formidable threat to the Central Government as its influence had extended to Wuhan and Peiping. Chiang's policy was to conciliate the Clique first while he waited for a situation to develop in order to break its power for good.³ The opportunity came in March 1929 when Kwangsi army commanders in Wuhan, in an explicit move to counteract the strengthening of Nanking's power there, dismissed the Governor of Hunan, Lu Ti-p'ing, without obtaining the necessary authorization from the Central Government. Chiang readily seized upon this opportunity, ignored possible avenues for peaceful solution and ordered a military expedition against "rebellious" Kwangsi generals in Wuhan.⁴ This soon escalated into a military conflict between Nanking and the Kwangsi Clique. Chiang, resorting to his customary practice of using one militarist against the other, rehabilitated T'ang Sheng-chih to win over the troops in Peiping and successfully oust the Kwangsi general Pai Ch'ung-hsi from North China. Furthermore, he installed Yü Tso-po as Governor of Kwangsi to seize power there and, at the same time, Nanking's military expedition routed the Kwangsi troops in Wuhan. Chiang's speedy manoeuvrings bore fruit; by April the Kwangsi Clique disintegrated and Li Tsung-jen and his followers had to flee overseas. The quick dissolution of the Kwangsi Clique made other regional militarists feel uneasy. They wondered who would be Chiang's next target. Attention was soon focused on Feng Yü-hsiang who had been on bad terms with Chiang since the Disarmament Conference. In fact, during the period of conflict between Nanking and Kwangsi, Chiang had got wind of Feng's promise of support to the Kwangsi Clique against Nanking.⁵ Inevitably, tensions between the two sides ran high and in May 1929, both sides were ready to strike at each other.⁶ As Feng was concentrating his forces against Nanking, his two major subordinates deserted with their armies to Nanking.⁷ This seriously reduced the strength of Feng's troops and he had no other choice but to announce his stepping down from power on May 27 1929.

Nanking's success in curbing regional power was no more than a partial one -- it

failed to entrench its power in Kwangsi as well as in the Northwest regions (mainly Shensi) formerly ruled by Feng Yü-hsiang. In the province of Kwangsi, Yü Tso-po was too imbued with communist ideas to comply with the orders of the Central Government;⁸ Li Tsung-jen was in fact waiting in the wings for a political come-back. In the Northwest regions, having resigned his command, Feng Yü-hsiang remained in Shensi. He had been revolving the idea of allying with Yen Hsi-shan against Nanking in his mind. In June, Feng went to Shansi (the province under the rule of Yen) and took up residence there. This was intended by him as a political gesture to show his sincerity in allying with Yen against Nanking. Yen of course would not be rushed into taking an irrevocable step against Chiang, nor did he comply with Chiang's urges to force Feng to go overseas. He made the best out of the situation and used Feng's residence in Shansi and his remaining influence in the Second Group Army to strength his bargaining power with Chiang. In this way he not only preserved his own regional power in Shansi but also subjected Feng to his control. In response to Yen's tactics, Chiang began to cultivate a friendly relationship with Feng's subordinates in the Northwest regions as a means of outflanking Yen. An intricate state of power balance among Chiang, Feng and Yen existed in North China.⁹ It was this state of perpetual rivalries between Central and regional power that decisively shaped the character of the KMT Left's opposition movement against Nanking during 1929-31.

The Kuomintang Left's Alliance with Regional Militarists

Centralization of power in the hands of the party was always advocated by the KMT Left. At the time when the Fifth Plenum assembled, Wang Ching-wei had expressed grave concern that Chinese politics appeared to be progressively dominated by regional militarists.¹⁰ Consideration of this factor motivated the Left to give full support to Chiang Kai-shek in the Fifth Plenum for abolishing Branch Political Councils. After the Leftists broke away from Chiang, for a time it never occurred to them that they could use regional militarists in their opposition against the Nanking leadership. This view remained unchanged up to early 1929. When Ch'en Kung-po published his treatise, *The Future of the Chinese National Revolution* in February 1929, he was not in favour of forging an alliance with regional militarists which in his eyes was "opportunistic." He pointed out that "opportunism (*chi-hui hsin*)" was observable in some quarters of the KMT Left. This kind of "opportunism" was manifested in the desire to seize political power as quickly as possible and in the inclination for an unprincipled collaboration with the militarists. In his view, "opportunism" might bring temporary success to the Left but in the end would only result in dismal failure. He entreated the Left to concentrate more of its efforts on the

building of a strong Leftist "groundwork" for itself rather than resort to any "opportunistic move."¹¹ The "Resolution on party affairs" passed by the First Congress of the RCA in January 1929, too, called on the Left to guard against any opportunistic move to ally with regional militarists who in its eyes were simply warlords like Chiang Kai-shek.¹² When the military conflict broke out between Nanking and Kwangsi in March-April 1929, the Left true to its pronouncements on the issue, regarded both sides as "new warlords" and the war a war between rival warlords.¹³

However, in early 1929 Wang Ching-wei began to think differently. At this time, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the Left still had a strong influence among the party ranks and its appeal to youth, intellectuals, students in general and the working class in North China was remarkable. But, in Wang's mind, using regional militarists to topple the Nanking leadership was a more efficacious means of achieving the political goals of the Left. The situation at the time was extremely favourable for such a course of action -- the continued rivalries between Central and regional power made the prospect of cooperation between the opposition in the party and the dissentient regional militarists against Nanking all the more likely. Wang was sufficiently a pragmatic politician who would not let this situation go unexploited -- we have noted that in early 1929 he had begun to shift the ideological emphasis of the Left to the issue of democracy in order to rally all kinds of opposition forces against Nanking. With the same purpose in mind, he in early 1929 also started to justify an alliance with regional militarists against Nanking. In a personal letter dated January 1 1929 to his close associate Wang Mou-kung, Wang wrote:

That the Chinese National Revolution should be based upon the people is a *fundamental concept* which should not be questioned. However, from the *tactical* point of view, [we can see that] the Chinese Revolution has one unique feature -- *the employment of military force*. The Chinese Revolution is in some ways different from revolutions in Europe. History is full of examples, which need not be instanced here, that many successful revolutions in Europe, as a matter of fact, did not rely on military force. Yet, this will not be the case for China. Not only should we realize that the Chinese Revolution must be based upon the people, but also we should know the importance of the cultivation of military force.¹⁴

Wang's emphasis that military force was required to accomplish the Chinese Revolution was an indication that he might make use of the forces of regional militarists against Nanking. His article "The collapse of new warlords is quicker than the *Peiyang* warlords" published in the *Min-i* (May 6 1929) began to identify the type of army which could be counted as an ally in the revolution. In the article Wang did underline the old themes that "warlords cannot be expected to overthrow warlords" and that "to overthrow warlords the precondition is to awaken the masses," nonetheless, he did not

think that all the armies in China were warlords' armies. Instead, he differentiated between two types of armies, those who were commanded by "military comrades (*wu-chuang t'ung-chih*)" and those by warlords. To him, "military comrades" were those who cooperated with the people whereas warlords were those who did not. No doubt, many new warlords could be found in the National Revolutionary Army. However, Wang pointed out, a significant number of "military comrades" could still be identified.¹⁵ Wang's view was immediately echoed in an article written by a Chung P'eng in the next issue of the *Min-i*. Following Wang's view, Chung P'eng argued that not all militarists were warlords; those militarists who espoused democracy and democratic forces were people's armies and only those who opposed them were the real warlords. The revolutionaries, Chung P'eng concluded, should differentiate people's armies from warlords' armies.¹⁶ All these cleared the way for a theoretical justification of an alliance with regional militarists. Subsequently, the main Leftist propaganda organs, *Min-hsin* and *Min-chu*, printed articles which advocated that the Left should ally with the militarists and other political forces which supported the Leftist cause.¹⁷ As a matter of fact, by early 1929 a decision had already been made by the Leftist leadership to ally with those regional militarists who were opposed to the Nanking leadership. Ch'en Kung-po, in his memoirs recalled that when he was in France (April-May 1929), Wang and he had reached a decision to use regional militarists against Chiang Kai-shek; in June, he went back to Hong Kong to take charge of the military campaigns against Nanking.¹⁸ One month earlier the RCA had set up a "Party-Defending and National Salvation Alliance" under which a "Party-Defending National Salvation Army" comprising the forces of dissident regional militarists was being formed.¹⁹ By this time allying with regional militarists for the purpose of overthrowing the Nanking leadership became the set policy of the Leftist opposition movement.

The Party-Defending and National Salvation Movement Sept.-Dec. 1929

In June 1929 when Ch'en Kung-po arrived in Hong Kong, the Headquarters of the RCA in Shanghai had already established constant communications with major regional militarists -- in North China with Feng Yü-hsiang (Shensi), Yen Hsi-shan (Shansi) and T'ang Sheng-chih (Honan); in Central China with Shih Yu-shan (Anhwei), Fang Chen-wu (Anhwei), Ho Chien (Hunan) and Chang Fa-k'uei (Hupei); in South China with Li Tsung-jen (Kwangsi) and Yü Tso-po (Kwangsi).²⁰ The Left tried to convince them to join the "Party-Defending Revolutionary Alliance," support the democracy cause and provide military forces for the "Party-Defending Army." On September 17, Chang Fa-k'uei, the military leader who was closely associated with the Left since the

Northern Expedition, took the lead in declaring his opposition against Chiang Kai-shek's "dictatorial rule." The Leftist Central Committee members headed by Wang Ching-wei immediately responded by issuing the September 24 Manifesto which called on party members, "revolutionary masses," "military comrades" and "Whampoa cadets" to rise up against Chiang's "tyrannical rule." Establishing democracy in the party and in the country became the major political demand of the "Party-Defending Army." Important regional militarists (with the notable exception of Yen Hsi-shan), followed in Chang Fa-k'uei steps; on October 10, Feng Yü-hsiang's army in Shensi (Feng himself still resided in Shansi under the "custody" of Yen), led by Sung Che-yuan, started a military operation against Nanking, and on December 3, T'ang Sheng-chih and Shih-Yu-shan also sent circular telegrams denouncing Chiang's rule -- as many as seventy important military leaders were claimed by T'ang to have supported his cause. In Kwangsi, the political situation also changed in favour of the Left. Yü Tso-po's inclinations towards the communists kindled discontent among his subordinates which easily led to his removal by Nanking in October; shortly Li Tsung-jen stepped in and regained control of Kwangsi in November and at once declared his joining in the "Party-Defending and National Salvation Movement." Some militarists in Szechwan and local armies in Anhwei and Kiangsu also voiced their support for the Leftist cause.²¹ For a time it appeared that the "Party-Defending Army" would overwhelm the Nanking leadership.²²

However, the opposition movement was speedily defeated by Nanking. In North China, by the end of November, Feng Yü-hsiang's army had suffered a substantial defeat and was forced back to Shensi by Chiang's army.²³ About the same time T'ang Sheng-chih's forces met the same fate and disintegrated in December 1929; T'ang himself was forced into retirement on January 6 1930.²⁴ In South China, the combined forces of Li Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-k'uei, after making an inroad into Kwangtung, were driven back in December 1929 and for a time they had to struggle for their survival against Chiang's army.²⁵ When the year 1930 began, the "Party-Defending and National Salvation Movement" had fizzled out.

Two major weaknesses in the alliance of regional militarists were brought out into sharp relief during the "Party-Defending Movement." First, despite the fact that these regional militarists had declared their allegiance to the Leftist cause, they never could reconcile conflicting interests among themselves. The three major militarists in North China, Feng Yü-hsiang, T'ang Sheng-chih and Yen Hsi-shan, all had their own ulterior purposes to serve and could not cooperate with each other. In particular, Yen occupied a pivotal position in North China and his attitude decisively determined the military outcome. Yen's basic tactics was to adopt a wait-and-see policy and to shift with political wind in order to get the most out of the situation. His promises of military

support had induced Feng and Tang to start their campaigns against Chiang Kai-shek. Yet, at every critical turn Yen reneged on his words and traded his neutrality for better rewards from Chiang. (He was appointed by Chiang as Deputy Generalissimo.) Thus both Feng's and T'ang's armies were left in the lurch and subsequently defeated by Chiang.²⁶ Besides, conflicting interests and jealousy of each other's power also existed between Feng and T'ang. In October when Feng's army rose up against Chiang, T'ang decided to side with Chiang in suppressing Feng first, before he started his own operation against Chiang in December.²⁷ Failure of cooperation between the two gave Chiang the opportunity to defeat them one by one. In his memoirs, Ch'en Kung-po bitterly pointed out that if Feng, Yen and T'ang could act in unison against Nanking, then the Leftist opposition movement would have succeeded. Yet they were jealous of each other's power and this factor in the end brought about disastrous defeat.²⁸ The same problem plagued the opposition movement in South China. Here the opposition movement was hamstrung by the rivalries between Li Tsung-jen and Yü Tso-po. As will be recalled, Yü Tso-po was used by Chiang to take over power in Kwangsi and oust Li. Although Yü soon proved himself a communist fellow-traveller and not a protégé of Chiang, Li Tsung-jen refused to cooperate with Yü in any military venture against Nanking and instead insisted on toppling Yü first. Animosities between Yü and Li quashed any hope of bringing them together in a common cause against Nanking.²⁹ Conflicting interests among these regional militarists, more than Nanking's military power, effectively crippled the "Party-Defending Movement."

Secondly, and more significantly, the Left found to its bitter disappointment that it could hardly bring regional militarists under its command. Indeed its connections with most of the regional militarists such as Ho Chien, Shih Yu-shan, Yen Hsi-shan and Yü Tso-po were flimsy and unstable. The Left never had a past record of association with these militarists and at this time it could no more than establish a secret channel of communications with them. Not surprisingly Yen Hsi-shan and Ho Chien were ready to desert them and eventually decided to side with Nanking.³⁰ And the same was true of Shih Yu-shan. Although at one time Shih had participated in the opposition movement, he soon switched to Chiang's side when it served his interests; Shih's participation in the movement lasted less than a month from December 3 to December 25.³¹ As to Yü Tso-po, he was more inclined to communist ideas than to the Leftist cause. He would not be a stable ally even if he had supported the opposition movement.³² Even with those militarists like Feng Yü-hsiang and T'ang Sheng-chih, with whom the Left enjoyed closer relationships, no political means of controlling them had ever been exercised by the Left. No doubt, both Feng and T'ang showed a high respect for Wang Ching-wei. On one occasion Yen Hsi-shan gathered an intelligence report that Feng had revealed to his subordinate that it was a great honour to stand on the same side with Wang

Ching-wei and Chang Fa-k'uei "who are the revolutionaries worthy of the name,"³³ and Wang, in a personal letter to Wang Mou-kung, also expressed the opinion that Feng was more sincere and cordial towards him.³⁴ Likewise, T'ang Sheng-chih thought highly of Wang at this time. In his reminiscences he wrote that Wang's oratorial power and devotion to revolutionary ideals impressed him much.³⁵ Yet, notwithstanding their high respect for Wang, jealousy of each other's power, as we have noted, prompted T'ang to support Chiang in suppressing Feng's army in October 1929. At this juncture Feng did request that the Left should press T'ang to change sides, but the Left possessed no clout to do this.³⁶ Contemporary party critics of the Left had perceived its helplessness with militarists; they made a penetrating remark that during the "Party-Defending Movement," what the Left had done was no more than issuing manifestoes against Chiang and declaring which militarists were its allies, but in reality it was incapable of influencing the course of events.³⁷

The failure of the "Party-Defending and National Salvation Movement" had exposed the grave limitations of the policy of allying with regional militarists in the opposition against Nanking. It was taken full advantage of by regional militarists to withstand Nanking's encroachments, but it did not provide the Left the means of controlling them. Yet, Wang Ching-wei did not think the policy should be changed; on the contrary, he was more determined than ever before to seek military aid from regional forces. Indeed, he had committed the Left to a course of action which eventually made the Leftist cause stand or fall not on the support of the party members nor of the people in general but on the fortunes of the regional militarists. And he had his own reasons to justify the decision.

The Pragmatic Side of Wang Ching-wei's Political Mind

After the routing of T'ang Sheng-chih's army in December 1929, the Left pinned its last hope on Yen Hsi-shan, who had promised to join the "Party-Defending Movement" but always refrained from such a move at crucial moments. Yen's dexterity at playing one side against the other for a time made him the chief beneficiary in the political struggle between regional militarists and Nanking. Except for Chang Hsüeh-liang's army in Manchuria, Yen's army now became the most powerful in North China and occupied a pivotal political position.³⁸ But Yen never felt secure in this position. His underhand dealings with Feng and T'ang were in fact known to Nanking.³⁹ The series of successful operations by Nanking to knock out militarists made him feel threatened and always suspicious of the ulterior motives of Chiang.⁴⁰ In February 1930, after much hesitation Yen finally made up his mind to break with

Nanking and started a war of words with Chiang; he sent circular telegrams attacking Chiang's dictatorial rule and advocating democracy in the party and in the country.⁴¹ Meanwhile, he reached an understanding with Feng and allowed him to go back to Shensi on March 8 to prepare for a joint military campaign against Nanking.⁴² Wang Ching-wei, who was in Hong Kong after he returned from France, sent Ch'en Kung-po to Taiyuan to hammer out the terms of alliance with Yen.⁴³ It was the alliance with Yen which fully revealed the pragmatic side of Wang's political mind.

Apparently the move to conclude an alliance with Yen Hsi-shan was a logical development out of the "Party-Defending Movement." Yet, reservations about the policy of allying with regional militarists were widespread within the Leftist ranks. In fact, at the moment when the decision to ally with regional militarists was made, the Left was still divided in its opinions towards the decision. In June 1929, two contributors to the Leftist organs of *Min-hsin* and *Min-chu*, still argued that the civil war in China at that time was a war between warlords. Feng Yü-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Yen Hsi-shan, like Chiang Kai-shek, were all branded as warlords. "Awakening the masses" and "fostering democratic forces" were heavily emphasized as the political task of the day.⁴⁴ When Wang Ching-wei decided to ally himself with Yen Hsi-shan, it was said that most of the middle and lower ranks of the Left were opposed to such a move; they remained to be convinced that an alliance with militarists such as Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan was not by nature "opportunistic."⁴⁵ As we shall see in Chapter 5, the decision to ally with regional forces made many Leftists disillusioned and weakened the appeal of the Leftist ideology to the masses in general. Of course, Wang Ching-wei was too shrewd a politician not to recognize the risks involved in an alliance with militarists. In an interview given to a newspaper correspondent on June 15 1929, he stressed that "warlords cannot be expected to overthrow warlords" and "only by awakening the masses can the warlords be swept away." In his view, without fostering democratic forces, any alliance with regional militarists would be pointless and bring only discredit.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, all these reservations were simply not uppermost in Wang's mind when he charted the future course for the Left; instead he was exceedingly pragmatic in handling of political affairs. Middle-ranking Leftists in their reminiscences came to agree that Wang held a pragmatic view of politics. His line of thinking was simply this: without allying with regional militarists, Chiang Kai-shek could not be overthrown; and without the overthrow of Chiang, nothing could really be done by the Left.⁴⁷ This pragmatic side of Wang's mind was fully revealed during the early months of 1930 in his handling of the party-legitimacy (*tang-t'ung*) issue and in his pronouncements explaining why he allied with regional militarists.

When Yen Hsi-shan declared his opposition against Chiang, not only the KMT

Left, but also the Western Hills Group, had approached him on the question of a political alliance. Yen was ready to accept the two groups as his allies; yet, the Left and the Western Hills Group, representing two opposite wings of the KMT since the Northern Expedition, came to conflict over the party-legitimacy issue. The issue arose because of the divisions of the party during the Northern Expedition. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, the Party Central was insistent on upholding the *yung-kung* policy in spite of a clamorous dissident voice in the KMT. In November 1925, the Western Hills Group broke away from the old Party Central in Canton and set up its own party organization in Shanghai. In early 1926 the Canton side convened the Second Party Congress and elected a new CEC and CSC; at the same time the Western Hills Group also convened its own Second Congress and elected a Party Central. The KMT was thus split into a Party Central elected in Canton (known as the "Canton Party Central") and one in Shanghai (the "Shanghai Party Central"); they denied each other the legitimate authority to represent the KMT. A further division of the "Canton Party Central" occurred in April 1927 when it split into the Nanking and Wuhan Centrals following bitter strife over the *yung-kung* issue. In July 1927 when the whole KMT eventually turned against the communists, the issue of which Party Central was the legitimate one (*tang-t'ung*) arose. After a series of intra-party struggles, the summoning of the Fourth Plenum had implicitly recognized the legitimate authority of the "Wuhan Party Central" (and hence the "Canton Party Central") and denied other Party Centrals any kind of legitimacy. However, the Western Hills Group stuck to its own standpoint and refused to renounce the legitimate authority of its "Shanghai Party Central." This would not have become a controversial issue had not the Left and the Western Hills Group both attempted to ally with Yen against Chiang at this moment and set up a new Party Central against the one in Nanking. They had to find a basis for a peaceful solution of the issue if they wanted to cooperate happily with each other.

From April to June the Left (represented by Ch'en Kung-po) and the Western Hills Group (represented by Tsou Lu and Hsieh Ch'ih) were engaged in a heated but futile dialogue in Taiyuan to settle the party-legitimacy issue.⁴⁸ The main standpoints of the Western Hills Group, expounded at length by Tsou Lu, consisted of the following: (i) they would not renounce the legitimacy of the "Shanghai Party Central" and would not recognize the "Canton Party Central" as the only legitimate authority of the party since 1926; (ii) to them, the party-legitimacy issue was a meaningless issue because in the past party-legitimacy was not always observed by the party. On this point one particular reason was advanced. According to the Party Constitution, election of Central Committee members should be conducted at least every two years. The "Canton Party Central" elected in 1926 had been in office for more than two years; its legitimate authority had expired and could never claim to be the legitimate centre of the

party. Based on this ground, there was no point to clarify which Party Central was the legitimate one; (iii) they supported the idea that all party members who joined the anti-Chiang opposition movement should unite together. Hence, the new Party Central should be composed of either old Central Committee members of both the Shanghai and Canton Party Centrals, or all Central Committee members of the First, Second and Third Congresses, or leading party veterans to be suggested by various quarters of the party.⁴⁹ Ch'en Kung-po's view on the issue was forcefully expressed in his article "The two important ways to settle the party dispute" published on June 6 1930. He insisted that the party-legitimacy issue was a vital issue for the KMT and that the "Canton Party Central" was the only legitimate authority of the party since 1926. He dismissed the Western Hills Group's argument that the legitimate authority of the "Canton Party Central" had expired. Instead he contended that the Party Constitution had not explicitly stipulated that the legitimacy of a Party Central would end after two years in office. Thus the "Canton Party Central" still held the legitimate authority of the party. Furthermore, the "Canton Party Central" had led the Chinese Revolution since 1926. The opposition to Nanking's Third Congress and the military campaign since May 1929 had all been directed by the "Canton Party Central;" and all party branches in opposition to Nanking had sworn their allegiance to this "Canton Party Central." On these grounds he deprecated the idea of sacrificing the legitimacy of "Canton Party Central" for an alliance with the Western Hills Group. Besides, he spoke disparagingly of the "Shanghai Party Central" and maintained that the "Canton Party Central" should not merge with it.⁵⁰

The uncompromising stand between the two sides resulted in a deadlock in the negotiation.⁵¹ In June Wang Ching-wei intervened and devised a solution to gloss over the issue. He voiced his opinion in a circular telegram on June 1 and in an article written on June 12. Basically he backed up Ch'en Kung-po's stand that the "Canton Party Central" was the legitimate authority since 1926. Like Ch'en, he argued that since 1926 the National Revolution was led by the "Canton Party Central." All party members, except a few Western Hills members, recognized its legitimate authority. All party branches which were opposed to Nanking's Third Congress, and all militarists who joined the "Party-Defending and National Salvation Movement," had acted in the name of the "Canton Party Central." It was unreasonable, Wang stated, to renounce the legitimacy of the "Canton Party Central" just for the sake of a few Western Hills members. Having laid down this basic Leftist position, Wang proposed a solution to gloss over the issue. He noted that the group of Central Committee members of the "Canton Party Central" who participated in the opposition movement was now without a quorum. The proper solution was to set up an Enlarged Conference of the Party Central (*Chung-yang tang-pu k'uo-ta hui-i*) comprising not only Central Committee

members of the "Canton Party Central" but also all other leading party members who participated in the anti-Chiang movement.⁵² Under this scheme the Enlarged Conference would admit party members who had never been Central Committee members or not recognized as such by the Left. Members of the "Shanghai Party Central," although not recognized by the Left as legitimate Central Committee members, could now be welcomed into this new Party Central -- the Enlarged Conference. Wang indeed envisaged that the Enlarged Conference was to unite all leading party members in a common opposition to Chiang.

Not all Western Hills members were insistent on the legitimacy of the "Shanghai Party Central." T'an Chen and Fu Yü-lin, both of them Western Hills members, played a crucial part in the mediation between the two sides. Rumours were also circulated that some military leaders, obviously vexed by the unending disputes over the party-legitimacy issue, were prepared to make the anti-Chiang movement a purely military undertaking without seeking the support from the Left or the Western Hills Group. Eventually, Wang's proposal was accepted by the Western Hills Group. Under this scheme both sides agreed to gloss over the issue by not officially denying the legitimacy of their respective Party Centrals and joining forces to set up the Enlarged Conference of the Party Central. In this way the troublesome party-legitimacy issue was solved.⁵³

Ch'en Kung-po was deeply troubled by the way the issue was settled. He later stated that he would have taken an uncompromising stand over the party-legitimacy issue if not because of Wang Ching-wei's conciliatory attitude. He recalled that on one occasion Wang sent him a telegram exasperatedly telling him not to be so unyielding on the party-legitimacy issue. To be sure, Ch'en never intended to raise objection to a political alliance with the Western Hills Group in the anti-Chiang movement, he only wanted to see that the legitimacy of the "Canton Party Central" be explicitly affirmed and was opposed to any implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the "Shanghai Party Central." To him, the Enlarged Conference solution had disregarded this basic principle. The new Party Central -- the Enlarged Conference -- not only included Central Committee members of the "Shanghai Party Central" but also those elected by Nanking's Third National Party Congress, both of these types of members were not recognized by the Left as legitimate Central Committee members.⁵⁴ Wang's solution only showed that he was ready to make an important concession in order to secure an alliance with the militarists.

Wang was aware that his alliance with militarists and his proposal to establish the Enlarged Conference would be attacked by his opponents as "opportunistic" moves;⁵⁵ his answer to these charges revealed the kind of considerations that had preoccupied his

mind at this time. On April 8 1930, in an interview granted to a correspondent of the *Nan-hua* newsagency (a Left's newsagency), Wang rebutted the charge made by Nanking that he had acted contrary to the principle of "*i-tang chih-chün*," because he had to rely on the militarists to advance his own interests. No doubt, he said, at an earlier time he was opposed to the Kwangsi Clique but now he had allied with it, and also with Yen Hsi-shan. But all these alliances were not opportunistic because they were built on the common ground of denying the legitimacy of the Third National Party Congress which was illegally monopolized by Nanking. He saw nothing wrong to ally with these militarists who had declared their support for "Party-Defending Movement" and pointedly added that in the past the Nanking leadership had made more blatant opportunistic moves to make use of the militarists.⁵⁶ Wang's pragmatic thinking was more sharply brought out into relief in an article "The necessity for the Enlarged Conference of the Party Central" published on June 12 1930. At that time there was a widespread belief that the Left had compromised on its stand in the proposal for an Enlarged Conference with the Western Hills Group and regional militarists; of course Wang tried to dismiss it. He first argued that in some cases compromises (*t'o-hsieh*) were not despicable. In fact, for him, compromises could be divided into two types, one was "reasonable and necessary compromises" and the other was "unreasonable compromises." The first type of compromises had nothing despicable and only the second type of compromises was disgraceful. He thought that his collaboration with the Western Hills Group was a "reasonable compromise" because it would advance the anti-Chiang cause. He did not think he had made an "unreasonable compromise" with the Western Hills Group because, he asserted, he did not abandon the basic stand of upholding the legitimacy of the "Canton Party Central." As to the charge that he had compromised with powerful militarists, Wang again tried to justify his action. He made known his cherished assumption, which had been expressed in the January 1 1929 letter to Wang Mou-kung, behind his decision to ally with militarists. The Chinese National Revolution, he stated, undoubtedly had to rely on the "revolutionary masses;" nevertheless, he asserted, "revolutionary armies" were also indispensable. The forces of regional militarists which were opposed to Chiang, Wang contended, constituted the "revolutionary armies" at the present time. Admittedly, Wang continued, the armies commanded by these regional militarists were still "personal armies." But, he hoped, through the cooperation between party and military leaders, these "personal armies" could be transformed into "party's armies" and "people's armies." The Enlarged Conference, which freely admitted military leaders to discuss party affairs, was an effort to forge the cooperation between party and army. If this was regarded as a kind of "compromise" with military leaders, then, Wang asked rhetorically, what would happen to the anti-Chiang cause if this "compromise" was not made. He predicted that the

party and the army would be divided against each other and military leaders in the end would ride roughshod over party leaders.⁵⁷

From Wang Ching-wei's pronouncements during this period we can see that a pragmatic approach to politics was inherent in his thinking. Because of this pragmatic element in his political thinking, he was always ready to make compromises and find justifications for them. This feature, as we shall see, often characterized Wang's decisions in the subsequent period of the Leftist opposition movement against Nanking.

The Enlarged Conference of the Party Central: the End of the RCA Cause

In May 1930 tensions between Nanking and Taiyuan finally erupted into a full-scale civil war in which more than a million soldiers participated. A "Headquarters of the Chinese Republican Army (*Chung-hua min-kuo chün tsung-ssu-ling pu*)" was set up in Taiyuan with Yen Hsi-shan as commander-in-chief. Major regional militarists who joined this opposition movement included Feng Yü-hsiang, Shih Yu-shan, Li Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-k'uei. Meanwhile, as the Left and the Western Hills Group had come to terms over the party-legitimacy issue, the Enlarged Conference of the Party Central was officially inaugurated in Peiping on July 13. Wang Ching-wei shortly left Hong Kong for Peiping on July 23 giving his open support for the anti-Chiang campaign initiated by Yen Hsi-shan;⁵⁸ the Headquarters of the RCA moved from Shanghai to Peiping as well.⁵⁹ On September 9 a new National Government was established in Peiping with Yen as its President.

With the summoning of the Enlarged Conference, Wang Ching-wei's policy of allying with regional militarists apparently bore fruit -- he had enlisted the support of the most powerful military forces against Nanking since the Northern Expedition and had established rival party and government authorities with an eye to replacing the Nanking regime. And in appearance, the policy did not seem to have put the Left at the mercy of the militarists. In the Enlarged Conference, the highest policy-making body on party and governmental affairs, the Left enjoyed a favourable power distribution.⁶⁰ Four major factions, for the present purpose of analysis, can be identified in the Enlarged Conference: the KMT Left; the Western Hills Group; the Yen Hsi-shan faction; the Feng Yü-hsiang faction.⁶¹ All these four factions amounted to about 87% of the total membership (30 seats) of the Enlarged Conference; out of these 30 seats, the Left held 12 seats (40% of the total) and was the largest faction in the Conference (see Table I). In the Conference's Standing Committee, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department and the Mass Training Committee, power distribution also tipped in favour of the Left (see Table II) -- the Left had a simple majority in the

Organization Department and the Mass Training Committee and occupied 42% and 40% of the seats in the Standing Committee and the Propaganda Department respectively.⁶² Moreover, the political climate in North China was remarkably propitious to the Left. Chi Kung-ch'üan, a close associate of Yen Hsi-shan, pointed out in his reminiscences that at that time "Leftist ideas" were prevalent in North China and in Taiyuan in particular. Those who still cherished "revolutionary ideals" invariably regarded the Nanking Government as "reactionary" and looked to Wang Ching-wei as the undisputed leader of the Left. Chi was also influenced by such ideas and frankly admitted that he was one of those people who was sympathetic to the Left.⁶³ Indeed, some close associates of Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang were prominent cadres of the RCA.⁶⁴ The penetration into the inner circles of both Yen and Feng by the Left strengthened its voice in the Enlarged Conference.

Yen Hsi-shan did not leave the dominant position of the Left unchallenged. Nanking's intelligence sources gathered that Yen had counted upon the Western Hills Group as a counterbalancing force to the Left in the Enlarged Conference.⁶⁵ Newspapers in Shanghai put out the story that the Western Hills Group and the Left received support from different militarists. Yen backed the Western Hills Group while Feng supported the Left; Yen's attitude incurred the disaffection of those Leftists in Peiping and Tientsin who labelled him a "feudal warlord" and not a "true revolutionary."⁶⁶ In fact, Yen not only made use of the Western Hills Group to circumscribe the power of the Left, he also instructed his party follower, Li Kuan-yang, to set up a party organization in Shansi, the "Provisional United Office of Provincial and Municipal Party Branches," to vie with the Left in winning support from the party's rank and file members.⁶⁷ Minor squabbles between the two sides were not lacking in Taiyuan.⁶⁸ However, despite all these manoeuvrings by Yen, they produced no serious challenge to the Left. The running of the Enlarged Conference, as Ch'en Kung-po pointed out, remained largely in the hands of the Left.⁶⁹

Although the Enlarged Conference unquestionably marked the zenith of political power achieved by the Left in its opposition against Nanking since early 1929, it also marked the end of the RCA's cause and the abandoning of the "Leftist alternative" of 1928. The ultimate objective of the opposition movement, proclaimed in the Manifesto of the Enlarged Conference of July 13, had no significant relationship with the platform of the RCA or the ideological line mapped out by the Ch'en Kung-po school in 1928. The Manifesto concerned itself only with the democracy issue. It vehemently denounced Chiang Kai-shek who was said to have acted against the ideology of the party and had usurped political power in the past few years. Democratic centralism of the party, it continued, was transformed by Chiang into a "personal dictatorship," which was

Table I: Factional affiliations of the members of the
Enlarged Conference of the Party Central

| Factional affiliations | Members | Total |
|--------------------------|--|-------|
| The Kuomintang Left | Wang Ching-wei, Wang Fa-ch'in, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü P'an Yün-ch'ao, Kuo Ch'un-t'ao Ch'en Pi-chün, Po Wen-wei, Pai Yün-t'i, Ch'en Chia-yu Ch'en Shu-jen | 11 |
| The Western Hills Group | Hsieh Ch'ih, Tsou Lu, T'an Chen, Chang Chi-pen, Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Mao Tsu-ch'üan, Fu Ju-lin | 7 |
| The Yen Hsi-shan group | Yen Hsi-shan, Chao Tai-wen, Chao P'i-lien, Shang Chen | 4 |
| The Feng Yü-hsiang group | Feng Yü-hsiang, Lu Chung-lin, Hsieh Tu-pi | 3 |
| Others | Li Tsung-jen, Huang Shao-hsiung Hsiung K'o-wu, Teng Tse-ju | 4 |

Sources: "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wei ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 7.28:2 (July 21 1930); *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.175.

evidenced in the monopolization of more than 80% of the seats in the Third National Party Congress by Nanking. And the party's objective of building democracy was ignored by Chiang, instead, in the name of Political Tutelage, he founded a dictatorial regime. Ever since, political and civil rights, the property and life of the people, had all been violated; and the party and the country had sunk into a wretched state. The Manifesto then declared that the opposition aimed to exterminate Chiang's regime and to "restore a unified party to party comrades and a unified nation to the people." It stated that it would soon summon a new Third National Party Congress and at the same time, in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's will, convene a National Convention to express the urgent needs of the people.⁷⁰ Furthermore, "Seven Fundamental Principles," which was declared the "ultimate guiding principles (*tsung fang-chen*)" on party and governmental affairs, were passed by the Enlarged Conference on July 28:

Table II: Power distribution in the Committees and
Departments of the Enlarged Conference
of the Party Central

| Organizations | Members (factional affiliations) |
|-----------------------------|--|
| The Standing Committee | Wang Ching-wei (i), Wang Fa-ch'in (i), Po-Wen-wei (i), Hsu Ch'ung-chih (ii), Hsieh Ch'ih (ii), Mao Tsu-ch'üan (ii), Chao Tai-wen (iii) |
| The Organization Department | Wang Ching-wei (i), Ch'en Kung-po (i), Chu Chi-ch'ing (i), Tsou Lu (ii), Chao P'i-lien (iii) |
| The Propaganda Department | Ku Meng-yü (i), P'an Yün-ch'ao (i), Chang chi-pen (ii), Fu Ju-lin (ii), Hsieh Tu-pi (iv) |
| The Mass Training Committee | Pai Yün-t'i (i), Ch'en Shu-jen (i), Ch'en Chia-yu (i), T'an Chen (ii), Shang Chen (iii) |

Sources: "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 7.31:9 (August 11 1930), *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.181; Li Chun-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," in *Wen-shih tzu-liao hsüan-chi*, vol. 16, p.96.

(i) The Kuomintang Left; (ii) the Western Hills Group; (iii) the Yen Hsi-shan group; (iv) the Feng Yü-hsiang group.

1. Preparation for the summoning of a National Convention, which is to be composed of members from different occupational groups, should be started.
2. In accordance with the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, a constitution (*chi-pen ta-fa*) should be drawn up to lay down the structure of the government and to guarantee political and civil rights of the people. This constitution should be passed by the National Convention. In case of emergency, the constitution can first be promulgated by the Enlarged Conference and be passed by the National Convention at a later time.
3. In accordance with the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, the immediate aim of the mass movement and mass organizations is to achieve local

self-government. Class struggle initiated by the communists should be carefully warded off.

4. The party should supervise and give direction to the government and politics but should not interfere directly in governmental matters.
5. The party should not be a substitute for representative bodies of the people.
6. The concept of party rule, as laid down by the teachings of the Late Leader, means the ruling of the nation in accordance with the ideology of the party. Hence, all talents should be enlisted to work together for the common cause.
7. In accordance with the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, political power should be equally shared between Central and regional governments. Centralization or decentralization of political power should not be favoured.⁷¹

The first three principles laid down the means of achieving democracy in China; the fourth to sixth principles defined and in a way limited the power of the party; and the seventh principle attempted to strike a balance between Central and regional power. On the whole the Manifesto and the "Seven Fundamental Principles" contained the main ideas of Wang Ching-wei's theory of democracy.⁷² And the work carried out by the Enlarged Conference during this time followed exactly Wang's ideas. During August and September, rules for the reregistration of party members, the setting up of "Preparatory Committees" to reform party branches at regional level, and an "Organizational Laws for the Third National Party Congress" were approved by the Conference as a step towards building a democratic party.⁷³ In the latter half of October, guidelines for the summoning of a National Convention and a "Draft Provisional Constitution," which was the most liberal and detailed constitution ever drawn up since the Republic was founded, were endorsed as well.⁷⁴ The Enlarged Conference had made the building of democracy in the party and in the country its ultimate aim. Yet, at heart Ch'en Kung-po and many members of the RCA felt uneasy at the heavy emphasis on democracy issue by the opposition movement at the expense of other ideological issues. They had particular reasons for their uneasiness. Ch'en Kung-po, in his memoirs, wrote bitterly that by the time the Enlarged Conference was summoned, the "spirit of the RCA" was lost forever. Originally the RCA had its own platform and ideological stand, yet, Ch'en continued, in order to accommodate to the interests of Yen Hsi-shan and the Western Hills Group, they were completely abandoned. Now the RCA had no other ultimate political objective than the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. In this way, the "spirit of the RCA," Ch'en disappointingly concluded, had totally vanished.⁷⁵ Ch'en, as the main architect of the Left's ideology of 1928 and of the platform of the RCA, certainly was more disappointed

than any one else when he witnessed the sacrifice of this body of Leftist heritage in the Enlarged Conference to the purpose of allying with militarists. Wang Ching-wei of course saw nothing undesirable in shifting the ideological emphasis of the Left to the issue of democracy. His distaste for the Marxist-oriented nature of Ch'en's ideology, and the obvious advantage of securing the support of regional forces against Nanking, made him stay on his course unflinchingly without regard to Ch'en's views. And, for all Ch'en's doubts about Wang's decisions throughout this period of the Enlarged Conference, his loyalty to Wang in the end compelled him to go along with Wang.⁷⁶

The Dissolution of the Enlarged Conference

The civil war at first augured well for the opposition. Yen Hsi-shan's army made several successful inroads into Nanking's territories; on June 25 the major city Chinan in Shantung province was captured. At the same time, the armies of Feng Yü-hsiang and Li Tsung-jen pressed on towards Hunan. However, Chiang Kai-shek's army soon regained the initiative and in mid-August recovered Chinan. At this moment Yen's army began to show signs of exhaustion. On September 18 when Chang Hsüeh-liang declared his support for Nanking and sent troops into North China, the fate of the opposition was sealed.⁷⁷ The Enlarged Conference was forced to retreat from Peiping to Taiyuan on September 25. Many of the resolutions of the Enlarged Conference had no time to put into execution -- the reregistration of party members, the reorganization of local party branches, the summoning of a National Convention and the Third National Party Congress, had never been carried out. Even the National Government which was inaugurated on September 9 had only a nominal existence; it never set up any departments to manage daily affairs. Meetings of the Enlarged Conference became merely perfunctory and attendances at these meetings dwindled.⁷⁸ Hence, when the Enlarged Conference finished its work on a "Draft Provisional Constitution" on October 27 in Taiyuan, Wang Ching-wei, Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan concurred to dissolve the Conference and their opposition movement. From November 1 onwards, Wang, followed by his close associates, clandestinely departed from Taiyuan to Tientsin where they took refuge in the Settlement; meanwhile the Western Hills Group also retreated into Peiping. On November 4 Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang announced their retirements from the political arena.⁷⁹ The Leftist-inspired opposition movement, this time lasted from May to November 1930, once again was defeated by Nanking.

On October 3, Chiang Kai-shek proposed to the Nanking Government a political amnesty to all his political enemies (except a few figures such as Yen Hsi-shan) in the Enlarged Conference.⁸⁰ On the same day, he also sent a circular telegram to the Party

Central which contained two important suggestions: the summoning of a National Convention and the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution during the Political Tutelage period, both of which indeed were the two basic demands of the Enlarged Conference.⁸¹ In November, agreeing with Chiang's proposals, the Party Central decided to summon the National Convention for May 5 1931.⁸² Having defeated all the opposition forces, Chiang chose a conciliatory course to reunite the country and was thus responsive to the main political demands of the Enlarged Conference. It created much public attention and narrowed the political gap between the two sides.⁸³ On October 9, Wang Ching-wei made a remark to the press that Chiang Kai-shek's new stand testified that the political demands of the opposition could not be suppressed by military force. He confidently predicted that the overthrow of personal dictatorship, the establishment of a National Convention and the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution would eventually be realized.⁸⁴

Amidst a conciliatory political climate, Wang Ching-wei's readiness to make compromises was again revealed in his two important decisions. The first one was about the attitude of the Left towards the Nanking leadership after the dissolution of the Enlarged Conference. Wang prescribed the future political stand for the Left in a "Manifesto on current situation" composed by him and issued in the name of the Enlarged Conference on November 12.⁸⁵ In the Manifesto, Wang lamented that a series of civil wars had immediately broken out after the Northern Expedition when the party and the whole nation had earnestly hoped for a peaceful national reconstruction. To him, the outbreak of civil wars was due to two reasons. First, the political programmes of the Political Tutelage period, for instance, the implementation of local self-government and the summoning of the National Convention, were not put into operation by the Nanking leadership. This engendered much disaffection among the people and created conflicts between Central and regional governments. Secondly, the Nanking leadership often acted contrary to the laws of the land. It trespassed upon the democratic rights of party members by packing the Third National Party Congress so as to preserve its monopoly of power and, it disregarded Sun Yat-sen's teaching that a Provisional Constitution should be promulgated during the Political Tutelage period. These were the reasons why civil wars had occurred. To bring a lasting peace to China, Wang propounded the following basic measures:

First, the National Convention should be summoned for the purpose of endorsing the Draft Provisional Constitution. If necessary, the Provisional Constitution can be promulgated first and be endorsed by the National Convention at a later time.

Secondly, a new legitimate Third National Party Congress should be summoned.

Thirdly, a point should be noted. Whether the Provisional Constitution can be operative completely depends on the decisions of the National Convention and the Party Congress. To secure the desirable decisions, the composition of these two bodies should be paid attention to. It is essential that the representatives of the National Convention, as laid down by the Late Leader, should be directly elected by mass organizations, and the representatives of the Party Congress, in accordance with the Party Constitution, be elected by party members.⁸⁶

These three measures, Wang asserted, were the demands of the "revolutionary masses and revolutionary comrades" since 1928; they were also the basic political aims of the Enlarged Conference. If these three measures were thoroughly implemented, Wang believed, the "revolutionary masses and revolutionary comrades" would never resort to military forces to stage their opposition; in its place they would employ "political channels" to voice their opinions. If a political system was established in which all policy formulations were openly and freely debated, the opposition in the party would not use military forces and would be happy to play a "legal opposition" role.⁸⁷ Here Wang, perhaps attempting to imitate the democratic politics in the West, indicated his willingness to carve out a "legal opposition" role for the Left under the Nanking regime. Wang's conciliatory attitude was not appreciated by Ch'en Kung-po. In one respect, Ch'en was passionately opposed to Wang's idea that the Left would be ready to play an opposition role bound by laws. He thought that under the present political system, the Nanking regime would never permit a legal opposition to exist. Wang's suggestion would achieve nothing but only discourage the Left to stand up to the Nanking leadership. Yet Wang did not yield to Ch'en's arguments. This was the last straw for Ch'en and he finally decided to leave Wang for a while and retired to Europe in early 1931.⁸⁸

The second important decision made by Wang at this time was the dissolution of the RCA. A detailed examination of the structure, power and influence of the RCA will be attempted in Chapter 5. It suffices here to note that when the fate of the Enlarged Conference was sealed after Chang Hsüeh-liang declared his support for Chiang Kai-shek, the RCA had already showed signs of disintegration. Communications between the upper and lower hierarchy of the organization broke down and its basic units, the cells, began to disintegrate and never held regular meetings again. Those who were opposed to the alliance with militarists became more disillusioned and an increasing number of the rank and file deserted from the Leftist camp.⁸⁹ Confronted by the prospect of a rapid disintegration of the RCA, a number of its middle-ranking cadres, having arrived in Tientsin after the dissolution of the Enlarged Conference, held several meetings discussing ways to revive the organization. Their deliberations led them to conclude that the RCA should not be abolished. On the contrary, it should continue to

shoulder "revolutionary responsibilities" and more actively pursue "revolutionary work." They sent a letter to Wang Ching-wei arguing against the dissolution of the RCA. They stated that the RCA was a product of the situation and it aimed at the realization of revolutionary ideals. Without such a revolutionary organization, the revolution would not succeed. Besides, the continued existence of the RCA would provide a sense of direction for the middle and lower ranks of "revolutionary comrades." They claimed that they were not upset by the recent failure of the Enlarged Conference. The only thing with which they were gravely concerned was that the leaders themselves were disillusioned by the recent failure.⁹⁰ Wang made no reply to these cadres for he had already made up his mind to dissolve the RCA.⁹¹ On November 21 he sent a letter to all party members advocating the disbandment of all factional organizations in the KMT. In the letter he stated that when the Enlarged Conference assembled, at first he did not think the time was ripe to put an end to all factional organizations in the party. But, after a few months of collaboration in the Conference, he noticed that all factional organizations in the Conference were in one mind to strive for the restoration of democracy in the party and the establishment of a democratic government in the country; they were now on good terms with each other and shared a common aim. Thus, Wang declared, the opportune moment had now come to dissolve all factional organizations whose members should now work together under the banner of the Enlarged Conference.⁹² As an indication of his sincerity, on January 1 1931, Wang proclaimed that the RCA was disbanded.⁹³

The suggestion for a "legal opposition" role for the KMT Left, coupled with the disbandment of the RCA, were in fact political gestures to sound out the Nanking leadership on the question of reconciliation between the two sides. (As we shall see later, nothing came of it.) Chiang Kai-shek's proposals of October 3 no doubt induced Wang to entertain such a possibility. A reconciliation with the Nanking leadership at this time would be an honourable way to end the Leftist opposition movement. The disintegration of the opposition movement in late 1930, the most formidable one ever mobilized by the Left, made the prospect of overthrowing the Nanking leadership bleaker than ever before. More seriously, the appeal of the Left to the party and among the people, as will be detailed in Chapter 5, weakened considerably after the Enlarged Conference. Wang's conciliatory posture was understandable in such a political context. But it is also true that his ever readiness to compromise at this time once more revealed to the full the pragmatic side of his mind. His tendency to shift the Left's political stand with the political wind of the time gradually led one to suspect that he was more a pusillanimous compromiser than a statesman who stood firmly on his principles. As we shall see in the next chapter, this pragmatic element in his political thinking had an

adverse impact on the power base of the Left in the party and among the people in general.

Notes

1. Yang Yung-t'ai, a member of the Political Study Clique, was said to have submitted a plan to curb regional power to Chiang Kai-shek. It was favourably received by Chiang. The centralization policy pursued by the Nanking Government against regional militarists was alleged to have been based on Yang's suggestion. See Li Chi-shen, "Li Chi-shen hsien-sheng lüeh-li," p.141; Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, p.133; *Pai Ch'ung-hsi hsien-sheng fang-wen chi-lu*, ed. Kuo Ting-yee, vol. 2, p.926.
2. Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p.261; Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, p.133; Chien Yu-wen, *Feng Yü-hsiang chuan*, vol. 2, pp.323-324; Chien Yu-wen, "Hsi-pei chün fan-Chiang shih-lu," *Chung-yang tao-pao*, 11:54-56 (September 9 1931).
3. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated October 19 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:59 (November 1984).
4. Available evidence suggests that the Wuhan Incident was not a premeditated plan of Li Tsung-jen to challenge the Nanking Government. Rather the whole affair was started by local army leaders in Wuhan, Hu Tsung-to and T'ao Chün. They were not aware of the serious consequences of their move and took the hasty decision to dismiss Lu Ti-p'ing, which provided Chiang the *casus belli* to start an operation against the Kwangsi Clique. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated March 3 1929, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:60 (November 1984); *Pai Ch'ung-hsi hsien-sheng fang-wen chi-lu*, ed. Kuo Ting-yee, vol. 2, pp.928-929; Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, pp.266-270; Li Chi-shen, "Li Chi-shen hsien-sheng lüeh-li," p.141.
5. YHSA, Liang-Hu shih-pien an, Ch'u Ch'i-ch'un to Yen Hsi-shan, April 20 1929; Teng Che-hsi, "Han Shih p'an-Feng ho Yen Feng lien-ho fan-Chiang ching-kuo," p.48.
6. The Disarmament Conference was not the only occasion which made Feng Yü-hsiang greatly dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek. On a number of other policy issues Feng also felt betrayed by Chiang. See Chien Yu-wen, "Hsi-pei chün fan-Chiang shih-lu," *Chung-yang tao-pao*, 11:61-64 (September 9 1931); Chien Yu-wen, *Feng Yü-hsiang chuan*, vol. 2, pp.321-329; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.272-278.
7. *Ibid.*, pp.276-279; Chien Yu-wen, "Hsi-pei-chün fan-Chiang shih-lu."

Chung-yang tao-pao, 11:64-66 (September 9 1931); Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, pp.134-135; Chien Yu-wen, *Feng Yü-hsiang chuan*, vol. 2, pp.329-333.

8. *Hsu Ch'i-min hsien-sheng fang-wen chi-lu*, ed. Kuo Ting-yee, pp.61-64; *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.213-215.

9. Teng Che-hsi, "Han Shih p'an-Feng ho Yen Feng lien-ho fan-Chiang ching-kuo," pp.53-54; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.279-285.

10. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated August 15 1928, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:58 (November 1984).

11. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min ko-ming ti ch'ien-lu*, pp.45-46.

12. "Tang-wu pao-kao chüeh-i an" in "TPK," chapter 2, section 3.

13. Chung K'o-jou, "Hsiang-sheng shih-pien yü tang-kuo ch'ien-t'u," *Min-i*, 1:14 (March 10 1929); Ching Po, "Shui-shih tz'u-tz'u hsiang-luan ti huo-shou," *ibid.*, 1:12 (March 10 1929); I Hsi, "Fan-tung chü-mien neng wen-ting i-shih mo?" *ibid.*, 5/6:16 (April 20 1929); Huai, "Chiang-kuei huo-ping ti kuo-ch'ü yü chiang-lai," *Ko-ming ch'u lu*, 2/3:3-4 (April 20 1929).

14. Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated January 1 1929, to Wang Mou-kung, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:59-60 (November 1984). In the letter, two other ideas also flashed across Wang's mind. One was the exploitation of the rivalries among militarists in order to eliminate them one by one. The other was to educate the rank and file in order to transform them into "people's army." Wang sought opinions from Wang Mou-kung on these two ideas.

15. Wang Ching-wei, "Hsin chün-fa ti peng-hui chiao pei-yang chün-fa keng-k'uai," *Min-i*, 8:3 (May 5 1929). The article was written on April 8 1929 in Paris.

16. Chung P'eng, "Chün-fa chan-cheng chung wo-men ying-ch'ü ti t'ai-tu," *ibid.*, 9:1-2 (May 12 1929).

17. See, Min Li, "Ch'uang-kung cheng-chü chao-shih wo-men ti fang-hsiang," *Min-hsin*, 2:6-8 (June 9 1929); T'an Chih, "Kuan-yü Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng ti san-chung hsin-li," *ibid.*, 4:1-3 (June 23 1929); T'an Chih, "Fan-tung hsüan-ch'uan chi wo-men ti t'ai-tu," *ibid.*, 5:8-11 (June 30 1929); T'ien Tzu, "Pei-fang tang-wu wen-t'i yü ko-ming t'ung-chih ti ch'u-lu," *Min-chu*, 1:4-5 (July 18 1929).

18. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.210-212.

19. See "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang hu-tang ko-ming ta-t'ung-meng ch'eng-li hsüan-yen," *Hu-tang*, 1:6-9 (May 15 1929). Ku Meng-yü was said to have been the

directing mind in the establishment of the "Party-Defending Revolutionary Alliance." See Tachibana Shiraki, *Chūgoku kakumei shiron*, pp.346-347. See also *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.212; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.295-298.

20. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.211-212; Teng Che-hsi, Ko Ting-yuan, "Feng Yü-hsiang yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.117; YHSA, Yüeh-kuei shih-pien an, Chu Shou-kuang to Yen Hsi-shan, September 25 1929, Chao Tai-wen to Yen Hsi-shan, October 5 1929; YHSA, Ch'u-li hsi-pei chün-shih kuan-hsüan ho-p'ing an, Chao Tai-wen to Yen Hsi-shan, September 26 1929; YHSA, Ch'u-li hsi-pei chün-shih Feng-shih tsai-pien an, Ho Ch'eng-chün to Yen Hsi-shan, December 3 1929, Chu Shou-kuang to Yen Hsi-shan, October 12 1929; Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, pp.277-278.

21. Major regional militarists were named by the RCA as commanders-in-chief of various "Party-Defending and National Salvation armies." Feng Yü-hsiang was conferred the title Commander-in-chief of the First Route Party-Defending and National Salvation Army; Chang Fa-k'uei of the Third Route Army; T'ang Sheng-chih of the Fourth Route Army; Shih Yu-shan of the Fifth Route Army; Hu Tsung-to of the Seventh Route Army; and Li Tsung-jen of the Eight Route Army. See Hsiao-min, "I-nien lai ti hui-tang yü hu-tang," *Min-chu*, 18:109 (February 1930); *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.215. For a brief history of the military campaigns between Nanking and regional militarists, see Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung Shih*, pp.69-86, 95-106; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.299-317.

22. Ch'en Kung-po himself was much impressed by the extent of support given by the militarists to the "Party-Defending and National Salvation" cause, see *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.215.

23. Teng Che-hsi, "Han Shih p'an-Feng ho Feng Yenlien-ho fan-Chiang ching-kuo," p.54; Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün-chi*, pp.140-142; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.70-75.

24. *Ibid.*, pp.103-113; *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.217; Li P'in-hsien, *Li P'in-hsien hui-i lu*, pp.109-111; Hsieh Tu-pi, "Wo tsai chung-yuan ta-chan shih-ch'i ti i-hsieh ching-li," p.122; Teng Che-hsi, "Han Shih p'an-Feng ho Feng Yenlien-ho fan-Chiang ching-kuo," p.54; Liu Hsing, "Hui-i kuo-min ko-ming chün ti-pa-chün" p.99.

25. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.83-94; *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.215-216; Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, pp.276-285; Hsu Ch'i-min hsien-sheng fang-wen chi-lu, ed. Kuo Ting-yee, pp.65-68.

26. Teng Che-hsi, "Han Shih p'an-Feng ho Feng Yenlien-ho fan-Chiang ching-kuo," p.54; Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, pp.140-142; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.70-75.

27. Liu Hsing, "Hui-i kuo-min ko-ming chün ti-pa-chün," pp.97-98; *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.216, 218; Li P'in-hsien, *Li P'in-hsien hui-i lu*, pp.109-111.
28. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.218.
29. *Ibid.*, pp.212, 218.
30. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, pp.103-111.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.213-215.
33. YHSA, Ch'u-li hsi-pei chün-shih Feng-shih tsai-pien an, Yang Hsiao-ou to Yen Hsi-shan, January 28 1930.
34. See Wang Ching-wei's letter, dated June 15 1929, to Wang Mou-kang, in *Li-shih tang-an*, 4:62 (November 1984).
35. T'ang Sheng-chih, "Kuan-yü pei-fa ch'ien-hou chi-chien shih ti hui-i," pp.108, 110-112; Liu Hsing, "Hui-i kuo-min ko-ming chün ti-pa-chün," pp.98-101; Li P'in-hsien, *Li P'in-hsien hui-i lu*, p.109.
36. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.216.
37. The comment was made by the Association of Chinese Military Youth in Kwangtung in 1934. See Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, p.115.
38. *Yen Hsi-shan t'ung-chih Shan-shi shih-shih*, comp. Shan-shi sheng cheng-hsieh wen-shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yuan hui, pp.137-142.
39. YHSA, Ch'u-li hsi-pei chün-shih Feng-shih tsai-pien an, Ho Ch'eng-chün to Yen Hsi-shan, December 3 1929; Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, pp.140-142; Teng Che-hsi, "Han Shih p'an-Feng ho Yen Fenglien-ho fan-Chiang ching-kuo," p.55; Hu Han-min, "Yen Feng Wang kou-chieh ti yin-yuan yü Wang Ching-wei hsiang-kung ti shih-cheng," in *Wang Ching-wei yü kung-ch'an tang*, pp.63-64.
40. Another reason for Yen Hsi-shan's breaking away from the Nanking Government was his discontent with Nanking's financial policies towards Shansi which he thought were trying to strangle the economic life of his province. See Chou Tai, "Yen Hsi-shan fa-tung chung-yuan ta-chan kai-shu," pp.35-36.
41. For an account of the "war of telegrams" between Yen Hsi-shan and Chiang Kai-shek, see Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, pp.136-152; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.326-332.

42. Teng Che-hsi, "Han Shih p'an-Feng ho Yen Fenglien-ho fan-Chiang ching-kuo," pp.55-56; Teng Che-hsi, Ko Ting-yuan, "Feng Yü-hsiang yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.117; Hsieh Tu-pi, "Wo tsai chung-yuan ta-chan shih-ch'i ti i-hsieh ching-li," p.124.

43. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.226-229. It was said that at first Wang Ching-wei had hoped that Chang Fa-k'uei's army, his trusted military ally, with the support of Li Tsung-jen, would capture Canton so that the Left could set up a government there and strengthen its bargaining power with the militarists in North China. However, the whole plan was miscarried because Chang's and Li's armies were driven back to Kwangsi by Chiang's army. See YHSA, Yüeh-kuei shih-pien an, Chao Tai-wen to Yen Hsi-shan, September 25 1929; Hu Han-min, "Wang Ching-wei ti p'ing-chia," in *Wang Ching-wei yü kung-ch'an tang*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Kuang-tung sheng hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.7-8.

44. Nan Hsiung, "Chün-fa hun-chan chung ming-chung ying-yu ti chüeh-wu," *Min-hsin*, 1:6-7 (June 2 1929); T'ien Chi, "Peng-hui hu, wen-ting hu," *ibid.*, 2:1-2 (June 9 1929).

45. Li Chün-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.94; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-tsu p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," p.146.

46. "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng tsai-fa chih t'an-hua," *Min-chu*, 1:37-40 (July 18 1929).

47. Li Chün-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.94; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-tsu p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," p.146. It is worthy of note that Wang Ching-wei's views were shared by Ku Meng-yü. See *ibid.*

48. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.229-231.

49. Tsou Lu, "Tang-t'ung wen-t'i," in *Ch'eng-lu wen-chi*, vol. 2, p.141; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, pp.158-159, 166-167, 173-174.

50. Ch'en Kung-po, "Chieh-chüeh tang-shih ti liang-tiao ta-lu," in *Hu-tang chiu-kuo chi*, pp.25-31.

51. For a detailed account about the negotiation on the party-legitimacy issue during April to June, see Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, pp.170-175; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.361-364.

52. See "Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng chih hai-nei-wai ko tang-pu ko t'ung-chin tung-tien," in *YLC*, pp.215-218; "Chung-yang tang-pu k'uo-ta hui-i chih pi-yao," *ibid.*, pp.207-215.

53. Hsieh Tu-pi, "Wo tsai chung-yuan ta-chan shih-ch'i ti i-hsieh ching-li,"

pp.124-125; Chi Kung-ch'üan, "Yen Hsi-shan yü k'u-o-ta hui-i," pp.110-112; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.174-175; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.364-365.

54. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.229, 231-232.

55. On July 28 1930, in a speech given to a memorial gathering of the Legislative Yuan, Hu Han-min attacked Wang Ching-wei for his readiness to shift his political stand in order to advance his own interests. Wang's alliance with Yen Hsi-shan and his proposal for the Enlarged Conference were cited as proof of his opportunistic tendency. See Hu Han-min, "Wang Ching-wei ti p'ing-chia," in *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng yen-chiang chi*, vol. 14, pp.176-179.

56. Wang Ching-wei, "Kuan-yü i-tang chih-chün chi t'an-hua," in *YLC*, pp.119-122.

57. Wang Ching-wei, "Chung-yang tang-pu k'u-o-ta hui-i chih pi-yao," in *ibid.*, pp.207-212.

58. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.180.

59. "TPK," chapter 6, section 2.3.

60. The other important government machinery was the nine-member National Government Council set up on September 9 1930. A majority of Council members were regional militarists and the President of the National Government was none other than Yen Hsi-shan. Chang Hsüeh-liang and T'ang Shao-i, a party elder and one-time a deputy commander in Sun Yat-sen's military government, were invited to sit on the Council. But they declined to assume the posts. Other Council members comprised Feng Yü-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen, Liu Wen-hui (a militarist in Szechwan), Shih Yu-shan and two party leaders, Wang Ching-wei and Hsieh Ch'ih. The National Government was not an effective functioning body as it was soon chased out of existence when Chang Hsüeh-liang decided to throw in his lot with Chiang and sent his troops to suppress the opposition movement on September 18 1930. See Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.194-195, 202-204.

61. Li Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-k'uei were preoccupied with military operations in the South; they did not assume any significant role in the Enlarged Conference in Peiping.

62. The Western Hills Group and Yen Hsi-shan's faction were reasonably well-represented in these organizations. As to Feng Yü-hsiang's faction, it occupied only one seat in the Propaganda Department but none in other departments. To be sure, Feng's faction was not deliberately excluded, rather it was Feng who refused to

nominate his men in these organizations because he wanted to concentrate on military affairs only. He was known to have shown not much interest in party matters and had expressed that he would defer to Yen Hsi-shan's decisions on party and governmental affairs. See Teng Che-hsi, Ko Ting-yuan, "Feng Yü-hsiang yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.117; Hsieh Tu-pi, "Wo tsai chung-yuan ta-chan shih-ch'i ti i-hsieh ching-li," p.124.

63. Chi Kung-ch'üan, "Yen Hsi-shan yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.109.

64. Li Chün-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.97.

65. "Kai-tsü p'ai yü chin Yen ti kou-hsin tou-chio," in "TKP," chapter 6, section 4.1.

66. *Min-sheng pao*, April 13 1930, *Chüeh-sheng jih-pao*, May 4 1930, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 440/3(4).

67. *Yen Hsi-shan t'ung-chih Shan-hsi shih-shih*, comp. Shan-hsi sheng cheng-hsieh wen-shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yuan-hui, pp.153-154; *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.233; Li Chün-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," pp.96-97. Li Kuan-yang seems to have wielded some influence in the KMT at that time. Previously he had been a member of the factional organization, the Grand Alliance of the Three People's Principles under Ting Wei-fen. As early as October-November 1929, he had conceived the notion of setting up a Labour KMT or Youth KMT to replace the existing party. Preparatory work to recruit members into this new organization began at this time. Li reported to Yen that 110 sections, with more than one thousand party members, had been set up clandestinely under his direction. See YHSA, Pei-fa fu chin-chi-ch'a-sui tang-cheng an, Li Kuan-hang to Yen Hsi-shan, October 27 1929, November 16 1929, November 28 1929. For a propaganda pamphlet produced by Li Kuan-yang's followers, see Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Shan-hsi sheng ko hsien-shihlien-ho hui chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui hsüan-ch'uan pu, ed., *Hsüan-ch'uan hui-pien*.

68. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.233; 243-244; *Yen Hsi-shan t'ung-chih Shan-hsi shih-shih*, comp. Shan-hsi sheng cheng-hsieh wen-shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yuan-hui, p.154; "Kai-tsü p'ai yü chin Yen ti kou-hsin tou-chio," in "TPK," chapter 6, section 4.2.

69. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.233.

70. Tsou Lu, "K'uo-ta hui-i," in *Ch'eng-lu wen-chi*, vol. 3, pp.94-95; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.175-176.

71. *Ibid.*, p.182. Tsou Lu, "K'uo-ta hui-i," in *Ch'eng-lu wen-chi*, vol. 3, pp.96-97.

72. On August 7 1930, the Enlarged Conference issued a proclamation elaborating upon the "Seven Fundamental Principles." For the proclamation, see *ibid.*, pp.97-103; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.183-188.

73. *Ibid.*, pp.189-197; Tsou Lu, "K'uo-ta hui-i," in *Cheng-lu wen-chi*, vol. 3, pp.103-116.

74. *Ibid.*, pp.115-120. For the Draft Provisional Constitution, see *Chung-hua min-kuo yüeh-fa ts'ao-an*. For the public opinion on the Draft Provisional Constitution, see, for example, "Lun-p'ing hsüan-chi," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 7.44:1-5 (November 10 1930).

75. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.231.

76. *Ibid.*, p.232.

77. For a brief history on the military campaigns between Nanking and the opposition, see Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.349-359, 374-384; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.205-232.

78. Chi Kung-ch'üan, "Yen Hsi-shan yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.113.

79. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.241-251; "Wang Ching-wei li-chin fu-ching shuo," in "TPK," chapter 6, section 10.7; "T'ai-yuan ch'ien-san k'uo-wei ching-kuo," in *Gendai Shina no kiroku*, November, 1930, comp. Hatano Ken'ichi, p.138.

80. Chiang Kai-shek at the time was at the military front in Chengchow. The proposal was embodied in a circular telegram to the Nanking Government. For Chiang's proposal, see "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing, *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 7.40:2-3 (October 16 1930).

81. For the circular telegram of October 3 to the Party Central, see *ibid.*, 7.40:3-4 (October 16 1930).

82. *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-san-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui pi-shu ch'u, p.20.

83. See "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 7.40:4 (October 13 1930), 7.41:3-5 (October 20 1930).

84. *Ibid.*, 7.41:5 (October 20 1930).

85. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.251.

86. "K'uo-hui tsai-ching fa shih-chü hsüan-yen," in *Gendai Shina no kiroku*, November 1930, comp. Hatano Ken'ichi, pp.221-224.

87. *Ibid.*, p.224.

88. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.251.

89. A detailed analysis of the disillusionment of RCA's rank and file members will be offered in Chapter 5.

90. "TPK," chapter 6, section 11.2.

91. "TPK," chapter 6, section 11.1 and section 11.2.

92. The letter was reproduced in part in Wang Ching-wei, "I-feng kuan-yü p'ai-pieh tsu-chih ti kung-kai fu-han," *NHPL*, 1.8:13 (July 4 1931).

93. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.251-252.

CHAPTER 5

THE KUOMINTANG LEFT AS AN OPPOSITION FORCE: ITS LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION AND POWER BASE

Hitherto historians have paid attention to the alliance between the KMT Left and regional militarists in the opposition to Nanking in 1929-30, but no serious work on the strength of the Left itself -- its leadership, organization and power base -- has ever been undertaken. An impression has been created, no doubt reinforced by the eventual failure of the Leftist opposition, that the opposition was directed by a few dissident party leaders without any significant following in the party and did not obtain any social support.¹ This view was first propagated by the Nanking leadership. Numerous public speeches given by Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min in the latter half of 1929 gave the impression that they did not think highly of the strength of the KMT Left. In his inspection trip to North China in June-July 1929, on many occasions Chiang Kai-shek went out of his way and delivered violent attacks on the "Reorganization Clique (*Kai-tsü p'ai*)," a term which was employed by the Nanking leadership to denote the whole KMT Left. One such occasion was a press conference held on June 27 1929, when Chiang dismissed the "Reorganization Clique" in a contemptuous manner:

The present Reorganization Clique has no clout to manipulate [the political scene], nor [has it] possessed any strength to achieve success. It does not contribute anything fruitful to revolutionary history. And its power cannot even match that of the communists; this is why it is forsaken by the communists. [It is hard to believe that] people in and outside China should be puzzled by [the strength of] the Clique. As a matter of fact, the Reorganization Clique is similar to the Political Study Clique (*Cheng-hsüeh hsi*) ten years ago. It is a cluster of reactionary elements who betray the party and the nation, who collaborate with warlords and who pretend to be revolutionary ... The Reorganization Clique is not guided by any ideology, it is just guided by opportunism pure and simple; it does not have any revolutionary strength nor revolutionary spirit.²

This view was voiced repeatedly in Chiang's other speeches during his visit to North China.³ Hu Han-min, too, shared Chiang's contemptuous attitude towards the Left. In various speeches given to party meetings in late 1929, Hu stated that the "Reorganization Clique" was a political faction devoid of any political strength and it

could do no more than "spreading rumours and sowing dissensions." Many people, he continued, might get the impression that the Clique had enlisted support from various sections of the people and was very active in politics. This was not true, Hu argued. It was a wrong image deliberately fostered by the Clique in order to conceal its weaknesses. He emphatically asserted that the Clique was powerless and disorganized; it was merely a cluster of "corrupt, degenerate and reactionary elements."⁴

The present chapter will attempt to determine whether these assertions by Nanking's high party leaders were intended for public consumption and propaganda purposes and how much they reflected the true picture of the time. It will examine the quality of the Leftist leadership, the relationship among its leaders, the organizational structure of the RCA and the overall strength of the Left in the party and in the country.

The Leadership of the Kuomintang Left

Wang Ching-wei was the undisputed leader of the KMT Left; no other Leftist leaders could rival his influence in the party. This kind of unrivalled political influence did not emanate from his personality. No doubt Wang was an eloquent speaker and a prolific writer; his courteous manner often impressed not only his followers but also his political rivals.⁵ But Wang's personality failings were often noted by his contemporaries. He was said to have been temperamental, compromising and lacked the requisite firmness demanded of a statesman.⁶ When confronted with political crises, it was not rare that Wang chose to withdraw from the political arena rather than weather the storm.⁷ Nevertheless, all these failings did not prevent him from becoming the undisputed leader of the KMT Left at this time. Three main reasons can be advanced to account for Wang's predominant influence in the KMT and his undisputed position among the Leftists. First, Wang had a long history of association with the KMT and Sun Yat-sen. He was a member of the T'ung Meng Hui since 1905 and was the leading polemicist in its main propaganda organ, *Min-pao*. During the anti-Manchu revolutionary period he worked closely with Sun Yat-sen and his bold attempt to assassinate the Manchu prince regent in 1910 made him a national hero after the 1911 Revolution. Although after the Revolution he remained aloof from politics for a while, he soon joined Sun Yat-sen again in 1917. His seniority in the party was all the more conspicuous after the death of Sun Yat-sen and Liao Chung-k'ai in 1925.⁸ Secondly, Wang held high positions in the KMT since the 1924 Reorganization. He was one of the party leaders selected by Sun to sit on the First CEC. And after the death of Sun, he was the virtual leader of the party and the government. He became Chairman of the

Political Council (responsible for day-to-day running of the party), member of the Standing Committee of the CEC (the highest policy-making body in the party) and Chairman of the National Government Council. Although this promising career was terminated by the March Twentieth Incident in 1926, in a later period Wang continued to hold high positions in the party. During the split in the party in April-July 1927, Wang was the undisputed leader of the Wuhan regime. And after the total break with the CCP, he was elected to the CEC by the Fourth and Fifth Plenums. His influence in the KMT could partly be ascribed to his preeminent positions in the party and in the government during 1924-27.⁹ Thirdly, and most importantly, Wang's great influence in the KMT in large measure derived from the image that he was the embodiment of the radical revolutionary heritage of 1924-27. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, Wang was the most zealous in endorsing the radical revolutionary line and defending the *lien-O yung-kung* policy against the party Right. His well-known remark, "All revolutionaries should come to the Left, anti-revolutionaries should get out and go to the Right" resounded through the party and typified his political thinking at the time. The break with the communists did not discredit him. On the contrary, such a break enabled him to act the role of salvaging the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27. At that time, the complete turnaround in the party's stand in 1927-28 under the Nanking leadership was viewed by many of the party's rank and file members as a betrayal of the revolutionary ideals. Amidst the cry of perfidy of the party leadership, Wang came to the fore and explicitly stated that he disagreed with these changes in the party's stand. He said that the *yung-kung* policy should be discarded but the revolutionary line laid down by the First and Second National Party Congresses, or as he sometimes termed it, the Spirit of the Reorganization, should be upheld. In short, he took upon his shoulders the responsibility to save the revolutionary ideals cherished by the party since the 1924 Reorganization. This readily raised enthusiastic support from many rank and file members whose revolutionary zeal was not dampened by the party purge; and they rallied to Wang Ching-wei. Wang's aspiration to be the living embodiment of the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27 earned him widespread support in the party ranks. The importance of Wang to the Left was aptly expressed by Ch'en Kung-po in 1930 when he told some Leftists that without Wang Ching-wei the Left would only be a political lightweight.¹⁰

Twelve other Second CEC and CSC members -- Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü, Wang Fa-ch'in, Ho Hsiang-ning, Wang-Lo-p'ing, Chu Chi-ch'ing, Ch'en Shu-jen, P'an Yün-ch'ao, Kuo Ch'un-t'ao, Po Wen-wei and Pai Yün-t'i -- constituted the leadership of the Left.¹¹ Among them, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü were widely known as the two right-hand men of Wang Ching-wei.¹² Both of them were new converts to the KMT -- they joined the party in early 1925. Before that Ch'en was a founding member of the

CCP but he soon dissociated from it and went to the United States to pursue further study in 1922-24. When he returned to China he was introduced by Liao Chung-k'ai to join the KMT. At the time the only other eminent party leader with whom Ch'en was well acquainted was Wang Ching-wei. In fact when Ch'en was in the United States faced with financial problems, it was Wang and Liao whom he turned to for support.¹³ After the death of Liao, Wang naturally became the patron in the party whom Ch'en would look to. But their close relations were established only during the Northern Expedition. Their support for the radical revolutionary line pursued by the party was the common ground which brought them together. A close working relationship was forged when they participated in the "Wuhan Government" and in the opposition against the Special Committee. In April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek broke away from the Wuhan Government, Ch'en Kung-po chose to side with the Wuhan Government and proved himself a stalwart supporter of Wang. And in September 1927 when the Special Committee was established, Ch'en went to Canton to win over the militarists there against the Committee. Ch'en was so trusted by Wang that the task of staging a Leftist coup in Canton in November 1927 fell mainly on him. From this time onwards a close relation between Wang and Ch'en was established.¹⁴ As regards Ku Meng-yü, he enjoyed a close relation with Wang as well. It was said that Li Ta-chao and Wang Ching-wei were the two party leaders who introduced Ku to join the KMT.¹⁵ His relations with Wang, like Ch'en Kung-po, were consolidated during the Northern Expedition. Ku, like Ch'en, had participated in the "Wuhan Government" and in the coup in Canton in November 1927. During this period he often accompanied Wang in person and his intellectual orientation was obviously agreeable to Wang. There is little doubt that Ku's relations with Wang were as close as the one between Ch'en and Wang. Yet, the relationship between these two right-hand men of Wang was far from smooth. They held contrary views on ideological and organizational issues. As we have noted, Ch'en was Marxist-oriented while Ku was anti-Marxist and this unbridgeable difference accounted for the ideological polemics between them in 1928. Ch'en later admitted that this ideological difference created divisions and discontents within the Leftist ranks.¹⁶ And on the question of establishing the RCA, again they found themselves at loggerheads with each other. Ch'en was in favour of organizing the Left into the RCA whereas Ku was opposed to such an idea. This resulted in their followers taking opposing stands on the issue of factional organizations in the KMT. The *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* coterie viewed with a sympathetic eye the numerous factional organizations in the party; by contrast, the *Ch'ien-chin* coterie lamented the baleful influence of these factional organizations to the party.¹⁷ Eventually the issue was resolved in favour of Ch'en because the majority of the Leftist leadership felt the acute need to organize themselves against other factions in the party.¹⁸ Yet, at heart Ku did not embrace such

an idea and, in 1931 he openly questioned the wisdom of forming factional organizations in the party.¹⁹ A Shanghai newspaper also alleged that the RCA was split into Ch'en's and Ku's supporters and when Ch'en went to Europe in early 1929, Ku expelled Ch'en's protégés like Hsiao Shu-yü and Ma Chün from the RCA.²⁰ Yet, for all the differences between the two men, there was no overt split between them and they continued to work together under Wang Ching-wei. One important factor may account for their continued cooperation -- Ku did not aspire to take Ch'en's preeminent position in the KMT Left. He seems to have been willing to let Ch'en play a more dominant part in the RCA. First, Ku did not take a strong stand against the platform adopted by the RCA's First National Congress which fully reflected Ch'en's ideological stand. And, as his health was not good at that time, Ku was ready to let Ch'en take charge of the day-to-day activities of the RCA.²¹ Ku's low political profile saved the Leftist leadership from dividing against itself. This factor, coupled with Ch'en's considerable appeal to party members, made Ch'en second only to Wang Ching-wei in the KMT Left. Thus, the well-known Leftist publicist, T'ang Leang-li, could make a claim in 1930 that Ch'en Kung-po was "all brilliance" and was the "deputy leader of the Left."²² For a while Ch'en's eminence seemed to overshadow Wang's position and a rumour had it that Ch'en wanted himself to be the leader of the KMT Left. Even Wang seemed to believe the rumour and this made Ch'en uneasy.²³ More significant differences between Wang and Ch'en lay in intellectual orientation and in political thinking. As we have discussed before, Ch'en was Marxist-oriented and Wang obviously was not. This prevented them from happily collaborating with each other in shaping the ideology of the Left. Furthermore, Wang's pragmatic political thinking -- his ever readiness to make compromises -- was disconcerting to Ch'en. All these differences came to a head during the Enlarged Conference. Wang's proposal for the settlement of the party-legitimacy issue was regarded by Ch'en as violating the basic political stand of the Left; his abandonment of the RCA platform in favour of the democracy issue was viewed with disapproval; his great interest in composing a Provisional Constitution for China was considered out of tune with the domestic political situation; and his suggestion for the Left to play a legal opposition was, to Ch'en, totally impracticable.²⁴ Ch'en's frustrations at this time had led him to adopt a passive attitude in the Enlarged Conference²⁵ and it was soon reported in the news media that a breach between Wang and Ch'en had occurred.²⁶ Finally, Ch'en decided to retire from active politics and went to Europe by the end of 1930.²⁷ Subsequent events showed that the strained relation between the two men was only temporary. In mid-1931 when another opposition movement developed in Canton, we see that Wang and Ch'en came together again. The relationship between the two men can be viewed in terms of a patron-client relationship²⁸ -- Ch'en's dependence on Wang for advancing his career in the KMT no

doubt induced him to come to terms with Wang. But, it was his almost unquestioned loyalty to Wang that was the crucial element in explaining why the two men with different intellectual orientations could have a life-long cooperation in the political arena. Ch'en liked to describe this kind of loyalty as a kind of devoted friendship,²⁹ which was clearly fortified by his conviction that Wang was an indispensable figure to the KMT Left and without him, the Left would be powerless in the party.³⁰ This unquestioned, perhaps blind, loyalty to Wang motivated Ch'en to comply with Wang's decision to make a drastic shift in the Leftist ideology and restrain him from openly questioning Wang's policy measures in the Enlarged Conference. It also prevented an overt split in the Leftist leadership.

However, petty factional divisions did exist in the Leftist leadership. Ch'en Kung-po admitted in his memoirs that three factions -- (i) members of the RCA, (ii) Wang Ching-wei's intimate associates and (iii) the non-RCA Leftists -- could be identified and petty factional squabbles often took place among them.³¹ More grievous signs of weakness were also observable -- the Leftist leadership was only a loosely organized group with a disappointingly low calibre of leadership. Not all Leftist Second CEC and CSC members were actively involved in the opposition movement against Nanking. Five of them, Ho Hsiang-ning, Ch'en Shu-jen, Kuo Ch'un-t'ao, Po Wen-wei and Pai Yün-t'i, apart from signing their names in the various manifestoes denouncing the Nanking rule, remained aloof from Leftist daily activities. As a matter of fact, Ho Hsiang-ning, Po Wen-wei and Ch'en Shu-jen did not join the RCA, and the other two leaders Kuo Ch'un-t'ao and Pai Yün-t'i, although they were members of the RCA, never played an active part in it.³² Only Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü, Wang Fa-ch'in, Wang-Lo-p'ing, Chu Chi-ch'ing and P'an Yün-ch'ao regularly attended to the activities of the RCA. Yet, the quality of the leadership of these activist leaders left much to be desired. Ch'en Kung-po, who had intimate knowledge of these leaders, testifies in his memoirs:

Mr Wang Fa-ch'in is old now. He is always enthusiastic and sincere but is lacking in ideas. Mr Chu Chi-ch'ing is a valiant man, yet he does not take long views and think deeply. Mr P'an Yün-ch'ao is long on critical power but short on constructive ideas. So the only man left is Wang-Lo-p'ing. Mr Wang is too much a man of action. His ways of doing things are sometimes impulsive and ill-considered and his policy measures tend to be contradictory, ... Mr Ku Meng-yü says that, as he is in bad health, he can only be a good adviser but not a good commander. Such is the state of affairs of the Reorganization Comrades Association. Other people may be optimistic [about the future of the RCA], but I understand the situation well and can only take a dim view of it.³³

The leadership was further weakened in March 1930 when Wang-Lo-p'ing was assassinated in Shanghai by Nanking's agents. At that time Wang had become the

guiding spirit of the Headquarters of the RCA in Shanghai while Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Kung-po were in Hong Kong in charge of the military campaigns in South China. Middle-ranking cadres of the RCA recollect that Wang-Lo-p'ing was an able and resolute leader. He took an active part in the RCA and built up a following from a group of intellectuals and youth. Gradually all decision-power on organization, propaganda, liaison and fund-raising work of the RCA in Shanghai was put in his hands. His assassination, in their opinions, paralysed the daily activities of the RCA. What was even worse was that Chu Chi-ch'ing, Wang's successor, was passive and incompetent in his work. Henceforth the grass-roots activities of the Left were much undermined.³⁴

Another unmistakable sign of strained relationship within the Leftist leadership was the dissolution of Ch'en Kung-po's coterie of followers in early 1929. As we have noted, when Ch'en started the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* in Shanghai, he gathered a group of Marxist-oriented intellectuals such as Shih Ts'un-t'ung, Hsu Te-heng and Liu K'an-yuan around him and they collaborated with Ch'en in shaping the ideology of the Left. However, by early 1929 Ch'en's coterie began to disintegrate. Partly this was due to the fact that this group of intellectuals was dissatisfied with the outcome of the RCA's First Congress and partly that Ch'en found himself gradually alienated from them. In the First Congress of the RCA, these intellectuals, led by Hsiao Shu-yü, proposed to elect a new Central Committee; their ulterior purpose was to make themselves Committee members. However, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü held contrary opinions; they thought that only the Second CEC and CSC could command respect and enough support in the KMT and so they favoured the retention of these Committees as the legitimate Party Central in the opposition against Nanking. Intense debates followed suit and finally Ch'en's and Ku's opinions were adopted by the RCA, much to the chagrin of Ch'en's associates. The incident strained their relationship so much that soon after Shih Ts'un-t'ung, followed by Hsu Te-heng, Hsiao Shu-yü, Liu K'an-yuan and Ma Chün, either withdrew or were expelled from the RCA.³⁵ Ch'en made no effort to repair the damage because at this time he also did not get along with his associates. In his memoirs Ch'en remarked that he was often troubled by their petty quarrels, their awkward working style and their inclination to identify with the communists. Hence, before he left Shanghai for Europe in January 1929, Ch'en had already been estranged from them.³⁶ The dissolution of Ch'en's coterie in early 1929 was a shattering blow to the Ch'en school of thought.

As the leadership of the KMT Left always abounded with petty power struggles, showed signs of disunity and, above all, its calibre was only mediocre, it is not surprising that in his memoirs Ch'en always expressed disappointment with it. He was so disillusioned with the Leftist leadership that he once remarked that if Nanking did not

take the unwise move to pack the Third National Party Congress, then the RCA with its weak leadership would have fallen into oblivion in Chinese politics.³⁷ Even if Ch'en overstates the point somewhat out of disappointment, there is little doubt that the Leftist leadership was never a unified and resolute group. If there was any moment in this period when a determined political will could change the course of events, the Leftist leadership could not be expected to rise to the occasion.

The Reorganization Comrades Association: Organizational Structure, Funding Sources and Propaganda Network

After the death of Sun Yat-sen in March 1925, numerous factional organizations sprang up clandestinely in the KMT as a result of deepening ideological and policy disputes. The break with the communists did not bring unity to the party; on the contrary, personal animosities and factional struggles engendered since the 1924 Reorganization rankled deep and more factional organizations emerged in the party than ever before.³⁸ To name the most conspicuous, there were the Grand Alliance of the Three People's Principles, the Practice Society of the Three People's Principles, the New China Association and the Anti-Bolshevik Corps. Their professed aims were to oppose the communists and the "degenerates" in the party alike.³⁹ Naturally the Left also felt the need to organize. In mid-1928, as the Left began to develop its own ideological stand, it decided to set up an organization to strive for its cause. This idea was strongly backed by some KMT officials who were in charge of regional party branches. Then, the occupation of Chinan in Shantung province by Japanese troops at this time prompted the Left to organize and precipitated the establishment of the Chinese Kuomintang Reorganization Comrades Association (*Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang kai-ts'u t'ung-chih hui*) in May 1928.⁴⁰

Not all the Leftists in the party came to join the RCA. Some Leftist leaders such as Wang Ching-wei, Ho Hsiang-ning, Po Wen-wei and Ch'en Shu-jen were not members of the RCA; and an undetermined number of rank and file Leftists were also unaffiliated to it. Ch'en Kung-po, as the leader of the RCA, offered an explanation of why a number of rank and file Leftists were left out. According to his account, the RCA at first was intended to embrace "all comrades from different quarters" of the party into its organization. But because of poor communication and the secret nature of the RCA, many "revolutionary comrades" were not informed beforehand of the setting up of the organization. These people, Ch'en continued, felt offended and subsequently many refused to join the RCA, though they continued to call themselves "Leftists."⁴¹ Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, another Leftist, who obviously was not Ch'en's man, put forward another version. According to his account, "the Left" who were outside the RCA were those who

held contrary opinions on the need of establishing such an organization as well as on its ideological stand. They believed that loyal followers of Sun Yat-sen should not form into secret factions; the founding of the RCA had blatantly violated this basic principle. Moreover, these people were inclined to Ku Meng-yü's views and came to differ from the Ch'en school of thought. As the platform of the RCA reflected Ch'en's thinking, it was not surprising to see that these "Leftists" opted to remain outside the organization.⁴² On the basis of these two accounts, it is likely that those "Leftists" who did not join the RCA had one reason or another to repudiate the organization; they sometimes even vilified the RCA.⁴³ Available evidence does not indicate the numbers of "the Left" outside the RCA, yet circumstantial evidence tends to suggest that their strength and influence were far weaker in comparison with those of the RCA which was a well-organized force with members permeating into every level of the KMT and armed with a systematic ideology. The preponderant weight of the RCA within the Left was vividly demonstrated in 1929-30 when it became the prime mover behind the extensive opposition movement against Nanking. Even the Nanking leadership simply identified the RCA as representing the whole KMT Left. Numerous speeches by Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min in 1929-30 concentrated their attacks on the RCA and made not a slight reference to "the Left" outside the Association.⁴⁴ Most importantly, the RCA earned its legitimate and preeminent place within the Left on the ground that it was founded and managed by the Leftist leadership, in particular by Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü, the two right-hand men of Wang Ching-wei. And Ku, whose views were well respected by "the Left," at first did frown at forming the RCA and was at odds with the Ch'en Kung-po school. But later he came to support and join the RCA, a move which set an example for the "Leftists" to follow. At any rate, the RCA was the only effective organized Leftist force and the centre of the opposition movement against Nanking in this period. Those "Leftists" who opted to remain outside the Association were more the sympathisers than protagonists in the Leftist opposition movement.


The RCA was envisaged to be the sole "revolutionary organization" of the Left.⁴⁵ Two other large organizations, the "United Office of Provincial, Municipal and Overseas Party Branches" and the "Chinese Kuomintang Party-Defending Revolutionary Alliance" founded in Shanghai, were affiliated to the RCA. They had different functions. The "United Office" was set up with the objective of organizing opposition in all party branches while the "Party-Defending Revolutionary Alliance" was to win over regional militarists against Nanking.⁴⁶ It was these two affiliated organizations which formed the channel through which the RCA conducted its opposition movement during 1929-30. As regards the organizational structure of the RCA, it was laid down in a General Constitution which in the main was modelled upon the General Constitution of the KMT and the concepts expounded by the Leftist leader, Wang-Lo-p'ing, in his

treatise, *The Organization and Training of the Chinese Kuomintang*.⁴⁷ Consequently the structure of the Association for the most part bore a resemblance to that of the KMT. The only conspicuous difference was that, unlike the KMT, it did not have supervisory committees in its organizational structure (see Figure I). The General Constitution of the RCA consisted of twelve chapters, the first of which dealt with admission of members. Basically any individual could become a member provided that he was introduced by at least two other members. He would be a candidate for a probation period of one to three months and would become a full member after the probation period if approved by the next two high levels of the hierarchy. Chapter II outlined the overall organizational structure of the RCA. The basic unit was a cell consisting of three to nine members. From the basic unit upward the hierarchy was usually graded into sub-branch, sub-district, district, provincial and national levels. At each of these five levels, power was vested in the Congress of representatives and its elected executive committee when it was not in session. Chapter III laid down the structure and powers of the National Congress and the General Headquarters of the Association. Supreme power was vested in the National Congress which elected a number of Central Executive Committee members to form the General Headquarters of the Association. The General Headquarters would exercise all power given to the Congress when the Congress was not in session. The General Headquarters was composed of a Secretariat, a Political Committee and a number of departments (see Figure II). Chapters IV-VII delineated in detail the power structure at provincial, district, sub-district, sub-branch and cell levels. Chapter VIII dealt with the tenure of office of Congress representatives and the Executive Committee members. Chapters IX, X and XI dealt with discipline, factions, membership fees and supplementary guidelines.⁴⁸

An eight-point outline of the objectives of the RCA was distributed to every new member. It reads as follows:

1. To prepare a new reorganization of the party clandestinely.
2. To foster the revolutionary spirit of our Late Leader and to put his teachings into practice.
3. To acknowledge the peasantry and the working class as the basic forces of our party and establish a united front of all democratic forces.
4. To build a Three People's Principles' country under the dictatorship of the party.
5. To continue the anti-imperialism movement.

Figure I: Organizational structure of the Reorganization
Comrades Association of the Kuomintang



Sources: "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang kai-tsu t'ung-chih hui tsung-chang," in "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.2; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsu p'ai hui-i lu," p.169.


6. To restore the mass movement.

7. To weed out the communists and other corrupt and degenerate cliques and organizations in our party.

8. To establish a new International of the Three People's Principles.⁴⁹

Two official leaflets, "Information on the Association" and "Outline of Training Programme" further defined the nature of the RCA. The secret nature of the Association was stressed and every member was to maintain strict secrecy concerning the RCA which the Left pointed out was always in danger of being suppressed by

Figure II: Organizational structure of the General Headquarters of the Reorganization Comrades Association



Sources: "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang kai-tsu t'ung-chih hui tsung-chang," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 3.2. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsu p'ai hui-i lu," p.169.

* The General Constitution envisaged the setting up of these departments but in practice they were not established.

"corrupt" and "reactionary" forces. A tight control on its members was exercised: the Association demanded that all activities of its members should be subject to the direction of the organization and all decisions should be obeyed and carried out without question. Cell meetings were to be held every week to discuss a wide range of policies and routine work, and attendance was compulsory. Three types of reports were to be kept on every individual member, they were: (i) a report of his whereabouts, (ii) a report on his residence and (iii) a weekly activity report submitted by the individual member. To redress the disorganized state of the Left, a comprehensive training programme for the Association's cadres was also drawn up. Four main training themes -- a single and unified ideology, stringent discipline, obedience to the organization rather than to individuals, and connections with the masses -- were stressed. It was hoped that through this training programme, unified will-power and solidarity in action would result. Furthermore, members of the association were exhorted to engage in practical work, to go to the KMT rank and file, the masses and mass organizations to win over sympathisers. The Association intended to plant its cells in three areas: schools, party machinery and mass organizations, some of which, as we shall see, became the power base of the Left.⁵⁰

With these elaborate rules and structures, the Left clearly intended the

Association to be a well-organized body with strict discipline which perhaps could serve as an organizational exemplar for the KMT. In actual fact, the Association fell short of this aim. As a secret organization, it was natural that the elaborate organizational structure and rules laid down by the General Constitution could not all be observed in practice. The General Headquarters of the Association, instead of establishing a series of departments and special committees, only had three departments handling organization, propaganda and general affairs.⁵¹ The National Congress of the Association, stipulated to be held once every year or at least once every eighteen months, was held only once in the two and a half years during which the Association was in existence. Except for branches in Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping and Kiangsu, the grass-roots network of the Association was rather loose and was not very active,⁵² and cell meetings were not held regularly.⁵³ More serious organizational deficiencies were revealed by the First National Congress of the Association in January 1929. The Congress noted that the organizational structure as a whole was "too simple" and this created difficulties for organizational work. It also stated that the merits of having an organization were not well recognized by its members. In some areas where KMT members and the masses supported the Leftist cause, the Association's cadres recoiled from organizing them for fear of bringing about "counterproductive results." In other areas, cadres just concentrated their energy on controlling KMT machinery and neglected to build up the organizational network of the Association. All these problems were viewed with disapproval by the Congress which continued to state the importance of forming a Leftist organization. Other organizational weaknesses were pointed out. The Congress did not fail to notice that activities at cell level, the basic unit of the Association, were always lacking. At the upper level, the qualities of the Association's cadres were called into question. A number of cadres were reported to be "opportunist" and were said to have a poor understanding of the aims of the Association. Cadres' indifferent attitude to the work of the Association and their lax discipline were remarked upon. Most of the cadres did not have an overall and systematic plan to guide their activities and they often gravitated towards petty power struggles. The lines of command within the Association were also surprisingly loose. Most regions, except those contiguous to the Headquarters, failed to forge close communication links with the centre. For this failure in communication, both regional and central leadership were taken to task -- the Headquarters for having failed to play a guiding role, and cadres at regional level for their neglect in submitting activity reports. In addition, the secret nature of the Association was in practice not often honoured and information concerning activities at both the central and regional levels often leaked out.⁵⁴ Obviously the RCA was far from perfect in its organizational structure, but these organizational deficiencies should not be exaggerated. The Congress of the Association did point out that the

development of the RCA since its inception was "very rapid" and "a firm groundwork was being laid."⁵⁵ The Association remained the centre of party opposition against Nanking during 1929-30. The organizational deficiencies, some of which were common to many organizations, did not prove lethal to the functioning of the Association. However, it is true that the Association failed to live up to its ideal and could not be an organizational exemplar for the KMT.

The RCA drew on several sources for financial support. Within the Association itself, a membership fee payable every month was imposed. An income tax, the rate of which depended on the individual member's income, was also levied.⁵⁶ Available evidence does not indicate the amount of money derived from these sources, yet it seems likely, judging from the size of membership of the Association (which we shall discuss later), that it did not constitute the main source of revenue for the Association. For the most part, financial support was derived from the political, industrial and commercial sectors, with which the Left had connections of various kinds. Political connections enabled the Left to obtain much financial support for its activities. For a time even the Leftist journals like the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun* and *Ch'ien-chin* were subsidized by T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek's henchman in financial circles.⁵⁷ Large contributions came from Li Fu-lin, previously an army commander in Kwangtung, who had collaborated with the Left in staging a coup in Canton in November 1927. Li donated ¥15,000 for the founding of the Leftist *Ta-lu* University and another ¥400,000 for Leftist military activities during 1929-30.⁵⁸ Yen Hsi-shan, the regional militarist in Shansi who allied with the Left in the Enlarged Conference convened in late 1930, provided it with ¥500,000.⁵⁹ The Left secured a major source of funding in the industrial and commercial sectors as well. One well-known case involved contributions and loans from the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company, a native Chinese business concern. From 1929 to 1930, the Company donated a total of ¥3,300 to the Leftist cause. It also advanced a ¥10,000 loan to Wang-Lo-p'ing and Chu Chi-ch'ing, the two Leftist leaders in charge of the Headquarters of the RCA, and another HK\$120,000 loan to Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Kung-po.⁶⁰ Numerous other reports related that small businessmen in Yangchow, Nantung, Fenghsien and Chenk'ou in Kiangsu and "power-seekers" in Chekiang were eager to make donations to the RCA.⁶¹ A large part of these loans and donations went to regional militarists for their campaigns against Nanking. It was reported that ¥100,000 was given to Yü Tso-po, ¥500,000 to Feng Yü-hsiang, and ¥120,000 to Chang Fa-k'uei and Li Tsung-jen for their subversive activities against Nanking.⁶² Expenditure for military purposes seems to outweigh donations to RCA. Nevertheless, on the whole, the Association did not suffer any serious financial stringency.⁶³

An extensive propaganda network was created by the RCA during the opposition against Nanking. Apart from numerous leaflets and treatises composed by the Left for propaganda purposes, various dailies and a great number of journals and periodicals were published by the RCA; an intelligence report compiled by Nanking listed more than sixty items of such publications.⁶⁴ Notable propaganda organs of the RCA during 1928-30 included the *Ko-ming p'ing-lun*, *Ch'ien-chin*, *Min-chung hsien-feng*, *Min-i*, *Min-hsin* and *Min-chu*. Most of the main Leftist periodicals and journals were printed in Shanghai, still a significant number were produced in various parts of China. In North China, a number of periodicals were published in Peiping (for instance, *Hsin-feng pan yüeh-k'an*, *Ko-ming ch'ien-lu*, *Hui-mieh*, *Pei-fang p'ing-lun*); in Tientsin (*Nuan-liu*, *Fen-chin chou-k'an*); in Tsingtao (*Ko-ming hui-k'an*, *Kung-jen chih-lu*); in Chuch'eng (*Chu-ch'eng tang-sheng*); in Sian (*Chüeh-wu ch'ing-nien*) and in Shengyang (*Kai-tsao yüeh-k'an*). In South China, periodicals were also published in Nanking (*Tang-ch'i*, *Huan-kung*); in Changchow (*Ko-ming ch'u-lu*); in Foochow (*Shih-wan huo-chi*) and in Hangchow (*Chih-nan chen*). Overseas, one periodical *Kuo-min*, was published in Paris and three, *Tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, *Tso-feng* and *Chien-t'ao* in Tokyo.⁶⁵ About fourteen newspapers and tabloids were published in China and overseas. Three newspapers were said to have been printed in the Kiangsi province alone (only one can be identified: the *Hsin-wen jih-pao* in Nanchang); one, *Nan-hua jih-pao* in Hong Kong; *Che-chiang jih-pao* in Chekiang; *Huan-pei jih-pao* in Anhwei; *Ping-min jih-pao* in Liaoning; *Jen-min jih-pao* in Tientsin; *Min-chu jih-pao* in Taiyuan; *Min-ch'i jih-pao* in New York; and a few tabloids like *Ying-pao* (it was said to have been edited by Ch'en Kung-po), *Shuang-pao* and *Hsiang-pao*, which were probably published in Shanghai.⁶⁶ By far the best-known RCA's newspaper was the *Chung-yang wan-pao*, which had its name changed several times because of the censorship imposed by the Nanking authorities. It was first published in October 1929 in Shanghai for three weeks, then it changed its name to *Chung-yang jih-pao* (for 1 month), *Ko-ming jih-pao* (early 1930 to late 1930), *Kuo-min jih-pao* (late 1930), *Hua-tung jih-pao* (January 1931-February 1931) and finally *Shang-hai min-pao* (mid-1931 to late 1931).⁶⁷ One significant feature common to RCA's publications was that most of them existed for a short period only. This was not surprising in view of the secret nature of its publications and the repression exerted by the Nanking authorities. On the whole, the numbers of dailies, periodicals and journals published by the RCA testify to the success of the Left in establishing an extensive propaganda network in important regions in China and in traditional party overseas footholds in Paris, Tokyo and New York as well as to its successful recruitment of a significant section of intellectuals for its propaganda work.

The Strength of the Kuomintang Left in the Party

To ascertain the strength of the Left within the KMT, two questions will be answered: the numerical strength of the Left in the party and, more importantly, the influence it wielded in the party as a whole. The numerical strength of the Left can be gathered by the membership figures of the RCA. By January 1929 the RCA officially reported that it had a membership of over one thousand and had established eighteen regional offices; and another eleven offices were in the process of being set up.⁶⁸ While at the peak of its activities, the RCA was said to have reached a membership of about ten thousand and its organization was extended to nineteen provinces and five major cities.⁶⁹ Overseas it had set up branches in France, Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore.⁷⁰ Available evidence tends to suggest that its members were scattered over a wide area in China and overseas; and in terms of the whole party membership, the RCA was just a minority group in the KMT. Compared with the official party census of October 1929 (the most comprehensive and reliable one after the party purge), which listed about 350,000 registered party members (266,338 members in China and 80,000 overseas; excluding the membership from the army which amounted to 280,000),⁷¹ the RCA with a membership of ten thousand controlled at most no more than 3% of KMT members. This lack of numerical strength can be illustrated at regional level in the two major cities of Nanking and Shanghai. The two cities are selected for analysis because they were the two areas where the figures of the RCA's membership are available and where the Left claimed to have built the best organizational network. The official registered party members of October 1929 in Nanking and Shanghai totalled 5,563 and 6,234 respectively, the RCA only recruited just more than 500 members in Nanking (merely 9% of party members there) and about 700-800 members in Shanghai (approximately 11-13% of party members there).⁷² In terms of numerical strength the RCA did not appear to be a formidable political force in the party. As regards its influence in the party, there is, of course, no way of measuring it accurately. But, it was obviously much stronger than the membership of the RCA would lead one to believe. In early 1929 the First Congress of the RCA noted that most party members were "very sympathetic" to the Leftist cause; similarly, at this time Ch'en Kung-po also remarked that the Left had a "predominant influence" in the party.⁷³ Fan Yü-sui, a leading Leftist in the headquarters of the RCA, recalled that at this time almost every KMT branch under the Nanking Party Central was infiltrated by the Left and most regional KMT officials were RCA's cadres.⁷⁴ The political climate and situation of the time were, in fact, propitious for the Left to assert its influence over party members.

In the first place, an undetermined but substantial number of party members were drawn to the ideology of the Left. The support given to the Left can be traced back to

the period of the alliance with the CCP when the Left wing of the party was dominant and a majority of rank and file members came under its influence and were imbued with radical ideas. The break with the CCP and subsequent policy changes confounded these KMT members but soon they turned to Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü who attempted to salvage the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27. The role of Wang Ching-wei in rallying KMT members to the Left was pivotal. As already noted, Wang's close association with Sun Yat-sen, his seniority and official positions accounted in part for his appeal in the party. More important was the fact that he was the embodiment of the radical revolutionary heritage of the KMT before and after the break with the communists. His aspiration to epitomise the radical revolutionary heritage of the party readily captured the minds of many KMT rank and file members whose revolutionary zeal was not dampened by the break with the communists. And after Wang retired to Europe in early 1928, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü and a number of Leftist theorists, as the logical inheritor of Wang's mantle, continued to give expression to the revolutionary mood of the party ranks. Hence, many rank and file members who were suspicious of the perfidy of the Nanking leadership in the revolution became sympathetic to the Left.

Secondly, the Left secured the support of a number of KMT officials in charge of regional KMT branches. After the Fourth Plenum, the Party Central began to reorganize KMT branches at lower levels. Because of the urgency of this task, many KMT officials not yet moulded and trained by the Nanking leadership were vested with the authority to reform regional branches. They became key members in many Provincial Party Affairs Directorates or in Party Affairs Rectification Committees.⁷⁵ The loyalty of these officials to Nanking soon came into question. Some of them cherished the revolutionary ideals of the 1924 Reorganization and were receptive to the Leftist ideology; some even urged the Leftist leadership to form a Leftist organization. After the founding of the RCA these officials became its cadres. Party branches in Liaoning, Kirin, Shantung and Peiping came under the sway of the Left as the majority of KMT officials there had connections with the Association.⁷⁶ A number of Nanking's key officials in Anhwei, Honan, Hopei, Kiangsu, Shansi, Shanghai and even Nanking were cadres of the Association.⁷⁷ Through these officials, the Left gained political leverage in regional branches and exerted influence over many rank and file members of the KMT.

More than anything, however, it was Nanking's high-handed way of selecting representatives for the Third National Party Congress in 1929 that gave the Left a good opportunity to widen its power base in the party. At that time, the KMT was seriously divided and factional organizations permeated it at every level. The Grand Alliance of

the Three People's Principles, the New China Association and the Practice Society of the Three People's Principles were well entrenched in North China and were the most powerful factions not taking their cue from the Nanking leadership. Since the Fourth Plenum, Chiang Kai-shek was intent on bringing the party under his control and tried either to win over or undermine these factions. Nanking's regulations for choosing Third Congress representatives were a means of excluding dissident factions from the Congress and hence depriving them of their power. This immediately provoked these factional organizations, particularly the Grand Alliance and New China Association, to mobilize their forces against Nanking. As a result, a flood of protests from KMT branches all over the country against the Third National Party Congress emerged. These factional organizations soon joined forces with the Left in the common cause of opposing the dictatorship of the Nanking leadership and upholding democracy within the party.⁷⁸ It was amidst this tense atmosphere that in March 1929 the "United Office of the Provincial, Municipal and Overseas Party Branches of the KMT" was established by the RCA openly rallying dissident party branches against Nanking. The "United Office" claimed to represent fifteen provincial and municipal branches, six overseas branches in France, the United States, Canada, Vietnam, British colonies and Dutch colonies, and six United offices of various district branches in Hupei, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Kwangsi, Hankow and Canton. It reported that 70% of all KMT members had been included under the "United Office."⁷⁹ Undoubtedly the opposition to Nanking's Third National Party Congress decisively augmented the Leftist influence.⁸⁰ It appeared that the Left's influence in the party was equal to if not surpassing that of the Nanking leadership.

Subsequent events showed that the Left's power base in the party was far more vulnerable than appearances suggested. The Nanking leadership, dominant at the top level of the party bureaucracy and the Central Government, possessed legal power, organizational means and military forces to promote loyalists and oust dissidents in the party. Key regional party officials and rank and file members who were associated or sympathetic to the RCA were obviously subject to the organizational control of the Nanking party apparatus and as such they were largely at the mercy of the Nanking leadership. The vulnerability of their positions in the party had not gone unnoticed by the Left. In early 1929 the First Congress of the RCA was aware of the danger of building its network within formal party apparatus which it perceptively pointed out would sooner or later revert to the Nanking leadership.⁸¹ Yet, nothing was really done to remedy this shortcoming. It gradually became clear that the Nanking leadership had gained the upper hand over the Left in the battle for control of regional party organizations. Faced with a flood of protests engineered by various opposition groups in the KMT in late 1928, the Nanking leadership decided to assert itself. In November 1928, Nanking issued a "directive on party discipline" warning that any violation of

KMT regulations would be immediately referred to the CSC for action in order to maintain discipline.⁸² Regional KMT officials in Nanking, Shanghai, Anhwei, Chekiang and Kiangsu, the regions usually considered the heartland of the KMT Government, were summoned to Nanking for "admonishment,"⁸³ high party leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek also came to the fore and delivered speeches stressing loyalty to the Party Central.⁸⁴ A wholesale reshuffling of regional party officials and a series of expulsions of party members who were found to have supported the opposition movement were carried out relentlessly by the Party Central. In the last three months of 1928, all party officials in two municipal and two provincial Party Affairs Directorates in North China were recalled and replaced by officials loyal to the Nanking leadership.⁸⁵ The process of reshuffling continued in earnest in 1929 with 21 important regional party executive committees (5 were municipal branches, 13 provincial branches and 3 overseas branches) thoroughly reorganized.⁸⁶ The Party Central also took disciplinary actions to expel "dissident" party members. In 1929, of the 309 party members who were disciplined by the Party Central, about 132 were expelled on the charges that they were involved in the Leftist opposition movement or were members of the RCA.⁸⁷ The persecution of dissident party members intensified on October 19 when the Party Central issued a directive to all party members urging them to guard against and weed out all "reactionary forces" such as the Leftists in the party.⁸⁸ And in the subsequent year, another batch of 176 dissident party members were expelled from the party.⁸⁹ Although the numbers of party members who were expelled are not large when we take the total membership of the party into consideration, they were significant because these party members were often leading party officials in regional executive committees. There is no record of how many party branches below provincial and municipal levels were reorganized because of the Leftist infiltration, or how savage the power struggle between the Left and the Nanking leadership at the grass-roots level really was. Judging from the extent of reshuffling of regional party branches and the continued practice of expelling dissident party members for more than two years (from late 1928 to the end of 1930), the tenacious influence of the Left over regional party organizations cannot be doubted.

However, the Left in the end failed to withstand the onslaughts from the Nanking leadership. The successful summoning of the Third National Party Congress was an effective means of excluding Nanking's opponents from the power centre and thereby undermining their influence in the party as a whole.⁹⁰ It also legitimatized the ruling position of the Nanking leadership before the party and this probably motivated a significant number of uncommitted party members to throw in their lot with Nanking. The first sign that the Nanking party apparatus triumphed over the opposition forces was the rapid disintegration of major opposition factions in the party immediately after

the Third Congress. The Grand Alliance of the Three People's Principles, a well-established faction in North China since the Northern Expedition, was completely shattered. Its founder, Ting Wei-fen (a member of the Standing Committee of the CEC), eventually submitted to Chiang Kai-shek and its members were dispersed after the Third Congress and many of them came to join the Left. Other factional organizations like the North China Association and the Practice Society suffered the same fate. Their members either came to terms with the Nanking leadership or were stripped of power in the party.⁹¹ The RCA held out longer but its power base in the KMT was visibly eroding. As more dissident branches were reorganized by Nanking after the Third Congress, the Left's "United Office" gradually lost its grip over regional party branches. The failure of the Left to withstand the Nanking party machinery can be well illustrated by the history of party branches in Hopei, Peiping and Tientsin during 1928-29. After the Northern Expedition, the region was brought under the direct control of the Yen Hsi-shan government. As it was not under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government, major party factional organizations such as the Left, which had been deeply entrenched there before the Northern Expedition, were able to dominate party branches in the region. The Leftists were especially emboldened by the fact that the Yen Hsi-shan government had no wish to purge them; on the contrary it tried to exploit them as a political counterpoise to the Nanking Government.⁹² Party branches in Hopei, Peiping and Tientsin thus became an ideal breeding ground for the Leftist activities. At that time, the importance of the Hopei party branch could not be overemphasized. It was situated in a key province in North China and constituted 6.43% of total party membership by October 1929 (added with those of Tientsin and Peiping, it increased to 7.38%), a figure which was surpassed only by those in Kwangtung (23.57%), Hunan (7.87%) and Kiangsi (7.84%).⁹³ To extend its influence to North China, the Nanking leadership had to bring these party branches to their knees. The first round of reorganization of party branches in that region was carried out by Nanking shortly before the Third Congress. All dissident party officials were replaced by those who were considered loyal to the Nanking Party Central. But it clearly fell short of its objective. In June 1929, when Chiang Kai-shek made an inspection trip to North China, he remarked in his various speeches that the Hopei, Tientsin and Peiping party branches were the most "complicated (*fu-tsa*)" branches and had virtually deviated from the party line that they were no longer a part of the KMT.⁹⁴ Soon, Ch'en Kuo-fu was sent by Chiang to North China in July 1929 to implement another round of thorough reorganization of party branches.⁹⁵ Then, a resolution was passed by the Party Central on July 25 laying heavy stress on the loyalty of party members to the party and the importance of party discipline.⁹⁶ In the subsequent three months from July to September, all party officials there were replaced by a batch of loyalists to the

Party Central.⁹⁷ After these series of reorganization, the party branches in Hopei, Tientsin and Peiping eventually fell into the hands of the Nanking leadership. The Nanking party machinery proved effective and strong enough to purge opposition elements in the party even in those regions not directly under its jurisdiction. By February 1930 the official organ of the RCA, *Min-chu*, lamented that in the year 1929 the Nanking Party Central, by using high-handed measures had succeeded in destroying "revolutionary party branches" and expelling "revolutionary comrades" from formal party organizations; now all formal party branches, it noted, were under the complete control of the "degenerates and bureaucrats."⁹⁸ Obviously, for all the strength and influence of the Left in the party, it could not withstand Chiang Kai-shek's party machinery.

In early 1930, when Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang declared war on Nanking, the Left was able to regain its control of formal party organizations in North China. In April 1930, under the auspices of Yen Hsi-shan, the "United Office" set up a Peiping-Tientsin Executive Office to conduct its activities in the North. Shortly after the "United Office" moved from Shanghai to Peiping where it could obtain protection from Yen Hsi-shan's army.⁹⁹ Not only party branches in Peiping, Tientsin and Hopei reverted to the control of the Left, but also those in Honan, Shantung, Shensi, Chahar, Suiyuan and Kansu.¹⁰⁰ But all these events did not portend a resurgent Leftist influence in the party; in the main they indicated that by 1930 the Left could retain its control of regional party branches only with the aid of regional militarists. A more ominous development was that the Left's remaining influence in the party declined precipitately in 1930. As we have noted, the assassination of Wang-Lo-p'ing, in the opinion of RCA's cadres, had an adverse impact on the grass-roots activities of the Left.¹⁰¹ A far more crucial and significant development was that by early 1930 the Left was confronted by a widespread disillusionment of its rank and file members. Nearly all leading RCA's cadres who left their reminiscences testify that a large number of middle- and low-ranking members did not think that it was a wise move to conclude an alliance with regional militarists in the opposition against Nanking. Many regarded it as an opportunistic and compromising move and were enormously disillusioned when Wang Ching-wei finally reached an alliance with Yen Hsi-shan. As a result of growing disillusionment, branches of the RCA, except those in North China, became largely inactive.¹⁰² It was also reported that a significant number of young Leftists in Nanking withdrew from the RCA and its Shantung branch completely disintegrated when its members learned that an alliance with regional militarists had been reached.¹⁰³ In his memoirs Ch'en Kung-po had to admit that an alliance with regional miltiarists was at the sacrifice of the Leftist ideology and he held this as a reason for the ultimate failure of

the Leftist opposition movement.¹⁰⁴ As a matter of fact, from 1930 onwards the policy of allying with regional militarists had interlocked the fortunes of the Left in the party inextricably with those of regional militarists. Inevitably, when Yen Hsi-shan's and Feng Yü-hsiang's armies were defeated on the battlefields in late 1930, the power base of the Left in the KMT collapsed. Subsequently, party branches in North China were once again thoroughly reorganized and reverted to the control of the Nanking Party Central.¹⁰⁵ Disillusionment and pessimism within the Leftist ranks spread more widely than before and an organized force of the Left in the party virtually evaporated. The dissolution of the RCA in January 1931 by Wang Ching-wei was a reflection of the demise of an organized force of the Left in the KMT.¹⁰⁶

The Social Base of the Kuomintang Left

After the break with the CCP in 1927, theories and policies that bore a communist tinge came under close scrutiny by the KMT -- ideological terms like "class" and "class struggle" were expurgated from the official creed. The Party Central in Nanking now claimed to represent "all Chinese people (*ch'üan-min*)" during the National Revolution and deprecated the idea of identifying the party with the interests of any particular class. It suspended the mass movement and pursued a deradicalization policy; consequently the Northern Expedition became exclusively a military expedition and the party was increasingly detached from the masses. In contrast, the Left at this time reiterated the crucial importance of appealing to the masses and continued to analyse Chinese politics in class terms. The new Leftist ideology set forth in mid-1928 laid much stress on activating the masses and striving for the interests of three specific classes: the workers, the peasants, and the petite bourgeoisie. All these ideas were reaffirmed by the First National Congress of the RCA during which a programme of minimum and immediate political and economic demands for workers, peasants, merchants, women and youth was drawn up.¹⁰⁷ In short, the ideology of the Left envisaged a strong and indissoluble link between the KMT and the masses. Whether it had succeeded in appealing to the masses and captured a social base are the focal point of the following analysis. To be sure, no massive body of evidence is available for a detailed reconstruction of the Leftist activities in various strata of society; such an account probably has to await more archival materials to be opened to historians in future. The following analysis is reconstructed mainly on fragmentary pieces of evidence and offers only a tentative account of the social base of the Leftist opposition movement during 1928-31.

As an opposition force, the KMT Left had a receptive audience in the country

during 1928-29. The Communist International, in a letter to the Central Committee of the CCP dated October 26 1929, recognized the potential Leftist appeal to the masses and entreated the communists to oppose the RCA with all their might:

At present the KMT Reorganization Comrades clique is trying to make use of the discontent of the masses. It constitutes the main barrier to the further development of the worker-peasant revolutionary movement. We should immediately develop the most formidable mass movement to wipe out the influence of the Reorganization Comrades clique and unmask its anti-revolutionary nature. We should do our utmost to point out that the so-called 'workers' programme' and 'land programme' of the Reorganization Comrades clique in fact go against the interests of the workers and land revolution -- they protect the landownership of big landlords and prolong the exploitation of capitalism.¹⁰⁸

About the same time, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, the general secretary of the CCP, aware of the great appeal of the Leftist ideology to the masses, pointed out that Wang Ching-wei posed a greater threat to the CCP than Chiang Kai-shek. He called on communist members to work hard to win the masses over and counter the influence of the KMT Left among the masses.¹⁰⁹ Ch'en Kung-po was far from boasting when years later he wrote:

In ideological struggles, the communists are not afraid of the Nanking leadership; instead, they hate the most what they call the KMT Left ... They know that the Right does not possess an ideology and so are not afraid of it. But the Left is equipped with an ideology and so they hate the Left the most.¹¹⁰

Ch'en was also much impressed by the popular support given to the Left. In early 1929 he remarked with relish that the Left had such strong support in society that "warlords, wicked politicians, bureaucrats, anarchists, the new bourgeois class, the Third Party, the CCP and imperialist Powers" all felt the acute need to concentrate their attacks on it.¹¹¹ A report of the First National Congress of the RCA as well corroborated the fact that the Left easily gained sympathetic responses from the general populace who, at that time, were disenchanted with Nanking's policies.¹¹²

Judging from these various sources of evidence, apparently the Left did have a receptive audience in society. What was the composition of its audience in society? Its two greatest political rivals, the Nanking leadership and the CCP, held different views on this question. The Nanking leadership was fully conscious of the enormous Leftist appeal to youth and students but did not think that it had gained significant support from other parts of society.¹¹³ On the other hand, the communists thought that the Left had a wider potential social support; "the liberal bourgeoisie," "the middle national bourgeoisie, the commercial capitalists of local origins, the upper strata of petite

bourgeoisie" and "the small landlords" were, in the eyes of the communists, the prospective social base for the Leftist movement.¹¹⁴ As regards the Leftists themselves, they had clearly targeted specific social groups within the country for support; in fact, their ideology had largely determined the composition of their social support.¹¹⁵

Taken as a whole the ideology of the Left (from 1928 to 1931) intended to make an appeal to the "oppressed classes" in China which comprised a variety of social categories such as the middle and small merchants, the peasantry from small landlords to farm labourers, the working class, the petite bourgeoisie, intellectuals and youth. In other words, the middle and lower classes of China were the social classes the Left would like to secure their support. Specifically, these "middle and lower classes" were defined by the Left as composed of three social classes -- the working class, the peasantry, and the petite bourgeoisie, all of which were regarded by it as the "revolutionary classes" in China. Its central thesis was that the success of the Chinese National Revolution depended on whether these three social classes could be won over, activated and would support the KMT. It virtually identified these social classes as the social base for a KMT or Leftist movement. And, in the event, we find that the Left did capture the support of a significant section of these three "revolutionary classes" during the opposition. Other social classes such as the native "big capitalists" in the commercial and industrial sectors and the "big landowners" had held aloof from the Leftist movement as the Left had never intended to appeal to their support. The mainstream ideology of the Left which advocated nationalization of primary industry, heavy industry, transports, banking and financial institutions obviously ran counter to the interests of the native big business concerns in China. Its proposal to confiscate "big landowners" land was certainly not welcomed by the landowners. It is true that in one instance the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company, a big Chinese business concern, did contribute funds to the Leftist cause. But, it was more for the motive to appease the Left rather than support its move to overthrow the Nanking leadership. Apart from this single and unique incident, no record shows that these social groups had exhibited the kind of support to the Leftist cause which in the least can be taken as constituting a social base for the Leftist movement. As the Left had intended to secure the support of the working class, the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie, and as other classes in China had kept a distance from the Left, the next question to be answered is to ascertain the extent of support given by the above three classes to the Leftist movement.

After the Second National Party Congress of the KMT, the working class was assigned the vanguard role in the National Revolution. Its importance in the Revolution remained unchanged in the eyes of the Left after the break with the communists. In the First National Congress of the RCA, guiding principles for the working class movement

and a platform of minimum and immediate demands for workers were laid down.¹¹⁶ The KMT Left, the Nanking leadership and the CCP all shared similar platforms on the improvement of working-class conditions. They differed in their political aims. Unlike the Nanking leadership, the Left would not hesitate to link up economic demands of the workers with political aims. And unlike the CCP, the Left did not underline class struggle, and wanted to circumscribe political aims to anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. These subtle distinctions in the short run did not make much difference to the workers. During 1928-31, the Left, the Nanking leadership and the CCP had just begun their battles to win over workers and none of them could claim to have had a predominant influence. However, the Left seems to have had more appeal to the workers than the Nanking leadership and was the major rival to the CCP in the working class movement.

During 1928 and early 1929, the Left's hold on the working class along the coastal provinces of North China (mainly the Peiping-Tientsin region) was remarkable. This was a result of changes of policy after the break with the CCP. Before the purge in April 1927, the communists had a strong influence on trade unions and the working class movement was mainly led by the CCP. The KMT at this time played no more than a supportive role. This situation underwent a radical change after the purge of the communists. For instance, in Shanghai where communist influence over workers was undoubtedly strong before the purge, trade unions were now either disbanded or reorganized. These reorganized trade unions were then put under close surveillance by the KMT.¹¹⁷ The same revamping was carried out in other regions where the KMT could exercise effective rule. Thus, by 1928, trade unions were virtually auxilliary organizations of the party; control of party branches became an important means in controlling trade unions. The Left was the beneficiary in the political change in North China where KMT branches were dominated by two factional organizations, the Grand Alliance and the RCA. Through their predominant influence in the region, these two factional organizations easily established strong footholds in trade unions, which were set up with the permission of the party. The General Trade Unions in Peiping and in Tientsin and the Tangshan Railways Unions were founded by the Left in the process; Leftist propaganda work among workers there was actively conducted.¹¹⁸ Some other trade unions in the North came under the sway of the Left as well. In July 1929 when Ch'en Kuo-fu went to inspect party branches in North China, he noted the "complicated" politics in various railways unions of both the Tientsin-Pukou and Peiping-Shanhaikuan lines. Ch'en's remarks strongly suggests that the trade unions there were under Leftist influence and not following the party line.¹¹⁹ Especially notable was the Left's influence in the trade unions in Tientsin, one of the main

industrial cities in China at that time. The Left claimed that it had achieved the greatest success in getting the support of the working class. Its connections with the workers were so strong that a number of RCA's cadres were specifically assigned to take charge of the affairs of factory workers and railways workers.¹²⁰ Indicative of its close ties with the workers was the social composition of KMT members in Tientsin where the Left had a predominant influence in its municipal party branch during 1928-29. In a census of KMT members in Tientsin in August 1929, as many as 55.8% of them came from the working class, a rare phenomenon in the KMT.¹²¹ Furthermore, the Left was reported to have mobilized trade unions in Tientsin and also in Peiping in late 1928 for political struggles against Nanking's intervention in party branches in the areas;¹²² it also organized strikes in the British-American Tobacco Company Ltd. in Tientsin.¹²³ For fear of workers' unrest, in August 1928 the regional government in North China ordered the disbandment of all trade unions in Peiping and Tientsin.¹²⁴ And in Shantung, two major cities also witnessed Leftist activities. In the city of Tsingtao, the Left published a journal *Kung-jen chih-lu* (The workers' road), which aimed at the spreading of anti-Nanking views to the workers.¹²⁵ And in Tsaochuang, a mining area in the city of Chinan, an attempt was made to instigate railways workers to go on strike against Nanking.¹²⁶ In the light of active Leftist work among the workers, the Communist International in October 1929 had to admit that the RCA had a "remarkably strong influence" on "yellow" trade unions in North China.¹²⁷ Other communist reports during 1930-31 continued to point out that the "revolutionary" ideology of Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Kung-po had a strong appeal to workers.¹²⁸ These reports all entreated the communists to unmask the anti-revolutionary nature of the KMT Left to the workers. The working class along the coastal regions of North China (especially the Peiping-Tientsin region) probably constituted a social base for the Leftist movement during 1928-29.

In other parts of China the Left also attempted to appeal to the workers. In Nanking, it worked out a "programme on workers' movement" and tried to infiltrate into the Nanking General Labour Union.¹²⁹ In Shanghai, it set up a "Committee on workers' movement," published a tabloid *Ko-ming kung-jen* (Revolutionary workers) and organized several strikes in cotton mills and docks during 1928-31.¹³⁰ Communist leader, Wang Ming, in November 1929 even warned that the KMT Left might use the workers, the army and the police in Shanghai to stage an anti-Chiang uprising.¹³¹ In areas where the local government was sympathetic to the Left, it also gained some footholds in trade unions. The Left was reported to have had some influence in the Nanchang Association of Labour Unions in Kiangsi and the Chengtu General Labour Union in Szechwan.¹³² In Shansi, where the Left had overt support from Yen Hsi-shan, both the Shansi General Labour Union and the Taiyuan Labour Association came under

its control.¹³³ However, in these regions the support of workers for the Left was far less stable than in North China. In the politically hostile environment such as in Nanking and Shanghai, the Left could not make much inroads into trade unions, most of which had been reorganized by Nanking and under its close scrutiny.¹³⁴ And in Kiangsi, Szechwan and Shansi, although the Left did control some of the trade unions, nonetheless, it was no more than a few scattered unions and available evidence does not show they were involved in the Leftist movement. On the whole, the evidence of working class support for the Left in other parts of China is flimsy.

The peasantry was the largest social class in China and naturally it was regarded by the KMT as the main revolutionary force in the National Revolution. Its indispensable role in the Revolution was never doubted. The Left's policy on the peasantry was officially defined by the First National Congress of the RCA in early 1929. It came to differ with the Nanking leadership on two fundamental aspects. First, unlike the Nanking leadership, the Left did not treat the peasantry as a homogeneous class, but divided it into five categories: (i) landowners, (ii) owner-farmers, (iii) part owner-farmers, (iv) tenant farmers and (v) farm labourers. The first category was not counted as "peasantry" by the Left and so did not enjoy any of the rights granted by the KMT to the peasantry.¹³⁵ Secondly, this class differentiation took on a significant political meaning in the Left's land policy which entertained the confiscation of big landowners' land.¹³⁶ This policy was unthinkable to the Nanking leadership which at this time had suspended the rent reduction policy in Kiangsu and Chekiang for fear of disturbing the social fabric in the rural areas. Only the communists were more radical than the Left in their land policy -- the CCP adopted a policy of confiscating all landowners' land. No doubt the confiscation of big landowners' land was a means intended by the Left of outbidding the Nanking leadership and competing with the CCP in winning the peasantry over.

In the rural areas the Left made itself felt only in three provinces: Kiangsu, Kiangsi and East Hupei. In Kiangsu, it was reported that the Left was very active in five rural districts of Liyang, Wuhsi, Wuchin, Tanyang and Yihsing and had allied with local army, police, government officials, bandits and even communists.¹³⁷ They successfully staged uprisings in Liyang and other neighbouring districts against the Nanking leadership in late 1929. In Hupei, the communists reported that there were "organized activities" by the RCA in their Soviet regions.¹³⁸ The CCP Special Commission of East Hupei and the Tungshan and Yanghsin District Soviets issued circulars warning against the RCA which was said to have been very active in various districts and even to have threatened the communists' work among the peasantry.¹³⁹ In South and West Kiangsi, they also reported that the Left had gained strong footholds in

rural districts and established connections with local militia. Many peasants were said to have harboured illusions about Wang Ching-wei and the RCA.¹⁴⁰ The Kiangsi Soviet had to issue a propaganda outline listing the RCA as one of its main enemies.¹⁴¹ In general, the CCP alleged that the "rich peasantry" provided the breeding ground for the Leftist activities in the rural areas.¹⁴²

These fragmentary accounts tend to confirm that the Left did not have any substantial support of the peasantry: its activities were confined to a few rural districts only. Even in the rural areas where the Left was reported to have had an appeal to the peasantry, no active involvement of the peasants in the Leftist political and economic struggles is observable. It is well demonstrated in the Leftist-inspired rural uprisings in Kiangsu in which only KMT members, government officials, local police and army units, but not the peasants, participated.¹⁴³ Moreover, the Leftist programme on the peasants failed in practice to activate them. It is true that its programme of confiscating big landowners' land and other "reformist" measures had more appeal to the peasants than that of the Nanking leadership which entertained no radical reform in the rural areas. However, in practice the Left could not make use of this advantage to activate the peasantry. Unlike the CCP in Kiangsi and elsewhere, the Left did not have any territory under its jurisdiction, nor did it show resolute will or have enough cadres at grass-roots level to implement its programme for the peasantry. And, in view of its complete lack of peasant support in vast parts of China, the Left cannot be said to have captured the peasantry as a social base in the opposition against Nanking.

The petite bourgeoisie was singled out by the KMT Left as an indispensable constituent in the worker-peasant-petit bourgeois revolutionary alliance. Yet, no exact and clear-cut definition was given to the term "petite bourgeoisie." The Left seems to have used the term as flexibly as possible to include various social strata and groups such as small merchants, handicraft factory owners, intellectuals and students.¹⁴⁴ The official stand of the Left towards this social group was defined by the two resolutions on the merchant movement and youth movement adopted by the RCA in early 1929.¹⁴⁵ In substance they were based on the programmes adopted by the Nanking leadership in July 1928.¹⁴⁶ In the battle to win the petite bourgeoisie, only the Nanking leadership was a chief rival to the Left. The communists at that time did not include the petite bourgeoisie as an ally in their revolutionary scheme. The success of the Left in gaining support from the petite bourgeoisie varied with different sections of this social group. It received zealous support from students and intellectuals but came off badly among small merchants and handicraft factory owners.

Evidence of the Left's actual practice in securing the support of small merchants and handicraft factory owners can hardly be found. Only in Nanking was there a report

that the Left attempted to infiltrate merchant associations,¹⁴⁷ and some merchants, like the President of the Yangchow Merchant Association and some well-off figures in Nantung, Fenghsien and Chenk'ou of Kiangsu province, did contribute funds to the Leftist cause.¹⁴⁸ Apart from these few examples, available evidence shows no other relations between the Left on one hand and small merchants and handicraft factory owners on the other. The failure to raise support from these classes is understandable. The Leftist programme for advancing the interests of merchants was in no way substantially different from Nanking's programme and had no more appeal to them. Moreover, merchants and factory owners were more disposed to maintaining the status quo rather than participating in a Leftist opposition movement which would disrupt their economic activities. All these factors explain why the Leftist cause evoked no response from them. In contrast, the Left achieved spectacular results with other sections of the petite bourgeoisie, specifically intellectuals and students. Reminiscences of cadres of the RCA all confirm that the Left received enthusiastic support from intellectuals, students and youth who held the view that "revolutionary ideals" had been betrayed by the Nanking leadership.¹⁴⁹ The ideology of the Left which attempted to save the revolutionary heritage of the 1924 Reorganization readily captured their support. Thus, when Ch'en Kung-po came forward to advocate the revival of revolutionary ideals in mid-1928, within three months he received more than 3,250 letters agreeing with his views.¹⁵⁰ Intellectuals undoubtedly formed the backbone of support. They constituted the majority of the membership of the RCA and certainly were the main force in the extensive Leftist propaganda network.¹⁵¹ The Leftist influence on students and youth was also remarkable. Its appeal to youth in general was so strong that in his inspection trip to North China during June-July 1929, Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to address this question. In speeches given in Peiping, Chiang exhorted the young people "to turn away from the Reorganization Comrades clique, support the Central Government and concentrate on their studies."¹⁵² The Party Central in Nanking, on January 1 1930, also issued a proclamation to the youth entreating them not to be misled by the Left.¹⁵³ Nanking's concern was well-founded. At that time, the Left had already built up strong footholds at schools in the large cities like Shanghai, Peiping and even in the capital, Nanking.

Nanking's Central University, Central Political Academy and Central Military Academy, all of which were training grounds for KMT and military cadres, for a time virtually became centres for Leftist activities. The Left recruited about 180 student activists from these institutions, amounting to 40% of the RCA's membership in Nanking. A "Working Programme for the Student Movement in Nanking" was drawn up by the Left, which envisaged further steps to infiltrate secondary schools, enlist

student support and promote the student movement. Some secondary school teachers were identified by Nanking's agents as cadres of the RCA.¹⁵⁴ The same strong influence was observable in Peiping where the student movement had a history dating back to the May Fourth Movement.¹⁵⁵ It was said that the Left was fairly active in various universities; a few Leftist journals such as *Ko-ming ch'ien-lu*, *Ch'ing-nien ch'u-lu* and *Hai-teng*, were published by university students and youth.¹⁵⁶ In one case, the student union of the Hopei No. 17 Provincial Secondary School (situated in Peiping), was so swayed by Leftist ideas that it published a journal "*Hui-mieh* (Destruction)" to propagate Leftist views.¹⁵⁷ More notable was the Leftist influence on Shanghai students. A RCA's cadre of Shanghai recalled in his later years that from mid-1928 to late 1931, the Left was in complete control of student unions in Shanghai; its student movement was directed by Ch'en Kung-po. The RCA set up many of its sub-branches in various universities and a majority of student representatives were its cadres. The all important Shanghai Student Association thus came under the Leftist domination and through it the Left was able to extend its power to the All-China Student Association.¹⁵⁸ The zenith of the Left's influence in Shanghai was marked by the establishment of the *Ta-lu* (Continent) University by Ch'en Kung-po in late 1928. It successfully recruited twenty-six teachers who had university education and as many as seventeen of them had received their education abroad.¹⁵⁹ The student population at the university was about two hundred and their quality was ranked high. Many "revolutionary youth" were said to have fallen over one another to enrol at the university which was acclaimed as a "revolutionary university" and a "Second Whampoa."¹⁶⁰ The University became the breeding ground for Leftist cadres¹⁶¹ and it soon was a target of sabotage by the Nanking leadership, the CCP and even the police in the Shanghai Settlement.¹⁶² Eventually, in May 1929, on the pretext that the University was a part of the communist machinery, the police in the Settlement forced it to close down.¹⁶³

In other parts of China, the Left's influence over the students in Shansi was the most conspicuous. Headmasters of a number of schools were cadres of the RCA and the Association of Shansi Student Unions was under the leadership of the Left. Its activities pervaded down to lower levels; it enlisted members from educational institutes at district level and set up a library system in universities and secondary schools to disseminate Leftist ideology.¹⁶⁴ Besides Shansi, fragmentary accounts of Leftist infiltration into schools in Anhwei, Hunan, Hupei, Kiangsi and Shantung are found. Several high-ranking officials in the government education machinery in Anhwei, Kiangsi, Shantung and Hankow were known to have affiliated to the RCA. At least four secondary and technical schools in Changsha, Hunan, were identified by Nanking's agents as Leftist footholds.¹⁶⁵ Undoubtedly, a significant section of students, youth and intellectuals formed a social base on which the Leftist opposition thrived.

From 1928 to about mid-1929, the working class along the coastal regions of North China (mainly the Peiping-Tientsin region), students, youth and intellectuals in various places were the principal social groups which gave active support to the Left; they formed the social base for the Leftist opposition movement. The social constituency for the Leftist movement was thus far more limited than the communists had suggested: all "the liberal bourgeoisie," "the middle national bourgeoisie, the commercial capitalists of local origins," and "the small landlords" hardly participated in the Leftist opposition and exhibited any support for the Leftist cause. Nor was this social constituency as diverse as the Left had intended to be: the handicraft factory owners, small merchants, the peasantry from small landlords to farm labourers and a great majority of the working class in various regions were largely indifferent to the Leftist cause. The failure to secure the support of the peasantry, which was the largest social class in China at that time, and an extensive segment of other social strata, demonstrates how marginal the social constituency for the Leftist opposition movement was. Indeed, the Nanking leadership was not far from the truth when it recognized that the social base for the Leftist opposition was limited to youth and students.

After mid 1929, even the limited social constituency the Left had built began to melt away. Subsequent events showed that the support of the working class in North China was shaky and transient. The Left's hold on the working class there owed its existence chiefly to its control over KMT branches after the Northern Expedition. Trade unions in these regions were organized by party branches and hence bore an indelible mark of Leftist influence. From late 1928 until 1930, as already noted, the power base of the Left in the party was gradually undermined by the Nanking leadership. The first phase of Nanking's attacks on the Left in North China lasted from 1928 to early 1929 when the party branches in Tientsin and Peiping were reorganized and trade unions suspended.¹⁶⁶ A further reorganization of branches was carried out in July-September 1929.¹⁶⁷ With these two phases of reorganization of branches in the north, the Leftist influence over trade unions seems to have declined precipitately. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the Left always relied on formal party channels to win over workers and no evidence has ever indicated that it set up its own secret trade unions. Given the poor organizing skills and low survival rate of trade unions in China in the 1920s,¹⁶⁸ it is no wonder the Left failed to use trade unions to stand up against the onslaughts from the Nanking authorities which were backed by military force.

More than anything, however, it was the Left's policy of allying with regional militarists against Nanking that eroded the social support it had received. For the most part, students, youth and intellectuals were alienated by this policy -- it was noted that

when the Leftist leadership decided to ally with the Kwangsi Clique in 1929, all the "revolutionary youth" in South China were opposed to it.¹⁶⁹ The ideology of the Left which professed to salvage the revolutionary heritage of 1924-27 was the main reason why this group of people gave their zealous support to the Left. The policy of allying with regional militarists against Nanking meant that practical political calculations would take precedence over ideology. This brought about widespread disenchantment among students, youth and intellectuals in particular, and weakened the Leftist appeal to the masses in general.¹⁷⁰ By late 1929, Ch'en Kung-po observed bitterly in his memoirs, the masses, particularly the peasantry, the working class and the petite bourgeoisie all had held aloof from the Leftist opposition movement.¹⁷¹ This was all the more an inevitable development as the disillusionment in fact grew from the Leftist ranks itself. As already noted, a large number of cadres of the RCA were opposed to Wang Ching-wei's policy of allying with regional militarists. This growing discontent made branches of the RCA, except those in North China, lapse into an inactive state.¹⁷² As the Leftist ranks were disillusioned, so did the masses in general. Consequently, when the Enlarged Conference was summoned in July 1930, the working class in the Peiping-Tientsin region no longer expressed support for the Leftist cause and students, youth and intellectuals likewise became more detached from the Left. The dissolution of the Enlarged Conference not only marked a complete collapse of Leftist organized force in the KMT but also witnessed the end of social support for the Leftist cause.

Thus, by early 1931 the Left was almost a spent force -- its only organization was dissolved, its adherents in the KMT were in a state of disarray and its social base had vanished. A new lease of life appeared in 1931 when Kwangtung militarist Ch'en Chi-t'ang led an opposition against Nanking and the Left decided to throw in its lot with him. A Party Executive Office was set up by the Left to coordinate activities in North China.¹⁷³ However, at this time the strength of the Left was merely a shadow of its former self; it never had any appeal to the masses and its strength in the party could not rival the Nanking leadership. In the end, the Left made a political turnaround by dissolving the opposition movement and coming to terms with Chiang Kai-shek in January 1932. The next chapter will show why and how the "Wang-Chiang cooperation," a political alliance much talked about in late 1927, was at long last achieved.

Notes

1. In an article published in 1962, Jerome Ch'en, an eminent historian, suggested that the Left wing of the KMT had ceased to be an effective political force after 1928. See Jerome Ch'en, "The Left Wing Kuomintang -- a Definition," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 25:576 (1962).
2. Chiang Kai-shek's speech was reproduced in *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 56:4 (July 1 1929).
3. See, for example, "Tui-yü pei-fang tang-wu ti kuan-ch'a," in *Tzu-fan lu*, vol. 2, pp.1583-1595; "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 6.25:4-7 (June 30 1929), 6.26:4-6 (July 7 1929), 6.27:4-7 (July 14 1929).
4. See Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, pp.382, 460.
5. Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p.235; Huang Chi-lu, *Hua shih-tai ti Min-kuo shih-san-nien -- ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui ti hui-i*, pp.3-4; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-ts'u p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," pp.145-146.
6. Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p.235; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p.339; Hu Han-min, "Wang Ching-wei ti p'ing-chia," in *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng yen-chiang chi*, vol. 14, pp.180-181.
7. In the years 1924 to 1927, Wang Ching-wei had withdrawn from the political arena twice. The first time was after the March Twentieth Incident in March 1926 and the second was after the communist insurrection in Canton in December 1927. In private Ch'en Kung-po disliked such an attitude of Wang. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.178-179. After Wang became President of the Executive Yuan, he again made a characteristic stepping down from politics in October 1932 and went to France. His stepping down, Wang said, was a gesture in protest against Chang Hsüeh-liang's "non-resistance policy" towards Japanese occupation of Manchuria. See *ibid.*, pp.290-291.
8. In a speech given to a party meeting in Nanking on February 4 1929, Chiang Kai-shek stated that in his opinion Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min were the two most senior members of the KMT. See Chiang Kai-shek, "Pen-tang tsui-chin chih chung-yao wen-t'i," *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 36:16 (February 11 1929).

9. For a brief description of Wang Ching-wei's political career at this time, see T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, chapters 7-9.

10. It was said that Ch'en Kung-po had made this remark during the time of the Enlarged Conference when he tried to mollify a group of Leftists who were dissatisfied with Wang Ching-wei's decision to ally with Yen Hsi-shan. See Kao Hsin-min, "Wang hsien-sheng chi-ch'i kai-ts'u p'ai," *She-hui hsin-wen*, 1.6:123 (October 19 1932).

11. Kan Nai-kuang and En K'o Pu Tu were not counted among the Leftist leaders. Kan Nai-kuang, who was closely associated with the Left during 1924-27, went abroad after the communist insurrection in Canton in December 1927 and after that he dissociated from the Left. See Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-ts'u p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.279; *She-hui hsin-wen*, 2.14:184 (February 10 1933). En K'o Pu Tu, although he had signed the Manifesto of March 11 1929 denouncing Chiang Kai-shek's rule, in the end decided to side with Nanking and attended the Third National Party Congress. See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien* 1929, p.47.

12. Lin Po-sheng et al., "Wang hsien-sheng sheng-p'ing fen-tou shih," handwritten copy, p.30a.

13. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.20-22; Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo yü kung-ch'an tang," in *Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fo-hai hui-i lu ho-pien*, pp.54-62.

14. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.160, 209-210.

15. Ta-tzu-sheng, "Ku Meng-yü wai-chuan," *She-hui hsin-wen*, 2.8:103-104 (January 22 1933).

16. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.188; Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-ts'u p'ai ti shih-shih," part I, p.278.

17. See, for example, Ch'en Kung-po, "Hsiao-ts'u-chih wen-t'i," *KMPL*; 6:1-2 (June 11 1928); I Ai, "Hsiao ts'u-chih ying-tang chüeh-wu liao," *CC*, 1.6:1-6 (August 16 1928).

18. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-ts'u p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.278.

19. Pai Yü, "Ch'u shen shih-chia erh ai-hsi yü-mao ti Ku hsien-sheng," *CCWH*, 29.1:16-17 (July 1 1976).

20. *Hu-chiang jih-pao*, July 13 1929, p.2.

21. Ho Ping-hsien, a Leftist KMT member, recalled that Ku Meng-yü was in poor health at that time. Interview with Ho Ping-hsien, Hong Kong, August 15 1983. See also *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.189, 259.

22. See T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, pp.340-341. Li Chün-lung, an important RCA's cadre in North China, also remarked that Ch'en Kung-po was the no. 2 leader of the Left. See Li Chün-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.103.

23. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.259-262.
24. For a discussion of Ch'en Kung-po's discontent with Wang Ching-wei's compromising attitude in the Enlarged Conference, see Chapter 4.
25. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.232, 262; Li Chun-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.104.
26. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.251. When the press reported that a breach had occurred between Wang and Ch'en, Ch'en immediately wrote a letter to Wang explaining that he could not compare with Wang in the party. The episode illustrated that by late 1930 the relationship between the two men had become strained. See *ibid.*, pp.262-263.
27. *Ibid.*, pp.251-252, 263.
28. For a definition of patron-client relationship in Chinese politics, see Andrew Nathan, *Peking Politics 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism*, pp.29-32.
29. Ch'en once told Wang that Wang was the only friend he had in the KMT after the death of Liao Chung-k'ai. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.262. In 1939 when Wang Ching-wei was prepared to risk his political life by opening negotiation with Japan, Ch'en decided to throw in his lot with Wang. He made a remark at this time that his devotion to Wang was so strong that he was ready to support Wang in whatever political course Wang would pursue. See T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Ch'ao-liu yü tien-ti*, p.169.
30. See footnote 10.
31. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.211. Ch'en did not specify who were Wang's intimate associates. It seems that they must be the people who always accompanied Wang in person and were his confidants. Wang's wife, Ch'en Pi-chün; his personal secretary Tseng Chung-ming; close friends like Lin Po-sheng and some of his relatives were the likely intimate associates whom Ch'en referred to. For Ch'en Kung-po's opinion about Wang's wife, see T'ao Hsi-sheng, *Ch'ao-liu yü tien-ti*, p.169; for Wang's relations with Tseng Chung-ming, see Wang Ching-wei, *Tseng Chung-ming hsien-sheng hsing-chuang*, pp.1-8; for the close relationship between Wang Ching-wei and Lin Po-sheng, see T'ao Chü-yin, *Ku-tao chien-wen*, p.218; for Wang's relatives, see Chin Hsiung-pai, *Wang cheng-ch'üan ti k'ai-ch'ang yü shou-ch'ang*, p.54.
32. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsü p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.279; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsü p'ai," p.215.
33. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.189.
34. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsü p'ai hui-i lu," p.169; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsü p'ai," p.223; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-tsü p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," pp.144-149.

35. "TPK," chapter 2, appendix, chapter 5, section 2; *Hu-chiang jih-pao*, July 3 1929, p.2; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsui p'ai," pp.217-218.

36. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.186-187; Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsui p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.281.

37. *Ibid.*, p.279.

38. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.188; Ch'en Kung-po, "Hsiao tsu-chih wen-t'i," *KMPL*, 6:1 (June 11 1928).

39. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.188; Pai Yü, "Tao T'ung kuan-hsien fan-lun pei-fa shih-ch'i fan-kung ch'ing-nien t'uan-t'i," *CCWH*, 40.5:87-93 (May 1 1982); Liu Pu-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ti mo-ying -- 'CC' t'uan," pp.231-232.

40. Different members of the RCA had different accounts about the time the Association was founded. Ch'en Kung-po once stated that the RCA was established in the winter of 1928. See Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsui p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.276. Yet, in his memoirs perhaps because of a slip of the pen, he said that it was established in late 1927, which is unlikely. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.188. Fan Yü-sui, a leading cadre of the RCA, told us that it was set up after the Chinan Incident of May 1928. See Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsui p'ai," p.216. Still another Leftist, Lo Fang-chung, recalled that the Association was formed before mid-1928; whereas Ho Han-wen, another leading cadre of the RCA, said that it was established in about March or April 1928. See Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-tsui p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.80; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsui p'ai hui-i lu," p.166. Chang T'ung-hsin, a historian of mainland China, based on his interview with Li P'ing-heng, a member of the RCA, concluded that the Association was probably established in May 1928. See Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.242-243. The date for the founding of the RCA in this thesis is based on a document of the Association itself which gives May 1928 as the date of its establishment. See "Tsung-pu chi ko-ti hui-wu pao-kao chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 10. The date corresponds with the accounts offered by Fan Yü-sui and Li P'ing-heng.

41. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsui p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, pp.280-281.

42. Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, pp.139-151.

43. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsui p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.281.

44. For one such typical speech of Chiang Kai-shek, see *Chung-yang chou-pou*, 56:4 (July 1 1929). See also Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, p.460.

45. "Lu-hui hsu-chih," in "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.4b.

46. "TPK," chapter 3, section 1.2; *Hu-tang*, 1:6-9 (May 15 1929).
47. Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts' p'ai," p.216. Wang-Lo-p'ing's treatise was published in 1927 in Shanghai.
48. See "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang kai-ts' t'ung-chih hui tsung-chang," in "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.2.
49. See "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang kai-ts' t'ung-chih hui ti kang-ling," in "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.1. One more plank was later added to the outline. It reads as follows "To sweep away the senile, the incompetent, the degenerate and the new warlord from our party." See "Lu-hui hsu-chih," in "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.4b.
50. See "Lu-hui hsu-chih," in "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.4b; "Hsün-lien ta-kang," chapter 1, section 3.3.
51. Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts' p'ai," p.215; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-ts' p'ai hui-i lu," p.169.
52. *Ibid.*, p.172.
53. *Ibid.*, p.173; "TPK," chapter 5, section 12.
54. "Tsung-pu chi ko-ti hui-wu pao-kao chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 10.
55. "TPK," chapter 2, section 10.
56. "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.2; "So te-chüan cheng-shou tiao-li," in "TPK," chapter 1, section 3.4.
57. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.180.
58. *Ibid.*, pp.163, 185, 262.
59. *Ibid.*, p.248; Yi Jen, Pai T'ien, "Ts'ung Chung-yang wan-pao shuo-tao Shang-hai min-pao," in *Tang-tai shih-sheng*, ed. Shang-hai chou-pao she, p.223; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-ts' p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," p.148.
60. Shang-hai she-hui k'o-hsüeh yuan ching-chi yen-chiu so, ed., *Nan-yang hsiung-ti yen-ts'ao kung-ssu shih-liao*, pp.458-459.
61. "TPK," chapter 5, sections 3-4.
62. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.262. For the unconfirmed report that ¥500,000 was given by the KMT Left to Feng Yü-hsiang, see YSHA, Ch'u-li hsi-pei chün-shih Feng-shih tsai-pien an, Chao Tai-wen to Yen Hsi-shan, October 11 1929.
63. In his memoirs, Ch'en Kung-po remarked that at that time, the Left had

already done its utmost in securing loans and donations from various sources. When military allies demanded more financial support, Ch'en saw no way to meet the demand. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.262.

64. "TPK," chapter 5, section 2.4. Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, as already quoted, listed 40 journals circulated during 1928-30 which were published by the KMT Left or those supporters sympathetic to its cause. See Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, pp.152-157.

65. The periodicals listed in the discussion are based upon the information provided by "TPK" and Ssu-ma Hsien-tao. A more detailed list of the periodicals published in various parts of China and overseas can be found in these two sources. See Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, pp.152-157; "TPK," chapter 5, section 2.4.

66. See "TPK," chapter 5, sections 2.4, 4, 5, 6, 15, chapter 6, section 2.3; I Jen, Pai T'ien, "Ts'ung Chung-yang wan-pao shou-tao Shang-hai min-pao," in *Tang-tai shih-sheng*, ed. Shang-hai shou-pao she, pp.218, 223; Shan-hsi sheng cheng-hsieh wen-shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yuan-hui, *Yen Hsi-shan t'ung-chih Shan-hsi shih-shih*, p.154; "Chiang-hsi sheng-wei kung-tso pao-kao," in *Chung-yang ko-ming ken-chü ti shih-liao hsüan-pien*, ed. Chiang-hsi sheng tang-an kuan, vol. 1, pp.103-105. A copy of the *Min-ch'i jih-pao* is deposited at the KMT History Archives, 7774/8060.80.

67. I Jen, Pai T'ien, "Ts'ung Chung-yang wan-pao shou-tao Shang-hai min-pao," in *Tang-tai shih-sheng*, ed. Shang-hai chou-pao she, pp.217-226; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-ts'u p'ai hui-i lu," p.169. In his memoirs, Ch'en Kung-po mentioned that there were two important dailies published by the KMT Left. He did not name the dailies but said that one was under the editorship of Ch'en Fu-mu and the other was under P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei and Mei Shu-tseng. The one under Ch'en Fu-mu cannot be identified while the one under P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei was the *Chung-yang wan-pao*. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.215; Ho Han wen, "Kai-ts'u p'ai hui-i lu," p.169.

68. "Tsung-pu chi ko-ti hui-wu pao-kao chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 10.

69. "TPK," chapter 5, passim; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-ts'u p'ai hui-i lu," pp.171-172; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts'u p'ai," pp.217-219; Lo Fan-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-ts'u p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.82; Wo Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-ts'u p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," p.142; "Chi shih," *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 14:4 (September 1929), 20:91-93 (April 1930), 27:44 (October 1930). The RCA set up its branches in the following 19 provinces: in Manchuria, Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang; in North China, Suiyuan, Chahar, Jehol, Hopei, Honan, Shantung, Shansi; in Central, South and

South-west China, Hunan, Hupei, Szechwan, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Kwangsi. The five major cities which had RCA's organizational network were Harbin, Tientsin, Peiping, Nanking and Shanghai. According to official information, the Nanking Party Central by October 1929 had established its branches in 22 provinces and 8 major cities. See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien*, 1929, pp.14-15.

70. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsū p'ai hui-i lu," p.172. There were reports that the RCA was also active in Honolulu and in South Africa, see *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-san-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan hui ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.251-252.

71. *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien* 1929, pp.16-17.

72. The total numbers of registered party members in Nanking and Shanghai are based upon the official party census of October 1929. See Tyau Min-ch'ien, ed., *Two Years of Nationalist China*, Table facing p.25. For the RCA's membership in these two cities, see Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-tsū p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.82; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsū p'ai hui-i lu," p.170. Another interesting case of comparison is in Shansi where membership figures are available. According to the party census, there were 8047 registered party members in Shansi, and the RCA claimed to have 150 "leading cadres" there. See Wu Ling-chu, "Kuo-min-tang kai-tsū p'ai tsai Shan-hsi ti huo-tung," p.189.

73. "Tsung-pu chi ko-ti hui-wu pao-kao chüeh-i-an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 10; Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min ko-ming ti ch'ien-lu*, pp.40-44.

74. Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsū p'ai," p.216.

75. *Ibid.*, p.216; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsū p'ai hui-i lu," p.172.

76. "TPK," chapter 5, sections 9, 12, 15-16; Ch'en Hsiang-lü, "Kai-tsū p'ai kuo-ch'ü tsai Pei-p'ing," *She-hui hsin-wen*, 2.13:167-168 (February 7 1933); "Kai-tsū t'ung-chih hui," in "Tang-p'ai ch'ing-pao ho-pien," Bureau of Investigation, 270/815.

77. "TPK," chapter 5, sections 1-3, 7, 11, 13, 15-16; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsū p'ai hui-i lu," pp.170-171; Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-tsū p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," pp.81-82; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsū p'ai," pp.216-217.

78. Hsiao Cheng, *Tu-ti kai-ko wu-shih nien*, pp.26-27; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsū p'ai," pp.213-214; Liu Pu-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ti mo-ying -- 'CC' t'uan," pp.231-232; Pai Yü, "Tao T'ung kuan-hsien fan-lun pei-fa shih-ch'i fan-kung ch'ing-nien t'uan-t'i," *CCWH*, 14.5:90-91 (May 1 1982); "TPK," chapter 3.

79. "Ko-sheng-shih hai-wai tsung-chih-pu lien-ho pan-shih-chu ti tsu-chih," in "TPK," chapter 3, section 2. The "United Office" claimed to have commanded

allegiance from the municipal and provincial party organizations in Fukien, Honan, Heilungkiang, Jehol, Kansu, Kirin, Liaoning, Shantung, Shensi, Suiyuan, Szechwan, Yunan, Harbin, Nanking and Peking.

80. Ch'en Kung-po made a remark in his reminiscences that were it not for Nanking's high-handed way of picking Third Congress representatives, the RCA would not have had such an important political role at that time. See Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-ts'u p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.279.

81. "Tsung-pu chi ko-ti hui-wu pao-kao chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 10.

82. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.46:1-3 (November 25 1928); Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, p.226.

83. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.46:1-3 (November 25 1928).

84. For Chiang Kai-shek's and Hu Han-min's speeches to party members, see *ibid.*, 5.44:1 (November 11 1928); 5.46:1-3 (November 25 1928); 6.7:3-4 (February 10 1929).

85. The municipal and provincial Party Affairs Directorates which were reorganized in late 1928 were in Chengchow, Peiping, Honan and Hopei. See *ibid.*, 5.40:3 (October 14 1928), 6.1:2-3 (December 30 1928).

86. The KMT Left claimed that important regional party branches reorganized by the Nanking leadership in 1929 included those in Tientsin, Peiping, Nanking, Hankow, Harbin, Honan, Shantung, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Jehol, Hunan, Hupei, Szechwan, Suiyuan, Shensi, Liaoning, Yunan, Kwangsi, France, Honolulu, and Manila. See Hsiao Ming, "I-nien lai ti hui-tang yü hu-tang," *Min-chu*, 18:90-96 (February 1930).

87. The figures are based on the information provided by the Chinese Kuomintang Yearbook 1929, which lists party members who were disciplined by the Party Central in 1929. Those who were charged with "opposition against the Party Central," "instigating rebellion," "violating party discipline," or "participating in reactionary activities" are counted in this study as being involved in the Leftist opposition movement. See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien*, 1929, pp.1194-1214.

88. *Ibid.*, p.1188.

89. The figure is based on the information provided by the KMT's party affairs journal of 1930. See the issues of *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an* for the year of 1930.

90. Liu Pu-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ti mo-ying -- 'CC' t'uan," pp.231-232; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, p.224.

91. Liu Pu-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ti mo-ying -- 'CC' t'uan," pp.231-232, 235-237; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts' p'ai," pp.213-214; Pai Yü, "T'ao T'ung kuan-hsien fan-lun pei-fa shih-ch'i fan-kung ch'ing-nien t'uan-t'i," pp.90-91; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.223-227. See also Pai Chih, "Ts'ung ch'ing-nien fu-sheng ti t'ing-k'an shou-tao hsiao tsu-chih ti pa-hsi," *Chüeh-tou*, 1.11-12 (January 1 1929).
92. Chiang Kai-shek had exerted pressure on the Yen Hsi-shan government to take action against the KMT Left in North China and Yen did arrest some Leftists in order to appease Chiang. However, Yen also instructed his commanders there to adopt a permissive attitude towards the Leftist activities. See YHSA, Pei-fa fu chin-ch'a-sui tang-cheng an, Li Fu-ying to Yen Hsi-shan, August 30 1929; Yen Hsi-shan to Li Fu-ying, September 2 1929; Chang Yin-wu to Yen Hsi-shan, August 30 1929; Yen Hsi-shan to Chang Yin-wu, September 2 1929; Chang Yin-wu to Yen Hsi-shan, September 4 1929.
93. *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien* 1929, pp.16-17. The Peiping and Tientsin party branches constituted respectively 0.66% and 0.29% of the total party membership.
94. Chiang Kai-shek, "Tui-yü pei-fang tang-wu ti kuan-ch'a," in *Tzu-fan lu*, vol. 2, pp.1584-1586. See also Ch'en Kuo-fu, "Shih-ch'a pei-fang chih ching-kuo," *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 59:30 (July 22 1929).
95. "Tang-wu pao-kao," *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 57:1 (July 8 1929), 58:1 (July 15 1929).
96. *Ibid.*, 60:1-2 (July 29 1929).
97. *Ibid.*, 63:4 (August 19 1929), 64:2-3 (August 26 1929), 66:3-4 (Sepgember 9 1929), 67:2 (September 16 1929). See also *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-san-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.229-230, 238.
98. Hsiao Ming, "I-nien lai ti hui-tang yü hu-tang," *Min-chu*, 18:98 (February 1930).
99. "TPK," chapter 6, section 2.2 and section 2.3.
100. Ch'en T'ien-fang, "Shih-ch'a Ho-nan tang-wu chih ching-kuo," *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 33:882-888 (April 1931); Liu Chi-wen, "Shan-tung sheng chih tang-wu," *ibid.*, 33:880-882 (April 1931); Miao Pei-ch'eng, "Yen Feng p'an-pien hou chih pei-fang ch'ing-hsing," *ibid.*, 23:171-172 (June 1930); Ma Ch'ao-chün, "Hua-pei shih-ch'a shu-yao," *ibid.*, 27:143-147 (October 1930); Miao Pei-ch'eng, *Wang-shih chi-yao*, pp.42-44; *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-san-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i chi-lu*, pp.229-230, 238-241.

101. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsü p'ai hui-i lu," pp.169, 176-177; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsü p'ai," p.223; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-tsü p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," pp.144-145.

102. Leading RCA cadres such as Ho Han-wen, Chao Wei-mo, Lo-Fang-chung (all of them in charge of the Nanking branch), Fan Yü-sui (a cadre at the Shanghai Headquarters), Wu Ho-hsien (in charge of the Shansi branch) and Li Chün-lung (a well-known Leftist in North China) all testify that many rank and file Leftists were disillusioned when Wang Ching-wei concluded an alliance with Yen Hsi-shan. See Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsü p'ai hui-i lu," pp.182-183; Chao Wei-mo, "Wo yü Ku Meng-yü hsien-sheng ti ssu-tz'u t'an-hui," *CCWH*, 29.1:19 (July 1 1976), Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-tsü p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.85; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsü p'ai," p.223; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-tsü p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," pp.145-146; Li Chün-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.94. As already noted, when the Enlarged Conference was summoned in July 1930, the disillusionment of the Leftist rank and file was so intense that Ch'en Kung-po had to hold a talk with them to mollify their feelings. See Kao Hsin-min, "Wang hsien-sheng chi ch'i kai-tsü p'ai," *She-hui hsin-wen*, 1.6:123 (October 19 1932).

103. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsü p'ai hui-i lu," p.183; "Kai-tsü t'ung-chih hui," in "Tang-p'ai ch'ing-poao ho-pien," Bureau of Investigation, 270/815.

104. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsü p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.280.

105. See footnote 100.

106. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.251-252; "K'uo-ta hui-i t'a-t'ai hou chih kai-tsü p'ai," in "TPK," chapter 6, section 11.3; Li Chün-lung, "Wang Ching-wei yü k'uo-ta hui-i," p.103; Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-tsü p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.85.

107. "TPK," chapter 2, section 9.

108. "Lun kuo-min-tang kai-tsü p'ai ho Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang ti jen-wu," in *Hung-she wen-hsien*, pp.341-342.

109. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, "Chün-fa hun-chan ho Wang Ching-wei," *Pu-erh-sai-wei-k'o*, 3.2/3:33-34 (March 15 1930). The article was dated October 9 1929.

110. Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo yü kung-ch'an tang," in *Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fo-hai hui-i lu ho-pien*, p.84.

111. Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min ko-ming ti ch'ien-lu*, p.44.

112. "Tsung-pu chi ko-ti hui-wu pao-kao chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 10.

113. In his inspection trip to North China in June-July 1929, on numerous occasions Chiang Kai-shek lamented that the young people and students were strongly attracted to the Leftist cause. See, for example, Chiang Kai-shek, "Chin-jih ch'ing-nien ti ti-wei chi ch'i ch'ien-tu," in *Tzu-fan lu*, vol. 2, pp.1625-1640. Nanking's grave concern about the successful appeal of the Left to the youth prompted its Party Central to issue a proclamation to the youth which stressed that they should not be misled by the Left. See "Kao ch'üan-kuo ch'ing-nien shu," *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 18:1-8 (January 1930).

114. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, "Chün-fa hun-chan ho Wang Ching-wei," *Pu-er-sai-wei-k'o*, 3.2/3:32-33 (March 15 1930); Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, "Lun kuo-min-tang kai-ts'u p'ai," *ibid.*, 3.4/5:41-50 (May 15 1930).

115. The eminent political scientist, Seymour Martin Lipset, suggests that there is a fairly logical relationship between ideology and social base. This basic tenet underlies the analysis given by Lipset on the social base of Fascism. See his "Fascism -- Left, Right and Centre," in Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, pp.127-179. An examination of the social base of the KMT Left tends to validate Lipset's tenet.

116. "Kung-jen yün-tung chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 9.3.

117. For the reorganization of trade unions in Shanghai, see Ma Ch'ao-chün, *Chung-kuo lao-kung yün-tung shih*, vol. 3, pp.807-814.

118. Hsiang Ying, "Kuo-ch'ü i-nien lai chih-kung yün-tung fa-chan ti hsing-shih ho mu-ch'ien ti tsung jen-wu," in *Chung-kung kung-jen yün-tung yuan-shih tzu-liao hui-pien*, ed. Fa-wu pu tiao-ch'a chü, vol. 3, pp.31, 43, 48-50. See also *ibid.*, pp.90-95.

119. "Tang-wu pao-kao," *Chung-yang chou-pou*, 57:1 (July 8 1929).

120. "TPK," chapter 5, section 4; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts'u p'ai," p.219. It should be noted that Nanking's agents tended to dismiss the Left's influence in the working class in Tientsin. See "TPK," chapter 5, section 4.

121. "Tang-wu pao-kao," *Chung-yang chou-pou*, 67:3 (September 16 1929). Liu Pu-t'ung, who was a CC clique member and was assigned to take charge of the training affairs in the Tientsin party branch, recalled that KMT organizations were present in every factory and firm and many trade union officials were KMT members. See Liu Pu-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ti mo-ying -- 'CC' t'uan," p.236.

122. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 6.1:2-3 (December 30 1928).

123. "P'ing chin Ho-pei chung-shih t'ung-chih ch'ing-yuan tai-piao t'uan ch'eng

March 3 1929," Pei-p'ing lin-shih cheng-chih fen-hui, Nanking Second History Archives, 114/227.

124. On August 16 1928, the military government in the Peiping-Tientsin region issued an order to disband all trade unions in these two cities. The order was shortly rescinded after a series of negotiations between trade unions and party-government officials. See Ma Ch'ao-chün, *Chung-kuo lao-kung yüntung shih*, vol. 3, pp.830-832; "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 5.32:3-4 (August 19 1928), 5.33:4-5 (August 26 1928); Ch'en I, "Wu-tz'u ch'üan-hui pi-mu hou ti ti-i-ko kuai hsien-hsiang," *Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng*, 17:19-20 (September 2 1928).

125. "TPK," chapter 5, section 9.6.

126. "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui pi-shu ch'u kung-han, May 28 1930," Ch'i-pan ko-ti kai-tsü p'ai, Nanking Second History Archives -(2)/172. It was reported by Nanking's agents that on one occasion the Left organized tens of thousands of people to stage a demonstration in Chinan. See "TPK," chapter 5, section 9.5.

127. "Lun kuo-min-tang kai-tsü p'ai ho Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang ti jen-wu," in *Hung-she wen-hsien* pp.340-341.

128. Fa-wu pu tiao-ch'a chü, ed. *Chung-kung kung-jen yüntung yuan-shih tzu-liao hui-pien*, vol. 2, pp.13, 26, 46, 70, vol. 3, p.67.

129. "TPK," chapter 5, section 1.4.

130. Chiang Hao, "Kuo-min-tang kai-tsü p'ai tsai Shang-hai ti huo-tung," in *Shang-hai ti-fang shih tzu-liao*, ed. Shang-hai shih wen-shih kuan, vol. 1, pp.201-203.

131. Wang Ming, "Ti-san tz'u pao-tung yü ti-ssu-tz'u pao-tung," in *Wang Ming yen-lun chi*, p.47.

132. "TPK," chapter 5, section 14.1; "Chiang-hsi sheng-wei kung-tso pao-kao," in *Chung-yang ko-ming ken-chü ti shih-liao hsüan-pien*, ed. Chiang-hsi sheng tang-an kuan, vol. 1, pp.103-104.

133. "TPK," chapter 5, section 13.6-7.

134. Hsiang Ying, "Kuo-ch'ü i-nien lai chih-kung yüntung fa-chan ti hsing-shih ho mu-ch'ien ti tsung jen-wu," in *Chung-kung kung-jen yüntung yuan-shih tzu-liao hui-pien*, ed. Fa-wu pu tiao-ch'a chü, vol. 3, pp.30-31, 47-48.

135. "Nung-min yüntung chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 9.

136. "Keng-ti cheng-ts'e chüeh-i an," in "TPK," chapter 2, section 8.

137. "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chih-hsin wei-yuan-hui kung-han December 5 1929," Ch'i-pan ko-ti kai-ts' p'ai, Nanking Second History Archives -(2)/172. See also *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 17:events 71-72 (December 1929).

138. "Hsin ti ko-ming kao-ch'ao yü i-sheng huo chi-sheng ti shou-hsien sheng-li," in *Chung-kung tang-shih chiao-hsüeh ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao*, vol. 1, p.282.

139. "Lun fan kuo-min-tang kai-ts' p'ai," Bureau of Investigation, 255.34/812; "Fan kai-ts' p'ai kung-tso," Bureau of Investigation, 255.34/812; "Fan-tui kai-ts' p'ai kung-tso t'ung-kao," Bureau of Investigation, 255.34/721.

140. Chiang-hsi sheng tang-an kuan, ed., *Chung-yang ko-ming ken-chü ti shih-liao hsüan-pien*, vol. 1, pp.185, 260, 431.

141. "Fan AB t'uán ti-san tang kai-ts' p'ai hsüan-ch'uan ta-kang," Bureau of Investigation, 262/825.

142. Fa-wu pu tiao-ch'a chü, ed., *Chung-kung nung-min yün-tung yuan-shih wen-chien hui-pien*, vol. 3, pp.87-88; "Hsin ti ko-ming kao-ch'ao yü i-sheng huo chi-sheng ti shou-hsien sheng-li," in *Chung kung tang-shih chiao-hsüeh ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao*, vol. 1, p.282.

143. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-ts' p'ai hui-i lu," pp.170-175; Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-ts' p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.82; "TPK," chapter 5, section 3.6.

144. For typical definitions of "petite bourgeoisie" used by the KMT Left, see Ch'en Kung-po, *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang so tai-piao ti shih shen-mo*, pp.110-111; *CC*, 1.9:12-13 (November 1 1928); *Hsien-tai chung-kuo*, 2.1:10 (July 16 1928).

145. "TPK," chapter 2, section 9.4-5.

146. "Min-chung hsün-lien chi-hua ta-kang," *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 2.2-6 (September 1928).

147. "TPK," chapter 5, section 1.3.

148. "TPK," chapter 5, section 3.7.

149. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-ts' p'ai hui-i lu," p.176; Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-ts' p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.81; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-ts' p'ai," p.214; Wu Ho-hsien, "Wo tui kai-ts' p'ai ti i-chih pan-chieh," p.141.

150. Ch'en Kung-po, "Tang-ti kai-ts' fang-fa ho shih-ch'i," *KMPL*, 18:1-4 (September 3 1928).

151. The First National Congress of the RCA noted that its members were largely drawn from intellectuals. See "TPK," chapter 2, section 10.

152. Chiang Kai-shek, "Tui-yü pei-fang tang-wu ti kuan-ch'a," in *Tzu-fan lu*, vol. 2, pp.1583-1594; Chiang Kai-shek, "Chin-jih ch'ing-nien ti ti-wei chi ch'ien-tu," in *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp.1625-1640.
153. *Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, 18:1-8 (January 1930).
154. "TPK," chapter 5, section 1; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsü p'ai hui-i lu," pp.173-176; Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-tsü p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.82.
155. "TPK," chapter 5, section 2; Tachibana Shiraki, *Chūgoku Kamumei Shiron*, p.327.
156. "TPK," chapter 5, section 2.2; Ho Han-wen, "Kai-tsü p'ai hui-i lu," p.170; Ssu-ma Hsien-tao, *Pei-fa hou chih ko-p'ai ssu-ch'ao*, p.153.
157. "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui pi-shu ch'u han kuo-min cheng-fu July 4 1929," Ch'a-chin ko-ti shu-k'an, Nanking Second History Archives, -(2)/219.
158. Chiang Hao, "Kuo-min-tang kai-tsü p'ai tsai Shang-hai ti huo-tung," in *Shang-hai ti-fang-shih tzu-liao*, vol. 1, pp.197-201; "TPK," chapter 5, section 2.
159. "TPK," chapter 5, section 2.3.
160. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.185; Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsü p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.274; Chang Chang, "Shang-hai ta-hsüeh yü ta-lu ta-hsüeh chih hui-i," in *Tang-tai shih-sheng*, pp.184-187.
161. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsü p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.274; K'o Kang, "Kai-tsü p'ai yü ta-lu ta-hsüeh," in *Hsien-tai shih-liao*, vol. 1, p.77.
162. Ch'en Kung-po, "Kai-tsü p'ai ti shih-shih," part 1, p.274; Ch'en Kung-po, "Wo yü kung-ch'an tang," in *Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fo-hai hui-i lu ho-pien*, p.84.
163. *Min-hsin*, 1:24-28 (June 2 1929); *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.185-186.
164. Wu Ling-chu, "Kuo-min-tang kai-tsü p'ai tsai Shan-hsi ti huo-tung," pp.190-191; "TPK," chapter 5, section 13.
165. "TPK," chapter 5, sections 5-9.
166. See footnote 84.
167. *Chung-yang chou-pou*, 63:4 (August 19 1929); 64:2 (August 26 1929); 66:3 (September 9 1929); Liu Pu-t'ung, "Kuo-min-tang ti mo-ying -- 'CC' t'uan," pp.236-237.
168. Jean Chesneaux in his study of the Chinese trade unions during 1919-26 notes that the survival rate of these unions was not high. See Jean Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labour Movement*, p.400.

169. YHSA, Pei-fa fu chin-ch'a-sui tang-cheng an, Li Kuan-yang to Yen Hsi-shan,
November 27 1929.

170. Ho Han-wen, "Kai-ts' p'ai hui-i lu," pp.178-179.

171. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.217.

172. See footnote 102.

173. "T'ien-chin chih-hsing pu ch'eng-li," in "TPK," chapter 7, section 4.

CHAPTER 6

THE EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE: THE LAST STAND OF THE LEFTIST OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 1931

Merely three months after the dissolution of the Enlarged Conference, a political storm developed which rallied the opposition forces once again. On February 28 1931, Hu Han-min, President of the Legislative Yuan, was under house arrest in Nanking by the order of Chiang Kai-shek. Hu was one of the duumvirs in Nanking since September 1928 and was widely known for his willingness to assist Chiang in the reconstruction of China; his unexpected arrest thus confounded the party and the country alike. In fact, for some time, Hu Han-min and Chiang Kai-shek had been at loggerheads over a number of policy issues. Differences in their characters partly accounted for these conflicts. Hu Han-min was well-known for his self-righteousness, integrity, lack of tact and stubbornness.¹ He naturally viewed with disapproval some of Chiang's measures which were clearly intended for political manoeuvrings and briberies. For instance, from 1929 to 1930, in order to appease Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsüeh-liang, at different times Chiang felt no scruples in promising them high government positions; Hu regarded these as abusing governmental powers. Moreover, being the most powerful leader in the Nanking Government, Chiang always had the final say on policy decisions. To Hu, this was simply personal dictatorship. Hu, an old guard since the T'ung-Meng hui's times and being more senior than Chiang in the party, would not put up with any kind of personal slights and did not make any effort to conceal his disagreements with Chiang.² Inevitably their conflict came to a head, this time over the issue of summoning the National Convention (*Kuo-min hui-i*).

As already noted, on October 3 1930, after putting the opposition's armies to flight, Chiang Kai-shek declared a political amnesty to the opposition and suggested to the Party Central that a National Convention should be summoned and a Provisional Constitution (*yüeh-fa*) should be promulgated in the Political Tutelage period. Subsequently, on October 9, the Standing Committee of the CEC decided to convene the Fourth Plenum on November 12 for deliberation of the issue. Chiang's October 3 proposal, which contained the main demands of the opposition, was evidently an attempt to conciliate the opposition and to bring unity to the whole country again; it

was also a move to take the wind out of the opposition's sails. The element of conciliation in Chiang's proposal was frowned upon by Hu, who lost no time writing an article on November 1 openly opposing any kind of rapprochement with Wang Ching-wei and his followers.³ Indeed, it was in Hu's interests not to see a rapprochement between Wang and Chiang; his dislike for Wang reinforced his attitude. Besides, he was gravely concerned about the suggestion of proclaiming a Provisional Constitution in the Political Tutelage period. On October 6, in a speech given to a memorial gathering of the Legislative Yuan, Hu showed no enthusiasm for the summoning of a National Convention. He stated that before the summoning of such a Convention, the country should have achieved unity and peace; China had not yet entered such a stage and the advocacy of a National Convention by the Enlarged Conference was utterly "ridiculous." He further quoted Sun Yat-sen's Testament to the effect that there was no need to promulgate a Provisional Constitution during Political Tutelage; as a matter of fact, the fundamentals of a constitution had already been embodied in Sun Yat-sen's teachings.⁴ When the Fourth Plenum meeting assembled from November 12 to November 18, a fierce debate over the issue broke out between Hu Han-min and a majority of party leaders who espoused Chiang Kai-shek's proposal. These leaders took the view that the summoning of a National Convention was always emphasized by Sun Yat-sen as an avenue to publicizing the KMT platform and political goals to the people; that the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution in the Political Tutelage period, too, was central to Sun's teachings. They saw no reason why these two ideas should be disowned now. Ultimately the majority carried the day and the Plenum fixed May 5 1931 for the summoning of the National Convention.⁵ Hu did come round to the decision but he unyieldingly maintained that a Provisional Constitution was not needed at the present time and the National Convention should not list this item on its agenda.⁶ He believed that the Government should first address itself to practical issues of national reconstruction before entertaining the proclamation of a constitution; the ultimate power in China still lay in the military, and a Provisional Constitution would produce no practical effect to curb military power but would only bring discredit to the Constitution because of its ineffectiveness in the face of the military.⁷

Apparently the polemics over the National Convention was waged on the theoretical plane -- each side bombarded the other with Sun Yat-sen's pronouncements on the subject. Yet, behind the fine-drawn theoretical arguments a substantial issue was involved. At that time a rumour that the National Convention was used as a means of conferring the position of the Presidency on Chiang Kai-shek had considerable currency in the KMT,⁸ and Hu Han-min happened to believe it. The issue of the Presidency in a way increased the tension between the two men, because Hu was the only party leader who could compete with Chiang for such a position -- on the day when Hu was put

under house arrest, he told Chiang bluntly that he never intended to compete against Chiang for the Presidency.⁹ This, coupled with Hu's discontent with Chiang's dictatorial handling of party and governmental affairs in the past, made Hu determined not to let Chiang have his way this time. In this light, Hu's unshakable obstinacy over the Provisional Constitution is understandable. Hu's defiance inflamed the feelings of Chiang and on February 28, Chiang took the unusual step to detain Hu in Nanking. A political storm then developed.

Wang Ching-wei and the Opposition Movement in Kwangtung

The detention of Hu Han-min in Nanking shocked the party and enraged Hu's supporters. For the first time a rift in the Nanking leadership came into view; Hu's supporters secretly trickled out of Nanking to Canton where an opposition against Chiang was being conceived. The development of an opposition movement in Kwangtung was not surprising as Hu Han-min was one-time Governor of Kwangtung after the 1911 Revolution and since then had built strong and lasting connections with local party and government officials. It was widely believed by party leaders at the time that Hu had the clout to sway the whole Kwangtung province to his side.¹⁰ Subsequent events fully bore this out. After Hu was put under house arrest, his party supporters, such as Ku Ying-fen (Secretary of the National Government Council), Sun Fo (Minister of Railways), Wang Ch'ung-hui (President of the Judicial Yuan) and Lin Sen (President of the Legislative Yuan) chancetinely left Nanking for Canton to organize an opposition against Chiang.¹¹ On April 30, four CSC members, Hsiao Fo-ch'eng, Ku Ying-fen, Lin Sen and Teng Tse-ju, made a proclamation in Canton denouncing Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial rule and indicting him for his illegal imprisonment of Hu. Before long the commanders of the army in Kwangtung responded by calling for the immediate stepping down of Chiang from power.¹² A full-fledged opposition movement against Nanking was brewing in Kwangtung.

To the KMT Left, the detention of Hu Han-min provided it an opportune moment to reiterate its democratic cause. In his two statements on March 4 and March 14, Wang Ching-wei compared Chiang Kai-shek's government with Yuan Shih-kai's and stated that both of them belonged to the same sort of military dictatorship; Chiang's imprisonment of Hu showed most clearly that he never distinguished the lawful from the unlawful; and Chiang's intention of proclaiming a Provisional Constitution was to mask his dictatorial rule. The present task for the party and the people, Wang concluded, was to overthrow Chiang and establish a democratic government.¹³ At the beginning, however, Wang was wary of committing himself to cooperating with Kwangtung leaders

who were not long before his political foes. Indeed he showed no sympathy towards Hu Han-min; in early March he made a pointed remark that Hu fully deserved the treatment because it was Hu who was the chief architect in bringing about Chiang's dictatorship. Yet, in the following months Wang's attitude obviously underwent a fundamental change. He no longer made any ungracious remarks about Hu Han-min and from late April he got in contact with both Ku Ying-fen in Canton and Su Fo who was then in Shanghai.¹⁴ After forging a consensus within his own ranks, on May 1, Wang sent a circular telegram to the whole party emphasizing the need for uniting all democratic forces in common opposition to Chiang Kai-shek,¹⁵ thereby making explicit his intention of joining forces with the Kwangtung side. Wang had strong reasons to join the opposition in Canton. After the dissolution of the Enlarged Conference, Wang once chose to be conciliatory in his political stand with an eye to sounding out Chiang Kai-shek about a reconciliation between the Left and Nanking. This conciliatory posture was not requited; Chiang did not take a step to bring the Left back to the party. In the meantime the strength of the Left in the party diminished, its leaders and rank-and-file were in disarray and there remained hardly any social support for its cause. The Left would make itself a spent force in Chinese politics and nothing would be gained politically if it kept aloof from the political struggle between Nanking and Canton. As the issue of democracy could once again rally the Left behind him as well as provide a common ground of cooperation with Hu Han-min's supporters, it was natural for Wang, who was always pragmatic in his handling of politics, to come to align with the opposition in Kwangtung.

At first, Canton also showed reciprocal feelings of distrust for the KMT Left. A large section of civilian party leaders such as party elders (CSC members Teng Tse-ju, Hsiao Fo-ch'eng and Ku Ying-fen), local power holders (Lin I-chung, Lin Yün-kai) and a number of Western Hills members (Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Kuei Ch'ung-chi), were opposed to any move to ally with Wang Ching-wei.¹⁶ Animosities and distrust between the Left and these factions dated back to the Northern Expedition when both sides were in opposite camps disputing over the communist issue. The Communist insurrection in Canton in December 1927, allegedly caused by Wang Ching-wei's followers, Ch'en Kung-po and Chang Fa-k'uei, intensified the enmity between the two sides. These suspicions and animosities remained when at this time both sides began to approach each other over the question of a political alliance. Hence, on May 9, Wang Ching-wei made a statement in Shanghai that he would support the opposition movement in Kwangtung from without and did not see that there was a need to go to Canton.¹⁷ In the end, practical considerations brought the two sides together. The military leaders in Kwangtung led by Ch'en Chi-t'ang (who was the commander of the Kwangtung army and virtual ruler of Kwangtung province), held the view that more substantial support

was needed to strengthen their hands against the Nanking Government. To them, Wang was too important a party figure to be left out of the opposition movement; no other party leaders on the Kwangtung side could match Wang's seniority, status and influence in the KMT. Furthermore, knowing that the army in Kwangtung could not stand up single-handed against Nanking's military force, they attempted to forge an alliance between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, an objective which could be achieved without difficulty if they could secure Wang's support first.¹⁸ Their view was shared by Sun Fo¹⁹ and, above all, Hu Han-min, who was said to have secretly informed the Kwangtung leaders that Wang was too important a figure to be excluded from the opposition movement.²⁰ Hence the view of these military leaders prevailed and on May 24, when Sun Fo sneaked out of Shanghai to Hong Kong, Wang Ching-wei joined him and went to Canton.²¹ Four days later, the Kwangsi Clique sent a delegate consisting of Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Chang Fa-k'uei to Canton to discuss a joint military campaign against Nanking.²² In the rapprochement between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, the forces of which had been at war over the past two years, Wang Ching-wei played a decisive role.²³

The Kuomintang Left in the Extraordinary Conference

On May 27 when leading opposition leaders had gathered in Canton, an Extraordinary Conference of the CEC and CSC (*Chung-yang chih-chien wei-yuan fei-ch'ang hui-i*) composed of all "loyal" CEC and CSC members of the First, Second and Third Party Congresses was summoned; once again a separatist Party Central other than the one in Nanking was formed. Next day, a National Government was also founded. Two manifestoes marking the establishment of the party and government machinery in Canton were issued by the opposition. They railed against Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial rule and called on the party and the people to overthrow the regime and set up a democratic government.²⁴ Another phase of democratic movement in opposition to Nanking thus opened.

The power configuration in Canton was unusually complicated. For the purpose of analysis, six major factions are identified: (i) the Kwangtung group; (ii) the party elders group; (iii) the Western Hills Group; (iv) the Sun Fo group; (v) the KMT Left; (vi) the Kwangsi Clique. Personal animosities and backbiting among them during the recent past were still fresh in their memories. No wonder the leading Nanking spokesman, Wu Chih-hui, in an interview granted to the *Central Daily* shortly after the Extraordinary Conference was formed, gleefully exposed the old enemies and intricate relations within the opposition camp; he stated that it was unthinkable that these people could forget

their past differences so easily and joined hands in Canton.²⁵ Despite the propaganda purpose of Wu's interview, it is true that he had pointed out the main weakness of the opposition -- they were an assortment of numerous factions with conflicting interests and thinking. From the start their relations were far from cordial; most of the leaders of the Left were deliberately discriminated against by Kwangtung party and military leaders. They only invited Wang Ching-wei to join them but debarred all his close associates from coming to Canton, a measure which was termed by them "peeling off the skin and keeping the bone (*ch'ü-p'i ts'un-ku*)."²⁶ In this way, not only Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü were not permitted to come to Canton, but other Leftist leaders were also excluded; only middle-ranking Leftists accompanied Wang to Canton.²⁷ The power holders in Kwangtung justified their measure on the ground that both Ch'en and Ku were communist fellow travellers;²⁸ but the real reason was that they wanted to split the Leftist leadership and deprive it of any strong voice in Canton. Wang Ching-wei was well aware of the unenviable political position he was now situated. He decided to maintain a conciliatory posture and intended a cementing role for the Left in the Extraordinary Conference. To avoid factional strife, he refrained from advancing his own men in the Conference,²⁹ and he always made use of various occasions to foster a spirit of fellowship within the opposition. His circular telegram of May 1 1931, which made known his intention to join the opposition in Kwangtung, laid a heavy emphasis on the "spiritual unity (*ching-shen t'uan-chieh*)" of all "revolutionary comrades" in the struggle for democracy. This was followed by an article "How to unite together" published on May 15 which reiterated his overriding concern to forge an unity within the opposition ranks. To unite a divided KMT, he wrote, ideological unity in the party was a must. The democratic cause against the Nanking regime, Wang declared, could serve as a common denominator for the ideological unity of the opposition; all past disputes could be set aside and all party members could unite together if they supported democracy against dictatorship and joined the anti-Chiang Kai-shek movement.³⁰ This became a constant theme in many of Wang's later speeches and writings.³¹ Furthermore, to demonstrate his goodwill, Wang was ready to change the Leftist long-held positions on the controversial party-legitimacy (*tang-t'ung*) issue and the factional organization (*hsiao tsu-chih*) issue.

The party-legitimacy issue had kindled a hectic polemic between the Left and the Western Hills Group when the Enlarged Conference was about to be summoned. Eventually they papered over their differences by not renouncing each other's claim to party-legitimacy. But the Left still stuck to its stand that the "Canton Second Party Central" was the only legitimate authority of the KMT during the Northern Expedition and all other rival Party Centrals constituted during the time were illegal. The whole

episode showed that the Left was very much concerned about the legality of the party authority which was part of the reason why Wang Ching-wei was sometimes dubbed as "Mr Party Constitution."³² In the Extraordinary Conference the party-legitimacy issue reappeared in another form. Since March 1929 the Left had taken the stand that the Third National Party Congress held in Nanking was illegitimate because the majority of its representatives were chosen by the Nanking leadership and not properly elected. The military campaigns instigated by the Left against the Nanking regime during 1929 to 1930 had intended to challenge the legality of the Third Congress. But during the Extraordinary Conference Wang in effect recognized the legality of the Third Congress by endorsing the opposition's Manifesto issued on May 27 which called for the summoning of the *Fourth* Party Congress to settle party affairs.³³ From experiences in the Enlarged Conference Wang knew only too well how divisive the party-legitimacy issue would be if he raised it in the Extraordinary Conference. Thus he decided not to take up the topic for the sake of preserving "spiritual unity" of the opposition forces in Canton.

Wang's conciliatory attitude was again fully expressed in his handling of the factional organizational issue. Since mid-1928 the Left had tacitly endorsed the setting up of factional organizations in the KMT when it founded the RCA in the party. The organization was dissolved in January 1931 immediately after the failure of the Enlarged Party Conference. When the opposition movement was revived in Canton, a number of Leftists attempted to restore the RCA and with this purpose in mind they penned a letter to Wang on June 24 1931. Wang gave a reply next day, which was published in the Leftist newspaper, *Nan-hua jih-pao*. In the reply Wang made it explicit that all factional organizations in the KMT should be dissolved and should come together to cooperate in the Extraordinary Conference. He reproached those Leftists who still dreamed to restore the RCA and declared that he would not connive at the setting up of any factional organizations in the KMT.³⁴ Wang also had Lin Po-sheng, the chief editor of the *Nan-hua p'ing-lun*, write an article deprecating the formation of factional organizations in the KMT. Since 1924, Lin wrote in his article, the KMT was increasingly fragmented into numerous factions -- more than one hundred and fifty factions had for one time or another existed in the party. After the break with the communists, he continued, young KMT members were still attracted to the communist organizational technique of building party-factions and were keen to form their own factional organizations to strive for their political goals. As a result, the interests of the factions preceded the interests of the whole party and the KMT was seriously fragmented and simply became the arena of power struggles among the multifarious factions. Undoubtedly factional organizations had shattered the party and fomented the growth of dictatorship. To rehabilitate the party, Lin asserted, all factional

organizations should be abolished.³⁵ Like what he had done in the party-legitimacy issue, Wang Ching-wei would not allow the factional organization issue to scuttle his calculated attempt at kindling a spirit of unity in the Extraordinary Conference and improving the Left's relations with major factions in Kwangtung. But the attempt fell short of its aim. Notwithstanding Wang's conciliatory posture, the Left's relations with major factions in Kwangtung during the whole period of the Extraordinary Conference from May to December 1931 were far from cordial.

To ascertain the role of the Left in the Conference, an analysis of the structure of power in Kwangtung is attempted here, which will be elucidated by examining: (i) the power distribution in the Extraordinary Conference and the National and Provincial Government Councils, the three most important party and government machinery in Kwangtung; (ii) the power relationships between the KMT Left and other major factions in Kwangtung.

The power distribution in the Extraordinary Conference and in the National and Provincial Government Councils is presented in Tables III, IV, and V. Tables III and IV show that the six major factions were all represented in the Extraordinary Conference and the National Government Council. In the Standing Committee of the Conference, seats were evenly distributed among various factions. Of its four working committeees, the Left filled one out of the three seats in the Propaganda Committee and one out of five seats in the Overseas Party Affairs Committee; but it was excluded from the Army Political Training Committee and the Organizational Committee, the latter was dominated by the party elders group which filled two out of three seats. The representation of the Left in the National Government Council was far weaker. Among the seventeen members on the National Government Council, the Left was represented by Wang Ching-wei only. At most the Left could count on the support from two Council members, Li Tsung-jen and T'ang Sheng-chih, who was in close alliance with the Left recently. Yet their combined strength was not equal to that of the party elders group which had the highest number of representatives on the Government Council as well as its Standing Committee. What was more striking was that the Left was deliberately precluded from reaching the lower level of the government. Under the National Government Council, two departments (Treasury; Foreign Affairs) and three committees (Overseas Chinese Affairs; Political Affairs; Finance) were established but the Left did not hold any seat on them. The Foreign Affairs Department was headed by an independent party figure Eugene Ch'en; the Treasury Department was under Teng Chao-yin who was a protégé of party elders;³⁶ and the three other government committees were dominated by the Kwangtung group and party elders group.³⁷ At the provincial level the Left met the same treatment (see Table V). All the posts in the

Kwangtung Provincial Government Council and its various departments were either filled by the Kwangtung group or its closest ally, the party elders group, both of which had a complete monopoly of power at the provincial level.³⁸ From this picture of power distribution at both the central and provincial levels, it is clear that the Left had merely a nominal influence in Kwangtung and did not acquire a political position which was proportionate to its weight in national politics at large. Its status in the Extraordinary Conference was a great contrast to those it had in the Enlarged Conference. The lack of power of the Left is more sharply revealed when the power relationships among major factional groups in Kwangtung are examined.

Table III: Power Distribution in the Committees of the Extraordinary Conference of the CEC and CSC

| <i>The Standing Committee</i> | <i>The Organization Committee</i> |
|---|---|
| Li Wen-fan (i) Ten Tse-ju (ii) Tsou Lu (iii) Sun Fo (iv) Wang Ching-wei (v) | Ten Tse-ju (ii) Ku Ying-fen (ii) Sun Fo (iv) |
| <i>The Propaganda Committee</i> | <i>The Overseas Party Affairs Committee</i> |
| Li Wen-fan (i) Tsou Lu (iii) Wang Ching-wei (v) | Ch'en Yao-yüan (ii) Hsiao Fo-ch'eng (ii) Liu Chi-wen (ii) Teng Ch'ing-yang (ii) Ch'en Shu-jen (v) |
| <i>The Army Political Training Committee</i> | |
| Huang Chi-lu (i) Lin I-chung (i) Huang Kung-tu (vi) | |

Source: Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, pp.347-348.
 (i)-(vi) denotes factional affiliations of individual members.
 (i) The Kwangtung group; (ii) the party elders group; (iii) the Western Hills Group; (iv) The Sun Fo group; (v) the KMT Left; (vi) The Kwangsi Clique.

Of the six major factional groups in the Extraordinary Conference, the Kwangtung

Table IV: Factional affiliations of the members of
the National Government Council

| Factional affiliations | Members | Total |
|-------------------------|---|-------|
| The Kwangtung group | Ch'en Chi-t'ang | 1 |
| The party elders group | Hsiao Fo-ch'eng, Ku Ying-fen*, Lin Sen, Teng Tse-ju* | 4 |
| The Western Hills Group | Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Chiang Tsun-kuei, Tsou Lu* | 3 |
| The Sun Fo Group | Sun Fo* | 1 |
| The Kuomintang Left | Wang Ching-wei* | 1 |
| The Kwangsi Clique | Li Tsung-jen | 1 |
| Miscellaneous group | Eugene Ch'en, Hsiung K'o-wu Li Lieh-chün, T'ang Shao-i,* T'ang Sheng-chih, Wu Ch'ao-shu | 6 |

Source: Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, p.393.

* also on the Standing Committee of the National Government Council.

group was predominant. This was due to its long-entrenched political positions in Kwangtung and to the fact that its army was the main military force in the opposition to Nanking. The group consisted primarily of army leaders and party-government office bearers in Kwangtung; its acknowledged leader was Ch'en Chi-t'ang, the commander of the Kwangtung army. He had firm support from his subordinates in the army like Li Yang-ching and Yü Han-mou and exercised control over local party and government affairs through his protégés, Lin I-chung and Lin Yün-kai. He achieved this dominant position in Kwangtung just shortly before the summoning of the Extraordinary Conference. Before the Conference assembled, political power in Kwangtung was not

Table V: Power Distribution in the Kwangtung
Provincial Government Council

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| Chairman | Lin Yün-kai (ii) | |
| Members | Lin I-chung (i), Hu Chi-hsien (i), Li Lu-Ch'ao (i), Fan Ch'i-wu(i), | Chin Ts'eng-ch'eng (i), Hsu Ch'ung-ch'ing (i), Teng Yen-hua (i), Ch'eng T'ien-ku (ii) |
| Head of the Provincial Affairs Department: | | Lin I-chung (i) |
| Head of the Finance Department: | | Lin Yün-kai (ii) |
| Head of the Education Department: | | Chin Ts'eng-ch'eng (i) |
| Head of the Reconstruction Department: | | Hu Chi-hsien (i) |

Source: Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yüntung shih*, p.416.

(i)-(ii) Factional affiliations of individual members.

(i) the Kwangtung group; (ii) the party elders group.

entirely in the hands of Ch'en Chi-t'ang; he had to share power with an army leader Ch'en Ming-shu, who was then Governor of Kwangtung and was pro-Nanking in his attitude. Ch'en Ming-shu wielded no direct control over the army in Kwangtung; his own army had been transferred to North China in the campaigns against Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan in 1930. But although this was the case, Ch'en Ming-shu still posed a countervailing force to Ch'en Chi-t'ang's power in Kwangtung. The summoning of the Extraordinary Conference enabled Ch'en Chi-t'ang to force pro-Nanking Ch'en Ming-shu out of Kwangtung.³⁹ Ch'en Chi-t'ang then realized his own personal aim and became the undisputed leader of Kwangtung province; thereafter he showed hardly any zeal in advancing his army against Nanking.⁴⁰ No wonder Nanking charged that Ch'en Chi-t'ang supported the Extraordinary Conference mainly from the motive of achieving his personal ambition to control Kwangtung.⁴¹ Probably Ch'en's motives in promoting the Extraordinary Conference were complex; he did not do it just out of supporting Hu Han-min against Chiang. Having secured the control of Kwangtung province, it became his set policy not to allow other factions (the party elders group was the only exception) to have a foothold in Kwangtung. Policy-decision was largely in his hands⁴² -- in particular, the Left suffered the most under this situation. It had a recent history of conflict with Ch'en Chi-t'ang. As early as

December 1927 the Left was accused by Kwangtung leaders of being responsible for the communist insurrection in Canton, and throughout the years of 1929 to 1930, both sides were actually on opposite camps in the civil war. Indeed, merely a few months before the summoning of the Extraordinary Conference, Ch'en Chi-t'ang had been supporting Chiang Kai-shek in suppressing the military revolts incited by the Left. It is hardly surprising the Ch'en never intended to allow the Left an active political role in his province. In fact, by bringing Wang Ching-wei into the opposition movement he had achieved the major aim of using Wang's influence in the KMT to strengthen his hands against the Nanking leadership and to secure support from the armies of Chang Fa-k'uei and Li Tsung-jen. Now he saw no reason why he had to buy Wang's support on the Leftist terms; he was thus determined not to allow Wang to have an important say in policy decision. According to Ch'eng T'ien-ku, who was then Mayor of Canton and a participant in the Extraordinary Conference, the Left had tried to play an active political role in the Conference but it soon found itself constrained by the Kwangtung group. Even Wang's prestige in the party did not help him much in the struggle -- all the same his policy initiatives were often thwarted by the Kwangtung group. It soon became clear that Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Chi-t'ang could hardly cooperate with each other.⁴³

In the struggle to curb the Leftist influence, the Kwangtung group enlisted the staunch support of the party elders group. This group consisted mostly of party elders such as Ku Ying-fen, Teng Tse-ju, Hsiao Fo-ch'eng and Lin Sen, who had unrivalled seniority in the KMT and a close tie with Hu Han-min as well as with overseas party members. It exerted a pervasive influence in Kwangtung which greatly surpassed that of the Left. Three major factors accounted for its considerable influence. First, an old patron-client relationship existed between Ku Ying-fen and Ch'en Chi-t'ang. It was said that Ch'en's rise to prominence in Kwangtung was in part due to Ku's patronage and in return, Ch'en always deferred to Ku's opinions.⁴⁴ In addition, Ku's relations with Kwangtung party and government officials were long standing and could be traced back to the 1911 Revolution; in the course of time he had built a strong tie there. Provincial power holders such as Lin Yün-kai (Chairman of the Provincial Government Council) and Ch'eng T'ien-ku (Mayor of Canton) were intimately related to him.⁴⁵ Moreover, Ku's credentials as a close associate of Hu Han-min were impeccable. From the time Hu was Governor of Kwangtung (1911) to the time he was President of the Legislative Yuan (1928), Ku was one of his intimate associates. The close relationship between the two men made Ku an irreplaceable link between Hu and the Kwangtung group. Ku's special positions in Kwangtung explained why this small group of party elders could have such a strong voice in Kwangtung politics.⁴⁶ Like the Kwangtung group, they were intent on keeping a tight rein over the Left. Ideological differences and personal animosities

dating back to the Northern Expedition continued to pit them against the Left. As a matter of fact, it was under the pressure from the military in Kwangtung that Ku came to agree to invite Wang to Canton; after that they did not fail to find occasion to keep the Left under their control.⁴⁷

As regards the Western Hills Group, only two of its leading members, Tsou Lu and Hsu Ch'ung-chih, came to Canton; others like Hsieh Ch'ih, Fu Yü-lin and T'an Chen remained in Tientsin.⁴⁸ By this time the Group had become merely a small political faction with only a few leaders but no large following in the party -- it was already a spent force after 1927.⁴⁹ It played no decisive role in the Extraordinary Conference; Tsou Lu could do no more than deliver a few speeches denouncing Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship while Hsu Ch'ung-chih was treated in Canton like a political and military lightweight.⁵⁰ Its relations with the Left were largely cordial, a situation which was obviously brought about by the recent history of cooperation in the Enlarged Conference. Reports even had it that Tsou Lu and Wang Ching-wei had taken a common stand in the Conference.⁵¹ To be sure, some individual Western Hills members like Hsu Ch'ung-chih were still smarting with irritation at the old enmities with the Left during the Northern Expedition. They refused to have anything to do with the Left in the Extraordinary Conference.⁵²

Unlike the Western Hills Group, the Sun Fo group made itself felt more widely in the Extraordinary Conference. Sun's unique status as Sun Yat-sen's son, his connections with military and government leaders in Kwangtung, lent weight to his political stand. Besides, he brought a group of bright young party followers to Canton who published the *Chung-yang tao-pao*, the official mouthpiece for the opposition.⁵³ Despite the fact that Sun Fo did manage to assume an active role in the Extraordinary Conference, his influence on policy decision was far from significant, as he, too, was politically constrained by Ch'en Chi-t'ang and party elders who jealously guarded their interests in Kwangtung against interference by outsiders.⁵⁴ As regards Sun's relations with the Left, both sides did not have a history of confrontation in the past and so did not have old scores to be settled. Hence, Sun's dissatisfaction at the monopoly of power by the Kwangtung group and the party elders group for a time drew him closer to the Left. A smooth relationship was established between the Left and the Sun Fo group.⁵⁵

Given this picture of power relationships, it is obvious that the Left had a hard time in the Extraordinary Conference. The combined strength of the Kwangtung group and the party elders group was sufficiently strong to deprive the Left of any say in the Conference, while the Left's smooth relationships with the Sun Fo group and the Western Hills Group hardly meant anything in power politics in Kwangtung. Moreover, the Left's powerful military supporters, Li Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-k'uei, were too far

from the scene and preoccupied with military affairs in Kwangsi to lend it any substantial help. Eye-witnesses' accounts came to the same judgement that Wang Ching-wei did not hold any power in the Extraordinary Conference. Ch'eng T'ien-ku, then Mayor of Canton, related in his memoirs that the Left hardly had any influence on policy decision in Kwangtung.⁵⁶ Hsu Chu-ch'eng, a reporter of the *Ta-kung pao*, who held an interview with Wang Ching-wei at the time of the Conference, opined that it was Ch'en Chi-t'ang and party elders who held real power in Kwangtung and Wang was merely a figurehead.⁵⁷ Wang himself later did admit to Ch'en Kung-po that he was often slighted by "power holders" in Kwangtung.⁵⁸ Being an eminent political figure in the KMT and in the country at large, Wang of course would not put up with this situation long. Probably at this time he realized that he had gained nothing by joining the Extraordinary Conference, but he saw no better way out. The policy of allying with regional militarists had its worst result for the Left in the Extraordinary Conference. Now the question was, would Wang Ching-wei make another change in the Left's political stand if an occasion offered itself?

The Merging into the Orthodox Party Line: the "Wang-Chiang Cooperation"

Although Canton had declared its opposition to Nanking in May 1931, no military conflict broke out between the two sides in the following months. Ch'en Chi-t'ang was reluctant to advance his army against Nanking, an attitude which was fortified by the failure to woo military allies in North China into Canton's fold.⁵⁹ At the same time, Ch'en and his associates in Canton also decided not to respond to a series of peaceful overtones put out by Nanking; thus a deadlock resulted.⁶⁰ From May to September the Extraordinary Conference concerned itself mainly with paperwork -- it promulgated the regulations for local self-government, started the preparation for summoning a National Convention and drafting a Provisional Constitution.⁶¹ (Meanwhile Nanking stole a march on Canton by convening a National Convention in May and proclaiming a Provisional Constitution in June).⁶² In early September, knowing that the deadlock would not be ended if Canton continued to withhold its troops against Nanking, Ch'en Chi-t'ang eventually overcame his reluctance and agreed to launch a military campaign against Nanking.⁶³ However, an unexpected national crisis emerged which changed the whole political picture in China.

On September 18 1931, the Japanese troops in Manchuria suddenly took control of Shenyang and proceeded to occupy other parts of Manchuria. The event, popularly known as the "Manchurian Incident," developed into a national crisis which decisively forced Canton and Nanking to close their ranks in the face of external threat. On

September 19, Nanking sent a message to Canton which called for national unity to save the country and proposed to open negotiation with Canton to settle their disputes. Faced with the exigencies of the situation, Canton had no alternative but to concur. Negotiations were soon conducted between the two sides. On September 28-29, a preliminary meeting between delegates from both sides was held in Hong Kong and they reached a tacit understanding that Chiang Kai-shek should step down from politics; that the National Government in Canton should be dissolved; and that a peace conference should be held in Shanghai to finalize the terms of the settlement. To foster an atmosphere of reconciliation, Hu Han-min was set free by the Nanking Government on October 14; eight days later, Hu, Chiang, Wang, and a number of high-ranking party leaders gathered in Shanghai and endorsed the peace conference solution.⁶⁴ Each side then sent a delegation for the Peace Conference (Wang Ching-wei was on the negotiation team sent by Canton) which was then summoned on October 27 in Shanghai.⁶⁵

Negotiations in Shanghai were full of twists and turns and the main stumbling block was on the question of Chiang Kai-shek's resignation. Canton insisted that Chiang should resign immediately whereas Nanking tried to stave off the question and held that Chiang would resign only after a settlement was reached between the two sides. After a series of mediations, an agreement was hammered out on November 7 which covered three main areas: (i) the policy towards Japan; (ii) domestic reforms; (iii) the unification of party and government machinery. The agreement stipulated that the government would appeal to the League of Nations to take action against Japanese aggression in Manchuria; it also sketched a reform outline on government structure and financial affairs based upon democratic principles. As regards the unification question, the following were agreed upon: each side would summon its respective Fourth National Party Congresses, one in Nanking and another in Canton; each side would issue a proclamation declaring that unity had been achieved in the party; a unified party plenum would then be convened to consider proposals submitted by the two Congresses as well as to enforce a reorganization of the National Government; a list of candidates for the CEC and CSC would be drawn up by consultation between the two sides. Furthermore, the agreement provided that the Canton National Government would be dissolved after the reorganization of the Nanking Government and that there was *no* need for Chiang Kai-shek to announce his resignation.⁶⁶ The last item of the agreement, as we shall see, took Canton by surprise. It caused a great uproar among the Kwangtung group and the party elders group and seriously divided the opposition ranks.

While negotiations were actively conducted in Shanghai, behind the scenes a new political alignment was taking place. The Manchurian Incident provided the occasion for Wang to switch his political alliance. At this very juncture Wang had made up his

mind to break away from Kwangtung and forge a political alliance with Chiang Kai-shek. The decision bore fruit in January 1932 when Wang and Chiang agreed to collaborate and formed a new leadership in Nanking. By that time the Left had abandoned its ideology and come to accept the official version of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine as the orthodox ideology of the whole KMT. It ended the Leftist opposition movement and ushered in an era of "Wang-Chiang cooperation (*Wang Chiang ho-tso*)" which lasted until Wang's defection to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War. The decision to ally with Chiang undoubtedly marked a turning point in the history of the KMT Left as well as the history of the whole party itself. Hitherto the political background and manipulations which led to the change of stand on the part of the KMT Left have largely remained obscure. Questions concerning when the decision to switch to Chiang's side was made, what motivated Wang to make such a decision and how the development of events culminated into the "Wang-Chiang cooperation" have been left unanswered. Enough evidence is now available for attempting an answer to these questions.

Ch'en Kung-po's memoirs is the principal source which indicates the time Wang Ching-wei had made the irrevocable decision to ally with Chiang Kai-shek. When he met Wang in Hong Kong on October 5 (Wang was en route to Shanghai for the Peace Conference there), Ch'en wrote in his memoirs, Wang was very angry at the way he had been treated in Kwangtung. Wang pointed out that even secondary party figures like Hsu Ch'ung-chih and Kuei Ch'ung-chi, both Western Hills members, had dared to abuse him publicly. His participation in the opposition movement in Kwangtung, Wang explained, was out of deference to Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Chang Fa-k'uei who urged him to go there to serve as a bridge between themselves and Ch'en Chi-t'ang in the alliance against Chiang. If not urged by them, Wang claimed, he would not go to Canton for he foresaw that nothing fruitful would come about. He then made it clear to Ch'en Kung-po that he would withdraw from Kwangtung at an opportune moment and asked Ch'en to contact Chiang's henchman, T.V. Soong, in Shanghai. The October 5 meeting made Ch'en aware that a "Wang-Chiang cooperation" was imminent.⁶⁷

Ch'en's memoirs reveals that by October 5 Wang was set on the course to ally with Chiang Kai-shek. Probably this decision was irrevocably made just a bit earlier than October 5. In the two public speeches given to a party gathering on September 28 and to mass organizations on September 23, Wang delivered a violent *ad hominem* attack on Chiang Kai-shek. He first set forth the opposition's stand after the Manchurian Incident. Wang stated that after the Incident Canton had agreed not to continue the military campaign to overthrow Chiang owing to the precarious situation China now faced. A military solution against Nanking would only foster Japanese aggression and lead to the extinction of the whole country. Nevertheless, he did not

think that Canton should immediately unite with Chiang together in the face of foreign aggression. In his view, Chiang Kai-shek should first step down from power so that unity could be achieved smoothly between Nanking and Canton and an effective policy towards Japan could then be implemented. He took Chiang to task for his weak-kneed foreign policy towards Japan in the Chinan Incident in 1928 and towards Soviet Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railways Incident in 1929. This time, he warned, Chiang might "sell the country" again and capitulate to Japan over the Manchurian Incident. Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsüeh-liang, Wang pointedly added, were skilful in using armies to stifle domestic dissidents, but, when confronted by Japanese aggression in Manchuria, were completely helpless and just resorted to the disgraceful "non-resistance policy." He called on the people to resist "Japanese imperialism" and overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and asserted that only by displacing Chiang from power could the country be united against the aggression of Japan. He concluded by repeating the opposition's stand that the immediate resignation of Chiang Kai-shek was a precondition for bringing Canton and Nanking together into a new unified National Government.⁶⁸

Judging from the vehement personal abuses heaped on Chiang Kai-shek in these two speeches, it seems unlikely that Wang Ching-wei had by this time irrevocably made up his mind to ally with Chiang, though it is likely that he had been entertaining the idea in his mind. The decisive moment which led to his decision probably happened after Wang had conversed with the Nanking delegates during the preliminary meeting in Hong Kong between Canton and Nanking on September 28-29. Hence, when Ch'en Kung-po met Wang in Hong Kong on October 5, Ch'en got the impression that Wang had already decided to ally with Chiang. It is during the period from September 28 to October 5 that Wang finally embarked upon the course of allying with Chiang and breaking away from Kwangtung.

Wang Ching-wei's switching of political alliance may be sudden but not unexpected. As we have noted, the power distribution and power relationships in Kwangtung had deprived the Left of any voice in policy-decision. Its leader Wang Ching-wei endured so many slights that his dissatisfactions with the Kwangtung group had reached a high pitch. This is well illustrated in an episode described by Ch'eng T'ien-ku in his memoirs. Ch'eng recalled that at a banquet given by Wang in his residence in Canton, Wang could not help but give vent to his long-pent-up grievances. He was aware, Wang said, that he would be taken advantage of if he came to Canton; yet he came to join the Extraordinary Conference because, he claimed, he intended to topple the dictatorial rule of Chiang Kai-shek and sincerely hoped that he could save Hu Han-min. He did not expect, Wang continued, that the military (i.e. the Kwangtung group) would obstruct him in every direction. In the end Wang was so carried away by

his emotions that he grumbled: "I would rather be ill-treated by the big dictator than by the little dictator."⁶⁹ The big dictator obviously referred to Chiang Kai-shek and the little dictator Ch'en Chi-t'ang. Wang's dissatisfactions with the Kwangtung group were all well recorded by his contemporaries in their recollections.⁷⁰ A break with Kwangtung by the Left became a matter of time.

Moreover, a rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek was what Wang had seriously thought about after the dissolution of the Enlarged Conference. We have seen that Wang had attempted to carve out a "legal opposition" role for the Left and to reconcile with the Nanking leadership in late 1930 -- the decline of the Left as a political force at this time made this move all the more necessary. But no response came out of it from Chiang. Now the Manchurian Incident provided Wang the opportune moment to sound out Chiang again and to initiate an honourable retreat for the Left from its political stand. Indeed, the Manchurian Incident was made use of by Wang to justify his volte-face in political stand. In a telegram to his associate after the formation of the "Wang-Chiang cooperation," Wang pointed out that somebody might think that the political stands of the Left before and after the Manchurian Incident were contradictory. This was not true, he argued. The outbreak of the Incident had made policy differences between the Left and the Nanking authorities insignificant. The question of the day was to save the country; and to save the country unity was needed. Therefore, Wang asserted, the Left decided that it would cooperate with the Nanking authorities if Nanking could save the country, and it would not take issue with Nanking over other policy differences.⁷¹ The Manchurian Incident thus greatly facilitated the Left to make a turnaround in its political stand and to switch its political alliance to Chiang Kai-shek's side.

In addition, the unfeasibility of a joint leadership comprising Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min also disposed Wang to secure an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek. At the time as Nanking and Canton began negotiation to settle their disputes, a number of party leaders pinned great hope on a "Wang-Hu cooperation" -- Western Hills members like T'an Chen and followers of Sun Fo advised Wang to cooperate with Hu; even Wang's close associates Ch'en Kung-po and Chang Fa-k'uei, strongly favoured such an idea.⁷² Yet at heart Wang did not see it feasible. He once told Ch'en Kung-po that the idea was impracticable because Hu would cooperate with him only if some of his close associates, particularly Ch'en himself, whom Hu regarded as a communist fellow traveller, were excluded from power.⁷³ Moreover, there was a subtler reason. Hu Han-min's political strength lay mostly in the Kwangtung group and the party elders group. An alliance with Hu would necessarily mean an indirect political connection with these groups, a prospect which was unthinkable to Wang after his experiences in the

Extraordinary Conference. As regards the triumvirate consisting of Wang, Chiang and Hu, it was all the more unlikely because Hu, after his recent humiliation at the hands of Chiang, harboured the secret aim of pressing for Chiang's resignation. The only alternative open to Wang was to sound out Chiang over the prospect of a political alliance.⁷⁴

Striving for an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek by the Left was the underlying pattern of events for the last three months of 1931 to the first month of 1932. When Wang Ching-wei arrived in Shanghai as a delegate of the Canton negotiation team on October 21 1931, reports had it that he had immediately got into contact with Chiang's man, T.V. Soong;⁷⁵ and in his several informal meetings with Hu Han-min during October and November, Wang frankly told Hu that he would not return to Canton because he himself and Ch'en Chi-t'ang never saw eye to eye with each other.⁷⁶ After the successful conclusion of the Peace Conference in Shanghai on November 7, Wang was the only official delegate from the Canton side who remained in Shanghai and did not go back to Canton. By this time the signs were clear that Wang had set on the course of breaking away from Kwangtung and had established contact with Chiang over the question of a political alliance.

Subsequent events further strengthened Wang's determination to break away from Kwangtung. The November 7 agreement reached in the Shanghai Peace Conference had provided for each side to summon its respective Fourth National Party Congress. In accordance with the agreement, Nanking summoned its Fourth Congress on November 12 and peacefully concluded it on November 23 amidst an atmosphere of reconciliation and unity.⁷⁷ Canton also duly convened its Congress on November 18, but it was seriously plagued by factional struggles between the Kwangtung power holders and the Left. Shortly before the Congress was summoned, Congress representatives were screened and party elders, Teng Tse-ju and Hsiao Fo-ch'eng, disqualified most of the Leftist representatives to the Congress. It was through Hu Han-min's mediations that the Left was able to secure places in the Congress.⁷⁸ Then, on November 23, while the Congress was in session, a heated dispute broke out between the Left and the party elders group over the Peace Conference agreement. As will be recalled, when negotiations started between Canton and Nanking, it was Canton's basic demand that Chiang Kai-shek should step down from power at once. However, to the surprise of the power holders in Canton, the November 7 agreement noted that there was no need for Chiang to announce his resignation. It is not exactly known why the demand for Chiang's resignation was left out in the agreement; it is likely that the Canton negotiation team, amidst an atmosphere of national crisis and an urge from the public for unity, saw no reason why it should take an intransigent stand on the resignation

question. Besides, Wang Ching-wei, one of the delegates in the Canton team, having got in contact with Chiang on the question of a political alliance, certainly did not like to see that Chiang should now step down.⁷⁹ But an agreement short of Chiang's resignation could hardly be acceptable to the power holders in Kwangtung. Both the Kwangtung group and the party elders group were dissatisfied with the agreement and on November 23, when the Congress was in session, party elders Hsiao-Fo-ch'eng and Teng Tse-ju took the lead in denouncing the agreement. They passed a proposal, signed by more than three hundred Congress representatives, which called for Chiang's resignation and demanded amendments on some of the items of the November 7 agreement.⁸⁰ Wang Ching-wei, being a delegate to the Peace Conference, felt slighted and infuriated; other delegates such as Sun Fo shared the same feelings and withdrew from the Congress in protest.⁸¹ Wang's supporters in the Congress, numbering about 160, walked out and left for Hong Kong, and the Leftist organ, *Nan-hua jih-pao*, began to label the Kwangtung group as "separatist warlord (*ko-chü chün-fa*)."⁸² The Congress meeting was brought to a standstill.

The unexpected turn of events in Canton prompted Hu Han-min, who never wanted open confrontation in the party during the national crisis, to go to Canton on November 29 to act a mediating role. He brought unity to the Congress and, except for the Left, other factions such as the Sun Fo group returned to the Congress. The Kwangtung group and the party elders group came around and accepted the agreement reached except one item. They, in line with Hu's idea, still insisted on the resignation of Chiang.⁸³ In the meantime Wang Ching-wei decided to have nothing to do with Canton. He instructed his Leftist supporters to gather in Shanghai where he summoned a mini-party Congress (legally an offshoot of the Canton Fourth National Party Congress) on December 3 which elected another batch of 9 CEC members to be included in the new unified Party Central in Nanking.⁸⁴ In so doing Wang ensured that the Left would produce an additional number of CEC members to the unified Party Central.⁸⁵

By early December, Wang Ching-wei had broken his alliance with Kwangtung, yet there was no indication that his contacts with Chiang Kai-shek had borne fruit or that he would come to Nanking soon. Political events from December to early January did not foreshadow that a joint leadership under Wang and Chiang would be formed in Nanking. On the contrary, such a prospect appeared dim. On December 15, bowing to the pressure from Canton, Chiang Kai-shek announced his resignation from all official posts in the Government.⁸⁶ This cleared the way for Canton and Nanking to set up a unified party and government machinery. During December 22-29, Canton and Nanking convened a unified party plenum and decided on the following important appointments:

- (i) Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min were appointed as members of

the Standing Committee of the Political Council (a machinery of the party) and with six other leaders, members of the Standing Committee of the CEC; (ii) Lin Sen was appointed Chairman of the new National Government and Sun Fo, President of the Executive Yuan.⁸⁷ Yet, when the new unified National Government was inaugurated on January 1 1932, Wang and Chiang did not assume their posts in the party.⁸⁸ Chiang remained retired to his native town of Fenghua while Wang stayed in Shanghai on the ground that he needed medical treatment there. Sun Fo, who wielded the executive power of the new government, was anxious to get both of them back to the party but to no avail.⁸⁹ On January 7 1932, Wang even announced his resignation from the Standing Committees of both the Political Council and the CEC.⁹⁰ Obviously, more intricate political calculations were behind the decisions of Wang and Chiang.

What had transpired behind the scenes between Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek in the months from October to December remains obscure. Judging from subsequent events in January when they at last came to power together, it is unlikely that they did not at least agree upon a collaboration during their secret contacts. Before Chiang retired to Fenghua on December 22, it was known that he had maintained contacts with Wang's close associates, Ch'en Kung-po, Ku Meng-yü and Wang Fa-ch'in.⁹¹ Even Wang's wife was said to have approached Chiang over the question of a political alliance.⁹² Probably Wang and Chiang had agreed to cooperate with each other and form a joint leadership in Nanking. Their refusal to assume party offices at this time was due to two main reasons. First, political pressure exerted from the Canton side prevented the reinstatement of Chiang. His resignation was insisted upon by Canton, which was the most reluctant to let Chiang have a political comeback in such an uncomfortably short period. This was disclosed by Chiang in a press interview on January 14 1932. He made it known that the Kwangtung group was against him and continued to make him the political target of attack. Under these circumstances, he could not resume his offices.⁹³ Chang Chi and Ch'en Ming-shu, the two key go-betweens between Canton and Nanking, who got in contact with Chiang at this time, also collaborated Chiang's account that it was the Kwangtung group which prevented Chiang from resuming power.⁹⁴ And, more than that, their absence from the new government was a calculated move aiming at dislodging Canton's influence in Nanking. The executive power of the new National Government was in the hands of Sun Fo; his appointment as President of the Executive Yuan was originally proposed and staunchly supported by Hu Han-min and the Kwangtung group who intended to make Sun, who had stronger connections with them than any other faction in the party, their representative in the Nanking Government to check the power of Wang and Chiang.⁹⁵ To embarrass and dislodge Sun Fo's government was the necessary means to counter the hidden influence of Canton in the new Nanking Government. In this way, Sun Fo's

government became the victim of power struggle between Hu Han-min and the Kwangtung group on one side, and Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek on the other side. To bring pressure to bear on Sun Fo's Government, Wang and Chiang absented themselves from the party while their followers used every means to boycott the new Government. They first tried to undermine confidence in government finance. T.V. Soong and his protégés in the Finance Department resigned from their offices *en masse* when the new Government was inaugurated. In consequence the Shanghai banking and financial circles lost confidence and were unwilling to advance loans to the government and this put the new Minister of Finance, Huang Han-liang, in a hopeless financial situation. Even the army became restive in view of the government's financial stringency.⁹⁶ Coupled with the financial difficulty was the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, a diplomatic issue with which Sun Fo's government evidently lacked the clout to deal -- Su Fo and his Foreign Minister, Eugene Ch'en, tried to take a firm stand against Japan, but this could not be carried out without a consensus in the party and the army.⁹⁷ The calculated withdrawal by Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek eventually paid off; by mid-January it was clear that the new Government could not effectively function without explicit support from them. Much now depended upon Hu Han-min's attitude. Confronted by a national and government crisis of such a great magnitude, Hu now had to concede that Wang and Chiang should both resume their official duties, no matter what he personally felt about the reinstatement of Chiang at the beginning. Motivated by such considerations, and supported by Yü Yu-jen, an old guard of the KMT, he held talks with the Kwangtung group so as to persuade it to soften its stand on Chiang.⁹⁸ But he was not prepared to bow to the opinion in the party which suggested that a triumvirate comprising himself, Wang and Chiang should be formed -- his recent humiliation at the hands of Chiang made this unfeasible. Hu's calculations at this time was that, although he would not join the new government, he would use Sun Fo as a check on the power of Wang and Chiang in Nanking. But he was soon disappointed. His mediation did prevail upon the Kwangtung group not to oppose Chiang to return to power,⁹⁹ but he did not expect that this also sealed the fate of Sun Fo's government. As Canton had now softened its stand, and, above all, as Wang and Chiang had convincingly demonstrated their indispensable roles in the government, what followed was plain-sailing for them. On January 16, Chiang sent a personal letter to Wang, who then went from Shanghai to Hangchow to confer with Chiang. They held a meeting on January 17 and Sun Fo shortly joined them on the next day.¹⁰⁰ There was no record available of what had been agreed upon in the meeting. Based on the development of subsequent events there is little doubt that in the meeting Wang and Chiang had agreed to assume duties and Sun Fo was forced to realize that he had to step down and make way for Wang to take over the executive arm of the Government.¹⁰¹

On January 21, in a press interview Chiang announced that he would resume his offices in view of the growing national crisis. Four days later he attended a meeting of the Standing Committee of the CEC which marked his political come-back. On January 28 Sun Fo resigned and Wang became President of the Executive Yuan.¹⁰² The power struggle between Wang and Chiang on one side and Hu and the Kwangtung group on the other ended with a complete victory for the former. The era of "Wang-Chiang cooperation" was ushered in and lasted until Wang's defection to Japan in 1938. Throughout this period until his death in 1936, Hu Han-min remained out of power and was a constant critic of Nanking's policies. It was a complete reversal of political roles for Wang and Hu.

The "Wang-Chiang cooperation" brought immediate material rewards for the Left. Wang Ching-wei and Ku Meng-yü were on the 9-member Standing Committee of the CEC.¹⁰³ Ch'en Kung-po, Ch'en Shu-jen, Wang Fa-ch'in, Ho Hsiang-ning, Chu Chi-ch'ing, Pai Yün-t'i and even Kan Nai-kuang, became CEC members; other Leftist leaders such as Ch'en Pi-chün, P'an Yün-ch'ao and Kuo Ch'un-t'ao were on the CSC. In the Government, Wang became President of the Executive Yuan and also Foreign Minister, Ch'en Kung-po was appointed as Minister of Industry, Ku Meng-yü Minister of Railways and Ch'en Shu-jen, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission;¹⁰⁴ a number of lesser posts were also reserved for Leftist leaders.¹⁰⁵ However, the "Wang-Chiang cooperation" was not a political alliance between two equal partners. Real power was still in Chiang Kai-shek's hands. Ch'en Kung-po observed that although Wang was President of the Executive Yuan, he did not have any say on military, financial and foreign affairs, all of which were entirely under the direction of Chiang. Only "trivial matters" came under Wang's jurisdiction. In the Party Central itself, too, Wang could hardly make his influence felt; the Left continued to be boycotted by Chiang's party followers.¹⁰⁶ In fact, the "Wang-Chiang cooperation" signified not a cooperation between equal partners, it merely signified the abandonment of the Leftist ideology and the end of its opposition movement against Nanking.¹⁰⁷ It was forced to cooperate with Chiang because, without so doing it would fall into oblivion in Chinese politics. The public announcement made by Ch'en Kung-po on January 1 1932 foreshadowed the merging of the Left into the Nanking leadership. The reason why the Left came to Nanking, Ch'en declared in the announcement, was that the survival of the Chinese race and the KMT was at stake at the moment (obviously referring to the Manchurian Incident), and the Left, like every Chinese people and every KMT member, had the responsibility to save the nation and the party. Consideration of this factor motivated the Left to join the Nanking leadership. He emphasized that the best means of unifying China was by economic reconstruction, not by military force nor political measures such as the calling of parliament or the promulgation of a constitution. His

remarks that "today we are not engaged in rhetoric nor in polemics but in saving the country and in national reconstruction" set the new political tone for the Left after 1932.¹⁰⁸ Ever since nothing was heard of the Leftist ideology of 1928, nor the demand by the Left for democracy in the party and in the country at large. On the ideological plane the merging of the Left into the Nanking leadership was total. Only as a political faction did the Left still survive after 1932. Although without any formal organization nor with any distinct ideological stand of its own, the Left was widely recognized in the party as the "Reorganization Clique" and could be identified as a distinct faction in the party as such. It remained involved in factional politics in the KMT before the Sino-Japanese War.¹⁰⁹ But the Left at this time was not the same as the Left during the opposition in 1928-31. It no longer represented any kind of political alternative to the official policy course of Chiang Kai-shek's regime, and it was merely a political faction without a distinct ideological stand of its own. Consideration of political survival compelled the Left to sacrifice its ideology and the "Leftist alternative."

Notes

1. *Hu hsien-sheng chi-nien chuan-k'an*, part 1, pp.32-33, 38-40, part 2, p.14; Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung chih chi-chien shih-shih," *San-min chu-i yüeh-k'an*, 2.6:105-106, 117 (December 15 1933).
2. For the differences between Hu Han-min and Chiang Kai-shek over policy issues, see *ibid.*, 2.6:106-109; Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek: soldier and statesman*, vol. 1, p.312; Kung Te-po, *Kung Te-po hui-i lu*, vol. 1, p.240.
3. See Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, pp.491-492.
4. *Ibid.*, pp.488-491.
5. For the heated debate over the Provisional Constitution issue, see *ibid.*, pp.492-496. Wu Chih-hui and Tai Chi-t'ao were the staunch supporters of Chiang Kai-shek's proposals. For their views, see their speeches collected in *Kuo-min hui-i chih i-i chi jen-shih*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang Shan-hsi sheng chih-hsing wei-yuan hui, pp.127-132. For Chiang Kai-shek's view, see "Kuo-min hui-i chung ti yüeh-fa wen-t'i," in *Chiang Tsung-ssu-ling yen-lun chi*, ed. Teng Wen-i, pp.1-5.
6. See Hu Han-min, "Tsun-i Tsung-li i-chiao k'ai kuo-min hui-i," in *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng wen-chi*, vol. 3, pp.756-769.
7. Hu Han-min, "Kuo-ming kuo-ch'eng chung chih chi-chien shih-shih," *San-min chu-i yüeh-k'an*, 2.6:115 (December 15 1933).
8. The rumour was so widely circulated in the party that on March 22 Chiang Kai-shek had to come out denying that he wanted to be President and suggested that the National Convention should concern itself with the promulgation of a Provisional Constitution but not the Presidency issue. See Chiang Kai-shek, "Hsün-cheng shih-ch'i pu hsu-yao ch'an-sheng tsung-t'ung," *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 147:1-2 (March 30 1931).
9. Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung chih chi-chien shih-shih," *San-min chu-i yüeh-k'an*, 2.6:117 (December 15 1933).
10. Ch'en Kung-po once observed that in early 1929 Chiang Kai-shek had to rely on Hu Han-min to win Kwangtung's allegiance because Hu had a close relationship with Kwangtung. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.190. And, as late as early 1931, Chiang Kai-shek suspected that the two strong men in Kwangtung, Ch'en Min-shu and Ch'en Chi-t'ang

were actually Hu's men. See Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung chih chi-chien shih-shih," *San-min chu-i yüeh-k'an*, 2.6:112 (December 15 1933). See also Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho tso' ch'in-li chi," p.49.

11. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.289.
12. *Ibid.*, pp.289-293, 302-304.
13. See *ibid.*, pp.285-288; "Liang-kuang ho-tso yü Wang Ching-wei ti ts'an-chia," in "TPK," chapter 7, section 1.
14. Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.231; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'i'en-hou," p.85.
15. For the circular telegram, see *NHPL*, 1.1:2 (May 15 1931).
16. See Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.234; *Hsien-tai shih-liao*, vol. 3, p.37; *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 155:13-14 (May 25 1931), *Chung-yang jih-pao*, June 6 1931, June 15 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 440/3.1(17), 625/1(3).
17. Wang Ching-wei, "Tui Hsiang-kang Nan-hua hsing-ch'i pao chu-hu chi-che t'an-hua," *NHPL*, 1.1:4-5 (May 15 1931).
18. "Liang-kuang ho-tso yü Wang Ching-wei ti ts'an-chia," in "TPK," chapter 7, section 1; "I-chou ta-shih hui-shu," *Chung-yang chou-pou*, 157:11 (June 8 1931); *Chung-yang jih-pao*, June 6 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 440/3.1(17); Hsu Chu-ch'eng, *Pao-hai chiu-wen*, p.171.
19. Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.229.
20. *Ibid.*, p.231; *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.265; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'i'en-hou," p.85.
21. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.21:1 (June 1 1931); Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.342.
22. *Ti-ssu-chün chi-shih*, p.383. As early as April 25, Chang Fa-k'uei sent a letter to Ch'en Chi-t'ang expressing his intention to cooperate with Kwangtung, see *ibid.*, p.382. And on May 2 Wang Ching-wei cabled Li Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-k'uei urging them to align with the Kwangtung army. See *NHPL*, 1.1:2 (May 5 1931).
23. According to Ch'en Kung-po's account, Wang told Ch'en that Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Chang Fa-k'uei agreed to collaborate with the Kwangtung army on the condition that Wang himself should first go to Canton expressing his support for the opposition movement there. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.265.
24. For the Manifestoes, see Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.343-345; 395-397.

25. "Wu wei-yuan ching-heng tui yüeh-shih chih ta-k'o wen," in *Kuei-chen Kuang-tung shih-pien chi wen-tien*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.13-26.
26. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.265; "TPK," chapter 7, section 5.
27. Meng Hsi, "Kuan-yü 'fei-ch'ang hui-i' ho 'ning yüeh ho-tso'," p.104.
28. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.265-267.
29. *Chung-yang jih-pao*, June 15 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 625/1(3); *Ta-kung pao*, June 24 1931, p.3; July 10 1931, p.5.
30. Wang Ching-wei, "Lu-ho lien-ho ch'i-lai," *NHPL*, 1.1:2-3 (May 15 1931).
31. See, for example, Wang Ching-wei's speeches to the Kwangtung Provincial Party Branch (May 25 1931), and to a joint party-government gathering (June 1 1931), in Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.331-333, 349-352.
32. The term "*tang-chi hsien-sheng* (Mr Party Constitution)" was first and frequently used by Wu Chih-hui, the leading Nanking spokesman, to label Wang Ching-wei in an uncomplimentary manner. See, for example, Wu Chih-hui, "Liang-ko chiu tien-pao," in *Wu Chih-hui hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*, vol. 9, pp.869-870.
33. For the Manifesto, see Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.343-345.
34. Wang Ching-wei, "I-feng kuan-yü p'ai-pieh tsu-chih ti kung-k'ai hsin," *NHPL*, 1.8:13-14 (July 4 1931).
35. Lin Po-sheng, "Lu-ho fu-hsing Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang," *ibid.*, 1.4:11-14 (June 6 1931).
36. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.401. The Deputy Foreign Minister was Fu Ping-ch'ang, who was a close associate of Hu Han-min, and the Deputy Finance Minister was Wu Shang-ying, who was a Sun Fo's man.
37. *Ibid.*, p.400. Under the National Government Council there was a Military Affairs Committee which comprised all important regional militarists in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek. See *ibid.*, pp.417-418.
38. *Chung-yang jih-pao*, June 9 1931, June 15 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 625/1(3).
39. Ch'en Ming-shu later went to Nanking and declared his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek. For his account of the episode, see Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," pp.50-53.

40. In August 1931, in a meeting discussing whether to launch a military campaign against Nanking, Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Ku Ying-fen proposed to open negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek to settle the dispute between the two sides. Wang Ching-wei and Li Tsung-jen argued otherwise and strongly favoured a military solution. Ch'en's attitude vexed Wang much and in protest Wang left Canton for Hong Kong. Fearing that the opposition movement might divide against itself, Ch'en later deferred to Wang's ideas. However, he remained unenthusiastic in advancing his army against Nanking. See "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.36:1 (September 14 1931). See also Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.435-436.

41. "Wu wei-yuan ching-heng tui yüeh-shih chih ta-k'o wen," in *Kuei-chen Kuang-tung shih-pien chi wen-tien*, ed. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan hui hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.21-22.

42. Meng Hsi, "Kuan-yü 'fei-ch'ang hui-i' ho 'ning yüeh ho-tso,'" p.105; Chou I-chih, "'Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.87; *Chou Yung-neng hsien-sheng fang-wen chi-lu*, ed. Kuo Ting-ye, p.136.

43. Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.235.

44. Kao Pai-shih, "I Ch'en Po-nan," in *Ku Ch'un-feng lou so-chi*, Kao Pai-shih, vol. 13, pp.124, 127; Han Yün, "Ku Ying-fen shih-shih chih ch'ien-hou," in *Hsien-tai shih-liao*, vol. 2, p.200; Chou I-chih, "'Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.84. It is worthy of note that Ku Ying-fen played a major role in dislodging Ch'en Ming-shu from Canton and so enabling Ch'en Chi-t'ang to dominate Kwangtung. See Ch'en Ming-shu, "'Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," p.50.

45. *Chung-yang jih-pao*, June 15 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 625/1(3); Ch'en Ming-shu, "'Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," p.49.

46. It was said that Ku Ying-fen had so dominated the political scene in Kwangtung that it created discontent among other factions. In June, a secret movement was initiated to boycott Ku. But it proved to be a petty power struggle and did not split the opposition forces. See *Chung-yang chou-pao*, 160:11-12 (June 29 1931); Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.433-435.

47. Ku Ying-fen once blocked Wang Ching-wei's attempt at reshuffling of provincial and municipal party branches in Kwangtung for fear of Wang's ulterior motives. Besides, Teng Tse-ju and Hsiao Fo-ch'eng always made hostile and carping criticisms of proposals put forward by the KMT Left. See Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.234; *Chung-yang jih-pao*, June 15 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 625/1(3). Chang Chün, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i yi-shih," in *Hsien-tai shih-liao*, vol. 3, p.37.

48. To be sure, Hsieh Ch'ih, Fu Yü-lin and T'an Chen had expressed support for the opposition movement. On one occasion Hsieh Ch'ih came to Canton to attend the inauguration ceremony of the new Government. See Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.401; Wang Ching-wei, "Tui Hsiang-kang Nan-hua jih-pao she chu-hu chi-che t'an-hua," *NHPL*, 1.1:3-4 (May 15 1931). Another well-known Western Hills member, Chü Cheng, was arrested by the Nanking Government in late 1929 because of his involvement in the opposition movement. See Lei Hsiao-ts'en, *Yu-huan yü-sheng chi tzu-shu*, p.78.

49. See So Wai-chor, "The Western Hills Group in the National Revolution (1924-1928): A study of ideology and politics within the Kuomintang," pp.219-267.

50. It was reported that Hsu Ch'ung-chih had attempted to buy support of the Fukien army, but Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Ku Ying-fen turned it down on the ground that it was beyond the means of Kwangtung to implement such an ambitious plan. Hsu felt slighted and for a while went to Hong Kong in silent protest. See "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.27:3 (July 13 1931). Chou I-chih, "Wo tui Hsu Ch'ung-chih liao-chieh ti p'ien-tuan," p.134; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, p.434.

51. "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.27:3 (July 13 1931).

52. "TPK," chapter 7, section 4; Chang Chün, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i yi-shih," in *Hsien-tai shih-liao*, vol. 3, pp.36-37; Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.232.

53. Meng Hsi, "Kuan-yü 'fei-ch'ang hui-i' ho 'ning yüeh ho-tso'," pp.104-105.

54. Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, pp.235-236; Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, p.163.

55. Meng Hsi, "Kuan-yü 'fei-ch'ang hui-i' ho 'ning yüeh ho-tso,'" p.105; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.85.

56. Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, pp.234-235.

57. Hsu Chu-ch'eng, *Pao-hai chiu-wen*, p.181. See also *Ta-kung pao*, July 10 1931, p.3.

58. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.264-266.

59. At that time Canton had established communications with several army commanders in the North such as Ho Chien (Hunan) Chiang Kuang-nai (Kiangsi), Shih Yu-shan (Hopei), and Shang Chen (Shansi). Only Shih Yu-shan responded to the call and staged a campaign against Nanking on July 19 1931. No sooner had he started the

campaign than he was quickly suppressed. See Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.422-425; Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.438-439.

60. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.432-433, 438-448.

61. For the daily activities of the Extraordinary Conference, see *ibid.*, pp.348-393; 400-416.

62. Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.418-424.

63. It was said that Ch'en Chi-t'ang eventually agreed to launch a military campaign against Nanking because of the pressure from Wang Ching-wei and Li Tsung-jen. See "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.36:1-2 (September 14 1931); Chang T'ung-hsin, *Kuo-min-tang hsin-chün-fa hun-chan shih-lüeh*, pp.435-441.

64. For a detailed account of the dialogue between Canton and Nanking before the Shanghai Peace Conference, see Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.457-478; Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," pp.56-62.

65. The Canton delegation was composed of Wang Ching-wei, Tsou Lu, Eugene Ch'en, Sun Fo, Li Wen-fan and Wu Chao-shu. On the Nanking negotiation team were Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Chang Chi, Li Shih-tseng, Chang Ching-chiang and Ch'en Ming-shu. See "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.43:1, 6 (November 2 1931).

66. The November 7 agreement was couched in the form of a Manifesto jointly issued by the two delegations. For the agreement, see "I-chou chien kuo-nei-wai ta-shih shu-p'ing," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.45:4-5 (November 16 1931).

67. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.264-266. Ch'en did not entertain Wang's request to contact T.V. Soong; at the time he favoured more a "Wang-Hu cooperation" than a "Wang-Chiang cooperation." See *ibid.*

68. Wang Ching-wei, "Chiu-wang chih wei-i t'u-ching," *NHPL*, 1.20/21:6-8 (October 10 1931); Wang Ching-wei, "I-chih mai-kuo hai-shih i-chih chiu-kuo," *ibid.*, 1.20/21:2-6 (October 10 1931).

69. Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.235.

70. Chou I-chih, "'Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'i'en-hou," pp.87-88; Meng Hsi, "Kuan-yü 'fei-ch'ang hui-i' ho 'ning-yüeh ho-tso'," p.106; *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.264-266. See also Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek: soldier and statesman*, vol. 2, p.234.

71. "Wang Ching-wei: 'chiu-i-pa' ch'ien-hou t'ai-tu chih shuo-ming," Kuomintang Archives,, 240/79. The telegram has two puzzling points. It is not known to whom the telegram was addressed, and the year in which the telegram was issued was not put down. According to the Kuomintang Archives Commission's opinion, it was probably issued in May 1932.

72. For Ch'en Kung-po's attitude, see *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.266-268. For Chang Fa-k'uei's attitude, see Meng Hsi, "Kuan-yü 'fei-ch'ang hui-i' ho 'ning-hüeh ho-tso,'" p.108. For the attitude of T'an Chen and Sun Fo's followers, see Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.90. Ch'eng T'ien-ku also related that many party members would like Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min to collaborate with each other to save the country. See Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.236.

73. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.264-268.

74. *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.267. Wang Ching-wei's decision to ally with Chiang Kai-shek was supported by Ku Meng-yü who was once an ardent advocate for "Wang-Chiang cooperation." See Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsui p'ai," p.211.

75. Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, p.166; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.88.

76. Wei Jung-hsi, "Ning-yüeh yu-fen-erh-ho ti i-tuan nei-mu," *Ch'un-ch'i*, 25:5 (July 16 1958). Chou I-chih, a participant in the Extraordinary Conference, noted that when Wang Ching-wei left Canton for Shanghai to attend the Peace Conference, he behaved just like he would leave Canton for good. See Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.90.

77. For the Fourth National Party Congress in Nanking, see "Nan-ching kuo-min-tang ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui," *Kuo-wen chou-pao*, 8.46:1-11 (November 23 1931), 8.47:1-9 (November 30 1931). See also Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.490-497.

78. "TPK," chapter 7, section 5.

79. In a press conference on November 27 1931, Wang Ching-wei stated that the November 7 agreement was not a concession to Chiang Kai-shek. He argued that even if the agreement had violated "some basic principle," it was done entirely for the interests of the whole nation. See *Chung-yang jih-pao*, November 29 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 440/3(20).

80. Apart from the question of Chiang Kai-shek's resignation, the Kwangtung group and the party elder group also disputed the procedure of electing new CEC and CSC members as laid down by the agreement on the ground that it was not

"democratic." For their views, see "Hsiu-cheng ho-hui chüeh-i an t'ung-tien," *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui chi-nien ts'e*, Ti-ssu-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui pi-shu ch'u hsüan-ch'uan pu, pp.6-8. See also Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.501-502; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i" ch'ien-hou," pp.92-93.

81. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.502-504.

82. *Chung-yang jih-pao*, November 29 1931, Newspaper clippings, Kuomintang Archives, 440/3(20); "TPK," chapter 7, section 9; *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.267; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.501.

83. *Ibid.*, p.511; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i" ch'ien-hou," pp.92-93.

84. For the mini-party congress in Shanghai, see "TPK," chapter 7, section 9; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.519-529; *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.267; Yen Jan, "Shang-hai ti ssu-ch'üan ta-hui," in *Hsien-tai shih-liao*, vol. 2, pp.80-94.

85. At the beginning both Nanking and Canton had reached an agreement that the new CEC and CSC should have a membership of 160. 112 of them were members elected by previous party congresses (i.e. the First, Second and Third Congresses) while the remaining 48 members were to be elected by both sides (with each side electing 24 members). The election of another batch of Central Committee members by the KMT Left in Shanghai was thus not provided by the agreement. Canton of course disputed the legality of this new "Leftist" batch of Central Committee members; finally a compromise was reached. This new batch would be included in the new CEC and CSC and at the same time both Canton and Nanking would elect another 9 new Central Committee members (Canton 4 members, Nanking 5 members); thus the new CEC and CSC membership was increased to 178. See Shen Yün-lung, *Min-kuo shih-shih yü jen-wu lun-ts'ung*, pp.320-323; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.501-514.

86. The Fourth National Party Congress in Canton ended on December 5 1931. It was insistent on demanding the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek and sent a delegation comprising Sun Fo, Wu Ch'ao-shu, Li Wen-fan and Eugene Ch'en to Shanghai with a view to pressing for this demand. On December 10 the Canton delegation discussed with the Nanking authorities on the issue and five days later, Chiang announced his resignation. See Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.532-533; Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," p.63.

87. *Ibid.*, pp.68-70; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, ed., *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.548-549. The list of appointments was first discussed in a meeting between

Wang Ching-wei's right-hand men, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yü and Nanking leaders, Yü Yu-jen, Chu P'ei-te, Shao Li-tzu, Ho Ying-chin and Ch'en Kuo-fu. See *K'u-hsiao lu*, p.278.

88. Hu Han-min also declined to take up his posts in Nanking, see Chiang Yung-ching, *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-pu*, pp.515-516.

89. *Ta-kung pao*, January 6 1932, p.3. See also *Chiang tsung-tung pi lu*, trans. Chung-yang jih-pao she, vol. 8, pp.131-132; Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek: soldier and statesman*, vol. 2, p.336.

90. *Ta-kung pao*, January 8 1932, p.3.

91. Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," p.67; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, p.543.

92. Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," p.80.

93. *Ta-kung pao*, January 15 1932, p.3.

94. *Ibid.*, January 15 1932, p.3, January 17 1932, p.3.

95. In October 1931, when Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei met in Shanghai, they agreed to nominate Sun Fo as President of the Executive Yuan. In the event, Wang did not back Sun when he reached an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek. Hu was said to have been enraged by Wang's "betrayal." See Ch'en Hsi-chang, *Kuang-chou shu-fu shih-hua*, p.270; Ch'eng T'ien-ku, *Ch'eng T'ien-ku hui-i lu*, p.236. Eye-witnesses' accounts confirmed that Hu Han-min strongly supported Sun Fo's government. See Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," pp.93-94; Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," pp.72-73; Meng Hsi, "Kuan-yü 'fei-ch'ang hui-i' ho 'ning yüeh ho-tso'," p.107. Hu's firm support for Sun Fo was most clearly expressed in his telegram (January 18 1932) to Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek where he frankly stated that he hoped that Sun Fo could still be allowed to carry out his government duties and policies. For the telegram, see "Fu Wang Ching-wei Chiang Chieh-shih liang hsien-sheng yen shih-cheng tien," in *Hu Han-min hsien-sheng cheng-lun hsüan-pien*, p.669.

96. Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," pp.73-75; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.95; Chien Yu-wen, *Hsi-pei ts'ung-chün chi*, pp.180-181.

97. *Ibid.*, pp.180-181; Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," pp.76-78; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," pp.95-96.

98. *Ta-kung pao*, January 19 1932, p.3, January 22 1932, p.3.

99. *Ibid.*

100. *Chiang Tsung-tung pi-lu*, trans. Chung-yang jih-pao she, vol. 8, pp.132-133; Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek: soldier and statesman*, vol. 2, p.337; Ch'en Ming-shu, "Ning-yüeh ho-tso' ch'in-li chi," pp.79-80; Chou I-chih, "Fei-ch'ang hui-i' ch'ien-hou," p.96.

101. In a publication printed by Hu Han-min's supporters in Canton in 1934, it was alleged that both Wang and Chiang had forced Sun Fo to resign. See Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chün-jen she, *Fan-Chiang yün-tung shih*, pp.552, 557.

102. *Chiang Tsung-tung pi-lu*, trans. Chung-yang jih-pao she, vol. 8, pp.132-133.

103. The other seven members of the Standing Committee of the CEC were Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min, Yü Yu-jen, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, Chü Cheng, Sun Fo and Ch'en Kuo-fu.

104. See *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang nien-chien 1934*, section 3, pp.58, 75, 78-80, 90-92, 105, 112.

105. For instance, Kan Nai-kuang was appointed as Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Interior, Kuo Ch'un-t'ao, Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Industry, Tseng Chung-ming, Wang Ching-wei's private secretary, Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Railways. Other middle-ranking Leftists such as Li Chün-lung and Chao Wei-mo secured posts in the diplomatic service. See Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsu p'ai," p.227.

106. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.327-332; Fan Yü-sui, "Wo so chih-tao ti kai-tsu p'ai," p.230.

107. During the first party plenum held on December 22-29 after the reconciliation between Canton and Nanking, Leftist Central Committee members led by Ch'en Kung-po put forward proposals advocating democratization of the party and the strengthening of the mass organizations. Their proposals were referred to the Standing Committee of the CEC and in the end nothing came of it. The Leftist leaders simply had to accept the hard fact that they did not have a majority support in the Party Central and had to comply with the decisions of the Party Central if they wanted a continued cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek. For the proposals of these Leftist leaders, see *Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-ssu-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-iu chi-lu*, pp.57-58, 69-70. For the deliberation of the issue in the plenum, see *ibid.*, pp.29-41.

108. The public announcement was made by Ch'en Kung-po on the occasion when he was appointed as Minister of Industry in the new Government. For the announcement, see *Chung-yang chou-pou*, 188:22-23 (January 11 1932).

109. *K'u-hsiao lu*, pp.327-332; Lo Fang-chung, "Kuan-yü kai-tsü p'ai ti i-lin pan-chao," p.85.

CONCLUSION

As should be evident now, the KMT Left in 1928-31 did develop its own version of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine and propound an alternative to the official policy line. That the KMT in this period was at a historical turning point, choosing between Chiang Kai-shek's course and the Leftist alternative is not to be doubted. That this Leftist alternative, consistent and coherent on the theoretical plane and comprehensive enough in its scope, is fundamentally different from the official ideology and policies of the Nanking leadership is also not to be disputed. One significant feature of this Leftist alternative, which has not been noticed by historians before, is that it underwent two phases of changing emphasis. The Leftist alternative shaped by the Ch'en Kung-po school in 1928 was distinctly different from the one defined by Wang Ching-wei in 1929-31. The former one gave expression to the revolutionary ideals of 1924-27 and interpreted Sun Yat-sen's doctrine in a Marxist-oriented direction, while the latter one shifted the ideological emphasis to the issue of democracy. The differences in ideological emphasis no doubt derived from the differences in intellectual orientation between Wang and Ch'en. The Marxist-oriented nature of Ch'en's thinking was not in tune with Wang's political mind. But the shift in ideological emphasis under the auspices of Wang also had everything to do with the political situation of the time -- Wang intended to provide a common denominator with regional militarists in the opposition to the Nanking regime. The drastic shift in the Leftist ideology revealed to the full Wang's pragmatism in handling politics.

The shift in the Leftist ideology signified as well a change in the nature of the Leftist opposition movement to Nanking. A political scientist, Gordon Skilling, in his study of the opposition in communist system, discerned four types of opposition. First, integral opposition, by which he means opposition to the system itself, which sometimes takes the form of violent revolts or mass demonstrations. Second, factional opposition, which is a type of opposition "to the leaders in power, normally by rivals for the topmost positions but sometimes by partners sharing power with those whom they seek to oust." Third, fundamental opposition, which is a kind of opposition to "a whole series of key policies of the regime, reflecting crucial differences in standards of value but also a rejection of the Communist system itself." Fourth, specific opposition, which is opposed to specific policies without a rejection of the regime, its leaders, or its general

policies.¹ Skilling's four types of opposition, may also be applied to the opposition in a one-party state such as China under the KMT rule. Drawing upon Skilling's ideas, we may say that the Leftist alternative as defined by the Ch'en Kung-po school represented a kind of fundamental opposition to the Nanking regime, which was also akin to a kind of integral opposition. It not only was opposed to the personnel of the Nanking Government, to its whole range of policy measures but also to its socio-economic system. It aimed at the establishment of a "non-capitalist socialist" China which bordered on a rejection of the political, economic and social system of the Nanking regime existing at that time. In contrast, the Leftist alternative as worked out by Wang Ching-wei can be grouped into the type of factional opposition, or even specific opposition. It did not make a change to the existing socio-economic system its primary aim; it mainly intended to change the leadership in Nanking, particularly it sought to displace Chiang Kai-shek who was held responsible for all the misery suffered by the party and the people. Its major ideological difference with Nanking boiled down to the element of "practice" -- the KMT Left promised that it would implement democracy in China at once if it was in power and it charged that the Nanking leadership had no intention of achieving democracy in China. Thus, the Leftist opposition in 1929-31 was more limited in its scope of opposition than the one conceived by Ch'en Kung-po.

Was the Leftist alternative a viable one in the political context of the time? At the outset of this study I proposed to tackle the question by examining the quality of the Leftist leadership and the political strength of the KMT Left in the party and its support among the masses. Now we can draw conclusions. As regards the leadership of the KMT Left, we have noted that not all Leftist leaders were politically active during the period of opposition. Even those activist leaders did not on the whole show much leadership quality. Firmness in political stand and force of will were all lacking in the Leftist leadership, and this was particularly true of Wang Ching-wei himself. The pragmatic side of Wang's political mind predisposed him to shift with the political wind. He abandoned the Leftist ideology shaped by the Ch'en Kung-po school and redefined it for the sake of forging an alliance with regional militarists, and his various political moves, such as sounding out Chiang Kai-shek for a political alliance after the dissolution of the Enlarged Conference and sacrificing the long-held Leftist stand on the party-legitimacy issue to an alliance with militarists in Canton, are ample proof of Wang's shiftiness and lack of firmness in political will. Based on the pattern of political behaviour of Wang Ching-wei during the whole period of the Leftist opposition, it is safe to draw the conclusion that even if the KMT Left had captured power in Nanking with the aid of regional militarists, it is doubtful that the Leftist leadership led by Wang Ching-wei would have stood up to the regional militarists by curbing their power and decreeing a democratic reform in China.

From the record of the Leftist opposition movement in 1929-31, Wang Ching-wei proved himself to be more an ordinary pragmatic politician than a leader of vision striving unflinchingly for his political cause.² This study in fact agrees with the long-standing belief that one salient characteristic of the politician in Wang Ching-wei was his ever readiness to compromise -- his shiftiness -- which, as this study shows, was a result of his pragmatic approach to politics. It is true that making compromises in certain situations are part of the politician's stock-in-trade. But Wang had resorted to this means too frequently and sometimes suddenly that it gave rise to the suspicion that he was more an opportunist than a leader of vision. For a man of vision in the Leftist leadership, Ch'en Kung-po's intellectual brilliance and breadth of thinking, rare among KMT leaders, might qualify him as such a man. But Ch'en's capacity was vitiated by the fact that he often acted against his own judgements in order to comply with Wang Ching-wei's decisions. His almost unquestioned loyalty to Wang made him fail to rank as a leader in his own right and to tower above the other Leftist leaders who he found were of disappointingly low calibre.

If the Leftist leadership did not exude the kind of firmness in political will in striving for its cause, to what extent could the political strength of the Left as a whole make up for this deficiency and thus enable it to capture power in Nanking? On the basis of the findings of this study, there was not much prospect for the Left to topple the Nanking leadership as the political strength of the Left was plainly inadequate for such a goal. True, after the party purge the KMT Left, aided by the political climate which still cherished the revolutionary ideals of 1924-27, and the disaffection of various factions in the party against Nanking's monopoly of the Third Congress, did find a large receptive audience among the party's rank and file. However, for all the strength and influence of the Left in the party, it soon proved that it could not withstand the Nanking party machinery. The Nanking leadership, dominant at the top level of the Party apparatus and the Central Government, possessed important means to weed out the opposition. The successful summoning of the Third National Party Congress marked the beginning of the end of the Leftist support in the party. The rule of the Nanking leadership was legitimatized by the Congress which probably motivated a large number of uncommitted party members to join the Nanking side. Shortly after formal party organizations at regional level fell into the hands of the Nanking leadership one after another and by early 1930 there were few party branches over which the Left could claim to have retained control. As regards the social constituency for the Left, it was at most marginal. We have noted that the Left's social support was confined to students, intellectuals and youth in various parts of China and to the working class in the Peiping-Tientsin region, with an overwhelming majority of the population -- the peasantry being the most notable group -- totally holding aloof from the Leftist cause.

And even the limited social constituency the Left had built began to disintegrate after mid-1929. The support of the working class in the Peiping-Tientsin region was so shaky and transient that after party branches in North China were successively reorganized by the Nanking Party Central, the Left's control over trade unions there was broken. And about the same time the support of students, intellectuals and youth was evidently in decline. The weakening of the Leftist appeal to this group of people was for a large part a result of the Left's decision to ally with regional militarists. Now the Left often had to compromise its ideological stand in order to maintain the alliance with militarists. This brought about disillusionment among students, youth and intellectuals, and it also seriously infected the Leftist ranks. With a marginal constituency in society, and inadequate strength in the party to withstand the Nanking party machinery, the Left had never possessed the kind of political strength to enable it to displace the Nanking leadership from power. It is worthy of note that Wang Ching-wei and his followers had decided to ally with regional militarists in early 1929 long before the decline of support in the party and among certain sections of the population was evident. Thus, their decision was more out of the motive of exploiting the discontent of militarists and obtaining their support to topple the Nanking leadership than out of the fear that they lacked influence in the party and in the masses. Such a policy under the direction of Wang Ching-wei in course of time only made the fortunes of the Left inextricably linked up with those of regional militarists; enlisting support from the party and the people became increasingly secondary in importance and was gradually disregarded in practice. As a consequence when the regional militarists were defeated by Nanking, the Leftist opposition movement also collapsed.

It is tempting to suggest, in view of the disastrous result of allying with regional militarists, that the Leftist leaders should have concentrated more on cultivating the support of party members and of the masses. But, as we take the political situation at that time into account, these leaders had strong reasons to believe that an alliance with militarists would have been more effective in overthrowing the Nanking leadership and serving their cause. First of all, the political conditions of the time were extremely favourable for forging an alliance with disaffected regional militarists. It would have been unthinkable to any leader in opposition not to take advantage of the political situation and strengthen his power. Furthermore, from the very beginning the social support for the Left was very limited. It seems, judging by the reaction of the news media, that the overwhelming majority of the population had few illusions about the KMT as a whole. Much time was certainly needed if the Left really intended to organize the masses in opposition to Nanking, but it was a course of action which the Left was not inclined to take because an alliance with regional militarists could more quickly decide the outcome of the struggle against Nanking. And it was inherent in the nature

of politics of the time that if the Left wanted an alliance with regional militarists, it had to compromise its ideological stand which was at the cost of its appeal to the party and the masses. The Left was obviously situated in a political dilemma from which it never emerged unscathed and in the end it had to overcome the dilemma simply by reidentifying itself with the Nanking leadership. In the last analysis, the source of this dilemma originated from the fact that the KMT Left never possessed the kind of political strength which could really rival that of the Nanking leadership. And it was this factor which rendered the Leftist alternative not viable in the political context of the time.

The failure of the Leftist opposition movement has a wider implication for Chinese Republican history. Throughout the Republican period up to 1949, to save China from extinction and to bring her into the family of modernized, industrial nations were the ultimate political goals of the time. Various political groups worked for these goals, among which Chiang Kai-shek's regime and the CCP were the most important. The Republican history finally culminated in a showdown between Chiang Kai-shek's political course and the communist alternative and it was resolved in favour of the communists in 1949. Viewing through this light, the Leftist opposition movement represented a "third" course between the two. From 1928 to 1949, there were numerous political forces attempting to find a way between Chiang's course and the communist one for China to develop into a modern nation. But it was the KMT Left which posed the only serious "third" course between the two -- throughout the period 1928-49, among all the "third" forces, the KMT Left was the only one which could claim to have enlisted significant support in the ruling party, appealed to certain sections of students, intellectuals, youth and workers, and more impressively, secured aid from many major regional militarists in the bid for shaping China's destiny. The eventual failure of this large opposition force in the KMT signified the end of any kind of serious "third" course between Chiang's regime and communism. After 1931, China increasingly faced a choice between Chiang Kai-shek's regime and a communist state, the other important "third" forces such as the Third Party and the China Democratic League never commanded the political strength the KMT Left once did have and as such they had no better prospects than the KMT Left in implementing their alternative programmes in China.³ If Chiang's regime could not survive in China, and in the event it did not, the only alternative for China to develop to was communism.

Notes

1. H. Gordon Skilling, "Opposition in Communist East Europe," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions*, pp.92-94.
2. Howard L. Boorman, in his discussion about Wang Ching-wei, holds the opinion that "Wang Ching-wei's claim to realism is dubious, for his public career was a monument to miscalculation, poor timing, and exiguous foresight." See Howard L. Boorman, "Wang Ching-wei: China's romantic radical," *Political Science Quarterly*, 79:505 (1964).
3. For a discussion about the political activities of the China Democratic League, see Anthony J. Shaheen, "The China Democratic League and Chinese politics," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977. For the Third Party, see Lin Mou-sheng, et al., *Chung-kuo hsien-tai cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih*, pp.296-326. See also John K. Olenik, "Left wing radicalism in the Kuomintang: Teng Yen-ta and the genesis of the Third Party Movement in China, 1924-1931," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1973.

GLOSSARY

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| Chang Chi 張繼 | Chien-t'ao 檢討 |
| Chang Chi-pen 張知本 | Ch'ien-chin 前進 |
| Chang Ching-chiang 張靜江 | Chih-nan chen 指南針 |
| Chang Fa-k'uei 張發奎 | chih-yeh she-hui 职业社会 |
| Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良 | chih-yeh t'u'an-t'i 职业团体 |
| Changchow 漳州 | Chin Ts'eng-ch'eng 金曾澄 |
| Changsha 長沙 | Chinan 濟南 |
| Chao P'i-lien 趙丕廉 | ching-chi tsu-chi wei chi-ch'u 經濟组织 為基礎 |
| Chao Tai-wen 趙戴文 | Ching Heng-i 經亨頤 |
| Che-chiang jih-pao 浙江日報 | Ching P'o 荆璞 |
| Ch'en Chi-t'ang 陳濟棠 | ching-shen sheng-ch'an 精神生產 |
| Ch'en Ch'i-yuan 陳其瑗 | ching-shen t'u'an-chieh 精神团结 |
| Ch'en Chia-yu 陳嘉祐 | Ch'ing-nien ch'u-lu 青年出路 |
| Ch'en Kang-shih 陳康時 | Ch'ing-nien hu-sheng 青年呼声 |
| Ch'en Kung-po 陳公博 | Chou Fo-hai 周佛海 |
| Ch'en Kuo-fu 陳果夫 | Chu-ch'eng tang-sheng 諸城堂聲 |
| Ch'en Ming-shu 陳銘樞 | Chu Chi-ch'ing 朱霽青 |
| Ch'en Pi-chün 陳璧君 | chu-ch'üan tsai-min 生木在民 |
| Ch'en Shu-jen 陳樹人 | Chucheng 諸城 |
| Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀 | Chung-hua min-kuo chün |
| Ch'en Yao-yuan 陳耀垣 | tsung-ssu-ling pu 中華民國軍總司令部 |
| Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Ch'en) 陳友仁 | Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang hu-tang |
| cheng-chih fen-hui 政治分會 | ko-ming ta-t'ung-meng 中国国民党护党 革命大同盟 |
| Cheng-hsüeh hsi 政學系 | Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang kai-tsu |
| cheng-li 整理 | t'ung-chih hui 中国国民党改组同儕會 |
| Ch'eng T'ien-ku 程天固 | Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang |
| Chenk'ou 鎮口 | ko-sheng-shih hai-wai tsung |
| chi-hui hsin 机会心 | chi-pu lien-ho pan-shih ch'u 中国国民党名宿 海外总支部联合会事處 |
| chi-pen ta-fa 基本大法 | Chung P'eng 中彭 |
| Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 | |
| chieh-chi she-hui 階級社會 | |
| chieh-chi tou-cheng 階級斗争 | |

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|--|--------------------------------|
| Chung-yang chih-chien wei-yuan | hsiao shih-min 小市民 |
| fei-ch'ang hui-i 中央執監委員非常會議 | Hsiao Shu-yü 蕭淑宇 |
| Chung-yang jih-pao 中央日報 | hsiao tsu-chih 小组织 |
| Chung-yang tang-pu k'uo-ta hui-i 中央黨部擴大會議 | Hsieh Tu-pi 薛鶴弼 |
| Chung-yang t'e-pieh wei-yuan-hui 中央特別委員會 | hsien 縣 |
| Chung-yang wan-pao 中央晚報 | Hsin Chung-kuo hsüeh hui 新中國學會 |
| chü 区 | Hsin sheng-ming 新生命 |
| chü-fen pu 区分部 | Hsin-feng pan-yüeh-k'an 新鋒半月刊 |
| ch'ü-p'i ts'un-ku 骨皮存骨 | Hsin-wen jih pao 新聞日報 |
| ch'üan-min 全民 | Hsing Chüeh-fei 邢覺非 |
| Ch'üan-t'i hsing 全体性 | hsiu-yang 修養 |
| Chüeh-wu ch'ing-nien 青年觉悟 | Hsiung K'o-wu 鮑克武 |
| chün-ch'üan chu-i 均权主义 | Hsu Ch'ien 徐謙 |
| erh-hua 惡化 | Hsu Chu-ch'eng 許鑄成 |
| Fan Ch'i-wu 范其務 | Hsu Ch'ung-chih 許崇智 |
| Fang Chen-wu 方振武 | Hsu Ch'ung-ch'ing 許崇清 |
| fei-yo 飛躍 | Hsu Te-heng 許德珩 |
| fen-chih ho-tso 分治合作 | Hu Chi-hsien 胡繼賢 |
| Fen-chin chou-k'an 奉進周刊 | Hu Han-min 胡漢民 |
| Feng Yü-hsiang 馮玉祥 | Hua-tung jih-pao 華東日報 |
| Fenghsien 丰縣 | Huan-kung 環攻 |
| Foochow 福州 | Huan-pei jih-pao 白皖北日報 |
| fu-hao 富豪 | Huang Chi-lu 黃季陸 |
| fu-hua 廉化 | Huang Kung-tu 黃公度 |
| fu-tsa 複雜 | Huang Shao-hsiung 黃紹雄 |
| Fu Ju-lin 傅汝霖 | Huang Yen-tsuan 黃延讚 |
| Hai-teng 海燈 | Hui-mieh 敗滅 |
| Hangchow 杭州 | i-chih 意志 |
| Ho Chien 何鍵 | i-ko ken-pen kuan-nien 一個根本觀念 |
| Ho Hsiang-ning 何香凝 | i-tang chih-chün 以黨治軍 |
| ho-i chih 合議制 | i-tang chih-kuo 以黨治國 |
| hsia-i ti chieh-chi 狹義的階級 | Jen-min jih-pao 人民日報 |
| hsiang 鄉 | Kai-tsao yüeh-k'an 改造月刊 |
| Hsiang-pao 响報 | kai-tsu 改組 |
| Hsiang-tao chou-pao 响導用報 | Kaifeng 開封 |
| Hsiao Fo-ch'eng 蕭佛成 | kai-tsu p'ai 改組派 |
| | Kan Nai-kuang 甘乃光 |
| | ken-pen kai-tsu 根本改組 |

ko-chü chün-fa 剷据軍閥
 ko-jen wu-li 個人武力
 ko-ming ch'ien-lu 革命前路
 ko-ming ch'u-lu 革命出路
 ko-ming hui-k'an 革命彙刊
 ko-ming jih-pao 革命日報
 ko-ming kung-jen 革命工人
 ko-ming p'ing-lun 革命評論
 Ku Meng-yü 顧孟餘
 Ku Ying-fen 古應芬
 kua-t'ou ti kuan-liao cheng-chih 寡頭的官僚政治
 Kuan Fu 觀復
 kuang-i ti chieh-chi 廣義的階級
 Kuei Chung-chi 桂崇基
 kung-ch'üan 公权
 Kung-jen chih-lu 工人之路
 kung-p'u 公僕
 kung-yu 公有
 Kuo Ch'un-t'ao 郭春濤
 kuo-min 國民
 kuo-min hui-i 國民會議
 kuo-min jih-pao 國民日報
 Li Chi-shen 李濟深
 Li Kuan-yang 李冠洋
 li-liang chi-chung 力量集中
 Li Lieh-chün 李烈鈞
 Li Lu-ch'ao 李祿超
 li-shih p'ai 歷史派
 Li Shih-tseng 李石曾
 Li Tsung-jen 李宗仁
 Li Wen-fan 李文範
 Liao Chung-k'ai 廖仲愷
 lien-O 联俄
 lien-chieh cheng-fu 廉潔政府
 Lin I-chung 林翼中
 Lin Po-sheng 林柏生
 Lin Sen 林森

Lin Yün-kai 林雲陔
 ling-tao ch'üan t'ung-i 領導权集中
 Liu Chi-wen 劉紀文
 Liu K'an-yuan 劉侃元
 Lu Ti-p'ing 魯添平
 Li yang 梁陽
 Ma Chün 馬騫
 Mao Tsu-ch'üan 茅祖权
 mao-tun 矛盾
 Min-ch'i jih-pao 民氣日報
 Min-chu 民主
 min-chu chi-ch'üan chi 民主集权制
 Min-chu jih-pao 民主日報
 min-chu shih-li 民主勢力
 Min-chung hsien-feng 民衆先鋒
 Min-hsin 民心
 Min-i 民意
 min-i chi-kuan 民意机关
 Min-pao 民報
 MiaoPin 紹斌
 Nan-hua 南華
 Nan-hua jih-pao 南華日報
 Nan-hua p'ing-lun 南華評論
 Nantung 南通
 Nuan-liu 暖流
 Pai Ch'ung-hsi 白崇禧
 Pai Yün-t'i 白雲梯
 P'an Yün-ch'ao 潘雲超
 Pei-fang p'ing-lun 北平評論
 P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei 彭學沛
 P'eng Tse-min 彭澤民
 P'ing-min jih-pao 平民日報
 Po Wen-wei 褚文蔚
 Pukou 浦口
 San-min chu-i shih-chien she 三民主義實踐社
 San-min chu-i kuo-chi 三民主義國際
 San-min chu-i ta-t'ung-meng 三民主義大同盟

Shang Chen 商震
 Shang-hai min-pao 上海民報
 shang-ts'eng tsu-chih 上層组织
 Shanhakuan 山海关
 sheng 省
 sheng-ch'an chieh-chi 生產階級
 sheng-ch'an fen-chi 生產份子
 Shih Ts'un-t'ung 施存統
 Shih-wan huo-chi 十萬火急
 Shih Yu-shan 石友三
 Shu Kuo-fan 舒國藩
 Shuang-pao 痘報
 Soong Ch'ing-ling 宋庆齡
 Soong Tse-ven (T.V. Soong) 宋子文
 ssu-ch'üan 私权
 Sun Fo 孫科
 Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙
 Sung Che-yuan 宋哲元
 Ta-kung pao 大公報
 Ta-lu 大陸
 Tai Chi-t'ao 戴季陶
 Taiyuan 太原
 T'an Chen 覃振
 T'an Yen-k'ai 謢延闕
 Tang-chi 党基
 tang-ti chuan-cheng 党的專政
 tang-t'ung 党統
 tang-wu cheng-li wei-yuan-hui 党務整理委員會
 tang-wu chih-tao wei-yuan-hui 党務指導委員會
 Tang-wu yüeh-k'an 党務月刊
 Tangshan 唐山
 Tanyang 丹陽
 T'ang Shao-i 唐紹仪
 T'ang Sheng-chih 唐生智
 Teng Chao-yin 鄧昭蔭

Teng Ch'ing-yang 鄧青陽
 Teng Mou-hsiu 鄧懋修
 Teng Tse-ju 鄧澤如
 Teng Yen-hua 鄧彦華
 Teng Yen-ta 鄧演達
 ti-fang tzu-chih 地方自治
 to chieh-chi ti hun-tou 多階級的混斗
 t'o-hsieh 妥協
 Tsai-tsao 再造
 Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei 蔡元培
 Tso-feng 左鋒
 Tso-hsiang 左向
 Tsou Lu 鄒魯
 tsung-fa feng-chien 宗法封建
 tsung fang-chen 总方針
 tung 動
 Tung-fang kuo-chi 東方國際
 Tungshan 通山
 tung-ti wu-kuan 動的物觀
 Wan Min-i 萬民一
 Wang-Chiang ho-tso 汪蔣合作
 Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛
 Wang Ch'ung-hui 王寵惠
 Wang Fa-ch'in 王法勤
 Wang Lo-p'ing 王樂平
 wu 物
 Wu Ch'ao-shu 伍朝樞
 Wu Chih-hui 吳稚暉
 wu-chih sheng-ch'an 物質生產
 wu-chuang t'ung-chih 武裝同志
 wu-kuan 物觀
 Wuchin 武進
 Wuhsi 無錫
 Yang Yung-t'ai 楊永泰
 Yangchow 揚州
 Yanghsin 陽新
 Yen Hsi-shan 閔錫山
 Yihsing 宜興

Ying-pao 硬報

yung-kung 密共

Yü Tso-po 倪作樞

Yü Yu-jen 于右任

yüeh-fa 約法

yüeh-fang wei-yuan 廣方言員

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