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JAPANESE MASS ORGANIZATIONS IN MANCHURIA, 1928-1945:
THE IDEOLOGY OF RACIAL HARMONY

by

David George Egler

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
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THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

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I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by David George Egler

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The Ideology of Racial Harmony"

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PREFACE

The role in continental expansion attributed by modern East Asian historians to the Japanese army has obscured a number of facets of Japanese imperialism that need further examination. In particular, the role played by civilians in Manchuria in the period immediately before the Manchurian Incident has been largely ignored by Western-language sources.

Manchuria has been regarded as the arena in which Japan's direct efforts to establish an unassailable position on the continent led her to alter the future course of her foreign relations and domestic politics. Such precipitous moves as she made in Manchuria resulted in a break with the interlocking system of international treaties, international cooperation, and parliamentary governmental initiative in foreign relations. Following this, the whole system of parliamentary government was laid open to attack from a military and bureaucratic establishment acting as spokesman for totalitarian solutions for a wide range of Japan's problems. Inevitably, the Manchurian Incident of September, 1931, looms so large in history because it was the single act that set in motion Japan's departure from her former direction and embarkation on a course that was to have a major impact on world history.

Since the Kwantung Army junior officers who executed the act wanted to set a new course, and since the 1930s did indeed present a new course, historians attribute to them and to their military collaborators in Tokyo almost sole responsibility for the expansionism that characterized the decade.

The Kwantung Army has received a great deal of attention in various monographic studies. Its internal motives and those of its allies, its dominant personalities, its struggles with a reluctant Japanese government, and its role in launching the state of Manchukuo all offer insights into the end of Taishō democracy and the beginnings of what James Crowley has called Japan's "quest for autonomy."

The present study explores the motives and aspirations that were generated in Manchuria not by the army and the Japanese government but by civilian Japanese residents. From roughly the mid-1920s to 1945, a particular kind of imperialist sentiment manifested itself among these civilian Japanese residents. Containing both a measure of idealism and of self-interest, of pan-Asianism and of concern for Japanese rights and interests, of anti-capitalism and of reverence for industrial progress, the thinking of these Japanese was very much colored by the experience of having committed themselves to individual

careers and livelihoods in Manchuria and also to a permanent presence there.

This study, accordingly, traces the process whereby these sentiments began to be expressed in a systematic way, in an ideology and active organization designed to offset Chinese nationalism, to separate Manchuria from China, and even to administer a polyethnic state. This sentiment-ideology was summed up in the term minzoku kyōwa (harmony among races or peoples). The organizations successively founded on it were the Manshū Seinen Renmei (Manchurian Young Mens' League), the Kyōwatō (Harmony Party), and the Kyōwakai (Harmony Association).

The present account is not intellectual history, since the substance of minzoku kyōwa ideology was rudimentary, obscure as to precise philosophical origins, and often inclined to slide into the expediencies of propaganda. It focuses more on the use of ideology in achieving particular ends. Neither, however, is it a theoretical study of ideology, since it mainly examines the organizations in question--their successes and failures, their range of activities, their shifts in structure, and the pressures and vicissitudes they encountered. In sum, this monograph attempts to trace the creation and application of minzoku kyōwa and to locate the minzoku kyōwa movement within the context of Kwantung Army plans for both the Manchurian Incident and for the formation and

administration of Manchukuo. It shows how the Kyōwakai, beginning with aspirations of becoming a single independent totalitarian political party, was gradually co-opted into the service of the bureaucratic administration of Manchukuo, finally ending up as a virtual arm of the government. In the process, the leading individuals who founded the Manshū Seinen Renmei and conceived its successors, the Kyōwatō and the Kyōwakai, as independent organs were shunted aside and replaced by men favoring assimilation. Seeing a fundamental corruption in the bureaucratization of their organization, many of these original minzoku kyōwa ideologues formed an out-group critical of and, in turn, opposed to the Manchukuo government and Kwantung Army power structure.

The main points of interpretation which I hope to demonstrate are as follows:

1. There were various forms of separatist feeling in Manchuria among Chinese, Manchus, and Mongols predating the Manchurian Incident. The Manchurian Japanese, as articulated through the Manshū Seinen Renmei, had their own version of this argument for separating from China and even for avoiding a total submersion in the Japanese empire. Their preference was for a unique entity governed along pan-Asian (though not necessarily egalitarian) lines.

2. This Japanese civilian movement paralleled but was independent of the Kwantung Army, although its ideology and organization were eventually utilized by the Kwantung Army to circumvent strictures placed on military action by a reluctant home government and to cope with a complicated political situation in Manchuria.
3. Non-Japanese collaborated to a degree with resident Japanese in Manchuria to achieve the separation of Manchuria from China.
4. The Japanese made efforts to utilize the multiplicity of ethnic groups in Manchuria not in a divide-and-conquer strategy but in an effort to reconcile all races. This was the essence of minzoku kyōwa. This ideology of racial harmony and the organization it spawned were co-opted into the Manchukuo administration after 1932 and became the basis of a major mass organization and mobilization effort by that government. In other words, there was something more to Manchukuo than mere Japanese conquest and rule through Manchu puppets.

None of this contradicts in any fundamental way the mainstream historical assumptions about Japanese imperialism. Rather, my intention is to fill in gaps. General histories rarely mention the Kyōwatō or Kyōwakai nor do

they deal with Manchukuo other than to stress the sham of its independence. The Manchurian Incident is usually discussed mainly in terms of its dramatic impact on foreign relations and on Japanese domestic politics. However, by over-concentrating on army conspiracies, the historian runs the risk of making Japanese imperialism into a one-dimensional phenomenon without counterplays or controversies. We must consider more closely the whole Japanese Manchurian experience and especially the struggle and failure to find a pan-Asian framework for dealing with continental peoples. Otherwise the later Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere pops up virtually unheralded and, hence, appears all the more cynical and self-serving in the light of what is presented as merely army expansionism.

While it is true that Japanese expansionism on the continent seemed part of a general Weltanshaung surrounding the "quest for autonomy" in a period of disillusionment with parliamentary democracy and cooperative international diplomacy, there was something unique about the combination of circumstances in Manchuria. First, numerous and sizeable non-Chinese ethnic groups, including a permanent Japanese population, resided there. Moreover, a relatively large and mobile Japanese garrison force helped control a vast and expandable Japanese economic base. These circumstances were not present in China when Japan began forcible penetration there, and some recent Japanese and Western

scholarship has suggested that Japan might have had more imperialist success had she focused more on Manchuria, rather than on China, and relied more on ideological warfare than on military force. For example, Chong-sik Lee and Suzuki Ryūshi comment on the distractions from the Manchurian pacification effort caused by the China Incident. Lincoln Li and John Boyle, writing about the China Incident, talk about the over-reliance on military force which prevented cooperation with Japanese or Japanese-sponsored administrations. In this light, perhaps we can accept that, whatever failures they experienced, civilian ideologues in Manchuria offered at least a possible alternative approach within Japanese imperialism.

Japanese historians consider Manchuria far more important to Japan's modern historical experiences than have most of their Western counterparts heretofore. Misuzu Shobō publishers' comprehensive Gendaishi Shiryō (Materials in Modern History) series and the even more extensive Meiji Hyakunen (The Hundred Years Since Meiji) series from Hara Shobō publishers both devote a large portion to Manchuria. The nature of Japan's takeover there produced less to feel defensive about than did the China Incident or Pacific War, and many with extensive Manchurian experience are still alive and active. Writings on Manchuria can range from utopian to nostalgic and what-might-have-been to a sprinkling of hard analytical studies and sizeable

compendia of data in relatively undigested form. This writer has made an effort to balance a first-hand account, like that of Mr. Yamaguchi Jūji, who has a strongly-delineated point of view, against more impersonal works, such as the cooperatively-compiled multi-volume Manshū-kokushi (History of Manchukuo) and Taiheiyo sensō e no michi (Road to the Pacific War).

Although Yamaguchi will be more fully introduced in the body of this study, a preliminary word is in order since he constitutes an important source of material. He was a charter member and major pamphleteer in the Manshū Seinen Renmei. As such, he was a primary shaper of applied minzoku kyōwa doctrine. He was also one of the originators of the Kyōwatō under circumstances described in Chapter VI. His unpublished handwritten memoirs were used with permission. These, along with his published Manshū kenkoku no rekishi: Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi (The History of Building Manchukuo: The Manchukuo Harmony Association), interviews, and correspondence with the author during 1970-1971, form a major primary source.

Although in his eighties at the time, Yamaguchi possessed a remarkable memory, energy, and enthusiasm. His writings reveal him to be anti-Communist but no friend of ultra-nationalist militarism. Because he was an ideologue and organizer of a doctrine and group that was changed, because he was ousted, and because he has not, for the most

part, changed his views, his biases flow along the lines of speculation on what turned sour in the organization and how it lost the original "correct" vision. For loss of the original vision he blames not only certain individuals and groups but, interestingly, certain states of mind or generalized views. While avoiding accepting at face value his simplistic terms such as "colonialist mentality" or "capitalist motivation," it is still possible, for our purposes, to accept what he says minzoku kyōwa was intended to be while checking actual occurrences against other sources.

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of how, from the late 1920s through World War II, the pan-Asian ideology associated with the term minzoku kyōwa (harmony among races or peoples) emerged and was used by Japanese resident in Manchuria to galvanize and manipulate mass public support for an independent corporate state there. The approach of the study is to trace the growth and changes in three successive organizations formed by these Manchurian Japanese--the Manshū Seinen Renmei (Manchurian Young Mens' League) from December, 1928, to March, 1932; the Kyōwatō (Harmony or Concordia Party) from March to June, 1932; and the Kyōwakai (Harmony or Concordia Association) from June, 1932, to August, 1945.

All of these organizations espoused pan-Asian tenets of mutual trust and cooperation among all the resident ethnic groups of Manchuria--Han Chinese, Manchu, Japanese, Korean, Mongol, Tartar, and White Russian. In so doing, each successive organization sought to gain broad acceptance of minzoku kyōwa and thus gain support for the formation and administration of Manchukuo.

The Manshū Seinen Renmei was formed in reaction to the rise of Chinese nationalism, manifested in demands for abolition of foreign treaty shelters, and to the possibility that Chang Hsüeh-liang, the warlord ruler of

Manchuria, would join forces with the newly-formed Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. The MSR acted as an agitation organization to rouse Japanese in Manchuria and Japan to the dangers from China and to try to promote sentiment for an independent Manchuria, separated from China and protected by Japan. Although at first MSR members believed that separation from China could come about politically, they gradually came to support the use of military force.

After the overthrow of the warlord regime of Chang Hsüeh-liang by the Kwantung Army in September, 1931, the MSR provided the Kwantung Army with civilian aid in marshalling at least a modicum of popular support for the Manchukuo government, which was formed in March, 1932. Left out of the new Manchukuo government, however, the MSR dissolved itself and formed the Kyōwatō, an organization with aspirations of bringing together a broad coalition of races and organizations into a single-party dictatorship. When it was opposed as a party entity by the growing Manchukuo government and by the Kwantung Army, Kyōwatō, rather than face dissolution, began a gradual process of accommodating itself to the Manchukuo government by forming the Kyōwakai.

The study then enumerates the various activities of first, Kyōwatō and then Kyōwakai on behalf of Manchukuo--activities such as ideological warfare,

pacification of insurgent areas, propaganda, and the organization of countless special-purpose bodies for service to the state. Ultimately, its independent party role was lost entirely as the organization was bureaucratized and became a more and more ubiquitous organ for national mass mobilization in the wartime atmosphere following 1937.

CHAPTER I

THE EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE "CULTURAL DOMINION" IN MANCHURIA, 1905-1920

By the Treaty of Portsmouth the Japanese succeeded to most of the former Russian rights in southern Manchuria--the leasehold in the Liaotung Peninsula, including the naval port at Lushun (Port Arthur) and commercial port at Dairen, and the South Manchurian Railway Line connecting the leasehold to the interior of Manchuria. However, they did not invoke all of the former Russian rights in Manchuria. For example, they did not require that application by foreign capital investments be made first to Japan nor did they prevent other powers in districts traversed by the South Manchurian Railway from obtaining railroad privileges.

If Japan did not automatically obtain a sphere of influence in Manchuria by the Portsmouth Treaty,¹ she soon, however, moved toward creating one in subsequent years. With Russian support, Japan successfully prevented United States and British financing of any railroad lines between 1905 and 1910.² She then invoked the Portsmouth Treaty and allegedly secret protocols of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of

1. C. Walter Young, Japan's Special Position in Manchuria (New York: AMS reprint, 1971), p. 86.

2. Ibid., p. 166.

1905 to assert railroad monopoly rights by opposing Chinese building of a parallel and competing line from Hsinmintun to Fakumen in 1909 on what was effectively Chinese soil, obliging China to pledge to arrange with Japan first before undertaking such construction in the future.³ Six-Power Consortium negotiations in 1912 gave further evidence of Japanese claims of a special position in Manchuria. Again with Russian backing, they successfully insisted that Manchuria be excluded from any co-ordinated loan program for China based on the Open Door.⁴

The Japanese claim to a preeminent position in southern Manchuria was dramatically furthered by the Twenty-One Demands of 1915. Those demands relating to Manchuria which the Chinese government finally accepted were: (1) to extend the lease on the Kwantung territory, the South Manchurian Railway zone and line, and the Antung-Mukden Railroad zone and line to 99 years; (2) to place Japanese in control of the railway line between Kirin and Changchun in Central Manchuria; (3) to grant Japanese mining concessions in the most lucrative mining regions of southern Manchuria; (4) to agree that, whenever China needed foreign loans, they were to approach Japanese

3. Ibid., pp. 121-23; Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, The Far East: A History of Western Impacts and Eastern Response, 1830-1975, 6th Edition (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 255.

4. Clyde and Beers, pp. 182-83.

capital sources first; (5) to allow Japanese subjects to lease land on a longterm basis for commercial and agricultural purposes in southern Manchuria and to reside and carry on commerce in the interior (i.e., outside the leased areas); and finally (6) to give Japanese political, financial, military, and police advisors preference in case foreign advisors were wanted by the Chinese government in South Manchuria.⁵

Technically, none of these concessions should have constituted an exclusive right of Japan, since any of the Powers could have claimed them under the most-favored-nation clauses, but, in practice, the commercial and financial matters stood the test as exclusive Japanese prerogatives. Moreover, agreement to the demands seems to imply recognition by China of Japan's exclusive sphere in South Manchuria.⁶ The United States similarly gave tacit recognition of Japan's special position in China in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908 and Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917.

Japan's diplomatic efforts were supplemented by a "positive financial and economic policy" launched with the inauguration of the Terauchi cabinet in 1916 for the purpose of funneling Japanese capital into Manchuria as well

5. Ibid., pp. 183-92.

6. Meribeth Cameron, Thomas Mahoney, and George McReynolds, China, Japan, and the Powers (New York, Ronald Press Co., 1952), pp. 360-64.

as the rest of China. Foreign loan exchange banks like the Yokohama Specie Bank were reorganized in November, 1917, in order to transfer foreign loan functions to the Oriental Development Company, which furthered Japanese colonization projects in Manchuria and Mongolia. The Bank of Chosen became the sole issue bank for gold yen in the area in an effort to get Chosen notes as a standard currency in Manchuria (much as United States dollars are used in international exchange today). Japanese bankers formed a syndicate for loan operations in China. A Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank was incorporated under Chinese law with a Chinese president and Japanese managing director. The South Manchurian Railway advanced loans to the Chinese government for various railroad lines in Manchuria. These official actions paralleled the more personal and conspiratorial activities of the Nishihara loans to the Peking military junta. In Manchuria, however, the loan agreements successfully laid out effective monopolies for Japanese finance capital in the development of a number of basic resources. Unlike the Nishihara loans, they remained relatively covert. British and Americans at the time complained that these machinations would eventually close South Manchuria to foreign commercial enterprise.⁷

7. Ibid., Chapter 8.

From the first, the Japanese felt their commercial position in Manchuria depended upon an atmosphere of peace and order, as indicated in part in the following from a diplomatic note replying to the Knox neutralization plan in 1910:

In the regions affected by the Japanese railways in Manchuria there have grown numerous Japanese industrial and commercial undertakings which owed their inception, as they owe their continual existence, to the fact that the Imperial Government, possessing the railways in question, are able to extend to those enterprises and to the persons engaged in them due protection and defense against attack and pillage by lawless bands that still infest the country.⁸

Japanese army authorities, especially the General Staff, argued that South Manchuria should be treated as a private preserve of the Empire. The Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and Russo-Japanese War had created a whole pantheon of national heroes and Japanese rights and interests in both Korea and South Manchuria became, to the army and public, something more than administrative or diplomatic matters. They were matters of national honor sanctified by blood. It is not surprising that the civilian government had a hard time setting aside the military establishment in the Kwantung leasehold following the Russo-Japanese War.

In May, 1906, the Saionji cabinet held a conference to establish future guidelines for managing Manchuria.

8. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, p. 251 in ibid., p. 150.

Yamagata Arítomo, Katsura Tarō, Terauchi Masatake, and Kodama Gentarō wanted to establish a special colonial bureau in the Japanese government to handle affairs in the leased areas. Yamagata advocated a comprehensive policy of defending the Northeast Asian areas as an integral part of Japan. Itō and Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, disagreeing, held that, since Manchuria legally was not Japanese territory, Japan had no right to establish either a civilian or military government there. The conference, reflecting genrō moderation, compromised on establishment of a civilian administration to replace the military one left over from the war. This came to consist of a kind of triumvirate composed of a Governor-General, a Consulate-General, and, unofficially, the South Manchurian Railway Company.⁹

To deal with the first two first, the Governor-General and Consulate-General comprised a dual and somewhat overlapping system, often at odds in the early years after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1907 the consulates came under the nominal administrative jurisdiction of the Government General as far as Manchurian political affairs went, but the Governor-General continued to be a high ranking military officer subject to the Ministry of War and Tokyo Chief of

9. Ken Kurihara, Tai Man-Mō seisakushi no ichimen (Tokyo, Hara Shobō, 1966), pp. 4, 9-10, 17.

Staff, while the Consulate personnel were from the foreign service and responsive to the Foreign Ministry. The confusion is frequently manifest in writings, as, for example, the reference to the Kwantung Territorial Government as "consular control."¹⁰ The Consul-General did, in fact, participate in administrative matters and the various consulates themselves were, perforce, a major factor in Japanese affairs in Manchuria since they handled the questions regarding extraterritoriality--questions tangential to both economic and political activities.

For the sake of expediency, we might speak of the Kwantung Territorial Government (including the railway zones) as comprised of the Governor and Consulate Generals. The Territorial Government exercised all civil administrative power in the Kwantung Leased Territory (about 218 square miles). The lease and later interpretations of it rested all sovereignty in the Territorial Government except the wholesale transfer of territory. In the railway zones (whose original trunk line zone totalled about 108 square miles) the Government General had ordinary administrative powers, including local and municipal, taxation, police, and real estate transfer powers. This government could employ railway guards.

10. Mark R. Peattie, "Ishiwara Kanji (1889-1949) and the Japanese Army" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1972), p. 165.

The Kwantung Army became an additional factor in administration of the Japanese leased areas after 1919, when it was constituted as a separate regular army unit. Beginning as railway guards, they reached about 7000 regular troops by the 1920s and around 10,000 by 1931. Their impact in administration after 1919 was generally regarded as substantial, although the purview of decision-making and legally constituted jurisdictions were seldom congruent. In fact, in the whole Japanese administrative situation in Manchuria, to try to make distinctions between actual and formally-vested administrative power requires examination on a case-by-case basis, a task that lies beyond the scope of this study.¹¹

The South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR Company) was a phenomenon with few counterparts in the modern world --the company-as-government. Like the Panama Canal Company, its functions proliferated into virtually a world in itself. Unlike the Panama Canal Company, it constituted an instrument for possible open-ended expansion and a

11. Ronald Suleski, "Manchuria Under Chang Tso-lin" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1974), pp. 20-23; Yukiko Hayase, "The Career of Gotō Shinpei: Japan's Statesman of Research, 1857-1929" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University, 1974), pp. 109-10; International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Record of the Proceedings (Tokyo, 1946-1949), Testimony of Shigeru Honjō for the defense, p. 19,246 (hereafter cited as IMTFE).

commitment beyond mere transportation management. The SMR Company was begun in 1906 with a capitalization of 200 million yen, half of which came from private capital and half from the Japanese Government. Land on either side of the trunk line (483 miles long) and various feeder lines formed strips of Japanese sovereignty that pushed like roots into every major productive region of Manchuria, vastly extending the linear frontier along which Japanese and Chinese control would be tenuously demarcated.

This railway zone, in addition to the Kwantung Leased Territory, formed an island of Japanese culture, where Japanese language publications, Shinto festivals, and so on were a normal part of daily life. These areas were not subject to Chinese authority, including taxation or other exactions. By the end of the 1920s the SMR Company areas of economic endeavor comprised not only railroad lines but also port facilities, shipping lines; the manufacturing of many items used in the railroads, coal, and iron mines; coke and steel production; electrical enterprises; chemical manufacturing; warehousing, hotels, real estate; and agriculture. As one of the largest capital sources in the world, the Company ran banking, credit, and insurance establishments and invested in a wide range of non-Company industry and commerce with an eye to encouraging business development, particularly in the 1920s. Everything from heavy primary industry to public utilities,

restaurants, and newspapers were sustained wholly or in part by SMR Company capital.

In addition, there were numerous non-profit enterprises which, taken as a whole, confirmed the Company as a kind of government within the railway zone. These included urban development--street-building, construction of parks, marketplaces, bridges, streetlighting, and other public works--as well as crime prevention and firefighting. The company provided schooling from primary through university level, including technical institutes and a medical college. There were company libraries and a museum. Public health was a major showcase item, with Company-provided hospitals, sanitoria, research laboratories, public immunization, and, notably for Manchuria, plague prevention. Social welfare included clubs, child care centers, household training programs, and summer camps. The Company ran industrial, agricultural, and forestry experimental stations and provided extensive tree planting to offset some of the dreariness of the Manchurian landscape. The Company's research department, which possessed almost a life of its own, became one of the Japanese Empire's greatest producers of official and semi-official research. The staff, which eventually was to number more than three hundred, produced a known total of over 6,200 studies covering the natural resources, social relations, economic possibilities, and political conditions in Manchuria, China, Korea, Japan, the

Soviet Union, and even more distant countries. By 1917 the Company had invested 176 million yen in Manchuria.¹²

The man primarily responsible for the direction taken by the SMR Company in the early years and largely maintained thereafter was Baron Gotō Shinpei, president of the Company at its inception in 1906 until 1908. It was Gotō whose thinking first and most clearly reflected the tenets of "cultural dominion" or "cultural governing" (bunkateki tōchi) which comprised so much of the resident Japanese citizens' view of their role in Manchuria. Proponents of cultural dominion seemed to accept at face value the assumptions of many of the Western colonial powers that outsiders can apply superior methods in an "underdeveloped" area and produce results beneficial to all, including the native population. The word "cultural" softened the harshness implicit in "dominion." Dominion, it suggests, would be more benevolent by being "cultural."

The implication was at once Confucian and Darwinian. By the criteria of the late nineteenth and twentieth

12. Yosuke Matsuoka, Building Up Manchuria (Tokyo, The Herald of Asia, 1937), Chapters 4, 6, and 7; John Young, ed., The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907-1945 (New York: Columbia East Asian Institute, 1966), p. 3; Carl F. Nathan, Plague Prevention and Politics in Manchuria, 1910-1931 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967), Chapters 1 and 2; Suleski, pp. 20-21.

centuries, Japan was "modern" and therefore "fitter" than China, which has failed to modernize. The Japanese way of doing things should prevail in any situation where they came into close contact with Chinese. This assumption is not so surprising if it is remembered that men like Sun Yat-sen accepted to a remarkable degree the idea of Japanese tutelage in matters of modernization during the period of the Chinese Revolution.

The concept of cultural dominion was also Confucian, perhaps, in that it was accomplished by a natural process of acceptance by those who recognized the obvious superiority of the modern system. Japan would seek to replace the Chinese administrative organs in the leased areas of Manchuria with a modern bureaucracy and modern industry. Through these, prosperity and security, or peace and order, would reign among the Japanese immigrants participating in the system. They would then become a model which the other ethnic groups in the leased areas and then in Manchuria at large would naturally follow as they saw the economic and security benefits. Like the Confucian assumption that leadership comes as the result of a recognition of obvious superiority, it would be a voluntary acquiescence.

Gotō, of course, was motivated by more than benevolence in seeking to make the company-administered area a showcase. To be sure, he regarded the SMR Company from

the first as more than an economic venture, and had to withstand criticism at home for his extravagance in building model communities, company housing, hospitals, company utilities, and the like. He basked in the admiration of foreigners who saw something utopian in his projects.¹³ But Gotō was very much the realist, who saw his "cultural" institutions in Manchuria as a means of forestalling foreign inroads and of softening Chinese and Western fears of the SMR Company as an imperialist foot in the door and a threat to Chinese territorial integrity.¹⁴ Even prior to the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, in 1905, Gotō had written to his friend Kodama, commanding the Japanese army in Manchuria, that Japan must hold firm in retaining the SMR Railway rights even if it meant giving up all other privileges gained. He saw the SMR Company as the key to filling the power vacuum, just as the British East India Company had in India. He even proposed that East India Company administrative and exploitative methods be adopted.¹⁵

In discussing plans for Manchuria with Kodama on a visit there later the same year, Gotō indicated that Japan

13. Hayase, p. 122.

14. Ibid., pp. 124-25, 128, 257.

15. Kazuo Takemori, Mantetsu kōbōshi (Tokyo, Akita Shoten, 1970), p. 12.

had won Russian recognition for her rights in Korea mainly because she had colonized Korea before other powers had done so, making it impossible for them to offset her position. Therefore, the best strategy was to establish the railway as a broad-based enterprise and send 500,000 Japanese citizens to Manchuria. Japan could gain a dominating position in Manchurian agriculture by her energetic colonist-farmers and use the railway to monopolize trade with Europeans.

Gotō's approach to Manchuria reflected the "aggressive" thinking of the Chōshū clique in the Army and government.¹⁶ Nevertheless, while Gotō thought along "integrationist" lines in overall policy, when it came to actual administration, he fought against interference from both military and Japanese bureaucrats. As president, he successfully fought for a position for the Company equal in decision-making to that of the military Governor-General of Kwantung Territory.¹⁷ For Gotō, this meant that the Company role as a future mover and shaker in Manchuria should not unduly limited. Between 1906 and 1929 he and his successors then assiduously and self-consciously developed the Company as a monolith of transportation, industry, and social services.

16. Hayase, pp. 106-7.

17. Hikotarō Andō, Mantetsu: Nihon teikokushūgi to Chūgoku (Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobō, 1965), pp. 34-35.

Thus, the early Japanese positions in Manchuria, as it was rationalized, seemed to be built around superior administrative and economic performance whose effects would be beneficial to all in that the Japanese, by their presence in some numbers, would uplift and sequester the region. All this sounds a bit presumptuous now, especially the talk of "colonizing" an area already long settled. It would seem that the Japanese who talked of cultural dominion really offered nothing more than the security, efficiency, and prosperity provided by any colonial power (although the Japanese in Manchuria delivered a good deal more on the prosperity part than, let us say, the British in India). These considerations aside, it is the object here to define the Japanese position, as it was developed after the Russo-Japanese War, as a long-range one built not purely on exploitation of the region. It is certain that the unique prosperity enjoyed by the leased areas of Manchuria was actually shared to some degree by all, as attested to by the flow of immigrants from North China, particularly following World War I. They came by the thousands with families in response to the superior opportunities offered by stability and industrialization.¹⁸

In contrast to the image of stability, progress, and respectability exemplified by the Kwantung Territory

18. IMTTE, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, pp. 18,700-18,800.

administration and SMR Company, there is, even in the pre-1920's period, a counterpoint theme of conspiracy and direct action behind the scenes, backed by individual members of the Army General Staff in Tokyo, members of the Kwantung Army (the rather sizeable force for the protection of the Leased Territory and railway zone), and civilian adventurers.

The first incident occurred in February, 1912, when Kawashima Ronsoku of the Kokuryū Kai (Black Dragon or Amur River Society) submitted a plan to members of the General Staff in Tokyo for separating Manchuria and Mongolia from China by backing the Manchu Prince Su and Mongol Prince Pa-lin in setting up a Manchurian-Mongol kingdom to be financed and armed by Japan. Although the plan had a surprising amount of support (albeit secret) from the Army Ministry and the approval of Governor-General of Korea Terauchi Masaki, Premier Saionji called the operation off before it got out of control. In the course of its development, Japanese arms were captured and thirteen Japanese killed.

The other occurrence, in 1916, was another Japanese plot to create an independent Manchurian-Mongolian state set up by Prince Su and the Manchu (Ch'ing dynasty) Restoration Party and backed by Bapuchapu, a Mongolian cavalry commander. It was masterminded by Tanaka Giichi, then vice-chief of the Army General Staff and Fukuda

Masatarō, chief of the Kwantung Army General Staff. Also participating at a later stage were Koiso Kuniaki (later Kwantung Army commander and, still later, Prime Minister), Foreign Minister Katō, Consul General (in the Kwantung Territory) Yada, a financier in Manchuria--Ōkura Kihachirō, and a variety of so-called Manshū rōnin (Japanese free-agent adventurers and thugs always on the fringes of conspiracies, who thrived in the Manchurian atmosphere of unclear authority). Premier Hara Kei called off the plot, although there was a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops at Chengchiatum.¹⁹

Whatever official Japanese government policy toward the continent was in the decade following the Russo-Japanese War, what seemed to define the extremes of policy in Manchuria were cultural dominion on the one hand--the gradual consolidation of power through the extension of the benefits of industrial capitalism--and conspiratorial direct action on the other. The interweave of these two themes provides much of the background for the whole period up until the Manchurian Incident of September, 1931.

19. Eiji Kurihara, "Daiichiji dainiji Man-Mō dokuritsu undō," Kokusai Seiji XXXI #2 (1958), pp. 38-52.

CHAPTER II

SEPARATIST SENTIMENT IN CHANG TSO-LIN'S MANCHURIA

The usual standards of international law were difficult to apply to Manchuria. Although the Japanese government officially regarded Manchuria as an integral part of China, it frequently preferred to deal with autonomous authorities to secure immediate ends not otherwise obtainable (even while taking an ambivalent attitude toward the "direct action" plotting, such as those incidents described above). It is safe to say that almost all Japanese could agree in hoping that Manchuria would always remain aloof from the disorder of warlord-ridden Republican China. One of the major figures on whom they pinned their hopes for a "sequestered" Manchuria during the 1920s was, paradoxically, the greatest warlord of them all, Chang Tso-lin.

Chang began as a simple bandit chief in the region who was employed by the Japanese as an anti-Russian guerrilla during the Russo-Japanese War. After the war, he was brought into the Imperial Chinese administration for the Manchurian region in 1906 as a military commander. Thereafter, as he built up his position into de facto ruling power in Manchuria, he vacillated between regarding the Three Northeast Provinces (comprising Manchuria) as a

part of China or as independent, depending on which suited his purposes. Beginning in 1911, he began to shape Manchuria into what was essentially a base, to be expanded south of the Great Wall as opportunities presented themselves. At times he declared himself subordinate to one or another nominal head of state in Peking in order to receive appointments; at other times he declared Manchuria entirely independent. He was responsive to his own interests first and his ultimate ambitions were as lofty as any of the succession of warlords who aspired to central authority in China.

His home base in Manchuria offered more security than did most. He operated in an atmosphere of personalized loyalties and hence was not inclined to follow anyone's administrative formalities. He moved his troops when and where he chose. The Japanese were, of course, a presence to be reckoned with in Manchuria but he was not afraid of them. Like other frontier figures and military men, he could be non-traditional in his regard for the efficiencies of central dictatorial authority in administration and in his respect for technology, both in weapons and in building up an industrial and transportation infrastructure. By the early 1920s Chang had established his own well-equipped arsenal able to manufacture small arms and even light artillery, as well as ammunition. With this single centralized arsenal he was able to provide his Fengtien Army

with equipment lavish by the standards of the day. Though this centralization did make the Fengtien Army particularly vulnerable to the inside coup of the Kwantung Army in 1931, it did tend to eliminate the possibility of rival provincial forces in Manchuria.²⁰

Although officially the three Northeast Provinces were a part of the Chinese Republic and the police, administrative, and educational systems all operated according to regulations out of the central government in Peking, Chang ruled it effectively as an independent kingdom. Authority of the Peking regime stopped at the Great Wall. Revenues from Manchuria were retained there and placed in the provincial treasuries. Potential revenues from Manchuria were, of course, considerable. The traditional salt gabelle, mining taxes, excise taxes, management taxes from large companies, revenues from Chinese national railroads in Manchuria were all withheld.²¹ In 1919 the Peking government formally "granted" broad powers to Chang. At the same time he undertook several adjustments in administration by which the provincial assemblies in

20. C. Walter Young, pp. 1-7; Robert B. Stauffer, "Manchuria as a Political Entity: Government and Politics of a Major Region of China, Including its Relations to China Proper" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1954), pp. 126-35; Suleski, pp. 5-8.

21. Suleski, pp. 16-17.

Manchuria were federated. Each claimed self-government but military power was in Chang's hands.²²

In 1922 Chang declared the Three Northeast Provinces independent in a fit of pique over losing this war with the Chihli faction, who, having taken over the Peking government, stripped him of his titles. At the same time, he began urging the provincial assemblies to take a more active policy-making role. He was reconciled with Peking in 1924, but his provincial assemblies in 1926 again declared the "autonomy" of Manchuria, although this appeared to be more for home consumption than an internationally-recognized fact, since Chang permitted the Chinese government to handle most of the major foreign affairs matters.²³ On the other hand, in 1924 Chang had gone so far as to plan the creation of a special administrative office for the Three Eastern Provinces (tung san sheng pan kung shu) to handle relations between the Peking government and Chinese officials in Manchuria almost as a "foreign office."²⁴ The position of the Chang regime vis-à-vis China Proper is summed up by Akira Iriye:

As of 1927 Manchuria was politically identifiable with China only insofar as its overlord, Chang Tso-lin, was also commander-in-chief of the

22. Stauffer, pp. 139-40.

23. Suleski, pp. 66, 7-27; C. Walter Young, pp. 18-25.

24. Suleski, p. 18.

anti-Kuomintang coalition controlling Peking. But Chang's economic and military base in the Three Eastern Provinces was entirely distinct from China and in the past he had occasionally proclaimed Manchuria's independence.²⁵

Chang Tso-lin's administration rested on both military and civilian components. Chang's inner circle of advisors was very close to him in philosophy--hard line right wing, seeing military power as the answer to any political situation. These men saw themselves as pragmatists and realists. They enthusiastically embraced any kind of technology available, and were disinclined to political subtlety when dealing with the populace. However, Chang realized that civilian officials were the key to tapping the wealth of a region for any warlord. They knew about tax collection, land titles, license regulations, and so forth. Warlords throughout China realized that they depended on the civil official sanctioned by the Confucian tradition of liaison with influential elites (who possessed the same backgrounds as officials). To undermine a warlord, civilian officials had only to "slow down" by operating less efficiently, passing on less information and taxes. Manchuria was especially vulnerable to this.

25. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 160.

Like most of the civilian elite, civil officials discreetly despised warlords. Like Confucians, they were suspicious of the solely military goals and technological methods evinced by the warlords' close circle. Of course, civil officials could not give entirely free rein to their disapproval by withdrawing cooperation completely. They were, after all, subject to reprisal and coercion for any overt action taken. Passive resistance was their only tool and overall administrative reform along late Confucian lines was their only long-range hope.²⁶ Civil officials felt that the military should be subordinated to the civilian branch. Most civil officials were traditionally educated and had a Confucian view of the duty of officials to take a fatherly interest in the people's welfare, in future development and in stability.

The Chinese economic elite--well-to-do landowners, merchants, and industrialists--shared the interest of civil officials in maintaining social and economic stability, since they came from similar backgrounds. The elite (both economic and civil administrative) had made large investments in the burgeoning regional economy. They especially feared war, either in the region or in Chang's adventures in China Proper, since it not only endangered property directly but exactions to fill Chang's war chest threatened

26. Suleski, pp. 2, 219-20.

to undermine the whole economic structure. The provincial assemblies, for the most part, represented the interests of the civilian elite of Manchuria. When they joined with civil officials, they could be a potent force to be reckoned with.²⁷

One of the major problems with administration in Chang's government (as it was to be of the Japanese government) was the difficulty of reconciling the side-by-side existence of military and civilian authority. All the panoplies of bureaucracy existed in Manchuria. Moreover, as just indicated, they were not by any means without a vital function. This function, however, as the civil administrators saw it, tended to be Confucian in inspiration --to create a stable, predictable system conducive to economic production (especially agricultural) and to tap the fruits of this production for internal purposes. The proper role of the military was internal control and defensive security and, hence, it should be minimal. External military operations (as warlord rivalries engendered) brought excessive and de-stabilizing demands on the economy. In this lay the seeds of inevitable controversy.

Ronald Suleski, in his study of the Chang Tso-lin regime, makes Wang Yung-chiang--the ablest and most effective of Chang's civilian officials--the personification

27. Ibid., pp. 216-17.

of this difference between the civilian and military points of view in governing Manchuria. Serving Chang loyally in the period 1916-1922, Wang operated as chief of Fengtien Province, succeeding in reforming and strengthening this key area, exercising firm control, increasing revenues, demonstrating economy in government, and creating fiscal stability. This was the foundation upon which Chang built his military power. However, in 1922, when Chang began to pursue goals of greater power in China, Wang challenged the system of military domination (though not Chang himself) by threatening to resign and remove his considerable contribution to Chang's position. Chang granted him power in the Fengtien provincial government free from interference by the Fengtien Army establishment, and the period between 1922 and 1924 became the most prosperous and stable years of the Chang regime.

Wang's reform program reorganized provincial banking and finances and set up a government textile mill. Wang's immigration and colonization plan brought in labor from North China which bade fair to boost industrialization and open the resources of North Manchuria. Tungpei University in Mukden was a show-piece for the whole region. In all, Wang's accomplishments represented what could be done

by civilian officials without military interference or the burden of war to contend with.²⁸

By 1925, however, it became clear that Chang was committed to expanding his power in China Proper and he began letting military needs take precedence over civilian programs. Wang's resignation in protest brought an immediate deterioration in cooperation between Chang and the Fengtien civil bureaucracy. Thus Chang's regional power base began to decline. Without a regular revenue flow, the regime resorted to forced bond sales and opium taxes. The hsien magistrates and tax officials were used as tools to squeeze money out of the local communities. Taxes were collected in advance, surtaxes and special levies became common. Trading restrictions and special "donations" were levied on merchants. Peasants were stripped of carts, draft animals, and sons. Chang transferred funds directly out of banks--at least sixty million yüan in 1927 alone--forcing increased issue of banknotes without silver reserves. The currency value dropped precipitously along with declining public confidence until the winter of 1928, when the economy of Fengtien collapsed. Currency became worthless, prices soared, and strikes over inadequate wages spread. Merchants closed down and unemployment

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-102, 105, 224-26; Ramon H. Myers, "The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932-1945" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1959), pp. 173-76.

rose.²⁹ Chang appeared willing to sacrifice the Manchurian economy entirely to the chimera of power in China Proper.

The origins of the political movement which was known as "Maintain the borders, pacify the people" (hokyō anmin in Japanese, pao-ching an-min in Chinese) lay largely in this dissatisfaction with Chang Tso-lin's involvement in China Proper as well as in the sense of independence which Chang himself had often exhibited. Not surprisingly, the foremost personality in the early hokyō anmin movement was Wang Yung-chiang. The phrase "maintain the borders, pacify the people" had been used as early as March, 1924, by Wang's Fengtien provincial government as a slogan to emphasize its special projects for the development of Manchuria. Soon it took on a wider meaning, expressing Wang's and many other civil officials' belief that Chang should concentrate on development of Manchuria and stay out of outside politics in China Proper. They felt the Fengtien Army should be used only defensively to protect Manchuria from the chaotic influences of the south. As the fighting in north China intensified in late 1925, the slogan took on an anti-Chang connotation and also took on the dimensions of a movement among civil officials and the civilian elite who stood with them.³⁰

29. Suleski, pp. 176, 205-206, 227.

30. Ibid., pp. 172-73.

Certainly there was plenty of local pride and a natural exclusivity about Manchuria, which the local elite (including civil officials) now seemed to harp on most. Defeats suffered by the Fengtien Army in 1922 and 1927 may well have fanned sentiment for autonomy and separation.³¹ Beyond this "pessimistic separatism," there was an optimistic side, seeing Manchuria as progressive, industrialized, and advanced--a considerable local pride which could either supplement, complement, or offset any sense of a greater Chinese nationalism. The hokyō anmin movement represented a potential "third interest" between the Chang Tso-lin military group and the Japanese. Like the Confucian gentry in imperial dynastic China faced with a choice between sustaining the Establishment or rebels in a deteriorating political situation, hokyō anmin advocates could "jump either way." Yüan Chen-to, who later supported "independence" for Manchuria in the form of a Japanese-backed Manchukuo, stated that

. . . Manchuria was a country of limitless natural resources. Because of this fact . . . if peace could be maintained and industries begun, Manchuria could do well to take after the example of the United States as an industrial nation.³²

Yü Chung-han was another transitional figure, beginning much as Chang did, employed by the Japanese

31. Stauffer, p. 141.

32. IMTTE, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, p. 18,827.

during the Russo-Japanese War and often acted as a go-between for Chang and the Japanese (an awkward role to play, for, as we shall see, relations between the Chang regime and the Japanese were frequently stormy). Yü became a kind of "elder statesman" in the Chang administration and was ranked as one of Chang's chief counselors. As such, he was distrusted by many civil officials. Nonetheless, opportunistic or not, he became a force in the hokyō anmin movement, both in its "Manchuria first" aspects and in a kind of idealistic way:

In establishing an area under the principle of the kingly way [wang tao] in the northeastern area, the principle should be adopted of cultivating no soldiery, that is an anti-military principle of non-menace, and non-aggression. . . . a state somewhat like Switzerland should be established without arms and founded on the principle of not menacing or being menaced by others.³³

Hokyō anmin as any kind of coherent program was highly rudimentary. It was generated equally out of local pride, local insularity, fear of spreading instability, opposition to Chang Tso-lin's broader involvement, and a certain vague glimmer of a better life separate from China. This last point, when coupled with the personal popularity of Wang Yung-chiang as an upstanding and progressive official, gives hokyō anmin a reform cast. Carryover from Wang's earlier actions in Fengtien Province seemed to

33. IMTTE, testimony of Tadashi Katakura for the defense, pp. 18,953-54; Suleski, pp. 14-16.

promise tax reform, improvements in the wage system of government officials, and cutbacks in a costly army.³⁴

Japanese who later had intimate contact with Chinese and Manchus professing the hokyō anmin point of view make reference to the movement as "democratic."³⁵ Yamaguchi Jūji, who was one of these, even indicated a belief that some kind of Manchurian independence movement might have come to fruition even without the intervention of the Kwantung Army in September, 1931.³⁶ These assertions must be taken with a grain of salt. What must be emphasized here, however, is that hokyō anmin constituted a potential bridge between a number of influential Chinese and Manchus on the one hand and the Japanese on the other. It is not illogical to say that Yü Chung-han's hope of creating a Switzerland in Northeast Asia was impractical except insofar as a balance of power could neutralize potential conquerors. Notwithstanding his statement about a nation established "without arms," he could not fail to see that military

34. Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964), pp 118-19.

35. IMTTF, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, pp. 18,830-32; testimony of Tadashi Katakura for the defense, p. 18,965; ibid.

36. IMTTF, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, p. 18,881.

power was the only means of making that balance of power credible. The Fengtien Army, instead of being husbanded for future defense, was being used offensively. If their strategy south of the Great Wall failed (as it did), their ensuing weakening might be offset by greater reliance on the Japanese, who had a stake in keeping Manchuria separated.³⁷ Yü was already fairly pro-Japanese. Moreover, in the early or mid-1920s, considering the progress of Manchuria, it would have been easier to see the Japanese in Manchuria as more acceptable than were the succession of Peking warlords, especially if any of the arguments of "cultural dominion" were persuasive.

From the Japanese point of view, hokyō anmin was a political position that could be considered compatible with "cultural dominion." True, a few among the Japanese considered that any kind of ideological rapprochement with Chinese to be a pressing matter as long as China remained divided. With the rise of a spirit of Chinese nationalism in the late 1920s, however, hokyō anmin provided one of the means of offsetting nationalist and irredentist sentiment from China and a foundation for building a Japanese-encouraged version of an independent Manchuria.

Much as the forces of hokyō anmin were piqued by Chang's wars, they were kept in line under his regime. As

37. Ogata, p. 119.

the greatest of the old-style warlords, he was the last who could have successfully held out against the tides of nationalism rising in the South. By 1928, Chang Tso-lin's strategy, as a holdout against the growing Kuomintang coalition in the Northern Expedition, was to try to move to the defensive and win over some of the warlords in that group. This strategy was typical of a whole era of "warlord politics." But by spring it was failing badly, as Kuomintang units were threatening Tientsin and Peking. His own civilian officials were now joined by the Japanese diplomatic corps in Peking as well as by Prime Minister Tanaka in pressuring him to return to Manchuria. The Japanese were worried about the loss of life among their countrymen in North China if bloody fighting took place. He finally took the advice and was on his way to Mukden when his train was blown up.³⁸

Chang Tso-lin's murder on the orders of the Kwantung Army staff officer Kōmoto Daisaku is inexplicable except as an entirely inappropriate response by Kōmoto and his fellow plotters to official statements coming out of Japan emphasizing the necessity of defining Manchuria as the "lifeline" of Japan. Kōmoto apparently decided that the death of Chang would open the way for establishing some

38. Nobuya Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924-1929 (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1972), pp. 338-39.

kind of "puppet" regime.³⁹ His plotting did not extend to how this would be done or what kind of regime to establish. It was an incomplete, atrociously-conceived updating of the conspiratorial side of Japanese involvement in Manchuria and it destroyed the Tanaka ministry.

Although the assassination of Chang Tso-lin had more immediate political impact in Japan than in Manchuria, the subsequent confluence of events and actions under his son and successor, Chang Hsüeh-liang, make his death in June, 1928, a convenient watershed for approaching the Manchurian Incident in 1931. His murder may be regarded as the end of an era in which tensions within Manchuria were present but in which the balance of power worked to maintain separation. Under Chang Hsüeh-liang, rapprochement with the Nationalists would oblige the Japanese to bestir themselves to save the position which had tacitly rested on such separation.

39. Ibid., pp. 340-41.

CHAPTER III

THE MANCHURIAN JAPANESE AND THE WORSENING SITUATION IN MANCHURIA IN THE LATE 1920s

The consensus of most sources puts the number of Japanese resident in Manchuria by 1931 at about 200,000. These Japanese, together with about one million Korean subjects of the Japanese Empire, represented only about four per cent of the total population of thirty million. In addition, there were the Han Chinese (about eighty-one per cent) who had been emigrating to Manchuria, mostly the south, since the heyday of the Ming dynasty. Ethnic Manchus and Mongols made up about twelve per cent and the remaining three per cent were a miscellaneous group of Turkic-speaking Moslems, Tartars, and White Russian refugees from the Bolshevik revolution and ensuing civil war.⁴⁰

Although a tiny minority, the Manchurian-resident Japanese, along with Koreans who owed their position in Manchuria to their status as citizens of a Japanese

40. Jūji Yamaguchi, Manshū Kenkoku no rekishi--Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi (Tokyo, Eikō Shuppansha, 1973), p. 39. In practice, Japanese writers often do not discriminate between Manchus and Chinese in Manchuria, lumping them together as "Manchurians."

protectorate,⁴¹ were highly concentrated in the most economically strategic areas--in the commercially bustling Liaotung Peninsula and along the economic taproot of the SMR. They were perhaps justified in believing they occupied a special position in Manchuria, having power that far outweighed their numbers. They had not only the controlling hand in Manchurian transportation, but also in many of the most modern sectors of the economy allied to transportation. They were backed by the most formidable power in East Asia and protected by a system of advantageous treaties. The Manchurian Japanese regarded their position as resting on two bases--first, on the modern economy made possible and symbolized by their presence in Manchuria and, second, on the backing of the Japanese imperial government. The question of how much power their Manchurian base alone would give them if unsupported from Japan, and how solid a position the treaties with China gave them in Manchuria eventually became a major bone of contention among the Japanese themselves, at home as well as in Manchuria. It is also one of the focuses of this study.

41. Korean emigration to Southeast Manchuria was encouraged by the Japanese in part to ease economic pressures that produced political unrest in Korea. Kenichirō Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō: Manshūkoku seikaku keisei no yōin," Kokusai Seiji XLIII #1 (1970), p. 59.

By the late 1920s, Japan's involvement with Manchuria had already spanned almost a quarter century and the children of those who had settled there following the Russo-Japanese War had grown to adulthood and had become assimilated into their local situations. Many of the second generation had been wholly or mostly educated in Manchuria and exhibited a conviction that their homes and aspirations lay there. Like Americans of the Canal Zone, they could be ultra-patriotic about the "home country" (Japan) while at the same time being fully committed to their place of birth. In the grammar schools of the Japanese areas of settlement, education policy was expected to follow curricula and texts compatible with Japanese Education Ministry guidelines. However, special supplementary texts dealt with Manchurian subjects and represented the definite beginnings of inculcation of a local consciousness, as in the case of elementary school readers that stated "We are Manchurian children."⁴²

To be sure, they were not assimilated into the broader native culture, defined as basically Han Chinese. Their effective confinement to leased territory and special extraterritorial status largely prevented such absorption. Rather they experienced an in-between cultural identity

42. See Kenichirō Hirano, "Manshū ni okeru Nihon no kyōiku seisaku, 1906-1931," Ajia Kenkyū XV #3 (1969), pp. 24-52.

based on their generally higher standard of living in comparison with counterparts in Japan. Because Manchuria was less rigidly stratified than Japan, opportunities abounded for many in Manchuria that would not have been available at home.⁴³ Consequently, most appeared to look forward to spending the rest of their lives in Manchuria. With the industrial establishment that centered around the SMR Company expanding under favorable conditions (creating a good atmosphere for the growth of all business and industry) and with the continued success of an efficient colonial administration, Japanese "cultural dominion" could be said to be working and any further assimilation into the Han Chinese culture would be entirely unnecessary.⁴⁴

Apart from a happy status quo, Manchuria also offered greater scope and leeway for applying talent and energy to change. There are a significant number of references in modern writings by those Japanese with Manchurian experience to the effect that, unlike Japan, where everything and everyone had to fit into a mold, in Manchuria a mold did not exist. At least until 1928, there seemed to be a limitless opportunity to move and shake things unencumbered by tenacious pre-existing forms and institutions. This encouraged a kind of "Great Leap" mentality

43. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 58.

44. Ibid., p. 59.

and optimistic attitude toward change among a number of articulate Manchurian Japanese like Tachibana. A strong strain of utopianism shows through clearly in a recent spate of nostalgic reminiscences about Manchuria in several popular journals.⁴⁵

The Japanese residents' strong sense of identity with Manchuria did not, of course, cut them free from all considerations of what diplomatic and military backing they could get from Japan. It was true that, in the relatively balanced situation in Manchuria of the early and mid-1920s, protection against banditry could be done locally and there was little need for Japanese forces to fend off any Chinese attempt to assert authority, divided as the Chinese were. However, as soon as the Chinese national government ceased to be a plaything of warlords and began to enunciate a clear ideological stand, the Manchurian Japanese could no longer count on a stable situation for themselves in Manchuria.

Japanese influence in Manchuria was built on the colonial administration, the Kwantung Army, the SMR Company, and, last but not least, the physical presence of the Manchurian Japanese. The sum total of the individual lives

45. Tetsunari Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," Kokusai Seiji XLIII #1 (1970), pp. 90-91; Jūji Yamaguchi's interview with the author, April 20, 1970; See Manshū Kaikoshū Kankōkai, eds, Aa Manshū: kokutsukuri sangyō kaihatsusha no shūki (Tokyo, Nōrin Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1965); see also "Aa Manshū," Shūkan Yomiuri, July 17, 1970, pp. 16-70; September 18, 1970, pp. 38-69.

and careers they had built comprised a kind of earnest of continuing Japanese presence, though in the future many would begin to see themselves as pawns rather than pledges. They would later see themselves in a position totally misunderstood both in China and Japan. As Japanese resident in Manchuria, they were directly threatened by the forces of Chinese nationalism--forces that were either given short shrift in Japan or ambivalently regarded. Increasingly they were obliged to view the military as their only protection for life and property. On the other hand, having been raised in Manchuria, they could appreciate the power of the appeal of nationalism in Manchuria and consequently groped for a solution that might reduce their formal ties with the mother country and the unequal treaty system.⁴⁶ Along with the Kwantung Army, but for slightly different reasons, they were the least ambivalent about Manchuria and, of all Japanese interest groups, the most suspicious of compromise. There is a strong analogy between their situation and that of the Franco-Italian pied noir in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s. There, as in Manchuria, the immigrants who occupied the top rungs of the economic ladder were most directly involved and more agitated than were

46. See Ogata, pp. 37-41; see also Peattie, p. 89.

decisionmakers in Europe, and were most impatient to scotch the threat from native nationalism.⁴⁷

The most overt manifestation of Chinese nationalism was, of course, the Northern Expedition of coalition armies under Kuomintang leadership which achieved a significant degree of unification south of the Great Wall by mid-1928. Halted by interposition of Japanese armed forces in Shantung, the Expedition nevertheless offered a distinct possibility that a revitalized China would generate nationalist revolutionary sympathies among the majority Chinese in the Northeast. The first key to achieving this goal was the young Marshall, Chang Hsüeh-liang.

The reciprocal dependencies and pressures which involved Chang Tso-lin's capable but easy going son and the three Northeast Provinces were bewilderingly complex. Let us begin by summarizing his position vis-à-vis (1) the Japanese government, and (3) the Manchurian Japanese.

Chang Hsüeh-liang was a critical makeweight for the Chinese Nationalists in that their newly-established power position depended on an understanding with him in their internal Chinese maneuvering. They could not directly coerce him in his Manchurian sanctuary since the Japanese would allow no armed excursions from the South. In order for the Nationalists to win his allegiance, they had to

47. See Paul Henissart, Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970).

begin to replace the Japanese as a "patron power" in Manchuria. To do this, they had to take a strong stand against the Japanese in foreign relations. Only a change in power relations would persuade Chang since he was no revolutionary ideologue. In spite of a grudge against the Japanese for murdering his father, he had inherited an autonomous power base and could have no interest in handing it over to the Nationalists by joining them quickly.

As for the Japanese, Chang was important to both Tanaka and, at first, Shidehara diplomacy as an alternative to dealing with the Nationalist government on outstanding Manchurian issues. The Japanese had every interest in excluding their treaty rights in Manchuria from negotiations with Nanking. Chang acted as both a surrogate and legitimizer for the ongoing treaty system. On the other hand, he needed the support of both Japan and China (at least into 1930) in order to play one against the other and avoid being swallowed by either. While relying on the Kwantung Army to suppress bandit activities against his regime, he tried at the same time to use the patriotic anti-Japanese movements that were now to be cropping up in the late 1920s as his own bargaining tool against Japan's pressure.

As for the Manchurian Japanese, I hope to illustrate the pressures they perceived bearing on them from a number of sources by 1928. In their day-to-day activities they began to be the recipients of anti-Japanese feeling and

increasing restrictions on their economic scope. To be sure, there had always been some attacks on Japanese and Koreans outside the zones of heavy Japanese settlement by local disgruntled elements. In the grey area of Manchurian sovereignties, Japanese always contended that Chinese could not keep order and Chinese saw each complaint as merely a pretext to push for use of Japanese troops in Chinese territory. What we see in 1928, however, are concerted manifestations of hostilities mirroring riots and boycotts in China following the Tsinan Incident in May. On top of this, it looked to resident Japanese as if Chang Hsüeh-liang could put pressure on them with impunity, currying public opinion and favor from the Kuomintang left wing, while avoiding reprisals from the Japanese government since they were apparently anxious to keep him as a middleman.⁴⁸

Increasingly, working through Chang seemed to represent an outdated mode. The main beneficiaries of a status quo in the treaty system would appear to be big business and its stockholders in Japan. For the Manchurian Japanese, what would have been desirable were extensions of areas of residency and easing of restrictions on business, for which the outlook was gloomy. Even if these had been gained, it would seem to any observer likely that such concessions might have been vitiated in any general

48. Suleski, p. 98.

rights-recovery movement in Manchuria (to emulate the one already under way in China). There was no evidence that Chang would or could withstand pressures for extending such rights recovery into their own backyards in South Manchuria. The Manchurian Japanese thus had no vested interest in maintaining a system tied to Chang that showed them such an uncertain future.

Just how uncertain that future appeared was clearly indicated by two parallel trends. First, there were the moves by Chang Hsüeh-liang toward abandonment of an autonomous base in Manchuria in favor of progressive accommodation with the Nationalist government in Nanking. Secondly, there was the rights recovery process which, in the context of China, could be virulently xenophobic as well as a reasoned give and take for the purpose of righting historic wrongs. Rights recovery, applied to Manchuria, could perhaps open up to "subversive" forces the carefully-nurtured Manchurian colonial base that represented the only real possibility of a long range and full scale Japanese continental presence.

On July 17, 1928, the Nationalist government issued a manifesto unilaterally abrogating all unequal treaties. In the Japanese case, this actually meant the treaties of 1896 and 1903, with the strong implication that the treaties of 1905, 1915, and other supplemental ones, upon which most of the Japanese position in Manchuria rested, would

follow.⁴⁹ On July 19, they abrogated the Sino-Japanese commercial treaty (actually, it was due to expire then and re-negotiations had broken down).

Meanwhile, Chang Hsüeh-liang negotiated with the Chinese government conditions for his acceptance of Nationalist sovereignty. His reasons for recognizing the Nationalist sovereignty were dictated by personal as well as political reasons. By now, he knew for certain who was responsible for his father's death. Moreover, the majority of his executive committee at Mukden, led by Yang Yü-ting, had begun to lean toward the Nationalists and were putting pressure on Chang. Their plea was that the populace of Manchuria was demanding that he make peace with the Nationalists. By doing so, Chang could re-direct several anti-Chang factions against the Japanese and solidify his popular base in Manchuria.⁵⁰

As conditions for acknowledging the Nationalists, Chang wanted to head the Kuomintang political council for Manchuria, making it the central organ for the Three Eastern Provinces in any merger. He wanted no interference from Nanking in Manchuria's political or military appointments. There were to be no Kuomintang party branch headquarters or propaganda organs in Manchuria. The Jehol Special District

49. Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 235

50. Bamba, p. 345.

(over which the Peking Political Council had taken control) was to be incorporated as the fourth province of Manchuria. Nanking, angered by Japan's arrogant demands in the aftermath of the Tsinan intervention, was anxious to steal a march in Manchuria while public feeling was high in favor of bringing Manchuria back into the Chinese political orbit. Hence, they readily gave in to Chang's conditions. It appeared by July 22 that the Kuomintang flag was to go up north of the Great Wall.⁵¹ Pressures from the Tanaka cabinet at the last minute pushed Chang into a position of stalling both sides for a time, but, as we shall see below, Japanese foreign policy ambiguities had already let Chang's balance tilt toward the Nationalists. In September, 1928, Chang announced in an interview that ". . . a unified China, including Manchuria, was one of his ideals," and he affirmed that he was a "patriotic Chinese."⁵²

Afterward, he was installed in October as head of the Manchuria State Council organized to mark the beginning in Manchuria of Sun-Yat-sen's "period of tutelage." Chang finally accepted the flag, provincial legislators disbanded in preparation for the Nationalists committee system, and Manchuria was formally reaffirmed as the Three Northern

51. Akira Iriye, "Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Japanese," Journal of Asian Studies XX #1 (November, 1960), pp. 37-38.

52. New York Times, September 27, 1928, p. 12 in Stauffer, p. 195.

Provinces of China on December 29, 1928. Although provisions for Manchurian autonomy were maintained, the union enabled Chang to avoid receiving the brunt of Japanese diplomatic pressure by referring the Japanese routinely to Nanking.⁵³ Between mid-1929 and mid-1930, the growth of rapprochement between Chang and the Nationalists slowed considerably as Chang held aloof during the Chinese government's quarrel with the USSR over the Chinese Eastern Railway (in which Chiang Kai-shek's government received a setback) and at the beginning of the Yen Shi-shan revolt in April, 1930.

However, in September, 1930, Chang realized that, in keeping a balance, he had to consider not only the Nationalist Chinese and Japanese but also the Russians as a possible threat to the Chinese. He thus moved again toward closer cooperation with the South. As he now held a strategic position in his proximity to Shantung and Peking, he was more militarily equal to Chiang and more at ease in this rapprochement. In November, 1930, he attended the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and accepted the post of deputy Commander in Chief of the Nationalist armed forces. In December he announced forthcoming formation of branch headquarters of the Kuomintang throughout Manchuria. In February, 1931,

53. Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 244-45.

General Wu Tieh-cheng of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee came to Manchuria to speed the process and help bring the Mukden administration in line with Nationalist government forms.⁵⁴ Kuomintang textbooks were introduced into schools and pressure was brought to close down Japanese-sponsored Korean schools in the Chientao region of eastern Manchuria.⁵⁵ Kuomintang labor organizer had already appeared among Chinese employed in Japanese enterprises in the leased areas, especially among the longshoremen at Dairen.⁵⁶ At the time, Chang was quoted by Reuter's Mukden correspondent as being greatly influenced by his contact with Nationalist leaders and was encouraging his subordinates to educate the people in ". . . the principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen." All officials should, he said, ". . . study the San Min Ch I."⁵⁷

Both Chang's rapprochement with Nanking and the process of rights recovery understandably undercut the complacency of the Manchurian Japanese and led them to launch efforts at counteracting these unsettling developments when it appeared that the Japanese government could not or would

54. Stauffer, pp. 201-10.

55. Manchuria Daily News Monthly Supplement, June, 1929, in ibid., p. 210.

56. Ibid.

57. Week in China, February 18, 1931, p. 273 in ibid., p. 211.

not do the job satisfactorily. Rights recovery was a central program of the Kuomintang party and Nationalist government. It was an explosive matter and their commitment to it was not taken lightly. Akira Iriye feels that it was motivated as much by economic as by political necessity. Given the continuing existence of warlord bases and their periodic revolts in China, the central government's collection of land taxes had been interdicted. Chiang Kai-shek realized that, for the sake of fiscal reform as well as political unification, he could not tolerate a status quo on tariffs, extraterritoriality, foreign leases, and foreign rights to station troops and navigate internal waterways.⁵⁸ To the extent that Chang Hsüeh-liang was coming into line with the Nanking government, rights recovery became his cause as well. In Manchuria the quantity and pervasiveness of the Japanese presence made it a more natural bastion to fight against the recovery movement. It was, perhaps, the sheer quantities of foreigners (Japanese and Koreans) affected as well as their commitment to remain that made the case of Manchuria unique in dealing with Chinese nationalism.

The Second Plenary Conference of the Kuomintang Central Executive Advisory Committee in May, 1929, established a basic program for rights recovery. The Committee

58. Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 254.

was to step up preparations for promulgating civil, criminal, and commercial laws to replace the extraterritoriality system. It endorsed demands to be made for retrocession of Weihaiwei, Dairen, Port Arthur, and other leases and settlements. Committee members opposed gradualism in treaty revision on principle. Hence, 1929 was to be the big year for struggle for complete sovereignty.⁵⁹

Although the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 (part of the Twenty-One Demands) guaranteed Japanese subjects freedom to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacturing of any kind, it had always been the practice of Chinese officials in Manchuria, wherever they could, to limit the freedom of action of Japanese on a day-to-day basis--binding them in red tape, requiring (and denying) travel permits, obstructing them through local laws, levying extralegal taxes, and so forth. Police pressure was applied in a thousand trivial but annoying ways. There were attempts to evict Japanese from many towns in the interior of South Manchuria. Chinese landlords were discouraged unofficially from renting to Japanese. Another irritant was the controversy over the right to lease land. The 1915 Treaty provided that Japanese subjects in South Manchuria could, by negotiation, lease land necessary to trade, manufacture, or agriculture.

59. Ibid., p. 255.

"Lease" meant no more than thirty years and the possibility of renewal. The Japanese took this to mean they could unilaterally renew--effectively enjoying perpetual lease. Chinese authorities disputed this renewal-without-negotiation. Provincial and local authorities often erected de facto barriers to leasing land, even sometimes passing ordinances forbidding leasing to Japanese. Sometimes they levied special fees or taxes on leased land.

Another source of irritation was the status and treatment of Korean immigrant farmers (which was to come to the forefront in the Wanpaoshan Incident in the summer of 1931). At stake here was the issue of Japanese sovereignty in Korea and, hence, the status of Koreans as Japanese subjects enjoying extra-territoriality.⁶⁰ Basically, the Chinese did not accept the validity of the 1915 Treaty because they had been coerced into signing it. For the Japanese government to stand on international law and say coercion was beside the point was to do little for the Japanese and Koreans on the spot. Apart from protesting, there was little the Japanese government could do that did not involve the same sort of gunboat tactics employed at Tsinan. By July, 1931, over 500 pending cases of Sino-Japanese dispute had accumulated.⁶¹

60. Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 127-31.

61. Ogata, p. 18.

Among the fair-minded students there never was any doubt that the Chinese during and after the Nationalist revolution of 1925-8 had needlessly irritated the Japanese on a good many occasions, and if each irritation in itself had been only a pinprick, it was still the case where a thousand pinpricks equalled the slash of the sabre.⁶²

Between April and November, 1929, the land ownership restriction policy followed by the Mukden regime seemed to originate directly out of Nanking, being enforced by the Manchurian provincial authorities outside the treaty areas, where Japanese and Koreans were reclaiming agricultural land or expanding activities in the cities and open ports. These came in the form of pressures on Chinese landlords to raise the rents of Japanese and Korean tenants or refuse to renew rental contracts; and, more and more, the policies were coming from the top.⁶³ By 1930, the Mukden government had issued laws aimed at recovering land from lease wherever possible. Anyone selling land, houses, or forests might be punished by death.⁶⁴ Nanking, as a matter of fact, was anxious to control the process of rights recovery from the tope and avoid the worst forms of anti-foreign hysteria which could only increase the strength of leftists and Communists. The objective was, of course, treaty revision

62. R. H. Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18-19, 1931," Journal of Modern History, XXVII (1955) p. 67.

63. IMTTE, testimony of Tadashi Katakura for the defense, pp. 19,161-77, 19,183-87.

64. IMTTE, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, p. 18,809.

rather than mass expropriation. However, in Manchuria, where foreign presence was more ubiquitous and whose local leaders were more independent of central control, the process of rights recovery appeared to be taking a less orderly and more radical form. Agitators, including many Communists, were active and their thrust, of course, was to play upon or create anti-Japanese sentiment.⁶⁵ Those receiving the brunt of this agitation were the Manchurian Japanese.

Rights recovery aimed at larger enterprises as well. The Nationalists made an abortive attempt in July, 1929, to seize portions of the operations of the Russian-run Chinese Eastern Railroad. The Mukden government was involved in this attempt and the portent for Japanese holdings was ominous.⁶⁶ Coupled with this recovery effort, Chang pressed railway construction on lines that competed with the SMR, using funds, the Japanese averred, that should have been used to pay back previous Japanese loans. Several railways were designated as centrally-operated national railroads to be supervised by the central

65. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, eds., Taiheiyo sensō e no michi (Tokyo, Asahi Shinbunsha, 1964), Vol. II, pp. 230-39.

66. Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 264-68; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 361.

government. A construction project for a competing harbor at Hulutao was contracted for by a Dutch firm.⁶⁷

In addition to railroad building, the Chang administration was taking some initiative in developing mining, forestry, milling, and textile works, marking what most observers saw as an economic "offensive" by Chinese capitalism which, if it could not yet vie with the Japanese for quantity or technological expertise, was nonetheless growing.

Moreover, Manchuria's Chinese population was growing rapidly due to immigration. This had been previously viewed with equanimity by the Japanese, but extensive agricultural settlement by Chinese fostered closer economic and social ties between Manchuria and China Proper and broadened the base of rapprochement.⁶⁸ Finally, in the spring of 1931, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Chen-ting laid out the dimensions of rights recovery in a statement. China would aim first at the recovery of tariff autonomy, next at the abolition of extraterritoriality, next at the return of foreign settlements, then at the return of leased territories, and, finally, at the recovery of the rights of railway operation, inland navigation, and coastal trade.

67. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. 1, p. 343.

68. Ogata, p. 17.

The Kwantung leasehold was included in those to be restored and the South Manchurian Railway was to be recovered.⁶⁹

A further dimension to the deteriorating situation was presented by the rise of clearly identifiable Communist activities in Manchuria. In November, 1928, after the Tsinan Incident and in response to the Li Li-san Line, the Manchurian Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, headed by Tank Hung-ching and Wang Li-kung, issued its first statement, attacking both Japan and the Nanking government. Their position at this time was for the retrocession to China of Dairen and Port Arthur, the withdrawal of Japanese railway guards, the overthrow of the Mukden warlord government, and the end to the "traitorous" diplomacy of the Nationalist government. They also began to instigate anti-Japanese attacks by Korean Communists effectively absorbing the Korean Communist movement.

The Chinese Communist Party paralleled the efforts of the Kuomintang in its anti-imperialist stance. They, in fact, had joined with the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Kuomintang, already in existence by November, 1928, in calling for the abolition of unequal treaties, and the return of railroads. This was the first real overt outburst involving a tacit combination of the two against the Japanese. In 1929, the Chinese Communist Party Central

69. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

Committee expanded guerrilla operations in Manchuria. On May 30, riots were staged in Chientao (an area adjacent to the Korean Yalu River border). In June-July, armed disturbances occurred along the Kirin-Tunghwa railway line (in eastern Manchuria). They established a Manchurian General Action Committee and military committees at the hsien and municipal levels, and provided arms to all party headquarters. By 1931, when Kuomintang branches were being set up in Manchuria, their lower echelons were mostly infiltrated by Communists, whose appeal was primarily to nationalistic sentiment, centered almost totally on an anti-Japanese stance.⁷⁰

Although the Japanese business position in Manchuria was less vulnerable to boycotts than in China Proper, these did play a role in shaping the crisis atmosphere prior to September, 1931. The boycotts of 1928-29 in retaliation for the Tsinan intervention and the Shanghai boycott beginning in July, 1931 (which led to the Japanese armed intervention there in 1932), may well have helped spur Manchurian Japanese toward the conviction that only separation of Manchuria would save it from the virus of Chinese nationalism in all its various forms. The boycotts, more

70. Chin-tung Liang, The Sinister Face of the Mukden Incident (New York, St. Johns University Press, 1969), pp. 127-29; In Teak Chung, "The Korean Minority in Manchuria, 1900-1937" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1966), pp 169-73.

than most manifestations of anti-Japanese behavior, seemed to illustrate how the Chinese could always make Japanese business in China a hostage, forcing the Japanese government either to soften its stand or engage in gunboat diplomacy which further angered and united Chinese popular opinion.⁷¹

The Manchurian Japanese concern over pressures from China cannot be fully understood unless one also considers the amplifying effect of world depression. Hitting Manchuria in 1929, it had some effect on all levels of Japanese endeavor, but the SMR Company's ebb in fortunes was the most dramatic since it was the economic lynchpin and largest single employer of Manchurian Japanese. Its 1930 income dropped substantially below the previous year, forcing postponement of repairs and upkeep on rails and rolling stock and causing dismissal of employees. Allied firms and independent businesses, most of them small or middle-sized, all felt the impact as well. The effect on the SMR Company was understandably intensified by the rivalry of Chinese railroads. Pessimism abounded in Japan, where inclinations to retrench and desires to cut losses often led to talk of abandoning altogether a position in

71. Donald A. Jordan, "China's Anti-Japanese Boycott of 1931-32: Commercial Nationalism" (Unpublished paper delivered at the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, October 24, 1975, Athens, Ohio. Jordan provides details on the boycotts, whereas the conclusions regarding Manchurian Japanese views are my own.

Manchuria increasingly vulnerable to both economic and political vicissitudes.⁷²

Hence, the problems in Sino-Japanese relations created by China's struggle to recover sovereignty in her territory occurred at a particularly vulnerable time for both the Japanese and Chinese. Overt public action in China had opened a Pandora's box for the Nationalist coalition which, while it was not dominated by the ballot box and was anxious to avoid enemies, could not afford to be outdistanced for long by activists within the populace. Japanese domestic public opinion, though more remote from the influences generated by these problems, had become vitally concerned about developments on the continent.

Japanese opinion was capable of being stirred by such occurrences as the Wanpaoshan Incident. In this, Korean immigrant farmers were seemingly victimized by local Chinese in Manchuria and, in retaliation, anti-Chinese riots broke out in Korea. The Japanese, anxious to assert their sovereign imperial position among Koreans, fanned the Sino-Korean hatreds with propaganda.⁷³ Japanese became angry over the shooting, at about the same time, of a Captain Nakamura, who, traveling incognito, was arrested and killed by Chinese troops. Chang Hsüeh-liang,

72. Ogata, pp. 17-18; Matsuoka, pp. 95-96.

73. Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 290-91.

apparently feeling capable of any necessary resistance with a troop strength of some 140,000 in Manchuria alone, refused to perform the obligatory apologies, indemnities, and so forth, after the Nakamura affair. The vague conviction was growing that these occurrences, coupled with boycotts and demonstrations, were all the products of a coordinated Chinese effort. In the simplistic predominant view expressed among the Japanese public, the Chinese were "arrogant" and needed chastizing by a Kwantung Army itching to do the job.⁷⁴

Public opinion among the Japanese in Manchuria, as they were closer to the line of confrontation, was more deeply exercised but somewhat less quixotic--a feeling of having backs to the wall, having no place to go, and needing to rally support. They felt that old patterns of legalistic negotiation, pressure and counter-pressure, and wrangling within the Japanese government were passé, that the mechanisms for dealing with the upsurge of Chinese nationalism were inadequate, and that there was going to be no end to their current kinds of problems without a sweeping change. It stood to reason that if Japan remained

74. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. II, p. 388; ibid., p. 291; James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 117-18; Yoshihashi, pp. 143-45.

quiet in Manchuria it would see its position relinquished little by little.⁷⁵

The possibility of separating Manchuria from China had had precedents of one sort or another.⁷⁶ However, the problems with this in the past had been numerous. For example, what form would be best for the separated entity now that some degree of autonomy could no longer be maintained by a Chang Tso-lin? In the case of open Japanese government backing for separation, how would they cope with international pressures? We must surmise that, if open Japanese government backing could not be obtained, then the matter would possibly fall back into the conspiratorial mode as in the past. Then the burden devolved onto local native separatist elements. The problem then would be what local forces to use, given the fact that any one group was too narrow a base (as the Japanese army conspirators had found in 1912 and 1916), whereas too many separatist groups would pull commitments in too many directions and were likely to make Japanese control difficult. Once local separatist forces were set loose, they would have to be quickly curbed and reintegrated if the separation were going to stand. Finally, there were the imponderables of Chinese Nationalist reaction to a breakaway movement at

75. Ogata, pp. 37-38.

76. See, for example, above, Chapter I.

this crucial point. Though they found it difficult to fully knit many of the warlord regimes, Chinese capability of dealing with a separatist movement under foreign aegis might well be better, especially as Chang Hsüeh-liang was pulling closer to Nanking.

All these considerations were to become burning and immediate as the sense of crisis deepened and as separation became increasingly attractive, whatever the dangers.

However, for the time being, the Manchurian Japanese looked to the Japanese government for a solution. Disappointment at the handling of relations between China and Japan in the late 1920s by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi and Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō became the final push in motivating Japanese activism in Manchuria--both in the Kwantung Army and among civilians.

Shidehara served as Foreign Minister from June, 1924, to April, 1927, in the two cabinets of Katō Kōmei and in the first cabinet of Wakatsuki Rēijirō. Again, from July, 1929, to December, 1931, he was Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Hamaguchi Osachi, briefly acting Prime Minister, and then Foreign Minister again in the second Wakatsuki cabinet. Tanaka Giichi served as Prime Minister from April, 1927, to July, 1929, being virtually in charge of foreign policy. Although they differed in method (and were mutual critics), taken together, they represented an

approach to foreign relations that put primary emphasis on economics, on treaty rights, and on international legality.

Whether dealing with Chang Tso-lin, Chang Hsüeh-liang, or with the Nationalist government, they saw Japan's relations with the continent in terms of the accepted order of legality--a kind of status quo which put Japan in the same position vis-à-vis China as the Western imperialist powers. Japan's advantage in this system came through her territorial proximity and her quantitatively unique presence in Manchuria. Economics and international order as foreign policy motifs had the advantage of fitting well with the formation of Taishō Democracy, in which the political parties who vied for power could not afford to ignore major economic interests. It also fitted with the Weltanschaung of the post-World War I era in which the grosser imperialistic confrontations appeared to be waning and, hence, Japan could expect less overt rivalry from the West if she merged with the rest of the international order, as she had done in the Washington Conference.

In the early 1920s there was a sense of optimism regarding international cooperation and shared notions. Statesmen of the West eulogized a new era with confidence that capitalistic values would apply throughout the world and that growing industrialism would produce universal harmony. That these values were shared by Japan cannot be

doubted. Cultural dominion in Manchuria, after all, partakes of such preconceptions in a colonial context.

However, inconsistencies in this system of international order quickly became apparent. There was disillusionment in Japan about the commitment of the rest of the imperial powers to a mutually-acceptable order when Japan saw what happened to the racial equality issue raised at Versailles. There were also the passage of anti-oriental immigration laws and rejection of the League of Nations in the United States. Moreover, the cosmopolitan view of capitalism was not matched by cosmopolitanism in the world political arena. Japan saw China moving toward xenophobia at the same time that the United States and Europe raised tariff barriers against Japan. The United States continued to apply force to protect her interests in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. Underneath the proclaimed commitment to disarmament, all the powers continued an arms buildup.⁷⁷ The major drawback of resting on international order as embodied in treaties was that Japan could not be like the rest of the imperial powers in China. Her "special position" in Manchuria was far too conspicuous to have avoided being singled out and attacked with particular intensity by the Chinese.

77. Akira Iriye, "The Failure of Economic Expansionism, 1918-1931" (Unpublished paper, n.d.), pp. 28-30, 37-39.

Thus, the proponents of multilateral diplomacy, like Shidehara, had to operate in an atmosphere of increasing suspicion. The West was no longer trusted so much and China, no longer so divided and supine, was pressing her case not just diplomatically but also in the realm of popular mass politics. The prospect was that a change in conditions meant that the course previously followed in diplomacy could no longer deliver the results demanded.

Shidehara remained to the end a master negotiator with foreign adversaries, but had difficulty mustering support at home. He regarded diplomacy as an imperial prerogative, above the tempest of party politics, and yet relied tacitly on his party to protect his policies against critics. The country at large, he symbolized privilege, wealth, and the West. Hence, he was ultimately unable to rally a base of support in the period prior to the Manchurian Incident.⁷⁸

When he first became Foreign Minister in 1924, Shidehara was keenly aware of the failures of the Japanese policy of meddling intimately in China's domestic politics during World War I. It was largely with this in mind that he rejected the practice of manipulating China's leadership

78. Sidney D. Brown, "Shidehara Kijurō: The Diplomacy of the Yen," in Richard D. Burns and Edward M. Bennet, eds., Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941 (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio Press, 1974), pp. 202-203.

or course of action with the threat of force. He felt it lay beyond the power of any nation to truly "guide" or punish Chinese political actions. Crushing a single government with anti-Japanese proclivities would not make China safe for Japanese interests, since China did not have a single center of power.⁷⁹

Contemporaries saw Shidehara and Tanaka as different, with Shidehara "soft" policies contrasting with Tanaka's "toughness." Most current observers agree that Tanaka's toughness was overrated, being lost too often in vacillation, and that there was less overall difference between the two than supposed at the time. However, Shidehara, it is true, was less zealous about Manchuria than Tanaka. Shidehara regarded it as part of China. He believed that Japan could use her competitive advantage to develop the enormous China market potential and wanted to avoid jeopardizing this by backing adventures to separate Manchuria from China. In fact, he grew almost paranoid about these schemes over the years. Tanaka, who was both an army general and Russian specialist, believed that, if Japan exploited the Manchurian investment field fully, she could build her economic advantage as well as control a highly strategic area.⁸⁰

79. Ibid., p. 211.

80. Ibid., p. 217.

Insofar as the "soft" policy of Shidehara attempted to promote Japanese economic interests within the limits of the international agreements concluded among the Powers and with China, it attached great importance to alleviating contending forces and controlling the scope of any domestic expansionism. Tanaka seemingly encouraged a certain degree of expansionism regarding Manchuria, but, in fact, this amounted to attempts to devise some sort of separation of Manchuria from China which could be mutually agreed upon by the rulers of both China and Manchuria, who would then come to some understanding on Japan's interests there. Where Shidehara looked to cooperation from the West, Tanaka looked to agreement with China. Neither of them thought in terms of a truly "independent" diplomacy in which operations would be executed at the cost of international hostility.⁸¹

Tanaka showed willingness to act unilaterally, as in the case of the Tsinan intervention, to block the Northern Expedition, since he faced more overt threats in an atmosphere that had altered from Shidehara's first stint as Foreign Minister. In fact, his willingness to intervene for Japan's own narrow purposes was bitterly criticized by Shidehara in the House of Peers in February, 1929:

If a "strong" policy means to protect our interests by coercive power and to go hell-bent for this, are you confident that you can deal with such a simple method? Did you ever bring any actual

81. Ogata, p. 117.

benefit to our Sino-Japanese relations by your "positive" policy? Isn't it true that because you raised your fist, the other party became more aggressive in response? Was the relationship between Japan and China bettered by your Shantung expeditions? To be "positive" in a real sense means to progress from the status quo. . . . The political purpose [of Japan's China policy] must be economic advancement. Nevertheless, did the government make any effort to promote Japan's economic development in the policy toward China?⁸²

At the same time, public criticism of Tanaka's policies was increasing. Business circles, hurt by the rapid decline in Sino-Japanese trade, joined students and leftists, as anti-imperialists, to decry the counter-reaction Tanaka had caused. On February 17, several thousand people gathered at Aoyama Kaikan in Tokyo to declare:

The unification of our neighboring country, China, will bring a good opportunity for a fundamental alliance of two great nations, Japan and China. Nevertheless, what the Tanaka Administration is doing is harmful not only to our own national interests but also to the general welfare of East Asia. . . . For the sake of "popular diplomacy"⁸³ we are determined to destroy the Cabinet.

The Tanaka cabinet, on taking power, should have created a semblance of order in domestic finance as quickly as possible, but it made its debut in April, 1972, with a matter of political expediency--a new look at the China policy. Yamamoto Gombei said, "China was Tanaka's only talking point in politics."⁸⁴ His concern for some

82. Bamba, p. 354.

83. Ibid., p. 353.

84. Yoshihashi, p. 13.

kind of immediate solution there stemmed from a belief that he could thereby forestall activities of extremists clamoring for an active policy, thus stealing a march on the radicals.⁸⁵

In his so-called Eastern Conference in June-July, 1927, there emerged some themes which formed the basis for his touted "positive" policies. Mori Kaku, Tanaka's parliamentary Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, set out four main points: (1) the Tanaka government would not hesitate to send troops to China Proper, Manchuria, or Inner Mongolia to protect rights, interests, life, or property of Japanese residents or quell anti-Japanese activity; (2) since Manchuria and Mongolia were vital, Japan would insist that order be maintained there; (3) Japan would back a regime indigenous to Manchuria if it respected Japanese interests; (4) Japan was ready to isolate Manchuria-Mongolia and set up a puppet regime if the Nationalists should alter the special status of these regions.⁸⁶ However, Mori was at pains to reaffirm the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity for foreigners in Manchuria. Moreover, it became clear that "backing for an indigenous regime that would respect Japanese interests" meant Chang Tso-lin, although this

85. Ibid., p. 14.

86. Ibid., pp. 22-26.

was not stated directly. Thus, in some important respects, the Tanaka regime was not much of a departure from previous practice.⁸⁷

The Japanese had tended to overrate their impact on Chang Tso-lin due to a kind of ethnocentric confidence that their leased areas, favored position, and wealth were the only things that prevented Manchuria from collapsing from the corruption of officials and Chang's impetuosity. Chang, however, was aware of and took full advantage of the confusion between the continual Kwantung Army push for expansion of the Japanese position on the one hand and, on the other, the low key policy mandated by Shidehara and what appeared to be hesitation on Tanaka's part in pressing Chang, out of his tacit commitment to Chang as his only viable diplomatic counterpart in Manchuria. Chang found it easy to ignore the Japanese, though he was careful about airing his attitudes openly.⁸⁸ He had every interest in stringing them along while trying to accomplish his ends in North China.

Tanaka's ambivalence was shown when he sent Yoshida Shigeru in July, 1927, to press Manchurian authorities to honor treaty obligations. When Yoshida took a strong stand, threatening to cut off Manchurian military trains in Mukden

87. Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 169-72.

88. Suleski, pp. 22-24.

(where they crossed the SMR), Chang requested moderation. The Kwantung Leased Territory government, SMR Company, and even representatives of the Kwantung Army felt Yoshida had gone too far and foresaw technical problems in implementing the threat. Tanaka then backed down by shifting discussions out of Yoshida's hands to Peking (where Chang was temporarily in power). The negotiations then were dominated by Yamamoto Jōtarō, President of the SMR Company, who offered Chang Japan's positive assistance for his position in Manchuria in return for his consent to further Japanese railroad construction, an agreement that would have amounted to a private contract with the SMR Company. Further, Yamamoto proposed a political agreement which would have given Japan considerable military responsibility and scope in maintaining the security of the region against "agents either within or outside China." A treaty submitted to Chang by Yamamoto proposed to open the resources of North and South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to foreigners, thus making the region more subservient to the needs of the Japanese economy. The project fell through save for the railroad-building agreement largely because the Foreign Ministry group resented Yamamoto's "private diplomacy" style and because Tanaka, in the face of this, failed to support Yamamoto.

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On the one hand, Tanaka was dependent on the co-operation of Chang Tso-lin, but, on the other, he had failed to enforce that cooperation and snatch the fruits of such cooperation, however transitory they may have been. He had failed to win anything new and fell back on defending what Japan already had by treaty.

Although Tanaka was as dismayed as anyone at Chang Tso-lin's assassination, it was his administration that paid the price for it. He agreed with Prince Saionji that the plotters must be punished, if only to restore discipline, but the military balked and his own Seiyūkai Party pressed for leniency. Tanaka ended by temporizing and allowing the assassins to go free. At the same time, he hoped to be able to deal with Chang Hsüeh-liang as he had with his father. On the issue of possible union between China Proper and Manchuria, Tanaka limited himself to verbal suasion to prevent such a union. On the other hand, he indicated that he hoped for unification of China, wanting only that Chang forestall southern forces from entering Manchuria, since he felt Japan's position could not be maintained if the Kuomintang entered the scene. He was willing to give all necessary financial and other assistance to Chang and was willing to give up Japanese extraterritoriality if Japanese residents could be granted freedom of

residence and business activity.⁹⁰ As support for Chang, Tanaka kept the troops dispatched to Tainan in Shantung and concentrated more troops of the Kwantung Army in Mukden.⁹¹

Simultaneously, the Japanese government moved toward rapprochement with Nanking, a move that was strongly advocated by Foreign Ministry professionals. They argued that to ignore or be "rough" on the Nationalists would be to encourage the left wing and Communists in the Chinese government as well as turning them further to reliance on Britain and the U.S. Japan and China worked out a series of compromise face-saving agreements on tariffs, debts, the likin, the Tsinan Incident, and the matters to be taken up in a possible revision of the unequal treaties. It paved the way for Japanese recognition of the Nationalist government later in June, 1929.⁹² Chang wanted to use Tanaka's pressure on him to encourage the Nationalists to give him better terms, but it was probably a foregone conclusion that he would move toward union, since the Japanese government appeared to offer no more than verbal opposition.

For his part, Tanaka simply could not keep effective pressure on Chang Hsüeh-liang. Tanaka feared both diplomatic isolation and being out of phase with what

90. Ibid., pp. 235-36.

91. Bamba, p. 343.

92. Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 239-41, 251.

he saw as the trends of the times. Chinese economic boycotts, the suspicions of the Powers, and criticism by political opponents at home all forced him to ease up.⁹³ Chang was then free to make his accommodations with the Nanking government as indicated earlier. In fact, by the time Tanaka resigned in July, 1929, the union of Manchuria and China (so long as the Chinese observed the status quo in treaty rights) no longer appeared to be a serious issue with the Tanaka government. They had come to regard it as inevitable in the sense that to oppose union would create antagonism at a time when they had wanted to settle economic issues with China--getting a mutually acceptable tariff, consolidation of debts to Japan, and abolition of the likin internal transit tax.⁹⁴

The Hamaguchi cabinet, with Shidehara as Foreign Minister for the second time, had come to power in 1929 on a promise of a "social policy" to poorer voters newly enfranchised by the universal manhood suffrage act of 1925. For the new voters, this implied government efforts to alleviate social ills. Instead, the cabinet elected to pursue a massive retrenchment at home and to honor international commitments abroad, including a conciliatory

93. Iriye, "Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Japanese," pp. 37-42; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 303.

94. Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 246-47; Liang, pp. 124-26.

policy toward China. Shidehara, in the rest of 1929, devoted himself to clearing up the same outstanding issues as had faced the previous government and largely ignored Manchuria. His cabinet's zeal in pushing the unpopular London Treaty, however, proved an expensive one. Preoccupation with justifying it left little time for domestic social matters which, if attended to, might have defused some of the criticism.

In the virulent attacks on the government for having usurped military prerogatives and endangering national defense, Shidehara's foreign policy plans went awry. British and U.S. pressure had made a policy based on "international order" untenable. Moreover, the full force of world depression hit Japan just as the government was retrenching and honoring foreign commitments by returning to the gold standard. Emotions unleashed during the treaty struggle surfaced in the assassination attempt on Hamaguchi (Shidehara would have been a target had he been on the spot). He took over as interim Prime Minister to a chorus of attacks from both Seiyūkai and Minseitō (an elitist, he was a member of neither).⁹⁵

Shidehara's policy of preserving the economic status quo in Manchuria, while permitting Chinese political advance, appeared to his critics as merely feeding the

95. Brown, pp. 216-17; Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, p. 51; Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 262.

dragon when the Chinese continued to press for further rights recovery. Wang Cheng-ting's outline of the full objectives of rights recovery in 1931 seemed to put Shidehara in the position of "appeaser." Nationalists in the Privy Council were especially vociferous in their attacks. The Asahi Shinbun, once an ally of Shidehara's, claimed he had fallen behind the times. More than 30,000 small private investors in the SMR Company saw their earnings drop and attributed it to the competition from Chinese rival railroad building seemingly encouraged by Shidehara diplomacy.⁹⁶

There was an additional problem in the divisions and lack of uniform line among the Japanese agencies in Manchuria--the Mukden and Dairen consulates, the Kwantung leased territory government under a Governor-General left over from the post-Russo-Japan War days, the Kwantung Army, and SMR Company. Theoretically, all were subordinated to the Tokyo government and occasionally they worked on a common tack, but uniformity did not often exist. All were agreed on the need to include Japan's rights in Manchuria in any overall Sino-Japanese settlement but differed on what these rights were and how they should be protected. All had, over the years, developed their own philosophies and trained their own personnel. Though all paid lip

96. Matsuoka, pp. 220-25; Brown, pp. 217-18; Yoshihashi, pp. 121-24.

service to the same emotional symbols--holding a strategic buffer against Russia, maintaining Japan's "lifeline" in Manchuria, etc.--the civil-military split in Manchuria was, if anything, even more severe than in Tokyo.⁹⁷

Deadlocks in negotiations over extraterritoriality arose over Japanese demands that the SMR zone and leased areas be excluded from Chinese jurisdiction and that the interior be opened (something Japan had wanted since 1915). Finally, on May 4, 1931, the Nationalist government unilaterally abolished extraterritoriality with no exclusions, asserting that the unequal treaties were the greatest obstacle to the revolution. Shidehara had no more cards to play. Whereas Tanaka had tried to do his negotiating with Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsüeh-liang, Shidehara had no real counterpart, since Manchurian authorities were now referring negotiations to Nanking and the Japanese were unwilling to consign the disposition of the outcome to those who were so wont to play the revolutionary ideologues when it suited them. To negotiate in Nanking would be to give up too much at the outset.⁹⁸

The peaceful expansionists of the 1920s, with which we can associate Tanaka, Shidehara, and most of the Japanese professional diplomats, envisioned economic

97. Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 161.

98. Ibid., pp. 287-90.

interdependence and an open international society. The mostly military expansionists who emerged full-blown in the 1930s saw a divided world with geopolitical "pan-regions." It was such a vision that prompted their direct action in ousting the West from Asia, nailing down their foothold before it could be eroded by Chinese nationalism, a concept most Japanese soldiers little understood and were inclined to confuse with "communism." Their point of view, like that of the peaceful expansionists, centered on Manchuria, where the Japanese had the most advantages, where they had deeper, more contiguous, and more systematized roots, and where the West would have little chance to compete. Unlike the Shidehara-Tanaka vision, this view saw the Japanese position in Manchuria as not necessarily part of the same system as that on which the Japanese commercial position in China Proper rested. Given the "crisis mentality" of the late 1920s, it was easy to conclude that little would be lost and much gained by going outside the international order and taking direct action.

Like many, the Japanese in Manchuria had little empathy with the problems of delicacies and balances in the diplomatic give and take between governments and larger entities. They looked for concrete results of diplomacy and saw failure. Unlike domestic Japanese, they were in the arena of the controversy and were likely to feel the effects of failure in their own backyard. In the face of

the deteriorating situation, therefore, it is not surprising that versions of the "alternative vision" and proponents of some kind of direct action began to find a voice among them. Moreover, those among the Manchurian Japanese (mostly centered in SMR Company) who had been attracted by a vision of Manchuria on the move, of burgeoning development without trammels, had seen that, not only was the Japanese government under the previous two administrations not removing Chinese obstacles, they were permitting what looked like an increase in future obstacles. Beyond this, the government had, by retrenchment, shamefully ignored the development of what the Japanese already had. Defense of the status quo, even if this were done with a show of force, as in the Tsinan Incident, was a deadend street. Out of this conclusion were born a number of activist political groups, the most important of which was the Manshū Seinen Renmei (Manchurian Young Men's League).

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMATION OF THE MANSHŪ SEINEN RENMEI

The genesis of the Manshū Seinen Renmei (Manchurian Young Men's League) is found in employee organizations in the South Manchurian Railway Company which, in time, shaped themselves into an association resembling a union. In the period before World War I, the Hinode Club was begun as a recreational and social club among lower level SMR Company employees living in company barracks in Dairen. One of its primary purposes was to provide adequate public baths so important for all Japanese. During World War I, another organization, called the Futo Club, with its nucleus among the port employees of the SMR Company in Dairen, was constituted as a cooperative to fight the runaway inflation engendered by the boom in Allied shipping passing through Dairen and Manchuria and connecting with the Trans-Siberian Railway to supply Russia and Eastern Europe.

The Futo Club spread to Anshan and Fushun, the great iron and coal centers of Manchuria, and its function as an economic mutual aid group was strengthened in the depression which followed the war's end. On these foundations was formed an Employees Association (shainkai) in 1925. It had all the aspects of mutual welfare promotion,

but moved quickly in the direction of a self-governing group with distinct ideological trappings. Much of the main leadership came from white collar lower executives in the Dairen main office. Mainly post-war imperial university graduates in their early 30s, these men reflected much of the post-war political ideological ferment which was seen as much in Japan as in the rest of the world, a ferment which frequently showed cross-currents of right and left wing thinking and which, in any one individual, was often expressed as a confusing hybrid of various European schools of socialism and Japanese quasi-familial harmony.

The focus for their political attention was dissatisfaction with Japanese political party patronage in the SMR Company's higher executive appointments and with party activities as they influenced SMR policies. From the early Taishō period, and especially during the Hara administration, the SMR Company had been drawn into party matters, contributing large sums to party coffers. The Employees Association decried a general lack of coherent planning regarding Manchuria in general and the SMR Company role there, being convinced that political parties, as they then operated in Japan, had as their sole selfish aim the advancement of their own party's interests. After the passage of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act in 1925, parties had to be oriented toward the qualified domestic

voters and were bound to slight the interests of Japanese residents abroad, who were not represented in the Diet.⁹⁹

The Employees Association's program, as summarized from the June, 1927, issue of Kyōwa (Harmony), the Association journal, determined that (1) they would organize an Employees Association which would try to counteract "outside interference and influence" being exerted on the SMR Company by political parties and interests in Japan; (2) they would try to form a self-governing organization for employees (sha-in jichi kikan) by which they hoped to have a voice in shaping the destiny of the SMR Company; and (3) they aimed at improving the collective welfare of the Company's employees.¹⁰⁰

Yamaguchi Jūji, who was later an important formulator of the ideological foundation of the Manshū Seinen Renmei, had been involved with the social clubs which formed the nucleus of the Employees Association. He claims that at least some of the dissatisfaction over party patronage influence with the Company was self-serving, since a significant portion of those pressing the point were executive staff who might have been by-passed by "outside"

99. Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," pp. 79-82; Yoshihiro Ominato, "Minzoku kyōwa shisō to Yamaguchi Jūji," in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 347-39.

100. Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," p. 82.

appointments. Yamaguchi, however, feels that the "elite" employees (of which he was not a part) did lend most of the idealistic tone to the Association in its early stages, though he also observes that their theoretical discussions often did not fit practical necessity.¹⁰¹ Yamaguchi had come to Manchuria in 1920 after having served in the police of the Government General of Korea. He left Korea after disagreement over the harsh methods used by Japanese authorities in 1919 to suppress the Seoul riots which were staged to press the case for Korea to the League of Nations. He became a store manager for the SMR Company in Dairen and, at the time of the Manchurian Incident, was a railroad stationmaster.¹⁰²

Yamaguchi indicates that there was much misunderstanding between the white collar executive contingent and the hard core (chūken) of middle-level employees over the character of the association-union. The elite emphasized political ends, whereas the middle-level employees called for improvement of wages and working conditions. There was a great deal of disparity between the wages, fringe benefits, and prerequisites of the staff and the ordinary employees. Although the association had some success in

101. Ominato, in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 439.

102. Yamaguchi's personal correspondence with the author.

June, 1927, negotiating with SMR Company President Yamamoto Jōtarō, it had difficulty in unifying its ideology and objectives. Yamaguchi considered the executive elite as a whole (with the Employees Association contingent not entirely excepted) as promoters of SMR Company colonialism and imperialism (ken-eki shūgi) in the sense of "guarding the inheritance of Meiji" (i.e., the fruits of the blood spilled in the Russo-Japanese War). He himself had little to do with the Association directly at this time. He was connected with the Employees Association Youth Auxiliary, which functioned then as a Marxist study group. He sympathized with the chūken and urged promotion of company loyalty (aisha), rather than class struggle within the company, as the best means of attaining concrete ends. However, he also felt that Japanese attention must not be limited to wages and working conditions (nor even to SMR politics) alone but must be addressed to the rising dangers of the anti-Japanese movement as well. He spoke for what he called a "society of harmony" (chōwa shakai) as an ultimate ideal. The aisha movement was best tailored to take advantage of the chūken qualities of knowhow, energy, and zeal, with which he was familiar. He felt the Employees Association could provide the means to generate a movement that would embody these qualities.¹⁰³

103. Ominato, in Yamaguchi Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 440-42.

The Employees Association gave rise to three more or less distinct groups. One group, associated with Shima Ichirō, functioned as a kind of secret society and therefore little is known of its activities before the Manchurian Incident. It was called the Seinen Dōshikai (Young Comrades Association) and it is known to have been close to the Daiyūhokai (Great Heroic Summit Society) of Kasagi Ryōmei. In September, 1931, its members met with Amakasu Tadahiko, Imada Shintarō, and other Kwantung Army conspirators in Harbin to foment disturbances and create excuses for army action. Thus they could be said to be closely identified with the radical right wing of the military. They were, in fact, in close touch with Suganami Saburō of the young Kōdō army officers and were arrested at the time of the February 26th Incident in 1936 by the Kempeitai under Tōjō Hideki.

The second group centered around the journal Shintenchi ("New Utopia"). The founder-editor, Nakamura Hobō, had been an executive in the SMR Company foreign liaison section until 1921. He maintained his contacts with the company employees while editing Shintenchi and was one of the main forces behind formation of the Employees Association. Shintenchi was called by many the "Chuo Kōron of Manchuria," meaning it was an ideologically composite magazine with a wide range of contributors. It was also known as "leftwing," as it had supported the tenant farmer movement of the Shakai Minshūto in Miyazaki prefecture, had

contributors from the Tokyo University Shinjinkai (New Men's Society), and had a Marxist editorial commentator, Otajima Kōzō. Nakamura, however, regarded the group he headed in the Employees Association as ideologically neutral, as gadflies, questioners, and critics. They regarded Shima's Seinen Dōshikai and the Daiyūhōkai as "right wing." The Shintenchi group was later active, however, in the Manchurian Incident as a source of propaganda and organizational talent. Some became active in pacification and some joined the Manchukuo government.¹⁰⁴

The third group, the Manshū Seinen Renmei (MSR) was, by contrast to either of the above factions, a bonafide mass movement. In May, 1928, a Manchurian Young Men's Diet (Manshū Seinen Gikai) was convened as a preparatory proceeding. The conference was proposed by Hōjō Kakunari, president of the Dairen Shimbun, Kobiyama Naoto, a SMR Company director, and Hirajima Toshio, a SMR Company regional section head. It was sponsored by the Dairen Shimbun. Included in addition were Tachikawa Kumobei, Ioya Satoshi, Satō Yoshinari, Iwai Sadroku, Morita Fukamatsu, Takatsuka Genichi, Ōhane Yukio, Terajima Tomiichirō, Nakazawa Funio, Okada Takeba, Kōki Shokujo, Seki Kazushige, Morita Takashi, Yamazaki Fujimoto, Aihara

104. Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," pp. 81-85.

Satoshi, and Yamaguchi Jūji. In all about ninety were there, including one Korean, from all regions of Manchuria.

After discussing the proposal for a Youth Union League (Seinen Daidō Renmei), the participants had a lively debate over Yamaguchi's draft of bylaws and proclamation. Yamaguchi issued a criticism of the Young Men's Diet as then constituted, having a variety of groups and a variety of axes to grind. He called instead for a genuine youth organization to form a nucleus of members committed to a clear and mutually agreeable ideology. He worked hard to persuade the Diet to meet again in November. Meanwhile, he sought to shape his own faction, the Youth Liberal Party (Seinen Jiyūtō), into a better political vehicle by stripping it down, eliminating members not committed to what was rapidly taking shape as a rudimentary ideology. Other factions' members with similar views were contacted and taken into a provisional group preparing to organize an ideologically-committed political body.¹⁰⁵ In November they met to form the MSR. Kobiyama Naoto was recommended as head and Kanai Shōji, Nakanishi Satoshi, Yamazaki Motomiki, and the above-mentioned original delegates became advisors.¹⁰⁶

105. Ominato, in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 446-48.

106. Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," pp. 91-92; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 360.

The opening proclamation of the MSR began, "Because Manchuria and Mongolia is a region of residency for both Japanese and Chinese, it is the great task of our state (kokka) to promote culture, open up natural resources for the use of all, and maintain the eternal peace of the Orient."¹⁰⁷ As a small minority in Manchuria, unable to rely on the Japanese government to offset Chinese nationalism, they had determined that "the only way to survive . . . would be to join hands with the various racial groups living in Manchuria . . . to devote themselves to the harmony of races . . . and to bring about a paradise-like republic to the land of Manchuria-Mongolia backed by Japanese civilization."¹⁰⁸ From December, 1928, to May, 1929, the original core constituted themselves into a travelling group to organize branches and expand membership. By June, 1929, they had formed twenty branches in the various parts of the leased territory and had some 2,000 members.¹⁰⁹

The reasons why the MSR burgeoned so quickly into a mass movement among Manchurian Japanese have been, in large measure, indicated above: the spreading anti-Japanese mood, the Nationalist government's commitment to rights.

107. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, eds., Manshū seinen renmeishi (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1968), p. 35.

108. Ibid., p. 494.

109. Ibid., p. 49.

recovery, and the adherence of Chang Hsüeh-liang to the Nationalist-Kuomintang cause. In addition, the continuing construction of competing railroad lines and the spread of the Shantung boycotts to Mukden in August, 1927, contributed to the sense of foreboding of those who supported the MSR. The gloom of world depression and fear of loss of jobs, retrenchment by government, and possible reduction of commitments in Manchuria in the interests of economy, while they did not initiate the MSR movement, certainly spurred it in 1929-1930. There were local issues concerning double taxation on Manchurian Japanese (by both Manchurian and Japanese authorities) as well as reform issues, such as the SMR Company's accommodation of Japanese concession hunters. There was the overall concern over whether the Japanese, even without a complete sellout, would be confined perpetually to their narrow leased areas. The conviction in Manchuria that there was no possibility of retreat was coupled with frustration at the do-nothing or even sellout mood perceived in the party governments in Tokyo. The Japanese in Manchuria wanted to "take back" Manchuria from the hands of the parties, the government, and the flaccid colonial organs set up in Manchuria. To do this required a mobilization of compatriots of like mind.¹¹⁰

110. Speech by Shinobu Koinuma, 1929, in ibid., p. 91.

There were 545 MSR members for whom background statistics are available and we may presume that this number represents the true activist core. On the average, their age was in the mid-30s, with the majority being technical school or private university graduates. Four hundred seven came from the SMR Company. Of these, 89 were executive "elite" white collar employees--almost all of them centered in Yamaguchi's Young Liberal Party faction and who seemed to have provided the central leadership over the next three years of MSR existence. The other 318 SMR Company employees were field or locally-responsible employees--stationmasters, foremen, employees of various SMR Company enterprises, and so forth. In addition, there were 25 journalists, 29 teachers (mostly grammar and agricultural school), 29 bank employees, and 52 independent (non-SMR) company employees. There seems to be a fair cross-section of occupational categories of Manchurian Japanese as a whole represented in the MSR (there were 38 ethnic Koreans included as well)--from the professions, manufacturing, transportation, and commerce. The slight disproportion of members from SMR Company is understandable, given its "politicization" by the Employees Association. If the 89 SMR Company white collar executives can be termed an "elite," then the remainder becomes a kind of "sub-elite."¹¹¹

111. Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," pp. 94-96.

Tokyo University research fellow Matsuzawa

Tetsunari sees an analogy between this "sub-elite" of MSR and those who made up the main elements in the agrarian social movement of the 1930s in the farming village of Ibarashiro, which he investigated. The latter, forming the nucleus of the local right wing (Matsuzawa uses the term "fascist") movement, were small landowners or middle class, technical or agricultural school graduates with some intellectual pretensions who found themselves to be "masters of a small universe" (or "big frogs in small ponds").¹¹²

Some of the factionalism that characterized the Dairen Shinbun-sponsored conference continued to divide the MSR in its early years. There were three principal groups within the MSR. The first seems to have been the one with the most sustained influence. It had grown out of Hirajima Toshio's Youth Liberal Party and was most closely tied to the SMR Company Employees Association. It contained the bulk of the white collar executives and was centered in the MSR main headquarters, but was also the most diversified in terms of members' occupations. This was Yamaguchi's group. The second grouping was the Independent Young Men's Party (Dokuritsu Seinentō), often in disagreement with the first faction. It contained many journalists and was described

112. Tetsunari Matsuzawa, "'Shōwa ishin' no shisō to kōdō--Tachibana Kosaburō no ba'ai," Shakai Kagaku no Kenkyū, XIX #3 (1968), pp. 42-53.

as a bit more "populist-oriented." The third group was the Young Comrades Association (Seinen Doshikai), which had influence in various MSR branches in Dairen and Mukden. With Shima Ichirō and others, this group had the closest contact with Suganami Saburō of the Kōdō young officers.¹¹³

The Daiyūhōkai was a separate organization of some 36 members that is often mentioned in connection with MSR, since they operated side by side during the Manchurian Incident. It should be noted that their position, somewhat on the "secret society" side and regarded as further to the right of the MSR, nevertheless parallels that of the MSR, though their small size gave them a coherency that enabled them to avoid the internal disagreements of the MSR, which always sought to become a mass organization. The Daiyūhōkai members were a bit younger, on the average, in their mid- or late 20s, and overwhelmingly Imperial University graduates, a kind of "executive cadet" group, also centered mainly in the SMR Company.¹¹⁴

Formation of Ideology

Having launched a "movement," it was necessary to formulate some kind of attendant ideology which would unify the movement, bring support from outside, and respond

113. Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," pp. 93-94.

114. Ibid., p. 95.

positively to the challenges of Chinese nationalism. One of the first extensive and coherent efforts along this line was a Dairen Shinbun-sponsored prize-winning article by Yamaguchi Jūji in the June, 1927, issue of Kyōwa (Harmony), the official organ of the SMR Company Employees Association, called "Sanjūnengo no Man-Mō" ("Manchuria-Mongolia after Thirty Years").

Yamaguchi first addressed himself to economics, which he treated as the "population and food supply problem." Increased application of technology would be necessary to increase the value of economic production in Manchuria. This meant development of protein and starch-production plants and mechanization in agriculture. The "oil problem" could be solved, he was convinced, by the purposeful application of discoveries in extraction of oil from oil shale (which was abundant). Application of the development of an electrical heat process could raise steel production. In this way, one of the obstacles to the "great leap" (yūhi) implicit in Japanese racial consciousness would be removed.

Yamaguchi revealed an overweening and perhaps naïve faith in technology as a solution to economic problems, but his main emphasis was on laying a prosperous foundation for a utopia which was based not merely on technology but on Sino-Japanese co-prosperity through a self-governing Manchuria and racial concord (minzoku

kyōwa). This was the first such treatment of Manchuria not as a separate entity, but as a united region where Chinese and Japanese could exist in fruitful cooperation on the basis of some equality, rather than "cultural dominion."

Yamaguchi claimed that the Japanese in Manchuria had been unable to exercise their full potential largely because of the inconsistency of Japanese government policy. Policies changed with every change of government and with every international vicissitude. This mercurial policy sought short run advantages for home capitalists but failed in the higher aim of establishing real roots in Manchuria. The parties had no understanding of a "policy line with a foundation" (kontaktei aru hōshin). Yamaguchi conceded that Shidehara diplomacy had a certain degree of consistency, but was unacceptable because, by condoning the existing treaty system, it would have limited the Japanese position. Parties in general were bound to engage in campaign struggle. This, along with the "narrow view of the buraku, the parochialism of the family, and racial prejudice" were all facets of a basic selfishness. For Yamaguchi, "the aim of unity and harmony has sprung spontaneously from the people's weariness with struggle and the desire for peace."

The problems of how to reconcile the obvious Chinese nationalist sentiment with increased Japanese aspirations was a major concern for Yamaguchi. He called for increased Japanese emigration, subsidized by the

Japanese government, and subsidies for expansion of long-range business, as well as keeping and expanding rights and interests in order to stabilize the position of the permanent residents. To encourage the Chinese (or "Manchurian") authorities to acquiesce in all this, Yamaguchi suggested (1) abolition of the Kwantung Territorial Government, to be replaced by the SMR Company; (2) establishment of a joint Sino-Japanese court system in place of extra-territoriality; (3) creation of a joint Sino-Japanese police and military; and (4) what he termed "positive promotion of the welfare of the nation." Finally, he advocated that

. . . those who dwell in Man-Mō have nationality in a self-governing entity. Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Koreans, and Japanese will participate in politics and bear the cooperative responsibility as citizens of the self-governing local areas equally and without distinction. They will equally share the cultural resources of Man-Mō. The Chinese and Japanese peoples will merge to form one society. We must make the ideology of mutual love a reality. We must live and prosper together [kyōson/kyōei].

Yamaguchi argued that, just as fights between individuals or races are extinguished by establishing a nation, so differences between nations or races could be ended by forming an international alliance. Kyōson kyōei (or minzoku kyōwa) could provide the ideological backing for such an "international" (really inter-ethnic) alliance in Manchuria..

Yamaguchi's political program involved the abolition of existing provincial governments and the merger of Manchuria and Mongolia into one self-governing body with a "national conference" for reflecting public opinion. Since all those residing in Manchuria would be citizens, Yamaguchi was confident that creating a new moral political climate could encourage the Chinese and others to participate willingly, if only to escape the evils of warlordism and chaos. Emigrants from Japan would be able to dwell anywhere in Manchuria and, as citizens, could safely exercise rights and interests long withheld from them. Yamaguchi was obviously not in favor of the surrender of rights and interests, but merely the legitimization of them in a new nationality. His view was that rights and interests were a matter for personal advancement of individuals as ambitious human beings with talent and energy to lend to a Manchurian economic situation. They should not have to derive from Japanese treaties with China. Hence, the issue of Manchuria's independence was of crucial importance.

As it became apparent to many Manchurian Japanese that no long-term position could be maintained under the treaty system as administered by the Kwantung Territorial Government, there would be agreement that the only viable position in the long run was independence. Self-government, racial harmony (minzoku kyōwa), and a new nationality for all could head off the impending clash between Chinese

nationalism and Japanese expansionism.¹¹⁵ Yamaguchi, in another context, suggested that, to promote minzoku kyōwa, one needed to (1) exercise self-discipline and the reform of one's life, getting rid of a "colonial mentality" (which was recognized as a serious problem for the Manchurian Japanese) and doing away with "extravagant luxuries"; (2) become intimate with the soil, either in the actual practice of farming or with agricultural planning (a utopian notion that Yamaguchi still maintains today); and (3) become conversant in the Chinese language in order to know the customs and culture of the fellow races.¹¹⁶

This approach was expedient in view of the special historical circumstances of Manchuria--the multi-national struggle between Russia, China, and Japan, with its attendant lack of clarity as to sovereignty; the political vacuum at the top; the failure to develop resources; and the peculiarly multi-ethnic nature of the region. China as a nation-state was as much an outsider or "imperialist" vis-à-vis Manchuria as any other nation-state. Thus, Yamaguchi's program for Manchuria was based on the premise that solidarity of peoples based on "soil" was stronger

115. Jūji Yamaguchi, "Sanjūnen go no Man-Mō," Kyōwa (June, 1927), pp. 158-83; Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," pp. 96-97; Ominato, in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 442-46.

116. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, pp. 97-115, 127, 133-38.

than solidarity based on "blood." Yamaguchi believed that the drive for unity and harmony was a kind of Weltanschaung which was already characteristic of the "developed" nation-states of Europe, a conclusion he may have derived from observing the war-weariness in the post-World War I period. The rise of a new popular consciousness among the under-developed nations like China was the beginning of a struggle of world significance.¹¹⁷

Yamaguchi's statement that "Those who dwell in Man-Mō must have nationality in the new self-governing area" denotes a new concept of territorial nationalism different from Oriental notions of purely racial consciousness (since Manchuria could rely on no one race). It partakes of the historical European statist approach and is one point where Yamaguchi reveals some Marxist influence. European eschatology, which had been dominated by a Christian world view, was secularized by Hegel and Marx. For Hegel, the ends of history are bound to the mechanism of the nation-state. In Marx we have the concept of an international alliance along class lines, leading to the destruction of the nation-state. It was a similar brand of "internationalism" that Yamaguchi held appropriate for the multi-ethnic Manchurian situation. We can see the significance of this ideology

117. Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," p. 97; Yamaguchi's personal correspondence with the author.

for many underdeveloped states that were to be formed out of formerly colonial territory without regard for racial, ethnic, or tribal divisions. Although the New World experience also approximated a secular inter-ethnic nationalism in the early phases of nation-building, the New World had a revolutionary background to aid the process, so that later immigration entered already-formed states. Minzoku kyōwa, by contrast, addressed itself to the problem of creating a non-revolutionary state by substituting inter-racial harmony and the prosperity of rapid resource development for revolution in a developing area.

In the Manchurian Japanese view, it was possible to regard Manchuria-Mongolia not as a part of China but as socially and politically "neutralized." It was virgin territory, a "clean slate" in which it was possible to "start over" to realize a state which could take advantage of all the newly-emerged political and economic methods of the day--state management, state welfare, and even a single-party dictatorship--while resting on minzoku kyōwa. Thus, although Confucian-style terminology like "racial harmony," "live together, prosper together," and, later, the "kingly way" (wang tao), showed up in most of the slogans of the Manchurian scene, the inspiration was thoroughly up-to-date. As an ideology, minzoku kyōwa was rationalized by the exigencies of public welfare and a common prosperity, but, as in many ideologies was bolstered

by an external threat in the form of Western imperialism, international Communism, and Chinese nationalism.

Yamaguchi was, by his own admission, "baptized" by French syndicalism and English guild socialism and influenced by his study of Marxism, just as were many others in the MSR, and, before that, in the SMR Company Employees Association.¹¹⁸ Moreover, he called his ideological solutions in the Kyōwa article a "New Socialism." However, a consistent affinity with any European ideological line is very difficult to see. Rather, it would appear that Yamaguchi, assiduous ideologue that he was, was an equally assiduous synthesizer and adapter.

To complicate matters further, the separation between "left and right wing" in the late 1920s and 1930s is seldom clear in many of the activists and intellectuals. It is well established that many an early socialist later turned up as an ultranationalist in the atmosphere of the 1930s. Apart from this, we see socialist assumptions carried through in the thinking of many so-called "fascist" writers like Kita Ikki, to say nothing of the agrarian movements that linked themselves with radical young army officers.

118. Ominato, in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 446; Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa'" undō," p. 82.

What all of these left and right wing movements--Japanese and European--had in common was a statist approach to economics, including a welfare state, and replacement of parliamentary government with a dictatorship based on support of new elements, though lip service always had to be paid to the Emperor in the case of Japan. Anti-capitalism (meaning opposition to protected, government-entwined, monopoly-ridden big business) was common to left and right and Yamaguchi shared this, while maintaining an equal opposition to Communism. He said, in another context, that "Manchuria has great resources. With independence from warlords, she has the great opportunity to escape both Communism and capitalism. Capitalism will prevent the resources from being used by the people of Manchuria." He advocated security and low taxation so that industry would develop spontaneously, without hindrance, in a free market.¹¹⁹

As a people very much a part of the milieu of the continent, it was incumbent upon the Manchurian Japanese to come to some pertinent conclusions about Chinese society. The extreme ranges of these attitudes went from the contemptuous view of the Chinese as a "degenerate race"¹²⁰ to

119. Jūji Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi" (unpublished manuscript, n.d.), pp. 24, 34.

120. Yamaguchi emphasizes the fact that too many of the nouveau arrivé Japanese speculators and get-rich-quick businessmen exemplified this aspect of the "colonial mentality."

an unabashed Sinophilism or willingness to "go native."¹²¹ The most realistic, of course, lay in between and these assumptions about the Chinese among whom the Manchurian Japanese lived lent much of the underpinning of a "co-operative" ideology like minzoku kyōwa. One of the clearest expositions on Chinese society from a Manchurian Japanese point of view was that of Tachibana Boku (Shiraki), editor of the influential Manshū Hyōron and a leading China scholar. A liberal who had also been a strong critic of capitalism, he experienced a "conversion" (tenkō) to the right wing shortly following the Manchurian Incident, favoring a Japanese, even military, solution to the Manchurian "problem."¹²²

Tachibana, in an article first published in April, 1927, called "Chūgokujin no kokka kannen" ("The Concept of Chinese Nationhood"),¹²³ gave a summary of his view of Chinese society. There was a basic contradiction, he found, between the traditional Chinese farmers' self-centeredness (rikōshin) and their patriotism (aikokushin).

121. Hakurō Kobinata, Bazoku senki, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Banchō Shobō, 1968), is a curious memoir of one who operated with Chinese bandits.

122. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 51.

123. Tachibana Boku Chōsakushū Kankō Iinkai, eds., Tachibana Boku chōsakushū, Vol. I: Chūgoku kenkyū (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1966), pp. 477-511. The author is indebted to Kēnichirō Hirano for his suggestions as to the relevance of Tachibana's writings.

In early modern China, the blood-related units of society (families, extended families, and clans) and regionally-affiliated groupings (buraku) were very strong. Because an overall racial consciousness did not exist, a unified state (kokka) likewise was lacking. In traditional China, because of the tenacity of these localized "natural" units, the concept of "nation" or "people" (minzoku) did not develop. Tachibana did not believe that China was doomed to perpetual fragmentation because they lacked the idea of nationhood. Rather, he believed that, in China, one moved toward mass unification from the bottom by building the whole out of the fragmented local units. However, modern China had tried to create a state (kokka) by means of political and economic centralism, bypassing the buildup of a sense of nationhood or unity as a people (minzoku). The Chinese managed to achieve the worst of both worlds--the central organs were never stable but at the same time the original "natural" units had been weakened.

The traditional Chinese state (kokka) had been an institution of bureaucratic controls solidified over two thousand years of history. The result was an extremely wide gap between the people and bureaucracy, with the "state" existing above and apart from the "people" (minshū). Lacking a government in intimate contact with the people, it was natural that there should be indifference to the state on the part of the people. Locally, the farmers

pursued their own livelihoods and developed a strong local-defense capability. Ordinarily, under such conditions, revolutionaries had very little hope of achieving any kind of inter-regional support. This situation approximated the connotations of the German term Gemeinschaft.¹²⁴

Tachibana relied on arguments that Manchuria was a special regional entity different from China Proper, a frontier or "remote region" (henkyō), in order to justify Japan's possession of it. The Japanese would acquire Manchuria not in the aggressive nor purely acquisitive sense, but as a presence in an area where fruitful interchange could freely take place between Chinese and non-Chinese cultures. This approximates the rather well-known depiction by Owen Lattimore¹²⁵ of the frontier as an area of mutual "socialization," where barbarians learned Chinese ways before conquering. The Manchu conquerors of China did not simply burst out of the steppes and forests into China. The frontier in South Manchuria was ecologically suitable for both hunting and agriculture and was therefore a suitable transition zone. The Manchus were able to control

124. Gemeinschaft refers to the sense and motivations of "community" as a natural formation--such as blood ties would produce--with a self-perpetuating tradition. Gesellschaft refers to groupings, more or less "artificial," formed for specialized purposes, such as industries, patriotic groupings, external endeavors like war, etc.

125. Owen Lattimore, The Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962).

the more numerous Chinese because they had had long years of experience with the Confucian-based agricultural administrative organs and were aware of the necessity for them. Being to that extent Sinified, they were accepted more peaceably by the Chinese. Their sojourn on the frontier was concurrent with the internal breakdown of the Ming Dynasty. Civil wars and chaos within China encouraged many Chinese to yield their allegiance to Sinified foreigners largely because they were foreigners. On the border there had always been many Chinese who were employed by or cooperated closely with the Manchus. For the most part, the Mint-to-Ch'ing changeover required, on the part of the mass of the people, no active revolt nor even a "voting with their feet." All that was required was for them to "mind their own business" (rikōshin), secure in the conviction that the top levels of the state would proceed as before, allowing them a maximum of local autonomy.

In the twentieth century Manchuria again took on the character of a frontier along which (or, more accurately, within which) two cultures confronted each other. However, the analogy between the Japanese and Manchus is only partly valid. The Japanese had entered Manchuria in the last days of the Ch'ing Dynasty, when values were changing. Once the Chinese had committed themselves to modernization in the wake of Meiji Japan, it was

the Japanese who would regard themselves as the "superior" culture-bearers and teachers. It is this situation that produced the setting for "cultural dominion"--the establishment of a modern and efficient administration and industrialization in the Japanese-leased areas which would serve as a model of security and prosperity for the bulk of the Manchurian residents. Since the expertise was to be Japanese, there was little danger of being assimilated into Chinese culture.

The very factor that would make it possible for the Chinese to acquiesce in the cultural dominion of the Manchurian Japanese, however, was the traditional weakness of Chinese nationalism and their affinity for local autonomy. Industrial development activity by the Japanese would, in fact, further encourage Manchurian Chinese self-centeredness (rikōshin) and further lull their sense of Chinese patriotism. Hence, the organs of modern "efficiency" would attain legitimacy for the Japanese presence in Manchuria by a kind of default of Chinese integration. The negative factor of evil warlord government further encouraged a weak attachment to the concept of "state" by the majority Chinese. If it were possible to maintain a high degree of local and regional autonomy under "personalized" regulation (i.e., using organs compatible with Gemeinschaft) within each of the various ethnic groups, regions, villages, and municipalities, it would then be possible to

introduce an outside group (like the Japanese) and expect them to be able to fit in with a minimum of hindrance. If Japanese cultural dominion then accomplished good government, in the sense of security and prosperity for all, the other ethnic groups would join in as well.¹²⁶

It must be noted that proponents of cultural dominion did not deal explicitly with the concept of equality among various groups. Equality of peoples was not a traditional value in the Far East. Both Chinese Confucianism and Japanese feudalism emphasize that, as long as the system was stable and offered something to everyone, each could accept his place in the full expectation of just rewards. Although some of the emerging ideologues of the MSR, such as Yamaguchi, strove for recognition of the importance of equality (byōdō), many ignored the matter or, perhaps, assumed a natural inequality which need not, to be sure, have presented any obstacle to "harmony" among peoples.

Minzoku kyōwa, whatever tag-ends of idealism were attached to it, was born with a certain amount of cultural dominion built in, especially when posited (as in Yamaguchi's Kyōwa article) upon industrial development by Japan.

Minzoku kyōwa was also linked to assumptions of customary Chinese social and political local autonomy--the races and

126. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 54.

local units cannot be melded but can co-exist harmoniously. In this way, Tachibana's thinking is relevant to the connection of a number of components into an emotional and logical system--what Kenichirō Hirano calls a "psycho-logic"¹²⁷ and what this writer chooses to term "ideology."

The Japanese, having established themselves in Manchuria at a time when the Chinese dynastic state was disintegrating, saw the Chinese system broken down into its essential parts--the "natural" units--to which Tachibana gave expression in his analysis. Manchuria, where the condition was most pronounced, provided a situation which the Japanese could approach safely and which offered the maximum opportunity. Where Japan and China did not face each other as monolithic entities, it could be stated, as in an address to the MSR, "In our Manchuria both Chinese and Japanese dwell and prosper together [kyōson, kyōei]. The development of its economy and advancements of its culture are within possibility. This amity between Japanese and Chinese will finally point the way to peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the Orient."¹²⁸

Minzoku kyōwa, as a catchword, a slogan a feeling, a concept to give shape to aspirations, seemed, however, to

127. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

128. Address of April 3, 1930, to the Manshū Seinen Renmei, in Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 237.

be merely an extra element, even superfluous, in the period before 1928. It would serve to bind together on an idealistic level the mosaic of a polyglot society which was maintained in separate parts, but, where cultural dominion achieved smooth results, minzoku kyōwa was not vital except as a pan-Asian gloss. However, when the elements of Chinese nationalism began to appear, minzoku kyōwa began to occupy a more central spot in an emotional and logical system. It became a rallying point for combating Chinese nationalism while avoiding recourse solely to diplomacy or the mailed fist. Later, of course, when Manchuria was forcefully separated from China, it became the basis of a purported "official" ideology. In either case it was the touchstone for an artificial Manchurian nationalism.

CHAPTER V

THE IDEOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES OF THE MĀNSHŪ SEINEN RENMEI

Having seen how the Manshū Seinen Renmei was launched and having examined some of the underpinnings of their "psycho-logic" or ideology, we must now consider how ideology and action proceeded hand in hand in the MSR. We can see an evolution taking place in its ideological response to various problems it faced by analyzing pertinent discussions, pronouncements, and actions from the end of 1928, when it was founded, until the Manchurian Incident in September, 1931. Through 1929 there were expressions of confidence in the assumptions of cultural dominion coupled with anxiety over the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment. The emphasis was on advocacy of Manchurian-Mongolian autonomy while at the same time stressing Sino-Japanese people-to-people amity within Manchuria. In 1930, however, the depression produced in the MSR a self-centered concern for the jobs, profits, and interests of the Manchurian Japanese. By 1931, the MSR, perceiving the failure of cultural dominion, shows increased disillusionment with the Japanese government and with the management of the SMR Company and turns to support for a military solution. Minzoku kyōwa

emerges fully and is carried over into mass organization efforts in establishing Manchukuo.

In 1929 the MSR movement was very active, especially in view of their dramatic organizational expansion throughout the leased areas. By comparison with 1931, the sharp sense of urgency was not there so much in their proceedings and utterances, although we do encounter statements like that of Kobiyama Naoto which assert the unacceptability of Japan's "apparent determination to fold up the flag and withdraw from Man-Mō."¹²⁹

There were two general conferences of the MSR held in 1929, one in June in Dairen and the other in November in Mukden. In the first, those agenda items having a bearing on the development of an ideological position were: (1) the unity between Chinese and Japanese young men, (2) an outline for research on Chinese society, (3) fellow countrymen-workers' (including Koreans') defense of the expansion of their position in Man-Mō, and (4) the improvement of a general standard of living. At the second conference, they discussed matters like (1) a plan for propaganda regarding the MSR policy on Man-Mō, (2) gaining popular support for establishing a self-governing system (jichisei) for Man-Mō, (3) organizing a Sino-Japanese Young Men's Harmony League (Nikka seinen kyōwa renmei),

129. Ibid., p. 73; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 363.

(4) establishing Manchurian-resident Koreans' auxiliary organs, (5) establishing a popular educational system for Chinese, and (6) encouraging the learning of the Chinese language by Japanese.¹³⁰

The mood of the debate was more balanced than in the succeeding two years. While arguments were advanced condemning the anti-Japanese movements, there were counter-arguments expressing fears of causing an intensification of anti-Japanese behavior by precipitous action. A proposal to abolish extraterritoriality was deferred as premature, especially since international diplomacy was as yet unsettled. To balance connotations of imperialism that might have been implicit in Japanese agitation over the anti-Japanese movement, there emerged at the end of 1929 a Harbin Anti-Imperialist Union which supported "popular diplomacy" and lasted into the early months of 1930.¹³¹

Although there was some division to be seen in the MSR between "die-hard" and "liberal" positions,¹³² the overall emphasis was on Sino-Japanese amity (nikka wagō). Since the Manchurian Japanese had become committed to settling there and to passing down some sort of legacy to

130. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, pp. 92, 141-42, 154; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 366.

131. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 372.

132. Ibid.

those that followed, it was natural to attempt to enshrine in ideology what they seemed sincerely to feel--good will toward the Chinese (and other fellow residents) and the desire for mutual understanding. The MSR rationale was seen largely as the need by the Yamato people for a far-reaching ideal on which to base the success of the empire. Certainly the idealistic side of cultural dominion, kyōson kyōei ("live and prosper together"), rested heavily on this understanding. Those discussing the matter in the second conference of 1929 stated:

The people of East Asia are entering a period in time when they must at some time move toward unity. The understanding of this and resulting collective spirit will become the basis of Asia's contribution to the development of the world. Mutual tranquility and prosperity are the contributions which, in fact, the age demands.¹³³

On a more concrete level is the example of the promoters of learning the Chinese language by Japanese. According to these advocates, the relations between Japanese and Chinese on both the official and popular level were shot through with too much coercion or excess (muri) and this tension was due largely to lack of a common language. It was felt that, if the Manchurian Japanese made an effort to learn Chinese, the barriers would be removed and they could achieve "understanding from the heart of indigenous

133. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 157.

peoples."¹³⁴ "The integration of Japanese know-how and financial power and resources and Chinese labor power of Man-Mō is manifested in language which expresses mutual feelings. At the same time as Japanese is intended to be fostered as a language, from the chiefs of state down to the apprentices and errand boys, if we are not ready to be well versed in Chinese, we will not succeed in solving mutual problems."¹³⁵

The matter of language is not so trivial as it may sound. There was a conviction among most of the MSR idealists that the Manchurian Japanese were, in fact, very close to assimilation, not into Chinese culture (which was not at its strongest in Manchuria in any case) but into a new multi-racial cultural entity made possible by the Manchurian atmosphere. Language was one of the few major barriers left (apart from the plaguing political short-sightedness of the surrounding states). Significantly, there was no call for a single lingua franca but rather an increase in bilingualism, starting with the Japanese. As it turned out, this had no real impact on prevailing educational policy, which was run mainly by colonial authorities sent from Japan. Chinese children in Japanese-administered schools continued to learn Japanese and Chinese language

134. Ibid., p. 180.

135. Ibid., p. 197.

was neglected among Japanese children.¹³⁶ Interestingly, during the military occupation in 1931 and pacification operations that followed, one of the main services provided by MSR personnel (many of whom were bilingual) was translation and interpretation for the Kwantung Army.

Self-rule or autonomy from China was viewed by the MSR as a means of isolating Manchuria from the chaos and xenophobia of Chinese nationalism--a kind of cordon sanitaire. They clearly recognized that to stand unmoving on the old treaty rights, striking back defensively with garrison troops or emergency expeditions would be a step backward for the development of Manchuria. The only progressive course for permanent peace and sustained regional development was to push Japanese cultural dominance outside the narrow confines of the leased areas into the hinterland --to break down the internal treaty barriers

... the Japanese of Manchuria are forced to limit themselves to an eight-mat wide strip like a silk thread in the leased territory on either side of the railway. They cannot take even one step into the hinterland. This illustrates clearly the deterioration of the situation in Manchuria.¹³⁷

Realistically, the only way to assure that cultural dominion had a fair chance of working was to expand. The only way to break free of the treaty confines was in a

136. Hirano, "Manshū ni okeru Nihon no kyōiku seisaku," p. 96.

137. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 106.

separated Manchuria. The Manchurian Japanese at this time liked to dwell on the "Chinese chaos" (Shina doran) and "intrigues of the Chinese warlords." But they did recognize the full implications of Chinese nationalism.

In the New China, they have become very conscious of themselves as a state. The people's movement has intensified and it is said that their morale has "risen to the heavens." Many ideas similar to those of the Japanese have begun to sprout and are expressed in both words and actions.¹³⁸

The Japanese government had always spoken of Manchuria-Mongolia as a "special region" (tokushū chi-iki) in any diplomatic negotiations concerning the area. The MSR gave full voice to the Manchurian Japanese assumption that they, as "insiders" on the spot, would have a primary role in making that notion of "special region" a permanent fact. The possibility of separating Man-Mō by means of military operations was, in 1929, not really considered by any Japanese outside the Kwantung Army. Rather, the MSR set in motion the idea of a self-governing Manchuria-Mongolia achieved through support of the people of Manchuria (kokuminteki enjo). It was to be an "inside job." Obviously, Japanese conciliation of the other residents became vital. Prior to the first conference, the MSR central headquarters announced that ". . . if the MSR members are able to eliminate 'expel the Japanese' principles by striving for racial conciliation through everyday contacts

138. Ibid., p. 97.

with Chinese, they will have achieved a singular success."¹³⁹ Such a homegrown movement posed practically no foreign relations problems and the Manchurian Japanese, as the only ones in a position to implement such a movement, would be the obvious beneficiaries.

Nobody in 1929 doubted that the various races could coexist economically in Manchuria, provided that no new or outside elements (like encouragement of the anti-Japanese movement) disturbed the picture. The Manchurian Japanese did seem to have moderately good rapport with the other races and the slogans "live and prosper together" and "Sino-Japanese amity" seemed to be taken seriously even outside the MSR.¹⁴⁰ The Manchurian Japanese, to be sure, maintained a relatively high standard of living, but the impact of this disparity most certainly was mitigated by their being confined to the most prosperous portions of Manchuria. Relatively speaking, a large number of Chinese migrants to Manchuria had also increased their standard of living as well. Moreover, under the assumptions of cultural dominion, it was expected that increased standards within the group sparking development would provide the "model" for others who would, by tacit promise, benefit relatively as development proceeded. The number of ethnic Japanese

139. Ibid., p. 81.

140. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 58.

in Manchuria remained steady at about 200,000 with no real followup immigration from the motherland. Thus Manchurian Japanese did not face any immediate unemployment in 1929 as Chinese advanced in occupational skills development.

Ideally, in fact, Chinese advancement would be applauded by idealists as vindication of cultural dominion.¹⁴¹ The

MSR recognized that standard of living was a crucial

point.¹⁴² They advocated holding a Man-Mō exposition for the purpose of ". . . showing the world the contribution

of Man-Mō culture to the development of its nationhood"¹⁴³

and the holding of a conference to show the prosperity

engendered by Far Eastern culture under a "good neighbor"

relation among Russians, Chinese, and Japanese.¹⁴⁴ Clearly,

further Japanese immigration would be desirable in any

independent Man-Mō without leasehold barriers.

The MSR came out somewhat divided on the question of taking on citizenship in the hypothetical new nation and giving up their own, although most who opposed a change did so out of concern for the adverse reaction it might cause in Japan and resulting dissension, not out of lack of commitment to autonomy. Kanai Shōji, head of the medical

141. Ibid., pp. 58-59; Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 118.

142. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, pp. 107-108.

143. Ibid., p. 153.

144. Ibid., pp. 180-84.

section of the SMR Company and advisor and later executive director of the MSR said, in reference to a change of citizenship in 1929, "There are many unsatisfactory points in the self-governing system which will produce serious reactions in the mother country."¹⁴⁵ Those favoring the point were optimistic. "There is no need for the Yamato people to feel anxiety about whether the colonists' mother country will feel antagonism toward a self-governing colonial area."¹⁴⁶ "If the groundwork of good will between Japanese and Chinese is well laid, we should rejoice to enter a new citizenship."¹⁴⁷

In 1929, the MSR ideological position devolved largely upon (1) cultural dominance, (2) Sino-Japanese amity, and (3) separation and self-government for Manchuria-Mongolia. The program was neither egalitarian nor altogether altruistic but it did aim squarely at "harmony." The most important element was cultural dominion--which is traceable most readily to the vision of the SMR Company from early on. Cultural dominion, if it rested on any realistic assumption at all, presupposed a view of Chinese society which approximated Tachibana's Gemeinschaft model. However, the Chinese nationalistic upsurge then penetrating

145. Ibid., p. 103.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., p. 156.

Manchuria in various forms, including a prevalent anti-Japanese (termed "expel the Japanese" [hai Nichi]) movement, did not square with this assumption. Nationalism exposed the fallacy of the expectations of cultural dominion and undermined Sino-Japanese amity. Thus, separation of Manchuria from China Proper was necessary in order to restore the smoothly-interlocking parts.

There was, however, a division of opinion among articulate Manchurian Japanese and within the MSR concerning Chinese nationalism. The one side, closer, it would seem, to the majority opinion within the MSR, felt that anti-Japanese feeling in China, though widespread, did not represent the true mainstream feelings of the Chinese people. It had originated and was sustained by a few leaders or by Japanese blunders.

The recent anti-foreign, anti-capitalist movements fermenting in various parts of Manchuria are a means used by Chinese-rights intriguers to restore a spirit of self-interest. They injure the people of both countries. The Chinese people, especially intellectuals who understand the facts of the matter, reject them.¹⁴⁸

The current anti-Japanese activities are widespread throughout China, however it is clear they originate with only two or three leaders. The true feelings of the Chinese people, especially those of the middle classes and above, do not support this.¹⁴⁹

148. Ibid., p. 54.

149. Ibid., p. 97.

For this segment of opinion the assumptions of Sino-Japanese amity and cultural dominion still held true.

A differing view expressed was that the anti-Japanese movement was spreading within the Chinese people. Logically, this would mean that it could not be wiped out through the "natural" processes of cultural dominion, since amity between the Chinese and Japanese was precluded by force of national identity and ". . . it is henceforth not necessary to 'flatter' the Chinese people."¹⁵⁰ The achievement of autonomy by "support of the people" becomes a chimera. "The anti-Japanese movement is a self-realization phenomenon and will not be destroyed in any 'natural' way."¹⁵¹ Although the mention of military operations is not made, one can readily see the implication in the second assumption leading to a "harder" line response which was likely to be engendered by intensification of anti-Japanese pressure. This was, in fact, manifested in 1931 by support for a military solution by the Kwantung Army.

Through 1930 the Manchurian Japanese were feeling increased pressure from a number of directions which produced a more pessimistic frame of mind. The Chang Hsüeh-liang regime, which had directed much of its attention at the USSR in 1929 in an abortive attempt to pressure a

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid., p. 155.

devolution of control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, now was taking a harder attitude toward the Japanese, and the beginnings of official backing for anti-Japanese agitation in Manchuria promised bitter times ahead. The world depression began to have a perceptible impact in Manchuria, eroding the economic foundation of Japan's Manchurian stronghold, the SMR Company. This was shortly to be sharpened by the Hamaguchi cabinet's ill-timed financial retrenchment. President of SMR Company Yamamoto Jōtarō and Kobiyama Naoto, chief executive of MSR who was also a major executive in SMR Company, left Manchuria for Japan, signalling some break in the connections between the SMR Company and the MSR. The MSR even found itself strapped for operating funds.¹⁵²

Consequently, the MSR activities slackened--fewer meetings by the headquarters leadership, fewer participants in those that were held, and some slowdown in organizing. The organization did issue three pamphlets-- "A Plan for an Independent Manchurian State," "The Five Principles for the Administration of Manchuria," and "Three Questions on Manchuria-Mongolia."¹⁵³

152. Ominato, in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 449.

153. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 63.

A third general conference was held in September, 1930, in Changchun. The agenda items contain nothing on Sino-Japanese amity nor on Manchurian independence. The main considerations seemed to be current economic and social problems and difficulties with earning a livelihood as a result of the retrenchment. Attention was less on planning a future course and more on meeting a day to day deteriorating situation. The overall political and economic crisis was phrased very much in terms of the individual survival (or "right to survive") of the Manchurian Japanese. The agenda included: (1) a demand to the authorities for establishing a Japanese national economic policy regarding Manchuria, (2) a plan for resolving the establishment of industrial development in Manchuria, (3) a plan for recommendation of more positive Japanese government policies toward Man-Mō, (4) discussion of the education of Japanese apprentices, (5) a demand that the SMR Company expand its social service facilities, (6) a recommendation for promoting export trade, (7) a discussion about establishing the Shōwa Steel Works in Manchuria, and (8) a demand that the government lend or pay a sum equal to the SMR subsidy to smaller businesses.

The MSR made an appeal to the Manchurian Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises to concern themselves less with short term profits and draining away capital and look more at the long-run Japanese position by greater

reinvestment and more Manchurian-centered business policies. The SMR Company, as a semi-governmental enterprise, enjoyed significant tax exemptions (viewed as a kind of "subsidy") and, as a profitable operation, had paid immense dividends to stockholders in Japan and allotments to the Japanese government. The MSR called for diverting both the dividends and allotments into Manchurian development. They also became involved in a controversy over whether to locate the major operations of Shōwa Steel in Korea or Manchuria. They called on the Japanese government to aid Manchurian businesses and industries of "recognized reliability" in view of the "added perception which comes with living in Manchuria, being native-born and resident."¹⁵⁴

The MSR undercut its earlier stand for Sino-Japanese amity by calling for the education for apprenticeships of young idle Japanese and the replacement of Chinese workers with these. The Chinese had been rapidly acquiring many of the vocational skills of the Japanese, thus usurping a Japanese forte.¹⁵⁵ A year before, this might have been viewed positively as fruits of cultural dominion, since it presumably solidified Chinese self-interest in supporting the system. We can consider this action, in the context of

154. *Ibid.*, p. 64; *Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Linkai*, pp. 254-57.

155. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 64.

1930, as an example of the expendability of the idealistic aspects of ideology, representing as it does a shift to more Japanese-centered ideological ground under pressure from a deteriorating situation.

A particularly galling aspect of this deteriorating situation was that significant numbers of Manchurian Japanese were now beginning to return to Japan. There is no ready economic explanation for their departure, but it caused great irritation among those who stayed, leading to concern for the survival not only of their dream but also of themselves in Manchuria.¹⁵⁶ There seemed to be a marked lack of interest in discussing Manchurian and Chinese affairs, as if the enthusiasm of the previous year had been exhausted. Chinese construction of competing harbor facilities at Hulutao, which was intended as a terminus for their own railroad network, might have provided a burning issue, but when asked what Japanese were thinking and where their enthusiasm had gone, a MSR counselor replied, "We are 'out of season'."¹⁵⁷

All of the pressures which existed in 1930 only intensified in 1931. The objects of Manchurian Japanese frustration, however, were, more than ever before, the Japanese home government and Japanese colonial institutions.

156. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 486.

157. Ibid., p. 282.

There were increased feelings of having been "deserted" by Japan. The foreign policy of Shidehara Kijūrō, based as it was on cooperation with the Western powers, tended to take a rather cold view of the problems of Manchurian Japanese as "local matters."¹⁵⁸ In a March, 1931, statement in the House of Peers, Shidehara said of the Manchurian Japanese, "they evince a superiority toward the Chinese and a dependence on the home government." This, he added, was the real cause of the "stagnation in Man-Mō."¹⁵⁹

Angered by Shidehara's remarks, the MSR organized a Union for Manchurian Japanese independence (Zen-Man Nihonjin Jishū Dōmei), saying in the proclamation, "We do not trust the government. In order to defend self-governing autonomy and protect national sovereignty, this cooperative group was formed by our fellow countrymen in Manchuria."¹⁶⁰ The MSR declared elsewhere, "The Japanese emigrants to the Four Northeastern Provinces are good businessmen. Yet, despite the qualities which ought to make their economic importance in Man-Mō's social structure worthy of a secure

158. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 65.

159. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 387; Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, pp. 265-67.

160. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 387.

legal basis, the people in Japan, for political reasons, are threatening their survival."¹⁶¹

The movement for locating the Shōwa Steel Works in Manchuria failed because that company lacked confidence that the necessary subsidies would be granted by the Japanese government, since Manchuria was deemed a "foreign country."¹⁶²

The MSR also complained that, since there were no Manchurian Japanese representatives in the Diet, Manchurian Japanese complaints tended to be used as political footballs by the major parties for their own ends--mostly by the Seiyūkai in attacking the Minseitō government in power. "They were discriminated against by domestic Japanese in both industry and politics."¹⁶³

There was the added hopelessness of feeling that they could not even return to Japan except as misfits who had been earlier conditioned in an atmosphere of hope. "They had passed over twenty years of their lives in Manchuria. Gradually they saw the basis of a livelihood painfully built up begin to deteriorate because of a lawless group of Chinese authorities. From the so-called elite in Man-Mō they received treatment as stepchildren.

161. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 462.

162. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 65.

163. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 463.

Where will the Manchurian Japanese, who today live opulently, live from tomorrow on?"¹⁶⁴ "Whether we leave or stay, all that awaits us is the cold grave."¹⁶⁵

The MSR also expressed grave disappointment in the SMR Company, which began to be scored for its "colonialist tendencies." Actually, the Company's main problem was an economic one: the depression led to a wholesale retrenchment policy that reduced facilities and jobs. In January, 1931, for example, the Manchurian Teachers College (kyōiku senmon gakko) run by the SMR Company, suddenly stopped enrolling students. Given the growing paranoia among Manchurian Japanese, this decision caused something of a sensation. The MSR, taking this a symbolic of many ills, began to treat SMR Company as just another "authority" that had deserted them, that could not serve their interests or the interests of "progress" in Manchuria. They called the "outsiders" in the SMR Company's Education Section who managed educational facilities in the railway zone, unreasonable and claimed it was time to have a "neutral" Manchurian administration of education.¹⁶⁶

Cultural dominion was bankrupt when the SMR Company, the major pillar of economic progress, was weakened.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid., p. 466.

166. Ibid., p. 400; Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihojin no dōkō," p. 65.

Manchuria could no longer be "Japanized" in this way. The SMR policies were regarded, apart from unemployment problems, as a "breach of trust" in which an old standby had "let them down." The bitterness seemed to take on a general anti-authority bias in which home and colonial authorities became as much to blame as the "lawless" Chinese authorities.

What occurred in 1931 was a massive lobbying effort on the part of the MSR to identify Manchuria as the "life-line of Japan" and the Manchurian Japanese as the only ones sustaining that lifeline. In March, they distributed a pamphlet entitled "The Truth Concerning the Man-Mō Problem," sending some 10,000 copies to home Japanese government officials, Diet members, media, provincial officials, and youth groups and to areas in Manchuria and Korea as well. It took the line now familiar to us by virtue of the Kwantung Army--Man-Mō was Japan's strategic buffer, it provided the raw materials to sustain the military and to feed the nation. Japan's special rights there rested on a supra-political basis, and was thus unlike the justifications used vis-à-vis the Western powers. There was no substitute in case of its removal. However, "the rights already acquired are in imminent danger of being thrown

away and we need to wake up, all 90 million of us, and reflect seriously on this."¹⁶⁷

In June the MSR sponsored a Conference on the Problem of the Outbreak of Riots, emphasizing the "right to exist" (seizōn ken). They agreed to aim for the following goals: (1) destruction of the "many-headed" government system in Manchuria (i.e., the overlapping of warlord, SMR, Consulate General, and Kwantung Leased Territory governments), (2) establishment of an effective vehicle for expressing Manchurian Japanese public opinion, (3) rejection of "railroad diplomacy" (tetsudō kōshō), (4) eradication of anti-Japanese education, (5) creation of harmony among the various ethnic groups in Manchuria. Along with this, they called for political democratization (seiji minshūka) in Manchuria side by side with vigorous and unbending diplomacy. Although the conference expressed positions somewhat harsher than those the MSR had previously taken as a whole, many within the MSR supported them.¹⁶⁸

The MSR then sent out speaking teams to Fushun, Anshan, and Mukden with the purpose of spreading their

167. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 387.

168. Ibid., p. 388.

position and agitating public opinion in these major industrial cities.¹⁶⁹ In July, MSR put out 5000 copies each in Manchuria and Japan of three pamphlets--"The Importance of the Man-Mō Problem," "The Manchurian Japanese Considered Apart from Rights and Interests," and "The Harmony of Various Races Presently in Manchuria." In the first, there was a quasi-Marxian argument which held that the rise of Chinese capitalism after the Revolution would cause a gradual decline in Japanese light industry. Either alternative markets for Japanese light industrial goods must be found or heavy industrialization pressed. Since Japan was not self-sufficient in raw materials, it was impossible to expect her light industry, with its old-fashioned mechanisms and inefficiencies to compete with high-level capitalism. Having lost the China market, she faced bankruptcy, with her special rights and interests in Manchuria her only hedge against the coming crisis. It was a matter of survival to guard them.

The second pamphlet listed the supposed political and economic discrimination against Manchurian Japanese by business, the political parties, and the colonial authorities in power in Manchuria, calling for solidarity with other races and groups which had suffered exploitation--thus welding the concept of minzoku kyōwa with Japanese

169. Ibid.

culture. The third produced another quasi-Marxian "analysis" depicting the Four Northeastern Provinces under a "semi-feudal despotism," whose vampire-like authorities lined their own pockets and tried to short-circuit the people's revolution by turning popular attention against Japanese imperialism. In order to follow behind Western diplomacy, the Japanese government had turned its back on the rights and interests, upon which numerous Japanese depended for their existence. The Powers, in turn, had tolerated the lawlessness of the semi-feudal despots for the sake of the China market. What stood in the way of getting rid of the semi-feudal character of Manchurian authorities was Japanese garrison troops. Since Japan's imperialistic special rights were an obstacle to the Chinese popular unification, by getting rid of the semi-feudal authorities, they would be striking at Japanese imperialism.¹⁷⁰

Some of this, as might readily be seen, was tortured logic (or rather perverted Marxism) in which the Manchurian Japanese were trying to rouse the Japanese public to the dangers of a sellout of rights and interests on the one hand and to excoriate "imperialism" on the other. It is not easy, of course, to make a broad public appeal based on protection of one's own livelihood, defined as rights and

170. Ibid., pp. 394-95; Manshū Seinen Renmeishi, Kankō Iinkai, pp. 459-66.

interests. For the "right to existence" of 200,00 relatively well-off Manchurian Japanese to mean anything to people back home, there had to be recourse to either a Marxist or nationalist line of reasoning. As propagandists will, they tried to cover both bases and, in the case of these pamphlets and similar writing, the logic or illogic must be judged as propaganda.

The shift from optimism in 1929 to personal survival in 1930 to collective action on behalf of self-interest in 1931 reveals the use of ideology in serving a changing perception of the situation. In retrospect, of course, we can see that, for twenty-five years, cultural dominion was, in fact, counterproductive. Instead of harmonizing Japanese and Chinese, the industrialization and even the prosperity upon which cultural dominion rested seem to have reinforced Chinese nationalism in Manchuria. The spread of education, for example, merely increased the means of spreading articulate anti-Japanese opinion. As already indicated, the emergence of new groups of Chinese skilled labor and the flood of new immigrants from Shantung produced a threat to Manchurian Japanese livelihood. Even the program of competitive railroad building in Manchuria, much as it was politically motivated from south of the border, revealed a spirit of "beating the Japanese at their own game."

Apart from pamphleteering, the MSR tried to reach the home Japanese more directly by joining a cooperative effort in dispatching a series of speaking teams to Japan beginning July 13th. Financed largely by Dairen newspapers, the effort involved a mixed bag of right wing groups, some of which had connections with the army and with the Greater Japan National Essence Party. They were the Alliance to Promote Popular Diplomacy, the East Asian League Conference, the Greater and Lesser Asia Peoples Association, the Great Japan Association, the Alliance of Citizens Concerned with the Manchurian and Korean Problems, the Alliance to Solve the Manchurian Problem, and others.

Although the overall effect of the tour in eliciting government action was a failure, the lobbying efforts turned up numerous private expressions of support among those in power and a degree of enthusiasm from any number of ad hoc right wing mass organizations, which they reached through rallies. Inukai Ki, president of the Seiyūkai, expressed "deep anxiety" over the weakness of Shidehara diplomacy. Matsuoka Yōsuke offered his assistance. Army Minister Minami Jirō applauded efforts to arouse public opinion. As a vanguard of that public opinion, he said, they must stick

to a predetermined, definite policy. Colonial Minister Hara offered vague support.¹⁷¹

Characteristically, it was in a meeting with Foreign Minister Shidehara on July 20th where the delegation was met with total candor and given pretty short shrift. He explained that most Japanese took a view of the Manchurian problem which pre-dated the Russo-Japanese War, whereas the Chinese had embraced the new postwar thinking associated with "Wilsonism" and were conducting their foreign relations accordingly. While expressing determination to hold fast to already-acquired treaty rights in Man-Mō, he warned the delegates about "believing useless and erroneous news and silly propaganda."¹⁷² Asking them how they viewed the abolition of extraterritoriality, these delegates replied negatively. Significantly the MSR, who represented only a portion of the tour's complement, had earlier produced statements in favor of abolition, but only in the context of a self-governing Manchuria. Shidehara then lectured them on the onus that would fall on Japan if the West supported treaty abolition for China and Japan was the holdout.¹⁷³

171. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 396; Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 466; Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa undō,'" pp. 97-98.

172. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 480.

173. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 396.

The delegates came away feeling that Shidehara's thinking "sprang from a single legalistic mind" and he had little understanding of what was currently happening.¹⁷⁴ The speaking teams went on to more sizeable rallies at Hibiya and Ueno parks and Aoyama Kaikan. Yamamoto Jōtarō added his enthusiastic support and General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu of the Army General Staff asserted cryptically that the "military's determination is set" and gave encouragement to the MSR to pursue their agitation of public opinion. They addressed the House of Peers, the Business and Industry Association, and the Seiyūkai and then toured the Kansai area under the auspices of the area's newspapers, addressing various business groups and reestablishing contacts already formed with labor unions there.¹⁷⁵

Their efforts seemed to spark or coincide with sympathetic vibrations in right wing parties like the Greater Japan Productive Party, which included Uchida Ryohei of the Amur River Society. A group of 140 army lieutenants of the Small Cherry Society, a group more radical than the Cherry Society, submitted a memorandum to Saionji on July 17 calling for action on the Manchurian question. On September 7, the 16th Division used army

174. Ibid., p. 397.

175. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, pp. 459-66.

aircraft to drop leaflets all over Fukui, Kanazawa, and surrounding areas.¹⁷⁶

Both the MSR speaking tour and the beginning of a movement toward an "army party" caused all factions in the House of Peers to shift to a harder line when the Nakamura Incident was announced. They now were more willing to see firmer moves taken to counter anti-Japanese action. Mori Kaku's efforts within the Seiyūkai began to bear fruit, because many saw the Chinese shooting of this clandestine figure as a clear setback for Shidehara policies. Those who had criticized hardliners in the military were now inclined to hold their tongues.¹⁷⁷

The upshot of the speaking tour was to push the MSR closer to commitment to possible direct military action in Manchuria. The tour showed them that they had views in common with other right wing groups in Japan, although these were a divided lot with little effective input into the government at this time. The failure of the tour to spur the government to action discouraged them profoundly. Notwithstanding individual professions of lip service to standing up for Japanese place in Manchuria, the MSR assessment of the speaking-lobbying effort was pessimistic.

176. Liang, pp. 34-35.

177. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, pp. 409-12; Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, pp. 478-88.

Their reception by the government was "not at all enthusiastic."¹⁷⁸ On their return to Manchuria, Governor General of the Kwantung Leased Territory Tsukamoto angered them by saying contemptuously, "By going to the homeland and presenting glowing pictures, didn't you gentlemen make a mountain out of a molehill?" and "Wasn't it a rash thing to fan the dangerous situation with the army burning to intervene?"¹⁷⁹ MSR delegate Okada took exception to this imputation of irresponsibility by saying to the audience in attendance, "We delegates bear the responsibility for promoting the influence of 1,300,000 fellow Manchurian residents" (meaning resident Japanese and Koreans). MSR delegate Satake Yoshinobu sounded a note of cautious optimism, however, in stating that, ". . . although the tongue of Foreign Minister Shidehara is not dry, it will be by force of public opinion that the great work of protecting our rights in Man-Mō will be carried out."¹⁸⁰ Takatsuka Genichi drew an analogy between the threat of giving up in the face of Chinese pressure and the Triple Intervention of

178. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 500.

179. Ibid., p. 494; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 426.

180. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 426.

1896, when France, Russia, and Germany pushed Japan into retroceding the Liaotung Peninsula.¹⁸¹

It is this curious blend of indignation at the indifference or hostility of the authorities and the inklings of yet-incoherent support for their general position that produced the serious discussions in 1931 about possibilities of independence from Japan. "We have been scorned by our fellow-countrymen as traitors. In their indifference, we quaff our bitter tears and declare our independence from the motherland."¹⁸²

From the beginning of 1931, the MSR and Manchurian Japanese often used the term "crisis" to imply the feeling of tension or isolation they had. It is difficult to explain the call for a break with Japan without considering the background atmosphere of "cohesion in isolation" or of their sense of being under great pressure. The number of Japanese returning to Japan was growing.¹⁸³ Retrenchment in the SMR Company remained likewise unameliorated and likely, if anything, to get worse if current policies remained. The lobbying teams, finally, had revealed the hard core of resistance to change in the government and colonial bureaucratic machinery.

181. Ikuhiku Hata, Gun fuashizumu undōshi (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1962), p. 97.

182. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 501.

183. Ibid., p. 486.

It would certainly seem that the call for independence, which came out in numbers of speeches and publications, can be viewed as a kind of bargaining threat against an indifferent set of authorities and thus an extension of their other efforts vis-à-vis Japan, but there was also an impact in ideological development which re-introduced minzoku kyōwa as a critical element. The concept of autonomy in the 1929 version of the MSR ideology was based on the traditional view of Chinese society, in which anti-Japanese manifestations of Chinese nationalism were seen as springing not from the true feelings of the people, who preferred to be left alone, but from Chinese (including Communist) leadership. Therefore, if it were possible to isolate Manchuria, the movement would abate.

By 1931, the MSR in general had become shriller and less idealistic than earlier. Thus it was perhaps natural that the idea of autonomy should focus much sharper and more strident criticism at the Chang Hsüeh-liang regime as it identified more and more with the Nationalist government. A great deal was made of the evils and backwardness of warlordism and the "egoism of the semi-feudal despotism."¹⁸⁴ This oppression was directed at various ethnic minorities in Manchuria. In fact, the record of the Chinese Nationalists vis-à-vis minorities had never been very good.

184. Ibid., p. 466.

Chang Hsüeh-liang had given more recent evidence of oppression of Mongols and Koreans. Moreover, the situation seemed to be worsening and there was a clear portent for the lot of the Manchurian Japanese if they were left out on a limb. The danger they faced now was all the worse since it came from a constituted authority, with all the force of law and the power to negotiate recovery of rights and necessary immunities.

For the first time, the Manchurian Japanese began to consider themselves as being in the same class as the other ethnic minorities, without the protection of a home or colonial government. Under conditions of independence from the mother country, however, perhaps they would not bear the stigma of Japanese imperialism. To achieve the old dream of separation from China required a sincere common cause with the other races. Thus, an updated use of minzoku kyōwa replaced the earlier Sino-Japanese amity. This had already been launched in a proclamation in Dairen in June entitled "The Harmony of the Various Races Currently Resident in Man-Mo."¹⁸⁵

The 1929 version of Sino-Japanese amity could afford a certain degree of sincerity as a visionary panacea because of the more benign circumstances. Minzoku kyōwa in

185. Ibid., pp. 406, 456; Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 68; Ominato, in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 450.

1931 was the effort of a cornered people who saw themselves fighting for survival. They reasoned that, if Japan were going to withdraw or lapse into indifference before reaping the final fruits of cultural dominion, then cultural dominion was a dead letter. The only way to survive was to find a place as one of a "harmonious" group of races in minzoku kyōwa. For them to separate from an ineffectual Japan was to lose no formidable ally; indeed, separation had the advantage of freeing Manchurian Japanese from the stigma of Japanese imperialism which, along with Western imperialism, had been under fire since the end of World War I.

In their calculations, the MSR, on behalf of the Manchurian Japanese, implicitly counted on cooperation from most minority ethnic groups--Mongols, Manchus, Tartars, White Russians, and, of course, Koreans. Even among the Chinese, they found various dissident factions to be possible sources of support for independence. Some of these favored a return to a monarchy, though most Ch'ing loyalists probably fell under the Manchu or Mongol ethnic classification. It was the hōkyō anmin ("maintain the frontier, pacify the people") position among Chinese that offered the best prospects, however, since their program of autonomy based on inter-ethnic cooperation and past expressions of opposition to domination by China, Japan, or the Soviet Union most closely resembled the present

ideology of the Manchurian Japanese. They included many influential businessmen of the local chambers of commerce (shōmukai) and landlords-landowners in agricultural associations (nōmukai).

On July 25, the MSR signalled a rapprochement with the hōkyō anmin movement by announcing that Chang Ku, an influential Chinese close to the Japanese; had called for "independence of the races in Man-Mō" and for offensive-defensive treaties between an independent Man-Mō and Japan. Henceforth the movement was given increasing propaganda support by the MSR and was to loom large in the period following the Manchurian Incident.¹⁸⁶ It is also possible that these more indigenous aspirations influenced Manchurian Japanese thinking on matters like autonomy and racial harmony to a degree not fully acknowledged by MSR sources.¹⁸⁷

Although the MSR had some hopes for what their program might be able to accomplish after separation, the problem of how to bring about separation was becoming difficult. A spontaneous or "natural" approach, as with earlier strategies which assumed the smooth workings of cultural dominion, required the unfailing backing of Japan.

186. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, pp. 403-405; Ogata, p. 40.

187. Ogata, p. 41.

Time was running out and, as the Manchurian Japanese read the situation, so was support from the home authorities.

Many among the Manchurian Japanese and even in the MSR, pessimistic about approaching Chinese in any basis, had already become "hard liners" and turned to a reliance on military force to bring about separation and also create favorable conditions to recapture some of the blessings of cultural dominion--removal of restrictions on exploitation of resources and progress in industrialization.¹⁸⁸ Now the Manchurian Japanese as a whole, by default, came to embrace military force. Even before they had dispatched the speaking teams in July, the MSR executive leadership held discussions with officers of the Army Reservist Association (zaigo gunjinkai). Nakanishi Toshinori, a MSR advisor, asked, "How can we obtain smooth cooperation and conciliation between Chinese and Japanese in order to avoid fighting?" Major General Iwai replied, "There is no way. Without fighting, nothing can finally be solved."¹⁸⁹

The Kwantung Army had, of course, already formulated operational plans for the military occupation of Manchuria entirely on its own. These will be touched upon below in talking about the rapprochement between the MSR

188. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," pp. 69-70; Ominato, in Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 450.

189. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 377.

and the Kwantung Army, although it is not the author's intention to deal with the military aspects of the Manchurian Incident. For most civilian Japanese in Manchuria, military force was considered drastic and full of unknown pitfalls. That the Kwantung Army determined on military operations in Manchuria was an extension of their training, their derring-do spirit, and the forceful persuasion of young officers like Ishiwara Kanji. For the Manchurian Japanese to have embraced force was a mark of their perception of the lack of alternatives in the growing crisis.

Certainly the application of military force, when it did come in September, 1931, ended whatever dissension there had been in the MSR and among the Manchurian Japanese. It removed the Chang regime and the concrete dangers of Chinese anti-Japanese action and thus produced further permutations in the Manchurian Japanese ideology. Since much of the call in 1931 for minzoku kyōwa had been in terms of survival of the Manchurian Japanese, who stood with their backs to the wall, the removal of danger actually removed much of their need to stress defense of special rights and interests. This tended to remove one of the major late contradictions in their thinking--trying to win an approved spot in a new multi-racial entity by divesting themselves of connections with an "imperialistic" Japan and still having to appeal to the Japanese government to defend treaty safeguards for their livelihoods. Put one

way, they no longer had to make excuses for their position in Manchuria now that it was, by military coup, "independent." Put another way, they could afford to put the benevolence back into a multi-racial harmony ideology now that they were in a commanding position (provided that the Kwantung Army did not simply put everyone under some kind of military occupation state).

With the emergence of the challenge of Chinese nationalism, cultural dominion had proportionately declined as an element of conciliation or mediation between the two people. Minzoku kyōwa henceforth had begun to devolve upon local autonomy (chihō jichi). This had been part of the view of traditional Chinese agrarian self-government but now emerged in a new context since the appearance of military force. The Kwantung Army, given limitations in numbers and expertise, relied, in its planning and implementation, on ratifying and strengthening existing local institutions in the post-Incident occupation. By design, these were to be left undisturbed. Although the Kwantung Army did not, for the most part, see minzoku kyōwa as indispensable, except as window dressing, they did perceive the connection between minzoku kyōwa and local autonomy. Moreover, what they especially needed were paramilitary operatives to perform services like translation, negotiations, transportation, skilled consultation, propaganda, and, later, counterinsurgency. All of these, by way of

"pacification," were undertaken by members of the MSR, as well as other Manchurian Japanese. In these local activities, minzoku kyōwa was highly useful, since it downplayed the conqueror's role and gave a non-threatening niche to Japanese on the spot. Insofar as it dovetailed with the hōkyō anmin position, it provided an admirable rationalization for the cooperation of local Chinese, Manchus, etc.

The 1933 Registry of Prominent Figures in Manchukuo (Manshūkoku Meishiroku) indicates that, of the Manchukuo local officialdom, the overwhelming majority had already been bureaucrats before the founding of Manchukuo. Noteworthy is the fact that, before the Incident, they had little or no connection with Japanese. Rather, they were graduates of the Chinese police and military academy and operated as middle-level administrators in the Chang regime. It was they who carried the local government structure of the new state and thus most needed a rationale for "collaboration."¹⁹⁰

Although the exercise of pacification through minzoku kyōwa propaganda and appeals to "nation-building" (kenkoku) by Japanese operatives never got below the hsien level, the marked though superficial success of what the MSR began to call "thought warfare" or ideological warfare

190. Hirano, "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai-Man Nihonjin no dōkō," p. 70.

(shisō sen) was an eye-opening experience for the more orthodox members of the Kwantung Army.¹⁹¹ It was a major contribution by the Manchurian Japanese. The MSR activists, insofar as they became closely involved in local government "guidance," were applying minzoku kyōwa ideology in the most pragmatic way. The hope was that, in unspoken reference to Tachibana's analysis, minzoku kyōwa would provide the binder for the mosaic of traditional society without destroying its constituent elements. Thus ideology, rudimentary and imperfect as it proved to be, had emerged as the only device available to gloss over the bankruptcy of colonial cultural dominion and to replace Chinese nationalism. It was fervently hoped that a new state, Manchukuo, could be built on the agglutinated local units--an artificial union which would be the product of a marriage of force (at least as the initial catalyst) and ideology.¹⁹²

191. Manshū Seinen Renmeishi Kankō Iinkai, p. 661.

192. Tachibana Boku Chōsakushū Kankō Iinkai, Vol. I, pp. 738-40.

CHAPTER VI

PLANNING AND MANEUVERING FOR AN INDEPENDENT MANCHURIA

The first formal drawing together between the MSR and the Kwantung Army took place in August, 1931. On August 27, the MSR had independently performed a memorial service for Captain Nakamura, who had shortly before been shot by Chinese troops while on a secret mission. Since his execution had become a cause célèbre within the Kwantung Army, the service may have been a gesture aimed at them in particular. At any rate, on that same day, the MSR executive leadership received a proposal from the Kwantung Army General Staff for a meeting to hear the MSR views. A party from the MSR consisting of Kanai Shōji, Yamaguchi Jūji, Okada Takeba, Ōhane Yukio, and Ozawa Kaisaku met with leading activist members of the staff, including Chief of the Operations Section Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, who had already shown considerable interest both in the possible uses of ideology and in the MSR in particular.

Kanai began rather stiffly with a lengthy and legalistic statement concerning Chinese violations of treaty rights. Ishiwara, disappointed, grumbled, "Is the MSR also, in the final analysis, to become advocates of 'the sanctity of rights and interests'?" Okada chided

Ishiwara in return, saying "Does the Kwantung Army have only a bamboo sword at its waist?" Ishiwara cut him off abruptly with the assertion that, "The Kwantung Army will not move a single soldier for the protection of 'rights and interests' or the capitalist way of life." Thereupon, Yamaguchi quietly undertook to explain the concepts of an independent Man-Mō based on minzoku kyōwa. Ishiwara responded positively to his reasoning and we may see in this the genesis of a fruitful cooperation between activists in the army and those in the civilian population in Manchuria.

Impressed by the possibilities of obtaining the services of an organized body of civilian collaborators, Ishiwara took the group into his confidence and briefed them on his military plans. He emphasized that even the slender means at the disposal of the Kwantung Army would be sufficient to overthrow the Fengtien Army forces, estimating that it would require about two days to conquer the key city of Mukden in a blitzkrieg-style engagement. When he went on to describe as "cowardly" both the imperialism of the Japanese government and the Manchurian military clique, he found a meeting of the minds with the civilian delegation. The MSR saw that the Kwantung Army was committed to and far advanced in planning for direct military action. The Kwantung Army staff developed greater confidence in the MSR, viewing it as the only Japanese-Korean group in Manchuria standing uncompromisingly against the

Kuomintang diplomatic thrust and successful in generating among the emigre residents a palpable "public opinion." Because Ishiwara's attention had shifted more and more away from a purely military occupation as the object of direct action and toward a scheme for an independent Manchukuo, the MSR, and especially their more ideologically-inclined contingent, began to have greater importance and greater influence.¹⁹³ The Daiyūhōkai (Great Heroic Summit Society), the youth group formed out of the higher managerial echelons of the SMR Company and led by Kasagi Ryōmei, now came over to the Manchukuo idea as well.¹⁹⁴

It is impossible to treat the creation of Manchukuo without tracing some of the Kwantung Army's strategic plans insofar as they attempted to make some administrative disposition of the area to be wrested from Chang Hsüeh-liang. The personality that comes down to us most forcefully in any of the planning is that of the irascible and brilliant Colonel Ishiwara. Whether others of the staff officers involved followed his ideas or merely operated effectively and facelessly behind the scenes, he is given the bulk of the credit for the blueprint for the Manchurian Incident,

193. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 427; Matsuzawa, "Manshū jihen to 'minzoku kyōwa' undō," p. 99; Peattie, p. 120.

194. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. I, p. 427.

although his role in setting up Manchukuo was perhaps less well-defined.

That many Kwantung Army officers had for a long time desired to separate Manchuria from China is unquestionable. Ishiwara and his activist cohort Planning Section Chief Colonel Itagaki Seishirō lent a new intensity to this goal from 1927 on with a strategic view that made Manchuria not only a zone of maneuver in case of war with Russia but also a necessity in case of war with China.

Ishiwara's unique contribution is the so-called Final War Theory formed in the mid-1920s in which he posits that aircraft technology would reach the point that military striking power could be extended quickly and decisively. The United States, whose presence in Asia was on the ascendance, and not Russia, became Japan's logical enemy in what was to be the last and greatest war of annihilation, the conclusion of which would usher in the millenium of everlasting peace. In such a war, the economic organization and resource base of a nation counted as heavily as its purely military power. Therefore Ishiwara was among the most articulate of the army "modernizers," along with Nagata Tetsuzan.¹⁹⁵ This meant that he saw the necessity for increased application of technology to war and for public support in a state organized for

195. Ogata, pp. 15, 41.

total war. Thus, the annexation of Manchuria became increasingly important as an industrial and resource base for an embattled empire.

Ishiwara traced the beginning of the actual planning of the Manchurian Incident to a field trip which a group of staff officers took to central and northern Manchuria in July, 1929. The trip turned into a kind of traveling seminar and tour de force conducted by Ishiwara who professed the fruits of his thinking over the previous two years. He suggested, among other things, that a study be undertaken to outline the means by which Manchuria would be administered after a lightning occupation.

Ishiwara's own tentative plan was called "Plan for the Annexation of Man-Mō by the Kwantung Army" ("Kantōgun Man-Mō ryōyū keikaku"). Part One envisaged dissolving the Chinese military and civilian administration, disbanding the Fengtien Army, confiscating public and private property, and apprehending escaped soldiers and "bandits." Expenses for the coup to be initiated within the Kwantung Army were to be met by taxation and disposal of confiscated properties. Part Two called for a military government to be kept "simple in structure." Government interference was to be kept to a minimum except for maintenance of peace and order. Nominally, economic development was to be based on a laissez-faire policy among the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. In fact, he envisaged a de facto division of

labor in which the Chinese would perform manual tasks and handle retail trade, Koreans would develop rice fields, and Japanese would engage in large-scale enterprise. Ishiwara hoped to minimize sudden and drastic change in administrative procedures. A governor-general would head a body of six departments--general affairs, military, civil administration, provincial administration, army division chiefs, and a provost marshall. Law courts were to be established in each province.¹⁹⁶

Unquestionably crude from a bureaucratic standpoint, even in its outline form, the plan never went beyond what was virtually a military regime responding to purely strategic imperatives. A more formalized effort at planning was initiated at the same time in July, 1929. A Captain Sakuma was commissioned to complete a plan within a year. He finished in September, 1930. For all the time input, this plan, "A Study Concerning the Administering of the Occupation of Man-Mō" (Man-Mō ni okeru senryōchi tōji ni kansuru kenkyū") was largely a re-hashing of Ishiwara's ideas. It based its expectations that "war can sustain war" on various fundraising schemes, including streamlining the tax structure. The object was to achieve a self-sustaining Japanese administration, locally financed, to provide the necessary base for the Kwantung Army. Again,

196. Jun Tsunoda, ed., Ishiwara Kanji shiryō (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1971), pp. 42-46.

it was to be a military government, which would direct the central administration, dismantle the upper level Chinese civil and military bureaucracy, and supervise all public works. At the same time, care would be taken not to disrupt the daily lives of the people, leaving them free to develop according to their respective racial characteristics and talents. The rationalization was simplistic: to improve the economic welfare of the mass of impoverished Japanese in Japan and relieve "the misery of the peoples of Manchuria from the misrule of the Chang Hsüeh-liang regime." The plan was accepted with little comment or dissent by Kwantung Army Chief of Staff Miyake Mitsuji on December 30, 1931.¹⁹⁷

Takehiko Yoshihashi makes reference to a secret Kwantung Army staff plan which is more comprehensive, encompassing a broad program of political and economic reform in both Manchuria and Japan under the aeigis of a totalitarian single party. According to Yoshihashi, it would have employed the Communist technique of cells whose members, by undercover methods, would subvert the various ministries and departments of the Chang government. Through such means the overall "national reconstruction" would eventually emerge. On the face of it, this looks like a far more sophisticated version of the pattern that

197. Ibid., pp. 52-57; Peattie, pp. 108-10.

did emerge in Japan through the mid-1930s whereby small ad hoc groups of committed soldiers and sailors tried to subvert the civilian government by coup and assassination. Unfortunately, no date or details of this intriguing plan are available. It is not even known whether copies still exist.¹⁹⁸

Ishiwara did not rely solely on the Kwantung Army staff for planning. He decided to take into his confidence the research group of the SMR Company. This bureau possessed more statistical data on Manchuria-Mongolia and was staffed with more informed specialists than any other contemporary organization. He was invited to lecture before them in March, 1930, and boldly set forth his ideas on solving the problems of Manchuria by force and his theories on the connection between a Manchuria-Mongolia bloc and preparations for the Final War. His ideas and charisma won a positive response and full cooperation. He acquired the expertise of men like Sata Kojirō, Chief of the Research Bureau; Miyazaki Masayoshi, specialist in Soviet industrialization plans; and Matsuki Tamotsu, legal advisor to the SMR Company. All took research assignments for Ishiwara and the Bureau's files were opened to the Kwantung Army staff, especially after Ishiwara created his

198. Yoshihashi, pp. 139-40.

own research office in the army staff. selecting talented officers imbued with his ideas.¹⁹⁹

Okawa Shūmei had been associated with the SMR Company's Research Bureau, becoming a director of one of its departments in 1929. His brand of idealistic schemes also had their impact on the organization, lending a revolutionary spirit which mixed rightist and leftist doctrine.²⁰⁰ Although Ishiara did not follow Okawa's views on the internal reconstruction of Japan, he seems to have accepted Okawa's ideas selectively regarding the philosophy guiding and administration of Manchuria.²⁰¹

Within the first three days of the Manchurian Incident, the Kwantung Army achieved a success exceeding most expectations, clearing Chang Hsüeh-liang's disorganized forces out of the areas adjacent to the railway zone in South Manchuria and occupying the key centers of Mukden, Kirin, Antung, Changchun, Fenghuangcheng, and Yingkou. At this point, the Kwantung Army was anxious not only to push Chang out of his stronghold in Chinchor in the south but also to push into northern Manchuria to complete the process of asserting effective army control.

199. Peattie, pp. 110-11.

200. Yoshihashi, pp. 138-39; George M. Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1936 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 108.

201. Yoshihashi, p. 142.

It was a matter of completing the job while the opposition was on the run, preventing regrouping or "outside interference."

However, on September 22, 1931, two messages came to Kwantung Army commander Honjō Shigeru from Tokyo General Staff Headquarters. The first ordered a cessation of military action. Although the Kwantung Army had been acting on its own initiative and although it was later to circumvent such orders by various subterfuges, the order was unequivocal and had to be obeyed. The second message, from Vice-Chief of the General Staff Ninomiya, ordered Honjō to proceed with a plan advanced by the Chief of Second Department of the General Staff, Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, advocating a move to create a separate state in Manchuria under a puppet ruler, who would be Pu Yi, the last of the Ch'ing dynastic line. Backed in general by Koiso Kuniaki of the General Staff and Araki Sadao, then of the Inspectorate General, this message had the effect of steering support away from an administration entirely dominated by the Kwantung Army and toward some kind of compromise which involved a quasi-civilian administration. In a Kwantung Army staff meeting called to discuss this development, Doihara Kenji, then provisional mayor of Mukden and head of the Kwantung Army's Mukden Special Service Section, advanced the suggestion for a multiracial autonomous state. He was under the influence of MSR director

Kanai Shōji, and was echoing the latest manifestation of MSR ideology.²⁰²

Without the full support of the Japanese government and central army authorities, Ishiwara's plans for military occupation had no chance. But the consensus of the Kwantung Army and significant figures in Tokyo Army headquarters did back Manchurian autonomy. Moreover, the need for native Chinese collaboration was beginning to be realized in army circles. Ishiwara had already enjoyed amiable contact with the MSR and had reacted positively to their ideas. The September 22 conference, then, introduced the notion of the relationship between an autonomous state and minzoku kyōwa before Honjō who, as Kwantung Army commander, was the formally responsible decision-maker. He, in fact, became an enthusiastic supporter of the most idealistic aspects of minzoku kyōwa.²⁰³

Ishiwara, hitherto the guiding figure in the Incident, was not originally of the "Manchurian independence" school. His Final War Theory sought a Manchurian-Mongolian bloc within the empire, to economically bolster Japan against the holocaust. However, realization of an obvious opportunity led him to embrace independence. The MSR

202. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai, eds., Manshū-kokushi (Tokyo: Man-Mō Dōho Engōkai, 1971 [Kakuron and Sōron]), (Kakuron), p. 76; Ogata, pp. 75-76; Peattie, p.126.

203. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 8-9; Yamaguchi's private correspondence with the author.

ideology offered a means of persuading Chinese and Manchu elements to build an independent state. This held out the possibility of accomplishing by "political maneuvering" what could not be done by forceful means alone, especially if the Kwantung Army were put on a leash. Although independence held uncertainties for most military men and was fraught with all kinds of factors potentially difficult to control, the case had been argued energetically and almost singlehandedly by the MSR for the previous three years in one form or other. The MSR appeared willing to put themselves on the line, with the possibility of carrying along a goodly number of the rest of the Manchurian Japanese with them. The prospect of accomplishing great things with a small but zealous nucleus could not but appeal to Japanese activists like Ishiwara, who had, after all, launched his military campaign along the same lines.

Independence had its attractions. It seemed best able to satisfy the aspirations of the Chinese, as well as other ethnic groups, thus offsetting their hostility. An independent Manchuria could, moreover, protect Japan's vital interests, provided they were tailored to fit autonomy, without forcing Japan to pay the price of administering and pacifying it. Ishiwara and other soldiers were certainly not interested in "capitalist" rights, interests, and immunities that transgressed autonomy. Their resource base and buffer against Russia were possible

with merely a close "relationship" between Japan and Manchuria, which would evolve in any case. We can see, then, that, as "political strategy" grew in importance from this time on, ideology as an instrument and civilian activists as political organizers also grew proportionately in importance.

On September 25th, Honjō received a message from the Tokyo General Staff approving in principle a "political strategy" for Manchuria, the removal of Chang Hsüeh-liang, and the use of Pu Yi. However, a message also came from the War Ministry prohibiting participation in any movement to establish a new regime in Manchuria. Moreover, the Kwantung Army learned that Chief of the General Staff Kanaya Hanzō disapproved of their plans.²⁰⁴

The Kwantung Army could not overtly disobey orders and participate in political action; they could, however, accomplish what bade fair to be an approximation of their goals by relying on Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol dissidents and upon the Manchurian Japanese. To soften opposition, the Kwantung Army sought to launch its own "diplomatic offensive" in Japan in early October, obtaining the help of Uchida Yasuya, President of the South Manchurian Railway Company, and the services of MSR speaking teams, who

204. IMTFE, testimony by Tadashi Katakura for the defense, p. 18,942.

repeated their lobbying efforts of August.²⁰⁵ Rather than continue to stand pat in continuing opposition to the long-desired "settlement" in Manchuria and thus risk a possible clash with the Army, the Tokyo government agreed that it would not oppose native Chinese efforts to create a new government in Manchuria.²⁰⁶

Simultaneously, Ishiwara's conversion to the goal of independence produced the "Plan for Man-Mō Administration" (Man-Mō tōji hōan") on October 2, 1931:

Japan's military force will secure the unity and tranquility of the Four Northeastern Provinces. Under their protection, a simple government suitable to the Chinese people will be created. All provincial governmental organs will be placed under the Manchuria-Mongolia Government-General (Sōtokufu). Hsien and municipalities will be self-governing.

Government-General duties will consist of (1) national defense, (2) putting down internal struggle within Man-Mō, (3) administering transportation and communications, (4) administering mining, forestry, and other important industries, and (5) administering higher-level justice.²⁰⁷

Honjō stated the rationale for his plan to move ahead with an independent state and revealed that he was very close to the MSR position. Manchuria, he said, had interests close to Japan's. Now that Japan seemed ready to follow the desires of the people, as shown in the

205. Ibid.

206. Ogata, p. 85.

207. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. II, p. 169; Tsunoda, pp. 86-88.

independence movements, she had to consider that old manifestations of superiority, such as "rights and interests," had to be given up. Japanese must become naturalized citizens of the new state. The cause of popular discontent in the past was warlord maladministration, so now good administration must be relied on to change people's opinions. It would be a mistake to restore Pu Yi if the will of the people opposed him. The Kwantung Army should maintain overall law and order but stay out of politics and allow the new nation to develop on its own.²⁰⁸ For his part, Ishiwara said, "As 1931 gives way to 1932, the idea of occupation (senryō) is liquidated and changed to the concept of independence."²⁰⁹

Blueprints for the new state were further moved toward completion when Matsuki Kyō, an international law advisor for the South Manchurian Railway Company then serving in its Shanghai office, undertook the job of preparing a final draft, beginning October 10th in consultation with Honjō, Itagaki, and Ishiwara. These were "The Draft of General Principles Concerning the Government of a Manchuria-Mongolia Republic" ("Man-Mō kyōwakoku tōchi taikōan") and "General Principles Concerning the Proposed

208. Shigeru Honjō, Honjō nikki (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1967), pp. 319-20; IMTFF, testimony by Seishirō Itagaki for the defense, pp. 30,268-70.

209. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. II, p. 169.

"Establishment of a Manchuria-Mongolia Free State" (Man-Mō jiyūkoku setsuritsuan taikō"). The former appears in its entirety below:

- I. Introduction
- II. Errors regarding views of Man-Mō independence:
It is an illusion to believe that the Empire can go along by simply establishing an independent nation-state or an independent power in Man-Mō. This is because:
 1. It is possible that a new independent Manchuria could become part of China by treaty or other convention, which would be undesirable.
 2. This would violate the obligations under existing treaties. Recently this has become clear in relations between Japan and Manchuria.
 3. An independent power in Manchuria could revert to warlordism.
- III. Outline plan for an alternative way of establishing an independent Man-Mō
 - to set up Manchuria as a territory of Japan is the best policy but this will create an international controversy
 - the next best thing is to set up an independent entity in Man-Mō which will, by itself separate administrative control from China
- A. Outline for a free Man-Mō nation-state
 1. We reject warlordism; we desire to control by civilian rule
 2. As much as possible, we intend to allow self-rule by the people and to reduce the scope of bureaucratic control
 3. We will support the Open Door and adoption of equal opportunity; there should be exploration of resources by invitation of internal and external sources of investment capital; industrialization must be pressed.
 4. Taxes must be reduced; public security must be maintained; freedom will be realized on the basis of equality of access to happiness and contentment.
- B. Structure of the Manchurian-Mongolian nation
 1. The independent nation will become a democratic structure divided into six

provinces--Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Jehol, a special regional Eastern area, and an autonomous Inner Mongolian region.

2. Based on the six provinces, the nation will move toward setting up a central government by gradually expanding central power; the next step is to unify the military, judiciary, and tax power, then gradually to reduce the power of each province.
3. Manchuria-Mongolia will become a constitutional government, i.e., with legal separation of the three powers. It will be a representative government. Therefore, it is recognized that the people of Manchuria-Mongolia will reach sufficient political consciousness.
4. Under the provinces, there will be a peoples' autonomy in the hsien and cities.

C. Means of Establishing Manchurian-Mongolian Independence

The function of establishing a nation is to complete autonomy at the lower levels (hsien and cities). However, at the higher levels, we will move to consolidate the provinces in their essential governmental functions toward a central government. This will then become completely independent of China.

According to the constitution and other laws, we will public and unify the military, tax and judicial systems. We will adjust or re-organize the structure of the independent state, nurture its power and try to gain recognition abroad. Japan will recognize it first, whereupon other powers, like Britain, the United States, etc., will be approached.

D. Relations between Manchuria-Mongolia and the Japanese Empire

1. Japan will recognize Manchuria-Mongolia.
2. The Empire will not interfere in the details of internal politics, but would consider it necessary to intervene in matters of national defense. Certain economic functions, as in the case of railroads and airlines, would necessarily fall under the Empire.

3. In order to lead and supervise Man-Mō temporarily, it will be necessary to set up advisory bodies composed of officials and citizens of Japan. This advisory body will reserve the power to issue the conclusion of treaties and important laws.²¹⁰

The preface to the "Man-Mō jiyūkoku setsuritsuan taikō" argues that "so long as Manchuria-Mongolia is to be regarded as part of the Chinese state, it is absolutely impossible to manage it at will, for there is no excuse for eliminating the participation of the Japanese central government in the Manchurian-Mongolian regime." Further, were an attempt made to control a regime not fully independent from the Nanking regime (and Tokyo policy at this time was still inclined to recognize a regime in Manchuria with formal ties to China), "it would become necessary to interfere thoroughly in its internal affairs, which would in turn be impossible to carry out."²¹¹

This plan emphasized the importance of avoiding open Japanese intervention, since "the Chinese have traditionally been a people who value face, so that, should it become outwardly clear that they are subject to Japanese interference or supervision, the authority of the

210. Ibid., pp 171-73.

211. Taken from Kantōgun Sanbobu Sōmuka, "Manshū jihen kimitsu koryaku nisshi," Vol. III, pp. 29, 33, in Oğata, p. 122.

administrators would not be effective."²¹² Thus self-governing bodies were to be the mainstay below the provincial level, in view of the current view in the Kwantung Army that it was not only economical to do so but had the further imponderable benefit of utilizing that inertia inherent in rural society. Control of the people was therefore to be fairly indirect, allowing a wide latitude in their daily lives and emphasizing the concept of welfare. Sadako Ogata, at several points in her admirable study of Kwantung Army decision-making, states that the Kwantung Army leadership at this time did have a sincere sympathy for the lot of the masses in Manchuria. They were now convinced, moreover, of the importance of winning over at least a significant portion of public opinion. Thus, the Matsuki program spoke of the "paradise of various races" and the "promotion of equal happiness of various races" and promised reduction in taxes, development of natural resources, and promotion of trade and industry on a basis which would bypass monopoly capitalism.²¹³

This consciousness of the necessity of placating public opinion likewise showed up in the Guarantee Law of Civil Rights, also prepared by Matsuki, which came out in March, 1932, when Manchukuo was formally inaugurated.

212. Ogata, p. 123.

213. Ibid., p. 124.

Rights to be guaranteed by law included personal liberty, property rights, religious and racial equality, right to public office and to petition, and the right of trial under the law. The people were to be free of any taxation, requisition, or penalty except to law (to end traditional warlord abuses) and would be protected from usury, excess profit, or unjust economic pressures, as might occur under more modern capitalism.²¹⁴

Both of the Kwantung Army plans for October expressed outward confidence in some kind of popular government--either a "constitutional republic" or "democracy." However, even though the Matsuki drafts called for adoption of a constitutional structure and a separation of powers, the assumption that had always been expressed was that the political sophistication of the masses was fairly low. Hence, a centralized constitutional government would be impossible. Moreover, Matsuki pointed out that if Manchuria-Mongolia were abruptly set up as a separate nation, Japanese control might be lost and the old difficulties might return. Therefore, the Matsuki plan envisioned only a gradual transformation from provincial autonomy into a centralized state.²¹⁵

214. Ibid.

215. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. II, p. 173.

The Japanese planners intended to implement the local "self-governing system" (jichisei) by a system of Japanese advisors. It is well known how, subsequently, the method was to place Japanese in secondary positions, nominally subordinate to Chinese of some prestige, but with actual decision-making capacities deriving from their backing by the Kwantung Army as the only real power source. Advisors, according to the Matsuki draft plans, were to be attached to the Privy Council to exert influence there, as well as to each province and to various departments and sections of central and provincial governments. The action of these advisors was to be kept as much as possible behind the scenes. Japanese control was certainly not ubiquitous but rather intended to be exerted in fundamental and pivotal matters which concerned Japanese interests. It was largely, in the local areas, below the provincial level, that the principle of self-government came into play, and it was here that the Jichi Shidōbu (Self-Government Guidance Board) was to fulfill its role.²¹⁶

The first way in which the Kwantung Army activists sought to utilize self-governing institutions was by means of the Peace Preservation Committees (chian iinkai). Having existed since time immemorial as local self-protection cooperative societies formed by merchant guilds

216. Ibid., pp. 171-73; Ogata, pp. 122-23.

in towns and by gentry in the countryside, they had traditionally been a-political, aiming at protecting property and maintaining basic local services in any situation where higher government authority could not or would not do these things. They had to be well-grounded in local affairs and be accepted at least passively by local people or else they would have been merely vigilante groups.²¹⁷

The first use of a Peace Preservation Committee was at Mukden at the instigation of Colonel Doihara Kenji. He was head of the Mukden branch of the army Special Services Organization (Tokumu Kikan), which had to do principally with intelligence and "unofficial liaison" activities among the native population (spying, agitation, and various conspiracies in support of the general ends shaped by the Kwantung Army decision-makers). Sometimes referred to, journalistically as the "Lawrence of Manchuria," Doihara was not so much a charismatic figure as he was a tireless worker with a fine sense of intrigue and a high opinion of his own efforts. His activities prior to the Incident involved trying to implement a scheme to get the warlord Yen Hsi-shan to attach Chang Hsüeh-liang, which, to Ishiwara,

217. James E. Weland, "Doihara and the Making of Manchukuo" (Paper presented at seminar, University of Arizona, Tucson, Spring, 1970), p. 22.

detracted from the main effort, invited unwanted scrutiny from Tokyo, and was "undisciplined."²¹⁸

Japanese Consul-General to Mukden Hayashi Kyūjirō revealed Doihara's plan in a letter of September 28, 1931, to Shidehara:

. . . it is scheduled that the local Peace Preservation Committee, organized at this time to maintain peace and order in the city of Mukden, should be led and gradually made into the central organ in administration and a distinguished Chinese should be later appointed as Mayor, chosen by this committee. Furthermore [Doihara] said that it was decided that the Self-Defense Corps now under the command of our Kempeitai [military police] should be transferred to the above Peace Preservation Committee and unified under the name of the Peace Preservation Corps, and it was further decided to have them organize a considerable number of policemen. It is said that, to date, 1000 rifles were delivered for this purpose.²¹⁹

The Committee was to be headed by Yüan Chin-kai, who had been a prominent local businessman and ex-governor of Liaoning Province. His close association was Ting Chien-hsiu. Doihara himself acted as temporary mayor of Mukden. The Committee form was not dictated in any way by Doihara nor did he apparently view the leaders as puppets, since there was some confidence that the Chinese sense of local autonomy would operate in a way which closely paralleled Japanese objectives. On October 5th, the Mukden Committee became the effective "shadow government" of the

218. Peattie, p. 119.

219. IMTTE, exhibit for the defense, pp. 33,605-6.

city. On October 18th a distinguished Chinese, Chao Hsin-pao, became mayor on recommendation of the Committee. Thereupon, Doihara and the Special Service Organization withdrew from the daily administration.²²⁰

The obvious problem with using the Peace Preservation Committee as a government was that it was incomplete. Doihara had operated well enough in Mukden by using behind-the-scenes persuasion, pressure, and negotiation. But Manchuria was a vast and diverse area. To expect local government to maintain a certain equilibrium in local areas was one thing, but for the crucial accomplishment of de jure independence required some kind of mass support for a common proposal. Moreover, there was the possibility that adherents of Chang Hsüeh-liang or the Kuomintang might fill any vacuum left locally. The specter of numerous dissident movements operating under the cloak of popular sovereignty or local autonomy was a real one; the local areas had to be shown that their best interests lay neither with Chang, the Kuomintang, nor with any of the various charismatic figures who might try to play the Nationalists off against the Japanese. The best means of dealing with these problems seemed to lie in regularizing a system of "guidance" which relied on relatively discreet

220. Ibid., p. 33,616; Weland, pp. 22-25; Tokuzō Komai, Dai Manshūkoku kensetsuroku (Tokyo: Chūo Kōronsha, 1933), p. 39.

methods of advising and propagandizing, thereby avoiding overt pressure tactics but hopefully diffusing their efforts as far as possible into the grass roots, where political warfare tactics would be harder to fight, harder to erase, and harder to countermand from home. The Self-Government Guidance Board that pressed these efforts proved to be the first springboard for mass mobilization efforts among the total Manchurian population by the Japanese.

Nakanishi Toshikazu, Yūki Jōtarō, and others of the MSR had already had the idea of encouraging innovations in administrative procedures at the local levels as an out-growth of their efforts to garner support for the Manchurian Incident in and around Mukden. The MSR and Daiyūhōkai were natural sources of personnel for the Self-Government Guidance Board and they were invited to form it in mid-October, 1931.²²¹ Personal connections also helped to weld the relationship between the MSR and Self-Government Guidance Board, since MSR Director Kanai Shōji had been close to Doihara for some time. Kanai, one of the experts from the SMR Company on whom the Kwantung Army relied

221. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 4; IMTFE, testimony by Ryōmei Kasagi for the defense, p. 2,791; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 76.

heavily prior to the Incident, probably had a preponderant influence on Doihara's ideas for popular government.²²²

Yü Chung-han, a prominent Chinese closely associated with the Hokyō Anmin ("defend the frontier, pacify the people") position mentioned above and one who had been close to the Japanese in the past, was tapped as overall head of the Self-Government Guidance Board system. The Mukden Self-Government Guidance Board original office was headed by Nakano Koitsu, a Mukden lawyer and member of Daiyūhōkai. Kodama Yoshio, also of Daiyūhōkai, was overall vice-head, and Kanai became a kind of supreme advisor. The nerve center of the Board was in Mukden, although by November there were branch boards created in various local areas. There were about 120 members, of whom fifteen were Chinese or Manchu and the rest Japanese. Among the Japanese, about twenty were from Daiyūhōkai and the remainder from MSR. There were eight organizational sections in the Self-Government Guidance Board: (1) Advisory, with both Japanese and non-Japanese members; (2) General Affairs, the overall policy-making body, with only Japanese; (3) Guidance; (4) Censorship (in the sense of an auditing body); (5) Liaison; (6) Propaganda; (7) Training and Education; and (8) Finance. The last five sections had

222. John H. Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 129; IMTFE, testimony by Kane-shirō Shibayama for the defense, pp. 28,629-30.

both Japanese and non-Japanese members. Although technically the Kwantung Army was not involved, Ishiwara, Itagaki, and Doihara all had a vital interest in this form of political maneuvering. They offered every cooperation and the Board was obviously already inclined to be responsive to the overall imperatives which encouraged close cooperation. Doihara, for example, furnished the names of numerous Chinese contacts amassed over a long time by the Special Service Organization but otherwise played no direct role. Although Japanese, especially military, rapport with Chinese never seemed very good during the bitter years of the 1930's experience, Japanese intelligence was invariably quite good. Operating funds came from the Liaoning Provincial Peace Preservation Committee but may well have derived partly from Kwantung Army slush funds.²²³

The scope of the guidance movement, because of the limits placed on Kwantung Army operations in the first few months, was mostly, although not entirely, centered in the key area of Fengtien (later Liaoning) Province. However, there were great hopes that a pattern would emerge elsewhere. The guidance program was touted as "self-rejuvenation" (tzu chu fu hsing) among hsien magistrates.

223. IMTTE, testimony by Tadashi Katakura for the defense, pp. 19,075-78; testimony by Ryōmei Kasagi for the defense, pp. 2,789-92; Weland, pp. 25-27; Harvey Michael Kane, "The Creation of Manchukuo" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oregon, 1968), pp. 38-39.

With the MSR bearing the brunt of the government-reorganizing effort, the Self-Government Guidance Board came gradually to supplant the Peace Preservation Committees, which tended to be eminent but conservative figures without any kind of real policy to offer.²²⁴

Three or four field representatives were assigned to each area. Their main work was propaganda, which, given the urgency they all felt, was leveled largely at local government people and elites. The main appeal was that government would be more stable, organized, and responsive to the people if they would declare their independence from Nanking.²²⁵ Their aims were perhaps a little beyond their means, for they intended not only to inject organizational and financial order into local self-governing groups but also to improve local economic conditions by promoting production, commerce, and formation of cooperatives in the villages.²²⁶ The immediate objective, more within their means, was to garner support for independence. By January, 1932, the Self-Government Guidance Board felt in a position to issue a proclamation appealing to the people to repudiate the Chang regime and to join in a popular

224. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 19; Yamaguchi's private correspondence with the author.

225. IMTFE, testimony by Ryōmei Kasagi for the defense, pp. 2,789-91.

226. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 8-9; Ogata, p. 119.

movement for independence under a new administration pledged to improve the living conditions of all.

One of the main considerations in impelling the efforts of the Self-Government Guidance Board was the existence of a variety of dissident anti-Chang factions and movements which represented both a potential threat to the unity the Japanese needed at this point and a possible source of native support for the Japanese. Although the slogan hokyō anmin was often applied as a blanket to cover both a Chinese-Manchu separatist and a neutralist stance (as Wang Yung-chiang and others originally used it), it is certainly doubtful that all of the variegated factions could be tied together in such a fashion. Rather, what they seemed to have in common in practice was opposition to Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Nanking government's extension of control northward and a willingness to deal with the Japanese.

This variety of opinions seemed to portend several things to the Japanese engaged in nation-building. A number in the Kwantung Army felt that Pu Yi would have to be brought in as head of state, in order to provide both a domestic focus for contending factions and the trappings of independence for outside consumption. Others were convinced of the necessity, at least in the initial period, for a compromise between the monarchical and quasi-democratic aspirations expressed by different factions.

Finally, those from the MSR, Daiyūhōkai, and like-minded allies saw in the fluid Manchurian scene possibilities for expanded mass mobilization efforts, both to aid the common cause of independence and to legitimize their organizations.

There had always been dissident groups and factions on the Manchurian scene whose disaffection took various forms. As in the case described earlier, Japanese had in the past sought their cooperation. Among the most active were various Manchu and Mongol figures promoting a restoration of the Ch'ing dynasty. The Japanese Chief of Public Safety in the Kwantung territory reported to the Japanese cabinet in January, 1929, that some of these could be classified as "bandit" groups, others as old banner contingents or tribal groups that retained traditional loyalties. Their tactics involved both coercing wealthy families to raise funds and, at the same time, seeking the cooperation of provincial governors. Their pronouncements, in the form of propaganda handbills, attacked Chang Hsüeh-liang for "usurpation" and misgovernment. They seemed, at the time, anxious to win some measure of friendship from Japan, being willing to concede that Manchuria had a "special relationship" with Japan.²²⁷

The main centers of restorationist activity were in Kirin and in Inner Mongolia. In Kirin the vehicles of this

227. IMTFS, testimony of Tadashi Katakura for the defense, pp. 19,151-56.

sentiment were the Tsuan She Tang (nominally a "party") and a secret society known as Man Tsu Kong Chin Hui. Independence of the Manchu and Mongol tribes from the Han Chinese was another aim along with restoration. A prime mover in the restoration movement was a Manchu named Hsi Hsia. Effectively a regional warlord as governor of Kirin province, his Kirin Army was only nominally a regional command of Chang Hsüeh-liang's and he fought against Chang in September, 1931, independently of the Kwantung Army. As a blood relative of Pu Yi, he was contacted shortly after the outbreak of the Incident by a Chinese, Lo Chen-yü, to bring about stability and an end to continuing hostilities by backing the installation of Pu Yi. The hope at the time was that Pu Yi would serve as a compromise figure to prevent either a return of Chang or of a Japanese military administration. In this expectation we see some common ground with the hokyō anmin civilian position. Along with Hsi Hsia, a volunteer pro-independence army in Inner Mongolia led by Kanyuruchapu attacked Chinese troops at the end of September, 1931.²²⁸ Other supporters of Ch'ing restoration included Chang Hai-kung in Taonan and even some Japanese

228. IMTTE, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, pp. 18,836-39, 18,941-43, 18,946; testimony of Tadashi Katakura for the defense, p. 18,967.

from among the so-called "Manshū rōnin," especially the group surrounding Kawashima Rōha.²²⁹

Doihara Kenji believed that introduction of Pu Yi into Manchuria could unite the many pro-independence factions. According to his testimony, the MSR seemed to agree,²³⁰ although Yamaguchi holds in his post-war writing that setting up Pu Yi was a blunder since it "alienated the Chinese."²³¹ Very likely this was an assessment with the advantage of hindsight. In any case, Doihara, after organizing the Peace Preservation Committee as the government of Mukden, traveled to Tientsin in late October to make preparations for bringing Pu Yi to Manchuria at the proper time. Consul General Kuwashima opposed bringing Pu Yi to Manchuria, but Doihara argued that, unless the vacuum were filled, the provisional governments might be willing to have Chang Hsüeh-liang back. Because there was no coherent popular demand for Pu Yi, his introduction had to be "managed."²³² Pu Yi obviously wanted a full restoration of the monarchy and was carefully misled by Doihara into believing this would be done.²³³

229. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," p. 24.

230. IMTFE, cross-examination of Kenji Doihara by the prosecution, pp. 15,726-28.

231. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 9.

232. IMTFE, testimony of Kenji Doihara for the defense, pp. 4,364-66; Weland, pp. 28-29.

233. Kane, p. 43.

General Honjō, anxious to achieve some kind of consensus among the independence factions, sent Itagaki on a tour through Manchuria in November and December to poll their views and to try to bring about some agreement. All were against Chang Hsüeh-liang and seemed to equate his regime with integration with China. Hsi Hsia in Kirin and the Mongol princes, as mentioned, favored a restoration of the Ch'ing monarchy. Hsieh Chieh-shih, a strong civilian presence in Kirin, concurred. Chang Ching-hui, an influential factional leader in Harbin, who had declared independence in September (although not backed by any military force) was against a restoration, favoring a parliamentary government. Ma Chan-shan, a military commander in the far north in Heilungkiang province who was later to cause some bad moments for the Japanese by mounting effective military opposition, was, in December, 1931, against a restoration but did not offer any clear alternative position. Tsang Shih-i, the Governor of Fengtien Province, opposed restoration of the monarchy but favored bringing in Pu Yi as a "president." Yüan Chin-kai, an influential faction leader in Mukden and strong friend of the Japanese, agreed.²³⁴

Yamaguchi Jūji identifies the local and regional chambers of commerce (shōmukai in Japanese, shang wu hui in

234. IMTTE, testimony of Seishirō Itagaki for the defense, pp. 30,276-77.

Chinese) as major clusters of independence sentiment opposed to Ch'ing restoration and supporting the position associated with the slogan "hokyō anmin" ("defend the borders, pacify the people"), which emphasized maintenance of Manchurian separation, the ousting of the Chang regime, and reliance on Japan for external defense.²³⁵

The hokyō anmin position is a confusing one because there were so many permutations of it, both through time and at any one given time. Some writers hold that the motivation to try to apply minzoku kyōwa as an ideology to Manchuria came as much from a number of hokyō anmin adherents as it did from the MSR ideologues.²³⁶ Yamaguchi, as one of the latter, disagrees. He traces minzoku kyōwa's origins mainly to the idealism inherent in those Manchurian Japanese who were both progressive and farsighted in their thinking and most deeply and firmly committed to a future in Manchuria. However, he is necessarily always at pains to emphasize the multiracial backing for independence and gives Manchu-Mongol-Chinese groups full credit for action on their own.

As indicated above, the early manifestations of hokyō anmin during Chang Tso-lin's tenure were associated

235. Yamaguchi, "Manshukokū Kyōwakaishi," p. 26.

236. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), p. 76.

with civilian officials' sense of the dangers of involvement with the chaos south of the Great Wall and of the advantages of neutrality between Russian, Japanese, and Chinese power impinging on Manchuria. In its association with Wang Yung-chiang, it took on a reformist tinge.

Hokyō anmin had taken other forms as well. Previously, in June, 1928, the Japanese military had advocated it as a course for Chang Hsüeh-liang following the assassination of his father. In mid-June, two Japanese officers of the Kwantung Army went to see Chang to persuade him to maintain the status quo and not compromise with the Nationalists by raising the revolutionary flag. Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, then attaché at Peking and later on the General Staff and involved in the Manchurian Incident, strongly suggested to his government that they press Chang hard to disassociate himself from the South and concentrate on creating a "prosperous utopia" in Manchuria with Japanese assistance. Tatekawa wrote on June 25th:

I believe it is the most necessary and urgent task for Japan to state explicitly that it will not be pleased to see the Nationalist flag raised in Manchuria and Mongolia, to direct the Manchurian government not to submit to the Southern regime, by forceful and threatening measures if necessary, and as soon as possible to have Manchurian leaders declare themselves to be independent of the South, under the principle of "maintaining the security of the border and pacifying the people," exterminate dangerous activities internally, and devote

themselves solely to the unification and maintenance of order within the Three Eastern Provinces.²³⁷

The creation of the Matsuki plan brought to the fore of the hokyō anmin coterie a group of Han Chinese civilian administrators called the Three Leaders (san chü t'ou) including Wang Yung-chiang, Yüan Ch'in-kai, and Yü Ch'ung-han. Wang, who had died earlier, was posthumously included as one of the three because he had been the leader among those Manchurian officials who sought progress through separation and reform. He was regarded as a model of Confucian virtue for his administrative and economic reforms and for having resigned in opposition to Chang Tso-lin's involvement in warlord conflicts in China Proper.²³⁸ It was with Wang's example in mind that Yüan and Yü made a conscious link between hokyō anmin and the Confucian notion of official virtue implied by the term wang tao ("the kingly way").

Yü Chung-han, a "prominent elder statesman of the Fengtien government,"²³⁹ was among the first major Chinese administrators to publically back the new state of Manchukuo. As nominal chief of the Self-Government Guidance Board in Fengtien Province, he had greatly facilitated

237. Tatekawa to Hata, June 25 and July 6, 1928 in Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 233.

238. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. II, p. 173; see also Suleski, Chapters 2 and 8.

239. Ogata, p. 118.

Japanese efforts in this key region following the Manchurian Incident. His Fengtien regime, even before the Incident, had taken an independent and decidedly liberal stance, with slogans talking about the obligation of authorities to provide good government, to guarantee "security of clothing, food, and homes, and . . . to lessen the gap between the rich and poor."²⁴⁰

Sadako Ogata also speaks of hokyō anmin as a movement with a fairly lofty aim:

The principles of racial harmony and of government by autonomous bodies are both found in traditional Chinese political thought. In the period immediately preceding the Manchurian Affair, a group of Chinese under the leadership of Chang Ku also attempted to create an autonomous Manchuria based on cooperation of its six largest ethnic groups (Japanese, Chinese, Russians, Mongolians, Koreans, and Manchurians) in order to protect the area from Japanese, Chinese, and Soviet encroachment. Members of the Manshū Seinen Renmei were in contact with Chang Ku and even helped propagate his program among the South Manchurian Railway Company officials and Kwantung Army authorities, so it is entirely likely that the Manchuria-Mongolia autonomy program of the Manshū Seinen Renmei was in part influenced by indigenous aspirations.²⁴¹

The chambers of commerce (shōmukai) and agricultural associations (nōmukai) that, Yamaguchi indicated, supported the hokyō anmin position had long been fixtures in Manchuria. C. Walter Young, in describing the centrifugal tendencies in Chang Tso-lin's Manchuria, contends

240. IMTFE, testimony of Seishirō Itagaki for the defense, pp. 30,263-65.

241. Ogata, pp. 40-41.

that "guilds" (which may logically be equated with the chambers of commerce), along with local government groups, were major props of Manchurian autonomy.²⁴² As early as 1916 there is mention of Chang nominating the head of the Mukden chamber of commerce. At this time, the various chambers of commerce, agricultural associations, artisans unions, and educational associations appear to have furnished Chang with the means to a broader power base by giving him the support of respectable prestige groups.²⁴³

The Chang administration welcomed whatever co-operation it could get from the merchant community, since the chamber of commerce officers were generally among the richest and most influential. There was a chamber of commerce in every market center in Manchuria. They were loosely tied in a semi-pyramidal structure, with the largest cities containing general chambers and smaller cities branches. The chambers of commerce were legally franchised bodies and thus had semi-official status as the civilian extension of provincial governments. Their main liaison with government was through the Bureau of Industry. They made reports to the government, enabling provinces to set policies, and worked with the Bureau of Industry to sponsor exhibits and encourage export trade. They

242. C. Walter Young, p. 25.

243. Stauffer, pp. 137-38.

cooperated with the government by collecting taxes from the business community, including the various special levies demanded by the warlord government. They had a real stake in protecting the economic and political stability of a given province, so that their interests often coincided with civilian officials, such as Wang Yung-chiang, who stood for both reform and regional progress.²⁴⁴

Yamaguchi indicates that the chambers of commerce, in many instances, had close contact with Chinese business firms south of the Great Wall. They were able to circumvent legal restrictions on yüan money orders by engaging in association banking and credit procedures via telegram and were thus able to carry on a secret trade with China Proper denied to other businessmen, especially Japanese. Japanese businessmen in Manchuria, who were used to conditions in Japan, tended to crave a controlled economy and were less able to compete at this kind of intrigue. Chinese and Manchu businessmen were sending cheaper Manchurian goods to China and were importing Chinese goods that were expensive in Manchuria, selling them on a widespread and open black market--to the loss of both the Japanese businessmen and the warlord government.²⁴⁵

244. Suleski, pp. 118-21.

245. Yamaguchi's private correspondence with the author.

The agricultural associations were composed largely of the larger landowners and landlords. In the face of paucity of government facilities and to protect themselves from exactions by the warlord authorities, they formed these associations in a fashion that seemed to bear out Tachibana's view of the traditional rural Chinese Gemeinschaft pattern. The typical slogan-objective was "Peace and Prosperity" (p'ing ho fan jung). The basic cell was called a ton, formed in the hamlets as the nucleus of an autonomous cooperative for buying and selling. The ton head was chosen by vote and exerted dictatorial powers over members, wielding banishment as a sanction. As they coalesced, they began to exert cooperative power at the hsien and then provincial levels as a kind of shadow government for members' economic affairs. Yamaguchi estimates about 200 such organizations in Manchuria.²⁴⁶

Both the chambers of commerce and agricultural associations, according to Yamaguchi, were highly "nationalistic," in the sense of being Manchuria-centered, and thus were potential centers for Manchurian independence insofar as the Manchurian economy could be improved by such autonomy.²⁴⁷ However, Matsuzawa Tetsunari believes that many chambers of commerce (though not agricultural

246. Ibid.

247. Ibid.

associations) actually supported Chang Hsüeh-liang insofar as they perceived him as pursuing something like a modernization program.²⁴⁸ It is undeniable, however, that, with the military defeat of Chang in 1931, the chambers of commerce tended to support hokyō anmin. It would be logical to observe that both the chambers of commerce and agricultural associations would see themselves best served by minimizing outside control as much as they could under the circumstances. Given a minimum of alternatives, minzoku kyōwa, in its initial enunciation, contained just enough populist elements to have attracted their support as the best expression of hokyō anmin after the Kwantung Army victory. In view of the generally middle and upper-middle class affiliation of both chambers of commerce and agricultural associations, we might conclude that their attraction to hokyō anmin and minzoku kyōwa was in the prospect of some stability as well as autonomy and the possibility of progress in development of the region.

Finally, amid the panoply of Manchurian factions favoring independence, Yamaguchi places what he terms the "new intellectuals" (shinjin interi) and the "change-of-leadership" faction. The former, composed of students returned after studying abroad, differed from both the Ch'ing restorationists and the hokyō anmin adherents.

248. Matsuzawa's interview with the author, May 16, 1970.

Supported by many teachers, university students, and young white collar employees, they advocated a "democratic revolution" along the lines of constitutional democracy. The "change of leadership" faction--T'ang Yü-lin in Jehol, Chang Chin-fei in Harbin, and Kan Tsu-shan in Mukden--were, according to Yamaguchi, after personal power and position. They wanted to oust the Chang Hsüeh-liang governing clique but did not adhere to any kind of ideological alternative.²⁴⁹

In view of the welter of autonomy-minded interests and aspirations reviewed above--Ch'ing restoration, Mongol independence, pro-Japanese Chinese desiring political influence, various hokyō anmin advocates, and "new intellectuals"--the Japanese, who were trying, from different vantage points, to stage-manage an independent state out of the Manchurian Incident, did not have a simple task. Moreover, the Japanese on the spot, either within the Kwantung Army or among the Manchurian Japanese, did not exactly agree with one another on how to proceed. There was, however, an increasing tendency to see a government under Pu Yi as the best beginning in the task of reconciling the numerous Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol factions.

On December 9, 1931, Kwantung Army Chief of Staff General Miyake Mitsuji issued a plan called "Explanation of

249. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 28-30.

the Temporary Expedient System" which opposed any abrupt change to a new government form. Such a change, he argued, might stimulate factional wrangling and striving for advantage among "various organs which have deep tendencies to lean toward political parties and factions, which become corrupt in efforts to grab rights and interests, or which wantonly speculate in international relations." Instead, he wished to see a government with Pu Yi, "autocratic in form to appease feelings in Japan" (presumably within the bureaucracy and military). His preference was to establish a governing section which the existing government organs would support. The present council system would then be made adequate by army guidance through an advisor system.²⁵⁰

In contrast to Miyake's "autocratic" form of government, Yamaguchi, in Far East Military Tribunal testimony, expresses support for a more popular form:

Even among the persons who had participated in the movement for the establishment of the nation there were two groups such as the civilian faction of Mukden [hokyō anmin] and the Kirin faction which advocated the restoration of the Ch'ing Dynasty. We were greatly worried over the fact that problems would arise between the various races; for instance, that the Japanese and Koreans, considering themselves natives of a victorious nation, would act in such a way as to be oppressive to the native Manchurians. Under such conditions, we came to the conclusion that, unless the movement for independence among the peoples was united,

250. IMTSE, exhibit, "Explanations of the Temporary Expedient System," pp. 32, 339-40; Kane, pp. 52-53.

. . . the maintenance of a so-called democratic state was impossible unless we were able to bring together various races in perfect co-ordination and cooperation so as to conform to the spirit of the founding of the state.²⁵¹

While Itagaki had gone about persuading various native factions, Kwantung Army Commander Honjō, who had been close to the minzoku kyōwa position since before the Manchurian Incident, set about to scuttle the Ch'ing restoration movement by proposing a compromise whereby Pu Yi would become "head of state" (shissei, also rendered as "regent") instead of emperor and Tsun Hsiao-hsi would be Prime Minister in a face-saving maneuver. The new state would be a kind of oligarchic commonwealth with those who had rendered "important services" put in important posts. There was to be a maximum of local self-government.²⁵²

A January 27th Kwantung Army conference produced a plan for establishing a committee composed of the Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol notables, to be led by the provincial governors, who were to work out the details of the new state and issue a statement declaring independence from Nanking. They were to decide on the form of government according to the popular will--representative organs having been formed at the local levels to present petitions and

251. IMTFE, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, pp. 18,840-41.

252. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 26-27.

give the outward appearance of reflecting public opinion. This became the Northeast Administrative Committee (Tōhoku Gyōsei Iinkai). Its leaders were Hsi Hsia of Kirin, Tsang Shih-yi of Fengtien, Chang Ching-hui, current governor of Heilungkiang, Ma Chan-shan, incoming governor of Heilungkiang, and Chao Hsin-po, mayor of Mukden.

The men who composed it were either in command of military establishments or in administrative posts. The committee contained no Japanese or Koreans. Hsi Hsia, backed by the Mongol princes, argued for a monarchy, Tsang and Chao wanted a republic, and Chang was ambiguous, but they finally agreed on the compromise pressed by Honjō, although the wording describing the form of state was changed from Honjō's "minshū" ("democratic") to "minpon" ("popularly oriented or rooted"). On February 18th they directed that a declaration formally breaking with Nanking was to be issued by Pu Yi and signed by the governors and princes. Beginning on February 20th, the Self-Government Guidance Board intensified its propaganda and mass mobilization efforts around these quasi-legal pronouncements, issuing posters, pamphlets, and a bi-monthly newspaper. They staged meetings of "popular representatives" which called for support for independence by passing resolutions and sending them on to the Board. On February 29th an all-Manchuria convention was held in Mukden at which representatives from all the provinces voiced their support

in denouncing the "old order" and "welcoming the new state." Members of the convention dispatched a formal delegation to invite Pu Yi to take office. He was inaugurated on March 9th, whereupon the Self-Government Guidance Board was dissolved.²⁵³

The Japanese army and government leaders in Tokyo had tried to restrain the Kwantung Army from pushing military action too far. However, once the Kwantung Army engaged in the political maneuvering of native elements, it was able to launch an independent state in Manchuria without having to resort to further military operations, at least for the time being. In the final analysis, the differences between the Kwantung Army and home authorities were not great when it came to final objectives. Both wanted Japan's interests protected and expanded. However, the Kwantung Army was entirely unsympathetic to the home government's anxiety about world opinion. Shidehara objected to the notion of a Japanese-centered client state on the grounds that the majority Chinese in Manchuria could not be accommodated in any system short of forced control. Japan could not mask this kind of aggression behind the flimsy window dressing of independence. Therefore, she would not only face the opposition of the West, but would

253. Ogata, pp. 28-29; Kane, PP. 65-69; IMTFE, testimony of Tadashi Katakura for the defense, pp. 19,007-11.

find it impossible in the long run to come to an understanding with China.²⁵⁴

The Kwantung Army and civilian activists in Manchuria could very well have construed Shidehara's views into less of a rebuke and more of a challenge to accomplish precisely what he saw as impossible--the accommodation of the native population. Certainly, in view of the lack of consensus around Shidehara's position, the Kwantung Army quickly perceived that Tokyo had no real Manchurian policy. Government warnings and limits could not easily be applied to political matters in Manchuria. For twenty-five years the government had been dealing with Manchuria either through its fragmented colonial agencies or through warlord governments. Now the colonial agencies were, in part, irrelevant to the new situation and the warlord regime deposed. This revolutionary state of affairs precluded any close supervision from home bureaucrats unequipped to offer positive alternatives. Moreover, fundamental agreement between the Kwantung Army and home government as to final ends had always undercut such strictures as might be placed on the Kwantung Army and had allowed its activist staff officers the scope to press their ideological notions to the limit. The Kwantung Army's decision to utilize a

254. Ogata, p. 191; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Vol. II, pp. 174-75.

political strategy in establishing Manchukuo, in turn, offered scope to the civilian advocates of minzoku kyōwa.

Manchukuo, launched as it was without direct support from Japan, had to have local public backing or, at least, acquiescence. The armed forces available in Manchuria or nearby would have been far too small to support a government on bayonets that was opposed by large numbers of Manchurian Chinese. The Kwantung Army itself could not generate this backing. The Japanese Army as a whole was not very cosmopolitan and the Kwantung Army, with the exceptions of men like Ishiwara, Itagaki, and Honjō, was not too different from the rest of the Japanese army. Army dealings with civilians, both their own nationals and others, normally were colored and constrained by contempt on both sides. For the Kwantung Army to make use of a civilian political situation for conspiratorial ends was not out of character. However, for it to make the step into the realm of mass organization in support of a government or movement necessitated the aid of organized civilian help. The MSR was available to fit this need at a crucial time. Their objectives and those of the Kwantung Army, at this stage, corresponded closely. They were demonstrably zealous in pursuit of these objectives in the face of an indifferent government. Finally, they could step into areas where the military could or would not

venture without arousing Chinese fears--public persuasion, propaganda, and grass-roots organization.

CHAPTER VII

THE KYŌWATŌ (CONCORDIA PARTY) AND THE KYŌWAKAI (CONCORDIA ASSOCIATION), 1932-1945

The Kyōwatō: Organization and Propaganda Activities

With the dissolution of the Self-Government

Guidance Board in March, 1932, its business office, along with all of the members of the Daiyūhōkai, entered positions in the Manchukuo government, taking over the duties of the National Administration Board's Administrative Assistance Office (Kokumuin Shiseikyoku). The members of the now-dissolved MSR, on the other hand, were not included in the new administration.

The exact circumstances or reasons for this exclusion are not entirely clear. Yamaguchi describes the situation as a "scramble for positions" among Japanese who, acting like "wild beasts in a cage," had forgotten all sense of ideological unity. More specifically, Komai Tokuzō of the Daiyūhōkai had simply compiled a personnel list to fit the administrative structure of the Administrative Assistance Office, which was also largely of his own creation. He thus stole a march on Kanai Shōji of the MSR and obtained positions for his own people. This was in conformity with typical Japanese oyabun-kobun practice whereby a leader maintains a factional following by

treating his adherents as a particularistic patronage group in which the leader exacts loyalty from his followers in return for the preferment his power can give them.

The "scramble for positions" went along similar lines in other sectors of the new government wherein officials of the SMR Company and Kwantung Territorial Government General were now hastening to attain leverage. Yamaguchi expressed it in terms of an effort to reassert a "colonial mentality" in Manchukuo and was concerned that the "insiders," who had swung the Manchurian Incident from objectives of mere military occupation to building an independent nation (kenkoku) would be replaced in the new government by "outsiders."²⁵⁵ Even the decision to locate the national capital at Changchun (renamed Hsinking) rather than Mukden operated to undercut MSR leverage, since the latter was more of a power base for the MSR, having been the site of the Self-Government Guidance Board's most intensive organization efforts.²⁵⁶

Whether by design or not, the former MSR leadership clique found itself outside the central government power circle. At the same time, they retained a kind of old comrades' unanimity regarding the ideological stance they had built over the past three years. They recognized that

255. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 16, 27-31, 53.

256. Ibid., pp. 62-64.

the new state faced stern tests--hostility from the Western powers, insurgency from the undefeated remnants of Chang Hsüeh-liang's forces operating as guerrillas, and internal division among Ch'ing loyalists, Hokyō Anmin neutralists, tribal separatists, and Japanese ready to assert their "rights and interests." The only antidote, in Yamaguchi Jūji's view, is a common ideology of minzoku kyōwa with which to rally the divided elements, show a united front to the outside, and to wage ideological warfare in counter-insurgency. To establish Manchukuo and dispense with a "founding spirit" was to him to "plow the field and forget to put the seed in the ground."²⁵⁷

Yamaguchi approved of making Pu Yi titular leader, serving as "head of state" (shissei) rather than as Emperor (the title originally favored by restorationists). This compromise was acceptable, however, only with the expectation that there would be a minimum of centralization of administrative power and a maximum of local autonomy, based on the chambers of commerce and agricultural associations. He felt that the rapid influx of "outsiders" boded ill for this expectation.²⁵⁸ Under these circumstances, Yamaguchi, Ozawa Kaisaku, and others of the old MSR group who had been involved in the Self-Government

257. Ibid., p. 31.

258. Ibid., p. 27.

Guidance Board determined to form the Kyōwatō (Harmony or Concordia Party), which they envisioned as a national organization for unification of disparate ethnic and political groups and for pursuit of ideological warfare against dissidents. They expected that its core would be the "non-professional activists" from MSR and various chambers of commerce and agricultural associations.

On March 16, 1932, Yamaguchi wrote a declaration of the objectives of the Kyōwatō consisting mainly of his views on the reasons why the Manchurian Incident had occurred. These emphasized warlord misrule and exploitation, the economic potential of Manchuria's resources, the failure of the inhabitants to fully benefit from such resources because of internal divisiveness and international struggles, and the dangers that faced Manchukuo from capitalist or communist exploitation and/or from a return of despotism if the various groups in Manchuria failed to unify. He perceived a golden opportunity for renovation which would finally secure public peace, public welfare, protection of livelihood and human rights, and low taxation. He saw the youth of the country especially as the core of a new set of ideals and of the Kyōwatō itself. The intentions of the Kyōwatō, as he summed up, were to (1) obtain racial cooperation in Manchuria and Mongolia, (2) exclude despotic government and promote self-government, (3) exclude capitalistic monopoly and

realize national economic control, and (4) develop industry in order to increase the people's welfare.²⁵⁹

Yamaguchi recognized that the very newness of Manchukuo made it seem ephemeral in the eyes of Chinese residents of Manchuria. There was still sentiment to return to some form of Chinese sovereignty. Communists found the fishing in these troubled waters good. Therefore it was vital to encourage Manchukuoan nationalist sentiment immediately and to place it on some basis that reflected public opinion.²⁶⁰

The constitution of the party, also written by Yamaguchi at this time, provided for a party general headquarters with branch chapters in "any important place." The president and vice-president would be "appointed by decision of the party members." The director, secretary-general, central committee members, and branch chapter heads would be appointed by the president. The constitution left most of the everyday decision-making concerning general party affairs to the secretary-general and of branch chapter affairs to the branch head. Membership was composed of full, associate, and patronage members. Associate members are appointed by branch heads and could be expelled by them. Full members were associate members

259. Ibid., pp. 32-37; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 77.

260. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), p. 258.

with at least one year's service and the recommendation of the branch heads. They were appointed by the president and could be expelled by him alone. Patronage members paid dues without participation or were honorary members appointed for some "service." Income for the party was to come from membership dues, "business activity surpluses," and "other sources."²⁶¹

The next step was to secure support from the Kwantung Army. Based on the working relationship built up during the Incident, both Yamaguchi and Ozawa had ready access to a number of staff persons and quickly secured approval and promises of support from both Itagaki Seishirō and Ishiwara Kanji. Ishiwara hoped that the Kyōwatō would ultimately become the single legal party in Manchukuo, funded by the national government and with the right to use government facilities. Although initially the party was intended to be self-sustaining, Ishiwara noted that Japanese political parties had become corrupted by their dependence on the business contributions that such self-sustenance produced. Miyazaki Masayoshi, who was Ishiwara's most frequent consultant, added that both the Soviet Communist Party and the Kuomintang were government-supported. They were willing to advance Yamaguchi 20,000 yen (the current equivalent of about 20 million yen or

261. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 37-41.

about \$67,000) and proposed that the Kwantung Army request annual support of 1.2 million yen from the Manchukuo government.²⁶² Miyazaki was a published Russian scholar who had studied three years in Moscow and was considered an expert in economics. He was a member of Baron Okura Kimmochi's braintrust and had headed a department of the SMR Company's Research Section at the time he joined Ishiwara's entourage before the Manchurian Incident. He was to have a critical early input in the organization of Kyōwatō.²⁶³

Yamaguchi had expected to build the Kyōwatō initially on the foundation of the old MSR and the Chinese, Manchus, and Koreans who had cooperated with them during the Incident, including the chambers of commerce and agricultural association organizations. He approached Yü Ching-yuan and Yüan Chen-to from the Self-Government Guidance Board, who indicated enthusiastic support. They had already expressed their own and others' concern over the rapid influx of Japanese bureaucrats into the Manchukuo government as dimming hopes for progress toward independence. Ultimately, Yamaguchi hoped to branch out to absorb disparate elements of the Kuomintang, Chinese Communist Party, Korean Communists, and Korean Independence

262. Ibid., pp. 42-43, 49.

263. Ibid., p. 54.

Party (who often cooperated with the Communists), the Ch'ing loyalist Tsung Shih Party, Manchu bannermen (Ch'i Jen) associations, and all other pre-existing organized bodies.²⁶⁴

On April 1, 1932, the founding ceremony of the Kyōwatō was held at the Mukden Memorial for War Dead. The obligatory declaration of purpose stated:

Although blessed with fertile fields, with boundless resources, and with the passing of an eternity of 4000 years of history, the land of Manchuria now lags in culture and falls behind the progress of the world in many ways. This is because in the past the various resident ethnic groups fought and mutually rejected one another

From the time of the Manchurian Incident on, a new country based on a self-government hoped for by 30 million people is being built. Getting rid of the prejudices among the peoples of Manchuria-Mongolia, obtaining mutual harmony, uniting in the Great Unity [Ta Tung] and comradely cooperation, we must hope for the perfection of the new nation.²⁶⁵

Their central office was organized into four bureaus --administrative, headed by Yü Ching-yuan; inspection, headed by Wada Tsuyoshi; and organization and propaganda, both headed by Yüan Chen-to. Yamaguchi and Ozawa constituted themselves as "counsellors" or assistants in one or more bureaus each. For their central office in Mukden they

264. Ibid., pp. 47, 50-55; *Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron)*, p. 77.

265. "Kyōwatō no sengen oyobi kōryō" in *Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron)*, p. 77.

took over the former headquarters of the Northeast Transportation Committee (an ad hoc civilian logistics organization formed during the Manchurian Incident) which previously had been the Manchurian headquarters for the Kuomintang.²⁶⁶ Basing themselves, as Yamaguchi had intended, on the MSR, chambers of commerce, and agricultural associations, and apparently with some influx of membership from former Kuomintang organizations, the Kyōwatō, within the comparatively short time of one month, established a party network of some proportions. In the Kwantung Leased Area (Liaotung) there were four branch chapters with 822 members; in the areas leased by the South Manchurian Railway there were fourteen chapters with 1623 members; in North Manchuria there were four chapters with 169 members for a total of twenty-two chapters with over 2600 members spread from Dairen in the south to Harbin and Chichihar in the north. Working through highly centralized coordination, they took advantage of every means to propagate the organization ranging from liberal newspaper coverage to local festivals and open air meetings.²⁶⁷

In addition to building up their own organization, the Kyōwatō engaged in a variety of activities which

266. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 55, 58; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), p. 258.

267. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 72-73, 107-14; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), p. 258.

included sending speakers' teams to Japan in June to lobby for formal recognition of the new state by the Japanese government, meeting with representatives of the Lytton Commission in June in an effort to influence Western attitudes toward Manchukuo, producing a number of position tracts by way of propaganda, and engaging in counter-insurgent pacification in North Manchuria during the Ma Chan-shan "revolt" beginning in April, 1932.

Regarding the matter of recognition, it was observed by Japanese in Manchuria that non-recognition of Manchukuo by the League and the Western powers, as well as the failure of Japan to step into the breach, seemed to have some influence in encouraging anti-Japanese insurgent forces in the north and southeast. Hence the pressing necessity for Japan to step forward on the matter. The attitude in Japan had vacillated since the Incident. Up until November, 1931, when the Kwantung Army leadership was on the point of erecting an all-Manchurian government independent of China, the Tokyo army authorities had insisted on creating a new local regime instead with authority to negotiate a settlement to the advantage of Japan while still under the formal sovereignty of the Chinese Nationalist Government. This was what the Inukai cabinet wanted and was what the Lytton Commission and world opinion apparently would have been willing to accept. The creation of the Manchukuo government by the Kwantung

Army in March was done in defiance of Tokyo but was a fait accompli which set in motion a reformulation of Japanese foreign policy by Shidehara's successor in the Foreign Ministry, Uchida Ryōhei, while preparing the Japanese public for an acceptance of recognition of Manchukuo in the face of hostile world opinion.

In this atmosphere, the Kyōwatō in June, 1932, sent a speaking team along with delegates from the Manchukuo government to hold lecture rallies throughout Japan. Headed by Yü Ch'ing-yüan, three teams of fourteen men, beginning in Tokyo and Osaka, covered every major city from Sendai to Kagoshima. The procedure was similar to MSR delegations before the Incident--contact "friendly" organizations, raise the issue publicly and widely, gain media coverage, and persuade Diet members and administrative officials. By August the government decided upon and on September 15th announced recognition. Quickly a treaty establishing diplomatic and commercial relations was signed.²⁶⁸

In April the Lytton Commission for the League, after visiting Japan and China, carried its investigations to Manchuria. At this time, Kanai Shōji, a former member of the MSR now heading the Executive Ministry for the

268. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 159-60; Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," p. 441; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), pp. 261-62; Ogata, pp. 172, 178-79.

Manchukuo government, suggested that members of the commission meet with a delegation from the Kyōwatō acting as a representative of the "public." On June 2nd Mr. C. S. Mass met with Yü Ch'ing-yüan, Yüan Chen-to, and Koyama Sadatomo. The Kyōwatō contingent did their best to emphasize Chang Hsueh-liang's warlord misgovernment, asserting, among other things, that the "revolution" which had come with the Manchurian Incident sprang from popular sentiment and would end anti-foreign sentiment. Lytton Commission investigators also visited party members, including chamber of commerce and agricultural association functionaries, in North Manchuria. Mass apparently showed some receptivity to the Kyōwatō objectives, but the Lytton report entirely rejected the assertion that popular support existed for the Manchukuo regime.²⁶⁹

In April, Yamaguchi wrote two propaganda pamphlets, "Ethnic Japanese Citizens of Manchukuo" ("Nikkei Manshūkoku kokumin") and "Join Hands all Patriots" ("Zenkoku no aikokusha yo te o nigire"), which were intended to stake out the basic ideological position of the Kyōwatō and to appeal for unity. The former seemed to be addressed more to ethnic Japanese and the latter to a broader audience, but, taken together, they give us a fair summary of the propaganda line taken in the early stages. Yamaguchi,

269. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (*Sōron*), p. 260; Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 157-58.

understandably, carried over much of the rhetoric from MSR propaganda.

First, he addressed the misgivings felt by Japanese and Korean residents about being in a new country and breaking with the old protections and immunities that the treaties had given them in the leased areas. "Ethnic Japanese Citizens of Manchukuo" proclaimed that "those who reside within the domains of the new nation will not be differentiated according to race." Ethnic Japanese and Koreans would be granted the same rights and treatment as other citizens of Manchukuo. They would not be treated as resident foreigners. The term "resident fellow Japanese" (sairyū hōjin) would cease and would be replaced by "ethnic Japanese citizens of Manchukuo" (Nikkei Manshūkokumin), just as Chinese would be "ethnic Chinese citizens of Manchukuo" (Chūkei Manshūkokumin), and so forth.

While Japanese could be confident that they would not be discriminated against, the converse was also to be true insofar as they would need to divest themselves of a sense of superiority. They would no longer expect to carry over into Manchukuo the extraterritorial privileges and immunities they had enjoyed in the leaseholds. Yamaguchi noted that, since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895-96, Japan had pursued its military and economic interests in Manchuria through the treaty system. But now, even without the unequal treaty system, Manchurian Japanese would be

secure by virtue of their Manchukuoan citizenship. Neither would the "lifeline" between Japan and Manchuria be broken, since ties of blood and culture would continue to overarch the Sea of Japan as long as there were ethnic Japanese in Manchukuo. In Yamaguchi's hopeful view, the Japanese could have the best of both worlds if only they replaced the outdated and indefensible unequal treaty system with self-government for Manchuria and a concerted commitment to create a peaceful and prosperous "paradise for all." He hoped that the ethnic Japanese in Manchukuo could pull together to lend their full talents and energies to this endeavor.²⁷⁰

"Join Hands All Patriots" followed soon afterward, addressing itself to concerns expressed among Chinese in Manchuria. For example, it emphasized "warlord despotism" as the justification for the Manchurian Incident. It attacked Chang Hsüeh-liang's "racial bias against foreigners" as a mask for his own misrule. The pamphlet called upon current government officials not to repeat the mistakes of the past but to become "servants of the people" in pursuit of a "democratic revolution" in the tradition of the English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions and the Meiji Restoration. Government under the old regime

270. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 66-71; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), p. 259.

represented a stage of "feudalism" which inevitably had to be superceded. Likewise, Yamaguchi criticizes the Kuomin-tang's San Min Chu I philosophy as the "emptiness of promises not borne out "since the Kuomintang Canton faction has degenerated into communism and the Nanking faction into militarism."²⁷¹

As in his first pamphlet, Yamaguchi stressed the good opportunity now existing for security, peace, welfare, a stable currency, and low taxes. He pointed out that Manchukuo had constitutional guarantees of suffrage, property protection, and civil liberties. The threat to these rights lay in allowing disunity, which had always been the curse of Manchuria, to continue. The "bandit" groups of Fengtien Army remnants constituted a potential reincarnation of the Chang military clique. Political dissidents like Communists and others would grow if not checked by a viable grass-roots program backed by a visionary ideology of unity. To offset class struggle, he called for a consensus between labor and capital in the common promotion of prosperity and welfare for all. The sum of it was to be minzoku kyōwa, a co-operation not just of "races" but also of "peoples" in the broader sense of varieties of socioeconomic class and experience. The Kyōwatō, which he here presents as a "federation of

271. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," p. 89.

patriotic groups," was to be the nexus of this hope of communal nation-building, organized into branches without distinction as to race, class, or occupation and integrated by a central organ and common goal.²⁷²

Both pamphlets were translated into Chinese, but the latter, "Join Hands All Patriots," was particularly widely distributed. However, there was some negative reaction to many of the points raised. From the Kwantung Army, Manchukuo government, Chinese collaborators, and even from within the Kyōwatō itself came criticism, particularly of the use of the sensitive term "democracy." In response to pressures, the term "democracy" (minshū shūgi) was changed minpon shūgi (literally, "people-centered") as a semantic alternative suggested by the theories of Yoshino Sakuzō.²⁷³

The Kyōwatō Pacification Activities

The most important activity of the Kyōwatō when it came to establishing a raison d'être was pacification. The earliest important arena for this activity was in North Manchuria, where most of the anti-Japanese guerrilla activity was attributed to the "revolt" of Ma Chan-shan (sometimes rendered Ma Tai-shan). Although some of Chang Hsüeh-liang's local commanders decided to cooperate with the Japanese after the Manchurian Incident, others chose

272. Ibid., pp. 83-103.

273. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

defiance. Ma Chan-shan, commander in Heilungkiang Province, vacillated between both. He had held out against the Kwantung Army's expedition to North Manchuria in November, 1931, apparently in the hope of making the Japanese lose face when the League convened in November to consider the Manchurian Incident. This phase of the Incident was accompanied by a great deal of obstruction of the Kwantung Army by the Tokyo government, which was trying to localize the fighting, and Ma was able to hold out in Chichihar until November 26th. He then sold out (or pretended to sell out) to the Japanese, reportedly for \$2 million, and participated in the planning and maneuvering for the Manchukuo government, accepting a provisional post as governor of Heilungkiang in February, 1932. Six weeks later, he absconded and turned up in Hailun, having announced his defiance of the Japanese and having invited the Lytton Commission to visit an "independent" portion of Manchuria (which they declined).

Although the anti-Japanese insurgent forces consisted of all possible motivations and political complexions, the existence of an active focus, such as the flamboyant Ma, seemed to galvanize the situation into a real threat to the new state, which had advertised itself as an independent and viable entity. This can be seen in Kwantung Army estimates of some 210,000 anti-Japanese combatants in all of Manchuria in September, 1932. This was after the main

military effort had been mounted against Ma Chen-shan and his immediate force shattered by July. In fact, it is estimated that anti-Japanese forces actually increased during the first two years after the Manchurian Incident.²⁷⁴

The major insurgents were as follows: Ma Chan-shan's forces, operating in the Ch'i K'o and Hsun Hai railway zones; General Ting Yüeh's army in the eastern and central areas of the Chinese Eastern Railway zone; the so-called Anti-Kirin Army in roughly the same area; and General Li Tu's Northeast Defense Army in the lower reaches of the Sungari River. Against these, the Kwantung Army command finally marshalled the 2nd and 10th Infantry Divisions and the 14th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade brought especially from Japan. These forces were apparently unfamiliar with conditions in North Manchuria. Moreover, it was known that their opponents were well-leavened with Chinese Communist operatives, who had been exerting themselves to agitate and generally to involve the local civilian population in the insurgency.

With this in mind, the Kwantung Army General Staff sent an urgent request on May 2nd to the Kyōwatō to provide accompanying "people's pacification" (minshū no senbu)

274. Manchukuo, Gunseibu, Gunji Chōsabu, Manshū Kyōsanhi no kenkyū (1937), pp. 18-19; Chong-sik Lee, Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1967), pp. 6-7; David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1971), pp. 522-24.

teams. Since the opportunity to practice what they were preaching as well as build up the party organization was manifest, the Kyōwatō, in the spirit of the MSR, responded enthusiastically. They formed 16 teams with 72 mixed Japanese, Chinese, and Manchu personnel. With the support of an estimated monthly sum of about one million yen from the army, they quickly organized a short training course, prepared a general guidance plan for operations, planned their tactics, and prepared a mountain of propaganda materials. On May 16th they left Mukden for Harbin.²⁷⁵

Coordinating headquarters was established at Chichihar for the western operational district, headed by Yamaguchi, and at Harbin for the eastern area, headed by Ohane Tokio. From reports we gain a quantitative view of the propaganda work in Yamaguchi's area. One million posters of 40 different kinds were displayed, and 5 million handbills of 100 kinds, 750,000 pamphlets of 25 kinds, 70,000 calendars, and about 4 million Manchukuo flags were distributed. About 6,000 lecture or speech meetings were held, radio broadcasts were made twice a week, movies were shown 46 times, dance and storytelling sessions were held throughout the area on innumerable occasions, food, medicine, and medical treatment was provided for some 30,000 people in eleven areas, and Japanese language

275. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), pp. 79-80; (Sōron), p. 259.

schools involving about 3,000 people were established in 30 places.²⁷⁶

Since the teams were obliged to deal closely with individual personalities in the civilian population, because they faced a wide variety of situations, and since they had to float through a virtual miasma of longstanding tensions, interests, and prejudices, they were necessarily flexible in method, notwithstanding formulated guidelines. In fact, it was apparent that many became highly individualistic in their improvisation. The vast physical area involved meant that Japanese-Manchukuoan armed forces confined themselves fairly strictly to combat roles. The nature of the pacification mission, moreover, often militated against too close a dependence on the troops. Thus, the teams, each with about 4 or 5 members, were frequently very much on their own.

Yamaguchi's instructions to the teams in his sector especially emphasized the overwhelming importance of political warfare as distinct from armed force. The 14th Division operating there had just participated in the Shanghai Incident and were clearly "excited." He feared that the Kyōwatō units would become infected with this aggressive spirit and act excessively. He comments to the reader on the "natural lack of subtlety" of all Japanese

276. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 260-61.

which had to be curbed and counterbalanced by correct ideological conviction--a theme he often reiterates in many different contexts. He also emphasized that establishing branches of the Kyōwatō was of utmost importance in that the party organization was to become the touchstone for the maintenance of "public peace" and the foundation for the kenkoku spirit.

The closest view of the workings, vicissitudes, and attitudes of the participants in this process comes from the reports of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th teams operating along the eastern line of the Tung-chi Railway, which Yamaguchi reproduces intact. First of all, the reports generally praise the essential discipline of the troops in the Japanese combat forces, which contrasted very well with what was appallingly bad discipline among their opponents. The guerrillas thus became a good foil for the Kyōwatō's appeal for law and order. The party conveyed the tacit promise of "protection" from Japanese troops who, even when they moved on, had left behind a kind of guarantee in the form of the Kyōwatō. The teams played their roles well by taking on all the trappings of local nodes of organization for vital services, able to give the necessary impression of permanence. Because they were so few in number, the teams relied implicitly on pre-existing chambers

277. Ibid., pp. 190-91.

of commerce and agricultural associations as the substance of the Kyōwatō branch chapters. These were self-supporting, without subsidy from the Kwantung Army, and thus relieved much of the financial burden of subsequent rapid party expansion. Other local notables who still remained behind, such as postal or communications officials, police, railway personnel, teachers, school principals, etc., were especially sought as the core of the branch chapters, presumably with the assumption that the populace would follow where the elite led. My impression from seeing meeting reports is that the local elite, in fact, often made up the sum total of many branch chapters.

The Kyōwatō teams utilized the branch chapters often to fill in the hiatus in regular administration where officials and functionaries had fled. The teams themselves mediated between the military and the villages, negotiating exemptions from punitive operations. Thus, they tried to associate themselves with the first semblance of at least symbolic "order." Yamaguchi states that there was popular support for the presence of the Kyōwatō because of the implication of protection. Kyōwatō (and later Kyōwakai) badges were much sought after, since the bearer was thought to be freer of police harrassment.

The problems confronted by the teams in dealing with an illiterate population led them to search for appropriate non-verbal propaganda "symbols" such as

graphics on posters and handbills and, of course, the display of the Manchukuoan flag. There was also increasing resort to lecture meetings, group singing, and "testimonials."

Another problem faced by the teams was the success of agitators among the guerrilla forces (often referred to generically as "Communists") in provoking the armed forces into reprisals, such as airborne bombing, with damage to the peasants and resultant hatred of Japanese. The frustration of Kyōwatō operatives on the scene, faced with maintaining a delicate balance in public attitudes, was echoed by Ishiwara, Itagaki, and Honjō, who often decried the lack of "ideological awareness" on the part of army field officers. The Hsinking government also was shown to be only partially responsive to local needs. For example, they provided relief money but never seemed to utilize it effectively and had no way of guarding against local dishonesty.

Once on the scene, a program known as "separation of bandits and people" was instituted by which every effort would be made to identify the intransigent enemy (mainly the Communists) and direct the military against them alone, exempting the people and encouraging those on the anti-Japanese side who were wavering to lay down their arms. The chambers of commerce and agricultural associations became vital in this endeavor, giving accurate information,

tabulating the "safe population," bribing and buying the rifles of hungry guerrillas, and helping to lay traps.²⁷⁸

The pacification teams were not unscathed in their work. Four were killed, 10 wounded, 6 suffered mistreatment as prisoners, and many others had hair-raising narrow escapes. Yamaguchi holds these operations and later ones by the Kyōwakai to be examples of the successful use of dedicated, ideologically-motivated men. He asserts that the Kwantung Army and Manchukuo government had missed opportunities in North Manchuria for avoiding fighting altogether by failing to profit from the possible submission of Li Tu and Ting Yüeh earlier and, by rash recourse to armed force, having actually driven Ma Chan-shan into rebellion. A prompt settlement with the Fentigien Army generals through diplomacy, to be followed by prompt abolition of extraterritorial rights in Manchuria, might have avoided the residue of rancor left by the fighting and might have offset Communist propaganda while strengthening their own.²⁷⁹

Yamaguchi attributes these errors to the "superiority complex" of the Kwantung Army staff and Manchukuo officials and contrasts what he calls their obsession with "rights and interests" to the "selfless volunteers" of

278. Ibid., pp. 192-204, 219-24, 227-29, 236-42, 429-30.

279. Ibid., pp. 218, 409.

Kyōwatō who reaped no reward. Yamaguchi reports a conversation with a member of the Kwantung Army staff who was in charge of appointment and removal of government officials (a prerogative that they exercised as a kind of veto power especially in the initial period). The man said, "People aspiring to government service, regardless of the ranking of the post, inquire about the pay and official rank. There are very few who are concerned about the function and duty of the post. Compared to the early days (i.e., before the Incident), the quality of the people has changed." Yamaguchi replied, "We are revolutionary workers who are risking our lives for principle. Those government officials whom you call from Japan are professionals. It is a matter of course for them to require a reasonable salary and position. It does not mean you do not care for a shoulder strap and decorations." On another occasion, Itagaki told him, "Yamaguchi-san, there are two kinds of people in Japan. One kind are those who do not care whether they gain or lose--in a sense, stupid people who work as zealots. The other is a wiser kind who are more interested in seizing power or making money. You and I belong to the former type; not a very wise sort, I think."²⁸⁰

The possibility of negotiating a way out of an insurgency of Fengtien Army remnants is speculation on

280. Ibid., pp. 258-59, 412.

Yamaguchi's part and he offers no substantiation for it. That he attacks the army and officialdom for having failed to negotiate out of a concern for "rights and interests" is revealing of his own bias against military force and bureaucratic methods, which he places in contradistinction to "ideological" methods. This division between the military-bureaucratic interest and the ideological interest did not, however, exist only in Yamaguchi's mind. It becomes a major theme in the history of the minzoku kyōwa movement, as the latter part of this study will indicate.

The initial position of the Kyōwatō was that they could act as a single party, bringing other party opponents, especially Kuomintang, into an association. It is clear that the intentions of the Kyōwatō thinkers were to create a dictatorship of a single party, either on the fascist or Marxist model. However, opposition to the Kyōwatō which stressed suspicion of the "party" aspect used the term "party" in its parliamentary form. In short, the term smacked too much of parties in Japan, which were viewed by the military and political right wing as corrupt, self-serving, and even anachronistic. Hence, although the Kyōwatō conformed to most of the military right wing positions on Manchuria, it seemed to draw opposition because it had aspirations to political power as a party rather than assuming one of the safer "transcendental" positions which would have obliged them to have acted mostly as a

propaganda or "educative" organ for the government. It was not so much its political ideas that came under fire as its existence as a potentially autonomous organization.

The Kyōwakai Replaces the Kyōwatō

In early March, 1932, there was a staff conference with General Honjō, Colonels Itagaki and Ishiwara, and Captain Katakura Tadashi on the future conception of Manchuria after the independent state was established. They considered, first, a structure in which the single political party was separated from government authority and, next, a structure in which the party was official. It was felt that either of these situations was possible. In the former, the Administrative Assistance Bureau of the State Council (Kokumuin Shiseikyoku) would be phased out and effectively replaced by the Kyōwatō. By June, however, the opposition to this alternative had gathered. Pu Yi himself hated the notion of a party for its associations with the Kuomintang which had deposed the Ch'ing monarchy. He was backed by the Ch'ing restoration movement in Manchuria which had constituted itself into a secret society, the Man Meng Tung Chih Hsueh Chin Hui.

The main opposition came from the Administrative Assistance Bureau, headed by Komai Tokuzō. Originally intended as a planning body for the new Manchukuo central administration, which the Daiyūhōkai allies of the MSR

had entered in March, it saw itself as the legitimate headquarters for "enhancement of the nation-building spirit." Komai and his influential subordinate, Kasagi Ryōmei of Daiyūhōkai, forcefully argued that the Kyōwatō was a wasteful "duplication of effort." Although the Administrative Assistance Bureau was ultimately dissolved, the opposition had made its point. Honjō called for making the Kyōwatō into a purely educational body divested entirely of administrative functions.

The time had come to reach a compromise that would save the organization from its critics. Ishiwara in mid-June commenced the negotiations which aimed at disarming some of their fears by changing the organization's name from Kyōwatō to Kyōwakai (Harmony Association, Hsüeh Ho Hui in Chinese) and proposed that Pu Yi, as head of state, be made nominal head of the Kyōwakai. A great deal of side negotiation went on between Yamaguchi and Wada Tsuyoshi, the proponents of the Kyōwatō, and Nakano Sumiyasu and Amakasu Tadahiko, who had been erstwhile critics of the personalities and the ideology of the Kyōwatō, although they too favored some kind of national organization similar in structure. One of the agreements made was for all Manchukuo officials below the rank of State Council to join the Kyōwakai. This was, in fact, the first major departure away from a structure which had emphasized ideological commitment in its recruitment and toward a

structure emphasizing organizational commitment or pure formalism. We shall examine this process in the next chapter.

Although there was still opposition to the Kyōwakai from Hsinking, where the opinion was widespread that the Kyōwakai and Kwantung Army activists were cooperating to subvert the Japanese government, on July 18th a committee met to formulate the structure and personnel list. It was headed by staff officer Katakura Tadashi and contained Itagaki Seishirō, Chang Yen-ching, and Hsieh Chieh-shih from the Manchukuo government, and Yü Ching-Yuan, Yüan Chen-to, Ozawa Kaisaku, Wada Tsuyoshi, Koyama Sadatomo, and Yamaguchi from the now-dissolved Kyōwatō. Pu Yi, per agreement, was made president. Honjō, as Commander of Kwantung Army, became a nominal "advisor," and Kwantung Army Chief of Staff Hashimoto Kingorō, along with 33 others, was made a nominal member of the Board of Directors (rijikai). Chang Yen-ching (of the Hsinking government) headed the Board. Men like Ishiwara who had been friendly to the Kyōwatō from the beginning were not put on the Board. Neither were any of the original activist members--Yü Chin-yuan, Yüan Chen-to, Yamaguchi, Ozawa, and others, although they did hold less powerful positions. Below the Board of Directors was the Central Administrative Bureau (Chūo Jimukyoku) with Hsieh Chieh-shih of the central government as head and Nakano Sumiyasu, a recent critic,

vice-head. The Bureau, which ran the Association, had four divisions--administration, organization, propaganda, and an inspectorate (auditing) whose heads were Chinese and vice-heads Japanese. Below these were regional business offices and, then, the branch chapters which subsumed those of the Kyōwatō.²⁸¹

On July 19th Yamaguchi received a secret telegram from Tokyo from a former MSR member, Hirajima Shigeo, informing him of various continuing anti-Kyōwakai currents. Yamaguchi went to Tokyo to investigate these and learned from Hirajima and from Kobiyama Arinobu that there was to be a regular personnel shift in the Kwantung Army which would bring elements hostile to the Kyōwakai into the staff. Assistant War Minister Koiso Kuniaki, who was to become Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, had already openly advocated disbanding it entirely. Secondly, there was a consensus in the Army Ministry that the Kyōwakai be disbanded because it was thought to be a "leftwing youth group which intended to bring about a renovation in Japan" and which was connected with the May 15th Incident, involving Okawa Shūmei and Kita Ikki and resulting in the assassination of Premier Inukai. Yamaguchi approached

281. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), pp. 261-62, (Kakuron), pp. 77-78; Yamaguchi, Manshūkenkoku no rekishi, pp. 173, 178-84.

people in the Army Ministry to try to correct the mis-understanding but received little support.²⁸²

Yamaguchi also met with Koiso at this time and literally sweated for hours trying to convince him that the Kyōwakai was not like Japanese political parties, that it was a vital tool in winning over through ideology those persons who would otherwise have to be conquered by force, and that it was necessary in offsetting Communism and San Min Chu I-ism. Koiso refused to accept any of the arguments, saying:

The suffering in Japanese politics today is from the abuse of party politics. It is a shame that this is making a failure of Japan. However, it is not possible to eliminate parties in Japan at present. Manchuria, on the other hand, is a country we will be building from the ground up. I do not understand why we have to create political party evils there.²⁸³

Yamaguchi also met with Nagata Tetsuzan, who argued that the military must not be "hampered" by considerations of ideological warfare in pacification since ideology tended to over-complicate their job.²⁸⁴

Faced with such vigorous opposition, Yamaguchi naturally felt a strong sense of foreboding when the

282. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 190-99.

283. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 404-405.

284. Ibid., pp. 407-408.

Kyōwakai was formally inaugurated on July 25th. Pu Yi's admonition speech on the occasion reiterated the warning against party activity. Yamaguchi noted that the festivities seemed to be for many high-ranking officials, since most of the "fighters" who had built up the minzoku kyōwa movement were still at the pacification front. Some of the spirit was gone and, "as it was impossible for an artificial flower to bear fruit, so it is impossible to win the hearts of the people by empty formality."²⁸⁵

The formal ideological goals proclaimed by the Kyōwakai at the inaugural ceremony were to eliminate mutual suspicion of the races and to suppress capitalism, Communism, and San Min Chu I-ism alike. They would disseminate kenkoku seishin (the nationbuilding spirit) under the principles of wang tao (the "kingly way") by way of eradicating the last of warlord despotism. Their announced economic policy was to promote agriculture and institute industrial reform in order to ensure an adequate popular livelihood, all while eschewing both capitalism and Communism.²⁸⁶ The constitutional provisions were similar to those of the Kyōwatō. Funding for the central office was intended to come from government subsidy, private

285. Ibid., pp. 416-17.

286. Ryūshi Suzuki, "Nihon teikoku shūgi to Manshū (Chūgoku Tōhoku): 'Manshūkoku' no seiritsu oyobi sono tōchi ni tsuite," Part 1, Tokushima Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kiyō I (1966), pp. 60-61.

business profit, and "miscellaneous income." The government initial grant was 200,000 yen.²⁸⁷

The Kyōwakai Pacification Effort

Before any effort toward economic reform could commence (and, indeed, it really never did commence for Kyōwakai), the ongoing matter of pacification had to be taken care of. We shall deal, respectively, with three major geographic areas of Kyōwakai pacification action-- Chientao and Tungpiantao in Southeastern Manchuria on the Korean border, continuing pacification in North Manchuria, especially flood relief operations beginning in November, and in Jehol in the southwest.

While the Ma Chan-shan revolt was going on, the Kwantung Army was obliged to concentrate the bulk of its forces, as well as those sent as reinforcements from Japan, in the North. Because the home government vacillated over a possible localizing of the Manchurian fighting, there was, for the time being, little military strength to spare. There was a sharp rise in insurgent activity particularly in the area of Chientao Hsien on the upper Yalu-Tumen River border and Tungpiantao on the lower Yalu. Therefore, at the same time Kyōwatō had been asked to furnish pacification auxiliaries for North Manchuria in May, they had been

287. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Sōron), pp. 262-63.

requested to try to do something similar in this border area. The MSR had established an early presence in Antung city on the lower Yalu thanks to the exertions of Nagae Ryōyi, and so the Kyōwatō, feeling they had some entrée to the region, sent 20 operatives.²⁸⁸

Even more than North Manchuria, the Southeast was considered an acid test for this kind of pacification program. Chang Hsüeh-liang, based in Tientsin, had ready access across the Pohai Gulf and was able to send arms and money on British merchant ships or smuggle them over the Korean-Manchurian border. This was easy because, in the confusion of the Incident, the regular river patrols had been scattered and the Antung customs house was still, from unequal treaty days, under the actual control of the British. Chang was therefore able to co-opt local officials and peace preservation forces into a viable resistance movement known as the National Salvation Volunteer Corps. The ethnic complexity of the region intensified the problem. There were 77,000 Koreans out of a total population of 130,000 in Chientao. Antung alone had over 16,000 Koreans who regularly commuted across the river. In addition, there were many Moslem Turkic people

288. *Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron)*, p. 81; Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 262-63.

in the hinterland. Finally, it was a region of mountains and forests that made guerrilla warfare easier.²⁸⁹

The Kyōwatō had pressed the establishment of branch chapters as well as the gathering of intelligence on the mounting anti-Japanese movement. The shift from party to association had scarcely affected these front-line organizers. Masuda Keizō, a former police inspector with the Korean Government General who was personally acquainted with Korean police and gendarmerie on the Yalu, led a field reconnaissance team consisting of selected Chinese, Manchus, and Koreans who smuggled themselves in and out of insurgent districts. Meanwhile, Yamaguchi established a liaison with the Japanese naval staff stationed in Manchuria who apparently had been languishing with little cooperation from the Kwantung Army. At Yamaguchi's urging and with Ishiwara expediting matters, the navy was given machine guns and supplies from the army to establish water patrols in Pohai Gulf and in the Yalu. British merchant vessels were stopped and searched and, under this intimidation, supplies to the insurgents slackened considerably.²⁹⁰

In October, 1932, the Japanese army based in Korea finally opened a military offensive in Southeast Manchuria intended to do the same thing the Kwantung Army had done in

289. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 263-66.

290. Ibid., pp. 277-78, 282-86.

the North. Kyōwakai pacification teams accompanied them for the same purposes. Within two months, by the end of November, the National Salvation Corps was destroyed but, in its stead, Chinese and Korean Communist Party and Korean Independence Party cadre began to assume more and more of the organization of the struggle. As the regular army forces were withdrawn, the principal burden of continued pacification fell onto the established branch chapters and special Kyōwakai Hsien Advisory Offices.²⁹¹

The Chinese Communist Party provincial committee for Manchuria had been formed in the Chientao area originally in August, 1932. By the beginning of 1933, the CCP Central Committee had ordered this committee to promote a "single anti-imperialist line" against the Japanese, calling for a struggle against the "Japanese imperialists and their running dogs," and, already, raids had begun to intensify. The Chinese Communists, led by Yang Ching-yü, coupled their actions with the Soviet-backed Korean Communist Party led by Kim Il-sung. In addition, the Southeast had become the base of the Korean Independence Party, organized in 1919 and led by Pak Chang Hae, many of whose members had fled Korea as political offenders. Since both Communist and Independence Parties competed for funds among Koreans living in the area, they were often pitted

291. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 81.

against one another. Pak Chang Hae was later to become a major supporter of the Kyōwakai, but, in the 1932-33 period, he operated against the Japanese.²⁹²

Kyōwakai operations formed only one part of the overall pacification effort by the government, which involved checking on the population, strengthening self-defense units, building communications for the police, and confiscating arms. Railway guard units using Japanese reservists and Koreans were also formed. The Kyōwakai's role was particularly notable since their structure was designed to outlast the insurgency, putting a continuing presence in the area that was intended to both reform and "nationalize" the region by enlisting mass support. Their efforts went beyond merely undercutting guerrilla activity.

Apart from the organization of branch chapters, the Kyōwakai engaged in the ongoing process of influencing local administration. Local administrators (village chiefs and heads of pao, chia, and self-defense corps) were usually selected from among landlords and wealthy farmers on the basis of traditional influence rather than capability. Since it was not expected that they could form a "progressive" group and put through reforms, the Kyōwakai was expected to recruit, train, and indoctrinate a young

292. Ibid.; Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 267-68; Suzuki, part 1, p. 59; Manchukuo, Gunseibu, Gunji Chōsabu, pp. 25-26.

intelligentsia to assist regular administrators. These young intellectuals were intended to accomplish necessary reforms.

This pattern of pacification was designed for all of Manchuria. Lack of dependable personnel, as well as corruption, was a serious difficulty in trying to create a viable government structure to withstand insurgency. Japanese officials assigned to local areas were too few to go around and those who were already there occupied a mandarin-like position--unable to speak the language and often isolated because of local suspicions. Although the success of the Manchukuo regime in winning positive support is difficult to assess and spotty at best, there is no question that the conception, if not actual execution, of the Kyōwakai program of obtaining a body of young, "progressively-trained," budding local officials would have enhanced kenkoku efforts. Certainly their counterinsurgency work, more easily judged, was effective. By inducing guerrillas to surrender, collecting intelligence, infiltrating CCP and KCP camps, and even killing guerrillas, they reduced insurgents in Chientao to impotence by the end of 1935. Infiltrating Communist groups was especially effective since it led Communists to believe that many among them were double agents. Purges and witch hunts often followed. A large number of Korean Communist

officers surrendered in 1934 rather than face possible torture or execution by their own group.²⁹³

The Kyōwakai utilized the complex ethnic composition of the border region rather than being hampered by it. Chang Hsüeh-liang had found it impossible to effectively co-opt Koreans into his insurgency plans and even the Communists found that differences between Chinese and Koreans hampered their efforts. The Kyōwakai cooperated with the Kwantung Army to set up an all-Korean organization modelled on the Kyōwakai called Hsueh Chu Hui (Harmony and Cooperation Society) in Chientao. Its objectives were precisely the same as the Kyōwakai's.²⁹⁴ Yamaguchi tells of success in utilizing a local newspaper as an entree to the Moslem tribes in the area. Called the Shōko Nippo (Business and Industry Daily), it was owned by a Japanese friend and had gone defunct during the Manchurian Incident. It had been published in Chinese but its staff contained many young Moslems. Yamaguchi proposed to resuscitate it, printing it in the Turkic language of these people, and to use the newspaper to create both an intelligence network and a series of Kyōwakai chapters.²⁹⁵

293. Lee, pp. 19-22.

294. Ibid., pp. 14-19.

295. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 286-88.

In North Manchuria, as in the Tungpientao-Chientao region, procedures had continued unchanged under the Kyōwakai. Then in August, 1932, unprecedented rain caused the Amur and Sungari Rivers to flood just at harvest time. Lowland Kaoliang, wheat, and millet were almost completely lost. Since the area was notably flat, the water did not drain off. Even though there had been some soybean harvest on higher ground, transportation and market distribution were hampered. Increasingly, the work of pacification turned to relief organization, since there was a danger of food riots, banditry, and an opening for the inevitable agitation by Communists amid dangers of starvation with cold weather coming fast. The impact was, of course, intensified by the devastation of society and the economy wrought by the recent fighting.

In November the Kyōwakai Central Office decided to act more or less independently of the government to initiate a relief program which would operate through Kyōwakai personnel, branch chapters, and the chambers of commerce and agricultural associations. Yamaguchi flew to Chichihar in the midst of a blinding blizzard and arrived only after having crash landed along the way in order to ask directions while dodging the pot shots of local bandits. In approaching the provincial governor and heads of the chamber of commerce and agricultural association, he made it apparent that the Kyōwakai would handle all the

necessary liaison with the government and military. The basic plan he implemented called for a pooling of existing stocks of North Manchurian soy beans (not normally or directly edible) for cooperative sale and conversion into cash. At the same time, a joint purchase of millet from Taonan was to be arranged and distributed under marketing conditions carefully set beforehand. Japanese troops were to be made available for guard duty in order to revive deserted market places. Their cost was to be borne by contributions from each district. Railroad transportation was to be discounted by fifty per cent for soybeans going out and was made free for millet, salt, and other relief goods coming in. Finally, a 2 million yen loan was arranged internally through banks.²⁹⁶

It must be observed that, apart from rail freight costs, this was an operation involving organization rather than charity. It relied largely, for actual implementation, on local people, with the Kyōwakai acting principally as contact and expeditor. Yamaguchi expresses his admiration for the strength of Chinese self-sufficiency and is quick to belabor the obvious lesson in the practical workings of minzoku kyōwa. He notes, somewhat smugly, that the Kyōwakai's prestige soared in the region. By contrast, the government's separate relief effort was

296. Ibid., pp. 245-46, 460-62, 464-67, 475-79, 483-98.

nowhere near as successful, amounting to only 350,000 yen of which almost 100,000 was consumed in overhead expenses.²⁹⁷ Imperialism under the terms of minzoku kyōwa would, if nothing else, presumably have been more cheaply bought.

The third area of Japanese pacification effort was Jehol Province. Lying between Chinchou Province and Inner Mongolia (Chahar) just north of the Great Wall, Jehol was fast becoming an area of tense political maneuvering, with Chahar under Nationalist control, the southern area of Chinchou harboring remnants of Chang Hsüeh-liang's forces, and unaffiliated bands of Mongol troops to the north. The major politico-military force in Jehol was the Communist-led Eighth Route Army, later to be commanded by Chu Teh and Peng Teh-hui. The provincial military governor of Jehol was Tang Yü-lin, a military subordinate of Chang Hsüeh-liang who had been appointed by the Nationalist government. However, he had become disaffected from Chang and the Nationalists and had entered into secret parlays with the Kwantung Army to join Manchukuo. Nevertheless, his freedom of action was limited by the proximity of these various armed forces. As long as the Kwantung Army was occupied with insurgencies in northern and southeastern Manchuria,

297. Ibid., pp. 501-15.

he could not risk disrupting the delicate balance of forces by open rapprochement with Manchukuo.

In February, 1933, the Kwantung Army finally decided on a campaign into Jehol and requested the Kyōwakai to furnish pacification teams. The Kyōwakai leadership had serious misgivings about the transfer of their previous pacification methods into Jehol. Hitherto, their task had been one of offsetting anti-Japanese feeling with propaganda, organization of cells of loyal adherents, and gestures toward stability and efficient administration such as the North Manchurian flood relief. However, the leadership correctly foresaw that in Jehol the battleground would not be so much in the political as in the economic realm.

Jehol had been the foremost opium-producing region of China and control of opium production and trade would be a rich source of funds of anyone who dominated the region. In Manchuria one of the most credible propaganda talking points by the Kyōwakai had been a return to stability and prosperity. Since Jehol was already stable and, if not prosperous, at least hard at work producing its only profitable crop. Hence, this point was lost. It would be an out and out competition for the economic control of production and trade and the major competitors would be the Communists. The CCP, which was estimated to be further advanced than the Kyōwakai in the subtleties of ideological warfare, was expected to be a dangerous opponent. Military

force in this situation would be of little help in the long run in such a struggle.

Although the Manchukuo government had tried to gain control over the opium crop, according to Yamaguchi, they had bungled the job. The government offered a set price ranging from 2 to 5 yuan per ryo (37.5 grams) depending on quality. The government officers on the spot, in practice, forced the farmer to accept the lowest price regardless of quality. The CCP had taken advantage of this by outbidding the government price and taking over the source, selling it in Tientsin for 37 yuan per ryo, thus winning firm support among the farmers and a tidy income for themselves. The government had also bungled the rationing of daily necessities, with the result that the CCP, obtaining stocks of cotton, sugar, rubber-soled tabi, etc. in Tientsin, used this black market as an inducement to building a Red District. Because of poor currency management, the Manchukuo currency was selling for only 30-50% face value in Tientsin. The Communists and others were able to obtain this currency and exchange it for full value in opium and other special products in Jehol.²⁹⁸

The Kyōwakai leadership emphasized that moving in with military force to reconstruct a "friendly" administration (Tang Yü-lin) was irrelevant to ideological warfare.

298. Ibid., pp. 524-27.

The only way to keep the Communists from coming back after the military inevitably left would be to fully reform and streamline the Jehol political and economic structure. They asked that the Kwantung Army consider creating a special administrative district in Jehol in which the legal, monetary, and economic system could be made entirely flexible in pursuing measures to offset the Communists. It may be speculated that, since the leaders actually in charge of these kinds of operations were the same ones who had dealt with the Communists in North Manchuria and in the Southeast, they were applying the hard lessons they had learned. It is also likely that they were anxious for the wider prerogatives that would likely fall to their organization in a pacification freed of outside interference.

In any case, the army opted for a traditional operation. Owing to the stoic qualities of the Ninth Division's infantry, in harsh weather and terrain conditions, the initial sweep was successful, driving the Communists, for the time being, into Chahar. Nakano Torazō, heading five teams of four men each, took charge of pacification. They faced repeated re-infiltration of the Communists, who were shielded by the villagers. Yamaguchi states clearly that Jehol was never really pacified. The Communist Eighth Route Army operated like fish in water, in contrast both to the Japanese troops, who, though well behaved, were aloof and never gained

peasant trust, and to the Manchukuo forces, who often replaced them and behaved badly. The government, he writes, never understood ideological or economic warfare any more than did the U. S. in Vietnam three decades later.²⁹⁹

The role played by both the Kyōwatō and Kyōwakai in pacification was not a massive one if measured solely by the number of personnel actually involved or geographical areas they operated in. This is not to say it was unimportant. The three areas indicated were ones of comparatively intense insurgent activity--"trouble" areas. Moreover, pacification, counter-insurgency, and ideological warfare are, by nature, "little wars," difficult to assess by the same means used with conventional warfare. We must not imply, therefore, that the concepts or approach they introduced were not singular and potentially fruitful. That they were called upon specifically indicates that there were at least some in the military who thought so. Also, we have some indication that, at least through 1935, pacification in general in Manchuria achieved some degree of success.

Pacification was, in fact, given a high priority in Manchukuo in the early years. The percentage of the total government budget devoted to its various aspects

299. Ibid., pp. 522-24; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), pp. 81-82.

amounted to 43% in the four months from March through June, 1932, 29% in 1933, 32% in 1934, and 27.5% in 1935 (averaging about 30% per year). This did not include indirect support and overall police budget allotments. It represented the largest single budget concern of the Manchukuo regime.³⁰⁰

This budgetary emphasis brought some quantitative success. Chong-Sik Lee uses the following figures: as of September, 1932, the anti-Japanese forces in Manchuria were estimated by the Kwantung Army at 210,000. Between March, 1932, and the end of 1933 the Japanese reported they had "engaged in battle a total of 336,500 enemy insurgent troops." Near the end of these operations, the strength of the anti-Japanese forces was estimated at only 70,000. He says this is due to vigorous prosecution by the Inukai cabinet and political divisions within the Nationalist camp.³⁰¹

Beginning in late 1934, counter-insurgency moved out of the realm of limited ideological warfare coupled with largescale armed attacks and settled into a relentless administrative affair replete with collective hamlets in trouble areas, "purification" of villages by residence registration, checks and searches of residents and travelers, confiscation of unauthorized weapons,

300. Suzuki, part 1, pp. 59-60.

301. Lee, pp. 7-8; Manchukuo, Gunseibu, Gunji Chōsabu, pp. 18-19.

organization of pao-chia and self-defense corps--in sum the familiar population control methods.³⁰²

In the 1932-35 period, the Japanese manifested certain advantages which contributed to the degree of success they did attain. In the plains areas of Manchuria there were no guerrilla sanctuaries. The winters were long and harsh everywhere. Unlike the situation in China after 1937, the Japanese seemed to be able to realistically appraise the problems they faced and possessed good information. Their determination to fight to the end, derived from their more limited and clearer objectives in Manchuria, affected guerrilla morale and encouraged collaboration from the first. Finally, they were able to neutralize peasant xenophobia by providing fairly orderly government, at least by comparison to preceding experience.³⁰³ All in all, they were able, in a remarkably brief period, to induce a widespread impression of permanent "presence," not so much of the Japanese themselves but of structures which, while owing their inception to Japanese, contained non-Japanese besides. To this end, the Kyōwakai had played an important part.

Although counter-insurgency was successful insofar as it neutralized the masses and produced an aura of

302. Lee, pp. v-vi.

303. Ibid., pp. viii-ix, 22-24.

effective administration, many of the measures used by the army and government inevitably showed their limits. The guerrillas who remained after earlier successes were tougher and more battle-wise. Reduced numbers did not require as much of a logistics base and they were more flexible. Gradually they lodged themselves in a number of inaccessible areas from which, under increased Communist organization, they proved impossible to dislodge. The ongoing government programs, static and defensive, proved unsatisfactory. The self-defense corps increasingly were composed of surrendered bandits, who proved untrustworthy and whom the government was reluctant to arm. The collective hamlet program, as might be expected, caused such resentment that cooperation from the population grew more and more difficult to obtain. While the government announced programs in 1936 such as "reconstruction of villages," "animation of public spirit," and "cultivation of waste lands," these were carried out less for the peoples' sake than for security. By 1940, destitution and even starvation in rural areas suggested that the regime was doing little for the farmers. In sum, after 1935, although the guerrilla movement did not grow again in size until late in the Pacific War, the limits of administrative counter-insurgency had been reached.³⁰⁴

304. Ibid., pp. 9-12, 41-42, 53.

Other Activities of the Kyōwakai

Having made its debut in pacification and counter-insurgency--activities which associated them, more or less closely, with the government and military--and having, in the process, established a chain of branch chapters and an organizational structure, the Kyōwakai took it upon itself to press for wider recognition in the nation on its own. As a preliminary, the organization prepared and issued "The Main Principles and Outline of the Manchukuo Kyōwakai" ("Manshūkoku Kyōwakai kai yōkō") in August, 1933, combined with "The Concept of the Founding of the Manchukuo Kyōwakai" ("Manshūkoku Kyōwakai sōritsu no rinen"), which comprised a kind of *raison d'être* and basic handbook.

Among the salient points worth summarizing is the emphasis on economic development to solve political division, an echo of "cultural dominion." "There are many ways to found a state; however, economic rehabilitation has to be its prime object. If we can be successful in developing industry, enriching the national economy, and promoting the people's welfare, then various political affairs will take care of themselves and harmony between Japan and Manchukuo will result." The "Main Principles and Outline" asserted that members were the basic unit for Kyōwakai activities. They should instil the kenkoku spirit in their respective social and occupational environments by educating the people, especially the young, through

lectures, meetings, language courses, radio and records, movies, plays, pamphlets, popular literature, posters, leaflets, and mass activities such as sports. Targets of mass education efforts were San Min Chu I-ism, feudalistic ideas, communism, and something called the "self-indulgence of the people."

Owing to the exigencies of pacification and the necessary administrative tasks the Kyōwakai had to perform amidst chaos, there had been popular misunderstanding that it was intended to be some kind of "outside agency" having charge of intercession, liaison, and propaganda. Therefore, the "Concept of the Founding of Manchukuo Kyōwakai" re-asserted, albeit obliquely, the commitment to a single party idea:

Neither absolute monarchy nor absolute parliamentarianism would fit Manchukuo. We believe that the best policy would be to organize a reliable political body in Manchukuo and let the body function as a decision-making organ on the fundamental policies of Manchukuo by gaining popular support. We should clarify here that the Manchukuo Kyōwakai was founded for this purpose and to help the body make smooth progress. If this body succeeded in gaining popular support of the 30 million people of Manchukuo, then let the body be a decision-making organ of Manchukuo. If we guide the body properly and effectively, it would not take a long time. Ambitious Japanese, please join Manchukuo Kyōwakai voluntarily! Thus Manchukuo will become an independent nation with racial harmony in which a Japanese individual will take part without going through Japanese political control and should be a

model of racial harmony among East Asiatic races and, in its turn, be a guiding star in directing world culture.³⁰⁵

The "Concept of the Founding of Manchukuo Kyōwakai," according to Yamaguchi, was based closely on an essay by Ishiwara Kanji called "Private view on Manchuria-Mongolia Strategies" ("Manmō keiryaku ni kansuru shiken") written in August, 1932 (though erroneously dated by Yamaguchi August, 1933).³⁰⁶ The latter was apparently considered too controversial in view of the already-manifested opposition to the Kyōwatō, so the former was issued instead. Compare Ishiwara's statement with the one just quoted:

It is still undecided basically what type of political system should be adopted by the new state. Some are apt to build and practice righteous government through absolutism by Pu Yi, to whom Japan acts as advisor, however, it seems impossible to pursue this in the light of the trends of human history or of the present situation in Manchukuo.

It is beyond question that liberal politics based on parliamentary despotism (gikai sensei) would not be beneficial to Manchukuo, especially since a small number of Japanese would then have to play a central role in directing politics.

All in all, it will be the best policy to organize a reliable political body in Manchukuo and let it be a decision-making organ for Manchukuo by having popular support. It would be authoritarian government by a single party.

53. 305. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 542-

306. Ibid., p. 553.

The Manchukuo Kyōwakai has been organized for this purpose. For many reasons the Kyōwakai is understood for the present as an educational body. However, clarifying its original purpose, Kyōwakai members should make efforts for its smooth and stable progress, and, since the Kyōwakai has succeeded in gaining the popular support of the 30 million people of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army commander should transfer sovereign power to this Kyōwakai. Given the present situation in Manchukuo, we would not need such a long time if we work properly. Believing firmly that Japanese are the ones who should take a leading role in this society, I expect right-minded Japanese to participate in the Kyōwakai's task voluntarily.

Thus, without going through political rule by Japan, Manchukuo could be an independent nation where we can enjoy harmonious relations between Japan and Manchukuo through the proper guidance by Japanese [in Manchukuo]. At the same time, we expect Manchukuo to be not only a model of the amity between China and Japan, but also a guide to the cultural movement of the world.³⁰⁷

In short, the Kyōwakai had aspirations that went far beyond being pacification auxiliaries, much as that experience had served to establish confidence in themselves and in them by others. They had begun to approach their single ruling party goal on several levels and the variety of their activities showed it.

As already indicated, during the period of initial paramilitary pacification, Kyōwakai field operatives were often placed in quasi-administrative roles. From 1932 roughly through 1937, their activities went along those same lines of economic, social, and administrative

307. Tsunoda, pp. 107-109.

"normalization." For example, they cooperated closely in reopening the grammar schools that had closed during the fighting. Further, to promote "cultural unity" in the field of language, they opened, by 1934, 36 Japanese language schools enrolling almost five thousand students, mostly in urban areas. In the realm of transportation, they delved into promoting a local road network (hitherto neglected) and bus companies to serve villages. They helped organize rural savings and loan cooperatives.³⁰⁸

Flood relief in North Manchuria had led them to establish economic cooperatives for the distribution of relief goods. This was transmuted there and in other areas into village, farm, and other economic cooperatives for a wide range of purposes. In Fushun, cooperatives aimed at opening new rice paddies. In Chichihar, it was an Industrial Workers' Advancement Association. Village Advancement Associations guided a program to improve seed strains, distribute them, and develop farm-based cottage industries with the help of loans. Seventeen cooperative farms were established in the Chientao region to supply fodder for the cavalry. The Fushun regional business office aimed at co-opting Koreans more closely through a

308. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 82.

Korean farmers cooperative which based itself mostly among independent landholders.³⁰⁹

The Kyōwakai also sponsored conferences, research associations, and exhibits. In May, 1934, a Conference on Policies for Farming Villages was held in Hsinking for the public and bureaucracy to discuss the problem of rural poverty. In October, 1932, and again in October, 1933, there were exhibits held in Japan to acquaint Japanese businessmen with Manchurian products and markets. In June, 1933, there was a joint Japanese-Manchukuo conference to smooth out difficulties in Manchukuoan duty collection and entry procedures. In the following month, the Kyōwakai invited some thirteen hundred Manchurian businessmen to an industrial fair in Mukden to promote trade. From July through September, there was a Manchukuo tourism exposition, mostly aimed at Japanese. In addition, there was a permanent monthly meeting of the Economic Research Association sponsored by Kyōwakai. There was also an ongoing effort to facilitate advertisement in Japan of Manchurian products. Also in pursuit of closer Manchurian-Japanese relations, the Kyōwakai formed the Nichi-Man Young Men's Association at Hsinking in August, 1933, which began an exchange of correspondence and meetings between about six hundred youths in Manchuria and twelve hundred university

309. Ibid.

students and professors in Japan. The association was supposed to become the foundation for an internationally-oriented movement enunciating "Greater Asia" goals which would parallel and complement the Kyōwakai association movement.

In view of Kyōwakai's special role in "social education," the familiar propaganda media were exploited fully as before--lectures, movies, drama troupes, dancers, twice-weekly radio broadcasts, almanacs, and other published materials, including textbooks. There were also civil mediation centers where small claims and quarrels were mediated. The Kyōwakai also sponsored a Physical Training Week and sports days for many organizations.³¹⁰

In order to nurture a steady supply of cadre personnel, the Kyōwakai established a training institute at the southern campus of the old Tungpei University in Mukden in August, 1933. In the first class twenty Manchu-Chinese, thirteen Japanese, three Koreans, and two Mongols matriculated, having been selected by examination. Twelve more trainees were nominated by the Kwantung Army. Yamaguchi became the head of the institute, but occupied with his collateral duties as vice-head of the Kyōwakai central office, he left most of the work to Itō Rokurō. Itō, Nagao Morimasu, and Kaibo Tadao were to be the

310. Ibid., pp. 91-93.

fulltime instructors. Most of the instruction came from members of the military, government bureaucracy, from the general population, from "pioneers in the kenkoku movement," and from Kyōwakai central and regional members. A one-year intensive training course was offered in which the students lived communally and received tutorial instruction. Part of the training emphasized debate and extemporaneous speaking to foster self-reliance. The training tended not to be theoretical but relied for content largely on pacification experiences. On graduation in August, 1934, the graduates were placed in the central and regional business offices and in branch chapters as advisors.³¹¹ Yamaguchi says that the present-day Tō A Renmei Comrades Association, a survival of minzoku kyōwa advocates, centers largely on Itō and these graduates.³¹²

In February, 1932, Kyōwakai also made a contribution to the work of recovering customs autonomy for Manchukuo. In substance, this meant the transfer of jurisdiction of some nine customs houses from the control of the Inspector General of Maritime Customs in Shanghai--effectively a British zone of responsibility since the nineteenth century. Rights recovery had, of course, been

311. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

312. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 282.

a proximate issue prior to the Manchurian Incident. There had been some hesitation on the part of Chinese in Manchuria now to seize these, but the Kwantung Army pressed the matter, having decided that it would demonstrate its lack of fear of the West and would thus solidify popular support. The Kyōwakai contributed trained workers with customs experience, many of whom were transferred from the SMR Company for the purpose, to ease the transition by "guiding" the customs houses.³¹³

The shift in the types of activities performed by Kyōwakai members after around 1937 was not abrupt; many of the earlier programs continued. However, a definite change in character did occur in places where the Kyōwakai involved itself in matters of indoctrination and helped create organizations primarily for mass control or for such specific war-related purposes as production increases. By the time of the Pacific War, their organizational facilities for social control or influence--if not an actual degree of social control--approximated those in Japan. Calling the year 1937 a watershed, therefore, may tend to over-emphasize the role of the China Incident as a causal agent in accounting for the changing nature of Kyōwakai activities. However, there is no doubt that there was an awareness in Kyōwakai and in government circles that

313. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," p. 518.

the incursion into China would be a long, drawn-out affair, that the dangers of Western confrontations were increased, and that there had to be intensified efforts at mass mobilization and social and economic control in Manchuria to ride out future challenges. Activities pointed more toward building a "defense state" facing outward than toward the more inward-looking kenkoku.

The Kyōwakai thought of their overall purpose as the inculcation of general principles of public morality (including exertions in the national interest where called for) by injecting organized activities into daily life, on a daily basis, in as ubiquitous a way as possible. Creative or worthwhile activities, it was recognized, intrinsically bore a "message" of proper behavior; but, of course, the organization never lost a chance to reiterate it in propaganda. This process was termed by both the government and Kyōwakai "spiritual building" or "spiritual maneuvering" (seishin kōsaku) and the staggering range of activities attest to the fact that it was considered a vital matter. The government subsidy budget for Kyōwakai, reflecting this increase in activity, grew from about 700,000 yen per year in 1932 to almost ten million yen per year in the 1940s. The question might be asked whether the object of the activities was public "morality" (or control) or the concrete goods or services derived from the activity. The answer, of course, is both, but, as war exigencies

increased, the latter was emphasized more than in the pre-1937 period.³¹⁴

One of the obvious primary targets of such "spiritual building" was, of course, youth. In the years after the Manchurian Incident, the main emphasis had been simply on restoring regular educational facilities and, to a degree, influencing them to achieve conformity with what the authorities wanted. Thus, the inculcation of public morality was done in the schools. By 1936, however, the pao chia and agricultural associations connected with village development programs had youth training programs which had grown out of the necessity of providing trained youth for the self-defense units.

In January, 1937, the Kyōwakai set up the first comprehensive centrally-directed youth training program with forty-eight training centers and about six thousand participants. This was the Young Men and Boys Corps (Seishōnen-dan). They were a relatively select group, aged sixteen to nineteen. The main objectives laid out by the Kyōwakai were to (1) instill non-discriminatory habits by bringing together diverse races; (2) instill Manchukuoan nationalism in Han Chinese to offset Chinese nationalism; (3) bring about a unity of ideology to offset anti-Japanese attitudes; (4) overcome or by-pass lack of

314. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), pp. 113, 118.

school facilities, low school attendance (still less than thirty per cent even after 1933), and illiteracy; and (5) maintain public order. The training consisted of industrial arts, agriculture, or animal husbandry (depending on the area), Manchukuo laws, military drill, hygiene, and Japanese language. Sessions were held two or three times a year so as not to keep trainees away from farms or homes where they might be needed. Returnees were encouraged to establish clubs to reinforce and further diffuse training.³¹⁵

By the 1940s the Young Men and Boys Corps comprised some 6800 organized units, 183 training centers, and over 1.3 million members. Training after 1941 differed between urban and rural areas and also according to race and social class. We shall see later how the Kyōwakai itself began to separate into homogeneous units. Their training, less elitist and less rigidly prescribed, was also less ideological, with greater emphasis on a labor increase and on technological skills. As national service began to take priority over the training objectives, the Young Men and Boys Corps fostered various labor organizations. Earliest was the Kyōwa Volunteer Service Corps, inaugurated in July, 1938, which enrolled those 20-35 (later extended to 40) years old and which by 1942 had 280,000 members with one

315. Ibid., pp. 108-109, 114-15, 117.

corps per hsien. They performed guard duty, construction work, emergency rail and road repair, and, in the Pacific War period, took on courier and motor transport duties, fire brigade duties, and even paramilitary anti-aircraft defense. High school and college students were enlisted in the Student Patriotic Labor Service Corps to be used during vacations.³¹⁶

In 1942 Handa Toshiharu, a provincial Kyōwakai official, travelled to Germany and was impressed by their mass mobilization organs--the Hitler Jugend and Arbeitsdienst. He returned to introduce the notion of an equitable labor conscription into his province as an improvement over the old volunteer-community spirit incentive. In October, 1942, a National Patriotic Labor Service law went into effect in emulation of the German experience. Rejects from military conscription served two years. For this, the previous volunteer groups, especially Kyōwa Volunteer Service Corps, were used as trained cadre.³¹⁷

Kyōwakai mass mobilization efforts against communism were directed at particularly troublesome geographical areas rather than against the abstract

316. Ibid., pp. 130-33, 138-40; Stauffer, pp. 344-45, 374.

317. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 148.

doctrines of communism in general. Thus, they were similar to the old counterinsurgency campaigns, but relied less on individual enterprise than before. In July, 1937, they organized an Anti-Communist Party and in November, 1939, a Kyōwa Youth Action Corps in T'unghua Province in Northeast Manchuria, where Russian influence was strong. In 1938 they formed a research group concentrating on analyzing and countering tactics of the Russian Communist Party. Despite the large scale fighting in 1938 around Changkufeng, the Kyōwa Youth Action Corps, using tactics learned from the Chinese Communists, were fairly successful by 1942. Thereupon, they were sent into Jehol to operate against the CCP and were not so successful, largely because the people were more apathetic or antipathetic and because the CCP used hit and run tactics.³¹⁸

Mass mobilization was directed at the scientific and technological community as well. In 1942 at the time of the Second Five Year Plan, it was recognized that a number of economic fields were going to have to be more energetically developed. The Kyōwakai agreed to manage a Scientific and Technical Federation, headed by a Mr. Kubota of the SMR Company Research Section. Their task was to recruit scientists and technicians and integrate them into a functional, project-oriented structure. The Federation

318. Ibid., pp. 115-17, 130-32.

grouped the scientists by field of endeavor, such as forestry, coal mining, liquid fuel, land reclamation, and so forth. They then formed an Enterprise Section which established liaison with various companies. The companies were to communicate their technical problems with the Federation, which then endeavored to establish research projects among the scientists to solve the problems. By matching the needs of business to a pool of technological experts, they succeeded in aiding those firms which did not have research and development facilities of their own.

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The Kyōwakai also devoted about 150 staff members to the promotion of Japanese colonization projects, i.e., the settlement of Japanese families in Manchuria. The government had hoped for at least one million families over 20 years' time (330,000 actually went by 1945) and the Kyōwakai helped in the settlement transition period (though not in recruitment), especially in the northeastern province of Sankiang, where families were placed as armed border settlers. The Kyōwakai also published the periodical Kaitaku Kyōwa (Colonization Harmony) for them.³²⁰

Beginning in 1937, the nationwide "spiritual building" movement involved general public-appeal campaigns

319. Ibid., pp. 150-51.

320. Ibid., p. 150.

as well: a no-smoking campaign, a public-health campaign, a tree-planting campaign, and a literacy campaign. These were mostly media-centered, geared to transmitting information and promoting national "consciousness-raising." The Kyōwakai enlisted the support of pre-existing organizations, of which religious societies seemed to be the most efficacious.³²¹

After 1940, these kinds of campaigns took on a more serious economic nature in such endeavors as scrap collection rallies, food and materials economizing campaigns, and public-opinion raising on matters like hoarding and the black market. Inevitably, such serious concerns were not left to generalized appeals alone but were subject to the same type of organization that we have seen above. The Kyōwakai itself sought, for example, to place its youth corps members directly in factories for the purpose of overseeing the labor of other young people who, more and more, were filling in as military conscription removed regular workers. The Kyōwa Volunteer Service Corps operated increasingly to move women into industry. The Kyōwakai offered ameliorating services to those who had been disrupted--farm cultivation for those who now lacked sufficient family labor, financial aid and counselling to

321. Ibid., pp. 109, 113-15.

small businessmen in difficulty because of the controlled economy, etc.³²²

The final link in the mass mobilization network in which the Kyōwakai had an organizational hand was the National Neighborhood Association. Here the power of public scrutiny and mutual aid reached deepest in economic matters--giving what in Japan would be the tonarigumi a national structure having both government and Kyōwakai functions. In cities, where local neighborhood associations were most successful, they functioned to distribute goods (thus facilitating rationing administration), to collect scrap, organized defense, and to assimilate government ordinances. Neighborhood association meetings passed decisions and opinions up to city Kyōwakai chapters. Information and orders the government wanted to go down to the neighborhoods also passed through Kyōwakai chapters. In the countryside the neighborhood associations tended to be more congruent with the old autonomous government structures, serving in matters of defense and mutual responsibility, providing conscripted labor, cooperative sale and shipment of crops, and storage of famine provisions. As with the traditional pao-chia system, which it did not entirely supplant, the neighborhood

322. Ibid., pp. 145-51.

association system tended to fail where the government, as it inevitably did, put too many demands on it.³²³

323. Ibid., pp. 135-37, 141-45.

CHAPTER VIII

THE AMALGAMATION OF THE KYŌWAKAI AND THE MANCHUKUO GOVERNMENT, 1932-1945

After 1932, the imperatives of war wrought both quantitative and qualitative changes in the activities of the Kyōwakai. Quantitatively, the organization involved itself in more and more areas of endeavor. But beyond this, a subtle change occurred in the nature of the organization itself. From a would-be political party aspiring to become the main political force in Manchuria, the Kyōwakai changed first into an advocate for and then into an arm of the Manchukuo government. This bureaucratization of the minzoku kyōwa ideological function resembled the process Max Weber called "routinization of the charismatic movement."

The overall course of bureaucratization and amalgamation of the Kyōwakai consisted of a number of subsidiary, inter-related processes:

1. The reshuffling of Kyōwakai staff removed more and more of the active leadership which had come through the MSR and the Kyōwatō. As old patrons in the Kwantung Army were routinely transferred or lost influence, their allies from the MSR were left

unprotected. These shakeups brought into the Kyōwakai leadership persons who were uncommitted to Manchurian autonomy under the banner of minzoku kyōwa ideology. The shift in 1932 from Kyōwatō to Kyōwakai initially opened the door to periodic reshuffling by creating figurehead positions in the Kyōwakai to allay criticism.

2. Decentralization within the organization itself produced, for a time, a tendency toward greater autonomy of branch chapters. Then the device of provincial and national federated deliberative conferences (zenkoku rengō kyōgikai) was instituted, ostensibly to tighten up the Kyōwakai structure. However, these were increasingly run along lines resembling the "democratic centralism" of Communist practice, with the result that government decisions and directives became more easily funneled into the organization by way of the top Kyōwakai leadership. The Kyōwakai thus became more responsive to the government and less to the independent imperatives of ideology.
3. The very enlargement of the Kyōwakai itself inevitably diluted the influence of the older leadership. An ideologically active, self-contained organ should have remained more elitist, acquiring strength and support by influencing other organs,

like the local chambers of commerce, agricultural associations, local civil administrations, and so forth. Instead, the tendency was in the direction of amalgamating outside bodies and taking in large numbers of ideologically unassimilable people, including, for example, government offices. In the end, the Kyōwakai itself was functionally amalgamated into the government in what was known as hyōri ittai ("both sides in one body") or nibai ittai ("two parts become one"). The result was the complete identification of the Kyōwakai and the government.

The absorption of the Kyōwakai reflected not so much the government's need for a viable ideology as its need to emasculate a potential rival and, more importantly, to utilize the Kyōwakai's organizational framework as a necessary extension of the bureaucracy. The advantage of using the Kyōwakai rather than working within existent central and local administrative organs was that the Kyōwakai could more easily engage in new activities, create new organizations, and bypass resistance to novelty. New wartime exigencies necessitated ad hoc organs and the Kyōwakai or its auxiliaries would provide the pool of available cadre for these. The early MSR, Kyōwatō, and Kyōwakai operatives had already shown they could obtain

good results in their pacification programs using remarkably few people.

Most observers would probably agree that, despite the opinion of Yamaguchi Jūji and other committed ideologues, the Kyōwakai could not ultimately have been a successful rival to the Manchukuo government apparatus, especially after the China Incident began to make excessive demands on the Manchurian economy and on the mutual tolerance of pan-Asianism. War necessitated control of the populace in as quick and complete a way as possible. It was inconceivable that the Manchukuo government and the Japanese in positions of power would have allowed the Kyōwakai to exist as it was originally intended. On the other hand, the Kyōwakai as an organization was seen as useful for mass mobilization providing it could be made into an arm of the administrative authority. Therefore, the attacks on the Kyōwakai were directed not so much at the organization as at the individuals in the organization who might use it as an independent political party. Pressure was easy to wield since, although the Kyōwakai had intended in its original charter to develop independent sources of funds, in practice it was always largely dependent on subsidies from the Kwantung Army or Manchukuo government. Moreover, its full-time personnel lacked independent personal incomes.

Kyōwatō and Early Kyōwakai Structure and Opposition
to Independent Party Aspirations

The forerunner of the Kyōwakai, the Kyōwatō, drew opposition from a variety of sources, including the military, due to its independent origins and hopes of becoming a political power base on its own. Its tight-knit structure reflected a concern for organizational self-sufficiency. According to the constitution, the president of the organization appointed executive committee members, a secretary-general, and the heads of branch chapters. He also had the power to "interpret" the articles of the constitution in actual application. Structurally, there were two levels of regular membership, associate and full members (in addition to "patronage" or supporting members, who paid a fee or were honorary). Associate members were selected by the branch heads, on the recommendation of at least two full members, and could be expelled by the branch head. The full members were selected by the president, after serving at least one year as an associate, and could be expelled only by order of the president. Full members were obliged to "obey party rules strictly."³²⁴ Taking much inspiration from the structure of the Kuomintang and, indirectly, from the CCP, party leaders sought a core within the party of ideologically

324. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 37-40.

responsive members and kept a great deal of discretion in the top echelons.

When the Kyōwatō was pressured into becoming the Kyōwakai and the top leadership was re-shuffled to admit figureheads, the power of the president (nominally Pu Yi) in daily practice devolved onto the central executive committee and secretary-general. It was up to the regional business offices (benjisho) and to advisors sent down from the central office and regional business offices to maintain common policy directions. However, the Kyōwakai maintained the Kyōwatō's two-tier system of regular membership by designating "permanent" and "general" members, the former acting in the same roll as "full" members in the Kyōwatō. Full members were supervised through the regional and central business offices and maintained a liaison with the higher echelons of the network. Within branch chapters, the chapter head was supplemented by a council composed entirely of permanent members with at least two years' membership. The branch head was drawn from this council. Permanent members could have separate meetings called by the central office, were expected to lead all discussions in chapter affairs, and would make reports to the central office. The central office retained the right to make changes in the bylaws. While nothing is said explicitly about the Kyōwakai central office's power in choosing members, the fact that upward mobility was based on service

time seemed to ensure some continuity and control of policy directions.³²⁵

The Kyōwakai, constituted in this way, drew a surprising amount of criticism and opposition from the Japanese military at home, and later routine reassessments posted many of these critics to the Kwantung Army. Much of the suspicion was based on vague or unsubstantiated rumor which, in turn, could only have stemmed from a misunderstanding of the MSR and Kyōwatō search for an ideology attractive to a wider cross section of people. As Sadako Ogata writes, minzoku kyōwa, born as it was among Manchurian Japanese and adopted by a limited, though temporarily influential, group of Kwantung Army reformers, had practically no echo in Japan.³²⁶ Therefore, rumors could take root which linked the Kyōwatō and the Kyōwakai with the "left wing" and which stigmatized them as "renovationist" among suspicious army officers and like-minded government officials.

A good example of this was in connection with Yamaguchi's draft of the propaganda pamphlet, "Join Hands All Patriots" of April, 1932. It was attacked by many army personnel, Japanese officials, and Manchukuo government officials particularly for the use of the term

325. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), pp. 82-83.

326. Ogata, p. 132.

"democratic" (minshū shūgi). Yamaguchi claimed that his critics hated democracy more than communism because they despised the actions of Japanese parties in the 1920s. Whether or not he is correct, it is certain that pressure was brought to bear. Koyama Sadatomo suggested using the word minpon shūgi in place of minshū shūgi and this was done in some versions, although Yamaguchi himself did not accept it.

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Another example of opposition occurred when the Kyōwakai, in order to expand propaganda operations in Inner Mongolia, built up a business association in July, 1933, called the East Asian Industrial Association, which they had to register in Hsinking. It was headed by Usami Katsuo with Yamaguchi as director of the board and with Cheng Hsiao-shi as nominal president. The Tokyo army headquarters suppressed it on the grounds that the association was "worked out by the Kwantung Army staff in collusion with 'Manchurian gangsters'" and was further termed the work of a "revolutionary group." The army alleged that those connected with the association had supported the putschist moves of young officers in the May 15th Incident of 1932. Usami and Yamaguchi both resigned.

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327. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 103-104.

328. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 289, 292-93.

Whatever military backing the original ideology of the Kyōwatō and Kyōwakai had achieved had come from a rather narrow circle centering on Ishiwara Kanji. He had numerous detractors in Tokyo headquarters, some of whom replaced him and his military circle in the Kwantung Army. The minzoku kyōwa position, which had won his strong support, suffered by association with him as he became more and more personally alienated from those like Koiso and Tōjō Hideki who would be wielding effective power in army circles. Mark Peattie notes that Ishiwara's close identification with the TōA Renmei (East Asian League), with its announced aim of uniting all East Asia under minzoku kyōwa, brought extreme criticism. According to a bureaucrat quoted by Peattie, "He's definitely a communist. Ideas like the East Asian League could only be the creation of the Soviet sphere."³²⁹ Such examples are revealing of the dark suspicion, not to say misunderstanding, of minzoku kyōwa and of the personnel who had formulated it and most forcefully espoused it.

Ishiwara and others notwithstanding, members of the Kwantung Army technically were not permitted to participate in the political activities of Kyōwakai. Although General Honjō had been named nominal advisor and liaison had been maintained through the Fourth Section of the General Staff

329. Peattie, p. 267.

(intelligence and public relations), there remained during the earlier pacification stages a certain wariness of any activities, such as ideological warfare and mass mobilization, conducted by "civilians," useful as they might be.³³⁰ This attitude was conditioned by the so-called "transcendental" political notions held by many of the military for a long time. Political maneuver and manipulation were despised in favor of certain eternal, uniquely Japanese, verities founded on obedience to the Imperial will. The armed forces considered themselves the highest exemplars of this selfless devotion. Treating with and even merging with alien peoples for any purposes other than obviously short-range Machiavellian ones required a flexibility not often found among them. Thus there was actually little sustained support for the ideological side of Kyōwakai in the Kwantung Army as a whole.

Opposition to the Kyōwakai and Its Response, 1932

On August 6, 1932, a regular shift in army personnel brought in Mutō Nobuyoshi as commander of the Kwantung Army in place in Honjō and brought in Koiso Kuniaki as the new chief of staff. Ishiwara was transferred back to Japan. Koiso, with whom Yamaguchi had already spoken, had expressed his absolute opposition to the Kyōwakai as

330. IMTFF, testimony of Tadashi Katakura for the defense, pp. 19,049-52.

nothing more than a crypto-political party (which, indeed, the old Kyōwatō activists wished it to become). Koiso's view of Japanese parties was totally negative. After several shouting matches, Koiso announced that he wished to completely disband the organization. A little later, he backed off slightly, apparently because Honjō, on leaving, had commended the organization to him and because Koiso could find too little support on his staff for such a drastic move. However, he did circulate a confidential staff memo which stated that the Kyōwakai would not be allowed to be either a political party or the germ of a later political party and that whether or not the Kyōwakai could continue, even as an "educational" organization, would be left entirely to the discretion of the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo government.³³¹

Yamaguchi, shown Koiso's memo by friendly officials, concluded that the Kyōwakai should perhaps voluntarily dissolve before being suppressed from above and while their allies in Manchuria still supported them. He states that Koiso's hostility was merely symptomatic of a general Kwantung Army turn toward "capitalist colonization." In fact, he strongly implies that the Kwantung Army had been "anti-colonialist" only to the extent of the

331. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 418-19, 424-38; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 85.

commitment to minzoku kyōwa by Ishiwara, Itagaki, Honjō, and a few others. With their departure, it was reverting to its old form. In that case, the Kyōwakai might be wiser to seek a grand gesture by self-dissolution and thus salvage some of the prestige of the cause for later. He was dissuaded by the practical argument among the Kyōwakai leadership (both Chinese and Japanese) that to dissolve would damage morale of their operatives hard at work in the pacification field, lose the support of the chambers of commerce and agricultural associations (which, in fact, were a major financial prop of organization-expansion activities), and harm the kenkoku cause. He was persuaded by these arguments, though he states in retrospect that he bitterly regretted that "compromises" were made in subsequent organizational and personnel changes rather than trying to face down Koiso and other aggressive types.³³² He invoked the comparison between what he considered the relative success of the Manchurian Incident and creation of Manchukuo and the dismal failure of the Japanese experience in China after 1937--the failure in the latter case being reliance on military force alone and neglect of the popular will. To rely on occupation alone was to be

332. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 428-35.

no different from Western imperialists and was to be hated along with them.³³³

Koiso, while leaving its overall fate in the hands of the Manchukuo government, sought to undercut the Kyōwakai in less direct ways: harassment by military police (the Kempeitai) and a curious plan to cut the Kyōwakai's government subsidy by creating a separate paramilitary group responsible directly to Koiso. He directed vice-director of the General Affairs Department Sakaya Kiichi to recruit a Japanese group called Seigidan (Righteousness Corps), led by an Osaka racketeer named Sakai Eizo, and to appropriate 100,000 yen out of the Kyōwakai subsidy of 700,000 yen to support them. On September 8th, there was an inaugural ceremony in Mukden for this Dai Manshū Seigidan, where they appeared in military-style uniform equipped with rifles. Yamaguchi describes them as villainous types, Chinese and/or Manchus who had been rejected for army or police service, as well as some sinister Japanese from Osaka. It is not known for what purpose they were intended or used.³³⁴

At the same time, the General Affairs Department duly ordered that the Kyōwakai confine itself to "educational" matters (i.e., propaganda presumably directed at

333. Ibid., pp. 335-40.

334. Ibid., pp. 428-29, 463-64.

buttressing the state). At this point, however, this directive was impossible to enforce for the very practical reason that the Kyōwakai was in the midst of ongoing activities, pacification and otherwise, which would have been extremely difficult for the government to take over directly. Were it otherwise, pacification would have been a matter for the government from the beginning. As it was, the Kyōwakai had already established five secretarial branches of the central office (jimukyoku), fifty regional business offices (benjisho) with both full and part-time leadership on hand, and more than 7800 branch chapters with approximately 300,000 members.³³⁵ Thus its size and extent of organization were sufficient to enable it to evade abrupt change at one stroke. The change would have to come by way of "taming" the organization and would have to be accompanied by changes in structure. These changes would be pressed by the government, by well-meaning military personnel, and even by those within the organization itself. Although these changes were often accompanied by criticism of various aspects of the Kyōwakai's ideology and activities, in general it seems to this writer that such change was a fairly natural and inevitable process since the government was becoming more complex and since Japanese interests were intruding more on Manchuria.

335. Ibid., pp. 462-63, 531-33.

The government grew as it took over more functions. Already, in June, 1932, the customs houses and salt gabelle had been taken over from control by Shanghai (traditionally under British administration). In September Japan formally recognized Manchukuo and foreign relations became a growing responsibility of the Hsinking government. The postal service, formerly under French control, was passed to the Manchukuoan Transportation Department. Consolidation of the legislative system, establishment of a central bank, unification of a monetary system, and readjustment of the financial system were all moving along. These were hastened, no doubt, by the desire to quickly build a viable Manchukuo and thus favorably impress outsiders. But, more ominously, the Soviet Union began a buildup on the Manchurian border in 1932, in reaction to the Japanese presence in North Manchuria. The Russians tripled their men and material by 1935, thus nurturing the conviction held by the Japanese military that a clash was only a matter of time.³³⁶ In the process of speeding a buildup of the government, many Japanese began to flock to Hsinking to enter the bureaucracy, the better part of them coming directly from Japan.

There had already existed within the Manchukuo government factions which had opposed the Kyōwatō in April,

336. Peattie, p. 189.

1932. Cheng Hsiao-hsü, who became prime minister and those of the Kirin group of Ch'ing loyalists did not want any civilian political group that would "cause trouble." The understanding among these men and like-minded Japanese was that a strictly civilian party would not be countenanced.³³⁷ Two major factions of Japanese in the Manchukuo government opposing the Kyōwatō and its party aspect were the Gōketsugumi of Amakasu Tadahiko and Tengyōgumi led by Nakano Koitsu. In addition, there were many Japanese hired into the government from the old Kwantung Leased Territory government who had been attacked in pre-Incident days by the MSR as "colonialist" in mentality.³³⁸ They were joined in continued antagonism to Kyōwakai by many of the bureaucratic newcomers from Japan. Yamaguchi, given his Manchurian-centered bias, regards the new people as "carpetbaggers" and opportunists. No doubt many were. In September, 1932, Harada Kumao was told by the Vice-Chief of the General Staff that, of some 150 Japanese sent to "advise" the Manchukuoan government, many were "loathsome characters."³³⁹

337. IMTFF, testimony of Jūji Yamaguchi for the defense, pp. 18, 841-42.

338. Yamaguchi, Manshūkenkoku no rekishi, pp. 39-40, 167.

339. Saionji-Harada Memoirs, part 4, Chapter 55, October 1, 1932, in Richard Storry, The Double Patriots--A Study of Japanese Nationalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 94 note.

Apart from that, there was already a growing discord between the local hsien administrations, which preferred greater autonomy, and the more statist tendencies of many of the central bureaucrats, especially Japanese. While not necessarily committed to the existing hsien officialdom per se, the Kyōwakai, which had to work with local authorities and whose ideology predisposed them to favor local autonomy, often found themselves speaking against the intrusions of central government.³⁴⁰ The argument from the government began to be heard that the Kyōwakai was "in the way" or was "unnecessary."³⁴¹

Among the Japanese military there had long been a tendency toward anti-capitalism which has been noted by many authors--a mixture of sympathy for the peasant exploited in an industrial society and contempt for the collusion between wealth and political power in bourgeois societies. This genesis of right wing anti-capitalism was not unique to Japan but seen in Europe as well, especially in the 1920s. The Kwantung Army activists of the late 1920s and early 30s who staged the Manchurian Incident were no exception as they spoke of liberating the Manchurian people from the prospects of capitalist exploitations just

340. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," pp. 517-18; Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 86.

341. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 86.

as they would liberate them from the feudal grip of warlord despotism. The prospects for resource development were not to be passed over to monopoly capital but would provide the very substance of a social welfare that would forestall communism as it would offset the divisions of nationalism and class conflict.³⁴²

The early MSR ideologues either aped or generated a great deal of this line of thinking as they proceeded from "cultural dominion" to minzoku kyōwa in the disillusionment of 1931. Both capitalism and communism (or even conventional socialism) were seen as adversarial contradictions inextricably associated with Euro-American culture and fundamentally at odds with pan-Asianism, which they advanced as an alternative to any Euro-American system and which would be implemented in economic affairs through the kind of state socialism favored by Ishiwarā, Kita Ikki, and Ōkawa Shūmei.

Though anti-capitalist rhetoric proved in practice to be more of a rallying cry than a real program, the suspicions of small and medium business interests were not assuaged. Many Manchurian Japanese businessmen who, before the Incident, had regarded the anti-Japanese movement as a danger and had backed the overthrow of Chang Hsüeh-liang, now expected a return to the halcyon days following the

342. Ogata, p. 132.

Russo-Japanese War, when they could operate within the shelter of treaties. It was natural for them to lend their opposition to any group who, ostensibly, might work to eliminate special advantages.³⁴³

On a more practical level, a whole class of private "business solicitors" (seigyōsha) had emerged under the auspices of the Kwantung Army and SMR Company and, in the name of the army or Company, they would requisition horses, supplies, and labor from the peasants. Abuses of this had grown in the year after the Incident and were reported in detail by the Kyōwakai, since such behavior was obviously deleterious to their pacification program. Receiving and mediating peasants' complaints, in fact, became, for a time, a major part of the movement's local work. The Kyōwakai gained prestige among the peasants but incurred enemies with connections in high places.³⁴⁴

The memorandum from Koiso that sought to consign the Kyōwakai to a more impotent status had caused consternation among the Kyōwakai leadership but no real loss of resolve. Those among the party-oriented MSR-Kyōwatō group remained in control and were inclined to try to weather the storm, relying on public opinion for sustenance. However, the organization had expanded in

343. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 43-45.

344. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 87.

size and had taken in many new members with none of the old comrades' unity. Newer members seemed more inclined toward ideological diversity and less amenable to centralized control within the organization. Unity and central control were based only on a tacit agreement about final goals and on the common background of experience in meeting the challenges of pacification.

The Kyōwakai National Federated Deliberative Assembly
and Structural Change, 1934-35

After 1933, the more dramatic phases of pacification in conjunction with Japanese armed forces ended and pacification settled into more of a long range day-to-day nagging series of mini-struggles bearing many of the characteristics of present-day police work in hostile neighborhoods. Once pacification by the Kyōwakai was no longer linked to the army, it was less able to stand up to scrutiny and criticism of its leadership, since the size of the organization and public opinion by which it rationalized its being seemed to reflect less on the ideology than on the organization. In short, it would seem that the organization could be separated from the old leadership, which had given it the ideology, and still be useful.

On January 20, 1934, the Manchukuo government announced the establishment of an emperor system for Manchukuo. Hitherto, Pu Yi had been termed Shissei,

vaguely translated "head of state," a term enjoined by Honjō in the planning stage of Manchukuo to strike a balance between the Ch'ing loyalists and republicans among Chinese, Manchus, and Mongols. The emperor title (kōtei) had been pressed by the Manchu bannermen and Mongol princes and was finally supported by Koiso, out of his support for imperial government in general and to forestall party growth.³⁴⁵ For Yamaguchi, an emperorship was symbolic of the reversion to despotism and domination by officialdom. It was clearly at odds with minzoku kyōwa as he conceived it. The danger was that this would further lead from autonomy to "colonization by the leading race" through an autocratic government in which the Japanese wielded the actual power.³⁴⁶ Nonetheless, the Kyōwakai leadership elected to take a compromise stance, recognizing that powerful groups favored a restoration of the Ch'ing monarchy. They held that (1) the emperor must be installed by the people, (2) the sovereign power rests in the people, and (3) the emperor must be regarded as an "organ" (kikan) of the nation. Making a virtue of necessity, they participated in the nationwide "spontaneous" demonstration for his installation.³⁴⁷

345. Yamaguchi, "Manshūkoku Kyōwakaishi," p. 564.

346. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 297, 335.

347. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 84.

At the same time that the Kyōwakai was holding mass meetings to ratify the monarchy, they were choosing delegates to what would be a National Federated Deliberative Assembly (Zenkoku Rengō Kyōgikai), which was held February 28, 1934, in Hsinking. There were 99 representatives (including three women) from the branch chapters. A surprising number, eighty-nine, were Chinese or Manchus, including 42 from the various nōmukai, 20 from shōmukai, 20 from public education, five from the military, and two from religious groups. In addition, there were three Moslem Tartars, three Koreans, three Japanese, and one Mongol. Attending the first conference were all the members of the central leadership, Pu Yi, and representatives from the Kwantung Army staff. There were the usual admonitory and congratulatory addresses, a report on the current state of the Kyōwakai by executive chief Hsieh Chieh-shih and a formal written pledge of loyalty.

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The Kyōwakai had always been a vital conduit of ethnic support for Manchukuo, virtually the only one existing. Minzoku kyōwa had been formulated precisely to accommodate such ethnic diversity and channel it toward nationhood. In addition, from the first the Kyōwatō and Kyōwakai had depended on an alliance or understanding with pre-existing local organs like the Chambers of Commerce and

agricultural associations. What this national assembly was designed to do was to reaffirm and solidify these alliances for the purpose of (1) achieving greater agreement on ideology, (2) putting up a more solid front in the face of bureaucratic mutterings that "Kyōwakai was unnecessary" and that it duplicated government functions, and (3) smoothing out the rough relations with the government. The latter point was the special concern of the February, 1935, meeting in which the Assembly explained its basic "essence" in terms of the slogan "Spread virtue, achieve sympathy" (sentoku tassei). This was outwardly based on Pu Yi's previous year's address, which also had some influence on Assembly regulations. By these regulations, the Assembly took on some life of its own, assuming some of the responsibility for the future running of the Kyōwakai.

The 1935 National Assembly was accompanied by regional conferences at three levels--in nine of the provinces, in several banner regions, and in most major cities. Generally dominated by the regional advisory personnel, these local conferences centered on problems of operation and involved a great deal of study and debate. At the local level and then later at the national level, the conferences strove to operate on the principle that

349. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

what benefitted the public benefitted the nation. This was to be the sentoku ("spreading virtue") part. By such ostentatious displays of moving from centralism to public accommodation, they hoped to get along better with the government (hence tassei or "achieving sympathy").

Although the Assemblies did not replace, but rather supplemented, internal structural controls and decision making, overall budget matters and regulations were, at least ostensibly, to be decided in conference rather than by the central executive committee as before. Furthermore, the assemblies tended to abandon majority-rule decision-making in favor of unanimity (manjōitchi). By this, they hoped to avoid the adversarial nature that characterized majority rule in favor of bringing together the local guidance people, central executives, and people now in Kyōwakai connected with the army and government in a "comradely" consensual give and take. A record was kept of speeches concerning any prospective policy or decision and this was noted in the "bill." Then the process of reconciling and synthesizing all suggestions from the speeches into a final proposal became a progressive, step by step, procedure. Known as ringisei, it was the familiar method in Japanese government and business of generating and circulating suggestions and opinions from the lower to higher ranks. It certainly enabled the Kyōwakai to avoid jeopardizing its relationship with the

government. The effect was to move the Kyōwakai further away from any prospect for a national policy role and deeper into the role of public opinion sounding board. The national policy decisions devolved more onto the government bureaucracy--freer of the stigma of party politics and, given the increasing proportion of "carpet-bagger" Japanese, less committed either to a working pan-Asianism or to independent status for Manchuria.³⁵⁰

Although Yamaguchi recognized that minzoku kyōwa as an ideal was dying, he believed the Kyōwakai still had a place in Manchukuo and could work within the emperor system; that the situation was, as yet, still unformed enough to be influenced.³⁵¹ At the end of February, 1934, Koiso was replaced as head of the Kwantung Army general staff by Major General Nishio Jūnari. Kyōwakai had survived the trials of the "Koiso era" as a national organization. In fact, during these troubles, figures emerged in the central government who sympathized with and had sought to protect the Kyōwakai--Sakaya Kiichi, Minagawa Toyoji, Yūki Kiyotarō, Wada Tsuyoshi, and others. It was they who pressed the suggestion, in a protective vein, that Kyōwakai come to a closer working cooperation with the government by appointing government bureau heads to

350. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

351. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 302-303.

Kyōwakai executive committee membership and by having many of the present leadership discretely withdraw. Put into effect, the suggestion placed Sakaya as vice-chief of the central office and Yūki and Wada as full-time committee members (all retaining their government posts). Most of those from the Kyōwatō, Yamaguchi and Ozawa among them, resigned.

Apart from this shakeup, in August, 1934, there came a petition submitting a plan for reorganization of the Kyōwakai structure from six veterans of the North Manchurian and Tungpientao pacification operations who had stayed on in those areas as regional advisors--Horita, Hirayama, Yabe, Fujita, Itō, and Ōhira. They were backed by other rural permanent members whose attitudes were shaped by the practical problems of field operations. In the central office changeover just mentioned, several members of this so-called "North Manchurian Faction" found their way into the central office to become vice-head Sakaya's "brain trust."³⁵²

The intention and effect of the proposed structural changes, which were implemented in 1934 and 1935, are difficult to analyze. They did tend to decentralize the organization and to bring field and local operatives into greater influence. The main theme was to avoid trouble by

352. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 87.

drawing closer to the Manchukuo government and by eliminating from central leadership those who were most controversial by virtue of their earlier ideological pronouncements. The changes, in sum, emphasized saving the organization at the expense of ideology. Pragmatic accommodationist views predominated over ideological consistency.

Concretely, the central office was changed from four offices (sho)--administrative, organization, social, and an inspectorate (including auditing)--to four sections (ka)--general affairs directly under the head, accounting, organization, and social. The central office also was to form two additional groups under its direct control--an inspectorate which observed and audited all Kyōwakai affairs and a research group to initiate and systematize studies on all local conditions. The central office also increased the proportion of Japanese members in its personnel. Hitherto there had been six Japanese and twelve Chinese and Manchus; now there were to be nine and nine, respectively.

Earlier practice in forming branch chapters had centered broadly on occupation as means of grouping. It lumped differing races and social classes together if they were of similar occupations. This conformed to their minzoku kyōwa optimism regarding the capability of various races to peacefully coexist but, as we have seen, they

could count on control being exerted through "regular" members who formed a chapter elite, took care of daily business through their own council (jōmukai) appointed by the central office, and maintained liaison (and, presumably, ideological conformity) with the center.

Ideological conformity in the early Kyōwakai was, in fact, to be largely the product of mutual understanding through comradeship and common interest. They had frequently built chapters around chambers of commerce, agricultural associations, and village organizations in which hsien administrators were influential.

The 1934-35 change cut many of the control ties from the central office by building up a stronger framework of regional advisory offices. Research sections were built up in the regional offices as well as in the central office, and field operatives were brought in to staff these. Thus, the "guidance" or advisory function rested increasingly with locally experienced personnel. It was asserted by the 1934 petitioners that the hsien bureaucracy, chambers of commerce, and agricultural associations had become "exploitive" mandarins, capitalists, and landlords. Hence, they should be the targets of sweeping reform which would exchange their support for that of peasants, workers, and small entrepreneurs. The petitioners pointed to organizations of "young intelligentsia" on the local scene as a possible "superior faction" around which to build chapter

leadership in lieu of the chambers of commerce, agricultural associations, and hsien bureaucracy.

Finally, the structural revolution envisaged forming new chapters along homogeneous ethnic and class lines in an effort to achieve stronger local chapter identity.

Although the reformers realized the danger of creating ethnic and class interest "lobbies" in the chapters, they had apparently found the old heterogeneity too difficult to work with (unless they, in turn, fell back on the "exploitive" pre-existing bodies). In practice, they compromised by devolving on regionally-based chapters in rural areas and enterprise-based chapters founded on commercial or industrial associations in cities. It was a transitional form that was more ethnically homogenized but with more diverse socioeconomic levels than the reformers might have desired.³⁵³ They, like the earlier leadership, hoped for (and relied even more on) a common political position and common interest to emerge and bridge the gaps between chapters. The National Federated Deliberative Assembly and attendant sub-assemblies were designed, largely, to substitute public opinion for ideological conformity.

353. Ibid., pp. 87-91.

Expansion of the Kyōwakai and Acceptance of
Partnership with the Manchukuo
Government, 1936-37

The next development in organizational change came in 1936 and 1937. As in 1934, it was a "friendly" change wrought by advocates of the Kyōwakai, initiated this time by the Kwantung Army. Likewise, it entailed closer amalgamation of the group into the Establishment by the simple expedient of recruiting within the Establishment--the army and government--as well as spreading the net for members more widely and systematically in Manchuria as a whole and even opening the way for the expansion of the Kyōwakai beyond Manchuria.

By way of background, the Kwantung Army command had passed from General Hishikari Takashi to General Minami Jirō and, as part of the same transfer, Colonel Itagaki Seishirō, one of the principals in the Manchurian Incident, came back to the Kwantung Army as vice-chief of the general staff. These men, especially the latter, were supporters of the Kyōwakai, so it looked as if it would not have to face the kinds of hostility that had encouraged the 1934 revisions. In January, 1936, ex-commander of the Kwantung Army Honjō addressed Kyōwakai regional business office heads in an encouraging way. In February Minami, in a congratulatory and optimistic speech to the central headquarters committee, made the following points:

1. The Kyōwakai is a "friend of the people," embodying the "nation-building" (kenkoku) spirit.
2. The Kyōwakai has begun to spread to all races and to military and government circles.
3. The Kyōwakai must "prosper along with Manchukuo"; shifts within the highest leadership of the organization must "guide the overall planning" of the nation (and, presumably, vice versa).
4. Local chapters must recognize that the "Kyōwakai way" for accomplishing things is unsurpassed; they must not build barriers but must strive to facilitate operations of the organization.
5. The most important mission is expansion and strengthening (kakudai kyōka) in which the races other than the main pillars of the organization (Japanese, Chinese-Manchus, and Koreans) must be fully integrated and in which army and government personnel, hitherto joining as special cases, must be recruited. The Kwantung Army planned to provide the necessary financial backing for such enhanced efforts.³⁵⁴

The Kyōwakai, since early 1936, had already been working on the problem of better integration of White Russians, Mongols, and Koreans. The White Russians at

354. Ibid., p. 95.

first had been treated separately from other ethnic groups, largely because priority was given to others with greater potential national identification outside Manchuria. There was a danger of their constituting a subversive group in the Harbin area, so the Harbin regional business office created a special White Russian department, aiming at forming separate ethnic Russian branch chapters. This done, Russian chapters met in their own regional Federated Assembly. There were concurrent attempts to reach the Russian youth through articles in the Russian-language newspaper, and the Kyōwakai even endowed a chair of Russian culture at Hokuman Gakuin, the highest educational institution in the northern region. In areas where Russians were too sparse for separate chapters, efforts were made to merge them with Japanese.

Mongols also had been mostly treated as a separate "minority" matter, but, since the Mongol nobility had been among the earliest props of Japanese ambitions, they resented their inferior status. Moreover, progressive economic changes threatened the feudal position of the nobility. The main problem area was Jehol, where they were a powerful group. The decision in 1936 was to create a special department, as for the Russians, in Chinchou. In the interests of achieving rapport with the lower classes, for productivity's sake, the nobility were submerged in ethnically homogeneous chapters.

The Korean situation was colored by the tensions between Chinese and Koreans in economic (especially land) competition. Therefore, ethnically homogeneous separate chapters were again prescribed, with an effort to absorb pre-existing popular Korean organizations. The Kyōwakai began to publish Kyōwa Report, a journal in the Korean language, for them. Simultaneously, efforts to organize ethnic Japanese were intensified, beginning in the South Manchurian Railway zone. And finally, as suggested, the Kyōwakai was to undertake the organization of military units and government offices.

These latter categories--Japanese, military, and bureaucrats--became the targets of a special operations committee formed in the Hsinking central headquarters under Handa Toshiharu. It was considered especially urgent to organize the ethnic Japanese bureaucrats and company employees as a kind of opening wedge to move others. Being strategically placed, their influence, it was hoped, would spread in widening concentric rings. Handa opened with a radio broadcast in which he announced that the Kyōwakai had met with the Kwantung Army and the government and they had achieved "perfect accord" (iken itchi). The Kyōwakai was not just one more people's organ, but the authoritative nationalist instrument. They would henceforth begin, via the Hsinking Special Operations Committee, to form branch chapters in army barracks, government offices, and private

companies, as well as in the public at large. Given the peculiar character of Manchukuo, he explained, the Kyōwakai was the only body that could unite the various races and the government authorities.³⁵⁵

We may surmise that such military-bureaucratic sanction was expected to allay traditional suspicions of the "political" (e.g., "self-interested") nature of the association. In the contemporary U.S., an analogy might be the suspicion of outside (national) union organization of public service employees as opposed to the acceptance of sanctioned "associations" for policemen, firemen, etc.

On February 22nd Koiso's old paramilitary Seigidan was disbanded and its surprisingly large (43,000) membership joined the Kyōwakai en bloc. On March 29th General Ueda Kenkichi, who had replaced Minami as Kwantung Army commander, gave, as his introductory speech, a pep talk to Japanese bureaucrats of the Manchukuo government boosting the Kyōwakai. On June 1st the Hsinking Special Operations Committee held a discussion and rally at Kwantung Army headquarters. Itagaki, Colonel Tsuji Masanobu (later of Malaya fame and a fervent booster of the Kyōwakai), twelve other army staff, and ninety government and company employees attended.

355. Ibid., p. 96.

At this time, Sakaya Kiichi, one of the prime movers in the 1934 reforms, expressed disagreement with the prevailing bloc recruitment policy, which he regarded as "manipulation" to achieve membership without commitment. He re-affirmed a more "spiritual" program that gained membership from the general population by activities conforming to the everyday lives and aspirations of the people and by concern for welfare. Although committed to some kind of partnership with the government, he can be regarded as leaning at least partly toward the original "party" concept--a transitional figure preferring "politicizing" (though not on an entirely independent basis) to sheer "organization."³⁵⁶

By July, 1936, the stage was set for another structural reorganization. In the opinion of the multiple compilers of Manshūkokushi, this change was linked to Japan's abrogation of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo insofar as abrogation made it urgently necessary to identify and fix the position and duties of Japanese in the new state, to make a clean sweep of the "rights and interests" colonialist mentality, and to erase the superiority complex which could jeopardize the goals the Kyōwakai was striving for. It was hoped that the Kyōwakai would add to the credibility of the new regime by

356. Ibid., pp. 96-97.

demonstrating solidarity with the other races under the umbrella of the Kyōwakai. To enhance the reality of solidarity, Article 2 of the new rules removed the contradiction between the outward policy of "no political activity" and persisting inclinations toward independent Kyōwakai decision-making by stating categorically that there was no opposition between the government and Kyōwakai. The relationship was termed hyōri ittai ("both sides joined in one body"). The organization program would be based on the premise that the Kyōwakai was the organ that "unites high and low bureaucrats and officials and public, which mobilizes, trains, and organizes the whole people." Finally, the organization was to launch a Kyō-A ("Prosper Asia") program intended to extend the kenkoku spirit to various peoples of Asia in a pan-Asian context.³⁵⁷

The branch chapters were organized along homogeneous lines according to regional territory, place of work, type of work, and race. Personnel in the central headquarters also were reshuffled, with Inoue Chūya as head, Hirajima Shigeo as head of General Affairs, Nakano Torazō as head of Guidance, and Handa Toshiharu as head of Planning. Kyōwakai members even began wearing a uniform, which began in 1936 as a simple shirt with a gold collar but, by 1938

357. Ibid., pp. 98-99.

had become more elaborate, adding a hat and braid to greet a fascist goodwill mission from Italy.³⁵⁸

Sakaya Kiichi's was not the only criticism levelled at the 1936 revisions. A group of soldiers and civilians in Tokyo who centered around Ishiara Kanji had formed a branch of the Kyōwakai there in 1934. Consisting originally of Hirajima Shigeo, Hara Takeshi, Ōmura Tetsutarō, and Kataura Tadashi, they identified themselves with the minzoku kyōwa of Incident days. Described as fervent idealists "even to the point of abrogating their Japanese-ness," they regarded the new hyōri ittai as a subordination to the government and as a betrayal of the independence of action so necessary if the Kyōwakai were to resist a return to colonialism. They contemptuously dismissed the new bloc expansion as "net fishing."

To offset this criticism, Tsuji Masanobu and others concerned with the Kyōwakai drafted an extended statement, called "The Basic Spirit of the Kyōwakai" ("Kyōwakai no kakuhon seishin") which endeavored to include some of the opinions of the Tokyo group. Issued within the Kyōwakai and the government under General Ueda's name and given as a speech by him in November, 1936, it was actually more of an effort to semantically blur some of the policies than to incorporate real changes.

358. Ibid., pp. 99-100, 117.

The main points of the "Basic Spirit," in summary, were:

1. The special political characteristics of Manchukuo are not conducive to parliamentary government; nor is government to be despotic. Rather it is minzoku kyōwa which actualizes the "creative originality" of wang tao (the "kingly way") for officials and people and which most accurately reflects the popular will.
2. The Kyōwakai, born at the same time as Manchukuo, is the designated organ of nationhood, maintaining the kenkoku spirit and training the people--a unique ideological, educational, and political body.
3. In defining the relationship between the Kyōwakai and the government, top priority must be given to promulgating the kenkoku spirit. The political launching of the kenkoku spirit rests with the government but the implementation of it is the responsibility of the Kyōwakai insofar as it is based on popular will. Therefore, the Kyōwakai is not to be viewed as subordinate to the government since neither is a competing body. The Kyōwakai is to become the "spiritual parent body of the government" (seifu no seishinteki botai nari). Public officials must become the most zealous practitioners

of the Kyōwakai spirit. True Kyōwakai members, whether in government or as civilians, will help realize wang tao government when they utilize the kenkoku spirit to guide thought, economics, and ideology toward a complete mobilization of the people.³⁵⁹

Ueda's speech and the burgeoning organization drive were efforts at fixing the character of Kyōwakai once and for all. Its role in pacification and efforts at shaping political decisions in its first years signified, in the eyes of the 1936 revisionists, that its character was yet unformed and was open to misconceptions, speculation, and conjecture. Although it had been openly a party, it had to draw in its horns and compromise with the opposition. What the speech said was, "Don't act as a party. But the government does need the cement of organized ideology and an organization which can approach the masses and mobilize them." Already the movement had, of itself, swung away from party aspirations, but Ueda affirmed an unassailable position for the organization. The ideology would have to pass from the organization to the state.

Yamaguchi, who, in looking back, feels that the minzoku kyōwa movement died in 1934, was of the opinion

359. Ibid., pp. 100-101; Suzuki, part 2 (1967), p. 62.

that the 1936 burgeoning of the Kyōwakai was only superficial and without real substance. He does grant that many individuals kept the illusion of a true "racial partnership" state alive until the very end in 1945. However, it would appear that 1937 marked the final clearly identifiable denouement in the amalgamation process.³⁶⁰

In February, 1937, Tōjō Hideki, who had previously headed the military police in Manchuria, who had opposed Kyōwakai in its early form, and who had vigorously moved to suppress the ToA Renmei organization where he had jurisdiction, was appointed chief of staff to the Kwantung Army.³⁶¹ In April his allies, Amakasu Tadahiko and Furumi Tadayuki, took over leadership posts in the Kyōwakai, with Amakasu in General Affairs and Planning (concurrently) and Furumi in Guidance. It is not illogical to surmise that the organization was to be further "tamed" by installing erstwhile enemies of its political aspirations as major administrators. Through Furumi, who held a concurrent post as Manchukuo government paymaster, Tōjō supported his men by substantially increasing the subsidy to the Kyōwakai. Suzuki Ryūshi cites subsidy figures, for comparison, of 800,000 yen per year for 1934 and 1935, 1.2 million for 1936, and 1.8 million for 1937. It was to reach 10 million

360. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 340.

361. Peattie, p. 326.

in the 1940s.³⁶² However, Yamaguchi uses a much higher figure of 30 million for 1937, which may have covered correlative Kyōwakai-initiated and run operations like youth training, village improvement, and so forth.³⁶³ In membership as well, the organization prospered via "net fishing." In March, 1936, there were 1421 chapters with about 500,000 members; and in 1937, 2917 chapters had about 1 million members.³⁶⁴

There were continuing differences centering around interpretations of the Ueda speech and a strong sense of rivalry between new and old membership who had joined under different circumstances. One bone of contention was over the advisability of the "net fishing" of new members and their formation into chapters. New developments appeared in regulation changes in 1937, for example, which eased membership qualifications and shortened processing time. Chapters, to conform to the induction of groups by category, now were fixed by residential units, regionally divided. A "region," however, could be an office, barrack, mine, factory, or business as well as village, hamlet, or city ward. Out of this welter, the old sense of esprit de corps

362. Suzuki, part 2, p. 61.

363. Yamaguchi, Manshūkenkoku no rekishi, p. 347.

364. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), p. 105.

could not be recreated no matter how much the government and leadership exhorted.³⁶⁵

What particularly sharpened the debate at this point was the return to Manchuria of Ishiwara Kanji in October, 1937, as vice-chief of staff under Tōjō. In his view, five years had changed Manchuria a great deal. Whatever indications there had been before that pan-Asianism would come to something had been stifled by the bureaucracy of the government and by the Kwantung Army's control over the government. Those he scorned as lacking qualities of vision--bureaucrats and, to a degree, business-men--were in the seats of power. In particular, the Kyōwakai, which was to have been the truly progressive force in Manchuria, was becoming a government and Kwantung Army tool.³⁶⁶ In Ishiwara's opinion, "the Kyōwakai spirit had become a mere abstraction." It was now to be "politics by Kempeitai," a reference to the fact that both Tōjō and Amakasu had come up by way of that much-feared organization. In Yamaguchi's eyes, the Kyōwakai had become merely a replica of the government (hsiao yamen) with the government as ta yamen.³⁶⁷

365. Ibid., pp. 101-102.

366. Peattie, p. 325.

367. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 364-70.

Ishiwara sought to renovate Kyō and return it to its former role by calling on the old MSR-Kyōwatō group, including Yamaguchi, to launch a kind of "revolution" (or counter-revolution, as the case may be) by undercutting the current leadership and trying to replace them with men from the Old Guard. In this Tōjō opposed him, saying that the work of the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo politics was under the leadership of the chief of staff; that is, Tōjō himself. Thus, the current Kyōwakai must follow the plan laid out by the Kwantung Army (as in 1936 and 1937). A vice-chief (Ishiwara) must not change a plan in operation "capriciously." Thus, he asserted, Amakasu and Furumi must not be interfered with.³⁶⁸

In many respects, the Tōjō-Ishiwara clash originated in personality differences. Tōjō was legalistic, discipline-oriented, conscious of superior-inferior relationships in command, and reserved. Ishiwara was outspoken, irreverent, idealistic, and with a sense of mission that overrode etiquette and hierarchy. Vis-à-vis the Kyōwakai, Tōjō was always the "amateur and outsider." He therefore relied implicitly on the opinions of subordinates on his staff, like Amakasu Tadahiko.

Amakasu's strange background begins as a Kempeitai captain in Tokyo. During the Kantō earthquake, his unit

368. Naoki Hoshino, Mihatenu Yūmei: Manshūkoku gaishi (Tokyo: Diamondosha, 1963), p. 276.

arrested and strangled a young radical, Ōsugi Sakae, and his common-law wife. The incident led to a court martial in which Amakasu shouldered the blame, apparently for the sake of the good name of the army. He received minimum punishment, was cashiered out, and went to Manchuria, where, from that time on, he held positions of some power (usually behind the scenes) in army-connected endeavors. Before and during the Manchurian Incident he fomented riots and marshalled squads of so-called "Manshū rōnin" as agitators. He was head of the police section in the Manchukuo government and then worked as an importer of Chinese laborers from Shantung before being installed in the Kyōwakai at the behest of Tōjō. He appears to have been a rather faceless type, a "good soldier" rather than adventurer, as his background might imply. Apparently lacking any political convictions whatsoever, he was just right for the role intended for the Kyōwakai. ³⁶⁹

It was a confrontation that Ishiwara and the Old Guard could not possibly win. The bureaucratization of the Kyōwakai which Ishiwara and Yamaguchi seem to view, in part at least, as conspiratorial was largely generated from broader causes--a natural absorption by the institutions paying the bills or an inevitable compromise with founding

369. Ibid., pp. 373-75.

principles which is probably a necessary step for any such organization.

Even after Tōjō left Manchuria for a place in the War Ministry, Ishiwara continued to clash with his successor, Isoya, over Kyōwakai until August, 1938, when he requested retirement and left Manchuria forever. Yamaguchi and Wada Tsuyoshi saw him off tearfully at Hsinking station. Afterward, he turned his attention to writing and setting forth his ideas through TōA Renmei, taking an unpopular "I told you so" stance as the Japanese army became bogged down in China fighting the peasants they should have been fraternally politicizing.³⁷⁰ For Ishiwara, now that Kyōwakai was "corrupted," TōA Renmei would carry on the ideal of pan-Asianism as it was meant to be applied--with full consciousness that there was more to building harmonious blocs than organization. Pan-Asianism could not, in fact, survive such "organization" as was shaping up in Manchuria. The prime movers, the Japanese, would inevitably fall into a "dominant race" frame of mind, would smother cooperative nation-building with bureaucracy, and would always be "external" to the process. It was in agreement on the vital importance of "inspired" and disinterested practitioners of ideology that Ishiwara, the spartan Nichiren Buddhist soldier, came

370. Ibid., p. 276; Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, p. 429.

closest to the MSR-Kyōwatō group. The organization, in and of itself, created only positions, which in turn spawned interests, and were susceptible to motivation by personal gain.

As for Yamaguchi, he had been appointed vice-mayor of Mukden in April, 1934, thus joining for a time the officialdom he purported to distrust. He claims, however, that, with the assistance of old comrades in Fengtien Province, he attempted to apply the minzoku kyōwa ideal in urban administration--setting up industrial areas, encouraging equality of opportunity to all races, and cancelling extraterritorial privileges. He resigned or was purged in July, 1937. After Ishiara's retirement, Yamaguchi took a token job with a private forestry company until early 1945, when he left Manchuria well before the Russian deluge.³⁷¹

Further Structural Change and Amalgamation, 1938-44

From 1938 to the end of the Pacific War, the organizational changes in the Kyōwakai mainly took the form of filling in omissions and completing the process outlined by 1937. The 1938 "General Guide to Branch Chapter Organization and Activities" tried to pinpoint inconsistencies with previous renovations and regularize

371. Yamaguchi, Manshū kenkoku no rekishi, pp. 370-74.

branch chapter matters. It enjoined chapters to instill like-mindedness (dōshi) by way of building a "blood brother unity." They were to work to keep out "impure thought" while both grappling with social problems in their local areas and "facilitating administration." Those old branch chapters that had been built around pre-existing economic, religious, educational, or philanthropic groups (as, for example, the chambers of commerce and agricultural associations) were now expected to reorganize themselves to conform to the new regional format. The steady growth in numbers of chapters and members continued. By September, 1938, there were 1.2 million members in 3,218 chapters. The breakdown in membership by ethnic group by this time was 960,881 Chinese-Manchu, 128,361 Japanese, 41,713 Korean, 4,001 Mongols, 2,879 Russians, and 49 others.³⁷²

By June, 1939, the general policy statement, "Outline of the Kyōwakai," totally embraced the notion that the Kyōwakai was a "mass tutelage organ" and went to some pains to eschew the "elitism of the common cause" (dōshiteki seishinshūgi).³⁷³ This seems to indicate, unless the statement was made simply for the sake of repetition, that there was still a tenacious pull among members toward the organization-as-ideology which could

372. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), pp. 106-107.

373. Ibid., p. 105.

not be overcome by the structural changes and leadership shakeups that had taken place.

At its inception, the National Federated Deliberative Assembly was designed to decentralize some of the decision making while tapping input from the lower levels.

It can also be seen as a means of knitting together the organization and helping to give it a more national orientation. Throughout the period 1934-41, the Assembly had proliferated, building up to a three-tiered system of assemblies at the provincial and hsien levels as well as at the national level.

It was in the 1942 National Assembly, which dealt almost exclusively with war-related matters, that the process of amalgamation between the Kyōwakai and the government is most clearly seen. To begin with, the Assembly included not only delegates from within the Kyōwakai but also from the national service bodies inaugurated and/or guided by the Kyōwakai--the Youth Corps, Kyōwa Volunteer Corps, National Women's Defense Association, Scientific and Technological Federation, land reclamation and village improvement programs, religious associations, educational associations, and others. Ambassadors to Manchukuo from Japan, Germany, Italy, and occupied China also attended.

Procedures also changed to something closer to the "democratic centralism" in Communist Party Congresses.

Hitherto there had been a requirement of unanimity, which in practice rested on a process of "negotiated consensus." Now the delegates' opinions and discussions were formulated into bills but were limited to those matters which would "benefit the nation" in a "patriotic" or "unselfish" sense. Operating at each of the three levels were so-called "bill adjustment" committees which were to apply these criteria. After the local levels had contributed their explanations for a given bill, the chairman of the Assembly made the final decision on its appropriateness. This was according to the procedural principle of shūgi tōsai ("general consultation, supervised judgment"). As would be expected, attrition took place at each level, while any disagreement moved a bill to the next higher level for decision. Thus, the process yielded only the lowest common denominator of proposals. It moved toward group authoritarian practice out of what was perhaps necessary avoidance of confusion from too many inputs. This procedure was considered a compromise between majority and dictatorial rule, which was in line with the expressed determination to avoid alike both despotism and parliamentary democracy. It was not necessary to go by the majority, since the chairman was expected to "consider public opinion" in the higher sense of "putting the community above the individual and the nation above the community." It seemed to satisfy the oriental notions of putting "moral responsibilities above rights."

The government had its own input into these decisions, since at the 1940 assembly they had begun to contribute delegates, including representatives of the special national development companies which were dominating so much of the Manchurian economy. At the same time, the policy of hyōri iHai opened the way for them to install officials in the branch and central leadership of the Kyōwakai. Therefore they participated at all levels.

The authoritarian aspects of these procedures is perhaps less surprising than the fact that it did keep channels open for tapping lower opinion. This was always stressed. The guidelines emphasized the Assembly as a "family conference" in that the object of this form of decision-making was not only to get the decisions but also to make public opinion reflect those decisions.

By 1942, the Kyōwakai National Federated Deliberative Assembly had already become one of the major focuses of national policy in a defense state. With this degree of amalgamation between government and the Kyōwakai, in fact, the Manchukuo Legislative Yuan virtually abdicated its functions entirely to the Assembly.³⁷⁴

It was not surprising that wartime demands following 1937 should have involved the Kyōwakai in the economic pursuits of Manchukuo. Much of its ideological rhetoric

374. Ibid., pp. 120-24.

had contained numerous economic references and, in fact, the earliest utopian vision of Manchuria held by Manchurian Japanese was of a major industrial state, utilizing its raw material potential but, at the same time, not a mere colonial source of raw materials for others. In January, 1937, the Manchukuo government launched its first Five Year Plan aiming at creating such an industrial establishment, modelled on the Soviet Five Year Plans already under way. It was to be implemented by a bewildering combination of directing authorities--bureaucrats, military officers, and monopoly industrialists both in Manchukuo and Japan. Anyone who thought that the objective of such a plan was primarily centered on raising the prosperity of all the people, as promised by the tenets of cultural dominion, might be suspicious that such a combination of administrators would exert themselves to fulfill such a promise.

We need not go into the complex web of control exerted by the Kwantung Army command, the SMR Company, the so-called "new zaibatsu," such as Aikawa Gisuke's Nissan Corporation, the new national policy companies, the so-called "super" bureaus and "new" or "revisionist" bureaucrats (shin or kakushin kanryō) both in Manchuria and in Japan. Suffice it to say that the first Five Year Plan became increasingly unrealistic as it was overtaken first by the China Incident and then the Pacific War. In the second plan, begun in 1942, a more realistic approach was

taken. Goods (machinery, etc.) expected to be imported from Japan for industrial expansion were significantly reduced and the overall emphasis was on efficiency and conservation rather than expansion of industrial facilities--which is to say, self-sufficiency of means while aiding the war effort wherever possible.³⁷⁵

The significance for the Kyōwakai was great. In a well-developed, well-integrated industrial milieu it would probably have had reduced economic importance. However, in a national defense state, under strain of shortages and with inevitable problems of distribution, the Kyōwakai expanded to provide the vital infrastructure of public control which all such societies under seige had to have. The National Federated Deliberative Assembly wrestled seriously with problems of distribution, which showed up as shortages and higher prices in the rural as compared with urban areas.³⁷⁶ Kyōwakai activities in promoting conservation by the public, fighting the black market, marshalling and redistributing labor from less to more desirable endeavors, etc., have been described in the previous chapter. Their overall structural effect was further amalgamation between the organization and the government. Giving the Kyōwakai an economic role launched it beyond

375. Ibid., p. 124.

376. Ibid., pp. 124-26.

mere propaganda and general public behavior matters. Now the Kyōwakai became a partner of the state in economic affairs and even in the police functions. Further toward the grass roots, the Kyōwakai, in fact, came close to substituting for the state, being more visible than any other manifestation of central authority.

Broadening the Kyōwakai's economic activities affected its structure by increasing the importance and vitality of their local chapters and affiliated bodies. Even as major decision-making in the organization was becoming more centralized and more state-derived, the Kyōwakai was also extending itself downward into the lives of the people. Specialized programs, ordered by the state or decided jointly with the Kyōwakai central leadership and launched on a national scale, were increasingly put into the hands of the branch chapters for implementation. They were expected to rely on their intimacy with the people in order to aid, mitigate, and ameliorate the effects of national economic programs as well as to enforce such programs. In short, the Kyōwakai was expected to be ubiquitous, undertaking everything from aid to small businesses to mobilization of science and technology.

In addition, the Kyōwakai was expected to participate in a new round of counterinsurgency pacification. Continued Korean and Chinese Communist Party guerrilla activity in Southeast Manchuria had defied all

past pacification efforts and, as they disrupted exploitation of valuable mineral resources needed for war production, in October, 1937, the Kwantung Army decided on another full scale military pacification operation, which lasted until March, 1940. This was to be an upgraded version of earlier operations, including all the elements of the previous ones plus land reclamation, resettlement of "safe" Japanese and White Russian populations into the area, and a "protected hamlet" program for some of the natives of the region.

The Kyōwakai was called upon to expedite the land reclamation and resettlement programs, including mediating between the old residents and new colonists.³⁷⁷ The structural significance came insofar as the Kyōwakai had to try to bridge the gap not as a small, relatively unobtrusive group already on the scene (as in 1932-1933) but rather from the position of "selling" the new programs from above.³⁷⁸ Something similar was also undertaken in Jehol against the Chinese Communists.

From 1937 through the end of the war, a series of military figures occupied the leading positions in the Kyōwakai. Amakasu Tadahiko continued to play an active and

377. Ibid., pp. 129-30.

378. The protected hamlets were impossible to "sell" and remained within the more coercive realm of the Kwantung Army, although the Kyōwakai no doubt had many tangential connections with the program. See Lee, pp. 79-185.

leading role as head of the General Affairs Department. From November, 1940, on, Miyake Mitsuhashi, a Kwantung Army officer who had been on the staff in the Manchurian Incident, was chief of central headquarters. He and Amakasu instituted their updating of hyōri ittai, called nibai ittai ("two sides in one body"), which involved an across-the-board installation of government officials in the Kyōwakai leadership. Provincial governors, by fiat, became Kyōwakai provincial headquarters chiefs; vice-governors became vice-heads; hsien magistrates headed hsien regional chapters; and vice-magistrates were their assistants. At the same time, over one thousand Kyōwakai personnel were moved into government offices. The Youth Training Corps and Kyōwa Volunteer Corps were placed under a more centralized direction within the Kyōwakai, whereas hitherto they had operated mostly on local initiative and had been responsive chiefly to local projects. This centralization was to make sure that projects which were given high priority by the government-Kyōwakai leadership got attended to first. The hsien regional branch chapters were fortified as the putative "front line" of the Kyōwakai and more Chinese-Manchu members were recruited. Structurally, this stage represented the final amalgamation between the Kyōwakai and the state. In the view of the proponents of this change, the aim was to "eliminate all friction between the two," hence achieving a "unitary

synthetic political leadership structure" and the "concentration of power."³⁷⁹

In August, 1944, Miyake instituted guidelines which dealt mostly with activities in the late wartime situation. Branch chapters now were further bureaucratized into committees composed of the heads of all the special activities--Youth and Boys Association, Kyōwa Volunteer Corps, and National Women's Defense Association--plus an Organization and Propaganda Committee in each. Districts were set up for these special activities and a Kyōwakai leader was designated to "patrol" each of these districts to blanket the country more completely. Assignments (and probably quotas) now were made to chapters to assure that their special activity projects were "useful" according to centrally-determined priorities. An increased effort was made to recruit and integrate women more fully into the Kyōwakai. Given the fact that women were taking on many industrial and service tasks, they were proportionately moved into Kyōwakai guidance positions.³⁸⁰

The government continued to milk the Kyōwakai more and more for "leaders" and cadre for all the multifarious endeavors, which is ironic in view of the mass character engendered by the "net fishing" approach, in which members

379. Manshūkokushi Hensan Iinkai (Kakuron), pp. 130-37.

380. Ibid., pp. 151-53.

were made so by definition with no real method established for separating leaders from followers within the organization.

On August 9, 1945, the Russian blitzkrieg fell on Manchuria. The head of the Kyōwakai, Miyake, evacuated Hsinking along with the Manchukuo government and went to T'unghua in the southeast. Vice-chief Yūki Kiyotarō was put in charge of the Kyōwakai's defense efforts, but these soon broke down with the unexpected speed of the Russian incursion. The rest of the Hsinking staff and their families also moved south. All staff, including field personnel who could make their way into the central headquarters, were paid off with a year's salary. The evacuation was interrupted by the surrender of Japan, and many, if not most, who had moved south returned. On August 15th the Kyōwakai was dissolved along with the Manchukuo government.

At this point the Russians began systematically to arrest Kyōwakai Japanese staff. Of 1300, some 1000 were imprisoned and then sent to labor camps in Siberia. The Russians apparently equated the Kyōwakai with the German Nazi Party and were aware of their anti-Communist pacification activities. Being treated accordingly, these were the last Japanese to be repatriated and reportedly received the cruelest treatment. However, although some Japanese were attacked by rioters in the final days, many, mostly women

and children, were hidden and saved by Chinese--the last bitter vestiges of minzoku kyōwa.³⁸¹

381. Ibid., pp. 154-55.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Throughout world history there have been various kinds of imperialism. Where the native peoples have tenacious and viable cultural institutions, as in India, the colonialists may opt, as did the British, to penetrate to a limited degree, dominating only those cultural and economic institutions which serve their purposes. There are other examples, however, where economics was not greatly affected by an imperialist presence but cultural penetration was deep, as in the conversion of Orthodox Serbs and Greeks to Islam or in the Germanization of Czechs and Poles. More complete conquests resulted when totally different and "inferior" peoples (such as the Bantus or American Indians) were conquered, expelled, exterminated, or made helots.

The Japanese on the Asian continent faced a dilemma, since neither assimilation nor helotry held much promise. For the first two decades in Manchuria, they seemed to be operating at an amicable standoff. The South Manchurian Railway Company provided gradual economic penetration, and political influence through diplomacy was exerted wherever a political vacuum occurred. While

conceding that Manchuria was effectively Chinese and accepting any Chinese leader in Manchuria who guaranteed a continuation of treaty rights, the SMR Company relied on the home government to maintain the balance of power in Manchuria in their favor. The Chinese warlord leadership on both sides of the Great Wall contributed to this stasis. Relationships with warlords like Chang Tso-lin enabled the Japanese to move comfortably into the set of assumptions associated with "cultural dominion" whereby the economic benefits of industrialization, full utilization of resources, and efficient administration were promised to all.

Manchurian Japanese who had operated under the assumptions of cultural dominion were among the first to recognize the danger to it posed by Chinese nationalism. Since Japanese imperialism could never rest permanently on force alone, a new set of assumptions, minzoku kyōwa, had to replace cultural dominion. Otherwise, Chinese nationalism threatened the whole Japanese position in Manchuria. Only by vitiating Chinese or any other separate national identities could the Japanese begin to assume the "big brother" role for which they felt their proven talents and energy fitted them. Hence, they had to create a new national identity, backed by a credible ideology of harmony among races in a new state. Such a new nationality was Japan's only answer to survival on the continent outside

of a system of unequal treaties, commercial capitalist special positions, and garrison forces which would always be caught uneasily between the increasingly restless Chinese and the manifold diplomatic advantages of the Western powers. This was the lesson of the Tsinan Incident, the economic boycotts, and the rights recovery movement.

Neither the idea of cultural dominion nor the need to undercut outside national loyalties was startlingly new to Japanese thinking. What was unique was the vision of an artificial nationalism created by propagating the slogan of racial harmony--minzoku kyōwa. The Manchurian situation had taught the minzoku kyōwa advocates that no race could afford to triumph too completely since ultimately the lion would have to lie with the lamb. Racial harmony had to approximate an ecology in the sense of mutual support between those who led and those who followed. In addition, there had to be ends for everyone to recognize, such as independence or prosperity through industrialization, to justify the means.

These assessments of minzoku kyōwa as an ideology fall into the realm of what was intended rather than what was effectuated, since the promises of pan-Asianism implicit in minzoku kyōwa were obviously not fulfilled in the wartime milieu following 1937. Whether one focuses on the later, totalitarian, uses of minzoku kyōwa or on its earlier pan-Asian possibilities, however, it is impossible

to ignore the fact that it existed in both ideal and expedient forms. What is unfortunate for scholarly purposes is that the two are often mixed.

This study has traced the process of "bureaucratization" of the Kyōwakai wherein putative ideologues became supplanted by those who were more pragmatic. It was a process not dissimilar to the controversy within the Chinese Communist Party over bureaucratization which Franz Schurmann sees in terms of "reds versus experts." The pragmatists were successful in their efforts to weld the Kyōwakai to the government because the Kyōwakai was dependent on outside funds. Also, after a certain point in the development of the organization, the ideologues were too few to maintain it on an independent party-oriented course. In the rarefied and constricted decision-making circles of early Manchukuo, specious anti-party arguments were effective.

Any aspirations to sharing power with the government and Kwantung Army were bound to be frustrated by the simple fact that the Kyōwakai, as originally constituted, was neither ubiquitous enough at the grassroots nor influential enough at the higher levels to take on sustained administrative functions without the backing of the army and/or government. Agricultural associations, chambers of commerce, and local branch chapters created in pacification could not go beyond purely local affairs or politicizing.

On their own, they were unable to transcend their local constituencies in order to weld them into the desired mosaic.

Finally, the wartime situation obviated a leisurely integration of grassroots organs. War speeded the growth of centralized government and expedited the subordination of such organizations as the Kyōwakai. War also enhanced the role of the army and encouraged its sense of impatience with political tactics. The war in China hastened the influx of Japanese personnel and domestic Japanese influence over Manchurian affairs. Minzoku kyōwa, as originally conceived, called for minimizing direct ties with Japan and greater reliance on Manchurian-centered thinking and on the Manchurian Japanese. This ideal of imperial decentralization was doomed by the circumstances.

In pursuit of economic and military domination of both Manchuria and China, the Japanese army and government abandoned their only potentially successful policy for dealing with the mainland, one which could have grown easily and naturally out of their original position in Manchuria. Yamaguchi Jūji, a spokesman for the original minzoku kyōwa vision, consistently lays blame for Japan's imperialist failures on the Japanese penchant for military force. He is convinced that Japan could have retained its special position in East Asia without resort to force and

thus withheld the West if she had paid more attention to the ideals of minzoku kyōwa ideology.

As it is, the Kyōwakai played a far greater role in the Japanese administration of Manchuria than could be gathered from most work to date. Suzuki Ryūshi states:

The Kyōwakai represents a unique effort at utilizing ideology in the pursuit of direct colonial rule in the context of Japanese imperialism. Japan's control of Manchukuo therefore took on a special flavor. Kyōwakai was necessary in the light of Manchuria's complex agricultural society's racial situation, her pre-modern landholding and local administrative system. It would have been impossible for Japan to have approached the administrative control problems of Manchuria in any other way.³⁸²

The minzoku kyōwa movement, hitherto neglected, has significance for modern Japanese history not so much for what it ultimately accomplished but for what was intended by at least a number of Japanese proponents. Existence of such a movement and the struggles of its adherents suggests that Japanese pan-Asianism, even in the 1920s and 1930s, was not entirely cynical nor did it derive wholly from the government. Ideology, however, did serve the purposes of both the Japanese and Manchukuo governments. Civilian organizations originally designed, as were the Manshū Seinen Renmei, Kyōwatō, and Kyōwakai, for the promotion of Manchurian-centered interests were increasingly utilized and eventually the Kyōwakai formed a key part of the

382. Suzuki, part 2, p. 62.

Manchukuo administrative establishment. So minzoku kyōwa was used. Whether or not its application in a more idealistic pan-Asian form would have made a difference in Japan's imperial fortunes can only be left as an intriguing question.

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