

HSU SHU-CHENG AND THE CANCELLATION  
OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN OUTER MONGOLIA

by

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## ABSTRACT

This paper outlines the background to the internal conflicts in the Peking government and the Outer Mongolian government in 1919, and relates how these conflicts influenced the negotiations for the cancellation of self-government. In conjunction with this background the translation and analysis of the 1919 section of Hsu She-cheng's nien-p'u provide a fairly detailed picture of the events in Urga in the latter months of 1919.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The return of Outer Mongolia to China in 1919 was one of the most dramatic events in the early history of the Chinese Republic; if Outer Mongolia had been permanently secured it would have been one of the most important events in the history of modern China. Outer Mongolia, over 1,300,000 square miles in area comprised more than one-quarter of the total land area of the Chinese empire.<sup>1</sup> The potential of this land to supply foodstuffs and raw materials to an over-populated and slowly modernizing China was tremendous. So also her promise as an area for colonization. Her political importance in Sino-Soviet relations has been considerable and will continue to be so. China's failure to retain Outer Mongolia is in good measure a result of the way in which she regained her, and the events there in 1919 help reveal that the adverse effects of bad politics in Peking could not be limited to China proper.

Hsu Shu-cheng Hsien-sheng Wen-chi Nien-p'u Ho-k'an was published in Taiwan in 1962 by the Taiwan Commercial Publishing House, the author Hsu Dau-lin (Tao-lin) is the son of Hsu Shu-cheng. The translation which forms the second chapter of this paper is taken from the nien-p'u in this work.

Making allowances for the fact that the material covering the Outer Mongolian affair in 1919, which is translated here, makes up only a portion of the nien-p'u, and

making allowances too for the difficulties the author had to contend with in writing objectively about his father, who was widely condemned as a pro-Japanese traitor,<sup>3</sup> the reader, nonetheless, cannot help but conclude that the Hsu Dau-lin has written badly.

An obvious question then, is, of what value is a translation of this section of the nien-p'u? An equally obvious answer is that it is of value because in the English language we at present have only very general coverage of the events in Outer Mongolia in 1919,<sup>4</sup> and therefore, anything of a more detailed nature which helps fill this hiatus seems a justifiable enterprise. But this is not a sufficient reason, for it can be pointed out that there are other Chinese works on the subject which do not share in the faults of Hsu Dau-lin's nien-p'u.<sup>5</sup>

The main advantage that this nien-p'u excerpt has over these other works is that it focuses specifically upon Hsu Shu-cheng, the central figure in this Chinese attempt to regain Outer Mongolia, and to some extent upon Ch'en I, his adversary. As a result of this focus the conflict between Hsu and Ch'en, and its relation to conflicts in the Peking government and in the Outer Mongolian government is made more apparent.

To my knowledge, no one has yet considered the extent to which this conflict determined the course of events in

Outer Mongolia. Hsu Dau-lin's treatment of this period, although of inferior quality, makes a good springboard for this analysis. This paper will attempt to make such an analysis.<sup>6</sup>

The power struggles which dominated the Peking and the Urga governments in 1919 stemmed mainly from the circumstances of the creation of these governments at the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in China.

In 1911 the Manchus were overthrown in China and a Republican government was established. But this radical change in the form of government, quite understandably, was not accompanied by a radical change in the political perception of the Chinese people. Government in the name of Republicanism became in reality government for the sake of personal or local gain. Yuan Shih-k'ai was strong enough to ensure some degree of stabilization, but his death in 1916 left no figure of sufficient stature to retain even the degree of stability that existed under Yuan. Warlordism and political intrigue were to dominate China for the next decade.

Outer Mongolia also declared her independence from the Manchus in 1911. The Chinese had looked abroad for a basis for their new government, the Mongols did likewise, basing their new government in part on the example of Imperial China and in part apparently on the West. A

Ministry of five portfolios was created, a bicameral parliament was established and the Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan was elevated to the position of Emperor and given a Chinese reign-style.

Much as the Chinese lacked the political experience to put a republican government into efficient operation, the Mongol government also lacked political experience and politics in Urga much like politics in Peking became very much a matter of preserving one's personal advantage or the advantage of one's group or party.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the political environment in Peking and in Urga was in this respect very similar. That it was not a situation that promoted lasting solutions to difficult problems is made adequately clear in Chapter III of this paper.

It remains only to comment briefly on several of the more important people involved in the Outer Mongolian affair in 1919, to assist the reader in understanding the place of these figures in the events of 1919 covered in the translation.<sup>8</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng, the central figure in this paper, was born in Hsiaohsien in Kiangsu Province on November 4, 1880, and was assassinated at Langfang on December 30, 1925. A gifted and energetic man, his political career began in 1901 in Tsinan when he met Tuan Ch'i-jui, whose staff he joined that same year. He was sent by Tuan to military

school in Japan and was to become Tuan's closest advisor, referred to as "the spirit of Tuan Ch'i-jui." His real rise to prominence, following that of Tuan, came with the fall of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Hsu was co-founder of the Anfu Club which successfully promoted Tuan's interests in 1918. By 1919 when he was appointed Frontier Defense Commissioner he was at the peak of his power. Noted for his ruthlessness and his ability to get things done, he did much to create dissensions within the Northern government.<sup>9</sup>

Ch'en I was born in Huang-p'o Hsien in Hupeh in 1873. He held various lesser administrative positions before his appointment as chief advisor to Ch'en Lu in negotiating the Kiakhta Agreement in 1915. Following this, he served as the Assistant Commissioner at Uliassutai until his appointment as Chief Commissioner in August, 1917. It was in this capacity that he conducted negotiations for the cancellation of Outer Mongolian self-government. He was apparently opposed to the Anfu Clique, or at least his actions in Urga seemed to indicate this, as did his re-appointment to Urga after the defeat of the Anfu Clique in 1920.<sup>10</sup>

Chin Yun-p'eng was born in 1877, probably in Tsining in Shantung Province. He was a graduate of Yuan Shih-k'ai's Peiyang Military Academy. Following the revolution in 1911 he was closely associated with Yuan Shih-k'ai and Tuan Chi'i'jui. In 1916 and 1917 he supported Tuan in his bid

for power. He was administrative director of the War Participation Army before this post was given to Hsu Shu-cheng in September 1918. He became Minister of War in January 1919 and concurrently Premier in September of that year. Because of Hsu Shu-cheng's manipulation of the Army and of the Cabinet a strong rivalry developed between these two men. Chin ultimately turned to the Chihli Clique which defeated the Anfu Clique in July, 1920.<sup>11</sup>

Hsu Shih-ch'ang was born in 1885 probably in Honan. He was a member of the Hanlin Academy and when he became President on October 10, 1918 he was the first non-military President of Republican China. He had received support from Yuan Shih-k'ai as a student and remained closely associated with Yuan thereafter. As President he became little more than a puppet of Tuan Ch'i-jui. To counter this he supported Chin Yun-p'eng for the Premiership to limit the hand of Hsu Shu-cheng, and intrigued with Chihli leaders and Chang Tso-lin to weaken the control of the Anfu Clique.<sup>12</sup>

Ch'en Lu was born in 1876 in Fukien Province. He was active in the Chinese Foreign Service and is mainly known for his work as China's chief negotiator for the Kiakhta Agreement in 1915. He was the first Chinese Commissioner to Urga following this agreement, handing the post to Ch'en I in 1917. In 1919 as Foreign Minister for a short time and as Vice Foreign Minister acting as Foreign Minister he was Ch'en

I's chief source of communication with the Peking government. Although Ch'en Lu headed the Frontier Defense Office for a time he is said to have been anti-Anfu in sentiment.<sup>13</sup>

Tuan Ch'i-jui played an important role in the development of the Peiyang Army. A strong supporter of Yuan Shih-k'ai during the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty he remained so in the initial years of the Republic, but his growing strength led to friction with Yuan Shih-k'ai and eventually he opposed Yuan's monarchical bid in 1916. From 1916 to 1920 Tuan was the dominant figure in the Peking government, holding the Premiership on four different occasions and manipulating the President's office. Hsu Shu-cheng's rising power during this period paralleled that of Tuan.

In 1919 Tuan was Director of the War Participation Bureau and then of the Frontier Defense Bureau when the change in name was made in June. Despite this position he seems to have had little to do with the events in Urga in 1919.<sup>14</sup>


There are three Mongol figures with whom we should deal here briefly. They are the Bogdo Gegen Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan, who will be referred to in this paper simply as the Living Buddha; the Minister of the Interior and concurrently Prime Minister, Badmadorji; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tserendorji.

The Jebtsundamba Hutuktu was the top ranking lama in Outer Mongolia. He exhibited a good deal of independence in his relations with China and was more and more looked upon as the seat of Mongol authority by other high-ranking Mongols who were dissatisfied with the administrative reforms of the Manchu's in Mongolia. When independence was declared, supreme authority was placed in the hands of the Living Buddha. The nobles did not foresee that this would limit their hand in the new government.<sup>15</sup>

Tserendorji was a Khalkha commoner who fared remarkably well in the government of independent Outer Mongolia. He began as an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later became Foreign Minister. It was in his capacity as Foreign Minister that he came in contact with Ch'en I, and was as a result of this contact eventually made the representative of the nobles in negotiations with Ch'en I for the cancellation of self-government. Tserendorji's abilities are attested to by the fact that he was also to serve as Prime Minister in the Revolutionary Government established in 1921.<sup>16</sup>

Badmadorji, a lama, and Minister of the Interior at the beginning of 1919, was concurrently appointed as Prime Minister by the Living Buddha following the death of Prime Minister Sain Noyon Khan to improve the controlling hand of

the lamas in government.<sup>17</sup> As the eldest member of the government Badmadorji carried considerable prestige and power, but because he had been passed over in the granting of titles, he harboured a degree of resentment towards the Living Buddha. Hsu Shu-cheng was to take advantage of this in his negotiations for the cancellation of self-government.



## CHAPTER II

### TRANSLATION

1919 - Hsu Shu-cheng age forty.<sup>1</sup>

Summary:<sup>2</sup>

In February 1919 peace negotiations between the North and South opened in Shanghai, but ended without result (May 13). On May 4 there was a student demonstration which spread throughout the entire country (the May 4th Movement). On June 10 the government terminated the appointments of Ts'ai Ju-lin<sup>3</sup> Chang Tsung-hsiang and Lu Tsung-yu. On June 13 Kung Hsin-chan headed the cabinet, replacing Ch'ien Neng-hsun. On June 24 Tuan Ch'i-jui was given the new position of Director of the Frontier Defense Bureau.

On September 24 Chin Yun-p'eng headed the cabinet, replacing Kung Hsin-chan. On November 22 Outer Mongolia cancelled her autonomy.

In the Southwest Ch'en Ch'un-hsuan was still in control of the Military Government.

#### Important Changes in the International Scene

While on the surface the reason for Tuan Ch'i-jui to have Hsu Shih-ch'ang installed as President was to alleviate the confrontation between himself and Feng Kuo-chang<sup>4</sup> but Tuan also thought that since Hsu was an intellectual and well on in years (Hsu was then 64), and since relations between them had always been good, and further, since Hsu had received the presidency through Tuan's support, that Hsu would be relatively more amenable to his decisions. Little did Tuan know that this was a serious misjudgment.

Hsu was a cunning old fox well versed in the ways of the world and the straight-forward Tuan was no match for him.

Also Hsu had his own views of domestic and international policies. Internationally he favoured the traditional strategy of playing off one foreigner against the other and was opposed to becoming overly dependent on any particular power. Also, he throughout had somewhat closer affinities with the English and Americans [rather than with the Japanese]. Domestically he was an intellectual with broad worldly experience who sought to achieve his aims through the manipulation of personal ties; he did not approve of the use of military force against the South. Thus, in both these important areas he was in direct opposition to Tuan.

Also, there had been a change in the international situation that was very much to Tuan's disadvantage. In the latter half of 1918 the war in Europe was drawing to a close and this resulted in a renewal of British and American interests in the Far East. No longer was Japan to be allowed to monopolize the political scene there. In Japan the Hara-Cabinet took office in September 1918 and, compelled to adapt themselves to the changed international circumstances, they initiated their policy of, "non-interference in Chinese affairs". (The huge, and for the most part unguaranteed Nishihara Loans, said to range between 200 million and 300 million yen,<sup>5</sup> were also part of the reason for the downfall of the Terauchi Cabinet).<sup>6</sup> On December 3, 1918 Japan issued a proclamation stating that, "until China was unified no

further loans nor any other form of financial aid, would be given to the Chinese Government".<sup>7</sup> This sufficiently explains the Japanese withdrawal under pressure from the West and the critical blow this was to Tuan's plans for a military re-unification of China.

Under international pressure (ostensibly this was applied because of the powers' desire for peace in China, actually it was an Anglo-American counter to Japan's aid to Tuan) a peace conference was opened in Shanghai on February 20, 1919 to which the North and the South both send representatives (Chu Ch'i-ch'ien headed the Northern delegates and T'ang Shao-i the South). The major point of contention at the meeting was the "War Participation Army" which Tuan Ch'i-jui had started training the previous year. The Southern representatives felt that with the end of the war in Europe there was no further reason for the maintenance of the War Participation Army, and that therefore the military agreement with Japan should have been annulled, the Army demobilized, and the War Participation Loans stopped. But Tuan had managed shortly before the opening of the conference (February 15) to have the effective period of the military agreement prolonged. Under these conditions the conference was doomed to failure. Consequently it lasted less than a year, its break-up being announced on May 13. (In August the North once again made a gesture of attempting to re-open the

conference again without result).

#### The Program of the Northwest Planning [Commission]

Although the War Participation Army had been maintained, the name, "War Participation", had become most inappropriate, so in the fall of 1918 a Northwest Border Planning Office was established within the War Participation Bureau. Hsu Shu-cheng was the director of this new office. This was a sort of preparation for using the term "Frontier Defense" to replace the term "War Participation".

As chance would have it the confusion in Russia at this time as a result of the October Revolution touched off a re-orientation towards China in Outer Mongolia. Hsu Shu-cheng's Northwest Frontier plans and his actions there came about as a result of this coincidence.

Outer Mongolia declared her independence in the hsin-hai year (1911) - on the lunar calendar, the 28th day of the 12th month.<sup>9</sup> The Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu assumed the throne in Urga and the nation called itself Ta Meng-gu Kuo, with the reign style, Kung-tai (共戴). This was of course the result of years of Russian intrigue in Mongolia.<sup>10</sup> In the Sino-Russian Declaration of November 22, 1913 China formally recognized Outer Mongolia's right to self-government (Article 2). China also agreed to post neither troops nor officials,

civil or military, in Outer Mongolia, and to stop the promotion of colonization.<sup>11</sup> This marked the real separation of Outer Mongolia from China. On June 7, 1915 the Kiakhta Agreement was signed by all three parties - China, Russia and Mongolia. It reaffirmed all the articles set out in the 1913 Sino-Russian Declaration. Thus were the treaty bonds by which we lost our rights re-affirmed and strengthened.

In 1917 as a result of the unsettled conditions in Russia caused by the continuing Communist revolution the Russians were losing their control of Outer Mongolia; this was paralleled by a gradual increase of Japan's interest in the area. By the spring of 1919 the Japanese plans to make use of the Buriat Mongol, Semenov, and the Mongol bandit, Fushengge, in Outer Mongolia became daily more positive. (This plan was to create a Greater Mongolia which would include Buriat Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia and Hulunbuir and also be under the control of the Japanese). Control of this operation was in the hands of Colonel Matsui, the Japanese military officer stationed in Urga. Our General Staff Office obtained some of the invitations to his meetings and banquets with the Buriat Mongols.<sup>12</sup> But many of the Outer Mongol nobles were very much afraid of the Japanese and thus favoured renewing their ties with China to defend themselves against the Japanese.

It was just at this time that Hsu Shu-cheng had assumed his duties as Director of the Northwest Border Defense Planning Commission and he was of course paying close attention to developments in Outer Mongolia and working out positive plans to deal with the area. On March 26 the French Ambassador said he had heard that the government had suggested, "sending troops into Mongolia," and Ch'en Lu replied, "the troops would probably be led by Lieutenant-General Hsu Shu-cheng."<sup>13</sup>

On April 17 Hsu presented his, "Policy Outline For the Northwest Frontier," and on June 10 it was approved by parliament. On June 13 the government gave him the special appointment of, "Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner," and on June 24 concurrently appointed him as, "Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Frontier Defense Army." Everything he did from this time on in Mongolia was based upon the policy he laid out in this report. I am therefore including a complete transcription of it:

Gentlemen: I have for some time been making plans for the Northwest Frontier area. I have been ordered to prepare a policy outline and submit it herewith for your decision.

The Northwestern area of China extends from Tsetsen Khan [Aimak] in the east to the Altai Mountains in the west, and from the border with Russia in the north to Chahar and Suiyuan in the south. This vast unbroken territory of over ten million square li is inhabited by the nomadic Mongol banners. Population is sparse and there

is little in the way of economic development. Whether the land is the property of the state or the property of the people has not yet been clearly formulated. Therefore any administrator for this area will have little chance of doing any good unless he embraces a strong determination to develop the country and bear with difficulties and hardships, and unless he employs both severity and leniency [in dealing with the people]. When a man is appointed for this position the government must give him full authority to act as circumstances require, otherwise his efforts will ultimately come to naught. Moreover at this time our treasury is depleted, yet what little capital there is is being used to foster useless plans. Given a little more time I fear the treasury will be drained dry. This is enough to arouse the indignation of any statesman. Each of us has our own way of doing things. The proposals I am putting forward may in some cases seem unsuitable and I do not expect everyone to agree with them as a whole. However, if on careful reflection you decide they should not be instituted then they must be discarded, but if they are adopted then not a single one of the proposals may be ignored.

1. First, an official title must be promulgated which is suited to the authority of the office. For when names are correct then intercourse can be fruitful, and with correct names and fruitful intercourse success becomes possible. If the title of the office is vague its orders will lack weight, if too precise its operation will be constricted. Hopefully it will be vaguely yet precisely enough delineated so that the officer can conduct his duties as he sees fit, without stirring up either internal or outside dissatisfaction. If we order that a general announcement be made stating that we are planning to reduce the number of troops and to bring order and security to the people and have therefore appointed a special officer to oversee the opening of new land we should thus ease the minds of both the military and the populace and create some degree of faith in this official, which is precisely what we want.

2. The authority of the office must be established immediately. In every case where authority

is not clearly defined efficient operation is made difficult. The establishment of the title of office, it seems to me, should be followed by the formulation of a systemized organisation of sub-officials which should be clearly explained. Parliament should be requested to draft and promulgate regulations for intercourse between the tu-hu's, tu-t'ung's and tso-li's<sup>14</sup> of the north-western area and the tuchuns and civil governors of adjoining provinces. With regulations to consult we should be able to avoid administrative tie-ups.

3. Railroads are the most urgent requirement. Industry, culture, commerce and defense are all dependent on a communication system. The North-west is a boundless desert wilderness and the people are for the most part nomadic herders. As a result of this communication is not the slightest bit developed. However, the country is largely flat without high mountains or broad rivers dividing any of it. Although there are expanses of desert they can be easily skirted. Railroad construction will definitely not be difficult. From Kalgan to Manchuli it is roughly 1,500 li, from Kuei-sui through Sair Usa and Urga to Kiakhta it is somewhat over 2,000 li. From Sair Usa through Uliassutai and Kobdo, turning back through the Altai Mountains to Urumchi, thence straight to Sui-ting amounts in total to 5,400 to 5,500 li. From Uliassutai to Tannu-Urianghai is just over 1,000 li. These make up the indispensable trunk lines which should be planned and constructed with the greatest haste in order to facilitate initiation of other ventures. If sufficient capital is available they should be constructed simultaneously, if it is not then they should be built in sequence. When a construction schedule has been worked out it will be a simple matter to write up contracts. As soon as the trouble in Russia has settled down we can discuss an extension north from Kiakhta to connect with the Trans-Siberian Railway. This would be most advantageous for trade.

4. Motor vehicles can be used on the routes initially. The construction of over 10,000 li of railroad lines will take a considerable length of time. Motor vehicle companies should therefore be

set up to operation along the routes of the proposed rail lines. In addition horse drawn wagons and camels can extend the service to more distant stations. Working together these services will complement one another in promoting the circulation of merchandise. Hopefully, commerce will come to life and when it does tax returns will improve day by day.

5. The opening of land and herding can be organized immediately. The Northwest is a vast and sparsely populated area with a very cold climate, and in Ch'ing times there are too many prohibitive laws; as a result people had no desire to settle there. Now the time is right to open the land and develop the herds. Land can gradually be opened on both sides of the rail lines and cattle and sheep and other animals can be raised in large numbers. Horses are of especial importance. Grasses that grow there at present can be used to enrich the soil. These are realistic goals. Although the land of the Northwest is divided by areas of desert there are also vast grass-covered plains very suitable for cultivating and herding. Although there is not an extensive river system coarse grass grows in profusion which is sufficient to prove that the water is not too far below the surface and that it will be an easy matter to sink wells to irrigate the land.

6. The extraction of minerals can begin immediately. Northwest mineral resources are abundant. The Altai-Tannu-Urianghai-Kubus Gol area and the Kharchin-Ordos region have all the major metals in large quantity and of excellent quality. Foreigners have long been eager to exploit these areas. Other minerals such as coal and salt also exist in not inconsiderable amounts, and are on the surface so that extraction will require little labour.

7. Trade can be promoted. The products of the Northwest are not as numerous as those of China proper, but the volume of animals and plants shipped to and sold in China is quite large. There are also a large number of products from China proper which are sold in Mongolia. Once transportation has improved trade is bound to flourish.

8. Military organisation should also be undertaken. Recent rumours of unrest in the Mongol Banners are not yet definitely known to be fact. Yet many military men and politicians are bringing forward plans for the immediate mobilization of troops to attack and suppress the Mongols. Such an unjustifiable use of military power will achieve nothing.

The Mongols are suspicious but eager to gain petty advantages and thus are easily won over. To frighten them with a sudden increase in troops might put them on the defensive, lead them to engage foreign assistance, and quite contrary to what we want would cause trouble. Such action could in no way compare with the early introduction of industry, commerce, land development and mining, which would draw them closer to us. As our ventures begin developing we should then increase our military forces in order to give them protection. Not only would this cut down on military expenditures, it would at the same time ease the pressure of government finances. This is indeed the best way to manage the border; conditions there will become daily more settled and defense will be permanently secure.

9. Education of the Mongols must be started immediately. From the beginning of the Ch'ing Dynasty up to the present Mongolia has belonged to China.

- a period of roughly 300 years. Throughout this period it was the policy of the government to keep the Mongols ignorant. Such a policy runs counter to proper human relations and morality. In future if we want to draw the Mongols closer to us, unless we make great effort to draw the Mongols closer to us, unless we make great effort to improve education and pass laws to promote learning, success will be difficult. Now, the Mongols are a dull people and if we were to suddenly force Chinese language and literature upon them there would not be one of them who would not reject it. I think it would be more suitable to have Chinese first study and achieve some degree of proficiency in written and spoken Mongolian. Government officials, civilians and clerks should study and practice their Mongolian together. As their Mongolian improves so there will be a daily improvement in relations between Chinese and Mongols. Ultimately some Mongols will begin to

to see the shortcomings of their own language and writing system. Once this happens there will be concerned Mongols taking up the study of Chinese. At that point there will be no need to force them, for led on by their realization of the advantages for them, they will of themselves turn to the right path.

10. Customs and habits should also be gradually changed. Up to the present the inconvenience of communication has limited exchange between Mongols and Chinese, and the greatest reason for the lack of a common culture has been this lack of communication. Herein lies the seed of many of today's problems. In addition to this, in the Ch'ing Dynasty restrictions did not allow intermarriage between Mongol and Chinese. As a result the division between the two peoples grew steadily greater with the result that in one country we have two completely different cultures. Present plans require an order to be issued removing all these restrictions. When men can take their families with them and intermarry long-standing difficulties will be quickly cleared away, and officials, farmers, commercial men and miners will be able to go to Mongolia with their families. When our people live there for long periods there will be increased communication between households and intermarriage will take place of its own accord. In the course of time they will adopt Chinese culture and the separation of the two regions will be obliterated.

Everyone of the above proposals demands immediate attention and before any of them can be undertaken large sums of money will be required. If we put these proposals into one actual practice we can expect some positive returns in three or four years; after ten years the returns will be tremendous. I submit herewith a plan for securing the needed capital.

We must establish our credit by issuing public bonds, and a bank must be set up and banknotes issued. Both moves are necessary - for the success of each will depend upon the other. The amount of the bond issue should be enough to cover the cost of the first rail line. The order of construction of the lines can follow whatever is most advantageous

to us. However, the Sui-yuan-Kiakhta line should be built first and should be built immediately. Because this line might involve complications with international treaties, if it is not done quickly there will undoubtedly be problems.<sup>15</sup> With this line completed, however, there will be less chance of trouble with the other lines.

This line totals over 2,000 li and each li will require over 20,000 yuan. At a rough calculation the bond issue will have to be for 50,000,000 yuan. They can be called Domestic Border Development Bonds, the use of the funds will be fixed, and border ventures will be used to guarantee them. Although it would be difficult to sell bonds at the present time, it is not necessary to sell them immediately. We need only use this to show that we are going to promote border development and as a basis to create trust in our selling agent, and for the present it will be sufficient to borrow two or three million.

In addition a Border Development Bank must be established and given authority to issue bank notes. By selling public shares in this bank another three or four million yuan can be raised. Together with funds raised by means of the bond issue this will easily total no less than six million yuan. With six million yuan in capital 11 or 12 million yuan in bank notes can easily be put into circulation. With these bank notes small loans can be made as time demands, and motor car and horse drawn wagon companies, farming, herding and mining, all these sorts of ventures, will begin to flourish within a few months.

When work on the rail line gets under way it will be more and more viewed as a sound investment. Then the initial debentures can be recalled and the sale of the bonds begun. The plan moves step by step, is sound, and will not fail. All the government has to do is select a competent man, create the office and give him the necessary authority and credentials. The logical nature of the plan will be apparent to all; all you will have to do is sit back and reap the rewards.

The fear that since the northwest is mostly Outer Mongolian territory and that therefore any mining or road building might, because of treaties incur trouble with Russia, is an unfounded one. The Russian treaty states that China is free to build rail lines in Outer Mongolia, but that if Chinese funds are insufficient any loans must be negotiated with Russia.<sup>16</sup> At the present time the turmoil in Russia is at its peak. To seek a loan from her would be no less than to ridicule her. Therefore, it is best that we raise our money within China. The Domestic Bonds will involve Chinese funds only and the Russians can in no way rationally oppose. The Russian-Mongol Treaty signed in Urga has given the Russians the right to open mines freely in Outer Mongolia, but we should definitely not impose restrictions upon ourselves by recognizing this treaty.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, there is nothing in this private treaty denying the Chinese the right to open mines, so we simply ignore it. I have gone over this problem very thoroughly and the plan is complete in every respect. I humbly await your decision upon it. Hsu Shu-cheng.<sup>18</sup>

On July 8 Hsu Shu-cheng's Chief Advisor, Li Ju-chang arrived in Urga with one company of men.<sup>19</sup> The entire 7th Regiment of the 3rd Brigade<sup>20</sup> gradually followed. Enroute there was a misunderstanding over the purchase of sheep and some horses were lost. The following eleven telegrams explain what occurred and at the same time they reveal how Hsu managed his forces.

1. Urga. August 31, 1919  
Attention: Frontier Planning Commissioner Hsu.  
Confidential.

According to the telegrapher at Ude, the 2nd infantry and artillery unit of the Northwest Frontier Defense Army, commanded by [Major] Li Ju-chang, passed through Ude on August 27 and gave the following report: "On the evening of

August 26 a motor vehicle was sent to an encampment of Mongol troops situated over thirty li to the southwest of Ude. They demanded sheep from the Mongol headquarters but were refused. There was some disagreement and the Mongol troops and officers immediately left and have not up to this time returned. This has already been reported to Urga." The Outer Mongols and myself have together hoped that troops would be sent here, and our relations have been exceedingly good. Before this whenever our Army came to Urga it was always well disciplined, had a very good name and was praised by all the Mongols. The difficulties of provisioning an Army are indeed real, but peaceful relations with the Mongols have always been maintained. Goods have been purchased at fair prices and any difficulties have always been amicably discussed. Although this particular affair is insignificant I do not want to see our army's good name ruined over small issues such as this, and for this reason must request you to wire a warning[to your troops] immediately. It is my opinion that intelligent, responsible officers should be permanently stationed at P'ang-chiang, P'ang-pei, Ude, T'ao-nan, T'ao-lin and T'ao-pei<sup>21</sup> to oversee our affairs and see that all parties are satisfied. I hope that you will check into this and act accordingly. Ch'en I. August 31.

2. Reply to Commissioner Ch'en. September 1, 1919. Attention: Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I. Confidential.

I have ready your reports of the 30th and 31st. In regard to the affair involving Major Li Ju-chang's battalion. I am sure that my men would not have resorted to such incorrect behaviour. There must be some misunderstanding. I have ordered that a strict investigation be made, and if the report proves to be true the offenders will be severely punished, and will not be protected by this office. I request that you first of all notify the Mongol offices of my views. Please ascertain and report the expenses of the Urianghai office.<sup>22</sup> Hsu Shu-cheng. September 1.

3. Order to the 3rd Brigade. September 1, 1919. Attention: Brigade Commander Ch'u Northwest Frontier Defense Army, Hsuan-hua.  
Confidential.

I have received a report that Major Li Ju-chang passed through Ude on August 26. One of the motor vehicles accompanying the force went to a Mongol troop encampment somewhat over 30 li to the southwest of Ude. They demanded some sheep but were refused and there was a dispute of sorts. The Mongols then left. I want you to make an immediate investigation to determine whether or not this is true, so that action can be taken. Hsu Shu-cheng. September 1.

4. Wire from Urga. September 1, 1919. Attention: Northwest Frontier Defense Planning Commissioner, Hsu Shu-cheng.  
Confidential.

Yesterday I informed you of the affair in which your troops in passing Ude had run into trouble with Mongol officers over the purchase of some sheep. I have just been informed that the error was not on the part of your troops. Because the Mongol troops had left and they had nowhere to buy sheep, they requested the services of a Mongol official to obtain some for them. This fellow was very uncouth and formerly when Chahar troops were stationed there, there were many altercations. I have already explained this to the Mongol authorities. According to Tserendorji when our troops first started moving into Mongol territory this fellow made many reports to the authorities until he was ordered to mind his own business. Following that he ceased making reports. Therefore please put your mind at rest over this matter and don't forget to inform Brigade Commander Ch'u. Ch'en I. September 1.

5. Reply to Commissioner Ch'en, Urga. September 3, 1919. Attention: Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I.  
Confidential.

I have read your wire of September 1. Military discipline must extend to the smallest matters;

nothing should be allowed just because it is trifling. Great rivers are formed from small brooks, and the lessons of antiquity are stern. I have already ordered that this matter be settled strictly. I will report anything further that I hear. Hsu Shu-cheng. September 3.

6. Wire from Commander Ch'u of the 3rd Brigade. September 7. Attention: Commander-in-Chief Hsu, Peking.  
Confidential.

Your wire of September 1 received and read. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Chai to investigate and have received his reply as follows: "I have received and read your wire of September 3. According to Ch'en I the disturbance at Ude involving Major Li Ju-chang and some Mongol troops was a result of language difficulties. The Mongol soldiers were timid. The matter has already been discussed with the Mongol authorities and they view the Mongol troops as being in the wrong." I also received the following wire from Ch'en I on September 1: "In regard to the affair in which our troops tried to buy sheep and ended up having trouble with the Mongol officials at Ude, I have just been informed that the troops were looking for sheep to buy enroute and requested the help of a Mongol official. There was a misunderstanding with the stupid fellow but everything has been explained to the Mongol authorities. You have also been informed of this through Commissioner Hsu. The troops are fatigued from their long journey and I have requested that no further enquiries should be made." This is what I have heard to date. I can send you a further more dependable report after further careful investigation. I have also just received a telegram from Lieutenant-Colonel Chai in Urga as follows: "The entire 1st battalion of the 7th regiment arrived in Urga on September 6." I am especially including this report along with my wire. Ch'u Ch'I-hsiang. September 7.

7. Reply to Brigade Commander Ch'u. September 8, 1919. Attention: Brigade Commander Ch'u, Kalgan Northwest Reconnaissance Force.  
Confidential.

I have read your wire dated September 7. When an army is formed you must have regulations, for if there are no regulations then it will be unruly. When a dispute occurs over the purchase of sheep there definitely has to be an exacting investigation and action taken. How can you use the words of Ch'en I in order to protect yourself, namely, that the troops have suffered from the long journey and no further enquiries should be made? How absurd! When you are a soldier there is no time when life is not rigorous; it cannot be said that it is rigorous only for those on the march and that permanently stationed troops lead a life of ease. If you continue to allow your mind to be entangled with this sort of thinking the defeat of your brigade will not be long in coming. I still demand a strict investigation and a full report. After that we will take the appropriate action. Lieutenant-Colonel Chai's views are also mistaken, and you should give him an appropriate reprimand, with the hope that in future he will make no further such errors. Hsu Shu-cheng. September 8.

8. Wire from Hsuan-hua. September 19, 1919.  
Attention: Commander-in-Chief Hsu, Northwest  
Frontier Defense Army.  
Confidential.

I have just received the following wire from Lieutenant-Colonel Chai Shao-tsu, dated September 16: "The entire 3rd battalion of the 7th regiment arrived in Urga without trouble on September 15. I have received your order to investigate into the trouble that Major Li Ju-cheng encountered in buying sheep at Ude. I have checked into the matter carefully. The said battalion reached Ude on August 27. The 9th company arranged the purchase of sheep through a Chinese merchant at a price of 6.4 yuan per head. That evening the said company sent Lieutenant Chang to the Mongol troops' herd with the money to pick up the sheep. But the price demanded was ten yuan per head. Because of this discrepancy in price Chang left without further words. There was no discussion between him and the Mongols. The next evening the Mongols suddenly arrived at the Chinese camp and drove off the people, carts and horses which had been hired by the 11th company. Seventeen head of horses were lost. At that time they had no idea of the reason

for the Mongols' actions. Captain Ts'ao was then sent by car, along with an interpreter, to the Mongol encampment to discuss the matter with Taiji, who made many excuses for the action. It was found out from subsequent enquiries that merchants had often had their horses stolen in this area. They all had been stolen by the Mongol troops and would only be returned on the payment of some price. Merchants warned one another not to stop at this point. Major Li, bearing the facts of the situation in mind, discussed the affair with the Taiji<sup>23</sup> who agreed that if the civilian carters who had been hired would pay 20 yuan to the local Mongols he would see that the lost horses were all returned. Major Li, seeing the horses had been returned, although it meant the loss of 20 yuan, for the sake of preserving the army's good name was not willing at that time to go any deeper into the matter. He planned rather to lay the whole matter before Commissioner Ch'en when he reached Urga; and through him request the Mongol officials to investigate and take any necessary action, to ensure that following troops would not get involved in similar incidents. I believe that the original wire to command headquarters reporting this affair was the work of the Mongol telegrapher at Ude covering over the error of the Taiji." Just in what way this matter should be handled I do not dare to presume. It is for this reason I am sending this wire. I humbly await your decision. Ch'u Ch'i-hsiang. September 18.

9. Wire to the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I.  
September 20. Attention: Urga Commissioner.  
Confidential.

In reference to the dispute our troops had buying sheep en route. It has now been clearly ascertained that the battalion concerned reached Ude on August 27. There the 9th Company arranged the purchase of some sheep through a Chinese merchant, at the price of 6.4 yuan per head. That evening the company sent Lieutenant Chang with money to pick up the sheep from the Mongol troops' flock. But they demanded 10 yuan per head. Because of this discrepancy in price he returned without further words, making no attempt to negotiate

The following evening the Mongol troops unexpectedly arrived and drove off the cart horses which had been hired from the people by the 11th company. Seventeen horses were lost. At that time the said brigade did not know the position of the Mongol officers, and they immediately sent Captain Ts'ao by car, along with an interpreter, to the Mongol camp to negotiate with the Taiji. The Taiji made all sorts of excuses, Later investigation revealed that merchants had on many occasions lost their horses at this place. In every case they were stolen by the Mongol troops who exacted a price for their return. Merchants warn each other not to stop at this station. Major Li in accordance with the situation negotiated with the Taiji and on the following day the civilian carters paid the Mongol troops 20 yuan and the Taiji only then returned all the horses. Although 20 yuan had been lost, because the horses had been returned Major Li was unwilling to press the matter further for the real fear that he might cause trouble for army units following later. I have just informed the said brigade to order Lieutenant-Colonel Chai Shao-tsu to explain this to you in detail at the first opportunity. This is what has been ascertained by my troops; please repeat it to Mongol headquarters. If the Mongol troops in this area show any unusual signs let me know so I can look into the matter thoroughly. I especially hope you pass this on to the Mongol government so that we will be able to work together honestly and ignore petty men who would cause trouble between us. Hsu Shu-cheng. September 20.

10. Wire from Urga. October 5, 1919.  
Attention: Frontier Commissioner Hsu.  
Confidential.

Your wire of September 20 received and read. My investigation into the incident that occurred over the purchase of some sheep is in complete accord with the account in your telegram. The officers of your army committed no error and Mongol headquarters is in agreement with this. I hope this will put your mind at ease. Ch'en I.  
October 5.

11. Reply to the Urga Commissioner. October 7, 1919. Attention: Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I. Confidential.

I have read your wire of October 5. In reference to your statement that "Mongol headquarters is in agreement," it is a mistake to say we can therefore rest easy. At this time we cannot afford to cause misunderstandings with the Mongols, therefore even the most trifling affair must receive our full attention. Now that my forces are within your jurisdiction would you please make periodic enquiries, both to avoid further mistakes and to better serve our country's advantage. This is not just my private opinion. Hsu Shu-cheng.<sup>24</sup>

#### Ch'en I's Negotiations for Withdrawal of Self-Government and his 63 Conditions

At this time the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I<sup>25</sup> was negotiating with the Mongol nobles for the withdrawal of self-government, but had talked himself into a hopeless position.

The proposal to cancel self-government was first put forward by the Mongol nobles. The ruling elite in Mongolia was originally divided into two parties,

...the nobles were known as the black party, and the lamas as the yellow party. Under the old system of the Ch'ing Dynasty the nobles controlled politics and the lamas controlled religion... the division was very clear ... but from the time independence was declared and the living Buddha was made the head of the government the yellow party consequently became the officials ... and monopolized government authority ... The nobles thus became very resentful.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, the aim of the nobles in proposing the cancellation of autonomy was not reunion with the Chinese central government, but was to, "restore the old Ch'ing Dynasty system," in order to regain the governmental authority which was now in the hands of the lamas. The representative of the nobles who took this position and who met Ch'en I was an official in the Autonomous Outer Mongolian government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tserendorji.

The discussion of the cancellation of autonomy between Ch'en I and Tserendorji got under way in January, 1919.<sup>27</sup> But throughout there was no concrete progress. At the Great Council which opened in Urga on August 4 the struggle between the nobles and the lamas came more and more to the surface. As a result a number of nobles decided to sacrifice autonomy in order to escape the control of the lamas. They named Tserendorji as their representative to discuss the conditions of the cancellation of autonomy. Both sides decided on a number of principles. The two most important points were:

1. The re-establishment of the old Ch'ing Dynasty system with the five aimaks under the direct control of an official residing in Urga (to replace the Living Buddha).
2. The establishment of local self-government conferences to be

organized by the nobles (to get rid of the lamas). The procedure to be used in these negotiations was as follows:

First the outline of the conditions was to be decided upon, while at the same time (actually the meaning here was, "following this") the Mongol officials would present their petition [to the Chinese government]. At this time Neither the Russians nor the lamas had any idea of the talks that were going on.<sup>28</sup>

When Ch'en I reported to the central government the way the negotiations were going the Cabinet proposed that they be discussed at a cabinet meeting (August 21). They expressed no particular opinions on the contents of the conditions proposed, but in reference to the negotiations procedure they ordered that,

The Outer Mongolian nobles as a body must first present a request to the Chinese government for the restoration of the Ch'ing system of government, after this the government in response to this request will discuss with the Mongols the requisite conditions.<sup>29</sup>

Throughout the negotiations there was no way in which Ch'en I could get this government demand accepted. Nonetheless, he carried on the discussion of the conditions with the nobles as before. Ch'en tried to evade this problem by advising the government that, "The Mongols will only agree if we settle the conditions informally<sup>30</sup> first."<sup>31</sup> By this time there had already been many

discussions based upon the "several tens of conditions proposed by the Mongol officials," and in broad terms agreement had been reached. On October 1 Secretary Huang Ch'eng-hsu was sent to Peking with a rough draft of the conditions. These were the 63 conditions which later became known as the "Conditions for the Rehabilitation of Outer Mongolia."<sup>32</sup>

As far as China's real long-term advantage was concerned these 63 conditions were not in her favour. I present below some of the more important items.

1. "The central government may under no circumstances alter the original system of the division of Outer Mongolia into Leagues (盟) and Banners (旗). The shabi (沙畢), league heads (盟長), chiang-chun (將軍) jassaks (札薩克), shang-cho t'e-pa's (商卓特巴), etc. of all the leagues and banners are to retain forever their governing authority as it was under the old Ch'ing system.<sup>33</sup> The central government also may not introduce a program of colonization, re-assigning Mongol land to outsiders." (Item No. 2).

2. In Urga one Amban (辦大臣) and one Assistant Amban (幫辦大臣) will be installed. In Uliassutai, Kobdo, Tannu-Urianghai and Kiakhta one attache (參贊) and one assistant attache (幫辦參贊) will be installed.<sup>34</sup> In each of these offices of the principals and assistant officials one must be Chinese and one Mongol and the positions will be alternated. (That is to say, if in the first term a Chinese should

hold the principal office with a Mongol as his subordinate, then in the next term a Mongol will be given the principal position and a Chinese the subordinate one). Also the Chinese will be limited to civil offices. (Items Nos. 6 and 8). Even in the Department of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs in Peking, of the director and assistant director, one position must be held by a Mongol noble. (Item No. 12).

3. "Concerning the maintenance of central government troops in Outer Mongolia, the drawing up of such plans and the number of troops are to be settled between the Amban and Assistant Amban stationed in Urga. (This also requires the approval of other Mongol officials). If there are disturbances which necessitate the dispatch of additional troops, when the emergency is over these troops must be withdrawn. (Item No. 33).

4. "Chinese citizens who wish to build homes, conduct commercial or industrial enterprises, and those who wish to open new land, plant crops or cut wood or grass must first obtain the permission of the jassak concerned. (Item Nos. 43 and 44).

5. "Mining development and the opening of railway, telegraph and postal services must be dependent upon deliberation between the Amban and Assistant Amban stationed in Urga. (Such development requires initial Mongol approval). If it is necessary to borrow foreign money, it must first be

approved by a meeting of the Mongol government, before the loan can be arranged." (Item Nos. 45, 48 and 49).

On the basis of these few items we can say that in fact Ch'en I was aiding the Mongol nobles' "seizure" of autonomy from China, rather than working for the "cancellation of autonomy."

The ministry of foreign affairs made the following criticisms of the 63 conditions:

If we examine the 63 conditions in their entirety ... we see that although the central government in name regains control of governmental authority, in fact these conditions leave us with restricted rights. Although Outer Mongolia has requested the cancellation of autonomy, under these conditions the spirit and the foundation of autonomy continue to exist as before ... As for the items which concern Russia ... all the advantages which Russia holds in Outer Mongolia have decidedly not been lost.<sup>35</sup>

On November 1 Hsu Shu-cheng presented the following analysis of these conditions to the government:

There are a number of unsatisfactory points in the conditions for the cancellation of autonomy proposed by Commissioner Ch'en. I plan to await the arrival of Assistant Commissioner En in order to have a thorough discussion of them with him. I already reported this yesterday. First let me present my views and the opinions that I have gleaned from the Mongols in the last few days.

An examination of the 63 conditions reveals a number of large and glaring faults.

Dating from the early years of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Mongolia has been under Chinese govern-

ment control for two or three hundred years. In the middle period of the Dynasty there was a change in policy to one of keeping the Mongols in ignorance, so that they would remain backward and the country poor. As a result as soon as they were subjected to strong foreign provocation they renounced their connection with China. The point here is that unless we bring about prosperity and raise the level of civilization our efforts will not be long remembered. Although to implement it too quickly would implant doubts in many Mongols minds, my plan if instituted gradually will ultimately achieve its purpose. It seems that some of these 63 conditions appear to have ignored this. These conditions would suppress civilization and that is my first objection to them.

At the time of the Yuan and Chin Dynasties the Mongols military might was supreme in Europe and Asia; they then fell never to rise again, and today they are at their lowest ebb. The fault lies in their restrictive religion and their small population. Further because the land is privately owned it is impossible to establish governmental regulations and make people follow them thus gradually building up their economy. The potential of the land has been ignored and the country becomes daily more poor. This is like eating unhulled rice when one's cellar is filled with gold. Under such conditions there is nothing that the government can do. The important thing in governing the Mongols is to guide them towards prosperity and give them civilization. In this way we will bring about great improvements. Even though we cannot forcibly remove their old habits, we must prepare them so that when the time is right they will respond. These conditions [of Ch'en I] revive the chronic weaknesses of the old system and protect them. Even if they do not cancel self-government we can take advantage of present conditions and restore our authority, taking the stand that Outer Mongolia is Chinese territory. But to cancel autonomy [with these conditions] would make it impossible to promote civilization among them. It would strengthen the barriers of darkness. This is my second objection.

What is to be valued in the cancellation of autonomy is not the act in name, but the actual re-establishment of government control. Aside from the

first very general item of these present conditions concerning the return of authority to the central government the rest all increase the control of the Mongol nobles. If we seriously fear that the Mongols will not respond should we play upon their natures to entice them then use force to gain the ends we hoped for? But can the government of a country operate on the basis of lies? Throughout history has there ever been a government like this which endured? To do this is to confuse the petty with the important. It is my third objection.

When autonomy has been cancelled how are taxes and duties to be revised? How is the fiscal administration going to be organized? And what is going to be done to develop agriculture, commerce and mining? The conditions make no mention of these points. They speak only of government payment of all the salaries of the nobles, jassaks and lamas, and of all the expenses for chaning sutras and so on. I must be ignorant for I fail to see where the funds to pay these expenses are to come from. If you say these funds are to be obtained from the Mongols then the Mongol people must pay taxes to the central government. But since the rights of the nobles and lamas are to be reinstated the people will have to support them as before. In view of the poverty of the Mongol people how can we put up with increasing their burden? If you say that the funds should come from the Chinese treasury, what of the fact that today our treasury is so short of funds that it requires all our efforts to take care of our own domestic needs? How then can we fulfill the needs of the Mongols? I am afraid that if these conditions are instituted the government will lose any functioning authority it might have had, and the opportunity in Mongolia will have been lost. Moreover, even if there was a surplus in the treasury, to use it for this purpose would be like buying a cracked goblet when you don't have enough money to buy a throne. To do so would be to damage fiscal government and is my fourth objection.

The Sino-Russian-Mongolian Agreement was settled by the Chinese and the Russians, and it is known to all nations. Since the Mongols cannot maintain it by themselves they therefore cannot unilaterally annul it. If we want to annul it we should negotiate

with the Russians. Perhaps you would say that since the Russians have no government we should for the time being arrange a treaty with the Mongols themselves in order to gain an advantage over Russia. But do you really think that when the government in Russia is re-established we will be able to counter their complaints with this agreement? And if the Russians don't protest and simply hold that the former agreement still apply could you use these conditions to prevent their re-entry into Mongolia? If we take advantage of Russian's present helplessness to establish real territorial control over Mongolia, which has always been ours, the Russians will be unable to hinder us. If we were to pay no attention to other considerations and institute these conditions with the extravagant hope of gaining quick returns, I fear that future negotiations will be plagued with complications, that we will be forced into a treaty which sacrifices our principles, that we will become the laughing stock of the powers and yet have gained no advantage withal. To do this would be to ignore the purpose of making treaties, and is my fifth objection.

Also, the main purpose of this agreement is our desire to be able to annul the agreement with Russia. But isn't having the new administration that is proposed roughly patterned on the pan-shih tso-li (辦事公理) and other offices of the Russian treaty a further proof of the existence of the Russian treaty?<sup>36</sup> This would be nurturing a contradiction and is my sixth objection.

In the talks that have been going on in Urga all of these conditions have come from the suggestions of a few of the nobles. The lamas are decidedly not in agreement, and even the nobles are largely not yet in agreement. Moreover, as long as the Living Buddha's control continues to exist, even if all the nobles should press him, if he did not respond would it not be impossible to accomplish anything? Therefore the lamas as a group cannot be carelessly ignored. It is my opinion that given their ignorance the Mongols can only be united by means of their religion. The nobles without the strength of the church would not be able to exert their authority over the people

of Mongolia. I cannot see any way in which the nobles could be effective in office if the church were left out. Therefore in planning for the government we must make use of them both. To maintain a balance between noble and lama we must use both restraint and leniency, we must entice them with gifts and advantages, we must bestow honours upon them, then none of them will be unwilling to come to us. To make over-optimistic plans which favour the nobility and needlessly ignore the complaints of the lamas would be to plant the seeds of future rebellion and give a strong neighbour (Japan) an immediate opportunity to step in. Such a plan is short sighted; this is my seventh objection.

To lead the Mongols to cancel their autonomy is, in name a fine cause. To develop the potential of a land and to enlighten its people is, in fact, a fine action. To achieve it in name and in fact is truly beautiful. But to settle for only the empty name and to fail to ascertain whether in fact one's proposals might be deleterious is poor statesmanship. In the management of military affairs I do not want to overstep my bounds and make offensive criticisms, but having the defense of the border entrusted to me I do not want to be remiss in my responsibilities. The purpose I especially concentrate on is to work for the improvement of the livelihood of the Mongol people in our border area. After examining carefully the suggestions in my proposals, if there is anything at all that you feel should be adopted, then I ask you to order Commissioner Ch'en and his assistants to redraft a set of more general conditions. There is no need for this to be done in fine detail, and there is no need to bring in international relations as this would probably lead to complications.

In my opinion the main point in these conditions should be political and financial controls. The government should decide on the requirements of the position and then select people for the job. When there are problems these officials will consult with the nobles and jassaks and they will be handled in a way suitable to both parties. The religious ceremonies should in all cases be upheld

by the government. The salaries of the nobles and the lamas and local administrative expenses should be decided upon generously and paid by the government. In general the rites of investiture will remain as they were before. In every case where local safety is endangered the government will provide necessary protection, and foreign relations will without exception be handled by the government. These few conditions will be sufficient. The more that is written the more loopholes there will be, and the more varying opinions will be aroused, which will only mean the more difficulties to contend with in future. It will be much better to say things in a summary fashion. The Mongols will be satisfied and there will be no obstacles to our plans for development of Mongolia.<sup>37</sup>

#### The Defeat of Ch'en I's Negotiations

Regardless of the contents of the 63 conditions, these negotiations were doomed to failure. Basically Ch'en I was negotiating with a group of nobles whose aim was to destroy the power of the lamas. But the major portion of governmental authority in Mongolia lay precisely in the hands of this group of lamas. In addition to this everyone in Mongolia, lamas and nobles alike, without exception worshipped and had superstitious faith in the Living Buddha (the Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu); but the Living Buddha placed his utmost trust precisely in this group of lamas. How could Ch'en I have any hope of success when he avoided the lamas and had no way of approaching the Living Buddha, thinking instead to direct all his attention to the nobles in an

effort to remove governmental authority from the lamas and the Living Buddha? Also, everything that he heard was the opinion of the nobles only, and as a result it was naturally difficult for him to recognize the real facts clearly. Consequently he has made a number of mistaken judgments which were based on the desires of one side only. On August 19<sup>38</sup> he wired the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "As far as the lamas go, they have to accept what the nobles dictate. The Living Buddha also has long favoured the central government so there is really nothing to worry about."<sup>39</sup> This baseless and bold supposition is the most important reason for the later defeat of his efforts.

On September 26 when Ch'en I made a report on the progress of the discussion of the conditions he said: "As a result of the strong efforts of the nobles to bring about an understanding all the lamas have given their agreement to the conditions ... In regard to the matter of investiture in office ... the Living Buddha was again notified and he too has given his consent."<sup>40</sup> I do not know whether his report is untrue, whether he was lied to by the nobles, or whether the Living Buddha later changed his mind, but on the fifth day following this wire - this was also the same day that Huang Ch'eng-hsu left for Peking carrying the draft copy of the conditions (October 1) - the Living Buddha

wrote a letter to the President of China, and ordered five lamas, including Mergen Khan (墨爾根堪布)<sup>41</sup> on October 19 to take the letter to Peking. This letter dated: "Today Ch'en I, the Chinese official Resident in Urga, suddenly proposed the cancellation of autonomy ... he also presented his fifty-odd conditions ... whereby the people of Outer Mongolia should unite and unilaterally void the 1915 Treaty with Russia ... I am unresolute and undecided. There are many questions that worry me - I am indeed deeply disturbed."<sup>42</sup> It is very obvious from his words that he did not approve of the conference which had already settled these conditions. With the passage of another twenty-odd days (October 24), afraid that his first letter would not reach Peking, or that it was not clear enough in its intention, he wrote the following letter:

For the attention of the President. I have recently been informed by the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I of the petition requesting the cancellation of our autonomy in Outer Mongolia, and the fifty-odd conditions which the Mongols must in future adhere to, and also of his private meetings and discussions of the conditions with various ministers. It is my opinion that if you are made aware of the situation you will agree that we should wait until we have found a way to quel the rebellious party led by Semenov and until we have called a meeting of all the Mongol nobles and jassaks and solved our internal difficulties, and that then you should be notified of this. At present the Mongol jassaks are for the most part not in agreement. Among them there are those who not only do not want our autonomy cancelled, but hope that it will

continue just as it is. If the Mongol lamas, commoners, subordinate officials, etc. hear of this proposed move there will be much talk against it. From this we can see that unless the Outer Mongolian people as a whole want to restore the old Ch'ing system it would be difficult to enforce them to follow it. This proposal to cancel our autonomy was not the idea of the Outer Mongol ministers, it was rather the suggestion of Commissioner Ch'en, who wants to take advantage of the border trouble to cancel our autonomy.

I have given this matter my careful consideration. We Outer Mongols have not been deluded by the specious words of the followers of Semenov, and have consistently upheld the tripartite treaty and kept our autonomy intact. To turn our backs to this treaty at this point and to request the cancellation of our autonomy, would in fact be unsuitable in many ways. But Ch'en I, the Commissioner of Urga, views the matter differently, he continually flaunts authority holding private discussions with the various ministers on this matter, with no consideration for the majority opinion. He has repeatedly pressured people and this has been even worse recently. He has even formed a force from the troops that are supposed to be stationed at Kiakhta for its defense and has stationed them close to the Urga monastery and other lama quarters, and they have with no authority commandeered the homes of foreign traders.<sup>43</sup> These sorts of trouble-making incidents really go against the wishes of the people, and I am deeply concerned about it. I have a deep faith in the secret order which you gave to Prince Ch'ao-k'o-t'u-erh Pa-ta-erh-hu (朝克圖爾巴達爾胡)<sup>44</sup> and because of this I am outlining the conditions here for you and secretly request that you will look into this. I have especially appointed Sa-mi-ti-pa-k'o Nomen Han Beile Kan-ch'an Hutuktu Ta-mu-t'ang-pa-cha-erh (薩密迪巴克什諾門汗北勒圖禪呼圖克圖達木慶巴扎爾)<sup>45</sup> to go to you with greetings and presents, and to earnestly request that Commissioner Ch'en I, whom we regard as suitable, be transferred elsewhere, and that the autonomous government be allowed to remain in effect as it now is. In this way the

respect for lamaism will increase and gradually spread, forever reflecting its benevolence and mercy, and harmonious relations between China and Outer Mongolia will be further ensured.<sup>46</sup>

The Living Buddha was afraid that this letter might not reach Peking so he sent the Jalkhansa Living Buddha (嘉寧尊達佛), next only to himself in rank, to personally deliver it to Peking. Chia-heng-tsun set out on October 24 and reached the capital on November 1.<sup>47</sup>

The sending of this letter marked the complete defeat of two or three months work on the part of Ch'en I and the nobles.

Of course, Ch'en I and the nobles were determined to make one final effort. Ch'en I, thus, received a petition signed by the nobles only, which he wired to Peking on October 29 and 30. Ch'en I claims that he was in receipt of this petition on October 14, but had been requested by the nobles, "not to wire Peking for the present time." On October 29 they requested that he wire their decision to Peking, but that they still desired that, for the time being this should be kept secret, and not immediately made public. Their hope was that by waiting until the Jalkhansa Living Buddha had wired his answer to Urga perhaps they could undo the request of the lamas. "Otherwise they should wait until everything had been satisfactorily arranged in Urga, and then Ch'en I could wire Peking to announce their request."<sup>48</sup>

After he had sent the Jalkhansa Living Buddha to Peking bearing the letter I cannot see how they could have got the Living Buddha of Urga to contradict this. What, in fact, could Ch'en I and the nobles have "arranged," with the Living Buddha and the entire body of lamas against them? Ch'en I said that the nobles themselves admitted that, "We are already in a precarious position ... If we do not succeed our fate is in their hands and our survival thus depends wholly on Peking ... Painful words, indeed."<sup>49</sup> I suspect that at this time Ch'en I was perhaps no less distressed than the nobles. Because of the unilateral nature of this request, without the agreement of the lamas or the approval of the Urga Living Buddha, no matter how you choose to view it, the most that can be said is that a portion of the nobles had turned against the autonomous government. It cannot be claimed that the autonomous government had requested the central government to cancel their autonomy. Even if Ch'en I was stupid he could not possibly have missed this point.

Although this defeat can be fundamentally defined in this way, in fact, the negotiations had been defeated before this. There were a number of other people who had recognized that [to remain Mongolian] would give a tremendous boost to their careers and they were afraid that someone else would snatch [this honour] from them. Thus,

when these 63 conditions first reached Peking the Prime Minister of the Cabinet, Chin Yun-p'eng, invited all ministries to send men to discuss them (October 27). Even the Navy was invited, and participated.<sup>50</sup> But the Frontier Defense Planning Commission, which legally should have been the office in charge, was not notified of this meeting.<sup>51</sup>

On October 20 the Cabinet wired Ch'en I as follows: "Frontier Planning Commissioner Hsu will arrive in Urga within a few days to inspect our forces there. He is to have no direct involvement with Mongolian affairs. Full responsibility for the same still lies with you. This is to make clear the limits of his authority." This obviously is the work of Chin Yun-p'eng, charging Ch'en I to maintain the secrecy of the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy. Ch'en I therefore wired to ask if, "Commissioner Hsu had read the conditions sent to Peking?"<sup>52</sup>

On November 1 Hsu wired Peking in reference to these conditions, stating his "seven objections" and advocating that a decision be withheld until he had held a further meeting. In a Cabinet meeting Chin Yun-p'eng stated that he felt this was, "decidedly wrong, and since we have already made a statement that after numerous Cabinet meetings we have made our decision, we cannot go back on this as this would injure our authority. Hsu's wire is self-contradictory. As for Hsu convening a meeting of all subordinate

officials, he can only do this concerning matters within the sphere of border defense, the matter of the cancellation of autonomy has been delegated specifically to Commissioner Ch'en and there is no need for anyone else to interfere. When Ch'en I has arranged everything, even if it turns out that there is something not to our advantage, we can begin the process again and nothing will have been lost ..."<sup>53</sup> It is difficult to accord the title of Premier to a man who, because his desire to manage everything himself had failed, would not allow the intercession of the official properly concerned and would let things degenerate to petty bickering, even in a matter as urgent as the cancellation of Mongol autonomy.

In regard to the 63 conditions, On October 22 Hsu Shu-cheng obtained access through the Cabinet Secretariat to the original copy of the conditions which had already been signed by the Foreign Office. On November 1 he issued his telegram of "seven objections." But on November 6 Ch'en I wired the Foreign Office to ask, "Am I permitted to let Commissioner Hsu see the conditions?" And on November 7 he again wired that he considered, "It would be better to let him see them."<sup>54</sup> We cannot but recognize that Ch'en I was far too naive.

Conclusion of the Negotiations for the  
Cancellation of Autonomy

On October 29 Hsu reached Urga. On November 1 he issued the telegram pointing out his seven objections to the 63 conditions and in addition advocating that a new set of conditions be drawn up, fewer in number and less detailed (see above). On November 6 he met the Living Buddha.<sup>55</sup> On November 10 he discussed the conditions with Ch'en I who still spoke in a guarded fashion. In his telegram of that date Hsu said:

Attention: Northwest Frontier Office  
Confidential.

Copies to: The President, the Cabinet, Director  
General Tuan [Ch'i-jui] and all  
Ministries.

I have just made an appointment with Commissioner Ch'en for tomorrow night to discuss the 63 conditions at my office. I have also arranged for the two Assistant Commissioners, Li and En, to come, and I am also asking the Commander of the [3rd] Brigade, Ch'u Ch'i-hsiang and my Advisor, Yang Chih-ch'eng to come so that we may all take part in the deliberations. In this way I hope to avoid the prejudiced views that might arise in a discussion between just the two of us. If there is any fear of information leaking out because so many men are involved, I can conduct the meeting under the rules of military law.

I knew Ch'en I's conditions soon after they were drafted, and when he sent his chief secretary, Huang Ch'eng-hsu, to Peking I was also aware of that. Because he did not report to me I therefore did not go to question him. After Huang had been in Peking six or seven days Ch'en I suddenly wired me to say

that Huang was coming to Peking bearing an important secret, and requested me to see Huang personally. To my surprise, when I met Huang he was hesitant in bearing and expression and covert in his speech. When I enquired about the important matter he bore he said it was nothing of great importance, only that he had requested a vacation to go to Fengtien and that Ch'en I had ordered that on the way he should make an effort to expedite the dispatch of a force [to Urga]. This amused me and I sent him on his way. The day before I left for Urga I paid my respects to the President and had the honour at that time to enquire about these conditions for cancellation of autonomy, and was ordered to get hold of them and examine them carefully. I then went to the Cabinet Secretariat where I borrowed the original copy signed by the Foreign office, which I took with me when I left for the north. At all our stopping points I spent the evenings reading it and am quite thoroughly familiar with its advantages and weaknesses. My intention was that I must discuss it with Ch'en I personally when I reached Urga, and I therefore made preparations in advance. I also hoped that in making plans for the development of the border regions I could enlist the services of Commissioner Ch'en and all the Assistant Commissioners to work out a program with me which we could put into operation at the beginning of spring next year. This could prepare the country for the institution of a new system of officials and silence the ones who supported the treaty with Russia. The area then could gradually take over its own administration. Before I left Peking I presented my ideas to the President whose response was, "Very good indeed, to enlist the aid of Ch'en is an excellent idea." Therefore the first evening in Urga I took these secret conditions for the cancellation of Mongol autonomy with the idea of having a completely frank exchange of views with Ch'en I. But he was throughout evasive. Whenever the matter of the cancellation of autonomy was mentioned he became covert in exactly the way that Huang had. There being no point in further discussion I therefore wired you my plan to await the arrival of the Assistant Commissioners Li and En so that we could discuss it in common. I afterwards discovered that Ch'en had received a secret order from someone in the government advising him that he did not have

to discuss the conditions with anyone, that he should concentrate on winning over one or two Mongol officials, make his own reports and manage the affair himself.

Since my arrival in Urga my every word and action have been wired to the government. Everything that I have seen, heard or reckoned about the state of affairs here I have thoroughly analyzed. I have neither betrayed the government nor my principles. My command in Outer Mongolia has fittingly given me a great deal of authority - can you expect me to be docile and cautious? Over the past years the authority of our country has been confined within Peking and there are many who look down on us. Therefore if we want everything to be well regulated we must have laws for the people to follow. So here I again present my views for your examination.

In my November 1 telegram I requested that you examine and make a decision on my proposed seven objections, and on my overall interpretation of the 63 conditions. I have received the reply of the Cabinet in which the President stated that my views revealed the depth of my experience and the long-range practicality of my planning. At our meeting tomorrow morning I am going to uphold these aims in [what I hope will be] a harmonious and just discussion. Further, among the conditions there are some that infringe upon the position and authority of the Frontier Planning Commission. In general these items should be removed, then Commissioner Ch'en should be given the responsibility to make suitable arrangements with the Mongols. If he is unable to do this then this responsibility should be passed to me, and when I have made satisfactory arrangements the credit for doing so should be given to Commission Ch'en. Although I have earnestly striven to establish the authority of the Commissioner my concern lies only with national affairs, and I decidedly will not let glory and fame interfere with my intentions. Briefly, the Northwest Frontier Planning Commission is an already established official Outer Mongolian office. The functioning and authority of the office are nationally established law. Orders issued by the office may not be altered nor can they be annulled after they are issued. I have received this appointment,

and as long as I hold it will perform my duties regardless of the consequences to me. Whether it be international affairs, domestic Mongol affairs or questions of a local nature, I shall in all cases bear full responsibility. If tomorrow I were freed of my duties I might ride a donkey, wearing a kerchief, or wander at ease upon a lake, but today I still hold my position and I will not let anyone in the least transgress upon it, because such transgressions destroy the law. The Republic is based upon law and to destroy law would be to destroy the Republic. Thus anyone who is an enemy of the Republic, even though he might be a close relative, I still must oppose him. I have been made a general by this country and will alike share her ills and her good fortune. To preserve the law and to preserve the nation is in all cases the duty of us all, and not just of the office of the Frontier Commissioner. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 10.56

By November 11 Hsu had realized that Ch'en I was unsatisfactory and stated this in a wire:

Ch'en I's words exceed his deeds. I would say that he is too eager to achieve fame, that his mind is incapable of deep and subtle reasoning. He himself thinks that he clearly sees even distant matters, but in fact even present matters obscure themselves from him. What his real worth is I dare not say, but this is how he appears to me, and I therefore cannot place full trust in him.57

Because of this Hsu finally decided to use his energies in another way. He stated:

After we had worked out which of the items to retain and which to drop Ch'en I went to discuss their institution with the Mongols. But I myself am independently devoting all my energies to this problem. My investigation of the problem

indicates that the matter should be settled quickly to avoid wasting time or the development of complications. When the matter is settled satisfactorily I will hand it back to Ch'en I, for I definitely am not competing with him.<sup>58</sup>

Following this, in his November 13 telegram he states:

... I thus venture to definitely say even with the passage of many years and months Ch'en I has not been able to accomplish anything. He is lacking in judgment and his emotions obscure things for him. From the very beginning he was making wrong moves and confusing matters. If at this time I left matters with him progress in this affair would come to a halt. To halt halfway through and watch our country lose respect and importance is something I cannot endure ... You have wired that it is your desire to see autonomy cancelled; give me time and it will be done. My previous telegram stated that a decision would be reached within three to five days. Arrangements have all been made, and if without the use of a single soldier or arrow our objective is achieved this will indeed be our good fortune. If it does not succeed I will make no excuses, and will resign and return to the south and let Ch'en I bring things to a conclusion. I will then, with all respect, accept any judgment of neglect of duties.<sup>59</sup>

On November 12 the Living Buddha sent an invitation for a banquet. I don't know just who was discourteous, but Hsu Shu-cheng refused the invitation. (I think that this was very possibly an excuse). The Living Buddha then sent the Mongol Premier and Minister of the Interior, Badmadorji (巴特瑪), with the invitation. Although few

words were exchanged Hsu ascertained that if they wished to cancel the autonomy of Outer Mongolia that this was the key man.<sup>60</sup>

On November 13 Hsu made the following report to the government:

Northwest Frontier Office  
Confidential.

Attention: Secretary General Kuo, Deputy Secretary General Tseng. Forward to:  
the President, the Cabinet, Director General Tuan Ch'i-jui, the Foreign Office.

Yesterday the Living Buddha sent me an invitation to a banquet. The invitation was incorrectly prepared and I therefore refused to go. He then sent the Mongol Premier Badmadorji to invite me. I sternly criticized the Living Buddha's breach of decorum but warmly praised Badmadorji's own energies despite his old age. I also mentioned the Living Buddha's many illnesses and that he would not live too much longer. I spoke of the high esteem in which he was held by the lama religion, and he left deeply moved. This is a very profound man, well-versed in foreign affairs, and if we direct our efforts toward this man we should definitely be able to affect the cancellation of autonomy. When I mentioned this to Commissioner Ch'en he agreed with me completely. Commissioner Ch'en maintains that we should threaten the lama party, but in my view the successful development of the border region and of military control rests on nothing more than the combined use of severity and gentleness. But their use throughout must be carefully calculated. By nature the Mongols are very suspicious and it would be difficult to get close to them through the use of severity. Therefore we must first win them over through gentleness. Probably after a time they will begin to see through this and then we must use severity to break them. The Mongols have no

real power and through fear will be forced to accept. Then again we will treat them with kindness in order to win their trust so that they will not seek to engage foreign assistance. In this way rebellious elements will be quelled forever. We can follow the principle of capturing [the barbarian] and then releasing [him] handed down to us by the Marquise of Wu61 - with a few changes to make it more applicable - as a basis for our long-range plans. This is not a plan that looks only to the present day. Ch'en I also agrees with this. But this cannot be done with empty words only. We must constantly pay attention to every matter and slowly we will achieve our aim. As to whether or not I will be able to turn these words into fact, I hope that by working out all critical plans ahead of time, and by directing operations and instructing people as the time demands I will achieve success. I respectfully submit this for your examination. Hsu Shu-cheng.

November 13.

On November 14, in accordance with these views, he took the matter into his own hands and applied pressure to Badmadorji. On that day he reported:

Attention: Northwest Frontier Office, Peking.  
Confidential.

Seal and forward to: The President, the Cabinet Director-General Tuan Ch'i-jui.

The Living Buddha's four most important men are, Badmadorji, concurrently Premier and Minister of the Interior, and the Great Shabi, Shang-cho-t'e-pa (大活佛), P'eng-ch'u-k'o (綱楚克) and Kun-pu (昆布). They are all top-ranking lamas and are the Living Buddha's only close advisors. All the nobles have a healthy respect for them. Nominally, the nobles' approval of the cancellation of autonomy stems from their warm desire to return to the central government, but in fact it is a product of their struggle with the lamas for authority, and if

they should succeed in gaining this power for the nobles, there will be little advantage in it for the Central Government. Although the 63 conditions drafted by Ch'en I are impractical, unfortunately a great deal of effort has already been expended on them. But the lamas have hampered this move from within, for although the Living Buddha convened parliament all the lamas were ordered to follow a policy of setting the nobles against one another. The Living Buddha did not examine the question of whether or not the conditions should be adopted, he only asked which of the members did not approve. None out of ten of the nobles gave their assent and parliament was adjourned. Although Ch'en I wanted to have things settled quickly he clearly understood the threat of the lamas and knew he had no way to curb them. Also, because he had listened too much to the nobles he had rendered the lamas even more intractable and unwilling to have any dealings with him so that they became an even greater obstacle. This is what I was referring to when I said, "If we should place our faith in Ch'en I and let him go ahead, even with the passage of years and months he would settle nothing."

When I had ascertained this I realized that when you want to catch thieves you should first catch their leader. For the time being we can ease off courting the nobles and do all we can to ingratiate ourselves with the lamas, then with the assistance of the policy of applying kindness and severity, it is hoped that my plan will be successfully completed. My original intention was to work together with Ch'en I. But how can this be done when at every meeting, as soon as the subject of the lamas is broached he earnestly voices the nobles requests, as though I bore a grudge against them and could not get along with them. It was for this reason that I stated in an earlier telegram that, "I could not place my complete trust in him." From the time I gave the strict order to the Tai-eh'ing-wang, P'eng-ch'u-k'o, I have continually sought to promote good relations with the key lamas. I have also discovered that Badmadorji had been given the rank of shang-cho-t'e-pa but had later had it

removed by the Living Buddha, and that younger men were made first class princes while he only held the rank of second class prince, and that he was indignant because of this. Moreover, as Premier he holds the reins of government and is well acquainted with foreign affairs so he can understand what is to his advantage. Therefore I have paid special attention to winning him over through trust and gaining his gratitude through friendliness. At all the large meetings I show my deference to him and revere him as my elder and praise him for his integrity. I have also talked to him about the Living Buddha's sickness and the possibility that he could replace him. When he reviewed our troops they displayed their firm discipline and high morale then he and the troops took a break together to watch a play. By joining them in their work and their pleasure he was made to see the firmness of their spirit. I am confident that I can win him over. I have had intimate talks with him in which I always say that the opposition between the nobles<sup>63</sup> and the lamas is detrimental to lamaism, and that he should advise the Living Buddha to establish his merit, strengthen his health and give up his superstitions. In truth, whether or not the Living Buddha responds favourably depends wholly upon the approval of these four men. Of these four men Badmadorji is the eldest and the most eminent. Since the Living Buddha has less trust in him than the others. Badmadorji is therefore spending all his effort in seeking help from the central government. I have promised to do all within my power to help him in these efforts, for which he is very grateful. Over the past three days he has seen the Living Buddha a number of times, but the Living Buddha has resolutely refused to cooperate. When it was suggested that we could not wait to hold parliament he immediately claimed that this could not be done because of diplomatic questions. Yesterday evening, still complying with this restraint Badmadorji pointed out that foreign affairs were the domain of the central government, that the matter could not await parliament, that the Living Buddha was not in the habit of waiting on parliament to determine policy, and that it was impossible to have him do so at this time. I then

asked him: "Just where do you and the Living Buddha now stand? If he has any objections I will answer him. You, even as old as you are, are not afraid to expend great effort to ensure the well-being of the lama religion, but the Living Buddha, evil to an extreme, is unwilling to give an inch. He orders the lamas to use their pomp and power to harm the nobles. The nobles have long been uneasy and are bound to be thinking of revenge. With both sides seeking rebellion lamaism will be doomed. If Lamaism is destroyed then Outer Mongolia will be scattered like grains of sand, its demise inevitable. You have a compassion for Outer Mongolia and for lamaism, but the Living Buddha persisting in his own way will cause rebellion. Outer Mongolia is Chinese territory and I, as the senior official here, have the responsibility of keeping it under control. I am unable just to sit back and watch. I request that you advise the Living Buddha that he must yield tomorrow and that if he does not that he will be imprisoned and sent to the capital, where he will be sentenced by the government." Badmadorji briefly mentioned the Russian and Mongol troops, his implication was that if we should do this we would stir up a lot of fear. I replied, "If there are any such fears produced they can be attributed to the stupid Living Buddha for I am not the cause of them. But that you even now still speak like this to preserve peace even more commands my respect - you are truly the leader of your religion." He promised to again do his best to convince the Living Buddha. When we talked further of his complaints I promised that when the whole affair was settled that his rank of Second Class Prince would be made official and that his younger brothers would all be given double their salary. With that he again agreed to see me on the following evening. I was reconsidering the whole affair by myself this morning; that if by any chance the Living Buddha should remain recalcitrant just how would I effect his arrest and deliverance to Peking. The thing to do would be to immediately warn his four top advisors that they were not to aid him and at the same time make preparations for his imprisonment in order to frighten him, and at the same time begin formulating another plan. I hope that by a judicious mixture of leniency and firmness to preserve the awe in which China is held.

Just as I was deliberating on this matter Badmadorji suddenly arrived in his car. Shaking my hand he told me that after we had parted the previous evening he had spent the whole night in consultation with the Living Buddha carefully laying out the advantages and disadvantages of relinquishing autonomy, following this up with tears. The Living Buddha finally came round and agreed to the cancellation of autonomy, but said that Ch'en I had sided with the nobles and that he therefore definitely did not want to abide by the 63 conditions that Ch'en proposed. Also he said that when Sain Noyon Khan<sup>64</sup> had died the Living Buddha's illegitimate son had been given a title. This had been done under the direction of Ch'en I but now Ch'en had suddenly raised this as an illegal action of the part of the Living Buddha. He also said that the Jalkhansa Living Buddha had been sent to Peking with a letter requesting the President to have Ch'en replaced, and thus, he requested that Ch'en I not be informed of this present affair. Also he did not want the other lamas and nobles to know. His intent was that he and myself, Hsu, should work out the conditions and present them to the government. Badmadorji also presented a number of former matters that the Living Buddha wished to maintain. In order not to lose this opportunity I thereupon promised to go to the Living Buddha with him that evening to discuss the matter, and that I would be very careful not to offend the Buddha, and to see that the lamas and the nobles received equal treatment. Badmadorji expressed his thanks and left. When the time came to go we maintained strict secrecy, with the intent that when the matter was settled only then would he make it public. When the meeting is over I will immediately send you a detailed wire, but this is to inform you of progress to this point. I request that you examine it carefully. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 14. 65, 66

Applying pressure to Badmadorji was much like using a very strong drug to counter a dangerous illness. The speed of the cure was indeed dramatic. On November 15 the question of the cancellation of autonomy, which Ch'en I had negotiated

for months with Tserendorji only to end in failure, was in the space of one day satisfactorily solved.

There follows the three telegrams that Hsu sent on the 15th:

Attention: Northwest Frontier Office

Confidential:

Copies to: The President, the Cabinet, Director General Tuan Ch'i-jui.

On November 14 I went to Badmadorji's residence to discuss the conditions for the cancellation of autonomy. With the purpose of removing the special rights and privileges of the lamas I firmly demanded that the conditions must be kept general, that the details could be worked out later in the regulations for conduct of the government. Or, I said, that if no conditions were worked out, then the Living Buddha must draft a request for the cancellation of autonomy but leave all the details of operation to be worked out later, perhaps by having someone accompany me to Peking. He cunningly tried to drag things out and insisted that he should go to the Living Buddha for further consultation. But I gave him a firm order saying that the responsibility for failure in Mongolia would lie on the lamas not on the Living Buddha. I gave him one day to conclude the arrangements, otherwise imprisonment would not be limited to the Living Buddha but he himself, despite his age, would also be imprisoned. This frightened him and he promised that the affair would be settled within one or two days. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 15.

Attention: Northwest Frontier Defense, Peking Office.

Confidential.

Copies to: The President, the Cabinet, Director-General Tuan Ch'i-jui.

You will have already received my first telegram of this date. Today Badmadorji called a

plenum meeting of the nobles and the lamas and they decided to first get the Living Buddha's signature and seal on the letter requesting the cancellation of autonomy. The conditions are all to be settled later. They sent a man to me to request that they not be required to complete the agreement that evening, but that it would be satisfactorily concluded within 24 hours. I complied with this request but still am demanding that it be concluded with the utmost haste, and that the Living Buddha appoint some important person to accompany me to Peking to convey their congratulations to the President. I am afraid that they might have misgivings and therefore must push for a speedy conclusion. I feel I must keep you informed, and submit this for your perusal. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 15, 2nd wire.

Attention: Northwest Frontier Defense, Peking Office.

Confidential.

Copies to: the President, the Cabinet, Director-General Tuan Ch'i-jui.

In my second telegram today I reported the progress of the meeting of the Mongol officials. They also requested that I not insist on a decision by this evening. This was brought to me by one of the Commissioner's messengers and I was told that the Mongol officials had requested that he forward it. After my last wire was sent someone asked Badmadorji why he was in such a hurry to leave the meeting before it had adjourned. He answered that Mr. Hsu had set the deadline for meeting him that day at six p.m. and that he was therefore going back early to await him. It was only at this meeting that I discovered that their decision making procedure was not quite as Ch'en I led us to believe. There was in fact no precedent for having the Living Buddha sign and seal this agreement. First the heads of all departments of government would sign and seal a document, then the decision of their meeting would be explained to the Living Buddha who would give his approval and request that their decision be made known to the whole government. If we examine the withdrawal of the Ch'ing Dynasty royal family

from government, the Empress Dowager ordered the Grand Council to deal with the officials of the Republic, the emperor himself did not have to sign anything. Even though Mongolia like Yeh-lang, is small their monarch is pleased with himself, but if he does not sign his name no foreign objection will be aroused so I agreed. Also the gesture of allowing this will help make up for my roughness last evening. The documents will be finalized at any moment now. This is how matters now stand, please give this your consideration. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 15, 3rd wire.

On November 17 the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia prepared two copies of the petition requesting the cancellation of their autonomy, sending one to the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I and one to the Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner, Hsu Shu-cheng. After its transmission to Peking the government announced its acceptance on November 22:

The President's Office, November 22, 1919.

According to the wire received from the Commissioner in Urga, our senior administrative official, Ch'en I, the nobles and lamas of the outer Mongolian Government have together signed a petition whose contents is as follows:

"From the time of K'ang Hsi in the former Ch'ing Dynasty Outer Mongolia has been subject to China. For over two hundred years she has emulated the Chinese. From the nobles to the common people all have alike lived in peace without trouble. At the time of the Tao-kuang emperor a change was made from the old system which offended Mongol feelings and resulted in the rise of suspicion and resentment among them. When the closing years of the Ch'ing Dynasty were reached the ministers in government were evil and debauched

and the people were filled with anger and resentment. At the time foreigners took advantage of the opportunity to incite the Mongols and thus was started the movement for independence. When a treaty was concluded the independence of Outer Mongolia became a reality, and China gained only the empty name of suzerainty<sup>68</sup> and the Mongol government lost its rights and privileges. Now, after several years of independence we have still not seen any satisfactory results, and it is indeed a saddening thing to think about past events.

At the present time Russia is in a state of turmoil and since no united government exists they are powerless to uphold the treaty if members of the rebelling parties should transgress our borders. Because she is not able at the present time to control her own territory the Buryats and others, without regard for the law have been leaguing with local bandits and forming parties which repeatedly send men to Urga pressuring us to comply with their plan to unite all Mongols into one Pan-Mongolian State. Every kind of incitement has been indulged in and conditions are extremely critical. The usurpation of Chinese suzerainty and the destruction of Outer Mongolian self-government are of no advantage to us and the officials of Outer Mongolia are well acquainted with this fact. These Buryat bandits if we will not comply, are going to send troops across the border and try to frighten us into compliance. Moreover Tannu-Urianghai has always belonged to Outer Mongolia, but now the White Russian Party have invaded it and oppose both Chinese and Mongol government troops. The Red Russians then follow right behind them so that it is impossible to do anything about it. The Outer Mongolian people have always had a most meager livelihood. Financially the country cannot meet its obligations and is incapable of rectifying this. We are short of arms and our army is feeble - we are indeed in dire straits. Although the central government has already assumed the responsibility for many problems as well as assumed the responsibility for protecting us, the development of industries has not yet been realized. At this point the foreign policies of the Mongol government have deteriorated to a most dangerous point and in order that our officials might better observe present conditions the nobles and lamas should be called into frequent conferences to discuss

the dangers and possibilities the future holds and hopefully we can initiate action in the right direction. We are all united in saying that in the last few years good feelings between China and Mongolia have been consolidated and that we are daily becoming closer. All suspicion and resentment has been wiped out and we are of a common mind and spirit. To secure a long lasting peace for the people, both the Mongols and the Chinese desire the cancellation of autonomy and the reinstitution of the former Ch'ing system of government. The authority of the jassaks is still to come directly from the central government, and in all cases their authority will be limited to domestic affairs. To avoid any international troubles they will rely on the strong support of the central government. The decision of the parliament has been reported to the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hukukhtu and has already received his approval. It is hoped that in establishing the limits of authority of the domestic Mongol government all decisions will be fair ones based on conditions in Mongolia. In this way all the regulations for the re-activation of the economy will not conflict with overall Chinese authority. With government thus in accord with Mongol conditions the people will be able to enjoy a long-lasting peace. The betterment of Mongolia is to the advantage of the nation as a whole. The five races enjoying peace together and sharing their common good fortune is what the officials and people of Mongolia have been praying for. In addition, the Sino-Russian-Mongolian Tripartite Treaty, and the Russo-Mongolian Special Commercial Agreement and the Sino-Russian Declaration were all signed on the basis of an autonomous Mongolia, but now that we ourselves have requested the cancellation of autonomy and all the former treaties are accordingly no longer effective. As for the necessary arrangements for Russians operating commercial enterprises in Mongolia, when Russia's new government is established the central government should take the responsibility of initiating new settlements, so that through sincere friendly relations between the two countries their old rights will be restored."

We also have a report from the Northwest Planning Commissioner, Hsu Shu-cheng, on the same matter:

"I have gone over this petition and find it very sincere. It is very evident that the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutuktu Khan and the nobles and lamas clearly understand that the principles of patriotism and the five races living as one family rest upon perfect sincerity of all parties. We should immediately respond to their requests in order to take advantage of their present feelings. All the honours which are due to the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutuktu Khan and the benefits which should accrue to the shabi of the four leagues should all remain as they were under the old system. We should treat them well in order that we may all enjoy the fruits of the republican form of government forever." Your president has great hopes for this.<sup>69</sup>

After the cancellation of autonomy had been arranged, on November 18 Hsu sent a wire with his analysis of conditions and the strategy he had adapted:

Attention: Northwest Frontier Office, Peking.  
Confidential.

Copies to: the President, the Cabinet and  
Director-General Tuan Ch'i-jui.

The views on the matter of cancellation are tangled and unclear; it has been long discussed with without decision. If at present we attach no conditions and are over-generous in reaching an agreement there is no telling what might happen.<sup>70</sup> When one checks into this matter we see that Commissioner Ch'en has held repeated deliberations for half a year already. [If you wish to see] the petty sort of points involved refer to the report I have sent to the Ministries. The two Assistant Commissioners, Li and En have been dashing about trying to win over those nobles who are outside Urga thus performing a worthy service that cannot be ignored. But I know that your office is already aware of this and there is no need for me to recount the details here.

The noble class are not sure which way to turn. They want to regain the rights and privileges that they have lost to the lamas, so on the one hand they have made the request to Ch'en I. But they are also afraid of the damage the Living Buddha could wreak upon them, and have accordingly also stated that they do not favour cancellation of autonomy. The lamas are dependent upon the Living Buddha. They use the abuse of power and bribes the pressure the people to follow their wishes. They are afraid that the cancellation of autonomy will destroy their base of their power and they therefore belittle the nobles for their weaknesses and try their utmost to sway the Buddha to listen to them so that he will support their actions although outwardly they try to cover this over with specious talk. From the time I arrived in Urga and had acquainted myself with this situation I daily sought to ingratiate myself with the lamas in order to win their trust. As I am a military leader and further, since I united with Kao Tsai-t'ien's regiment my prestige and power is substantial here. Therefore the lamas saw me as a means to oppose Ch'en I and thus control the nobles. When the nobles saw that the lamas had support they had no choice but to ally themselves closer to Ch'en I to strengthen their own position, to avoid the possibility of being divided. I therefore had to concentrate my attention on drawing in the lamas. To inveigle them I used kindness, making use of endless friendly talk, to control them I employed sternness, using awing language. In this way, I confused them so they didn't know what to think. At that time I quickly came to the point and accused them of misleading the Buddha and causing trouble. I also accused the nobles of a lack of resolution and the inability to recognize what was to, or not to their advantage. For me to thus take up the sword of the nation and devise and guide such schemes holding a large army in my hands, frightening the ignorant and helpless Mongols was like taking up a two-edged sword and frightening a young child - an act to bring shame upon a man. It was only because this matter had gone so long unsettled and because our country was running the risk of losing its prestige that I spared no effort in drawing up this poor plan.

The plan I outlined in my previous wire was exactly what I have been describing here - however I did not expect the good fortune to carry it off so perfectly. Yet, if it had not been for Ch'en I's skillful management there would not have been any opportunity to institute it, and if it had not been for our Kao's regiment garrisoned there beforehand even if we had any prestige it would have been difficult to achieve success so quickly. The merit for this achievement lies entirely with Ch'en I and Colonel Kao Tsai-t'ien's regiment. My efforts in ending the impasse were concerned wholly with future I have not paid any attention to the present. How could I dare say that this matter was my success? My repeated telegrams have often expressed a little dissatisfaction with Ch'en I but this arose from the fact that when wires from your office had what I considered to be wrong views of Ch'en I's work, my replies were rather indignant. This was not because I had a grudge against Ch'en I. I beg your forgiveness in this matter. Hsu Shu-cheng. 71 November 18, second wire.

On November 19 he again issued a telegram to the Cabinet.

Attention: the Cabinet, Peking.  
Confidential.

I have received your wire of November 15. I am ashamed because I am not equal to the praises that you heap upon me. The Mongol government had agreed to request the cancellation of autonomy prior to the establishment of conditions. The three Commissioners Ch'en, En and Li are in complete accord. I have repeatedly wired you of my plans and requested that you check them over. My daily communications with Ch'en I were invariably heated. We interpreted matters differently and were unaware of the confusions that were arising. The Cabinet has been very tolerant and has said nothing even though it certainly had the right to do so. I most sincerely acknowledge my error and hope you will pass on these expressions to Director Tuan Ch'i-jui and all other ministries. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 19. 72

At this time Hsu dropped his hostilities toward Chin Yun-p'eng, who had blocked him at every turn.

On November 20, just before returning to Peking, Hsu entertained the Mongol officials and people with a play. He sent a report of this event by wire:

Attention: Northwest Frontier Defense Office,  
Peking.

Confidential.

Copies to: the President, Director-General Tuan,  
and all Ministries.

I have decided to set off for Peking tomorrow morning. Many Mongol officials have been coming to my office to bid me goodbye and were most warm in their friendship. For this evening I have invited Mongol officials, all the Commissioners and all military officers above the rank of Captain to a banquet. In addition I will have a play performed for their pleasure and have announced throughout the whole of Urga that all guards are to be removed and that everyone, rich or poor, Mongol or Chinese, will be allowed to attend. When all have assembled for the play I will announce to the crowd: "This gathering is to celebrate the cancellation of Mongol Autonomous government. I have long been aware that this has been the desire of the Living Buddha, the Mongol officials and of every banner. Therefore at this time, without awaiting further deliberation, I have so acted, displaying thus my patriotism and my affection for Mongolia. Also, the responsibility for submitting this letter requesting cancellation of autonomy to Peking rests upon me because I have been so closely concerned in this affair; therefore my felicitations are especially sincere. I celebrate both for the nation and for Mongolia, and also for myself. I again express my thanks to those who exerted themselves performing their various responsibilities over the past 20 odd days. What I desire to ascertain at present is guidelines for future operation to ensure that everything will run smoothly. But it

is only with your help that I will succeed, and if I do it will be with much thanks to you. Although in truth I have not been here long everyone has treated me as cordially as if I were an old friend. Now to suddenly return to the south will mean that I must leave without bidding adieu to many of these new friends. Although I am happy that it will not be long before I return I nonetheless find it difficult to express this, and I expect that many of you have similar feelings. We will, however, be able to alleviate our loneliness through the mail and the telegraph."

My main intention in thus speaking to them is to win their approval of this request for cancellation of autonomy and thus ensure their satisfaction. In this way no matter who should come in to see the play, and this will most certainly include foreign agents, what they find will be to our benefit.

I respectfully submit this report for your inspection. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 20. 2nd wire.73

Colonel Matsui<sup>74</sup> who was just at that time engaged in trying to gain Outer Mongolia for the Japanese, sought out Hsu on this day in order to congratulate him.<sup>75</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng reached Urga on October 29 and on November 21 he again left for Peking. In the space of 22 days, without expending a soldier or an arrow, he successfully completed his task of regaining Outer Mongolia.<sup>76</sup>

When Hsu reached Peking in addition to making a report to the government he also wired a report to Sun Yat-sen who was in Shanghai (November 24). Sun Yat-sen wired in return congratulating him on his success (November 26). The contents of this telegram in part were:

I have just received your wire, and am fully acquainted with the Mongol change of heart and their return to China. It has been a long time since our country has had a Pan Ch'ao or Fu Chieh-tzu. Such success in such a short space of time - when I compare this with the ancients I don't know who is superior! From the closing years of the Ch'ing Dynasty our border areas have been turning away from us, and the size of the country has been diminishing at the rate of almost 100 li per day. Outer Mongolia has been in a state of confusion for the last seven years, and now in one day it has returned to the fold, and we again have the Republic composed of the five races. This is something that the nation may be truly joyous about.<sup>77</sup>

Liang Yen-sun also sent a letter praising Hsu Shucheng, in which he said, "He braved the snow to march northward to protect the peace of our northern borders. His diligence and perspicacity stir us to fall in obiesance to him ...."<sup>78</sup>

On November 30 the Cabinet passed a resolution to eliminate the office of the Urga Commissioner, and Ch'en I was reappointed the Wei chiang-chun of Honan Province. Complete authority for the management of Outer Mongolian questions passed to the hands of the Frontier Planning Commissioner. On December 1 the government appointed Hsu Shucheng Director of Outer Mongol Affairs; on December 2 he was appointed Special Commissioner for the Investiture of the Living Buddha. On December 15 Tuan Ch'i-jui personally headed a group of over 100 military officers giving a farewell banquet for Hsu at the Pao-ho Tien. On December 16 Hsu Shih-ch'ang gave Hsu audience in the Huai-jen T'ang

and ordered him to bear the Seven-Lion Gold Seal and confer it upon the Living Buddha.<sup>79</sup> The text of the investiture order was as follows:

In agreeing to the cancellation of autonomy the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan is planning for lasting peace in Outer Mongolia. His benevolence and intelligence are especially worthy of high commendation. Let it be known that in order to display his special merit he is being invested as the Outer Mongolian Assister of Reform and Civilization, the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan.<sup>80</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng reached Urga for the second time on December 27. At this time he was the Special Commissioner for the Investiture of the Living Buddha, and therefore, "the Outer Mongolian government officials, nobles, lamas, military and the general populace were line up for ten li from the city to welcome me. There was much pomp and ceremony; there was an unbroken line of observers along the road, young and old, male and female. The market place was festooned with welcome banners."<sup>81</sup> The investiture ceremony was to take place on January 1, 1920. Also it was ordered that all officials taking part in the ceremony should

follow a vegetarian diet for the three days from December 29 to the investiture in order to display the sincerity of their respect, and to add importance to the ceremony and honour the Living Buddha.<sup>82</sup>

As for the actual things that were done when Hsu was in Mongolia, for his government policies we have already seen his "General Plan for the Development of the Northwest Frontier." I was unfortunately unable to bring other materials together in time. At this point I will recount what I can of the events of that time.<sup>83</sup>

1. Concerning affairs in Mongolia at that time I know that at that time Wang Yin-t'ai, the head of the General Service Office of the Northwest Frontier Planning Office was the most well-informed. I have throughout urged him to record the important events to pass on to posterity (the last time I so advised him was on Tiger Bridge in Nanking in 1946). Unfortunately he could stir no interest in the subject. He died in 1961.

It seems that Wang Yin-t'ai served yet another function during the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy. It was said that at that time the daughter-in-law of the Living Buddha's younger brother was also a prostitute. Her name, if my memory serves me correctly, had the word "Hua" (flower) in it. This woman had a lot of influence in the government. At that time Wang was a handsome young man and this Mongol woman was quite strongly attracted to him. As a result they had an affair. It is said she exerted a lot of pressure in getting the Living Buddha to agree to the cancellation of autonomy. In 1921 when our family was in Shanghai I often heard Kuei Sen joking

with Wang Yin-t'ai, "It is fortunate that the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy were quickly concluded, otherwise I am sure that we would have had to sacrifice you to madam 'Hua'".

2. Education was at the centre of Hsu's policies for the government of Mongolia. In his General Plan for the Development of the Northwest Border he said, "Mongolia has given her allegiance to China for roughly the last 300 years. The policy of the Chinese government throughout this period was to keep the Mongol people ignorant - truly a policy which ignores basic principles of humanity. From now on I want to see harmonious relations with the Mongols, and this will be difficult to achieve without a spirited reform of education, a promotion of learning." K'o Shao-min stated, "When he (Hsu) reached the capital I said to him, "Do you perhaps wish to use the chun-hsien system to govern these nomadic people of the Northwest?" He replied, "Do you place your faith in what has been written on the subject, rather examine the plan that I have prepared." It is obvious that this was a serious expression of his views and not merely idle words.

It is said that as soon as he got to Urga he chastised the Shansi merchants, demanding that they be honest in their dealings with the Mongols, and forbade any further dishonest dealings. One of the common tricks that the Shansi merchants used at that time to cheat the Mongols was the extension of credit. Because they could thus get things without paying for them immediately the Mongols frequently used credit to buy goods for which they had no need. The Mongols used sheep as the medium of exchange in their trading. If the agreed upon price was 100 head of sheep, at the end of the year the Shansi merchant would arrive and demand 140 sheep. When the Mongol asked why they demanded the extra forty sheep the merchants would respond, "Have not our sheep had lambs?" The Mongols could not deny the logic of this and would allow the merchants to lead away the extra sheep. When Hsu arrived he ordered the merchants to avoid giving credit at all costs, and if that credit had to be given, then at the time of repayment the number of sheep in the contracted debt could not be exceeded.

The Mongols regarded silver as very precious. Outside of Urga there was a very deep gorge and if a Mongol was very ill and had had a lama read sutras for him to no avail, then he would throw silver into this gorge in order to gain the help of buddha. When Hsu arrived in Urga he established a bank (Li Tsu-fa was the director) and issued bank notes on which there was a picture of a camel caravan, which pleased the Mongols greatly. One day when Hsu was in the bank he saw a Mongol sunning himself at the entrance to the bank. After a little while he pulled out a piece of silver from a very greasy leather pouch, went into the bank, and exchanged it for a one dollar bank note. Again he sunned himself at the bank entrance amusing himself looking at the dollar bill. After a while he took another piece of silver from the pouch, re-entered the bank and exchanged it for a five dollar bill, and a little later he exchanged another piece for a ten dollar bill. Hsu paid much attention to this because he hoped that the bills would induce the Mongols to put their silver into the bank instead of throwing it into the gorge.

At one point there was a drought and the Mongols wanted Hsu Shu-cheng to pray for rain. He donned the ceremonial uniform of a general and under a very impressive banner reached the mountain where he was to pray for rain. Following this it actually rained and the Mongols were greatly pleased with him. Later, when Hsu was returning to Peking his car got stuck on the road and was pulled out by a large number of Mongol nobles, all wearing their red hats of feudal rank. This is one of his most well-remembered recollections of his time in Mongolia.

3. With the purpose of developing Outer Mongolia's mineral resources Hsu Shu-cheng invited a chemistry professor from Germany, a Doctor Konrad Bartelt, who was also a good friend of Wang Yint'ai. He also invited Johannes Muller as an advisor on administrative law. In addition to going to Urga with Hsu, Muller went to many other places including Uliassutai and Sair Usu, and some rather extensive investigations were undertaken. (After the Chihli-Anfu war he served as a

professor at T'ung Chi University. During the Sino-Japanese war he established a German high-school in Shanghai. He has since then died).

4. Chang Chen-han, tzu, yen-sheng, who was born in Hsu-chou, and who at that time had led troops to Urga told me that when they reached Urga there were no vegetables at all in the market. Hsu then ordered them to try planting Tientsin cabbage and the experiment was a complete success. When Chang-Chen-han left Mongolia two years later cabbage had become a common food in Urga. He told me a number of other things as well; unfortunately these are the only things that I remember clearly.

5. I have heard men of Hsu's generation say that when he was in Urga he spent everyday from dawn until dark checking on the military encampment, often eating with the troops. On one occasion when they were having a play to celebrate the new year he helped in the festivities by singing a K'un ch'u. Every time he went to Urga he took a flautist, Fan Chin-ch'uan with him. Also, he was constantly discussing the classics with his subordinate officials. He was most pleased with his ability to interpret Mencius. (In his "Chih yao-chung shih hsiung-ti shu" he has made reference to this).

In 1919 following the May 4 Movement there was a widespread development of the new-thought tide which was very obviously at odds with people of the time who advocated conservatism. Lin Ch'in-nan was a central figure among the conservatives and my father at the time was in sympathy with the conservatives. Therefore, Lin Ch'in-nan very much hoped that my father would be able to take advantage of his government position to strike a blow against the new thought tide. He published a novel at that time entitled, "Ching Sheng," which covertly expressed this:

Signs of the coming revolt began to appear in 1911 and all the important officials began leaving the capital. Also, the number of tourists in the city was extremely small. From Nan-cheng Hsien in Shensi there was a fellow named Ching Sheng. He was wandering about the capital on very little money and was lodging in the Western Chamber of the T'ao-t'ing. He had one shelf of books and a string of coins which weighed 18 chin, which he hung on the wall. The priest did not dare to ask him if he could make use of this money, but he was very striking and the priest knew he was a robust youth. At the T'ao-t'ing in those days the officials in the capital always used to come to drink and pass the time, but because of the political unrest it was at this time empty. On May 18 from down out of the mountains there came a small lackey carrying a great vessel of wine on his shoulders, followed by three carts carrying three young men. One of them, T'ien Ch'i-mai was an Anhwei man, another, Chin Hsin-yi, was a Chekiang man, the other, Ti Mo, I do not know where he came from. They had all recently arrived from America and were well-versed in philosophy, but T'ien Ch'i-meи was especially gifted. He had the ability to criticize things that other men would not dare to criticize. Mr. Chin was well-versed in literature. The three became bosom friends and decided to wander through the hills. When they arrived at the T'ao-t'ing they peered into Ching's room in disdain and reckoned he was an uneducated swaine, and indifferently ignored him. They called the monk to make up their room and to warm wine for them and bring them food. They sat engaging in small talk, separated only a window from Ching's dwelling. Chin was sitting in the middle and he said, "China is finished and the blame lies with Confucianism. What reason is there to lay so much stress on human relationships? If the foreigners had wed their nieces how could they have become strong? Man exists in this world - there are parents but what compassion do my parents have towards me?" Ti Mo laughed loudly and replied, "It is written language which has misled men and brought them to this point." T'ien put his hand on the table and said, "How can dead words produce living learning? We must reject Confucianism and the theory of human relationships." Ti Mo said, "My idea is that we must

do away with classical Chinese and replace it with colloquial; thus making way for the general spread of knowledge. This will make it possible for all men to get a broad and general education that will not be blocked by the obstacle of a difficult and abstruse literary language. The only problem will be how Chin can remain silent and not explain the subtleties of the wording." Chin laughed and said, "You know my name - it is Chin [gold], no more. The nature of those named Chin is to lust after gold. So anyone of this name who would rather explain characters would be a stupid illiterate. I very much want to assist you in so spreading colloquial language." With this the three of them were very pleased and swore to act as brothers in doing what they could to destroy Confucius. Suddenly they heard a tremendous noise and the boards fell off the walls falling on their table and shattering the cups and bowls.

A splendid fellow strode in through the hole in the wall and pointing to the three of them said, "How can you speak like this! For over 4,000 years China has used the theory of human relationships as the basis of the country. How can you just destroy them? Why did Confucius become the sage of his time? At the time of the Spring and Autumn annals ritual was stressed, but today science is stressed. Just suppose, for example, that Shu Liang-ho (Confucius father) was seriously ill in Shantung Province when Confucius happened to be in Chiang-nan. When he heard the news would he use a telegram to express his concern, and would he go by train to see his father? Or would he still send a letter by the old post system and ride in stages taking a month to reach Shantung, thus not seeing his father before he died? Which do you think? Children need their parents. When they are small they must be suckled and as they grow they must be educated. It is by means of your mother's milk that you become a man and it is through education that you become literate. Without the work of your parents you would be unable to communicate as you do today. For example you have received financial help from others and your life has not been lived without help from others so that if you have a heart you must respond with kindness. Only if your parents had not given you your start in life would you then be justified in using this heretical talk. To me

the thought of having no home and of abandoning my parents is unbearable. But you venture to talk like wild beasts and confuse my ears." T'ien still wanted to argue against him, but this imposing fellow thrust two fingers against his head and his brain hurt as though it had been pierced by an awl. Then he kicked Ti Mo causing an excruciating pain in his kidneys. Chin was short-sighted - the fellow snatched his spectacles and threw them away. Chin was as frightened as a hedgehog for his life and kowtowed repeatedly. The fellow laughed saying, "You have gone crazy just like Li Chih you certainly are an oddity among men. I have just washed my hands and feet and shouldn't contact your diabolical bodies. You filthy vermin get out of here and don't sully my plaque. If I should kill you I would become a fugitive from justice, wandering the mountains and swamps. Since I don't want that to happen it is better to let you go and let the spirits work their vengeance." The three men looked at each other without speaking, all of them anxious to leave. When they glanced back up at the threatening veranda the fellow was still there, holding his plaque and laughing fiercely.

Old Li said, "Mr. Ching was a real busybody and quite a joke. When I stayed at a certain old gentleman's house in Taiwan this fellow had over twenty dogs and there was barking continuously throughout the night, but I resolutely went to bed and pretended that I did not hear them. Again when I stayed on Ts'ang-hsia Chou, where thousands of egrets nested in the Li-chih trees I ignored the din they used to make at daybreak. Why? The animals of this world have their own tongue which is of no concern to man." I had this event related to me by a scholar named Li. It seems that Mr. Li did not approve of these three men and therefore with some pride and pleasure told me about it. When I heard it I could not stop laughing. If in this impure world there are only vain people like T'ien and Ti, where are we to find anyone like Mr. Ching? I have read Hsueh-chung-jen and I have seen the humbling letter of General Wu and this anecdote is of the same class as these works. Perhaps Mr. Li had some purpose in telling me this, and for this reason I have recorded it since it helps fill a gap in my talks.

The Mr. Ching, T'ien Ch'i-meи, Chin Hsin-i and Ti Mo in this story refer respectively to Hsu Shu-cheng, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'ien Hsuan-t'ung and Hu Shih. Although the intention of the story was very obvious Hsu Shu-cheng evidenced no reaction to it.

On March 4 of this year Hsu's mother died. She was buried some time in August or September.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **ANALYSIS**

The translation from Hsu Shu-cheng's nien-p'u presented here is the complete 1919 section, which extends from page 223 to page 266 of the original text. This section of the nien-p'u limits itself almost exclusively to an analysis of Hsu Shu-cheng's success in re-establishing full Chinese authority in Outer Mongolia in that year.

This analysis can be broken down into five main problems. First, a background to the political problems in North China is given to indicate the origin of the Frontier Defense Army, Hsu Shu-chang's command of it and his interest in Outer Mongolia. Second, the Outer Mongolian background is outlined. This section focuses its attention on Ch'en I and his negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy. It is made clear that these negotiations were bound to fail for two basic reasons: the conditions, because they catered to the advantage of the nobles were unacceptable to the Outer Mongolian government as a whole, and because they restricted her authority they were also unacceptable to the Chinese government. The author considers the Living Buddha's second letter to President Hsu Shih-ch'ang, sent on October 24, as a signal of the final defeat of Ch'en's negotiations.<sup>1</sup> Hsu Shu-cheng's arrival in Urga on October 29 is therefore seen as following the defeat of Ch'en I.

The third section covers Hsu Shu-cheng's assumption of negotiations and his successful conclusion of the cancellation

of Outer Mongolian autonomy. It makes up the bulk of the author's presentation of this period and will be the focal point of our attention. The fourth section, brief and disappointing, covers Hsu Shu-cheng's period of administration in Outer Mongolia. It consists of a number of recollections of little historical value, which the author acknowledges.<sup>2</sup> The concluding section of his analysis is a quotation from a novel by Lin Shu, a well known, conservative writer of the early Republic,<sup>3</sup> which seems to bear little relevance to events in Outer Mongolia, but which serves both as favourable comment on the character of Hsu Shu-cheng and unfavourable comment upon his detractors.

A detailed analysis of all the problems involved in Hsu Shu-cheng's appointment as Frontier Commissioner and his work in Outer Mongolia is beyond the scope of this paper. While reference will be made to all the major problems, the following analysis will concentrate on the two men, Ch'en I and Hsu Shu-cheng, their qualifications for their place in the negotiations with the Outer Mongols, and upon some of the reasons for the ultimate failure of the Chinese attempt to regain control of Outer Mongolia.

Hsu Dau-lin's analysis of the events leading to his father's appointment as Frontier Commissioner takes into account the major international and domestic factors leading to the creation of this office, but this quick review is

insufficient to give the reader any idea of the sort of man this appointment had been given to.<sup>4</sup>

To do so we must go back briefly to the fall of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the appointment of Tuan Ch'i-jui as Premier on August 1, 1916.<sup>5</sup> Both Li Yuan-hung, the new President, and the Parliament which Tuan was forced to convene opposed him to some extent and Tuan made the decision to use his military strength to control this opposition.<sup>6</sup> Yuan's fall is generally regarded as marking the beginning of warlordism,<sup>7</sup> and it is doubtful that Tuan could have operated outside this context. To maintain his controlling position he required more military support.

China severed diplomatic ties with Germany in March 1917.<sup>8</sup> The ensuing argument over participation in the war in Europe resulted in Tuan's dismissal from the Premiership in May.<sup>9</sup> Participation in the war was, in part, seen as an excuse to increase military strength through Japanese aid, which Tuan hoped would increase his control of the government.<sup>10</sup> Chang Hsun's restoration of the Hsuan-t'ung Emperor in June, 1917 was used by Tuan to get rid of Li Yuan-hung, who opposed entry into the war, and with Li removed war was declared on Germany in August, 1917.<sup>11</sup>

At the same time, however, Sun Yat-sen, in the South, organized a Military Government to oppose Tuan.<sup>12</sup> The struggle between the North and South which followed became

one of the contentions further widening the Northern split into the Anfu faction of Tuan Ch'i-jui and the Chihli faction led by Feng Kuo-chang. In sum, the more Tuan sought to increase his military power the greater the need for this military power became.

On November 22, 1917 Tuan resigned the Premiership when his military plans were failing.<sup>13</sup> He remained, however, influential in the government because of his militarist backing.<sup>14</sup> On December 18 Feng made him Commander-in-Chief in charge of all forces to fight in Europe and Minister of War.<sup>15</sup> This heralded in a strong year for Tuan and his followers. Threatened by Fengtien forces brought into Chihli through the efforts of Hsu Shu-cheng, and by the tuchuns who supported Tuan, Feng was forced to make him Premier again in March.<sup>16</sup> It was in this year that the Nishihara loans were negotiated and used basically to build up the War Participation Army.<sup>17</sup> Also, in March of 1918 the Anfu Club was formed specifically to manipulate the election of the New Parliament in June.<sup>18</sup> This organization was also supported by these Japanese loans.<sup>19</sup> The Anfu Club did its job well, for the new parliament was completely under its control.<sup>20</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng figures largely in all of the events of this year. It was he who had engineered the presence of

Fengtien troops within the Great Wall, and he was appointed Vice Commander-in-Chief of this force.<sup>21</sup> He used some of the funds for this army to build up a personal force which was to become part of the War Participation Army. In September he was made Co-director of the War Participation Army.<sup>22</sup> By the end of 1918 he was one of the strongest military men in the North, although he continued to operate under the aegis of Tuan Ch'i-jui.

Young, ambitious, arrogant and extremely capable, he had not achieved his success without alienating a considerable portion of the Northern government. It is reported that one of the reasons for his appointment as Frontier Commissioner was to remove him from the center of Peking politics.<sup>23</sup> It was Tuan Ch'i-jui himself who ordered him to draw up a proposed Outline of Operation for the Northwestern Frontier, although Hsu had already been appointed Director of the Office of Northwestern Frontier Affairs when it was first established in the fall of 1918.<sup>24</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng was not picked for the office of Frontier Commissioner because he was especially qualified for this position. The above resumé indicates rather that he was to some extent backed into the position. This does not mean that he was totally without qualifications for the job nor that he did not undertake it with some degree of

earnestness. Hsu brought with him to this job his tremendous energy, his ambition, and his ability to carry things through against strong opposition.<sup>25</sup> He brought with him also ties with financial sources both in China and Japan and some experience in investment,<sup>26</sup> and the military power necessary to supply any protection that Urga might need against White Russian insurgents.<sup>27</sup>

By 1919 the Chinese position in Mongolia had changed considerably from that in 1915 when the Kiakhta Agreement was signed. The intervening period had seen a gradual re-establishment of Chinese influence in Outer Mongolia and a corresponding weakening of the Russian position. Conditions by the end of 1918 were favourable for a Chinese bid to secure in some permanent way the advantage she was gaining.<sup>28</sup>

The official government line at the beginning of 1919 was that China should negotiate to secure for herself the commercial advantages that had been granted to the Russians by the Outer Mongolian government in 1912, but that self-government should not be terminated.<sup>29</sup> This was a very conservative position taken largely because of fear of international objections to illegal breaking of treaties, and because of their reluctance to lay themselves open to the charge of violation of the principle of self-determination.<sup>30</sup> There was also a desire not to alienate the

Mongols which was more than just a cold concern for Chinese advantage. China was a republic and whether or not its republican spirit would stand up under close analysis, there were undoubtedly many Chinese who sincerely believed in it.

It seems, however, that the loss of Outer Mongolia had never been fully accepted by the Chinese, for with the change in the Outer Mongolian scene a number of suggestions began to appear of a much bolder sort, advocating the resumption of full Chinese control there. These proposals ranged from advocation of outright military takeover to much milder proposals for wooing the Mongols into the Chinese fold through acculturation. The bulk of these proposals were submitted to the government in March.<sup>31</sup> Hsu Shu-cheng's border proposal was submitted on April 17 and its contents seem to indicate that he was thoroughly familiar with all these previous plans.

Hsu set out clearly and convincingly a plan to achieve the ends that were being increasingly voiced at the time. It represented a marked policy change from the government's former cautious position, and there was thus some reluctance on the part of the Foreign Office to give its approval.<sup>32</sup> But the plan accorded with the rising aspirations of the time and provided the Anfu Party with an excuse to maintain its army, which was coming increasingly under pressure at this time.<sup>33</sup>

Hsu's plan can be broken into five main parts. In the first he explains that this office should be set up to give maximum power to the incumbent and to his office, since he feels that the difficulties of this position make this necessary. He also asks that relationships between this office and the subordinate offices with which it would have to deal should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion. It is interesting that Hsu anticipates here a problem that in fact was to arise. From the time of his preparation to leave for Urga, when he obtained a copy of the 63 conditions from the Foreign Office, until his return and the cancellation of the office of the Urga Commissioner the division between Ch'en I's and Hsu's authority was never satisfactorily defined. This confusion appears to have had a marked effect on the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy after Hsu's arrival in Urga on October 29, a problem we will return to later in this paper.

Hsu's requirements for this office are followed by a number of broad economic proposals for the development of herding, farming, mining and trade, all to be based on the gradual construction of a railway and highway network. He suggests the initial establishment of horse and camel service, to be replaced by motor vehicles and railroads as development proceeds. All other development would follow along with the opening of this communication network.

Hsu counters any objections to the tremendous distances involved with the lack of any major obstacles to construction such as extensive river or mountain crossings. He claims that the feasibility of irrigation is indicated by the abundance of grass. These claims for the production potential of Mongolia are not unreasonable. Considerable attention was being directed toward Mongolia at that time. The Russians, for example, had been making extensive mineral surveys,<sup>34</sup> and the May 17, 1919 edition of the North China Herald carried a full-page feature-article on the economic potential of Outer Mongolia which was every bit as optimistic as Hsu Shu-cheng's plan.<sup>35</sup> Hsu's goals are rendered more realistic because they are envisioned in a way they could be worked for gradually, because there were no major technical problems (the minerals for example could be surface-mined) and because of the abundance of resources. This part of his plan must undoubtedly have carried a good deal of appeal.

Hsu's military proposals are not what one would suspect from the man who had control of one of the largest armies in China at that time. He criticizes the undertaking of a large military expedition which he deems unnecessary, and suggests instead the employment of small forces which would accompany the expanding developments to afford them all necessary protection. This plan was first

suggested by Kao Tsai-t'ien and it must have had a lot of appeal.<sup>36</sup> Hsu seems correct in saying it would ease military expenditure at a time when the government was short of funds, and in saying it would provide adequate protection for Chinese ventures and would be less inclined to arouse the opposition of the Mongols.

The next portion of the plan deals with education and makes proposals to promote the sinicisation of the Mongols. Hsu's proposals ignore geographical determinants involved in the differences between Mongol and Chinese culture and his proposals that the study of Mongolian by Chinese would lead to Mongol acceptance of Chinese culture may not seem convincing today, but in the context of 1919 Republican China this proposal seems plausible. At the same time that he embodies republican sentiments he caters to traditional Chinese attitudes towards sinicisation of the barbarians. What he suggests is a sort of "guided self-determination", which must have appealed quite strongly to the Peking government at that time.

The plan concludes with a scheme for raising the necessary capital to initiate his proposed program. Briefly an initial two or three million yuan was to be borrowed, backed by a fifty million yuan bond issue for initial railway construction. A Frontier Development Bank was to be established and a capital of three or four million yuan

raised by selling shares in the bank. This, plus the capital borrowed on the strength of the bond issue, was to be used as backing for the issuance of double this sum in bank notes, and this latter sum would be sufficient to get the program under way.<sup>31</sup>

This was perhaps not the firmest ground to begin from, but if the economic potential of Outer Mongolia could be considered to be anything like the claims that were being made at that time, the plan must have seemed a feasible one, and had several aspects to it that must have been very appealing to the government at that time. First, the plan was set up so that it could be instituted with the use of then limited Chinese funds. Hsu was talking about a vast program, but the six million yuan required to put it in operation should not have been beyond the means of Chinese investors at that time. Second, an outright military take-over of Outer Mongolia would involve financial expenses that no one in the government was willing to undertake. Even in periods of great wealth the cost of expeditions north of the Great Wall had been a heavy burden on the Chinese treasury.<sup>38</sup> The Republic, with an empty treasury, was in no position to finance a large expedition to Outer Mongolia. Also, no one with the necessary military power at that time, Hsu Shu-cheng included, would have been willing to weaken his position in China proper by removing his troops to the North.

Finally, an outright military takeover would have aroused strong international opposition, and the Chinese government as we have noted had a great fear of this. Hsu offers instead a plan that proposes basically a non-military re-assumption of Chinese control. He sets it up as a profitable venture with Outer Mongolia not only re-entering the Chinese fold, but at the same time helping to replenish the depleted Chinese treasury.

Hsu's plan can be judged from three points of view. If it was going to be considered at all, the first requirement was that it be economically feasible. The investment capital required was not excessive, the economic potentialities were there, although Hsu exaggerates a little. The only point that seems to have been unrealistic from the economic point of view was his call for reliance on domestic capital, but such a judgement is based more upon what later occurred rather than upon the availability of domestic funds.

Hsu's first move to begin this development took place in mid-February, 1920. Outer Mongolia had just rejoined China at this point and this should have been an opportune moment to promote the sale of Frontier Development Bonds, as they would have been received with some degree of optimism. But no effort to do so seems to have been undertaken and two large Japanese loans were negotiated for railroad construction and development.<sup>39</sup> This, however, seems to be at least

as much a positive desire to use Japanese funds as it does an inability of the Chinese to raise funds domestically. Hsu had as early as December 17 suggested that Japanese funds be allowed to participate.<sup>40</sup> But whether Chinese funds were used or not, the plan looked basically practicable.

Assuming the economic viability of the plan it can then be judged from the political point of view, first in Chinese terms then in Outer Mongol terms. To judge the political validity of Hsu's proposals in Chinese terms we can begin by asking what the motivations were behind the presentation of this plan. As has already been mentioned, Hsu drew up these proposals on Tuan's order. It has been claimed that this was done to get rid of Hsu because he was becoming too powerful with his growing War Participation Army, because he was becoming more obnoxious with his increasing power, and was falling out of Tuan's favour largely because of these problems.<sup>41</sup> A more immediately obvious reason for the presentation of the plan was the need to create an excuse for the continuance of the War Participation Army and the creation of a means of raising funds to support it.<sup>42</sup> A third possibility that has been raised is that it was somehow tied in with Anfu connections with Japan and even with Semenov.<sup>43</sup> The position of power enjoyed by Tuan, Hsu Shu-cheng and the Anfu Club was made possible through the receipt of vast loans from Japan in late 1917

and in 1918. The last of these loans was made on September 28, 1918 - the twenty million yen War Participation loan.<sup>44</sup> Seventeen million yen of this loan apparently laid untouched in a Korean bank as late as March 1919.<sup>45</sup> Although the Japanese government stated it had no control over the release of these funds it appears that pressure from the Allied Powers made it difficult for the Northern government to make use of these funds.<sup>46</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng had been intimately involved in the creation of the War Participation Army.<sup>47</sup> In September he had been made Co-Director, with Tuan, of this army and had been involved in the negotiations for the above-mentioned loans.<sup>48</sup> By 1919 the War Participation Army, which Hsu had been expanding since his appointment as Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Fengtien Army, had increased to a force of around 25,000 men.<sup>49</sup> It would have been lucrative for Japan to support these forces through loans and military assistance and this would answer to the Chinese need.

A number of incidents point to close cooperation between Hsu Shu-cheng, the Anfu Club and the Japanese. The arrangement of the September War Participation Loan coincides with Hsu's appointment as Co-Director of the War Participation Army. In November 1918 he was sent to Japan to study field maneuvers, but it was rumoured at the time that he was negotiating for further Japanese support in return for

concessions in Manchuria.<sup>50</sup> On February 5, 1919 Hsu signed for China the agreement for the extension of the Mutual Military Assistance Pact which allowed for the presence of Japanese troops in China.<sup>51</sup> On conclusion of the cancellation of Outer Mongolian autonomy Hsu reports being congratulated by Colonel Matsui, the Japanese officer who was stationed in Urga, and who had been associated with Hsu in negotiating the Military Assistance Pact.<sup>52</sup> While in Peking following the cancellation of autonomy Hsu proposed that a domestic loan be arranged for extension of the Peking Suiyuan Railway to Kiakhta, but also suggested that Japanese funds be allowed to participate.<sup>53</sup> In mid-February, 1920 he negotiated two large loans with Japan, one for regional development and the other for construction of a railway between Kalgan and Kiakhta.<sup>54</sup> According to an article in the February 28 issue of the North China Herald these loans were made possible when the loan embargo imposed upon China by Great Britain, France, the United States and Japan was effectively broken with the offer by these powers to make a loan of five million pounds sterling (approximately \$17,000,000) to the Peking government on the condition that the major portion of it be used to effect a partial troop disbandment. A note to this effect was sent to the Chinese Foreign Office on February 5<sup>55</sup> and rumours of it appeared in the February 7 edition of the North China Herald.<sup>56</sup>

It appears that the Peking government rejected this loan but that it effectively broke the embargo so they were in a position to borrow from Japan.<sup>57</sup> Hsu's return from Urga at this time was made in great haste.<sup>58</sup> The loans were arranged and Hsu was made Director of the proposed railway.<sup>59</sup> Hsu did not return to Urga until the beginning of May.<sup>60</sup> When he did he remained there only until mid-June. Following the defeat of the Anfu Clique in July Hsu took refuge in the Japanese legation in Peking where he remained for over three months. Finally he was hidden in a willow basket and transported to Tientsin thence to Shanghai.<sup>61</sup> It is fairly certain from all this evidence that there was some sort of understanding between Hsu and the Japanese about Mongolia and it may well have been that his plan was conceived with the intention of creating an opportunity for Japanese investment and military aid.

In this connection it has also been suggested that the Japanese support of Semenov was in part at least to create an excuse for the entry of Chinese forces into Mongolia, possibly with Japanese assistance in the form of troops but more likely in the form of money and munitions.<sup>62</sup> That the intentions of the Japanese were as circuitous as this seems rather unlikely: at its extreme, for example, one can envision Japanese troops with Semenov fighting Japanese

troops with the Chinese. Probably Fritters' estimate that Japanese involvement with Semenov was under the aegis of the military and that the central government was reluctant to deny it because of the strength of the military in the Japanese government, is a correct one.<sup>63</sup>

In sum, there is no doubt about Japanese connections with Hsu, Tuan and the Anfu Clique in China proper and there is little doubt, although there is no direct proof, that there was some sort of understanding between Hsu and at least some important military or financial contacts in Japan, and that he perhaps had some sort of Japanese assurance of financial support for his program in Outer Mongolia.

So from the point of view of Anfu politics the plan provided a viable solution to the need to get Hsu out of the centre of things. It provided a basis for maintenance of the War Participation Army without requiring that the bulk of the army be removed from China proper, for to have done so would have been contrary to the reasons for its existence. Also it provided an excuse for the participation of Japanese capital, money which could be used for other purposes when necessary, and which could quite legitimately be used for the Frontier Defense Army. The plan was designed to answer the political realities of the time in Peking, and to appeal to Chinese sentiments. The plan in fact was so well-conceived and in parts seems so out of keeping with Hsu's character

that one suspects that there may have been other hands in its preparation, but we can assume that it was Hsu's work, for since he presented it it bears his final approval.

Although from the point of view of Chinese politics the plan was well-conceived, the plan shows almost no recognition of possible Outer Mongol reactions.

In his proposals for changing the customs and habits of the Mongols Hsu attributes the differences between Mongol and Chinese culture to Ch'ing Dynasty restrictions on emmigration and intermarriage and seems completely unaware of any of the reasons for the gulf between Mongol and Chinese culture, nor of Mongol rejection of Chinese culture. The centre of Hsu's attention is very obviously upon the territory of Outer Mongolia and not upon the Outer Mongolian people. His proposals for railroad construction and all other commercial activity show no recognition of the need for Mongol agreement. The proposals he is making are similar to the administrative changes made at the close of the Ch'ing Dynasty, which were the direct cause of the Mongol break from China in 1911.<sup>64</sup> In the same vein he considers the question of breaking the treaties with Russia only from the point of view of how the Russians will react. He ignores the question of the Mongol reluctance to break these agreements.

If Hsu's proposals were to be accepted by the government they should have anticipated possible objections. Here

certainly was an area for objection but there is no evidence that any objections of this sort were raised by the government. The probable reason for this was that Hsu's attitudes towards the Mongols would have been the same as those generally held by the great majority of Chinese at that time. It would be pointless to suggest that this office should have been reserved for someone who was capable of understanding the Mongol position, for even if such a person could have been found it is very likely that any proposals he might have made would have been rejected because they ran counter to prevalent attitudes. There must have been other people who, like Ch'en I, were well-acquainted with the difficulties of dealing with the Mongols, but if there were, they made no counter proposals, and even if they had, it is doubtful if their necessarily more restricted proposals would have been preferred over those of Hsu.

In sum, all the reasons for Hsu's presentation of the program arose from internal political exigencies. Hsu's army, created to control the government, engendered as it grew more opposition within the government. Further pressures against it were caused by the British and American support of the Chihli faction and their opposition to the Anfu Cliques concept of military reunification.<sup>65</sup> With the loans from Japan stopped it became imperative to create a legitimate role for this army so that funds for its support could

be obtained. Hsu made it clear with his well-conceived proposals that he was the man for the job; it was also the job for Hsu. Animosity towards him made it almost imperative to remove him from Peking; the program provided an out for his army and promised some legitimate revenue. Given the opportunity Hsu handled it extremely well. His program emphasized a self-supporting and economically feasible development, with military expense kept at a minimum.

Despite the promise of Hsu's plan nearly two months passed before it was adopted. The basic reason for this had to be the reluctance of Tuan Ch'i-jui and the Anfu Clique to remove any of their attention from Peking proper unless absolutely forced to do so. The increasing unpopularity of the Anfu government with its Japanese connections culminated in the May 4th Movement,<sup>66</sup> and pressures against the Anfu Clique following this made it imperative to do something about the War Participation Army.<sup>67</sup> Another reason for reluctance may well have been a lack of faith in Hsu. His plan, as I have mentioned, seems rather out of character and it was common knowledge that a major reason for the proposal was to provide an excuse for maintenance of the War Participation Army.

With the strength of the opposition to maintenance of the army it was necessary that the Anfu government create some means of justifying it, and with the feasibility of

Hsu's program they were able to push it through. Following approval of the plan on June 10 events moved quickly. On June 13 Hsu was appointed as the Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner. On June 19 the Commission was given control of Frontier Military Affairs, and on June 24 Hsu was made Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Frontier Defense Army.<sup>68</sup> On this date the entire War Participation Army was redesignated as the Frontier Defense Army, with Tuan Ch'i-jui continuing on as Director-General.<sup>69</sup>

In Late June the first Frontier Defense troops were dispatched to Urga. This force of fifty men accompanied by 18 motor vehicles was of an exploratory nature. It was led by Major Li Ju-chang.<sup>70</sup> On July 18 the administrative set-up of the Frontier Defense Office was promulgated.<sup>71</sup> By September 15 the entire 7th Regiment of the 3rd Brigade, a force in the neighbourhood of 3,000 men, had reached Urga.<sup>72</sup> No further troops were dispatched to Outer Mongolia.

The preparation for the dispatch of this force of troops to Urga must have began as soon as Hsu received his appointment as Commander-in-Chief. A July 11 report from Peking to the North China Herald describes preparations for the expedition at Kalgan. One hundred motor vehicles had been purchased - this was to be the first large-scale motorized military expedition to Outer Mongolia. Kalgan was apparently in quite a mad state of confusion with the presence of these troops and the noisy and unusual motor

vehicles frightened the pack animals.<sup>73</sup> It was noted in the same edition of the Herald that these preparations were causing considerable consternation in Urga.<sup>74</sup> The expedition finally got under way sometime around the middle of August. By August 27 the first unit of this force had entered Outer Mongolian territory.<sup>75</sup> Almost immediately there was the confrontation between Chinese and Mongol troops recounted in the series of telegrams given in the translation. Ch'en I's concern for relations between China and Outer Mongolia is made very apparent in these telegrams, which represent the first extended contact between Hsu Shu-cheng and Ch'en I.

There are signs of further trouble caused by the presence of these troops in the Living Buddha's second wire to the President of China, on October 24, where he mentions that troops were stationed around the Urga monastery and other lama quarters and that they had commandeered the houses of foreign traders.<sup>76</sup> These were Hsu's troops. He had ordered that the Living Buddha's residence be guarded when he heard rumours that the Living Buddha was planning to flee to Russia.<sup>77</sup> In mid-September official Russian complaints were made against Hsu's troops commandeering a Russian villa on the Tola river.<sup>78</sup> The wording of the Living Buddha's letter seems to indicate that this was not the only incident of this nature, and it is fairly certain that these troops

would have had an adverse effect on Ch'en I's negotiations in Urga. At this point we must review the background to these negotiations in Urga.

The initial period of Outer Mongolian independence from December 1912 to November 1919 falls into two quite distinct periods, the point of division being the signing of the Sino-Russo-Mongol Kiakhta Agreement on June 7, 1915.<sup>79</sup> The signature of this Agreement marked the first recognition by the Outer Mongolian government that Outer Mongolia was to remain Chinese territory. Professor Jagchid<sup>80</sup> refers to the first as the period of Outer Mongol "independence," and to the second as the period of "self-government."<sup>81</sup>

The reluctance of the Russian government to support Outer Mongolian desires for a complete and real independence led to considerable Mongol dissatisfaction with Russia,<sup>82</sup> and this, along with Russia's inability to assume the economic functions formerly filled by China, created a situation that was rather favourable to a re-establishment of Chinese influence.

The Kiakhta Agreement recognized China's suzerain rights in Outer Mongolia and made provision for the establishment of a Chinese Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner at Urga, Kiakhta, Uliassutai and Kobdo.<sup>83</sup> The basic functions of these officials were to ensure that Chinese suzerain rights were not transgressed upon and to protect the interests of Chinese immigrants and merchants in Outer Mongolia.<sup>84</sup>

The office was very much like a consulate in nature,<sup>85</sup> but would not have been called so since Outer Mongolia by the Kiakhta Agreement was still Chinese territory. Thus, at the very outset the office of the Urga Commissioner was to some extent an ambiguous one because of the rather ambiguous relationship between Outer Mongolia and China. As a result the authority that was to accrue to the office was to prove to be very much a matter of the ability of the person in the office to negotiate with the Mongols.

Ch'en Lu, the principal Chinese representative in negotiating the Kiakhta agreement was given the post initially.<sup>86</sup> He and Ch'en I, who replaced him on August 7, 1917,<sup>87</sup> worked to improve the Chinese position. In March of 1916 Chen Lu began negotiating to get Outer Mongolian approval of Chinese investiture of the Living Buddha. On July 8 an agreement was reached whereby the Urga Commissioner was granted the authority to perform the investiture ceremony. The Chinese considered this an important gain because such a right was a further recognition of her, at that point, ambiguous suzerainty.<sup>88</sup>

In April, 1918 the first regular motor vehicle service between Kalgan and Urga was put into operation by Ch'en I, and promised to help promote closer ties and increased commerce with China.<sup>89</sup>

Following the independence of Outer Mongolia in 1911, Russia from the outset was unsuccessful in assuming the

commercial position of China in Outer Mongolia.<sup>90</sup> This resulted in considerable economic hardship for the Mongols,<sup>91</sup> and led to a gradual re-establishment of the Chinese as the dominant commercial group.<sup>92</sup> Although there were other factors the major reason for Russia's failure was her involvement in the 1st World War. The rouble which, despite the dominant commercial position of the Chinese, had been the most common medium of exchange in Outer Mongolia since the latter decades of the 19th century<sup>93</sup> had dropped to about half its pre-war value by 1917.<sup>94</sup> Chinese merchants and many Mongols were by this time refusing to accept the rouble as a medium of exchange.<sup>95</sup> Ch'en I at this time began to negotiate with the Outer Mongol government for the establishment of a branch of the Bank of China in Urga.<sup>96</sup>

The Outer Mongolian government had obtained three loans from Russia in 1913 and 1914 totalling 5,100,000 roubles. Ch'en I's first offer was that China, taking advantage of the devalued rouble, would repay this debt to Russia in return for the right to establish a bank. Peking and Urga were in agreement but the Ministry of Finance did not have sufficient funds to make the payment. In November 1918, by using the cancellation of debts and interest to the former Bank of the Board of Revenue and Population as a bargaining condition, Ch'en I finally succeeded. A fourteen-point agreement was signed which gave China the right to establish

a bank and to issue currency which was to be used as the standard medium of exchange. This represented a considerable victory for the Chinese government, although she was unable to take full advantage of it because of her own economic difficulties.<sup>97</sup>

In 1917 Ch'en I had also managed to have the duties on Chinese merchandise removed and had restored the Chinese postal service.<sup>98</sup> Generally speaking, with the weakening of the Russian ability to represent her interests in Outer Mongolia the Chinese position improved. Finally, in the fall of 1918 - a clear sign of the altered position of China - the troop limit was broken and two companies of Kao Tsai-t'ien's Suiyuan regiment were sent to Urga.<sup>99</sup> This would be a force somewhere in the neighbourhood of one thousand men.<sup>100</sup>

All of these changes brought some improvement in the Chinese position in Outer Mongolia and each improvement would mean some alteration in the responsibility of the Urga Commissioner. As a result it seems reasonable to assume that each improvement in the Chinese position, while it brought an increase in the authority of the Commissioner, it would at the same time increase the ambiguity of his position - a position which, as we have already pointed out, was from the beginning somewhat ambiguous.

Although the Chinese position in Outer Mongolia was

improving she was by no means in a strong bargaining position. The government in China suffered generally from the heavy military burden which was at the same time a product and a cause of the split between the North and South and the internal dissensions within each of these camps.<sup>101</sup> The best that can be said is that she was in a relatively better position than Russia vis-à-vis Outer Mongolia.

There were, however, three factors which tended to improve the Chinese position. There were the Outer Mongol disillusionment with the Russians (which we have already discussed) internal troubles in the Outer Mongolian government, and the growing threat of attack from White Russian insurgents.

Outer Mongolian officials, mainly nobles, had believed at the time of alignment with Russia that their economic position would be improved.<sup>102</sup> For example, the immense debts to Chinese traders were cancelled.<sup>103</sup> But the position of the nobles in fact deteriorated. The new position of power accorded to the lamas by making the Living Buddha the head of government had not been foreseen. Not only did the nobles lose the old emoluments they had received from the Chinese government, they also found their expenses increased. The Kiakhta Agreement had allowed for Russian as well as Mongol use of the public post system and the expenses of this system, which were borne by the nobles, proved

onerous. The Russian loans to a large extent were used to train and maintain the army. The remaining funds were for the most part spent by the lama heirarchy on such non-essential things as a wall around the Living Buddha's palace.<sup>104</sup> One report dealing with the lama abuse of their position claims a purchase of ten thousand brass images of Buddha.<sup>105</sup> The burden on the nobles was further increased by the maintenance of the tax-free privileges of the shabinar, the serfs of the church, and this was exacerbated by a large increase in the number of shabinar in order to evade taxation. Roughly one-third of the working-age male population were shabinar.<sup>106</sup>

In addition to the unsatisfactory economic situation, the independent government posed a threat to the hereditary positions of the nobles, for in theory commoners could now rise to positions of rank. Tserendorji, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been a commoner.<sup>107</sup> The death of Sain Noyon Khan in April 1919 was followed by rumours that he was poisoned by the lamas and provided thus a further reason for the nobles to look to China for the preservation of their position.<sup>108</sup>

Generally speaking it appears that it was the nobles who felt they had suffered by the change to independent government, but it is misleading to assume first, that they were therefore pro-Chinese, and second, that a clear division

existed between pro-Chinese nobles and pro-independence lamas. The majority of government officials were nobles. Three of the five Ministries were headed by nobles and of the ten deputy-Ministers only one was a lama.<sup>109</sup> Some high-ranking lamas were also pro-Chinese. The Jalkhansa Living Buddha, second only in rank to the Living Buddha of Urga, was pro-Chinese and the majority of the lamas in the Gendung monastory gave him their support.<sup>110</sup> The critical factor was the over-riding authority of the Living Buddha of Urga and his dependence on the advice of a few very close advisors, Badmadorji concurrently the Minister of the Interior and the Premier being the most important of these.<sup>111</sup> It was chiefly Badmadorji who blocked approval of the 63 conditions.<sup>112</sup>

Much in the same way that it is a mistake to view the lamas as solidly anti-Chinese, it is a mistake to view the nobles as solidly pro-Chinese. First we should note that the reasons for returning to China were basically negative ones - that is, the intention was to get out of a situation they found unsatisfactory. There was, as a result, an element of reluctance on the part of the nobles to make this move. This is evidenced fairly clearly just by the length of time the negotiations went on. The basic reasons for this reluctance were the general distrust of the Chinese by the Mongols, the knowledge that a return to

China would probably require repayment of the extensive debts which had been cancelled at the time of independence, and the ever-present example of what had happened to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia.

Despite these factors creating a reluctance to negotiate with China there were several factors which promoted the consideration of returning to China. The position of the Outer Mongolian government was somewhat paradoxical, for, surrounded by stronger neighbours, it was able to achieve a degree of independence only through dependence on one or the other of its neighbours. The choice was basically between China and Russia, but the growing strength of Japan in the Far East and her involvement in Korea and Manchuria had made her a third possibility. An attempt was made to contact the United States in October 1919 but was successfully blocked by the Chinese.

Japan, with her support of Semenov and the attempt to promote a pan-Mongol movement, was rejected by the Outer Mongols for a number of reasons. The Outer Mongolian government had been slighted by the Japanese on two occasions, which had done nothing to promote good relations between them,<sup>113</sup> but probably the Japanese treatment of Koreans was a more important deterrent. The year 1919 saw many anti-Japanese demonstrations in Korea and these were cruelly suppressed. In September 1919 the North China Herald reported

an estimate that the Japanese had shot thirty thousand Koreans in suppressing the trouble.<sup>114</sup> Also the Outer Mongols were wary of a pan-Mongol state because of the international implications.<sup>115</sup> They were somewhat contemptuous, too, of other Mongols who had "sold out" their culture - the Buryats were thought to be Russified and Inner Mongols Sinicized. To join with them would to some extent threaten the continued existence of the traditional Mongol culture.<sup>116</sup>

This tends to portray the Outer Mongol desire for independence as a nationalistic or "culturalistic" motivation. This is true to an extent but can very easily be overemphasized to the neglect of the fact that personal interests were also involved. For example, Tserendorji, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who negotiated with Ch'en I was part Chinese,<sup>117</sup> Perhaps a better example was Sirning Damdin who was pushed by Ch'en I as a replacement for Premier Sain Noyon Khan when he died. Sirning Damdin was fluent in Chinese and had lived in Peking for a number of years. His knowledge of China would have meant it was to his interest to maintain closer ties with China. For this reason he was firmly rejected by the Urga Living Buddha.<sup>118</sup> Undoubtedly personal interests were the main reasons behind Badmadorji's rejection first of Ch'en I's conditions which threatened to reduce his personal power and his later cooperation with Hsu, both to counter Ch'en I and for the titles and advantages

promised to him by Hsu.<sup>119</sup>

The foregoing constitute the major factors leading to and influencing Ch'en I's negotiations for the cancellation of Outer Mongolian self-government. In review they were: Outer Mongol disillusionment over Russia's reluctance to support a real independence; Russia's economic failure in Outer Mongolia; the gradual reassertion of Chinese influence and the ambiguous nature of the official position of the Chinese representative; the continuing weakness of China's improved bargaining position; governmental dissensions in Outer Mongolia the threat from Semenov; the long-standing distrust of the Chinese and the interest in personal gain of many of the participants.

The negotiations between Ch'en I and the Outer Mongolian government in 1919 were basically a continuation of the Chinese attempts to improve her position there while Russia was at a disadvantage. Initially the Chinese were interested in gaining the commercial advantages that had been granted to Russia in the 1912 Russo-Mongol Trade Protocol.<sup>120</sup> Although the possibility of cancelling Outer Mongolian self-government had been raised as early as January it did not become the centre of negotiations until August 1<sup>4</sup> when the Mongols themselves suggested it.<sup>121</sup> Thus, Ch'en I's negotiations with the Mongols in 1919 fall into two fairly distinct periods.

Although Ch'en had some discussion with Tserendorji on the subject in the latter months of 1918<sup>122</sup> the Foreign Office directive to Ch'en I on January 5, 1919 is generally considered as the beginning of negotiations. In this directive Ch'en I was advised to open negotiations with Tserendorji for the conclusion of a new treaty which could later be used as a bargaining point with the Russian government when it had stabilized.<sup>123</sup> The intention at this time was not to cancel autonomy, which it was felt might alienate the Mongols and arouse international objections. In addition to gaining Russian commercial advantages, which we have already mentioned, the hope was to remove restrictions on troops and to restore as many of the old Ch'ing institutions as possible.<sup>124</sup> Given the relationship between Outer Mongolia and China at this time, Tserendorji, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was the official who properly represented the Outer Mongolian government in negotiations with China. There was not at this time any suggestion of the Chinese government fostering a division between the lamas and the nobles, although Ch'en I was aware of the fact that there was some dissatisfaction among the nobles over the lama control of government.<sup>125</sup> Further wires in January stressed that the purpose of the negotiations was not to cancel self-government but was to gain mainly commercial controls.<sup>126</sup> On February 14 Tserendorji asked Ch'en to draw up rough conditions as a

basis for negotiation. On February 21 Ch'en I reported these conditions to the central government.<sup>127</sup> Briefly these five conditions were: (1) self government to be maintained, (2) the opening of farm lands and mines by foreigners to be restricted, (3) China to be given right to conduct commercial negotiations with Outer Mongolia, (4) Chinese goods to be taxed as formerly to meet Outer Mongolian administrative expenses, (5) Russian debts to be repaid, and lamas to be given good treatment.

Although there seems to have been good accord between Ch'en and Tserendorji at this point, there seems to have been little progress beyond this in these negotiations. It is possible that knowledge of the proposals for a takeover of Mongolia which reached their peak in March to some extent dampened the negotiations. It is more certain that the death of Sain Noyon Khan on April 17 affected them.

The death of the Premier, the Mongols most able negotiator<sup>128</sup> and the official who had to some extent controlled the Living Buddha, had an adverse affect on the negotiations in two ways. First, rumour had it that he was poisoned by the Living Buddha, although there is some doubt as to the veracity of this report.<sup>129</sup> This rumour, plus the loss of the controlling influence of the Prime Minister resulted in an increase in tension between the lamas and the noble officials. Also, Ch'en sought to seize this opportunity to replace Sain Noyon Khan with the strongly pro-Chinese Sirning

Damdin. This aroused the opposition of the Living Buddha and increased his distrust of Ch'en I and the Chinese.<sup>130</sup>

During these initial months of 1919 Semenov was active in seeking the establishment of a pan-Mongol state in which the inclusion of Outer Mongolia was essential.<sup>131</sup> But although he was received with distrust by the Outer Mongols who refused to deal with his Buryat representatives,<sup>132</sup> his efforts were not yet seen as a threat to Mongol autonomy. In fact he was not threatening the Mongols yet as much as wooing them, and he therefore cannot be viewed as a pressure promoting return to China for protection at this time.

The other major event at this time which was to have some influence on Ch'en I's negotiations with the Mongols was the presentation of Hsu Shu-cheng's Outline of Operation for the Northwest on April 17, although it was not approved by the Cabinet until June 10.<sup>133</sup> This plan represented the creation of a second policy towards Outer Mongolia. Ch'en I continued to negotiate on the basis of the January policy but his negotiations were with little doubt soon to be affected by this new policy.

Although these negotiations strictly speaking brought no results, they were beneficial in that they established a mood of negotiation. They also made clear to both sides the issues involved in the negotiations, at least this seems to be indicated by the fact that the principles involved in these

originally set conditions form the basis of the major portion of the 63 conditions later elaborated.<sup>134</sup>

From January Ch'en I wired repeatedly for troops to counter the Semenov threat.<sup>135</sup> The North China Herald suggested that this threat was being used an an excuse for a troop build-up.<sup>136</sup> For the period from January until April this seems a plausible charge. It is quite likely that Ch'en hoped that an increase in China's military presence would improve his bargaining position. After April, however, his requests for troops acquired a basis in fact. The Mongols seemed very reluctant to openly request the dispatch of Chinese troops but Semenov's forces were increasing. Apparently in the early months of 1919 Semenov was given fairly strong Japanese support, but with the arrival of Allied intervention forces Japan was restricted to some degree.<sup>137</sup> Also, revolt in Korea diverted the Japanese attention from Semenov.<sup>138</sup> Semenov's army increased considerably in size however, during this period by the influx of a large number of mostly Buryat bandit recruits.<sup>139</sup> But the nature of its growth was resulting in a very unruly army, and the lack of sufficient Japanese support following the arrival of intervention forces meant that the army had to resort to looting to support itself.<sup>140</sup>

In May the Outer Mongolian government made a first request to the Chinese government to help control banditry.<sup>141</sup>

On June 7 Tserendorji for the first time spoke to Ch'en I of the threat from Semenov.<sup>142</sup> At that time there were rumours that he was about to cut the Kiakhta-Urga road.<sup>143</sup>

It was just at this time that Hsu Shu-cheng's program was accepted (June 10) and Hsu given his appointment as Frontier Commissioner (June 13).<sup>144</sup> On June 12 Ch'en I informed Tserendorji that if the Mongols accepted Semenov China would use force.<sup>145</sup> Semenov's large and unruly force included a large number of Buryats. The Outer Mongols were suspicious of and somewhat contemptuous of the Buryat Mongols and resented and to some extent feared the Buryat attempts to set the course of Mongolia's future.<sup>146</sup>

The larger Semenov's force became the more necessary it became for it to achieve its ends, and thus the greater the threat it became to Outer Mongolia. Semenov's group became desperate in the summer and threatened Urga. The Outer Mongolian government bought time by agreeing to discuss joining Semenov at a meeting of the representatives of all Aimaks to be held July 17.<sup>147</sup> This meeting was postponed until August 4 at which time Semenov was rejected.<sup>148</sup> But if the Outer Mongolian government was reluctant to join Semenov there was an almost equal reluctance to consider China.

Ch'en I's threat to Tserendorji was a mark of an impending change in the attitude of China. By July Ch'en I's calls for troops were based on real fear of attack by

Semenov. In a wire to Peking on July 4 he outlines the threatened lines of attack which would cut Urga off completely.<sup>149</sup> Yet despite this real fear Ch'en must still have seen this troop increase as an improvement in China's bargaining position. This imminent increase in troops, however, had adverse effects on negotiations as well, for it could not help but arouse Outer Mongolian suspicion of Chinese intentions.

Another factor hindering progress was the noble-lama split which had intensified with the death of Sain Noyon Khan.<sup>150</sup> Ch'en I's attempt to get a pro-Chinese replacement installed had caused a worsening of his relations with the Living Buddha, and because the nature of the Outer Mongolian-Chinese relationship had led to his negotiating through Tserendorji, Ch'en I must have been more and more identified with noble interests.

In summary, up to the August meeting, while the situation had changed, the factors promoting a turn to China seemed to have been cancelled by factors against it. Through all this Ch'en I, who up to this time had exhibited a great deal of patience in his dealings with the Mongols, began to give way to an over-eagerness to get things done. Several writers on the subject have charged him with this.<sup>151</sup>

The meeting scheduled to begin on July 17 to discuss the Semenov question did not begin until August 4.<sup>152</sup> Most

of the officials, however, had arrived in Urga in early July.<sup>153</sup> It is likely that considerable discussion took place at this time and that there was a certain crystallization of the complaints of the nobles against lama control of the government.

When the meeting finally got under way Semenov's demands were formally rejected. The Semenov threat was at its peak at this time and this rejection made the possibility of an attack against Urga almost a certainty.<sup>154</sup> The noble representatives saw the opportunity to use this threat as the basis of a proposal to return to Chinese control to ensure protection, but their further intent was that this return to China would remove control of the government from the lamas.<sup>155</sup> On August 14 Tserendorji, the obvious choice since he had been central in all negotiations with Ch'en I, was nominated as the representative of the nobles of four Aimaks to act as their spokesman with Ch'en I.<sup>156</sup>

A condensed translation of the conditions they worked out, as forwarded to Peking on October 1, with final Cabinet revisions, is included in an appendix. The conditions in good measure reflect the desires of the Mongols as expressed in Tserendorji's previous negotiations with Ch'en I. Although China's bargaining position had improved in the period following the Kiakhta Agreement, she was still in a relatively weak position. Ch'en I was aware of this and of the

concommittant necessity of retaining the Mongols' good faith. Thus, the conditions provide for a good degree of Mongol control and provide checks against much-feared exploitation by Chinese commercial firms. The conditions would indeed place a restraining hand on Chinese development of Outer Mongolia, but on the other hand, because they accorded with Mongol aspirations, they seemed to provide, as Ch'en I states, the basis for a lasting peace between China and Mongolia.<sup>157</sup>

Some discussion followed as to what procedure should be adopted in cancelling Outer Mongolia's self-government. The principal problem was the conflict of the Outer Mongol desire that the conditions be first settled informally with the Peking position that the negotiations should begin only after the petition for return to China had been presented. The Chinese position was taken in order to eliminate possible Russian and foreign accusations that Outer Mongolia had been pressured.<sup>158</sup> The Chinese government continued to insist on this point but ultimately waived it on the insistence of Ch'en I.<sup>159</sup> On September 26 he wired that with the exception of a few difficulties the conditions were settled and that in a few days they would be sent to Peking with his Chief-Secretary, Huang Ch'eng-hsu.<sup>160</sup> On October 1 Huang left for Peking with the conditions.<sup>161</sup>

Actual discussion of the conditions began on August 21.<sup>162</sup> Although the nobles were in collusion with Ch'en I

these conditions had to be discussed by the government as a whole since the approval of the Living Buddha and other lama officials would be required to pass it. It is unclear to what extent Ch'en I participated in these discussions, but the Kiakhta Agreement stipulated his right to attend parliamentary meetings as the representative of the suzerain state.<sup>163</sup>

Predictably, a power struggle developed within the Mongol government. Two of the Ministers were lamas, Lobsangbaldan, the Minister of Finance and Badmadorji the Minister of the Interior and Premier,<sup>164</sup> whom, it will be remembered, was placed in this position following the death of Sain Noyon Khan to ensure the maintenance of lama control. Lobsangbaldan was apparently willing to go along with the majority decision,<sup>165</sup> but Badmadorji was adamant on two questions which involved the degree of authority of the Living Buddha of Urga, of the lamas and, of course, of himself. These two questions concerned the 18th and the 22nd of the 63 conditions.<sup>166</sup>

The question involved in the 22nd condition was whether or not the Living Buddha was to have control of the appointment of officials. Badmadorji insisted that he should, his intention undoubtedly being to preserve the lama advantage. The nobles were of course firmly against this as the main purpose of return to China was to remove power

from the Lamas. Ch'en I, through assurances to the nobles that their interests would not be injured, finally gained their consent.<sup>167</sup> He was not so successful with the 18th condition. In the form this condition was agreed to by the lamas it read, "Any transactions which the Living Buddha has ordered to be carried out cannot be altered." The nobles remained unsatisfied with this condition and Ch'en I, before forwarding the conditions to Peking, that is, sometime between wiring Peking on September 26 and October 1 when he sent the conditions with Huang Ch'en-hsu, altered this condition to retain the good faith of the nobles.<sup>168</sup> The two characters (照例) were added so that the conditions now read " Any transaction which the Living Buddha has, in accordance with regulations, ordered to be carried out, cannot be altered.

It is not clear exactly when Badmadorji discovered this addition, but because of his disapproval the initial agreement to the conditions was reversed. This change took place no later than October 19.<sup>169</sup> Badmadorji insisted that a further meeting involving more outlying representatives was necessary.<sup>170</sup> This was not a full about-face on the part of the leading lamas for there had been a certain degree of reluctance on their part to the whole idea of returning to China. Ch'en's letter accompanying Huang Ch'eng-hsu and the conditions notes a lama request at that time for further

discussion before a decision.<sup>171</sup> The alteration of the 18th condition did not really bring a change of heart, it merely provided the lamas with a good excuse. It has been pointed out as a tactical error on the part of Ch'en I.<sup>172</sup> Another factor probably influencing Badmadorji's opposition to the conditions was the fact that he had been deprived of the rank of Shangchotba by the Living Buddha in 1911 on the insistence of Santo, the Manchu Amban, which would very likely have created a considerable resentment towards Manchu-Chinese authority.<sup>173</sup> But undoubtedly the main question was the one of preservation of power.

These negotiations seem in good measure to have involved Ch'en I as a mediator, an unenviable and frustrating position in any case, but it must have been rendered much more frustrating by Ch'en I's Chinese committments. He has been accused of exhibiting impatience at this point in his negotiations, but his impatience is understandable. It is likely that in addition to the frustration of being caught in a power struggle, his impatience was increased by the seeming nearness of success and by the fear that Hsu Shucheng's growing presence might either raise Mongol suspicion and reluctance, or else that Hsu might steal his glory. And finally, he must have been aware that the threat of attack from Semenov had been severely reduced in early September because of internal troubles in Semenov's army which had

resulted in a revolt and the killing of one of his former chief deputies Fushengge.<sup>174</sup> The Semenov threat it must be remembered was the basis upon which the advisability of cancelling autonomy was argued.

This was the state of negotiations at the time of Hsu's arrival in Urga, but before discussing how he responded to this situation, we should sum up the factors influencing relations between Hsu Shu-cheng and Ch'en I.

As was mentioned earlier, the signing of the Kiakhta Agreement created an ambiguous relationship between China and Outer Mongolia, for by it Outer Mongolia was at one and the same time independent and a part of Chinese territory. Thus the position of the chief Chinese representative in Urga could not but share in this ambiguity. The office was in function somewhat similar to a consulate, but could not be so called because it was Chinese territory. In addition, as the Chinese position in Mongolia improved, the authority of the Urga Commissioner expanded but this altered authority was not laid down in any specific regulations. Ch'en I thus found himself in the rather strange position in 1919 of in effect, negotiating for the cancellation of his own office. The only official authority for his doing so was a directive from the foreign office on August 21 of that year.<sup>175</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng's authority in Outer Mongolia was based upon his proposals in his Outline of Operation for the Northwest. That Hsu somewhat ignored the diplomatic

subtleties of the Kiakhta Agreement is indicated by the fact that his plan refers to Outer Mongolia as China's Northwest and by the omission of any consideration of the necessity of Mongol approval of his development proposals. Perhaps Hsu was aware of the ambiguous position of Outer Mongolia in relation to the Chinese government and that that is at least part of the reason for his concern that his office be given sufficient authority. But it seems reasonably certain that he did not anticipate the international nuances of the problem. The presidential mandate of July 18 gives Hsu control over the army and all aspects of development and education, and states that in all areas mentioned the Urga Commissioner was to be subject to the control of the Planning Commissioner.<sup>176</sup> Strictly speaking this does not give Hsu authority over the cancellation of autonomy, since it falls under none of the categories mentioned in the mandate.

Ch'en I had been ordered by the foreign office on January 5 to begin negotiations to cancel the Russian Treaty. Numerous other directives had followed, and on August 21 he was directed to proceed with the negotiations. But Hsu Shu-cheng had specific plans for the development of Mongolia. In his audience with the President before departure for Mongolia he claims he received Presidential approval for his plans. It is not clear what was said about the cancellation of

autonomy but Hsu's plans imply he assumed it, for they could not have been put into operation otherwise. In his wire of November 10 Hsu states that in his meeting with the president before his departure for Urga, when he discussed his plans and received presidential approval, that the President advised him to get a copy of the 63 conditions.<sup>177</sup> This meeting cannot be reconstructed but there is no doubt that Hsu was aware of the existence of the 63 conditions. His wire of November 10 when he talked of his meeting with Huang Cheng-hsu who had brought the conditions to Peking on October 4, indicates this.<sup>178</sup> Hsu in short, must have felt that he was being denied some of the authority that properly belonged to his office.

The approval of Hsu's operation for the Northwest Frontier and the subsequent creation of the office in fact marked the adoption of a second policy for Outer Mongolia by the government in Peking. Ch'en I's negotiations represent the initial cautious policy of negotiations in good faith and Hsu's proposals represent the aggressive policy of forced acceptance of Chinese dictates. Thus we have created to the north of the Great Wall a situation that in many respects paralleled the North-South split in China proper and in particular the growing Anfu-Chihli split which was in itself a reflection of the North-South split. It is not surprising that a government split over domestic issues should carry

this split into - since we can't quite say foreign affairs - other areas.

Such a conception of the situation in Outer Mongolia is rather interesting for it helps make clear that Hsu viewed Ch'en as an extension of the opposition in Peking. This fact coupled with the vague delineations of authority between Hsu and Ch'en in regard to the cancellation of Outer Mongolian autonomy was bound to have a measurable effect on the actions of these two men.

The first significant interchange between Hsu Shucheng and Ch'en I was a series of telegrams which extended over an eight day period from August 31 to September 7. Ch'en had begun the negotiations for cancellation of autonomy on August 21 and these negotiations were in progress. This series of telegrams, which is included in the Nien-pu,<sup>179</sup> stemmed from an incident involving the first unit of Hsu's force, then on its way to Urga, and the Outer Mongol garrison stationed at Ude, the first stopping point on the Kalgan-Urga road which was actually in Outer Mongolian territory. There was a dispute concerning the purchase of sheep for Hsu's forces. To have trouble between Hsu's forces and the Mongols almost on the moment of their arrival in Outer Mongolian territory posed a threat to the successful conclusions of Ch'en's negotiations. At this time the question of Hsu usurping Ch'en's authority had not yet taken form. Ch'en had

after all been asking repeatedly for the dispatch of Hsu's troops.<sup>180</sup> Ch'en must have been aware that military backing could well prove a mixed blessing. As a result when he was informed of this trouble he immediately wired Hsu Shu-cheng. The tone of his telegram is that of a polite order. There is no indication that Ch'en considers his position to be less than Hsu's.

Hsu Shu-cheng undoubtedly took considerable pride in the discipline of his forces. The 5th telegram of this series, for instance, indicates his concern for discipline, as do all his directives here to Ch'u Ch'i-hsiang. In his telegram of November 1<sup>4</sup> he mentions with obvious pride the discipline and high morale displayed by his troops when reviewed by Badmadorji.<sup>181</sup> In item five of Hsu Dau-lin's recollections of his father's period of administration in Urga it is recorded that Hsu "spent everyday from dawn until dark checking on the military encampment."<sup>182</sup> It appears from the wires that followed that Hsu was irritated by Ch'en's criticism of his troops for his replies were quite stiff. Ch'en, it appears, had been in error and as we move through the series we find him adopting an almost apologetic tone while Hsu by the closing wire of the series has become exceedingly stiff. At this point it appears that neither Hsu nor Ch'en had envisaged an authority problem. Hsu however gives us a fairly strong indication of his unwillingness to take a back seat in

this affair. In fact, on June 28 following news of Hsu's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Frontier Defense Force, a North China Herald reporter estimated just that: "Hsu's appointment will mean action in Outer Mongolia as Hsu is not wont to take a back seat."<sup>183</sup>

The preparation of the force for the expedition had probably taken up most of Hsu's time, and he had neither time nor reason to concern himself with the question of the division of authority in Outer Mongolia. On the basis of his appointment he could reasonably assume that he would be in charge.

Events between this time and his departure for Urga on October 23 however, created some reason for Hsu to concern himself. Ch'en's initial negotiations were completed by the end of September and on October 1 he sent Huang Ch'eng hsu to peking with a draft copy of the 63 conditions. It appears that Huang took 10 days to get to Peking for the conditions were not presented to the Foreign Office until November 11.<sup>184</sup> On October 14 the cabinet called a secret meeting to discuss the cancellation of Outer Mongolian self-government.<sup>185</sup> On October 15 Chin Yun-p'eng requested all cabinet ministries and bureaus to submit their recommendations on the 63 conditions,<sup>186</sup> and on October 16 a provisional committee was ordered to discuss the 63 conditions.<sup>187</sup> Hsu and the Frontier Defense Bureau were excluded from these

deliberations.<sup>188</sup> We know from Hsu's wire of November 10 that he was aware of the existence of the 63 conditions soon after they were drafted. We can only guess as to his motivations for leaving for Urga, but it seems probable that it was a result of his exclusion from these discussions. On November 20 the Foreign Office wired Ch'en I that Hsu would soon be in Urga.<sup>189</sup> It was in this wire that the Foreign Office specifically stated that Ch'en I was to remain in charge of the negotiations for the cancellation of self-government and that Hsu Shu-cheng's authority was restricted to military matters.

We also know from Hsu's telegram of November 10 that on October 22, the day before his departure for Urga, he met President Hsu Shih-ch'ang and, he says, "enquired about these conditions." Exactly what was said is not known but apparently the President ordered him to obtain and examine the conditions.<sup>190</sup>

Since the President apparently did not deny this claim, we must assume that Hsu did have his approval. It is probable, however, that Hsu Shu-cheng insisted that he be given access to them and that Hsu Shih-ch'ang acceded, because he could find no good reason not to. It is at this same meeting that we have the first indication, although not very strong, that Hsu considered Ch'en I to be under his authority, when Hsu quotes the President as responding to his plans for

Outer Mongolia with the words, "Very good indeed, to enlist the aid of Ch'en is an excellent idea." If Ch'en was to assist it would seem that Hsu was to be in charge.

Hsu reached Urga on October 29 and had his first meeting with Ch'en I that evening. It appears to have been an exploratory meeting on the part of both of them with caution on both sides. Hsu claims he intended to have a "completely frank exchange of views with Ch'en I" over the conditions, but states that Ch'en was evasive.<sup>191</sup> He himself however did not volunteer the information that he was familiar with the conditions. This is evident from Ch'en's wire of November 7, asking if he should reveal the conditions to Hsu.<sup>192</sup> Probably to this point Hsu had not considered Ch'en as a problem. He had not taken kindly to Ch'en's criticism in the earlier series of telegrams and did not in any way suggest acceptance of Ch'en as his superior. In his meeting with the President before his departure there was some evidence that he considered that Ch'en would be under him.

By the time he arrived in Urga he was thoroughly familiar with Ch'en's conditions, which he had picked up from the Cabinet Secretariat. Although he does not say so in his objections to Ch'en's conditions which he wired to Peking on November 1, in his wire of November 10, he points out that some of the conditions infringe on his plan.<sup>193</sup>

The conditions conceived and worked out under entirely different circumstances than Hsu's program, gave the Mongols a good deal of control over development plans for their country, over troop deployment, and created an administrative structure that held no place for Hsu.<sup>194</sup>

Also in this November 10 telegram, Hsu reveals his discovery that someone in the government had informed Ch'en not to allow Hsu to take over. There is no way of ascertaining when he made this discovery but it is possible that he heard it the following day (October 30), and that this information which would have confirmed any doubts he had about Ch'en's cooperation after their first meeting, prompted him to draft his objections to Ch'en's conditions in an effort to have them removed.

Hsu's concern at this point is understandable if we recall that the basic reasons for the creation of Hsu's position were to provide an excuse for the maintenance of the army and to shine up the Anfu image which was then on the wane. To this we must add Hsu's ambition and his dislike of playing second fiddle.<sup>195</sup> Part of his reason in going to Outer Mongolia appears to have been that the negotiations were near conclusion and that if he was to gain a part in this he must be there. To find at this late stage that he was to be excluded from the negotiations posed a threat to the continuance of his army, to the Anfu clique, to the

future of his plans, and also placed a stricture upon his ambition. His discovery that Ch'en I was being supported by cabinet elements against him - and Hsu was undoubtedly aware that this opposition centered in Chin Yun-p'eng and Ch'en Lu - in effect rendered Ch'en I an extension of the split in Peking. Thus, an interesting situation was developing. The Anfu-Chihli split within the Northern government was ideologically and to a large degree in action, based on their disagreement as to whether the South should be reunited with the North through force, (主戰派) or through negotiation (主和派).<sup>196</sup> The scene in Mongolia reflected this split and the participants were aligned with the corresponding groups in Peking. The existence of this split goes back to the many proposals in the spring of this year concerning Outer Mongolia and to the acceptance of Hsu's plan in June. This latter event marked, as has been said, the creation of a second policy line for Mongolia.

The breakdown in communications suggests that even as late as October the government was unclear in its position. First, the meetings to discuss the 63 conditions were supposed to be secret. Yet Hsu learned of them and received the President's approval to pick them up from the Cabinet Secretariat. Yet the government seems to have remained unaware that Hsu had seen them, since they did not inform Ch'en that Hsu knew of them - although Ch'en wired on November 6 and 7

to ask whether he should reveal them to Hsu.<sup>197</sup> Neither was Ch'en informed by the government that Hsu had objected to his conditions, and strangely, although the government okayed the conditions on October 28<sup>198</sup> they did not so advise Hsu, and in fact, in his November 10 wire he states that he received a reply from the Cabinet and President commenting favorably on his seven objections.<sup>199</sup> Even more strangely they did not advise Ch'en I until November 4, that his conditions had been approved and were being forwarded to Urga.<sup>200</sup>

Hsu Shu-cheng showed none of the indecision of the government. On November 4 Premier Chin Yun-p'eng rejected Hsu's objections, but as we have seen, Hsu apparently received a wire approving them prior to this. These objections were probably prepared in great haste following Hsu's discovery that he might not be able to employ Ch'en to his ends as he had planned. His introduction to the objections gives us some evidence of this, for he states that the objections will include the opinions he has gathered from the Mongols since his arrival. The introduction could of course have been written after the objections were prepared, and it is only the seventh objection concerning Ch'en's reliance on the nobles which seems to reflect opinions he probably gleaned in Urga. But the lack of any close analysis of the conditions and the presentation instead of very general criticism seems to suggest a hurried preparation.

The criticism of the 63 conditions seems to be in good measure based on the fact that they are inimical to Hsu's own proposals. That they do not promote civilization (objections 1 and 2) counterpoints 9 and 10 of his plan, that they restrict China's administrative authority (objection 3) runs counter to all those parts of Hsu's plan that assume unrestricted Chinese rights to develop communication, industry, and commerce. That they promise to increase China's fiscal burden (objection 4) runs counter to the premise upon which his plan was constructed - that Outer Mongolia could bring no returns at the same time the country was being developed and sinicized, and finally that this negotiated settlement provided no guarantee that Russia would honour it (objection 6 and 7) runs counter to Hsu's apparent conception that there was little need to take account of Outer Mongolia's objections. That Hsu conceived force to be the best means to re-establish Chinese control is fairly evident for example in the following two quotations from his objections: "Even if they do not cancel self-government we can take advantage of present conditions and restore our authority, taking the stand that Outer Mongolia is Chinese territory." and "If we take advantage of Russia's present helplessness to establish real territorial control over Mongolia, which has always been ours, the Russians will be unable to hinder us,"<sup>201</sup>

Although in the seventh objection he speaks of the use of leniency and severity, even this ultimately was to be a matter of force. In his wire of November 13 speaking of his employment of leniency and severity he says, "Their use throughout must be carefully calculated. By nature the Mongols are very suspicious and it would be difficult to use severity alone to pacify them. Therefore we must win them over through leniency. Probably after a time they will begin to see through this and then we must use severity to break them."<sup>202</sup>

Hsu's presentation of his seven objections mark his decision to openly counter Ch'en's position as chief negotiator. He reveals however, in the penultimate paragraph of his objections that he was aware of the problem of authority: "In the management of military affairs I do not want to overstep my bounds and make offensive criticisms, but having the defense of the Outer Mongolian border entrusted to me, I do not want to be remiss in my responsibilities."<sup>203</sup> As I have pointed out, the nature of China's position in Outer Mongolia made the limits of authority of Ch'en somewhat unclear. The conflict in Peking over what policy to follow as we have also seen, made the relation between Hsu and Ch'en even more unclear. It seems likely that this state of affairs on the one hand created the opportunity for Hsu to claim more authority than he originally might have had,

and at the same time made him move more quickly both to take advantage of the situation to improve his position and to ensure that China's interests (from his point of view) were best served.

At the same time a number of things had occurred that must have served to make Ch'en I somewhat defensive. We have seen that the arrival of Hsu's troops caused a certain amount of alienation of the Mongols, for example, Hsu's troops, as has been noted, surrounded the Living Buddha's quarters prior to Hsu's arrival. At almost the same time as this, Ch'en also learned through a source in Urga that the Living Buddha had written to the President demanding Ch'en's removal. This demand was in fact related to the surrounding of the Living Buddha's quarters with Hsu's troops, - the Living Buddha mentions this specifically in his second letter to the President which also contained the demand for Ch'en's removal. There could have been no doubt in Ch'en's mind but that Hsu posed a threat to the successful conclusion of his negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy, and there was also very likely little doubt in his mind as to the intention of Hsu to usurp this role. Ch'en Lu's forwarning of Hsu's arrival re-affirming Ch'en's control, indicates fairly clearly the foreign office estimate of Hsu's intentions.<sup>204</sup> Ch'en I could not but have shared their views. On October 29, the day of Hsu's arrival, Ch'en wired Peking that China's

image was at stake and that great care must be taken.<sup>205</sup> This was an expression of his fear that Hsu would cause trouble. On November 4 Ch'en Lu informed Ch'en I that the 63 conditions had been accepted and would be returned to him shortly. With success seemingly so near to being in his hands he must have been extremely wary of Hsu's presence. His fears probably engendered a reluctance to deal with Hsu openly. Yet he was aware of the danger of Hsu's interference with his negotiations. On November 6 Hsu Shucheng had an audience with the Living Buddha. According to Jagchid Sechen Hsu was accompanied by troops in all his negotiations with the Mongols.<sup>207</sup> This audience provided Ch'en with fairly clear evidence that Hsu intended to bypass him and take negotiations into his own hands. He accordingly on this same day, wired Peking that the return of the 63 conditions be expedited for fear that Hsu would find fault with them, and that the confusion of two separate Chinese claiming authority for control of negotiations would weaken the Chinese image.<sup>208</sup> Ch'en I's estimate was well considered, for this split was creating a situation in which the Mongols would have the opportunity to play Hsu off against Ch'en. Surprisingly, the return of the 63 conditions does not seem to have been expedited, but perhaps more surprisingly, Ch'en I was not informed of Hsu's objections, even on November 10th he appears to have been unaware

of their existence.<sup>209</sup> On November 7 Ch'en and Hsu met and discussed the negotiations but Ch'en still did not reveal the 63 conditions.<sup>210</sup> Hsu Shu-cheng informed Ch'en I that if the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy did not conflict with the authority of his office, he would not interfere.<sup>211</sup> Ch'en felt that he should reveal the conditions to Hsu to ward off the possibility of trouble between them.<sup>212</sup> Hsu still considered that he was to be in charge, however, as is revealed in his statement "If we are at variance on some points, I will still bear responsibility for direction of matters concerning the Mongols."<sup>213</sup> On November 7 Assistant Commissioners Li Yuan and En Hua arrived in Urga and Ch'en met with them and presumed that they were in agreement with him.<sup>214</sup> By November 10 either Hsu had revealed to Ch'en I that he knew of the conditions or Ch'en I had informed him of them, for on that day they arranged to discuss the conditions at Hsu's office on November 11.<sup>215</sup> It is also in this wire of November 10 that Hsu asserts that he is going to involve himself in these negotiations. He points out that he has received approval of his objections, and that the conditions infringe upon the authority of his office. He has called a meeting for the following day, November 11, to discuss the changes he feels should be made. Hsu had no authority to alter the cabinet decision on the 63 conditions yet he was not ordered not to interfere.

In this same wire he says he has arranged to have the two Assistant Commissioners Li Yuan and En Hua, his advisor Yang Chih-ch'eng, and the commander of the 3rd Brigade, Chu Ch'i-Hsiang, take part in his discussion of the conditions with Ch'en in order to ensure a fair judgment.<sup>216</sup> It is doubtful that this was his intention. Two of these people were his own military subordinates, and would undoubtedly support him. It seems likely that he was also sure of the support of the Assistant Commissioners, or at least that he would be able to force their agreement. His later commendation and employment of these two men certainly suggests that they cooperated with him in blocking Ch'en's conditions.<sup>217</sup>

At the meeting on the morning of November 11 Hsu laid down four principles which he insisted the conditions must uphold: that the administration must allow for improving of Mongol civilization; that administrative controls must go to the central government, not to the nobles; that neither the lamas nor the nobles be favoured; and that they must not infringe upon the authority of his own office.<sup>218</sup> With this as a basis for his argument, Hsu insisted that Ch'en's conditions be scrapped and replaced with eight general conditions.<sup>219</sup> Ch'en I was instructed to begin re-negotiating on the basis of these new conditions that afternoon.<sup>220</sup> This day marks a turning point in negotiations.

November 11, thus, marks Hsu's assumption of authority for the negotiations. He did not however, it appears, receive approval of this action from Peking other than that he was not ordered not to interfere. It seems safe to assume that he therefore realized the necessity of moving quickly, not only because of the dubious authority of his position, but also because he could not be sure that Ch'en I would not continue to work against him. These factors very likely contributed to the speed with which Hsu drew his negotiations to a conclusion.

On November 11 Hsu for the first time openly condemns Ch'en I. He also openly states that he is assuming charge of the negotiations. Yet he still recognizes that he is functioning in a temporary capacity and states as he did in his wire of the 10th, when he suggested that he should take charge of negotiations, that when the negotiations were cancelled, he would hand the matter back to Ch'en I.<sup>221</sup> It is possible that Hsu was insincere in these statements and that he made them to smooth the opposition to his takeover. But for a number of reasons, it seems just as likely that he intended to act as he said.

As we have seen, Hsu's interest in Mongolia arose from political and economic pressures in China. His political career to this point was very much Peking-centered. He waited to the last minute before going to Outer Mongolia and,

in all, spent very little time there because of his deep involvement in the government in Peking. To take over the administration of Outer Mongolia would remove him from the centre of political influence. Secondly, if he successfully negotiated the return of Outer Mongolia to China, the retention of the Frontier Army would have been justified and the Anfu image measurably improved, which were the initial aims behind his involvement in the Outer Mongolian question. If he in fact had intended to return Ch'en's position to him, perhaps to later replace him with someone else, we must account for Hsu's change of mind.

Although anything we say must remain in the realm of speculation, it is fairly easy to account for such an alteration in Hsu's plan. Hsu rose to political prominence, following Yuan Shih-k'ai's death, under the wing of Tuan Ch'i-jui. Despite the fact that he was tremendously capable, energetic and ambitious, he remained very much a cog in Tuan's machine. He was also younger than most of the northern politicians with whom he was associated. Tuan, for example was 15 years his senior and President Hsu Shih-chang at 64 was 26 years his elder.<sup>222</sup> Hsu was popularly referred to at the time as "Little Hsu" to distinguish him from "Big Hsu" the President.<sup>223</sup> We have no record of Hsu Shu-cheng objecting to this sobriquet, but it seems reasonable to suggest that his ambitions were less than satisfied with the

position he held at the time he went to Outer Mongolia.

Very touchy about violations of his authority, it is likely that the confusion in Outer Mongolia which resulted in Hsu's seizure of authority, left him with an authority that was somewhat in question. It seems reasonable to suggest that this led Hsu to act in a more precipitate way than he otherwise might have. The events that follow his assumption of control on November 11 seem to bear this out.

On November 12 Hsu met Badmadorji for the first time and quickly ascertained that this was the point at which to apply pressure.<sup>224</sup> Although he does not say so, he must have been aware that it was Badmadorji who had blocked acceptance of Ch'en's conditions.<sup>225</sup> The other factors he saw as rendering Badmadorji the key man were that Badmadorji as Premier held the reigns of government, that (probably because of Badmadorji's power) the Living Buddha had less trust in him than in his other top advisors, that Badmadorji had once been stripped of the rank of Shangchotba by the Living Buddha and had been passed over in the granting of titles, and therefore harboured considerable resentment towards the Living Buddha of Urga.<sup>226</sup>

Badmadorji, although pressured by Hsu, was much in the same way as Hsu, forced to move quickly because of the power struggle between the lamas and the nobles. There was no certainty at this point that Ch'en I, or the nobles had

acquiesced, and there was the added danger that if Hsu negotiated with the nobles it would be neither to the lamas, nor to Badmadorji's advantage. The events of the few days from Hsu's assumption of control to the acquiescence of the Outer Mongols seems to bear this out.

First, Hsu did not seek out Badmadorji on November 12. The Living Buddha had sent an invitation to Hsu to attend a feast.<sup>227</sup> It is doubtful that this was simply a gesture of friendship. It seems, rather, that the Living Buddha had been advised by his top advisors, notably Badmadorji, that Hsu could be used to counter Ch'en I. The nobles at a meeting on November 13 approved cancelling self-government.<sup>228</sup> This meeting had to have been arranged beforehand, and it seems likely that Badmadorji at least realized the necessity of acting before the nobles in order to protect lama interests as much as possible. Once Badmadorji had met Hsu there is no evidence of his reluctance to negotiate. He attended a play in company with Hsu and it is unlikely that this was forced upon him.<sup>229</sup>

Hsu was determined to move quickly in cancelling autonomy but it is very likely that he was provoked to move faster by the news of the nobles decision on November 13. Although Hsu was not informed of the nobles position until November 14 he probably knew of it on the 13th. Secrets seemed to have short life-spans in Urga at this time. Hsu,

for example, had fairly quickly learned of the wire to Ch'en I advising him Hsu was not to control negotiations. Ch'en I heard very quickly of the Living Buddha's request to have him removed. Given the unstable position of Outer Mongolia at the time, it is likely that a number of people endeavoured to keep a foot in both camps to ensure their future and that it was through these people that information leaks were channeled.

Regardless of whether Hsu actually knew of the noble position on November 13, he delivered his ultimatum to Badmadorji on that day, the day after he had met him, threatening to imprison the Living Buddha if they should refuse to comply! Hsu must have been quite sure that the situation was ripe in order to have issued this ultimatum, but as sure as he might have been, it was still a rather precipitate action.

The following day when Ch'en informed him of the nobles' petition, Hsu had already presented his ultimatum. Although he wired the government that they could make use of this petition to cancel self-government and that he would only remain to keep the peace, he went that evening to Badmadorji's quarters accompanied by his officers and pressed Badmadorji to accept his own eight conditions or else agree to the cancellation of autonomy without any conditions.

When Badmadorji still appeared hesitant, Hsu repeated his ultimatum extending his threat of imprisonment to Badmadorji as well as the Living Buddha.<sup>230</sup>

On the morning of the 15th all Mongol officials, lamas and nobles, met to discuss the ultimatum.<sup>231</sup> This was quite a tumultuous meeting and initially the nobles and lamas as a group, demanded resistance to Hsu's ultimatum.<sup>232</sup> According to Ch'en I the Outer Mongolian officials at this point not only rejected Hsu's eight general conditions, they demanded that the 63 conditions must be the basis of negotiations.<sup>233</sup> It is impossible to ascertain if this was so, but it seems likely that it was. But despite this strong opposition to Hsu, the Outer Mongolians finally agreed to Hsu's demands, although they rejected all conditions, rather than accept his eight conditions.<sup>234</sup> No doubt the major reason for their acquiescence was a realization that there was no way they could avoid it. Yet it is likely that noble-lama differences also prompted acceptance, for both sides must have feared that if they refused, the other side would take advantage of this to accept the Chinese offer in hopes of gaining some advantage.

The rejection of Hsu's conditions and the petition drafted for presentation to China to some degree seem to reflect this continuing power struggle. Although Hsu's conditions could have been rejected by both sides because they

were too authoritarian, it is possible that it was a concession to the nobles. Ch'en's conditions, which in a way represented the noble position, had been rejected, therefore Hsu's conditions, to some degree identified with the lamas, should also be rejected. This in itself seems insufficient to support such an argument, but the petition finally presented by the Mongols on November 17 was almost verbatim the petition which the nobles had presented to Ch'en I in October.<sup>235</sup> This plus the fact that the petition was presented to Ch'en I seems to be an indication of an effort to appease the noble element. The official publication of the petition by the Peking government on November 22 included a report from Hsu Shu-cheng which advised acceptance and the granting of honours and benefits to the Living Buddha and the Shabinar. It appears that these honours and benefits were those mentioned to Hsu by Badmadorji on November 14,<sup>236</sup> a final indication that power interests remained important even through the debate of Hsu's ultimatum.

Hsu Shu-cheng in his wire of November 18 relates his recognition of this outer Mongolian power-split and his utilization of it. At the same time he denies any competition between himself and Ch'en I and admits that Ch'en I's negotiations had created the conditions that made it possible for him to conclude the cancellation of self-government, and that

therefore much of the credit should have gone to Ch'en I.<sup>237</sup> Hsu in earlier wires, stated that it was his intention to push for successful conclusion of the cancellation of self-government, and that he overrode Ch'en because he feared Ch'en was unable to do so. At that time he said that when the negotiations were concluded he would place control back in the hands of Ch'en I.<sup>238</sup> Basically there are only two possible interpretations of these early statements. The first being that Hsu from the outset intended to replace Ch'en and that these statements were political lies, meant simply to help counter any resistance to his takeover, but if this was the case, there was in fact little need for him to later accredit the success in good measure to Ch'en, for to do so would to some extent provide ammunition for his opponents guns.

If, on the other hand we assume that Hsu was sincere in stating his intention to return control to Ch'en I after the negotiations were successfully concluded, it is fairly easy to account for the change which occurred in Hsu's position in the twenty-odd days he was in Urga.

Hsu had planned to make use of Ch'en to institute his plans for Outer Mongolia, but after his arrival in Urga he discovered that Ch'en was supported to some extent by the opposition to himself in the cabinet. As late as November

13 he was advised by the cabinet to leave negotiations in Ch'en's charge.<sup>239</sup> With the successful negotiation of the cancellation of autonomy all of these initial aims were achieved. He could well have returned control to Ch'en I at this point, but a number of factors worked against this. The Mongols tended to turn to Ch'en I following Hsu's pressure, for example, in Ch'en's wire of November 17 he claims they have asked for a re-institution of the 63 conditions.<sup>240</sup> In fact a number of events indicated Ch'en's superior position at this time. Ch'en had supported the Mongols in resisting Hsu's demand for a formal presentation of the petition and when the petition was delivered, the Mongols refused to send it to Hsu and presented it instead to Ch'en.<sup>241</sup> Only at Ch'en's request did they prepare a copy of it to present to Hsu Shu-cheng.<sup>242</sup> Hsu at this point also bowed to Ch'en's judgment that there should be no ceremony involved in the Outer Mongol presentation of the petition to avoid causing them to lose face.<sup>243</sup>

There is little doubt that Ch'en and Hsu had taken a personal dislike to each other. They seem to have been very different in personality. Hsu had come to Urga and usurped Ch'en's position and taken from under his nose the success he had been working towards for several months. Hsu's comments in his wires leave no doubt as to his opinion of

Ch'en I.<sup>244</sup> The Mongols, on the other hand, preferred to recognize Ch'en I's authority, and this undoubtedly irked Hsu Shu-cheng.<sup>245</sup> In his wire of November 18 he acknowledges the crucial part played by Ch'en I in negotiations, but there is little doubt that the course of events in Outer Mongolia, and particularly of the interference over the presentation of the petition on November 17, were leading him to the view that Ch'en I's continued presence in Outer Mongolia would be a threat to his own position.

In his initial wires Hsu Shu-cheng had stated that it was not his intention to usurp Ch'en's position in Urga but that he felt it was necessary to ensure the successful conclusion of negotiations and that he would not interfere with Ch'en once this had been accomplished. But it seems that developments in Outer Mongolia altered this view. We have already mentioned two of these factors: one, that the nature of Outer Mongolia's relationship to China contributed to an ambiguity in the limits of Ch'en I's and Hsu's offices and two, that this was exacerbated by the fact that the conflict in Urga became an extension of the conflict in Peking. This had led to Hsu moving more quickly than he might have, applying more pressure than he might have, all of which resulted in his extraordinary success in concluding these negotiations. This success, I think, changed his conception

of the position of Mongolia and fired his ambition. This change did not occur of course overnight but evolved over the period of his work in Outer Mongolia, influenced and furthered by the problems that arose each day.

By November 19 the change in his conception of the part Outer Mongolia could play in his own career begins to emerge clearly. In his first wire of this day, he points out that his is the superior office and that Ch'en I's office, if it is to continue, must operate strictly in its subordinate capacity.<sup>246</sup> In his second telegram of this date, he suggests the advisability of moving the headquarters of his office to Urga.<sup>247</sup> These suggestions in themselves might be taken as quite logical conclusions considering the changed status of Outer Mongolia. The office of the Urga Commissioner was created to supervise Chinese interests in independent Mongolia. Independence was terminated therefore the office had become superfluous. Since Hsu's was the office in charge of frontier development, Hsu could logically argue that he should move headquarters to Urga. Following events, however, seem to indicate that there was more involved than these administrative adjustments.

In his wires of November 20, the day before his departure for Peking, he again justifies his interference with Ch'en I and in his proposed address to the Mongols, it is made clear that he intends to remain in charge.<sup>248</sup> When he

left Urga for Peking on the following morning, he placed Ch'en I under guard and put Chu-Ch'i-hsiang in charge during his absence.<sup>249</sup> Following his arrival in Peking on November 24<sup>250</sup> he set to work to have Ch'en I removed. On December 1 the office of the Urga Commissioner was abolished, Ch'en I was given an appointment in Honan,<sup>251</sup> and Hsu was appointed Director of Outer Mongolian Rehabilitation.<sup>252</sup> Hsu was treated as a conquering hero on his return to Peking on November 24. Sun Yat-sen compared him to three traditional culture heroes who had been pacifiers of barbarians.<sup>253</sup> Hsu's political prestige before his departure for Urga had been somewhat in question. Now it was at its peak. Hsu himself considered that he was the hero of his age,<sup>254</sup> and not without reason. Sun Yat-sen stated the case quite precisely; China had been suffering setback after setback from the closing years of the Ching Dynasty, and now in a matter of days Hsu had regained Outer Mongolia.<sup>255</sup>

Hsu had gone to Urga with the intention of participating in the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy. The initial objectives had been to create an excuse for the maintenance of the former War Participation Army, and to ease somewhat, the pressure created by Hsu's presence in Peking. The institution of the frontier program itself, though probably of secondary importance, was also part of the plan.

Hsu's discovery on his arrival in Urga, first, that Ch'en I would not cooperate, then that Ch'en I had been told not to cooperate, plus the ambiguous limits of Ch'en's and his own authority, then seemed to have forced Hsu to move much more quickly than he otherwise might have done. His extraordinary success coupled with his irritation over the authority question moved his thoughts in a new direction. He began, I think, sometime during this period, to conceive of Outer Mongolia as a territorial base to provide him with sufficient power to operate as a warlord in his own right. "Little Hsu" was after all proving himself to be quite big. Hsu had referred to himself as "King of the Northwest" (西北王) soon after his appointment as Frontier Commissioner. Thus, equating himself with Chang Tso-Lin, the "King of the Northeast" (東北王).<sup>256</sup> At that time these words could not have been anything more than a boast, but with his spectacular success in Urga they must have seemed almost a reality and it is understandable that he should begin to consider it as such.

Hsu's attempted assumption of such a role was in fact a contributing reason to the final break between the Anfu and Chihli Cliques in July, 1920. It was also the final cause of Chang Tso-lin's turn against the Anfu Clique,<sup>257</sup> and thus it may be said that Hsu in attempting to further secure his position brought about his own defeat.

It is interesting to speculate at this point what might have occurred if Hsu had followed his originally stated intentions of restoring Ch'en I upon conclusion of the negotiations. If he had done so, it might well have secured the permanent re-alignment of Outer Mongolia with China. Because of his opposition to Hsu, and his actual taking of the Mongol side in a number of issues, the negotiations with Hsu would have rendered Ch'en I much more acceptable to the Mongols. China's control re-established Hsu could to some extent have served as a scapegoat. Ch'en I, not closely involved in Peking politics, would not have complicated Mongol administration with Peking problems and would have served to a degree as a check against such a situation occurring. His past experience in negotiating with the Mongols would bear him in good stead with the new Outer Mongolian post, and he could also to some extent have served as a check on unsuitable administrative proposals emanating from Peking. The authoritarian way that Hsu had overridden Outer Mongolian wishes would admittedly have raised a scar not easily erased, and Ch'en might, we must admit, have been able to do little to mitigate this resentment.

He was, however, not to be given the chance, for by the conclusion of the negotiations, Hsu was determined to have him removed. Hsu's involvement in Outer Mongolia, as we have said, came about as an intended solution to internal

Chinese political difficulties. Although Hsu was an extremely capable man, intelligent, ambitious and tremendously energetic, he was the wrong man for what was an essentially delicate diplomatic position, for paradoxical as it might seem, if the relationship between China and Outer Mongolia created by the Kiakhta Agreement was based on a subtle fiction, the relationship remained much the same with the nominal return of full Chinese authority. That the full return of Chinese authority was nominal is, I think, made sufficiently evident by the Outer Mongolian turn to Soviet Russia in 1921.

Hsu's unsuitability for this position became evident even before his arrival in Urga, he resorted to the threat of force in every stage of his negotiations. First he wired from Ude to have the Living Buddha headquarters surrounded as he had heard a rumour that the Living Buddha was about to flee to Russia,<sup>258</sup> this latter in itself powerful testimony to the unfavourable influence of Hsu's troops and Hsu on Ch'en I's negotiations in Urga. He throughout the negotiations revealed little understanding of the Mongol reverence for the Living Buddha. He refused the Living Buddha's invitation which would be regarded as an insult.<sup>259</sup> In his discussions with Badmadorji he called the Living Buddha stupid and evil.<sup>260</sup> He bribed Badmadorji by giving him a

car, which, according to the Dilowa Hutukhtu, incensed the other Mongols.<sup>261</sup> He took troops with him to all negotiations as a measure of coercion<sup>262</sup> and when pushing through his ultimatum at one point apparently had his troops enter Tserendorji's office.<sup>263</sup>

Immediately following the removal of Ch'en I, Hsu moved to consolidate his position in Urga. On December 2 the Mongols were disarmed by Hsu's troops and the Chinese military authorities occupied the former Mongol ministries.<sup>264</sup> Mongol troops were then disbanded.<sup>265</sup> The Mongols were also required to bear the expense of provisioning the Chinese garrison troops.<sup>266</sup>

Some of these moves were initiated while Hsu was in Peking, where in addition to making arrangements for his return to Urga, he was re-consolidating the position of the Anfu Club.<sup>267</sup>

Around December 20 he again left for Urga arriving there on December 27.<sup>268</sup> He immediately made arrangements for the investiture of the Living Buddha on January 1, 1920, and once again, his conduct showed no consideration of Mongolian reactions. The Mongols had planned a celebration on December 31 to commemorate their 1911 independence. To prevent this Hsu ordered that a three-day fast be observed and suggested that the celebration be observed at the same

time as the investiture of the Living Buddha on January 1. This upset the Mongols for two reasons: it ignored their independence celebration and it insulted the Living Buddha.<sup>269</sup> As Professor Jagchid Sechen points out, the Living Buddha was a symbol of purity; by the touch of his hand he could cleanse a sinner, and it was therefore an offense to require that he abstain to purify himself.<sup>270</sup> In the actual ceremony on January 1 the Living Buddha was made to face North and to bow to a photograph of the Chinese President, both acts considered degrading by the Mongols.<sup>271</sup>

Following the investiture of the Living Buddha on January 1, 1920 Hsu remained in Urga less than two months, returning to Peking in the middle of February to negotiate two loans with the Japanese, one for the construction of the Kalgan-Urga Railway of which he was made the director, and the other for frontier development.<sup>272</sup> Boorman states that he returned to Urga soon after this, but reports in the North China Herald indicate his presence in Peking over the months of March and April, his return to Urga being delayed until the beginning of May.<sup>273</sup> During this period he was deeply involved in the struggle to maintain the advantage of the Anfu clique. He was so successful in this that Chin Y'un-p'eng was unable to conduct cabinet business, because Hsu had ordered the Ministers of Finance, Justice and Communications to absent themselves from cabinet meetings.<sup>274</sup> On

March 15 Tuan Ch'i-jui called over thirty Peiyang officers to his headquarters to reprimand them and privately pressured Hsu to restore harmony to the cabinet. Only then was Chin able to conduct cabinet business.<sup>275</sup> Even after his return to Urga, Hsu in early June wired Tuan that he was coming back to Peking to counter the opposition, but was ordered by Tuan to remain in Urga.<sup>276</sup> So, of the roughly six months that Hsu was in charge of Outer Mongolian administration he spent less than four months there, and the month of June he spent there, so to speak, under duress. The focus of his interest undoubtedly was still Peking.

Further evidence of his mal-administration in Urga is readily evident, although it is impossible to make an accurate assessment of his work there since most of the information is rather general and at present cannot be verified. It appears that with the re-establishment of Chinese authority, the Chinese firms whose debts had been cancelled following the break from China in 1911, moved back in and demanded repayment of debts plus accumulated interest.<sup>277</sup> Armed backing was used to enforce collection.<sup>278</sup>

The discontent, according to Dilowa Hutukhtu, resulted in the determination of the Mongols to send a delegate to Peking to request the institution of Ch'en I's 63 conditions. This occurred in the March-April interim when Hsu was in

Peking. Apparently on Hsu's instructions Li Yuan, the former Assistant Commissioner under Ch'en I, went to this meeting and announced that anyone who proposed the institution of Ch'en's conditions would be shot.<sup>279</sup> This was not the only outlet of discontent for delegations were also sent to Ungern-Sternberg and to Lenin.<sup>280</sup> Choibalsang and Sukhebator, the principal leaders of the Outer Mongolian revolutionary Government in 1921 headed these delegations.<sup>281</sup> A delegation was even sent to Harbin to seek a loan from Japan for the purchase of munitions.<sup>282</sup>

All that we have said to this point concerns negative aspects of Hsu's administration, but when we seek for positive aspects we find little evidence that there were any. Hsu Dau-lin includes in the nien-p'u a series of anecdotes which apparently are intended as favorable comment on his fathers period of administration.<sup>283</sup> Unfortunately, there is little useful information in the anecdotes. More than anything else they tend to portray the gullibility, or the childlike nature of the Mongols. They show no evidence of the sort of concern for Mongol livelihood that Hsu Shu-cheng laid claim to. They reveal rather than Hsu Shu-cheng held tradition Han Chinese attitudes of the inferiority of non-Han barbarian peoples like the Mongols, and of the invincibility of the Chinese culture. The pervasiveness

of these attitudes in Hsu's time is clearly revealed in Sun Yat-sen's congratulatory telegrams. Sun, the father of Chinese republicanism and the leading exponent of the doctrine of the equality of the five races, in these telegrams compares Hsu to three Chinese culture heroes, all of whom were pacifiers of barbarians.<sup>284</sup> Ethnocentric values such as this (by no means limited to the Chinese) situated as they are at the very centre of the national ego, die a very slow death. It is fairly obvious by the inclusion of these anecdotes that Hsu Dau-lin shares basically the same attitudes towards the Mongols as did his father. These attitudes are not irrelevant for they undoubtedly must have worked to the detriment of Sino-Mongol relations.

If these anecdotes express Hsu Dau-lin's attitudes towards the Mongols and towards his father's work among the Mongols, his conclusion to the 1919 section of the nien-p'u expresses his attitudes towards his fathers critics. Hsu Shu-cheng has been generally branded as a Japanese-lover and a traitor and has been accused of alienating Outer Mongolia from China permanently.<sup>285</sup> In the introduction to the nien-p'u Hsu argues that his father was neither of the former two<sup>286</sup> and in the 1919 section of the nien-p'u he presents his father's work in Outer Mongolia as a successful tour de force. In 1936 in the periodical Tu-Li P'ing-lun he argued that the failure of the Peking government to support

his father in Urga was good measure responsible for the ultimate loss of Outer Mongolia.<sup>287</sup>

The quotation from Lin Ch'in-nan's novel, Ching Sheng novel, which presents Hsu (Ching Sheng) as a stronghold of traditional virtues Lin concludes with two anecdotes from Mr. Li, the supposed narrator of the story, both with the intent of showing that civilized man must ignore the din made by wild animals, and that Ching Sheng should have ignored the clamorings of these three fools who would negate traditional Chinese values.<sup>288</sup> The parallel is not exact but the suggestion seems too strong to ignore: that Hsu Dau-lin advises his readers to ignore the wild clamouring of those who would detract from his father's success.

It appears in fact that the author's reaction to his father's critics was a major motivation for the writing of the nien-p'u. It is unfortunate that this was the case for his desire to place his father in the best light possible has resulted in very bad writing.

The faults in Hsu Dau-lin's are for the most part so obvious that there is no need to point them out. All we need here is a few examples to refresh the reader's memory. Perhaps the most obvious fault is the author's acceptance of his father's words as proof of his father's actions. More specifically, in presenting his father's program for the

Northwest, he makes the statement that all his father's actions in Outer Mongolia were based upon this plan.<sup>289</sup> We are given no evidence that this was the case. Already obvious to the reader, he makes this fault even more obvious in the anecdote in which he claims that education was central in his policies for Outer Mongolia, and refers the reader back to the plan.<sup>290</sup> The reader has travelled full circle but seen nothing.

A not so obvious shortcoming is Hsu Dau-lin's exclusion of information that would weaken his arguments for the justification of his father's position. For example, he deletes the closing paragraph from the first telegram from the Living Buddha of Urga, which fairly clearly acknowledges the Living Buddha's acceptance of the return to China:

Further, I earnestly hope that when Outer Mongolia and China have been united that you will share my desire to have my intentions carried out, and that the rights we request will be granted to us completely.<sup>291</sup>

Likewise, almost from the first mention of the conditions which Ch'en I has been negotiating, he assumes their defeat, but he ignores completely the fact that it was Hsu who blocked their presentation to the Outer Mongolian government.

These shortcomings are symptomatic of the weakness of the nien-p'u as a whole. It is not surprising that the

Chinese reviews of it criticize it severely. Hsu Dau-lin would have written much better if he too, like old Mr. Li, had shut out the wild clamourings of the critics, for by not doing so he only subjected himself to a revived din -- this time directed not at his father, but at himself.<sup>292</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

## Abbreviations

- Boorman: Biographical Dictionary of Republican China
- Ch'e-chih: 外蒙古撤治問題
- Cheng-chih shih: 中國近百年政治史
- Clubb: 20th Century China
- CYB: China Year Book
- Fritters: Outer Mongolia and its International Position
- Jagchid: 外蒙古的獨立自治和撤治
- NCH: North China Herald
- Nien-p'u: 徐樹鍾先生文集年譜合刊
- Political History: The Political History of China: 1840-1928.
- Rupen: Mongols of the Twentieth Century.
- Shih-hua: 北洋軍閥統治時期史話
- Shih-liao: 中俄關係史料, 外蒙古
- T and A: Outer Mongolia: Treaties and Agreements.

## Footnotes to Chapter I

1. CYB: 1919, p. 1.
2. It forms approximately one-fifth of the nien-p'u.
3. Nien-p'u, preface, pp. 132-133.
4. Even Gerard Friters', Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, the most thorough book on the subject in English, passes very quickly over the events of 1919, and contains a number of fairly serious errors.
5. Li Yu-shu's, Wai Meng-ku, Ch'e-chih Wen-ti and Jagchid Sechen's monograph, Wai Meng-ku de "Tu-li" "Tze-chih" ho "Ch'e-chih," are both well-written and reasonably objective.
6. Because the records of the Frontier Defense Office were destroyed (Hsu Dau-lin, Tu-li Ping lun, No. 209 (July 12, 1936, "Tsai Lun Wai-Meng Ch'e-chih," p. 13) we are forced to resort to detective work for much of this analysis. All the wires that we have that were sent to the Frontier Office are presumably preserved because they were sent with instructions to forward copies to some other office.
7. CYB: 1919, p. 587.
8. For convenience in typing all umlauts have been dropped from Chinese names.
9. Political History, pp. 359-363.
10. 朝代中華民國滿洲帝國人名鑑) p. 370, Ch'e-chih, pp. 34-35.
11. Boorman, Vol. 1, pp. 382-384.
12. Boorman, Vol. 2, pp. 136-140.
13. Boorman, Vol. 1, pp. 211-213.
14. Boorman, Vol. 3, pp. 330-335.
15. Friters, p. 345; Rupen pp. 59-60; CYB: 1919, p. 465.
16. Friters, p. 346, Rupen, p. 67.
17. Shih-liao, p. 543.

## Footnotes to Chapter II

1. (tr.) Since he was born on November 4 Hsu Shu-cheng was actually 39 years of age for the greatest portion of 1919.
2. (tr.) The author precedes important years of the nien-p'u with a summary of some of the major events of the ensuing twelve months.
3. (tr.) A number of the persons Hsu Dau-lin refers to in this section of the nien-p'u have no significant relationship to Hsu Shu-cheng's period in Mongolia. For brevity it has been decided to omit footnotes in such cases. It may therefore be assumed that any person not footnoted on first appearance, falls into this category.
4. (tr.) Feng Kuo-chang was Acting President from July 1917 to October 1918. He was leader of the Chihli Clique which opposed and finally defeated the Anhwei faction of Tuan Ch'i-jui.
5. (tr.) Hsu Dau-lin is inaccurate here. Tao Chu-yin in the Shih-hua estimates that Japanese loans to the Peking government were close to 300,000,000 yen. He then makes an estimate based on the boast of General Terauchi himself that loans to China during his period in office amounted to three times all former Japanese loans to China. Since T'ao reckons former loans at 120,000,000 yen he concludes that the Nishihara loans could have been in the neighbourhood of 360,000,000 yen.
6. Shih-hua, Vol. 4, p. 167.
7. Shih-hua, Vol. 4, p. 183.
8. (tr.) The nien-p'u has been criticized for the forms it uses to refer to Hsu Shu-cheng. (Liu Feng-han, Hsu Shu-cheng hsien-sheng nien-p'u te shang-ch'ueh, p. 21). To avoid confusion the translator has taken the liberty to use Hsu's surname, or his full name where the surname alone might be confusing, to replace the several different forms of reference used by the author.

9. (tr.) The hsin-hai year on the lunar calendar extends well into 1912, the 28th day of the 12th month was February 15, 1912. The formal announcement of independence was made to the Manchu Amban, Santo, at Urga on November 30, 1911.
10. Ch'e-chih, p. 6.
11. Ch'e-chih, p. 27.
12. Shih-liao, pp. 411 and 433.
13. Shih-liao, p. 353.
14. (tr.) Following the Kiakhta Agreement China was given permission to establish a Commissioner in Urga (都護使), with a guard of 200 men. His Assistant Commissioners, one in Kiakhta and one in Uliassutai, were called tso-li (佐理). The functions of these commissioners were similar to those normally taken by a consulate, but since Outer Mongolia was not a separate state the term Consulate, would be inappropriate. The tu-t'ung (都統) or Military Governors referred to were those in charge of military administration of Inner Mongolia.
15. (tr.) I have been unable to ascertain just what international complications might be involved with this line. In 1920 Hsu arranged a loan with Japan for construction of this rail line; it is possible that this had been arranged during Hsu's trip to Japan at the end of 1918, and that he envisioned international objections, as there was a loan embargo on China at this time. When the loan embargo was broken by the Consortium agreement to a large loan in 1920, Hsu rushed back from Mongolia to arrange it (NCH, Vol. 13<sup>4</sup> (February 28, 1920), p. 523).
16. (tr.) Hsu's reference is to Article 5 of the Russo-Mongolian Railway Agreement signed September 30, 1914. He has interpreted this article rather freely and I have for this reason included the text:

In view of the fact that the Mongolian government has a right to construct railroads within the confines of its territory, the Imperial Russian government shall not interfere if the Mongolian Government should desire to construct a useful railroad with its own means. However, as regards the granting of railroad concessions to anyone,

the Mongolian Government shall, by virtue of the relations of close friendship with the neighbouring Great Russian Nation, previous to granting the concession, enter into conference with the Imperial Russian government and consult with it as to whether the projected railroad is not injurious to Russia from an economic and strategic standpoint (T and A, p. 29).

17. (tr.) The Russo-Mongol Trade Protocol signed November 3, 1912 makes reference to Russian rights to open mines in Outer Mongolia in Article 7 specifically, and in articles 1 and 2 indirectly. None of these articles include the word, "freely." (T and A, pp. 19-20).
18. Shih-liao, pp. 380-382.
19. Ch'e-chih, p. 145.
20. (tr.) Typographical error: chien (件) for san (三).
21. (tr.) The telegram gives us three characters (p'ang (滂), wu, (烏), t'ao (鴟) to indicate the names of the points at which officers should be stationed. These characters could refer to only three, or a total of six stations. Given the condition of the route, and the speed at which troops could be moved along it, it is more likely that he meant all six (for the condition of route see Shih-liao, page 613).
22. (tr.) A small Chinese force had been assisting Outer Mongolian troops in controlling fighting between Soviet and White Russians in Urianghai. As Frontier Defense Commissioner Hsu was responsible for any military expenditures (see Shih-liao, pp. 424 ff.).
23. (tr.) The taiji were the lowest rank of Mongol nobility.
24. Shih-liao, pp. 508-511.
25. Ch'en I, tzu, Shih-k'o (太司). Born in Hupeh, Ch'en I was the grandson of the famous general of the Ch'ing Dynasty restoration, Ch'en Shih (陳湜). At the time of the attempted restoration Ch'en I was given the position of Vice-President of the Board of Posts and Communication. He had already taken up this post, but

when the restoration attempt failed he fled from Peking. "He was captured at Huang-ts'un Station, where the resident army cut off his queue, made him pledge that he would never take part in another restoration attempt, and then let him go. In 1915 Ch'en I first went to Mongolia as a deputy Commissioner. He became a commissioner in August 1917. (Shih-hua Vol. 3, p. 209, and Yeh Hsia-an Nien-p'u 1946, p. 52).

26. Shih-liao, p. 460, (Ch'en I wire, August 14).
27. Shih-liao, p. 308, (Ch'en I wire, January 18).
28. Shih-liao, pp. 461-462, (Ch'en I's second wire, August 14).
29. Shih-liao, p. 473 (Cabinet wire, August 21).
30. The word "informally" (非正式) is really meaningless here.
31. Shih-liao, p. 50.
32. For the complete text see, Shih-liao, pp. 538-553.
33. (tr.) The leagues were the administrative divisions imposed on Outer Mongolia by the Manchus. They corresponded to the original Outer Mongol aimaks which were hereditary administrative divisions. Each aimak was composed of a number of banners, each banner under the control of a hereditary jassak or prince. The banners were further divided into somon, and each somon was administered by a chiang-chun.

The Shabi, or shabinar in the plural, were lama novices. They formed a large class of serfs attached to various lamas. Shang-cho-t'e-pa was a high lama rank. (CYB: 1919, p. 576 ff.).

34. (tr.) The Ambans and their assistants were the overseeing Manchu Residents in Outer Mongolia (China Year Book, 1919, p. 463).
35. Shih-liao, pp. 557-558 (Foreign Office Memorandum).
36. (tr.) The offices allowed to China in article 7 of the Kiakhta Agreement signed by China, Russia and Outer Mongolia on June 7, 1915.

37. Shih-liao, pp. 574-576.
38. (tr.) Typographical error: August 19 should read August 16.
39. Shih-liao, p. 465.
40. Shih-liao, p. 500 (tr.) The sentence without the deletion reads: "In regard to the matter of investiture in office, the lamas demand that all appointments must be approved by the Living Buddha first, then sent in to the central government. But the nobles firmly opposed this and finally persuaded the lamas to approve that appointments should be reported directly to the central government by the Amban. They only asked that the impressive ceremonies of the Living Buddha be preserved. The Living Buddha was again notified and has given his consent." To have the Living Buddha approve all appointments would have put the lamas in an advantageous position, therefore the nobles opposed it.
41. K'an-p'u is a lama title. The CYB, 1919 translates it as, "abbott" (p. 464).
42. Shih-liao, p. 579 (October 1 letter).
43. (tr.) These were Hsu Shu-cheng's Frontier Defense troops which had all arrived in Urga by September 6 (see above, p. 26).
44. (tr.) I have been unable to ascertain who this man was and what secret order was given.
45. (tr.) This is the full title of one man. The Jalkhansa (噶克廈) Living Buddha, referred to in the paragraph following (Jagchid, p. 119).
46. Shih-liao, p. 573.
47. Ch'e-chih, p. 223.
48. Shih-liao, p. 568.
49. Shih-liao, p. 586.
50. Shih-liao, p. 529.

51. Functions of the Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner (issued July 18, 1919).

1. The Government has especially established the Northwest Frontier Planning Commission in order that Northwest Border affairs may be regulated, and also in order that production may be activated in all areas.

2. The Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner is to be especially appointed by the President. He will be in charge of the planning and direction of communications, police, forestry, mining, the extraction of salt, commerce and education in all areas, and in defense requirements the forces deployed in all areas will be under his direction.

In reference to the above arrangements, the Urga Commissioner will work under the guidance of the Frontier Planning Commissioner in all matters, and all officers under him will also be subject to the authority of the Frontier Planning Commissioner. This has been planned to meet all eventualities (Min-kuo yen-i, p. 685.).

52. Shih-liao, p. 516 (Ch'en I's wire, October 21).
53. Shih-liao, p. 576 (Foreign Office wire to Ch'en I, November 4).
54. Shih-liao, p. 582, (Ch'en I wires, November 6 and 7).
55. Shih-liao, p. 582, (Ch'en I wire, November 6).
56. Shih-liao, pp. 584-585.
57. Shih-liao, p. 587 (November 11 wire).
58. Shih-liao, p. 587 (November 11 wire).
59. Shih-liao, p. 607.

60. Ch'en I also knew that this was the man who had defeated the 63 conditions. (Shih-liao, p. 522, October 25 wire).
61. (tr.) (武鄉侯) was a title given to Chu-ko Liang. (Chung-Kuo Jen-min T'a Ts'e-Tien, p. 1607).
62. Shih-liao, p. 588.
63. (tr.) Typographical error: (現公) should read (王公).
64. (tr.) The former Premier of Outer Mongolia.
65. Shih-liao, p. 593.
66. It was also on November 14 that Ch'en I finally revealed to Hsu the nobles independent request for the cancellation of autonomy. Hsu considered that: "The government could make use of this to order the cancellation of autonomy first and other matters could be worked out later ... rather than working everything out first ... which would delay the achievement of our aims. I will remain here for the present to keep the peace and to ensure that nothing untoward occurs." (November 14 wire. Shih-liao, p. 59). But by November 15 conditions had so changed that this proposal was already irrelevant.

(tr.) This author's note contains two typographical errors. The character yen (願) is mistakenly used for yuan (願) in ch'ing-yuan, meaning petition or request, usually in the sense of a petition made to the government. A more serious mistake is the misprinted page reference, page 59, which should read page 590.

67. Shih-liao, p. 594.
68. (tr.) Typographical error. Original reads (宗室權), text reads (宗權)
69. Shih-liao, pp. 601-602.
70. (tr.) Hsu is referring here to his general conditions, not the 63 conditions of Ch'en I.
71. Shih-liao, p. 598.
72. Shih liao, p. 598.

73. Shih-liao, p. 604.
74. (tr.) This Japanese officer had been posted in Urga for over a year. His attempts to negotiate with the Mongols were apparently unsuccessful (NCH, Vol. 131 (April 5, 1919), p. 20).
75. Shih-liao, p. 604.
76. He reached Peking on November 24 (Shih-hua, Vol. 5, p. 90).
77. Hsin-sheng Puo, Taiwan, December 13, 1958. Chih-Weng, "Ku-ch'un feng-lou so-chi."

This congratulatory telegram from Sun Yat-sen aroused the opposition of a party member, Ling Yueh. Sun Yat-sen answered this opposition: "Hsu's regaining of Outer Mongolia surpasses Fu Chieh-tzu and Ch'en T'ang in merit. Public recognition of this cannot be suppressed." (December 23, see Kuo-fu nien-p'u, p. 474). In fact from about July or August of 1919 Tuan's faction had been moving closer to Sun Yat-sen. Since in the north the Chihli and the Anfu Cliques were at that time coming out in open opposition and in the South Sun Yat-sen had already long been under pressure from the Kwangsi Clique, therefore, with the union between the Chihli Clique and the Kwangsi Clique it was only natural that Tuan's Clique should fall in with Sun Yat-sen (see Sun Yat-sen's "P'i-lin Hsiu-me Shu," Kuo-fu nien-p'u, p. 47).

78. Liang Yen-sun nien p'u, Vol. 2, p. 58.
79. Tu-chun-t'uan Chuan, pp. 239-240.
80. Min-kuo Yen-i, p. 695.
81. Shih-liao, p. 612.
82. Shih-liao, p. 612.
83. (tr.) Because of the different nature of this material the author had it set in smaller type. I have therefore single-spaced but not indented it, to set it off from both the body of the text and from the quotations.
84. (tr.) This was a type of folksong which originated in the K'un-lun Mountain region (Ts'e-hai, p. 987).

## Footnotes to Chapter III

1. See p. 44.
2. See p. 71.
3. May 4th, pp. 64-65.
4. The complete nien-p'u does, of course, give the reader quite a good picture of Hsu Shu-cheng.
5. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 332.
6. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 332.
7. Sheridan, p. 8.
8. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 332.
9. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 332; Houn, p. 207 n.
10. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 333.
11. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 332.
12. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 332; Houn, pp. 137 and 142.
13. Clubb, p. 67.
14. Political History, pp. 381-382.
15. Political History, p. 382.
16. Clubb, p. 68.
17. Political History, p. 383.
18. May 4th, p. 78.
19. Political History, p. 384.
20. Political History, p. 384. May 4th, p. 78.
21. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 144.
22. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 144.

23. NCH, Vol. 131 (June 21, 1919), p. 762.
24. See p. 14.
25. Nien-p'u, pp. 140-141.
26. NCH, Vol. 131 (May 17, 1919), p. 417.
27. NCH, Vol. 130 (March 1, 1919), p. 526.
28. Friters, pp. 184-185.
29. Ch'e-chih, p. 166.
30. Ch'e-chih, pp. 165-166
31. Ch'e-chih, pp. 148-166.
32. Shih-liao, p. 323.
33. Jagchid, p. 113.
34. Friters, p. 111.
35. NCH, Vol. 131 (May 17, 1919), p. 407
36. Ch'e-chih, pp. 153-156.
37. Hsu's cost estimate of 20,000 yuan per li seems to be in line with constructions costs given in CYB: 1921-22 pp. 742 ff.
38. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 10.
39. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 145.
40. NCH, Vol. 133 (December 20, 1919), p. 744.
41. NCH, Vol. 131 (June 21, 1919), p. 762.
42. NCH, Vol. 132 (July 12, 1919), p. 92.
43. NCH, Vol. 131 (June 21, 1919), p. 763.
44. Cheng-chih shih, p. 526.
45. NCH, Vol. 130 (March 15, 1919), p. 683.
46. NCH, Vol. 130 (March 15, 1919), p. 683.

47. Shih-hua, Vol. 5, p. 130.
- 48.
49. NCH, Vol. 130 (March 1, 1919), p. 526.
50. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 144.
51. Liu Feng-hau, p. 25.
52. Shih-liao, p. 601.
53. NCH, Vol. 133 (December 20, 1919), p. 744.
54. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 135.
55. NCH, Vol. 134, (February 14, 1920), p. 407.
56. NCH, Vol. 134 (February 7, 1920), p. 386.
57. NCH, Vol. 134, (February 28, 1920), p. 523.
58. NCH, Vol. 134, (February 28, 1920), p. 523.
59. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 145.
60. NCH, Vol. 135, (May 1, 1920), p. 245.
61. Nien-p'u, p. 278.
62. NCH, Vol. 131, (June 21, 1919), p. 763.
63. Friters, p, 230.
64. Friters, pp. 159-160.
65. Ch'e-chih, p. 235.
66. Political History, p. 392.
67. Ch'e-chih, p. 233.
68. Ch'e-chih, p. 237.
69. Ch'e-chih, p. 237.
70. Ch'e-chih, pp. 177 and 244.
71. Ch'e-chih, p. 237.

72. Shih-liao, Chronology, p. 27. Since there were roughly 1000 troops in Urga previous to the arrival of this force and since the total number of troops subsequent to this increment was about 4000 (CYB, 1921-22, p. 576) this force had to be in the neighbourhood of 3000 men.
73. NCH, Vol. 132, (July 19, 1919), p. 153.
74. NCH, Vol. 132, (July 19, 1919), p. 154.
75. See p. 23.
76. See p. 43.
77. Tu-Li p'ing-lun, No. 203 (May 31, 1936), p. 14.
78. Shih-liao, p. 498.
79. T and A, p. 32.
80. Professor Jagchid Sechen is a Chahar Mongol who resides in Taipei and teaches Mongol at Taiwan National University. His excellent monograph on the subject of the cancellation of Outer Mongolian self-government is especially valuable in that it gives us a Mongol point of view on the subject.
81. Jagchid, pp. 39 ff.
82. Friters, p. 174. CYB: 1919, p. 587.
83. T and A, p. 33; Ch'e-chih, p. 31.
84. Ch'e-chih, pp. 31-32.
85. Ch'e-chih, p. 256.
86. Ch'e-chih, p. 31.
87. Ch'e-chih, pp. 34-35.
88. Ch'e-chih, pp. 32-33.
89. Ch'e=chih, pp. 35-36.
90. CYB: 1921-22, p. 575.
91. CYB: 1919, p. 588.

92. Ch'e-chih, p. 42.
93. Ch'e-chih, p. 37.
94. Ch'e-chih, p. 37.
95. NCH, Vol. 131, (May 17, 1919), p. 430.
96. Ch'e-chih, p. 37.
97. Ch'e-chih, pp. 37-40.
98. Friters, p. 185.
99. Ch'e-chih, p. 71.
100. CYB, 1921-22, p. 515, gives troop numbers in various military units.
101. NCH, Vol. 130, (March 8, 1919), p. 607.
102. Rupen, p. 59.
103. Rupen, p. 59.
104. Jagchid, pp. 103-104.
105. This report was in the North China Herald. It is very likely an exaggeration, but is indicative of the free spending of the lama-dominated government.
106. Jagchid, p. 104.
107. Dilowa Memoirs, p. 33.
108. Jagchid, p. 104.
109. Shih-liao, pp. 633-634.
110. Ch'e-chih, p. 215.
111. Hsu Shu-cheng points this out in his November 13 wire. See p. 53.
112. Ch'e-chih, p. 211.
113. Friters, p. 221.
114. NCH, Vol. 132 (September 20, 1919), p. 733.
115. Rupen, pp. 111 and 136.

116. Rupen, p. 111.
117. Dilowa Memoirs, p. 33.
118. Ch'e-chih, p. 176.
119. See p. 57.
120. Ch'e-chih, p. 166.
121. Shih-liao, p. 569.
122. Ch'e-chih, p. 172.
123. Ch'e-chih, p. 166.
124. Ch'e-chih, p. 166.
125. Ch'e-chih, p. 174.
126. Shih-liao, chronology, p. 16.
127. Shih-liao, p. 326.
128. Friters, p. 81-83; Rupen, p. 65-66.
129. Rupen, p. 95.
130. Ch'e-chih, p. 175.
131. Ch'e-chih, p. 178.
132. Jagchid, p. 102.
133. See pp. 16-23.
134. See appendix.
135. Shih-liao, chronology, pp. 15-25.
136. For example, NCH, Vol. 131, (April 5, 1919), p. 20.
137. Ch'e-chih, p. 140.
138. Ch'e-chih, p. 140.
139. Ch'e-chih, p. 140.
140. Ch'e-chih, p. 140.

141. Ch'e-chih, p. 143.
142. Ch'e-chih, p. 142.
143. Ch'e-chih, p. 142.
144. Ch'e-chih, p. 237.
145. Shih-liao, p. 410.
146. Ch'e-chih, p. 146.
147. Ch'e-chih, p. 177.
148. Ch'e-chih, p. 178.
149. Ch'e-chih, p. 145.
150. CYB: 1921-22, p. 576.
151. Jagchid, p. 118.
152. Ch'e-chih, p. 178.
153. Ch'e-chih, pp. 177 and 180-181.
154. Ch'e-chih, p. 179.
155. Ch'e-chih, p. 210.
156. Ch'e-chih, p. 181.
157. Shih-liao, p. 512.
158. Ch'e-chih, pp. 192-93.
159. Ch'e-chih, p. 193.
160. Ch'e-chih, p. 193.
161. Ch'e-chih, p. 193.
162. Ch'e-chih, p. 193.
163. T and A, p. 3<sup>4</sup>, article 10.
164. Shih-liao, pp. 633-634.
165. Jagchid, p. 118.

166. Ch'e-chih, pp. 204 and 210-211.
167. Ch'e-chih, p. 211.
168. Ch'e-chih, p. 206.
169. Ch'e-chih, p. 211.
170. Ch'e-chih, p. 210.
171. Shih-liao, p. 511.
172. Jagchid, p. 118.
173. Jagchid, p. 118.
174. Rupen, p. 136.
175. Shih-liao, pp. 472-473.
176. See p. from footnotes to Chapter II, p. 169.
177. See p. 49.
178. See pp. 48-49.
179. See pp. 23-30.
180. Shih-liao, chronology, pp. 15-25, lists Ch'en I's many requests for troops.
181. See p. 56.
182. See p. 74.
183. NCH, Vol. 131, (June 28, 1919), p. 833.
184. Shih-liao, p. 511.
185. Shih-liao, chronology, p. 28.
186. Shih-liao, p. 514.
187. Shih-liao, chronology, p. 28.
188. See p. 46.
189. See p. 46.
190. See p. 49.

191. See p. 49.
192. See p. 47.
193. See p. 50. It would perhaps have been impolitic to mention this earlier.
194. See appendix.
195. NCH, Vol. 131, (June 28, 1919), p. 833.
196. Clubb, pp. 63 ff.
197. See p. 47.
198. Shih-liao, p. 560.
199. See p. 50.
200. Shih-liao, chronology, p. 29.
201. See p. 38.
202. See p. 53.
203. See p. 39.
204. See p. 46.
205. Shih-liao, p. 566.
206. Shih-liao, chronology, p. 29.
207. Jagchid, p. 127.
208. Shih-liao, p. 582.
209. He, of course, was aware by this time that Hsu knew of the conditions.
210. Shih-liao, p. 582.
211. Shih-liao, p. 582.
212. Shih-liao, p. 582.
213. Shih-liao, p. 582.
214. Shih-liao, p. 582.

215. See p. 48.
216. See p. 48.
217. For example, they were appointed his special assistants for [investiture of the Living Buddha], (Shih-liao, chronology, p. 31).
218. Ch'e-chih, p. 252.
219. Ch'e-chih, p. 256.
220. See p. 51.
221. See p. 50.
222. Boorman, Vol. 3, p. 330, Vol. 2, p. 136.
223. Rupen, p. 153.
224. Shih-liao, p. 578.
225. Ch'e-chih, pp. 210-212.
226. See pp. 55-56.
227. See p. 53.
228. Ch'e-chih, p. 258.
229. See p. 56.
230. See p. 59.
231. Ch'e-chih, p. 258.
232. CYB: 1921-22, p. 577.
233. Ch'e-chih, p. 257.
234. I have been unable to locate a specific record of these eight conditions. Possibly they were the eight conditions he gives at the end of his seven objections (See pp. 39-40), or else were based on these. The eight conditions recorded by the Dilowa Hutukhtu in his memoirs, however, differ radically from the above set: 1. China to build civil and military schools on a large scale, 2. China to direct planting and cultivating of land, 3. China to construct hospitals,

4. Mongolia to be divided into counties and provinces like China proper, 5. China to build Urga-Kalgan railway, 6. Lamas under 40 to be allowed to marry, 7. China to open mines, 8. China to construct racetracks. It is difficult to account for this discrepancy. The Dilowa Hutukhtu, of course, could be as biased a source as any other, yet it is hard to accept that his conditions are a fabrication. More likely, there was a good deal of popular discussion of these conditions and they were altered somewhat in the transmission at that time and through the ensuing years. Nonetheless, they suggest that there must have been some difference between our record of Hsu's suggestions and the later platform of action. Since the petition for cancellation of autonomy carried no conditions there was no need for Hsu to base his administration on the points he presented.

235. Shih-liao, pp. 568-569.
236. See p. 58.
237. See p. 66.
238. See p. 50.
239. Shih-liao, p. 588. There is obviously some conflict between this statement and the cabinet's earlier approval of Hsu's objections (see p. 50).
240. Shih-liao, pp. 591-592.
241. Jagchid, p. 128.
242. Ch'e-chih, p. 260.
243. Jagchid, p. 128.
244. See p. 51.
245. Ch'e-chih, p. 258.
246. Shih-liao, p. 600.
247. Shih-liao, p. 600.
248. See p. 67.

249. NCH, Vol. 133, (November 29, 1919), p. 546. There was some fear for Ch'en's life.
250. His eagerness to reach Peking is indicated by the fact that he covered the 1200 miles from Urga to Peking in half the normal travelling time.
251. I have not been able to verify it, but if my memory serves me correctly, wei-chiang-chun was an empty title; Ch'en had been "kicked upstairs."
252. See p. 69.
253. See p. 69.
254. Shih-hua, Vol. 5, p. 90.
255. See p. 69.
256. Shih-hua, Vol. 5, pp. 90 and 129.
257. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 145.
258. Jagchid, p. 130.
259. Jagchid, p. 126.
260. See p. 57.
261. Dilowa Memoirs, p. 43.
262. Jagchid, p. 127.
263. CYB: 1921-22, p. 577.
264. CYB: 1921-22, p. 578.
265. CYB: 1921-22, p. 578.
266. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 145.
267. Shih-hua, Vol. 5, p. 90.
268. See p. 70.
269. Jagchid, p. 132.
270. Jagchid, p. 132.
271. Jagchid, p. 132.

272. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 145.
273. NCH, Vol. 135 (May 1, 1920), p. 245.
274. NCH, Vol. 134 (March 20, 1920), p. 749.
275. NCH, Vol. 134 (March 20, 1920), p. 749.
276. NCH, Vol. 135 (June 5, 1920), p. 571.
277. Friters, p. 190.
278. Friters, p. 185.
279. Dilowa Memoirs, p. 46.
280. Jagchid, p. 133.
281. Jagchid, p. 133.
282. Jagchid, p. 133.
283. See pp. 71-74.
284. See pp. 69 and
285. Boorman, Vol 2, p. 143.
286. Nien-p'u, pp. 132-133.
287. Hsu Dau-lin, Tu-li P'ing-lun, No. 203 (May 31, 1936), "Wai-meng Wen-t'i hui-ku te I-wen," p. 16.
288. See p. 77.
289. See p. 16.
290. See p. 72.
291. Shih-liao, p. 579.
292. The reviews of Hsu Dau-lin's book by Liu Feng-han and Li Ao are unmercifully vitriolic.

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APPENDIX

CH'EN I'S 63 CONDITIONS

This is a condensed translation of the conditions for cancellation of self-government negotiated by Ch'en I and the Outer Mongolian nobles. The more important conditions are given more complete translations, but considerable detail has been omitted and the translation is intended for reference purposes only. It is taken from the final form of the conditions as presented to Ch'en I, with the Chinese Cabinet revisions appended. The Chinese text is in Shih-liao, pp. 538-553.

1. The government of Outer Mongolia requests the cancellation of self-government. Outer Mongolia will be one of the "special" regions of China, with all administrative rights reverting to the Central Government.

No revision

2. The Central Government will not alter the system of leagues and banners. Officials are to retain their original authority. The Central Government will not undertake colonization nor the sale of banner lands.

No revision

3. Outer Mongolia endorses the Republican system of China. The Central Government must treat Outer Mongolia in accordance with the principle of the equality of the five races.

No revision

4. Chinese must accord lamaism and lamas good treatment.

No revision

5. All the government offices of the former system will be placed under the office of the Chief Administrator in Urga (駢庫辦事大臣). All lesser offices in the Kobdo, Uliassutai, Urianghai and Kiakhta areas will be placed under the offices of the officials (專員) for those respective areas.

No revision

6. There shall be one Senior Administrator and one Assistant Senior Administrator stationed in Urga. They shall be in general charge of the administration of all Outer Mongolia as well as administrating the Tushetu Khan League and the Tsetsen Khan League. At Uliassutai, Kobdo, Urianghai and Kiakhta there will be stationed one Administrator and one Assistant Administrator. The Uliassutai office will administer the Sain Noyon Khan League and the Jasaktu Khan League. The Kobdo office will be in charge of league and banner affairs appropriate to it. The Urianghai office will be in charge of affairs in the Urianghai area. The Kiakhta office will be in charge of border defense stations and cross-border trade. All of these offices will be subject to the authority of the Urga office. Chinese officials will be

chosen from among civil-officials on the basis of government experience, good nature, integrity and knowledge of Mongol life. Mongol officials will be chosen on the basis of character, ability and reputation.

Revision: There will be one Senior Administrator stationed at Urga. He will be specially appointed by the President and may be either Mongolian or Chinese. There will be two Assistant Senior Administrators stationed at Urga one Mongol and one Chinese. These three officials shall be in general charge of the administration of all Outer Mongolia as well as administrating the Tushetu Khan League and the Tsetsen Khan League. At Uliassutai, Kobdo, Urianghai and Kiakhta there will be stationed one Administrator who may be either Mongol or Chinese and two Assistant Administrators, one Mongol and one Chinese. (Remainder unchanged).

7. Positions in all public offices will be open to both Mongols and Chinese.

No revision

8. Both Mongol and Chinese are eligible for the positions of Senior and Assistant Senior Administrator and Administrator and Assistant Administrator. Length of term in office

is to be settled and Central Government will appoint Mongols and Chinese to these positions on a rotation basis. Officials in the same office must be in agreement on all decisions.

Revision: [The revision of condition 6 made condition 8 irrelevant; only the final sentence was retained].

9. In conducting their administration the offices at Uliassutai, Kobdo, Urianghai and Kiakhta will normally get prior approval from Urga. In emergencies they must inform the President and all concerned Central Government organs at the same time they inform Urga.

No revision

10. All local officials in conducting their administration must make all required reports directly to the office of the senior official concerned.

No revision

11. The nobles and common people of Mongolia have the right to participate in the government of China and to be elected to both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

No revision

12. In the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs either the Director or the Deputy-Director must be an Outer Mongolian noble, or following the precedent of the form Ch'ing Dynasty an additional Outer Mongolian Assistant to the Director shall be appointed. All appointments below this level may be filled by Outer Mongols. All other offices outside the capital may employ Outer Mongols whose education is of sufficient calibre.

Revision: The Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs will appoint a Vice-President from among the Outer Mongolian nobles. [Remainder unchanged].

13. When the people of Outer Mongolia consider that the administration is unfair or that an unjust judgment has been made against them, they may bring the matter to the Administrative Court or the Supreme Court [in Peking].

No revision

14. In Urga a local Outer Mongolian Assembly shall be set up, to which all aimaks will elect representatives. The Senior Administrator and Assistant Senior Administrator will oversee this Assembly, which may make decisions on all matters affecting the welfare of all banners and on all matters brought before it by the Administrators. When the necessity arises the Assembly may request the Office of Mongolian and

Tibetan Affairs to inform the President requesting the matter be put before Parliament [in Peking].

Revision: In Urga a local Outer Mongolian Assembly for self-government shall be set up ... [Remainder unchanged].

15. The title of the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan and all accompanying ceremonies shall be forever maintained. [Each new Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu] shall be invested with the title National Teacher and Patriarch of Lamaism in the North.

No revision

16. The positions of advisor to the Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu shall be maintained. Four of them will be chosen from among the nobles and lamas who will request the Senior and Assistant Senior Administrators to request the President to install them. Their salaries will be decided by the government and paid annually. The service of all other nobles in Urga will be on the old annual rotation basis.

No revision

17. If important national or religious matters arise the Living Buddha has the authority to wire the President directly.

No revision

18. Any orders that the Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu has promulgated may not be altered.

No revision

19. Thirty-six thousand ounces of silver for the annual expenses of Sutra chanking shall be paid by the Central Government. The Central Government will also grant the title of Hubilgan to the reincarnations of every generation.

No revision

20. The hereditary ranks and awarded titles of all officials, nobles and lamas shall continue to be granted by the President.

No revision

21. All officials, nobles and titled lamas shall be given seals and credentials or credentials only, by the President, in accordance with the regulations of the Republic of China.

No revision

22. In Outer Mongolia all reincarnations of Hutukhtu's and lamas and inheritance of hereditary titles by nobles and officials must first be reported to and approved by the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu. In accordance with custom all such

matters under the jurisdiction of the Urga office will be reported to the President and the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan affairs. All matters of re-incarnation and inheritance in the Uliassutai, Kobdo and Urianghai regions will be reported directly to the President and to the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs and at the same time to Urga. Aside from re-incarnations and inheritance, for such other special awards the Uliassutai, Kobdo and Urianghai offices should act only on advice from Urga.

Revision: In Outer Mongolia all re-incarnations of Hutukhtu's and lama's must first be reported to and approved by the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu. [Remainder unchanged].

23. The Senior Administrator and Assistant Senior Administrator must inform the President of all appointments for league-head, somon-head, etc.

No revision

24. In the selection of k'an-pu's, shangchotba's, ta lama and hsieh-li-taiji, aside from those under the jurisdiction of the Urga office which the Urga office will present directly, nominations under the jurisdiction of the Uliassutai, Kobdo and Urianghai offices will be forwarded to the Urga Office which will in turn present them [to the President].

No revision

25. Lesser officials in the banners will, according to regulations, on the request of the jassak, be appointed by the league-head, who will report the appointment to the appropriate office at the first opportunity.

No revision

26. All officials and nobles shall be given annual stipends according to rank and duty. The funds for this will be dispatched from the Central Government treasury to the appropriate offices which will give them to the recipients.

No revision

27. All nobles and lamas in Outer Mongolia shall pay their annual visits to the Central Government as before. In case of illness or extraordinary circumstances they may submit a report so that their trip to the capital may be omitted. The malpractices of the Ch'ing Dynasty of sending officers to verify illnesses and to extract bribes shall be abolished. The decision to go to the Capital is a private affair and shall be left to the discretion of the individual.

No revision

28. The present sutra chanting expenses and administrative expenses of the positions of the Urga K'an-pu Nomon Khan, Lan-tsung Nomon Khan and the Erdeni Shangchotba will be

annually provided by the Central Government. The stipends of the Ta Lamas and others are also to be discussed and fixed.

No revision

29. The Erdeni Shangchotba of Urga shall wear his traditional ruby cap, and embroidered robes of Prince of the first class, and shall be next in rank to the Khans. Ta Lamas shall wear their traditional ruby caps and the embroidered robes of the Beidze, and shall be next to Dukes in rank.

No revision

30. All the re-incarnated Hutukhtus, the Beile Khans and Shangchotbas of all Leagues and Shabi shall be granted annual sutra chanting expenses and administrative expenses.

No revision

31. The expenses of the official in charge of a public office such as wages, living quarters, equipment fuel, water and horses shall be provided by the public funds of the office. The leagues and banners cannot be [further] assessed for these expenses.

No revision

32. League heads and commanders shall select suitable locations in all leagues and banners where they will set up permanent office to handle league affairs. The funds required to set up these offices will be provided by China. The number of those who work for the league-heads and somon-heads should be fixed and salaries provided.

No revision

33. The Central Government in order to secure the defense and maintain peace may garrison troops in Mongolia proper, and at strategic points along the border. The Senior and Assistant Administrator in Urga shall determine size and location of forces. Reinforcements may be introduced in emergency but must be withdrawn afterwards. Forces within Outer Mongolia may be transferred from place to place by the Administrators. Military forces in Outer Mongolia shall not interfere with local government.

No revision

34. The size of all military forces will be set by the Senior and Assistant Senior Administrator in Urga. They will be under the control of the somon-heads in each league and all will be subject to the control of the Urga Administrators.

No revision

35. Central Government troop expenses will be borne by the Central Government. Expense of Mongol troops will be borne by the Urga treasury with tax receipts from the regional government.

No revision

36. For convenience in moving troops livestock herds will be established. The Urga Administrators will delegate nobles to maintain these herds.

No revision

37. The military must purchase livestock at current prices.

No revision

38. Rations to banner troops are to be discontinued when their duties terminate and they return to their banners.

No revision

39. The Central Government will from time to time replenish the equipment of the league and banner military forces.

No revision

40. All shabinar and all taiji and the servants of the taiji will be exempt from military service.

No revision

41. The post stations are for the use of officials and troops on public business, and for the mails. The Central Government is to replace the post system within five years. Present stations should be regularly inspected. Those who abuse the system will be punished. The post stations are to supply only quarters, horses, camels, fuel and water. Provisions and equipment must be privately arranged. The people operating the post service may not turn it to their personal advantage.

No revision

42. Military forces are to use the post system only in emergency. In these cases all banners must assist in supplying camels and horses. When the emergency is over these horses and camels must be returned to their original banners, and persons accompanying these animals must be compensated by the officers concerned.

No revision

43. Chinese people, in accordance with regulations, in all settlements and all banners may request a location for a market place, and with the approval of the jassak concerned, may carry on business there.

No revision

44. Chinese who wish to open land, plant crops, cut wood or mow hay, must first make a written request to the appropriate office, which will in turn order the jassak concerned to look into the matter and make a decision. If it does not interfere with sacred areas or grazing lands, when the jassak's approval has been received and a guarantee signed the land may be rented. No officials, jassaks, or clerks may privately rent land. Public companies must follow the same procedure as private individuals.

No revision

45. In the case of mining operations in all leagues, whether they are to be government or commercially operated, the Senior and Assistant Senior Administrator in Urga must discuss them with the chief agency concerned and make a decision. If they are approved an investigation must first be undertaken [of the proposed mine]. The procedure followed will be as in the previous condition.

No revision

46. In the case of all government and commercially operated mines, and all farms, wood-lots and hayfields rented by Chinese, the ownership of the land is to remain with the banners.

No revision

47. Local taxation in Outer Mongolia should be based on former regulations. These regulations will be decided by the government in Urga. In accordance with former regulations all banners and shabi should be given the expenses for operation of their offices.

No revision

48. All railroad, telegraph lines and postal services will be re-organized by the Central Government, but with the prior approval of the Senior and Assistant Senior Administrator in Urga, Provided that they do not violate scared areas railway right-of-ways will be examined and approved by the jassaks concerned.

No revision

49. Mines, railroads and any other industry affecting the land must be undertaken with domestic funds. If this is impossible then the Senior and Assistant Senior Administrator must advise the local Assembly which will ascertain whether or not it would be to the detriment of the country, and only then may such a loan be made. Neither land nor any industry related to communication may be used to secure loans, nor leased, or sold to foreigners.

Revision: In line with the revision of condition 14 the term, "self-governing" has been added before "Assembly."

50. Courts must be established at all market places to handle complaints involving Chinese and Mongols. Each court is to have a chief and a deputy magistrate and both Mongols and Chinese may fill these positions. They are not to interfere with the affairs of the jassaks and shangchotbas of these areas.

No revision

51. Chinese offenders should be tried in the office of the chief local official, but he is not to administer punishment except in cases where there has been an actual disturbance of the peace.

No revision

52. When the punitive law of the former Ch'ing Dynasty conflicts with present Mongol law it must be corrected on the basis of local custom and conditions, and on the basis of its suitability to both Mongols and Chinese.

No revision

53. All government owned enterprises in Outer Mongolia will be administered by the chief official in the office concerned.

No revision

54. Budgets will be projected for the reorganized local governments, and will be covered by taxes set by the Urga government with Central Government approval. If funds are insufficient the central government will temporarily provide assistance, but when the tax structure has been adjusted this assistance will be terminated. When there are surplus revenues they will be used to pay accrued debts to the Central Government.

No revision

55. The debt of 3,200,000 roubles still owed to the Russian government will be repaid from the Russian funds of the Ministry of Finance. [In Urga].

No revision

56. All debts with commercial firms contracted by the leagues banners and shabi which bear a government seal or which do not bear a government seal but can be verified must be repaid. To ease the difficulty for the Mongols the government will fix time limits for repayment, and repayment will be made in equal installments.

No revision

57. In future, debts incurred privately with Chinese traders may not be collected from the banner if the debtor is unable to pay.

No revision

58. Existing mining contracts with Russians and the contract with the Bank of China are to remain in effect.

No revision

59. When the Central Government revises the former Ch'ing statutes representatives of all leagues, banners and shabi should take part.

No revision

60. The Sino-Russo-Mongol Tripartite [Kiakhta] Agreement, the Russo-Mongol Trade Protocol and the Sino-Russian Declaration are by this agreement naturally annulled. China will be responsible for re-negotiating new trade agreements between China and Russia [in Mongolia].

Revision: Any items of the Kiakhta Agreement or the Sino-Russian Declaration which conflict with this agreement will be annulled.

61. Russian traders may conduct business as before in Outer Mongolia. Old commercial contracts will remain in force until their expiry dates when new contracts must be negotiated.

No revision

62. If there are any regulations that should be included in the above conditions they should be entered immediately to help ensure that the conditions will be upheld.

No revision

63. These conditions become effective on promulgation.

No revision