



## Barick Chung

Employment:  
2022-present Associate Professor (Teaching), Economics, CUSZSZ.  
2014-2022 Senior Lecturer, School of Management and Economics, CUSZSZ.  
2012-2014 Lecturer, School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong.  
2006-2012 Instructor, Department of Economics, CUHKHK.

Education:  
2003-2007 Ph.D. (Business) Indiana University – Bloomington.  
1987-1991 BS.Sc. (Economics) Chinese University of Hong Kong – Hong Kong.

Research paper:  
Chung, Barick, "Two Level Price Discrimination and Vertical Relationship" (March 05, 2012). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1997070>.

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
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## ECO 2011 (Sections L07-10) Basic Microeconomics

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A (Normal-form) game has:

- 1) A list of participants, or players
- 2) For each player, a list of strategies
- 3) For each array of strategies, one for each player, a list of payoffs that the players receive

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$\{U, L\}$

Normal-form  
game

		↓ player B	
		L	R
→ player A	U	<u>4, 5</u>	-2, 4
	D	2, 0	1, 1

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### Dominant strategy

*Game Theory .net*

A strategy is dominant if, **regardless of what any other players do, the strategy earns a player a larger payoff than any other**. Hence, a strategy is dominant if it is always better than any other strategy, for any profile of other players' actions.

(<http://www.gametheory.net/>, accessed Oct 12, 2006)

### Dominated strategy

*Game Theory .net*

A strategy is dominated if, **regardless of what any other players do, the strategy earns a player a smaller payoff than some other strategy**. Hence, a strategy is dominated if it is always better to play some other strategy, regardless of what opponents may do.

(<http://www.gametheory.net/>, accessed Oct 12, 2006)

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		Player B		
		L	C	R
Player A	T	2 , 0	1 , 1	1 , 2
	M	3 , 4	5 , 2	0 , 5
	B	1 , 1	0 , 2	3 , 3

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