

## CS 346 Class Notes

Mark Lindberg

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### **This Time:**

Exam be done.

Prime order subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  ( $p$  prime).

$p = rq + 1$ .  $p, q$  prime. Order  $q$  subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .  $\{h^r \bmod p \mid h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\}$ . These are called the  $r$ th residuals modulo  $p$ .

It's very easy to show that this is a subgroup.

It is a bit more challenging to prove that the subgroup is order  $q$ .

Note that  $p - 1 = rq$ .

Idea of proof: Show that  $f(h) = h^r \bmod p$  is “ $r$ -to-1”.

We need to show that groups of  $r$  elements each map to 1 element in our new group.

A result from last time, which now becomes useful: Proposition 8.53. Let  $G$  be a finite group,  $g \in G$  an element of order  $i$ . Then  $g^x = g^y \Leftrightarrow x \equiv y \pmod{i}$ .

Corollary: If  $g$  is a generator,  $g^x = g^y \Leftrightarrow x \equiv y \pmod{|G|}$ .

Back to the proof: Let  $g$  be a generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . Therefore,  $g$  has order  $p - 1$  by theorem 8.56. The  $g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{p-2}$  are all of the elements of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .

Let  $i, j \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ .

Claim 1:  $g^i$  and  $g^j$  have the same  $r$ th residue mod  $p$  if and only if  $q \mid (i - j)$ .

Proof: Corollary above implies that  $g^{ri} \equiv g^{rj}$ , working in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , if and only if  $ri \equiv rj \pmod{p-1}$  if and only if  $r(i - j)$  is a multiple of  $p - 1 = qr$ , if and only if  $i - j$  is a multiple of  $q$ .

Claim 2:  $(g^0)^r, (g^1)^r, \dots, (g^{q-1})^r$  are distinct.

Proof: Immediate from previous claim.

Claim 3: Let  $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ .

Then  $g^\ell, g^{\ell+q}, g^{\ell+2q}, \dots, g^{\ell+(r-1)q}$  all have the same  $r$ th residual modulo  $p$ .

Proof: Immediate from claim 1.

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Advantages of this type of group  $G$ , the prime order subgroup:

1. We can generate a uniform random element of  $G$ : Choose  $h$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  uniformly at random. Take  $h^r \bmod p$ .

2. We can identify a generator for  $G$  efficiently: Repeat 1) until we get an element  $\neq$  identity.

3. We can efficiently test whether  $h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  belongs to  $G$ . Claim:  $h \in G \Leftrightarrow h^g = 1$ .

Proof of 3): Let  $h = g^i$  where  $g$  is a generator of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .  $i \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ .

Claim 1:  $h \in G \Leftrightarrow r \mid i$ .

Proof: (IF) Assume  $r \mid i$ . Then  $i = cr$ ,  $h = g^{cr} \Rightarrow h \in G$ .

(ONLY IF) Assume  $h \in G$ . Then  $h = (g^j)^r = g^{jr}$  for some  $j \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1}$ . By the corollary from the beginning of class,  $i \equiv jr \pmod{p-1}$ . Thus,  $qr \mid (i - jr) \Rightarrow r \mid (i - jr) \Rightarrow r \mid i$ .

Claim 2:  $h^q = 1 \iff r \mid i$ .

$$\begin{aligned} h^q &= 1 \\ \iff g^{qi} &= 1 = g^0 \\ \iff (p-1) &\mid qi \\ \iff rq &\mid qi \\ \iff r &\mid i \end{aligned}$$

### **“Discrete Log” Problem.**

New experiment.  $\text{DLog}_{\mathcal{A},G}(n)$ . We have  $G$  as a group generation algorithm. It generates  $(\mathbb{G}, q, g)$ , where  $\mathbb{G}$  is a cyclic group of order  $q$ , and  $g$  is a generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ . Our security parameter is  $\|q\| = n$ , the number of bits in the binary representation of  $q$ .

$\text{DLog}_{\mathcal{A},G}(n)$ :

- Run  $G(1^n)$  to get  $(\mathbb{G}, q, g)$ .
- Pick  $h$  uniformly at random from  $G$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $G, q, g, h$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $x$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds if and only if  $g^x = h$ .

Definition 8.6.7: Discrete log is hard relative to  $G$  if  $\forall$  PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\Pr[\text{DLog}_{\mathcal{A},G}(n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$ .

”Discrete log problem is hard”  $\exists G \dots$

Section 8.4.2: Construction collision resistant hash functions given that we assume the discrete log problem is hard.

Construction 8.78. That’s a lot of numbers. There is an explanation of this in the text. (I tend to space out at the end of classes, sorry. 2 classes in a row does that to me.)

Claim: Construction 8.78 gives a collision resistant hash function assuming the discrete-log problem is hard relative to  $G$ .

Idea of proof: Show that a collision enables us to compute the discrete log of  $h$ .