Computationele logica

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
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1 Exercise 1: Singapore problem


 ϕ = date of Cheryl's birthday a = Albert, b = Bernard, c = Cheryl

With arrows we are representing the children's knowledge relations, so we'll get an epistemic model: all relations R1, R2, R3 are equivalence relations. So in particular they are reflexive, but for simplicity of drawing we skipped the loops.


(a) Model M of the situation immediately after Cheryl gives the boys their pieces of information:



- (b) Epistemic sentence encoding Albert's first announcement: $!_a(\neg K_a\phi \wedge K_a \neg K_b\phi)$
- (c) Updated model M' after Albert's first announcement:



(d) Epistemic sentence and updated model M" after Bernard's announcement: $!_b(K_b\phi)$



(e) Epistemic sentence and updated model M"' after Albert's second announcement: $!_a(K_a\phi)$



2 Exercise 2

Prove formally that, for every sentence φ , the sentence

$$\neg K_a \varphi \Rightarrow K_a \neg K_a \varphi$$

(expressing "Negative Introspection of Knowledge") is valid on (the family of all) $\mathit{epistemic}$ models.

3 Exercise 3

Using the semantics of knowledge K_a and common knowledge Ck, show that the following is NOT valid on *epistemic models with (only) 2 agents a and b:*

$$(K_a K_b \phi \wedge K_b K_a \psi) \Rightarrow Ck(\phi \wedge \psi)$$

* = The representation of the world

 $\mathbf{P}=\phi$

 $\mathbf{Q}=\psi$

The epistemic model holds the beliefs that both a and b know P and Q, but they are not sure whether they know the fact that both a and b know P and Q.

