

Draft
Security Assessment for

70-2021-12-vader (3New-FD) (XOK-SP) (OK-FLP) (1Positive-UT) (1Negative-FR)

July 23, 2023



Informational

Issues

Executive Summary

| Overview | |
|--------------|--|
| Project Name | 70-2021-12-vader (3New-FD) (XOK-SP) (OK-FLP) (1Positive-UT) (1Negative-FR) |
| Codebase URL | https://github.com/code-423n4/2021- 12-vader |
| Scan Engine | Al Analyzer |
| Scan Time | 2023/07/23 17:09:15 |
| Commit Id | 842662a |

| Total | | No |
|--------------------|-------------------|----|
| Critical Issues | PIAL AUDIT REPORT | |
| High risk Issues | 22 | |
| Medium risk Issues | 0 | |
| Low risk Issues | 0 | |
| | | |

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| Critical Issues | The issue can cause large economic losses, large-scale data disorder, loss of control of authority management, failure of key functions, or indirectly affect the correct operation of other smart contracts interacting with it. |
|-----------------------|---|
| High Risk Issues | The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impacts on clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users. |
| Medium Risk Issues | The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact. |
| Low Risk Issues | The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low-impact in view of the client's business circumstances. |
| Informational Issue | The issue does not pose an immediate risk but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth. |



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Summary of Findings

MetaScan security assessment was performed on July 23, 2023 17:09:15 on project 70-2021-12-vader (3New-FD) (XOK-SP) (OK-FLP) (1Positive-UT) (1Negative-FR) with the repository https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-12-vader on branch default branch. The assessment was carried out by scanning the project's codebase using the scan engine Al Analyzer. There are in total 22 vulnerabilities / security risks discovered during the scanning session, among which 0 critical vulnerabilities, 22 high risk vulnerabilities, 0 medium risk vulnerabilities, 0 low risk vulnerabilities, 0 informational issues.

| ID | Description | Severity |
|---------|--|-----------|
| MSA-001 | MWE-204: Unsafe First Deposit MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-002 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-003 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-004 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-005 | MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation | High risk |
| MSA-006 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-007 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-008 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation | High risk |
| MSA-009 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-010 | MWE-207: Unauthorized Transfer | High risk |
| MSA-011 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-012 | MWE-205: Front Running | High risk |
| MSA-013 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation | High risk |
| MSA-014 | MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation | High risk |
| MSA-015 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-016 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-017 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-018 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-019 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-020 | MWE-206: No Slippage Limit Check | High risk |
| MSA-021 | MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation | High risk |



| ID | Description | Severity |
|---------|--|-----------|
| MSA-022 | MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation | High risk |

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Findings



Critical (0)

No Critical vulnerabilities found here



FICIAL AUDIT REPORT High risk (22)

1. MWE-204: Unsafe First Deposit



High risk



Security Analyzer

First depositor can break minting of shares or drain the liquidity of all users.

File(s) Affected

contracts/x-vader/XVader.sol #25-41

```
ON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
function enter(uint256 _amount) external {
    // Gets the amount of vader locked in the contract
    uint256 totalVader = vader.balanceOf(address(this));
    uint256 totalShares = totalSupply();
    uint256 xVADERToMint = totalShares == 0 || totalVader == 0 // If no xVader exists, mint it 1:1 t
        ? _amount // Calculate and mint the amount of xVader the vader is worth.
        : // The ratio will change overtime, as xVader is burned/minted and
        // vader deposited + gained from fees / withdrawn.
         (_amount * totalShares) / totalVader;
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
OF__mint(msg.sender, xVADERToMint);
     // Lock the vader in the contract
    vader.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
```

Recommendation

When totalSupply() == 0, send the first min liquidity LP tokens to the zero address to enable share dilution.







No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex-v2/pool/VaderPoolV2.sol #153-194

```
function mintSynth(
     IERC20 foreignAsset,
     uint256 nativeDeposit,
     address from.
      address to
      external
      override
      nonReentrant
      supportedToken(foreignAsset)
      returns (uint256 amountSynth)
      nativeAsset.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), nativeDeposit);
                                                           IT REPORT
      ISynth synth = synthFactory.synths(foreignAsset);
      if (synth == ISynth(_ZERO_ADDRESS))
         synth = synthFactory.createSynth(
             IERC20Extended(address(foreignAsset))
         );
      (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(
                                     NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
         foreignAsset
 ); // gas savings
      amountSynth = VaderMath.calculateSwap(
        nativeDeposit,
         reserveNative,
         reserveForeign
     );
      // TODO: Clarify
         _update(
reserveNative,
     );
      synth.mint(to, amountSynth);
 }
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.









No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex-v2/pool/VaderPoolV2.sol #206-246

```
function burnSynth(
     IERC20 foreignAsset,
     uint256 synthAmount,
     address to
 ) external override nonReentrant returns (uint256 amountNative) {
     ISynth synth = synthFactory.synths(foreignAsset);
         synth != ISynth(_ZERO_ADDRESS),
         "VaderPoolV2::burnSynth: Inexistent Synth"
     );
                                        NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
require(
      synthAmount > 0,
         "VaderPoolV2::burnSynth: Insufficient Synth Amount"
     );
     IERC20(synth).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), synthAmount);
     synth.burn(synthAmount);
     (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(
         foreignAsset
     ); // gas savings
     amountNative = VaderMath.calculateSwap(
      synthAmount,
         reserveForeign,
         reserveNative
     );
     // TODO: Clarify
     _update(
         foreignAsset,
         reserveNative - amountNative.
         reserveForeign,
                                        NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
         reserveNative,
         reserveForeign
     GAL AUDI
     nativeAsset.safeTransfer(to, amountNative);
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.









← High risk



Security Analyzer

No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected



contracts/dex-v2/pool/VaderPoolV2.sol #311-362

```
function mintFungible(
            IERC20 foreignAsset,
           uint256 nativeDeposit,
           uint256 foreignDeposit,
            address from,
            address to
        ) external override nonReentrant returns (uint256 liquidity) {
            IERC20Extended lp = wrapper.tokens(foreignAsset);
                                                         DFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
            require(
                lp != IERC20Extended(_ZERO_ADDRESS),
                "VaderPoolV2::mintFungible: Unsupported Token"
            );
            (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(
                foreignAsset
            ); // gas savings
            nativeAsset.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), nativeDeposit);
            foreignAsset.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), foreignDeposit);
            PairInfo storage pair = pairInfo[foreignAsset];
            uint256 totalLiquidityUnits = pair.totalSupply;
            if (totalLiquidityUnits == 0) liquidity = nativeDeposit;
            else
                liquidity = VaderMath.calculateLiquidityUnits(
                   nativeDeposit,
                    reserveNative,
                    foreignDeposit,
                    reserveForeign,
                    totalLiquidityUnits
                                                NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
                );
343 require(
                liquidity > 0,
                "VaderPoolV2::mintFungible: Insufficient Liquidity Provided"
            );
            pair.totalSupply = totalLiquidityUnits + liquidity;
            _update(
               foreignAssec,
reserveNative + nativeDeposic,
reserveForeign + foreignDeposit,
~~veNative,
               foreignAsset,
         reserveForeign
            lp.mint(to, liquidity);
            emit Mint(from, to, nativeDeposit, foreignDeposit);
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.



5. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex-v2/pool/BasePoolV2.sol #203-246

```
function _burn(uint256 id, address to)
   internal
   nonReentrant
 returns (uint256 amountNative, uint256 amountForeign)
   require(
       ownerOf(id) == address(this),
       "BasePoolV2::burn: Incorrect Ownership"
   );
   IERC20 foreignAsset = positions[id].foreignAsset;
   (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(
       foreignAsset
                                       NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   ); // gas savings
   uint256 liquidity = positions[id].liquidity;
   PairInfo storage pair = pairInfo[foreignAsset];
   uint256 _totalSupply = pair.totalSupply;
   amountNative = (liquidity * reserveNative) / _totalSupply;
   amountForeign = (liquidity * reserveForeign) / _totalSupply;
   require(
       amountNative > 0 && amountForeign > 0.
       "BasePoolV2::burn: Insufficient Liquidity Burned"
                                       NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   pair.totalSupply = _totalSupply - liquidity;
   _burn(id);
   nativeAsset.safeTransfer(to, amountNative);
   foreignAsset.safeTransfer(to, amountForeign);
   _update(
       foreignAsset,
       reserveNative - amountNative,
       reserveForeign - amountForeign,
                                       NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
       reserveNative,
       reserveForeign
   emit Burn (msg.sender, amountNative, amountForeign, to);
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.





High risk



Security Analyzer

No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected



contracts/dex-v2/pool/BasePoolV2.sol #479-533

```
function _mint(
       IERC20 foreignAsset,
       uint256 nativeDeposit,
       uint256 foreignDeposit,
        address from,
        address to
    ) internal nonReentrant returns (uint256 liquidity) {
        (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(
            foreignAsset
        ); // gas savings
        nativeAsset.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), nativeDeposit);
        foreignAsset.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), foreignDeposit);
        PairInfo storage pair = pairInfo[foreignAsset];
        uint256 totalLiquidityUnits = pair.totalSupply;
        if (totalLiquidityUnits == 0) liquidity = nativeDeposit;
        else
            liquidity = VaderMath.calculateLiquidityUnits(
                nativeDeposit,
                reserveNative,
                foreignDeposit,
                reserveForeign,
N-OFFICIAD:AUDIT REPORT
                totalLiquidityUnits
            liquidity > 0,
            "BasePoolV2::mint: Insufficient Liquidity Provided"
        );
        uint256 id = positionId++;
        pair.totalSupply = totalLiquidityUnits + liquidity;
                                            NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
        _mint(to, id);
        positions[id] = Position(
            foreignAsset,
            block.timestamp,
            liquidity,
            nativeDeposit,
            foreignDeposit
        );
        _update(
           foreignAsset,
            reserveNative + nativeDeposit,
            reserveForeign + foreignDeposit,
         reserveNative,
            reserveForeign
        );
        emit Mint(from, to, nativeDeposit, foreignDeposit);
        emit PositionOpened(from, to, id, liquidity);
```



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Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.

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4 High risk NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT

Security Analyzer

No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks. UDIT REPORT

File(s) Affected



contracts/dex-v2/pool/BasePoolV2.sol #479-533

```
function _mint(
     IERC20 foreignAsset,
uint256 nativeDeposit,
     uint256 foreignDeposit,
     address from,
     address to
 ) internal nonReentrant returns (uint256 liquidity) {
     (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(
         foreignAsset
     ); // gas savings
     nativeAsset.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), nativeDeposit);
     PairInfo storage pair = pairInfo[foreignAsset];

Office totalLiquidityUnits = pair.totalSupply;

Office totalLiquidityUnits = pair.totalSupply;
     foreignAsset.safeTransferFrom(from, address(this), foreignDeposit);
         liquidity = VaderMath.calculateLiquidityUnits(
             nativeDeposit,
             reserveNative.
             foreignDeposit,
             reserveForeign,
              totalLiquidityUnits
         );
                                          NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
  require(
     liquidity > 0,
         "BasePoolV2::mint: Insufficient Liquidity Provided"
     uint256 id = positionId++;
     pair.totalSupply = totalLiquidityUnits + liquidity;
     _mint(to, id);
     positions[id] = Position(
         foreignAsset,
liquidity,
         block.timestamp,
         nativeDeposit,
         foreignDeposit
     );
     _update(
        foreignAsset,
         reserveNative + nativeDeposit,
         reserveForeign + foreignDeposit,
         reserveNative,
                                          NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
         reserveForeign
     emit Mint(from, to, nativeDeposit, foreignDeposit);
     emit PositionOpened(from, to, id, liquidity);
```



contracts/dex/pool/BasePool.sol #148-193

```
function mint (address to)
      external
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REP
      override
 nonReentrant
      returns (uint256 liquidity)
     (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(); // gas savings
     uint256 balanceNative = nativeAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
     uint256 balanceForeign = foreignAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
      uint256 nativeDeposit = balanceNative - reserveNative;
      uint256 foreignDeposit = balanceForeign - reserveForeign;
      uint256 totalLiquidityUnits = totalSupply;
      if (totalLiquidityUnits == 0)
          liquidity = nativeDeposit; // TODO: Contact ThorChain on proper approach
      else

liquidity = VaderMath.calculateLiquidityUnits(
 else
             reserveNative,
             foreignDeposit,
             reserveForeign,
             totalLiquidityUnits
         );
      require(
         liquidity > 0,
         "BasePool::mint: Insufficient Liquidity Provided"
                                               -OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
      uint256 id = positionId++;
     totalSupply += liquidity;
      _mint(to, id);
      positions[id] = Position(
        block.timestamp,
         liquidity,
         nativeDeposit,
         foreignDeposit
OFFI);
      _update(balanceNative, balanceForeign, reserveNative, reserveForeign);
      emit Mint(msg.sender, to, nativeDeposit, foreignDeposit);
      emit PositionOpened(msg.sender, id, liquidity);
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.





8. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/mocks/MockUniswapV2Router.sol #35-80

```
function _addLiquidity(
         address tokenA,
           address tokenB,
          uint256 amountADesired,
           uint256 amountBDesired,
          uint256 amountAMin,
          uint256 amountBMin
       ) internal virtual returns (uint256 amountA, uint256 amountB) {
           // create the pair if it doesn't exist yet
           if (IUniswapV2Factory(factory).getPair(tokenA, tokenB) == address(0)) {
           IUniswapV2Factory(factory).createPair(tokenA, tokenB);
           (uint256 reserveA, uint256 reserveB) = UniswapV2Library.getReserves(
               tokenA,
              tokenB
          if (reserveA == 0 && reserveB == 0) {
               (amountA, amountB) = (amountADesired, amountBDesired);
           } else {
                                              NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
              uint256 amountBOptimal = UniswapV2Library.quote(
$60N-OFFICIAL
                 amountADesired,
                  reserveA,
                   reserveB
              );
              if (amountBOptimal <= amountBDesired) {</pre>
                  require(
                      amountBOptimal >= amountBMin,
                      "UniswapV2Router: INSUFFICIENT_B_AMOUNT"
                  );
                   (amountA, amountB) = (amountADesired, amountBOptimal);
               } else {
                                          Uniswap..
                   uint256 amountAOptimal = UniswapV2Library.quote(
   ON-OFFICIAL AU reserveA
                      amountBDesired.
                      reserveB,
                   assert(amountAOptimal <= amountADesired);</pre>
                   require(
                      amountAOptimal >= amountAMin,
                      "UniswapV2Router: INSUFFICIENT_A_AMOUNT"
                   (amountA, amountB) = (amountAOptimal, amountBDesired);
80ON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
          }
```



contracts/mocks/MockUniswapV2Router.sol #82-114

```
function addLiquidity(
        address tokenA,
         address tokenB,
         uint256 amountADesired,
86 ulnt250 L
87 uint256 amountAMin,
         uint256 amountBDesired,
          uint256 amountBMin,
          address to,
          uint256 deadline
          external
         virtual
         override
         ensure (deadline)
          returns (
              uint256 amountA,
98 uint256 liquidity
      {
          (amountA, amountB) = _addLiquidity(
           tokenA,
             tokenB,
              amountADesired,
             amountBDesired,
             amountAMin,
              amountBMin
          );
           address pair = UniswapV2Library.pairFor(factory, tokenA, tokenB);
    TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenA, msg.sender, pair, amountA);
           TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenB, msg.sender, pair, amountB);
           liquidity = IUniswapV2Pair(pair).mint(to);
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.



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No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/mocks/MockUniswapV2Router.sol #186-212

```
function removeLiquidityETH(
  address token,
   uint256 liquidity,
   uint256 amountTokenMin,
    uint256 amountETHMin,
    address to,
    uint256 deadline
   public
    virtual
override
ensure(deadline)
returns (uint256 amountToken, uint256 amountETH)
      token,
      WETH,
      liquidity,
       amountTokenMin,
       amountETHMin,
      address(this),
        deadline
    );
                                   to, amounties.
    TransferHelper.safeTransfer(token, to, amountToken);
IWETH (WETH) .withdraw(amountETH);
    TransferHelper.safeTransferETH(to, amountETH);
```





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contracts/mocks/MockUniswapV2Router.sol #249-285

```
function removeLiquidityETHWithPermit(
    address token,
    uint256 liquidity,
    uint256 amountTokenMin,
     uint256 amountETHMin,
     address to,
      uint256 deadline,
bool approveMax,
     uint8 v,
      bytes32 r,
      bytes32 s
 )
    external
     virtual
      returns (uint256 amountToken, uint256 amountETH)
     address pair = UniswapV2Library.pairFor(factory, token, WETH);
      uint256 value = approveMax ? type(uint256).max : liquidity;
                                                 FICIAL AUDIT REPORT
 IUniswapV2Pair(pair).permit(
         msg.sender,
        address(this),
        value.
         deadline,
         v,
        r,
     );
     (amountToken, amountETH) = removeLiquidityETH(
        token,
         liquidity,
amountTokenMin, amountETHMin,
          to,
         deadline
      );
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.

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10. MWE-207: Unauthorized Transfer





The contract allows transferring tokens from an address different from the message sender without checking the approval of the address owner.

File(s) Affected

contracts/mocks/MockUniswapV2Router.sol #605-627

```
{\tt function} \ \ {\tt swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (}
                                                     CIAL AUDIT REPORT
  uint256 amountOutMin,
     address[] calldata path,
     address to,
     uint256 deadline
 ) external payable virtual override ensure(deadline) {
     require(path[0] == WETH, "UniswapV2Router: INVALID_PATH");
     uint256 amountIn = msg.value;
     IWETH(WETH).deposit{value: amountIn}();
     assert(
         IWETH(WETH).transfer(
             UniswapV2Library.pairFor(factory, path[0], path[1]),
             amount.In
); Aug
     uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20(path[path.length - 1]).balanceOf(to);
     _swapSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(path, to);
     require(
         IERC20(path[path.length - 1]).balanceOf(to).sub(balanceBefore) >=
             amountOutMin,
         "UniswapV2Router: INSUFFICIENT_OUTPUT_AMOUNT"
     );
```

Recommendation

Check the business logic about the transfer and add the approval check if necessary.

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Security Analyzer

No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/pool/BasePool.sol #148-193

```
function mint (address to)
                                               NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
            external
            override
            nonReent.rant
            returns (uint256 liquidity)
            (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(); // gas savings
            uint256 balanceNative = nativeAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
            uint256 balanceForeign = foreignAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
            uint256 nativeDeposit = balanceNative - reserveNative;
            uint256 foreignDeposit = balanceForeign - reserveForeign;
            uint256 totalLiquidityUnits = totalSupply;
            if (totalLiquidityUnits == 0)
162 else
                liquidity = nativeDeposit; // TODO: Contact ThorChain on proper approach
                liquidity = VaderMath.calculateLiquidityUnits(
                   nativeDeposit,
                    reserveNative,
                    foreignDeposit,
                    reserveForeign,
                    totalLiquidityUnits
               );
            require(
               liquidity > 0,
     OFFIG: AL AUDI
                "BasePool::mint: Insufficient Liquidity Provided"
                                                           ICIAL AUDIT REPORT
            uint256 id = positionId++;
            totalSupply += liquidity;
            _mint(to, id);
            positions[id] = Position(
               block.timestamp,
                liquidity,
                                               NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT
                nativeDeposit,
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                foreignDeposit
            _update(balanceNative, balanceForeign, reserveNative, reserveForeign);
            emit Mint(msg.sender, to, nativeDeposit, foreignDeposit);
            emit PositionOpened(msg.sender, id, liquidity);
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.



12. MWE-205: Front Running





Users are required to transfer assets in advance and minting token/liquidity/earning thus could be frontrun.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/pool/BasePool.sol #148-193

```
function mint (address to)
   external
   override
   nonReentrant
   returns (uint256 liquidity)
   (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(); // gas savings
   uint256 balanceNative = nativeAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
   uint256 balanceForeign = foreignAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
   uint256 nativeDeposit = balanceNative - reserveNative;
   uint256 foreignDeposit = balanceForeign - reserveForeign;
   uint256 totalLiquidityUnits = totalSupply;
   if (totalLiquidityUnits == 0)
       liquidity = nativeDeposit; // TODO: Contact ThorChain on proper approach
   else

Chaliquidity = VaderMath.calculateLiquidityUnits(ALAUDIT REPORT
           foreignDeposit,
           reserveForeign,
           totalLiquidityUnits
       );
   require(
       liquidity > 0,
       "BasePool::mint: Insufficient Liquidity Provided"
                                          Idity .
ON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   );
   uint256 id = positionId++;
   totalSupply += liquidity;
   _mint(to, id);
   positions[id] = Position(
       block.timestamp,
       liquidity,
       nativeDeposit,
       foreignDeposit
   );
    _update(balanceNative, balanceForeign, reserveNative, reserveForeign);
   emit Mint(msg.sender, to, nativeDeposit, foreignDeposit);
   emit PositionOpened(msg.sender, id, liquidity);
```

Recommendation

Put asset transfering and token minting in the same function to keep atomicity.







No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/pool/BasePool.sol #148-193

```
function mint (address to)
   external
   override
   nonReent.rant
   returns (uint256 liquidity)
   (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(); // gas savings
   uint256 balanceNative = nativeAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
   uint256 balanceForeign = foreignAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
   uint256 nativeDeposit = balanceNative - reserveNative;
   uint256 foreignDeposit = balanceForeign - reserveForeign;
   uint256 totalLiquidityUnits = totalSupply;
   if (totalLiquidityUnits == 0)
       liquidity = nativeDeposit; // TODO: Contact ThorChain on proper approach
   else
       liquidity = VaderMath.calculateLiquidityUnits(
         nativeDeposit,
           reserveNative,
           foreignDeposit,
           reserveForeign,
           totalLiquidityUnits
       );
   require(
       "BasePool::mint: Insufficient Liquidity Provided"
                                        NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   uint256 id = positionId++;
   totalSupply += liquidity;
   _mint(to, id);
   positions[id] = Position(
       block.timestamp,
       liquidity,
       nativeDeposit,
       foreignDeposit
   _update(balanceNative, balanceForeign, reserveNative, reserveForeign);
   emit Mint(msg.sender, to, nativeDeposit, foreignDeposit);
   emit PositionOpened(msg.sender, id, liquidity);
```



contracts/mocks/MockUniswapV2Router.sol #82-114

```
function addLiquidity(
         address tokenA,
         address tokenB,
         uint256 amountADesired,
         uint256 amountBDesired,
          uint256 amountAMin,
         uint256 amountBMin,
          address to,
          uint256 deadline
          external
          virtual
          override
          ensure (deadline)
          returns (
              uint256 amountA,
             uint256 amountB,
              uint256 liquidity
           )
      {
          (amountA, amountB) = _addLiquidity(
             tokenA,
               tokenB,
amountBDesired,
               amount AMin,
               amountBMin
          );
           address pair = UniswapV2Library.pairFor(factory, tokenA, tokenB);
           TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenA, msg.sender, pair, amountA);
           TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(tokenB, msg.sender, pair, amountB);
           liquidity = IUniswapV2Pair(pair).mint(to);
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.

NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT



14. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/pool/BasePool.sol #213-252

```
function _burn(uint256 id, address to)
   internal
   nonReentrant
   returns (uint256 amountNative, uint256 amountForeign)
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   require(
       ownerOf(id) == address(this),
     "BasePool::burn: Incorrect Ownership"
   );
   (uint112 reserveNative, uint112 reserveForeign, ) = getReserves(); // gas savings
   IERC20 _nativeAsset = nativeAsset; // gas savings
   IERC20 _foreignAsset = foreignAsset; // gas savings
   uint256 nativeBalance = IERC20(_nativeAsset).balanceOf(address(this));
   uint256 foreignBalance = IERC20(_foreignAsset).balanceOf(address(this));
   uint256 liquidity = positions[id].liquidity;
   uint256 _totalSupply = totalSupply; // gas savings, must be defined here since totalSupply can
   amountNative = (liquidity * nativeBalance) / _totalSupply; // using balances ensures pro-rata (
   amountForeign = (liquidity * foreignBalance) / _totalSupply; // using balances ensures pro-rate
   require(
       amountNative > 0 && amountForeign > 0,
       "BasePool::burn: Insufficient Liquidity Burned"
   );
   totalSupply -= liquidity;
   _burn(id);
_nativeAsset.safeTransfer(to, amountNative);
_nativeAsset.safeTransfer(to, amountForeign);
   foreignBalance = _foreignAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
    _update(nativeBalance, foreignBalance, reserveNative, reserveForeign);
   emit Burn(msg.sender, amountNative, amountForeign, to);
```



contracts/tokens/USDV.sol #100-120

```
function burn(uint256 uAmount)

external

conlyWhenNotLocked
returns (uint256 vAmount)

uint256 uPrice = lbt.getUSDVPrice();

burn(msg.sender, uAmount);

symmetric wamount = (uPrice * uAmount) / le18;

if (exchangeFee != 0) {
    uint256 fee = (vAmount * exchangeFee) / _MAX_BASIS_POINTS;
    vAmount = vAmount - fee;
    vader.mint(owner(), fee);

wader.mint(owner(), fee);

vader.mint(address(this), vAmount);

createLock(LockTypes.VADER, v
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.





4 High risk



Security Analyzer

No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.



contracts/dex/pool/BasePool.sol #288-378

```
function swap(
             uint256 nativeAmountIn,
             uint256 foreignAmountIn,
         ) public override nonReentrant validateGas returns (uint256) {
                                                                         UDIT REPORT
             require(
                 (nativeAmountIn > 0 && foreignAmountIn == 0) | |
                      (nativeAmountIn == 0 \&\& foreignAmountIn > 0),
                 "BasePool::swap: Only One-Sided Swaps Supported"
             (uint112 nativeReserve, uint112 foreignReserve, ) = getReserves(); // gas savings
             uint256 nativeBalance;
             uint256 foreignBalance:
             uint256 nativeAmountOut;
303/V-OFFIG/A/
             uint256 foreignAmountOut;
                  // scope for _token{0,1}, avoids stack too deep errors DIT REPORT
                 IERC20 _nativeAsset = nativeAsset;
                 IERC20 _foreignAsset = foreignAsset;
                 nativeBalance = _nativeAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
                 foreignBalance = _foreignAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
                 require(
                     to != address(_nativeAsset) && to != address(_foreignAsset),
                     "BasePool::swap: Invalid Receiver"
                                                   NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
                 );
      OFFICAL if (foreignAmountIn > 0) {
                     require(
                         foreignAmountIn <= foreignBalance - foreignReserve,</pre>
                          "BasePool::swap: Insufficient Tokens Provided"
                     );
                     require(
                         foreignAmountIn <= foreignReserve,</pre>
                         "BasePool::swap: Unfavourable Trade"
                     );
                     nativeAmountOut = VaderMath.calculateSwap(
                                                  NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
                         foreignAmountIn,
                         foreignReserve,
                   nativeReserve
                     );
                         nativeAmountOut > 0 && nativeAmountOut <= nativeReserve,</pre>
                          "BasePool::swap: Swap Impossible"
                     _nativeAsset.safeTransfer(to, nativeAmountOut); // optimistically transfer tokens
                 } else {
require (
nativeAmountIn <= nativeBalance - nativeResc:...

"BasePool::swap: Insufficient Tokens Provided"
"BasePool::swap: Insufficient Tokens Provided"
                         nativeAmountIn <= nativeReserve,</pre>
```



```
"BasePool::swap: Unfavourable Trade"
       );
        foreignAmountOut = VaderMath.calculateSwap(
           nativeAmountIn,
                                   NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
           nativeReserve,
            foreignReserve
        require(
           foreignAmountOut > 0 && foreignAmountOut <= foreignReserve,
           "BasePool::swap: Swap Impossible"
        );
        _foreignAsset.safeTransfer(to, foreignAmountOut); // optimistically transfer tokens
   }
    nativeBalance = _nativeAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
    foreignBalance = _foreignAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
_update(nativeBalance, foreignBalance, nativeReserve, foreignReserve);
emit Swap(
  msg.sender,
   nativeAmountIn,
   foreignAmountIn,
    nativeAmountOut,
   foreignAmountOut.
   to
);
return nativeAmountOut > 0 ? nativeAmountOut : foreignAmountOut;
```

contracts/mocks/MockUniswapV2Router.sol #349-367

```
function _swap(
     uint256[] memory amounts,
     address[] memory path,
     address _to
  ) internal virtual {
      for (uint256 i; i < path.length - 1; i++) {</pre>
          (address input, address output) = (path[i], path[i + 1]);
         (address token0, ) = UniswapV2Library.sortTokens(input, output);
         uint256 amountOut = amounts[i + 1];
          (uint256 amount0Out, uint256 amount1Out) = input == token0
             ? (uint256(0), amountOut)
              : (amountOut, uint256(0));
          address to = i < path.length - 2
             ? UniswapV2Library.pairFor(factory, output, path[i + 2])
          IUniswapV2Pair(UniswapV2Library.pairFor(factory, input, output))
              .swap(amount0Out, amount1Out, to, new bytes(0));
                                          NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
OFFICIAL AUDIT RE
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.







No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/math/VaderMath.sol #116-149

```
function calculateSwapReverse(
    uint256 amountOut,
      uint256 reserveIn,
      uint256 reserveOut
  ) internal pure returns (uint256 amountIn) {
      // X * Y
      uint256 XY = reserveIn * reserveOut;
      uint256 y2 = amountOut * 2;
OFFIG//-4y
      uint256 y4 = y2 * ^{2};
      require(
          y4 < reserveOut,
          "VaderMath::calculateSwapReverse: Desired Output Exceeds Maximum Output Possible (1/4 of Li
      // \text{ root}(-X^2 * Y * (4y - Y)) => \text{ root}(X^2 * Y * (Y - 4y)) \text{ as } Y - 4y >= 0
      uint256 numeratorA = root(XY) * root(reserveIn * (reserveOut - y4));
      // X * (2y - Y) => 2yX - XY
      uint256 numeratorB = y2 * reserveIn;
      uint256 numeratorC = XY;
      // -1 * (root(-X^2 * Y * (4y - Y)) + (X * (2y - Y))) =>
                                                                    -1 * (root(X^2 * Y * (Y - 4y)) +
      uint256 numerator = numeratorC - numeratorA - numeratorB;
      uint256 denominator = y2;
      amountIn = numerator / denominator;
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.

EPORT.

NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT







No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/router/VaderRouter.sol #122-149

```
function addLiquidity(
     IERC20 tokenA,
     IERC20 tokenB,
     uint256 amountADesired,
      uint256 amountBDesired,
     address to,
     uint256 deadline
     public
      override
      ensure(deadline)
      returns (
uint256 amountB,
          uint256 liquidity
     )
     IVaderPool pool;
     (pool, amountA, amountB) = _addLiquidity(
         address(tokenA),
         address (tokenB),
         amountADesired.
          amountBDesired
 tokenA.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(pool), amountA);
      tokenB.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(pool), amountB);
      liquidity = pool.mint(to);
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.

NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT







No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/router/VaderRouter.sol #393-437

```
function calculateInGivenOut(uint256 amountOut, address[] calldata path)
                                             DFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
public
    view
    returns (uint256 amountIn)
    if (path.length == 2) {
        address nativeAsset = factory.nativeAsset();
        IVaderPool pool = factory.getPool(path[0], path[1]);
        (uint256 nativeReserve, uint256 foreignReserve, ) = pool
            .getReserves();
        if (path[0] == nativeAsset) {
               VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
                   amountOut,
                   nativeReserve,
                  foreignReserve
               );
        } else {
               VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
                   amountOut,
                   foreignReserve,
                   nativeReserve
               );
     } else {
        (uint256 nativeReserve0, uint256 foreignReserve0, ) = pool0
            .getReserves();
        (uint256 nativeReserve1, uint256 foreignReserve1, ) = pool1
            .getReserves();
        return
            VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
               VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
                                      NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
                   amountOut,
DFFICIAL AUDIT, RE
                   nativeReserve1,
                   foreignReserve1
                foreignReserve0.
               nativeReserve0
            );
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.







No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/router/VaderRouter.sol #393-437

```
function calculateInGivenOut(uint256 amountOut, address[] calldata path)
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
      public
   view
      returns (uint256 amountIn)
      if (path.length == 2) {
          address nativeAsset = factory.nativeAsset();
          IVaderPool pool = factory.getPool(path[0], path[1]);
          (uint256 nativeReserve, uint256 foreignReserve, ) = pool
              .getReserves();
          if (path[0] == nativeAsset) {
                  VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
                     amountOut,
OFFICIAL AUDIT; REPORT
                     nativeReserve,
                     foreignReserve
                  VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
                     amountOut,
                     foreignReserve,
                     nativeReserve
                  );
          }
          IVaderPool pool0 = factory.getPool(path[0], path[1]);
        IVaderPool pool1 = factory.getPool(path[1], path[2]);
          (uint256 nativeReserve0, uint256 foreignReserve0, ) = pool0
              .getReserves();
          (uint256 nativeReserve1, uint256 foreignReserve1, ) = pool1
              .getReserves();
          return
              VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
                  VaderMath.calculateSwapReverse(
                     amountOut,
                     nativeReserve1,
                      foreignReserve1
                  foreignReserve0,
                  nativeReserve0
              );
```









contracts/dex/router/VaderRouter.sol #243-258

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.



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No slippage limit check was performed to prevent sandwich attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/dex/router/VaderRouter.sol #452-496

```
function calculateOutGivenIn(uint256 amountIn, address[] calldata path)
     external
     view
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
     returns (uint256 amountOut)
     if (path.length == 2) {
         address nativeAsset = factory.nativeAsset();
         IVaderPool pool = factory.getPool(path[0], path[1]);
         (uint256 nativeReserve, uint256 foreignReserve, ) = pool
             .getReserves();
         if (path[0] == nativeAsset) {
                 VaderMath.calculateSwap(
                     amountIn,
                     nativeReserve,
                     foreignReserve
DFFICIAL) else {
                 );
             return
                 VaderMath.calculateSwap(
                     amountIn,
                     foreignReserve,
                     nativeReserve
                 );
         }
         IVaderPool pool0 = factory.getPool(path[0], path[1]);
         IVaderPool pool1 = factory.getPool(path[1], path[2]);
         (uint256 nativeReserve0, uint256 foreignReserve0, ) = pool0
          .getReserves();
         (uint256 nativeReserve1, uint256 foreignReserve1, ) = pool1
             .getReserves();
         return
             VaderMath.calculateSwap(
                 VaderMath.calculateSwap(
                     amountIn,
                     nativeReserve1,
                     foreignReserve1
                 ),
                 foreignReserve0,
                 nativeReserve0
             );
```

Recommendation

Add slippage limit check when do liquidity-related operations.



21. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/lbt/LiquidityBasedTWAP.sol #150-189

```
function _updateVaderPrice(
            IUniswapV2Pair pair,
            ExchangePair storage pairData,
            uint256 timeElapsed
         ) internal returns (uint256 currentLiquidityEvaluation) {
           | bool isFirst = pair.token0() == vader;
                                                               AUDIT REPORT
            (uint256 reserve0, uint256 reserve1, ) = pair.getReserves();
            (uint256 reserveNative, uint256 reserveForeign) = isFirst
               ? (reserve0, reserve1)
                : (reserve1, reserve0);
                uint256 price0Cumulative,
                uint256 price1Cumulative,
                uint256 currentMeasurement
          uint256 nativeTokenPriceCumulative = isFirst
              ? priceOCumulative
                : price1Cumulative;
            unchecked {
                pairData.nativeTokenPriceAverage = FixedPoint.ug112x112(
                       (nativeTokenPriceCumulative -
                           pairData.nativeTokenPriceCumulative) / timeElapsed
                                              NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
         FICIAL AUDIT
            pairData.nativeTokenPriceCumulative = nativeTokenPriceCumulative;
            pairData.lastMeasurement = currentMeasurement;
            currentLiquidityEvaluation =
                (reserveNative * previousPrices[uint256(Paths.VADER)]) +
                (reserveForeign * getChainlinkPrice(pairData.foreignAsset));
NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
```



contracts/lbt/LiquidityBasedTWAP.sol #113-148

```
function syncVaderPrice()
       public
       override
       returns (
          uint256[] memory pastLiquidityWeights,
           uint256 pastTotalLiquidityWeight
       )
      uint256 _totalLiquidityWeight;
       uint256 totalPairs = vaderPairs.length;
       pastLiquidityWeights = new uint256[](totalPairs);
       pastTotalLiquidityWeight = totalLiquidityWeight[uint256(Paths.VADER)];
       for (uint256 i; i < totalPairs; ++i) {</pre>
           IUniswapV2Pair pair = vaderPairs[i];
           ExchangePair storage pairData = twapData[address(pair)];
          uint256 timeElapsed = block.timestamp - pairData.lastMeasurement;
          if (timeElapsed < pairData.updatePeriod) continue;</pre>
          uint256 pastLiquidityEvaluation = pairData.pastLiquidityEvaluation;
           uint256 currentLiquidityEvaluation = _updateVaderPrice(
               pair,
                                           NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
               pairData,
-OFFICIAD; AUDIT
               timeElapsed
           pastLiquidityWeights[i] = pastLiquidityEvaluation;
          pairData.pastLiquidityEvaluation = currentLiquidityEvaluation;
           _totalLiquidityWeight += currentLiquidityEvaluation;
       }
       totalLiquidityWeight[uint256(Paths.VADER)] = _totalLiquidityWeight;
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.



22. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/lbt/LiquidityBasedTWAP.sol #353-383

```
function _updateUSDVPrice(
            IERC20 foreignAsset,
            ExchangePair storage pairData,
            uint256 timeElapsed
         ) internal returns (uint256 currentLiquidityEvaluation) {
             (uint256 reserveNative, uint256 reserveForeign, ) = vaderPool
                                               NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
                 .getReserves(foreignAsset);
                uint256 nativeTokenPriceCumulative,
                uint256 currentMeasurement
             ) = vaderPool.cumulativePrices(foreignAsset);
             unchecked {
               pairData.nativeTokenPriceAverage = FixedPoint.uq112x112(
                        (nativeTokenPriceCumulative -
                            pairData.nativeTokenPriceCumulative) / timeElapsed
       DFFICIAL, AUDIT REPORT
                                                           FICIAL AUDIT REPORT
             pairData.nativeTokenPriceCumulative = nativeTokenPriceCumulative;
             pairData.lastMeasurement = currentMeasurement;
             currentLiquidityEvaluation =
                 (reserveNative * previousPrices[uint256(Paths.USDV)]) +
                 (reserveForeign * getChainlinkPrice(address(foreignAsset)));
1383N-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
```



contracts/lbt/LiquidityBasedTWAP.sol #316-351

```
function syncUSDVPrice()
                                     NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
    public
override
    returns (
       uint256[] memory pastLiquidityWeights,
       uint256 pastTotalLiquidityWeight
    )
   uint256 _totalLiquidityWeight;
    uint256 totalPairs = usdvPairs.length;
    pastLiquidityWeights = new uint256[](totalPairs);
    pastTotalLiquidityWeight = totalLiquidityWeight[uint256(Paths.USDV)];
    ExchangePair storage pairData = twapData[address(foreignAsset)];
       uint256 timeElapsed = block.timestamp - pairData.lastMeasurement;
       if (timeElapsed < pairData.updatePeriod) continue;</pre>
       uint256 pastLiquidityEvaluation = pairData.pastLiquidityEvaluation;
       uint256 currentLiquidityEvaluation = _updateUSDVPrice(
           foreignAsset,
           pairData,
           timeElapsed
       );
    pastLiquidityWeights[i] = pastLiquidityEvaluation;
       pairData.pastLiquidityEvaluation = currentLiquidityEvaluation;
        _totalLiquidityWeight += currentLiquidityEvaluation;
    }
    totalLiquidityWeight[uint256(Paths.USDV)] = _totalLiquidityWeight;
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price. AL AUDIT REPORT AL AUDIT REPORT



Medium risk (0)

No Medium risk vulnerabilities found here



Low risk (0)

No Low risk vulnerabilities found here JDIT REPORT



Informational (0)



No Informational vulnerabilities found here



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