

Draft
Security Assessment for

61-2021-12-sublime (1New-FD) (1Positive-FLP)

July 23, 2023

The issue can cause large

management, failure of key functions, or indirectly affect the correct operation of other smart contracts interacting with it.

economic losses, large-scale data disorder, loss of control of authority

The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk or

0

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0

0

is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impacts on clients' reputations or serious financial



Executive Summary

Overview Open	No CIAL AUDIS
Project Name	61-2021-12-sublime (1New-FD) (1Positive-FLP)
Codebase URL	https://github.com/code-423n4/2021- 12-sublime
Scan Engine	Al Analyzer
Scan Time	2023/07/23 23:16:51
Commit Id	9df1b7c

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	AUDIT REPORT

	OTAL O	implications for clients and users.
	Medium Risk Issues	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
<u>N</u> O,	Low Risk Issues	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low-impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
No.	Informational Issue	The issue does not pose an immediate risk but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.

0%

100%

0%

0%

0%

Critical Issues

High risk Issues


Low risk Issues

Medium risk Issues

Critical Issues

High Risk Issues







Summary of Findings

MetaScan security assessment was performed on July 23, 2023 23:16:51 on project 61-2021-12-sublime (1New-FD) (1Positive-FLP) with the repository https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-12-sublime on branch default branch. The assessment was carried out by scanning the project's codebase using the scan engine Al Analyzer. There are in total 8 vulnerabilities / security risks discovered during the scanning session, among which 0 critical vulnerabilities, 8 high risk vulnerabilities, 0 medium risk vulnerabilities, 0 low risk vulnerabilities, 0 informational issues.

ID	Description	Severity
MSA-001	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-002	MWE-204: Unsafe First Deposit MWE-204: Unsafe First Deposit	High risk
MSA-003	MWE-204: Unsafe First Deposit	High risk
MSA-004	MWE-204: Unsafe First Deposit	High risk
MSA-005	MWE-204: Unsafe First Deposit	High risk
MSA-006	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-007	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-008	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk







Findings



4 Critical (0)

No Critical vulnerabilities found here ICIAL AUDIT REPORT



High risk (8)

1. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Security Analyzer

Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/mocks/yVault/Controller.sol #169-177

```
function getExpectedReturn(
  address _strategy,
   address _token,
   uint256 parts
) public view returns (uint256 expected) {
   uint256 _balance = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_strategy);
    address _want = IStrategy(_strategy).want();
    (expected, ) = OneSplitAudit(onesplit).getExpectedReturn(_token, _want, _balance, parts, 0);
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price. AL AUDIT REPORT e. IL AUDIT REPORT







First depositor can break minting of shares or drain the liquidity of all users.

File(s) Affected

contracts/mocks/yVault/yVault.sol #81-87

```
NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal {
   require(account != address(0), 'ERC20: mint to the zero address');
   _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(amount);
   _balances[account] = _balances[account].add(amount);
   emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);
```

contracts/mocks/yVault/yVault.sol #275-288

```
function deposit (uint256 _amount) public
      uint256 _pool = balance();
      uint256 _before = token.balanceOf(address(this));
     token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
      uint256 _after = token.balanceOf(address(this));
      _amount = _after.sub(_before); // Additional check for deflationary tokens
     uint256 shares = 0;
      if (totalSupply() == 0) {
          shares = _amount;
      } else {
          shares = (_amount.mul(totalSupply())).div(_pool);
     _mint(msg.sender, shares);
    ICIAL AUDIT REPORT
```

Recommendation

When totalSupply() == 0, send the first min liquidity LP tokens to the zero address to enable share dilution.







First depositor can break minting of shares or drain the liquidity of all users.

File(s) Affected

contracts/mocks/yVault/yVault.sol #275-288

```
NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
function deposit(uint256 _amount) public {
  uint256 _pool = balance();
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   _amount = _after.sub(_before); // Additional check for deflationary tokens
   uint256 shares = 0;
  if (totalSupply() == 0) {
       shares = _amount;
   } else {
       shares = (_amount.mul(totalSupply())).div(_pool);
                                            OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   _mint(msg.sender, shares);
```

Recommendation

When totalSupply() == 0, send the first min liquidity LP tokens to the zero address to enable share dilution.









First depositor can break minting of shares or drain the liquidity of all users.

File(s) Affected

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     uint256 _after = token.balanceOf(address(this));
     _amount = _after.sub(_before); // Additional check for deflationary tokens
    uint256 shares = 0;
    if (totalSupply() == 0) {
        shares = _amount;
     } else {
        shares = (_amount.mul(totalSupply())).div(_pool);
                                        NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
    _mint(msq.sender, shares);
```

contracts/yield/AaveYield.sol #290-304

```
function _depositERC20(address asset, uint256 amount) internal returns (address aToken, uint256 sha
   aToken = liquidityToken(asset);
   uint256 aTokensBefore = IERC20(aToken).balanceOf(address(this));
   address lendingPool = ILendingPoolAddressesProvider(lendingPoolAddressesProvider).getLendingPool
   //approve collateral to vault
                                           DN-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   IERC20(asset).approve(lendingPool, 0);
   IERC20(asset).approve(lendingPool, amount);
   AaveLendingPool(lendingPool).deposit(asset, amount, address(this), referralCode);
   sharesReceived = IERC20(aToken).balanceOf(address(this)).sub(aTokensBefore);
```

Recommendation

When totalSupply() == 0, send the first min liquidity LP tokens to the zero address to enable share dilution. NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT







First depositor can break minting of shares or drain the liquidity of all users.

File(s) Affected

contracts/mocks/yVault/yVault.sol #290-304

```
function depositETH() public payable {
uint256 _pool = balance();
    uint256 _before = token.balanceOf(address(this));
    uint256 _amount = msg.value;
    WETH(address(token)).deposit{value: _amount}();
    uint256 _after = token.balanceOf(address(this));
    _amount = _after.sub(_before); // Additional check for deflationary tokens
    uint256 shares = 0;
    if (totalSupply() == 0) {
        shares = _amount;
    } else {
        shares = (_amount.mul(totalSupply())).div(_pool);
                                        NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
__mint(msg.sender, shares);
```

Recommendation

When totalSupply() == 0, send the first min liquidity LP tokens to the zero address to enable share dilution.



6. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/Pool/Pool.sol #817-830

```
function _updateLenderSharesDuringLiquidation(address _lender)
 returns (uint256 _lenderCollateralLPShare, uint256 _lenderBalance)
   uint256 _poolBaseLPShares = poolVariables.baseLiquidityShares;
   _lenderBalance = balanceOf(_lender);
   uint256 _lenderBaseLPShares = (_poolBaseLPShares.mul(_lenderBalance)).div(totalSupply());
   uint256 _lenderExtraLPShares = lenders[_lender].extraLiquidityShares;
   poolVariables.baseLiquidityShares = _poolBaseLPShares.sub(_lenderBaseLPShares);
   poolVariables.extraLiquidityShares = poolVariables.extraLiquidityShares.sub(_lenderExtraLPShare
   _lenderCollateralLPShare = _lenderBaseLPShares.add(_lenderExtraLPShares);
                                       NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
```

contracts/Pool/Pool.sol #864-890

```
function liquidateForLender(
   address _lender,
   bool _fromSavingsAccount,
   bool _toSavingsAccount,
   bool _recieveLiquidityShare
) external payable nonReentrant {
   _canLenderBeLiquidated(_lender);
   address _poolSavingsStrategy = poolConstants.poolSavingsStrategy;
 (uint256 _lenderCollateralLPShare, uint256 _lenderBalance) = _updateLenderSharesDuringLiquidat:
   uint256 _lenderCollateralTokens = _lenderCollateralLPShare;
   _lenderCollateralTokens = IYield(_poolSavingsStrategy).getTokensForShares(_lenderCollateralLPS)
   _liquidateForLender(_fromSavingsAccount, _lender, _lenderCollateralTokens);
   uint256 _amountReceived = _withdraw(
       _toSavingsAccount,
       _recieveLiquidityShare,
       poolConstants.collateralAsset.
                                       NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
       _poolSavingsStrategy,
       _lenderCollateralTokens
   _burn(_lender, _lenderBalance);
   delete lenders[_lender];
   emit LenderLiquidated(msg.sender, _lender, _amountReceived);
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.



7. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/yield/CompoundYield.sol #178-183

```
function getTokensForShares(uint256 shares, address asset) public override returns (uint256 amount)

//balanceOfUnderlying returns underlying balance for total shares

if (shares == 0) return 0;

address cToken = liquidityToken[asset];

amount = ICToken(cToken).balanceOfUnderlying(address(this)).mul(shares).div(IERC20(cToken).balance)

}
```

contracts/Pool/Pool.sol #864-890

```
function liquidateForLender(
   address _lender,
   bool _fromSavingsAccount,
   bool _toSavingsAccount,
   bool _recieveLiquidityShare
) external payable nonReentrant {
   _canLenderBeLiquidated(_lender);
    address _poolSavingsStrategy = poolConstants.poolSavingsStrategy;
    (uint256 _lenderCollateralLPShare, uint256 _lenderBalance) = _updateLenderSharesDuringLiquidat:
    uint256 _lenderCollateralTokens = _lenderCollateralLPShare;
    _lenderCollateralTokens = IYield(_poolSavingsStrategy).getTokensForShares(_lenderCollateralLPSh
    _liquidateForLender(_fromSavingsAccount, _lender, _lenderCollateralTokens);
    uint256 _amountReceived = _withdraw(
       _toSavingsAccount,
        _recieveLiquidityShare,
     poolConstants.collateralAsset,
        _poolSavingsStrategy,
        _lenderCollateralTokens
    _burn(_lender, _lenderBalance);
    delete lenders[_lender];
    emit LenderLiquidated(msg.sender, _lender, _amountReceived);
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.

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8. MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation





Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

File(s) Affected

contracts/yield/AaveYield.sol #256-265

```
function getTokensForShares(uint256 shares, address asset) public view override returns (uint256 ar
if (shares == 0) return 0;
address aToken = liquidityToken(asset);

(, , , , , , uint256 liquidityIndex, , ) = IProtocolDataProvider(protocolDataProvider).getRes
amount = IScaledBalanceToken(aToken).scaledBalanceOf(address(this)).mul(liquidityIndex).mul(shares)
IERC20(aToken).balanceOf(address(this))
);
}
```

contracts/Pool/Pool.sol #694-702

```
function calculateCollateralRatio(uint256 _balance, uint256 _liquidityShares) public returns (uint26 _ uint256 _interest = interestToPay().mul(_balance).div(totalSupply());

address _collateralAsset = poolConstants.collateralAsset;

address _strategy = poolConstants.poolSavingsStrategy;

uint256 _currentCollateralTokens = IYield(_strategy).getTokensForShares(_liquidityShares, _col:

uint256 _equivalentCollateral = getEquivalentTokens(_collateralAsset, poolConstants.borrowAsset

_ratio = _equivalentCollateral.mul(10**30).div(_balance.add(_interest));

}
```

Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.

📤 Medium risk (0)

No Medium risk vulnerabilities found here



No Low risk vulnerabilities found here

(?) Informational (0)

No Informational vulnerabilities found here



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