

Draft
Security Assessment for

# 131-2022-05-backd (10K-FLP) (1Negative-SP)

July 23, 2023


The issue can cause large economic losses, large-scale data




### **Executive Summary**

Overview	Overview 121 2022 05 healtd (10K FLD)	
Project Name	131-2022-05-backd (10K-FLP) (1Negative-SP)	
Codebase URL	https://github.com/daoyuan14/2022-05- backd/	
Scan Engine	Al Analyzer	
Scan Time	2023/07/23 21:39:24	
Commit Id	bffa09a	

Critical Issues	disorder, loss of control of authority management, failure of key functions, or indirectly affect the correct operation of other smart contracts interacting with it.
High Risk Issues	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impacts on clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users.
Medium Risk Issues	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
Low Risk Issues	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low-impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational Issue	The issue does not pose an immediate risk but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.







# **Summary of Findings**

MetaScan security assessment was performed on July 23, 2023 21:39:24 on project 131-2022-05-backd (10K-FLP) (1Negative-SP) with the repository https://github.com/daoyuan14/2022-05-backd/ on branch default branch. The assessment was carried out by scanning the project's codebase using the scan engine Al Analyzer. There are in total 8 vulnerabilities / security risks discovered during the scanning session, among which 0 critical vulnerabilities, 8 high risk vulnerabilities, 0 medium risk vulnerabilities, 0 informational issues.

ID	Description	Severity
MSA-001	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-002	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-003	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation  MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-004	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-005	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-006	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-007	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk
MSA-008	MWE-200: Insecure LP Token Value Calculation	High risk









# **Findings**



# **Critical** (0)

No Critical vulnerabilities found here

FICIAL AUDIT REPORT 4 High risk (8)







Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected

protocol/contracts/swappers/SwapperRouter.sol #162-191

```
function _swapForWeth(address token_) internal returns (uint256 amountOut) {
      if (token_ == address(_WETH)) return _WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
      // Handling ETH -> WETH
      if (token_ == address(0)) {
          uint256 ethBalance_ = address(this).balance;
          if (ethBalance_ == 0) return 0;
          _WETH.deposit{value: ethBalance_}();
          return ethBalance_;
                                          NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
      // Handling Curve Pool swaps
      ICurveSwapEth curvePool_ = curvePools[token_];
      if (address(curvePool_) != address(0)) {
          uint256 amount_ = IERC20(token_).balanceOf(address(this));
          if (amount_ == 0) return 0;
          _approve(token_, address(curvePool_));
          (uint256 wethIndex_, uint256 tokenIndex_) = _getIndices(curvePool_, token_);
          curvePool_.exchange(
              tokenIndex .
              wethIndex_,
amount_,
_minWethAmountOut(amount_, token_)
              wethIndex_,
-OFFICIAD:AL
          return _WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
      // Handling ERC20 -> WETH
      return _swap(token_, address(_WETH), IERC20(token_).balanceOf(address(this)));
```

NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT

NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT

NON-OFF

NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT

NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT



protocol/contracts/swappers/SwapperRouter.sol #125-155

```
function swap(
         address fromToken ,
          address toToken_,
          uint256 amountIn_
        ) public payable override returns (uint256 amountOut) {
                                                                                                  NON-OFFI
130 // Validating ETH value sent
            require (msg.value == (fromToken_ == address(0) ? amountIn_ : 0), Error.INVALID_AMOUNT);
           if (amountIn_ == 0) {
               emit Swapped(fromToken_, toToken_, 0, 0);
               return 0;
           if (fromToken_ == toToken_) {
                if (fromToken_ == address(0)) {
                    payable(msg.sender).transfer(amountIn);
              }
               emit Swapped(fromToken_, toToken_, amountIn_, amountIn_);
         return amountIn_;
                                                              CIAL AUDIT REPORT
           }
           // Transferring to contract if ERC20
           if (fromToken_ != address(0)) {
                IERC20(fromToken_).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amountIn_);
           // Swapping token via WETH
           uint256 amountout_
emit Swapped(fromToken_, toToken_, amountout_);
return _returnTokens(toToken_, amountOut_);
           uint256 amountOut_ = _swapWethForToken(toToken_, _swapForWeth(fromToken_));
```

#### Recommendation









Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected

protocol/contracts/swappers/SwapperRouter.sol #414-425

```
function _minTokenAmountOut(uint256 wethAmount_, address token_)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            L AUDIT REPORT
                                internal
                                returns (uint256 minAmountOut)
                              uint256 priceInEth_ = _getPriceInEth(token_);
                              if (priceInEth_ == 0) return 0;
                                                             weth \verb|Amount|.scaledDiv(priceInEth|).scaledMul(slippageTolerance).scaleTo(interpretation of the property of
                                                                                           IERC20Full(token_).decimals()
                                                           ) :
```

protocol/contracts/swappers/SwapperRouter.sol #198-227

```
NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
function _swapWethForToken(address token_, uint256 amount_)
   internal
   returns (uint256 amountOut)
   if (amount_ == 0) return 0;
   if (token_ == address(_WETH)) return amount_;
   // Handling WETH -> ETH
   if (token_ == address(0)) {
       _WETH.withdraw(amount_);
    A return amount_;
   // Handling Curve Pool swaps
   ICurveSwapEth curvePool_ = curvePools[token_];
   if (address(curvePool_) != address(0)) {
       _approve(address(_WETH), address(curvePool_));
       (uint256 wethIndex_, uint256 tokenIndex_) = _getIndices(curvePool_, token_);
       curvePool_.exchange(
           wethIndex_,
                                       NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
           tokenIndex_,
          amount_,
         _minTokenAmountOut(amount_, token_)
       return IERC20 (token_).balanceOf (address(this));
   // Handling WETH -> ERC20
   return _swap(address(_WETH), token_, amount_);
```

#### Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price. V-OFFICIAL AUDIT REP V-OFFICIAL AUDIT REP







Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected

protocol/contracts/swappers/SwapperRouter.sol #433-444

```
function _minWethAmountOut(uint256 tokenAmount_, address token_)

internal

view

returns (uint256 minAmountOut)

437  {

uint256 priceInEth_ = _getPriceInEth(token_);

if (priceInEth_ == 0) return 0;

return

tokenAmount_.scaledMul(priceInEth_).scaledMul(slippageTolerance).scaleFrom(

IERC20Full(token_).decimals()

);

444  }
```

protocol/contracts/swappers/SwapperRouter.sol #162-191

```
function _swapForWeth(address token_) internal returns (uint256 amountOut) {
     if (token_ == address(_WETH)) return _WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
     // Handling ETH -> WETH
     if (token_ == address(0)) {
         uint256 ethBalance_ = address(this).balance;
         if (ethBalance_ == 0) return 0;
         _WETH.deposit{value: ethBalance_}();
         return ethBalance_;
                                        NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
     // Handling Curve Pool swaps
     ICurveSwapEth curvePool_ = curvePools[token_];
     if (address(curvePool_) != address(0)) {
         uint256 amount_ = IERC20(token_).balanceOf(address(this));
         if (amount_ == 0) return 0;
         _approve(token_, address(curvePool_));
         (uint256 wethIndex_, uint256 tokenIndex_) = _getIndices(curvePool_, token_);
         curvePool_.exchange(
             tokenIndex .
            wethIndex_,
amount_,
_minWethAmountOut(amount_, token_)
             wethIndex_,
DFFICIAD;A
         return _WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
     // Handling ERC20 -> WETH
     return _swap(token_, address(_WETH), IERC20(token_).balanceOf(address(this)));
```

#### Recommendation







Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected

protocol/contracts/pool/LiquidityPool.sol #504-525

```
function depositFor(
                                   NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   address account,
uint256 depositAmount,
   uint256 minTokenAmount
) public payable override notPaused returns (uint256) {
   if (depositAmount == 0) return 0;
   uint256 rate = exchangeRate();
    _doTransferIn(msg.sender, depositAmount);
   uint256 mintedLp = depositAmount.scaledDiv(rate);
   require(mintedLp >= minTokenAmount && mintedLp > 0, Error.INVALID_AMOUNT);
    lpToken.mint(account, mintedLp);
    _rebalanceVault();
   } else {
       emit DepositFor(msg.sender, account, depositAmount, mintedLp);
    return mintedLp;
```

#### Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.



NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT

NON-OFF







Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected

protocol/contracts/pool/LiquidityPool.sol #608-616

```
function exchangeRate() public view override returns (uint256) {
uint256 totalUnderlying_ = totalUnderlying();
  return totalUnderlying_.scaledDiv(totalSupply);
```

protocol/contracts/pool/LiquidityPool.sol #533-559

```
function redeem(uint256 redeemLpTokens, uint256 minRedeemAmount)
   public
                                       NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
   override
 returns (uint256)
   require(redeemLpTokens > 0, Error.INVALID_AMOUNT);
   ILpToken lpToken_ = lpToken;
   require(lpToken_.balanceOf(msg.sender) >= redeemLpTokens, Error.INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE);
   uint256 withdrawalFee = addressProvider.isAction(msg.sender)
       ? 0
       : getWithdrawalFee(msg.sender, redeemLpTokens);
   uint256 redeemMinusFees = redeemLpTokens - withdrawalFee;
   // Pay no fees on the last withdrawal (avoid locking funds in the pool)
   if (redeemLpTokens == lpToken_.totalSupply()) {
       redeemMinusFees = redeemLpTokens;
   uint256 redeemUnderlying = redeemMinusFees.scaledMul(exchangeRate());
   require(redeemUnderlying >= minRedeemAmount, Error.NOT_ENOUGH_FUNDS_WITHDRAWN);
   rebalanceVault (redeemUnderlying);
   lpToken_.burn(msg.sender, redeemLpTokens);
   _doTransferOut(payable(msg.sender), redeemUnderlying);
   emit Redeem(msg.sender, redeemUnderlying, redeemLpTokens);
   return redeemUnderlying;
                                        NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
```

#### Recommendation







Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected

protocol/contracts/pool/LiquidityPool.sol #711-737

```
function _rebalanceVault(uint256 underlyingToWithdraw) internal {
             IVault vault = getVault();
             if (address(vault) == address(0)) return;
        uint256 lockedLp = staker.getStakedByActions();
             uint256 totalUnderlyingStaked = lockedLp.scaledMul(exchangeRate());
             uint256 underlyingBalance = _getBalanceUnderlying(true);
             uint256 maximumDeviation = totalUnderlyingStaked.scaledMul(getMaxReserveDeviationRatio());
             uint256 nextTargetBalance = totalUnderlyingStaked.scaledMul(getRequiredReserveRatio());
             if (
                 underlyingToWithdraw > underlyingBalance ||
                 (underlyingBalance - underlyingToWithdraw) + maximumDeviation < nextTargetBalance
             ) {
                uint256 requiredDeposits = nextTargetBalance + underlyingToWithdraw - underlyingBalance;
                vault.withdraw(requiredDeposits);
             } else {
                uint256 nextBalance = underlyingBalance - underlyingToWithdraw;
                 if (nextBalance > nextTargetBalance + maximumDeviation) {
                     uint256 excessDeposits = nextBalance - nextTargetBalance;
                     _doTransferOut(payable(address(vault)), excessDeposits);
                     vault.deposit();
NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
```



protocol/contracts/pool/LiquidityPool.sol #533-559

```
function redeem(uint256 redeemLpTokens, uint256 minRedeemAmount)
   public
   override
  returns (uint256)
   require (redeemLpTokens > 0, Error.INVALID_AMOUNT);
   ILpToken lpToken_ = lpToken;
   require(lpToken_.balanceOf(msg.sender) >= redeemLpTokens, Error.INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE);
   uint256 withdrawalFee = addressProvider.isAction(msg.sender)
        : getWithdrawalFee(msg.sender, redeemLpTokens);
    uint256 redeemMinusFees = redeemLpTokens - withdrawalFee;
    // Pay no fees on the last withdrawal (avoid locking funds in the pool)
    if (redeemLpTokens == lpToken_.totalSupply()) {
        redeemMinusFees = redeemLpTokens;
   uint256 redeemUnderlying = redeemMinusFees.scaledMul(exchangeRate());
   require(redeemUnderlying >= minRedeemAmount, Error.NOT_ENOUGH_FUNDS_WITHDRAWN);
    rebalanceVault (redeemUnderlying);
   lpToken_.burn(msg.sender, redeemLpTokens);
   _doTransferOut(payable(msg.sender), reueemone.
emit Redeem(msg.sender, redeemUnderlying, redeemLpTokens);
```

#### Recommendation

Do not use AMM pool or custom liquidity calculation to caculate LP token value/price.





NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT







Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected


protocol/contracts/oracles/ChainlinkOracleProvider.sol #50-80

```
function _getPrice(
     address asset_,
      address denomination_,
     bool revert
   ) internal view returns (uint256) {
      try _feedRegistry.latestRoundData(asset_, denomination_) returns (
                                                POM-
    Flow uint80 roundID_,
          int256 price_,
         uint256 startedAt,
          uint256 timeStamp_,
          uint80 answeredInRound
          require(timeStamp_ != 0, Error.ROUND_NOT_COMPLETE);
          require(block.timestamp <= timeStamp_ + stalePriceDelay, Error.STALE_PRICE);</pre>
          require(price_ != 0, Error.NEGATIVE_PRICE);
          require(answeredInRound_ >= roundID_, Error.STALE_PRICE);
          return uint256(price_).scaleFrom(_feedRegistry.decimals(asset_, denomination_));
                                                   FICIAL AUDIT REPORT
 catch Error(string memory reason) {
          if (revert_) revert (reason);
          if (denomination_ == Denominations.USD) {
              return
                  (_getPrice(asset_, Denominations.ETH, true) *
                     _getPrice(Denominations.ETH, Denominations.USD, true)) / 1e18;
          return
              (_getPrice(asset_, Denominations.USD, true) * 1e18) /
              _getPrice(Denominations.ETH, Denominations.USD, true);
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
-OTFICIAL AUDIT REF
```

#### Recommendation







Liquidity token value/price can be manipulated to cause flashloan attacks.

#### File(s) Affected

protocol/contracts/tokenomics/VestedEscrowRevocable.sol #84-91

```
function balanceOf(address _recipient) external view override returns (uint256) {
   uint256 timestamp = block.timestamp;
   uint256 timeRevoked = revokedTime[_recipient];
   if (timeRevoked != 0) {
   timestamp - c.
}
return _balanceOf(_recipient, timestamp);

AUDITREPORT
       timestamp = timeRevoked;
```

protocol/contracts/swappers/SwapperRouter.sol #162-191

```
function _swapForWeth(address token_) internal returns (uint256 amountOut) {
     if (token_ == address(_WETH)) return _WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
     // Handling ETH -> WETH
     if (token_ == address(0)) {
        if (ethBalance_ == 0) return u;
_WETH.deposit{value: ethBalance_}();
__wethBalance_;
        uint256 ethBalance_ = address(this).balance;
     // Handling Curve Pool swaps
     ICurveSwapEth curvePool_ = curvePools[token_];
     if (address(curvePool_) != address(0)) {
        uint256 amount_ = IERC20(token_).balanceOf(address(this));
        if (amount_ == 0) return 0;
         _approve(token_, address(curvePool_));
         (uint256 wethIndex_, uint256 tokenIndex_) = _getIndices(curvePool_, token_);
         curvePool_.exchange(
                                         NON-OFFICIAL AUDIT REPORT
            tokenIndex_,
amount_,
            wethIndex_,
             _minWethAmountOut(amount_, token_)
        );
         return _WETH.balanceOf(address(this));
     // Handling ERC20 -> WETH
     return _swap(token_, address(_WETH), IERC20(token_).balanceOf(address(this)));
```

#### Recommendation





No Medium risk vulnerabilities found here



# **A** Low risk (0)

No Low risk vulnerabilities found here



# ? Informational (0)

No Informational vulnerabilities found here



#### **Disclaimer**

This report is subject to the terms and conditions (including without limitation, description of services, confidentiality, disclaimer and limitation of liability) set forth in the Services Agreement, or the scope of services, and terms and conditions provided to you ("Customer" or the "Company") in connection with the Agreement. This report provided in connection with the Services set forth in the Agreement shall be used by the Company only to the extent permitted under the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement. This report may not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to or relied upon by any person for any purposes, nor may copies be delivered to any other person other than the Company, without MetaTrust's prior written consent in each instance.

This report is not, nor should be considered, an "endorsement" or "disapproval" of any particular project or team. This report is not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any "product" or "asset" created by any team or project that contracts MetaTrust to perform a security assessment. This report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technologies proprietors, business, business model or legal compliance.

This report should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. This report in no way provides investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort. This report represents an extensive assessing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology.

Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. MetaTrust's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. MetaTrust's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies, and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze.

The assessment services provided by MetaTrust is subject to dependencies and under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results. The services may access, and depend upon, multiple layers of third-parties.

ALL SERVICES, THE LABELS, THE ASSESSMENT REPORT, WORK PRODUCT, OR OTHER MATERIALS, OR ANY PRODUCTS OR RESULTS OF THE USE THEREOF ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND "AS 131-2022-05-backd (10K-FLP) (1Negative-SP) Security Assessment AVAILABLE" AND WITH ALL FAULTS AND DEFECTS WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED UNDER APPLICABLE LAW,



MetaTrust HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY, OR OTHERWISE WITH RESPECT TO THE SERVICES, ASSESSMENT REPORT, OR OTHER MATERIALS. WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, MetaTrust SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT, AND ALL WARRANTIES ARISING FROM COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE. WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, MetaTrust MAKES NO WARRANTY OF ANY KIND THAT THE SERVICES, THE LABELS, THE ASSESSMENT REPORT, WORK PRODUCT, OR OTHER MATERIALS, OR ANY PRODUCTS OR RESULTS OF THE USE THEREOF, WILL MEET CUSTOMER'S OR ANY OTHER PERSON'S REQUIREMENTS, ACHIEVE ANY INTENDED RESULT, BE COMPATIBLE OR WORK WITH ANY SOFTWARE, SYSTEM, OR OTHER SERVICES, OR BE SECURE, ACCURATE, COMPLETE, FREE OF HARMFUL CODE, OR ERROR-FREE. WITHOUT LIMITATION TO THE FOREGOING, MetaTrust PROVIDES NO WARRANTY OR UNDERTAKING, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATION OF ANY KIND THAT THE SERVICE WILL MEET CUSTOMER'S REQUIREMENTS, ACHIEVE ANY INTENDED RESULTS, BE COMPATIBLE OR WORK WITH ANY OTHER SOFTWARE, APPLICATIONS, SYSTEMS OR SERVICES, OPERATE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, MEET ANY PERFORMANCE OR RELIABILITY STANDARDS OR BE ERROR FREE OR THAT ANY ERRORS OR DEFECTS CAN OR WILL BE CORRECTED.

WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, NEITHER MetaTrust NOR ANY OF MetaTrust'S AGENTS MAKES ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS TO THE ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, OR CURRENCY OF ANY INFORMATION OR CONTENT PROVIDED THROUGH THE SERVICE. MetaTrust WILL ASSUME NO LIABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR (I) ANY ERRORS, MISTAKES, OR INACCURACIES OF CONTENT AND MATERIALS OR FOR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE OF ANY KIND INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF ANY CONTENT, OR (II) ANY PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE, OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER, RESULTING FROM CUSTOMER'S ACCESS TO OR USE OF THE SERVICES, ASSESSMENT REPORT, OR OTHER MATERIALS.

ALL THIRD-PARTY MATERIALS ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF OR CONCERNING ANY THIRD-PARTY MATERIALS IS STRICTLY BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND THE THIRD-PARTY OWNER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF THE THIRD-PARTY MATERIALS.

THE SERVICES, ASSESSMENT REPORT, AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS HEREUNDER ARE SOLELY PROVIDED TO CUSTOMER AND MAY NOT BE RELIED ON BY ANY OTHER PERSON OR FOR ANY PURPOSE NOT SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN THIS AGREEMENT, NOR MAY COPIES BE DELIVERED TO, ANY OTHER PERSON WITHOUT MetaTrust'S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT IN EACH INSTANCE.

NO THIRD PARTY OR ANYONE ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY THEREOF, SHALL BE A THIRD PARTY OR OTHER BENEFICIARY OF SUCH SERVICES, ASSESSMENT REPORT, AND ANY ACCOMPANYING 131-2022-05-backd (10K-FLP) (1Negative-SP) Security Assessment MATERIALS AND NO SUCH THIRD PARTY SHALL HAVE ANY RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AGAINST MetaTrust WITH RESPECT TO SUCH SERVICES, ASSESSMENT REPORT, AND ANY ACCOMPANYING MATERIALS.



THE REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF MetaTrust CONTAINED IN THIS AGREEMENT ARE SOLELY FOR THE BENEFIT OF CUSTOMER. ACCORDINGLY, NO THIRD PARTY OR ANYONE ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY THEREOF, SHALL BE A THIRD PARTY OR OTHER BENEFICIARY OF SUCH REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES AND NO SUCH THIRD PARTY SHALL HAVE ANY RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AGAINST MetaTrust WITH RESPECT TO SUCH REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OR ANY MATTER SUBJECT TO OR RESULTING IN INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT OR OTHERWISE.

FOR AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, THE SERVICES, INCLUDING ANY ASSOCIATED ASSESSMENT REPORTS OR MATERIALS, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED OR RELIED UPON AS ANY FORM OF FINANCIAL, TAX, LEGAL, REGULATORY, OR OTHER ADVICE.