

Fairness in Social Influence Maximization via Optimal Transport

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We examine fairness in social influence maximization, where the goal is to strategically select seeds that spread information through a network while ensuring balanced outreach among different communities. Existing fairness metrics focus on marginalized expected outreach within groups but fail to account for a joint stochasticity in information diffusion. This oversight can lead to misleading fairness evaluations, as highly unequal outcomes may still be classified as fair. To address this issue, we introduce a new fairness metric, *mutual fairness*, which considers outreach variability using optimal transport theory. We propose a novel seed-selection algorithm that optimizes both outreach and mutual fairness. Experiments on real datasets show that the proposed approach enhances fairness with minimal or even no loss in efficiency.

Keywords: Social Influence Maximization, Fairness, Optimal Transport

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1 Introduction

Social Influence Maximization (SIM) is the problem of selecting a small group of early adopters in a social network to maximize the spread of information, such as product endorsements [16], job advertisements [3], or public health awareness [25]. Since finding the optimal selection is NP-hard [10], heuristic strategies like greedy algorithms and centrality measures are commonly used. However, these approaches focus solely on network topology and ignore user demographics, raising fairness concerns. Real-world social networks consist of diverse social groups with varying sizes and connectivity patterns. Prioritizing highly connected nodes often excludes less-connected minorities, leading to inequitable information distribution and reinforcing biases [9, 23], particularly in critical domains like health, education, and employment.

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Several multiple group-level fairness metrics have been proposed over the years [6]. They fall under the notions of *equity* [8, 9, 20], *equality* [6], *max-min fairness* [7, 28], *welfare* [15], and *diversity* [23]: All of them quantify the fair distribution of influence across groups. In particular, Stoica et al. [20] propose a new SIM algorithm that operates under the constraint that, in expectation, the same percentage of users in each category is reached.

Many models of diffusion processes in the SIM problem are inherently stochastic, meaning that *who* gets the information transmitted can vary greatly from one run to another. Consider, as an example, the case in which 50% of realizations over a diffusion process, no one in group 1 receives the information and everyone in group 2 does, whereas in the other 50% it is the opposite. This circumstance would be classified as fair in expectation, even though it is commonly not perceived as fair. We show how this phenomenon is common in real-world data and how our proposed framework can detect such undesired scenarios. This prompts us to propose a novel fairness metric. Our work [5] presents two key contributions: mutual fairness, a new fairness metric based on optimal transport, and a novel seeding algorithm that balances fairness and efficiency in social influence maximization. Mutual fairness addresses limitations in existing metrics by considering all groups simultaneously and measuring deviations from an ideal equitable distribution. We use this metric to evaluate popular influence-spreading algorithms, revealing that network topology significantly impacts fairness—group-label-blind seed selection can lead to inequality in moderately homophilic networks, while only highly integrated or segregated networks tend to achieve a fairer outreach. The proposed seed selection algorithm optimizes for mutual fairness, enhancing fairness with minimal or even no loss in efficiency. This approach offers a comprehensive framework for designing and evaluating fair influence maximization strategies. Our work [5] is inspired by a recent line of work that draws on optimal transport theory [26] for fairness guarantees [2, 4, 18, 19, 22, 27]. To our knowledge, this is the first work to develop novel metrics and seeding algorithms that leverage optimal transport for the SIM problem.

2 Mutual Fairness via Optimal Transport

2.1 Motivating Example

Consider the SIM problem with network nodes belonging to two groups, group 1 and group 2, with each group having the outreach probability distribution $\mu_g = \frac{1}{2}\delta_0 + \frac{1}{2}\delta_1, g \in \{1, 2\}$, with δ_k representing the delta distribution at $k \in [0, 1]$. That is, in 50% of the cases all members in group g receive the information, and in 50% of the cases no one in group g receives the information. It is tempting to say that this setting is fair since μ_1 and μ_2 coincide and therefore share the same expected value. We argue that this information does not suffice to claim fairness. Indeed, consider the two following probability distributions over the final configurations:

$$\gamma_a = 0.5 \cdot \delta_{(0,0)} + 0.5 \cdot \delta_{(1,1)}, \quad \gamma_b = 0.25 \cdot \delta_{(0,0)} + 0.25 \cdot \delta_{(1,1)} + 0.25 \cdot \delta_{(0,1)} + 0.25 \cdot \delta_{(1,0)},$$

with $\delta_{(i,j)}$, representing the delta distribution at $(i, j) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$. Interestingly, both γ_a and γ_b are “compatible” with μ_1 and μ_2 : If we compute their marginals, we obtain μ_1 and μ_2 . However, γ_a and γ_b encode two fundamentally different final configurations. In γ_a , the percentage of members of group a who get the information *always* coincides with the percentage of people of group b . Conversely, in γ_b , more outcomes are possible; in particular, there is a probability of $0.25 + 0.25 = 0.5$ that all members of one group receive the information and no member of the other group receives it (see Fig. 1). Thus, from a fairness perspective, γ_a and γ_b encode very different outcomes. We therefore argue that a fairness metric should be expressed in terms of *joint* probability distribution γ , and not solely based on its marginals μ_1 and μ_2 , as commonly done in the literature [8, 20].




Fig. 1. Illustration of the (γ_a, γ_b) example. The outcome of γ_a is always fair: In all realizations the share of agents of group 1 receiving the information coincides with the share of agents of group 2. The outcome of γ_b is instead largely unfair in 50% of the cases, as only one group receives the information. However, γ_a and γ_b share the same marginal distributions: In 50% of the cases everyone in the group receives the information and in 50% of the cases no one receives it.




Fig. 2. The transportation cost c measures the length of the solid segment, denoted by the perpendicular distance between the red and blue points w.r.t. the ideal fairness diagonal; shifts along the diagonal (dotted) are not considered for fairness and are only relevant for efficiency.

2.2 Mutual Fairness

Our motivating example prompts us to reason about fairness in terms of the joint probability measure γ , instead of its marginal distributions μ_1 and μ_2 . Since γ is a probability distribution (over all possible final configurations), we can quantify fairness by computing its “distance” from an “ideal” reference distribution γ^* along the diagonal, capturing the ideal situation in which both groups receive the information in the same proportion. We do so by using tools from optimal transport.

Background in optimal transport. For a given (continuous) transportation cost $c : ([0, 1] \times [0, 1]) \times ([0, 1] \times [0, 1]) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, the optimal transport discrepancy between two probability distributions $\gamma_a \in \mathcal{P}([0, 1] \times [0, 1])$ and $\gamma_b \in \mathcal{P}([0, 1] \times [0, 1])$ is defined as

$$W_c(\gamma_a, \gamma_b) = \min_{\pi \in \Pi(\gamma_a, \gamma_b)} \mathbb{E}_{(x_1, x_2), (y_1, y_2) \sim \pi} [c((x_1, x_2), (y_1, y_2))], \quad (1)$$

where $\Pi(\gamma_a, \gamma_b)$ is the set of probability distributions over $([0, 1] \times [0, 1]) \times ([0, 1] \times [0, 1])$ so that the first marginal is γ_a and the second marginal is γ_b . Intuitively, the optimal transport problem quantifies the minimum transportation cost to morph γ_a into γ_b when transporting a unit of mass from (x_1, x_2) to (y_1, y_2) costs $c((x_1, x_2), (y_1, y_2))$. The optimization variable π is called transportation plan and $\pi((x_1, x_2), (y_1, y_2))$ indicates the amount of mass at (x_1, x_2) displaced to (y_1, y_2) . When the probability distributions are discrete (or the space $[0, 1]$ is discretized), the transportation problem (1) is a finite-dimensional linear program and can therefore be solved efficiently [14].

Optimal transport to measure fairness. To address the identified limitations in evaluating fairness, we define fairness using the joint outreach probability distribution $\gamma \in \mathcal{P}([0, 1] \times [0, 1])$, where $\gamma(x_1, x_2)$ represents the probability of x_1 and x_2 respective fractions of group 1 and 2 receiving the information. We introduce an optimal transport-based fairness metric, computing the minimal transformation cost required to shift γ to an ideal fair




Fig. 3. Joint outreach probability distribution for different datasets, different propagation probabilities p , and seedsets cardinalities $|S|$.

distribution γ^* —wherein both groups receive the same proportion. Our *mutual fairness* metric is:

$$\text{FAIRNESS}(\gamma) = 1 - \sqrt{2}W_c(\gamma, \gamma^*), \quad (2)$$

where W_c represents the optimal transport discrepancy between γ and γ^* , and c is the transportation cost defined as the Euclidean distance from the fairness axis, which is represented by the diagonal line in Fig. 2, and γ^* is the reference distribution located on the top right corner of the plane (i.e., everyone receives the transmitted information). Finally, $\sqrt{2}$ is a normalization factor that ensures that the metric lies in the interval $[0, 1]$. This approach ensures that fairness is accounted for through each realization, and not just in expectation. Note that mutual fairness can be combined with other known metrics that account for efficiency using a re-weighting parameter $\beta \in [0, 1]$ that balances the trade-off.

3 Experiments and Results

We evaluate our approach on several real-world datasets: Add Health (AH), Antelope Valley variants 0 to 23 (AV_{0-23}) [24], APS Physics (APS) [12], Deezer (DZ) [17], High School Gender (HS) [13], Indian Villages (IV) [1], and Instagram (INS) [21].

Our first case study, Fig. 3, examines the joint outreach probability distribution across different datasets, revealing four distinct outcomes. In dense graphs with high cross-group connectivity and extreme propagation probabilities ($p \geq 0.5$ or $p \rightarrow 0$), outreach is nearly deterministic and highly fair (Fig. 3a), making fairness metrics redundant. For moderate p (e.g., $p = 0.1$), outreach aligns along the diagonal (Fig. 3b), ensuring fairness in both expected and realized outreach. However, in cases such as APS with $p = 0.3$ (Fig. 3c), the outreach becomes highly stochastic, sometimes excluding one group entirely despite having a similar expected value across each group. Lastly, AV_0 (Fig. 3d) shows a stochastic outreach with slight bias towards one group, where mutual fairness provides deeper insights than equity metrics alone.

The study in Figure 4 evaluates our proposed seed-selection algorithm, called Stochastic Seedset Selection Descent (S3D, detailed in Appendix A), across various datasets against baseline methods like the degree centrality (bas_d) and greedy (bas_g) based algorithms [11] and other heuristic based algorithms [20] (hrt_d, hrt_g). By




Fig. 4. S3D trade-off and improvement against other label-aware and label-blind algorithms for several datasets, propagation probabilities p , seed set cardinalities $|S|$ and fairness-efficiency tradeoffs β . Filled markers refer to greedy-based algorithms: \blacksquare = bas_g, \bullet = S3D_g, and \blacklozenge = hrt_g. Empty markers refer to degree-based algorithms: \square = bas_d, \circ = S3D_d, and \lozenge = hrt_d. Along with S3D’s performance one can also see difference between standard greedy, degree, and other heuristic-based algorithms.

initializing S3D with these baselines (S3D_d, S3D_g), our results show that S3D shifts the joint outreach probability distribution toward the diagonal, enhancing fairness while maintaining or slightly reducing efficiency (Fig. 4). In datasets with high cross-group connections (AH, DZ, INS), label-blind seed selection already achieves moderate fairness. For low cross-group connectivity datasets (APS), label-blind strategies naturally select diverse seeds, functioning similarly to S3D. However, in moderate cases (AV, HS, IV), S3D significantly outperforms label-blind strategies in terms of fairness.

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A Stochastic Seed Selection Descent (S3D)

Algorithm 1 Stochastic Seedset Selection Descent

Input: Social Graph $G(V_G, E_G)$, initial seed set S_0 , β fairness weight, ε -tolerance

Output: Optimal seedset S^*

```

1:  $\mathcal{S} \leftarrow \{\}, S \leftarrow S_0$  ▷ initial collection of candidates, running seedset
2: for  $k$  iterations do ▷ configurable  $k$ 
3:    $V_S \leftarrow$  nodes reachable from  $S$  via cascade, using SEEDSET_REACH routine
4:    $S' \leftarrow \{\}$ 
5:   for  $|S|$  iterations do ▷ searching nearby states,  $V_{S'}$ , to get  $S'$ 
6:      $S' \leftarrow S' \cup \{v\} \mid v \sim V_S$ 
7:      $V_{S'} \leftarrow$  nodes reachable from  $S'$  in a fixed horizon, using SEEDSET_REACH
8:      $V_S \leftarrow V_S \setminus V_{S'}$ 
9:      $E_S \leftarrow -\text{BETA\_FAIRNESS}(S, \beta)$  ▷ expected potential energy defined on  $\beta$ -fairness
10:     $E_{S'} \leftarrow -\text{BETA\_FAIRNESS}(S', \beta)$ 
11:     $p_{\text{accept}} \leftarrow \min\{1, e^{E_S - E_{S'}}\}$  ▷  $S'$  acceptance on energy minimization
12:    if  $x \sim \mathcal{B}(p_{\text{accept}})$  then ▷ Metropolis sampling
13:       $S^+ \leftarrow S'$  ▷ get a better seedset
14:    else
15:      if  $x \sim \mathcal{B}(\varepsilon)$  then ▷ for some small constant  $\varepsilon$ 
16:         $S^+ \leftarrow \{v_i\}_{i=1}^{|S|} \mid v_i \sim V_G$  ▷ random seedset
17:      else
18:         $S^+ \leftarrow S$  ▷ retain existing choice
19:     $\mathcal{S} \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \cup \{S^+\}$ 
20:     $S \leftarrow S^+$  ▷ for next iteration
21:  $S^* \leftarrow S \in \mathcal{S} \mid \text{BETA\_FAIRNESS}(S, \beta)$  is maximum ▷ via S3D_ITERATE
22: return  $S^*$ 

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