ARTEMIS

SOLVING THE SECURE PLATFORM PROBLEM FOR THE HELIOS E-VOTING SYSTEM

Bachelor thesis - Mike Boss

WELCOME

TO

MYTHOLOGY 101!

Zeus

Apollo

Helios

Artemis

Belenios

MYTH OF SECURE E-VOTING

SECURITY?

Verifiability

+

Privacy

E-VOTING SYSTEM

- 1. Vote creation
- 2. Vote submission
- 3. Tally

3. Tally

HOMOMORPHIC TALLYING

$$\{1\}_k + \{0\}_k + \{1\}_k = \{2\}_k$$


ZKP: 0 or 1

3. Tally

RE-ENCRYPTION MIX-NET

$$9vHIdy98I3 + \{0\}_k = ZFTXcqIoxO$$

RE-ENCRYPTION MIX-NET



FIRST THERE WAS



HELIOS

1. Vote creation	Benaloh Challenge			
2. Vote submission	Just send			
3. Tally	Homomorphic tallying			

BENALOH CHALLENGE

(Voter-initiated-audit)

 $\{Alice\}_k$

Cast


Audit

Cast


Audit

MALICIOUS DEVICE

BOOTH AUDIT => SECURITY LOCAL AUDIT => SECURITY X



ARTEMIS



- 1. Voting terminal 💻
- 2. Active voting assistant 📳
- 3. Voting assistant(s)
- 4. Tallying authority
- 5. Registrar

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1. VOTE CREATION

- 1. Audit on multiple devices => Security
- 2. Interactive creation of indirection => Privacy

INDIRECTION

Alice ↔		\longleftrightarrow	I7ngr2d
Bob ↔	-	\leftrightarrow	l02JfTp
Charlie ↔	_	\longleftrightarrow	d38Gnd

Problem

🔳 can tell which ballot 📲 submitted

Problem

💻 can tell which ballot 📲 submitted

Solution

RE-ENCRYPTION

- 🗐 for privacy
- for receipt-freeness

RE-ENCRYPTION

$$\{1\}_k^1 \longleftrightarrow$$

$$\{0\}_k^1 \longleftrightarrow$$

$$\{0\}_k^2$$

$$\{0\}_{k}^{3}$$

2. VOTE SUBMISSION

TWO AUTHORITES

- Against ballot stuffing
- Against malicious voting terminal

REGISTRAR

sends to all voters

- 1. Cast codes
- 2. Lock-in code

SUBMITTING A VOTE

Enter cast code => ? => Enter lock-in code

WHY ?

switches ballot with entered cast code



switches ballot with entered cast code

Enter lock-in code only if same ballot

3. TALLY

Mix-net => No change

Homomorphic tally => ZKP's invalid X

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Mix-net => No change

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Groth-Sahai proofs re-randomizable



CONCLUSION

ARTEMIS

PRIVAPOLLO

Multiple devices

Indirection

BELENIOSRF

Re-encryption

Receipt-freeness

PROTOCOL

- Security + Privacy
- Receipt-freeness
- More election modes than BeleniosVS
- Easier to implement
- Benaloh Challenge

IMPLEMENTATION

- Works
- Simple
- Helios code base
- Wrong encoding
- Not finished