

Teacher Turnover in Wisconsin

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March 17, 2017

Abstract

Given the consistently-affirmed importance of teacher quality to student success, understanding teacher churn is crucial to formulating and evaluating teacher labor market policy. This paper replicates the analysis of Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) over a longer and more recent time period in Wisconsin and confirms all of its major findings, namely that while inter-district pay differentials are a significant determinant of turnover, school quality measures are much better predictors of all three types of churn – within and between school districts and out of local public schools.

Introduction

Literature Review

Because the potential policy implications of turnover in the teaching profession (from human capital and equity/distributional perspectives both) are far-reaching and polypartisan, the literature on turnover-related topics in education is extensive. As relates to this paper, there are five broad (and often overlapping) categories of inquiry: the relationship between turnover and wages, which has tended to focus on “opportunity wages” outside of the field of education; the relationship between turnover, school demographics, and other nonpecuniary benefits, which has tended to focus on distributional inequalities—whether teachers with certain characteristics are more or less likely to be teaching certain disadvantaged groups; the relationship between turnover and teacher quality as measured by student performance, usually value added; collective bargaining agreements in education, focusing by and large on the implications (or lack thereof) of seniority-preferential clauses; and the recent phenomenon of specific retention incentives, the provisioning of wage bonuses to teachers willing to teach in high-needs schools.

One of the earliest papers attempting to rigorously investigate turnover was a panel study of teachers in Michigan by Murnane and Olsen (1990), who used college degree field wages outside of education as opportunity wages, finding the expected lower exit rate for teachers with higher wages in teaching relative to the authors’ defined alternative. Dolton and Van der Klaauw (1999) use panel data on university graduates in the United Kingdom to estimate a competing risks model of the decision to leave teaching entirely, finding results in line with Murnane and Olsen (1990). Returning to panel studies in the US, Loeb and Page (2000) use PUMS data to get an idea of teacher relative wages in many states and find that dropout rates fall when teacher relative wages are high. Stinebrickner (2002) also uses panel data (this time NLS-72) to track both teachers and non-teachers, focusing in particular on young teachers who leave the profession for long stints, and finds that the best predictor of female exit is recent childbearing, which is an important consideration for all work related to teacher turnover because such a high percentage (76 nationwide) of teachers are female. Lastly, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) focuses on teachers in Texas and emphasizes that the characteristics of students are much stronger factors in predicting teacher exit than are wages (while also affirming the statistical significance of pay).

While wages have been found consistently to have some measurable effect on teacher turnover, it is impossible to explain within-district migration (which constitutes a large portion of switching—as much as 50%) through wage-only channels because contracts are fixed at the district level. As such, another strand of literature has chosen to focus on the nonpecuniary aspects of the decision to take a teaching job—school environment/rapport, student enthusiasm, neighborhood characteristics, etc.—usually by directing attention to a single district so that any wage-based considerations are stifled, as is the case for Boyd et al. (2005) and Engel, Jacob, and Curran (2014). Boyd et al. (2005) track early-career teachers in New York City as they quit or transfer out of

the city, and most importantly finds that commuting time is an important, often overlooked aspect of location preference. Engel, Jacob, and Curran (2014) leverages a unique data set from Chicago Public School job fairs which affords them a rather strong measure of teachers’ demand for vacancies, neutralizing the influence of school administration’s behavior on turnover (through poor match selection or other means). The authors contribute evidence that the school’s neighborhood (perhaps due to ambient crime or other reputational effects good and bad) is a better predictor of teachers’ preference than distance from home, going somewhat against the grain of Boyd et al. (2005). Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2007) examine statewide data from Georgia, but ignore wage effects, choosing instead to focus on disentangling the contributions of low student achievement and minority status to turnover; they find that minority status is the more salient associate of teacher exit.

The key element missing from all of the above studies is perhaps the most important consideration in the issue of teacher turnover–teacher quality. None of the studies above have student-teacher matched data, and so are unable to directly associate student outcomes with any given teacher. If, with respect to any measure of quality you would like, we find that transitioning teachers are identical to their replacements, the issue of teacher turnover is not, in fact, much of an issue—it leans closer to hot air and wasted ink. Thus, the recent trend in the literature to incorporate measures of teacher quality (in large part made possible by a trend towards administrative records allowing students to be linked to teachers and tracked over time) in considerations of teacher turnover has made big strides in addressing the most policy-relevant questions to be asked. The most common and widely accepted measure of teacher quality is value added¹ (in its various guises), and the literature has begun to incorporate such measures into studies of teacher turnover. Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) considers value added as a measure of teacher productivity, and ask if common results of labor search theory (namely that turnover falls with tenure and that turnover is negatively associated with match-specific productivity) continue to hold in the education labor market. In fact, the authors find that the teachers most likely to switch schools are those with low measured match quality, and especially that those who leave teaching entirely are those with the lowest match quality. The results are more pronounced for schools with high proportions of low-SES students, which has strong policy implications, as it appears the best teachers in high needs schools are the least likely to change jobs. Goldhaber, Gross, and Player (2007) performs a similar analysis with the longitudinal data of North Carolina and comes to similar conclusions, strengthening the robustness of the results. Lastly, Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobald (2015) examine the inequity in the distribution of teacher quality by high-needs groups in Washington state, and find that for all three measures of quality (teacher experience, licensure exam score, and value added), the distribution of teachers favors the less needy (as measured by free/reduced-price lunch status, minority status, and low prior academic achievement).

The aforementioned papers have tended to keep the collective bargaining aspect of salary determination for teachers out of the spotlight, if largely for reasons of data restrictions. Nevertheless, it stands to reason to believe that the rigid structure of union-negotiated contracts could serve to contribute in a large way to teacher turnover. Ballou and Podgursky (2002) give much descriptive evidence of the shape of the wage-tenure profile, rooted in a data set collected by the Department of Defense and published by the AFT. They find that seniority premia in education largely mirror those in more traditional white collar professions, that steeper profiles are associated with less turnover, and that district financial and demographic conditions alone are insufficient to explain variation in contracts. Another common (and recently quite controversial, as evidenced by the contention in the ongoing contract negotiations in Philadelphia) feature of union-negotiated teacher contracts are seniority privileges—preferential treatments granted to teachers in voluntary and involuntary transfers. Moe (2006) codes contracts from 158 districts in California according to the strength of seniority rights therein guaranteed to teachers and finds that such rights are associated with the distribution of teachers across schools (measuring quality as experience and certification) in a way that serves to harm minorities. Revisiting California with a slightly different sample and definition of the “determinacy” of the contracts with respect to seniority, Koski and Horng (2007) come to the opposite conclusion—that there is no such relationship. As a rebuttal, Anzia and Moe (2014) pin the difference in results on the exclusion in Moe (2006) of small school districts, where it appears that the entrenchment of bureaucracy falters and the rigidity of

¹The most commonly cited expositions on value added, its validity, and so on are probably Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), an extensive exploration of the predictive powers of empirical Bayes VA measures; and Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014a) and Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014b), the largest-scale study of long-term inferences based on value added.

contract language wane, a claim which they support by repeating their analysis with the inclusion of an interaction for district size—indeed, for small districts the result of Koski and Horng (2007) holds, while the insight of Moe (2006) holds in larger districts. Cohen-Vogel, Feng, and Osborne-Lampkin (2013) use data from Florida and their results align with those of Koski and Horng (2007) (though they neglect to nuance their results by district size).

Finally, an emerging but still immature strand of literature is beginning to look at the potential for transfer bonuses and retention incentives to positively affect student outcomes. Fulbeck (2014) analyzes a scheme in place in Denver whereby teachers who choose to transfer to high-needs schools (low-performing) are given recurring bonus pay, and those initially stationed there are given retention incentives. She concludes that recipients of incentives are significantly less likely to switch jobs, as driven by a reduction in district exit rates and especially by teachers whose incentive payments exceed \$5,000. Glazerman et al. (2013) evaluate the Talent Transfer Initiative, a randomized controlled trial conducted in 10 districts whereby high-performance teachers were given \$20,000 over the course of two years as reward for transferring the identified high-needs schools, and conclude that there were significant effects on teacher retention as well as on student outcomes.

Data

The State of Wisconsin’s Department of Public Instruction (DPI) releases annual Salary, Position & Demographic reports through the WISEstaff data collection system, and these reports represent “a point-in-time collection of all staff members in public schools as of the 3rd Friday of September...” (Public Instruction 2017), which serve as the primary source of data on teachers in this paper. Data are available at the position-teacher level cross-sectionally, with each entry corresponding to one of possibly several positions held by each school district employee. Identifiers in each file permit unique identification of an employee within a given year, but this identifier does not follow teachers between years. To overcome this substantial hurdle to identifying teacher mobility, data are first fed through the matching algorithm described in further detail in the appendix. Essentially, we are aided by the presence of various imperfect identifiers which are more stable over time, most crucially teachers’ first and last names and years of birth. By building on these covariates and incorporating some limited fuzzy matching techniques, we construct a panel of teachers spanning the 1994-95 academic year (AY) through AY2015-16.²

As noted in the companion paper, the introduction of Wisconsin Act 10 introduced a substantial structural break in the labor market for Wisconsin teachers, so we include only data from 2000-2008 to avoid conflating the effects of this policy on teacher turnover, a topic covered in more detail in the companion paper and elsewhere, with the earlier functioning of the labor market (i.e., we do not want to mix the results from distinct equilibria of the teacher labor market, but would prefer to analyze the pre- and post-Act-10 markets separately). We drop all employees who are not full-time, full-year regular teachers of a major core subject (all-purpose elementary teachers or English/Math) at a single regular public school with a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree and fewer than 50 years’ recorded experience; taken together, these restrictions eliminate 77% of employees, the lion’s share of which come from eliminating substitutes/support staff and teachers non-core subjects. We then eliminate teachers with missing information on their subsequent school or district and teachers with instability in their recorded ethnicity, as well as teachers not categorized as white, black, or Hispanic, eliminating a further 1% of all employees³. Finally, we drop teachers’ multiple positions by keeping only the highest-intensity position for each teacher, as measured by full-time equivalency, resulting in a final count of 253,935 teacher-year observations.

This data is also used for the incorporation of counterfactual salary calculations, by incorporating the salary schedules estimated in the companion paper. Details of the fit procedure can be found there, but essentially salary schedules are computed as monotonicity- and concavity-constrained median-targeted splines (Ng and Maechler 2007) for each level of certification (Bachelor’s or Master’s degree) in each district in each year⁴.

²For brevity, we herein refer to academic years by the spring year, e.g., AY2003-04 will be simply 2004.

³Wisconsin teachers are predominantly white (96%).

⁴One difference is that the salaries included in the payscales estimation were less restrictive with respect to included subject areas. This was done since contracts are collectively bargained at the district level for all teachers, with scant mention of subject

Data sparsity led this procedure to be unreliable in many cases, so ultimately around 29% of teachers have missing salary information⁵, mostly in rural districts or other districts with only one or two schools and a small number of students.

We supplement the DPI teacher salary data set in several ways to incorporate data about other characteristics of schools and districts in Wisconsin. To get school- and district-level measures of socioeconomic makeup (percentage of students who are black or Hispanic or eligible for free/reduced lunches) and community type/urbanicity, we tap the National Center for Education Statistics' Common Core of Data's Universe Surveys, which provide this information on a yearly basis for all years in the study⁶. At the district level, we also use this data to compute class size and the size of the student body.

Lastly, we turn to DPI's public data again to get school- and district-level performance metrics. While Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) were able to obtain school- and district-level average scale scores on a standardized test in Texas, such a metric is not publicly available in Wisconsin for all years. Instead, we calculate student proficiency rates for each school and district as the percentage of test-takers deemed to be at grade level in mathematics or reading in a given year on the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts Examination (WKCE), which is administered to 4th, 8th, and 10th-grade students.

Results

Table 1 replicates Table 1 of Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) (HKR), and as HKR found in Texas, most turnover in Wisconsin is happening within districts and out of the profession. In Wisconsin, the fraction of teachers transitioning among districts is vanishingly small after a "burn-in" period of roughly 6 years – only 0.8 of such teachers do so (compared with 3.1% for the comparable group in HKR), but is still relatively higher among the youngest teachers – roughly twice as high for the "probationary" teachers (1-3 years' experience) as for teachers with 7-11 years' experience in both states.

By contrast, movement patterns within districts in the two states are very similar, lending weight to teachers "earning their stripes" within a district to be able to choose the best schools as a privilege of seniority. As expected, we also observe a U-shaped pattern in teachers exiting Wisconsin public schools, which jives with two types of quits. Early-career quitters who change to private schools, change state of residence, or change professions, and late-career quitters who retire. Results not included here break down the exit rates by experience level, where this dichotomy is even more dramatic – first-year exit rates are about 9 percent and quickly level off at around 2 percent before spiking again past around 25 years.

As examined further below, the low rate of switches between districts appears to be owing to the generally more rural nature of Wisconsin vis-à-vis Texas. To wit, Milwaukee is the only major urban area in the state, and its population (2010 Census) of 594,833 would rank 7th in Texas. This means that two major types of movers in the HKR data – Large Urban - Large Urban and Suburban - Large Urban – are limited within the state to ending up in a relatively minor metropolitan area. HKR don't provide any results disaggregated by city, precluding any attempts to compare these numbers more comparably to those that would obtain from eliminating the largest cities in Texas.

Table 2 replicates HKR Table 2, and supports its most important conclusions. HKR argue that there is little support for the idea that scores of young teachers are using large urban schools as a training ground before "settling down" with easier assignments in the suburb, based on the general low level of turnover from Large Urban districts. We affirm the scarcity of transitions from districts in Milwaukee, while also noting that such

area in wage determination.

⁵More specifically, we eliminate district-years featuring less than 20 teachers, less than 7 distinct levels of observed experience, or less than 5 unique values of the two measures of pay (salary and fringe benefits) in either degree track. HKR include like-minded restrictions, but combine teachers of different certification within an experience level.

⁶The method of recording urbanicity by the Common Core switched from being "metropolitan-centric" to being "urban-centric" for Wisconsin from 2006 (Sable 2009). We map the codes corresponding codes to match those used by HKR as well as possible, and use the data file from 2006, which has both types of code for all US districts, to confirm that this correspondence is by and large working as intended. For a small number of districts/schools with missing urbanicity codes in certain years, we use information from other years to inform urbanicity.

Teacher Experience	Percent of Teachers Who					Number of Teachers
	Remain in Same School	Change Schools Within District	Switch Districts	Exit Wisconsin Public Schools		
1-3 years	85.2	9.4	5.4	7.3		37,044
4-6 years	88.9	8.0	3.1	4.6		33,972
7-11 years	91.1	7.2	1.7	2.8		48,047
12-30 years	94.2	5.3	0.5	3.0		113,334
>30 years	96.7	3.0	0.4	15.1		21,538
All	91.8	6.4	1.8	4.8		253,935

Table 1: Year-to-year Transitions of Teachers by Experience, 2000-08

a path is certainly present, as evidenced by the majority of those who do leave Large Urban districts ending up in a Suburban district in both settings.

As mentioned in the discussion of Table 1, the major difference with respect to quantities observed in Texas appears to be driven in differences in the urban landscape between Texas and Wisconsin⁷. This is supported by the overall similarity of magnitudes of transition rates to community types besides Large Urban in the two papers. Again, the “stickiest” community type is Rural – over 60% of Rural teachers remain Rural in both papers, and even fewer Rural Wisconsin teachers end up in a big city than is the case for Texas. Also as in HKR, we find broad similarity in the community type transition patterns of younger teachers as compared to all teachers.

Table 3 replicates Table 3 of HKR, and confirms its most important insights. Raw salary differentials predict teacher mobility, but the pay differential is not on average very large – only about \$200, or 0.4% higher than the counterfactually expected wage that would have obtained had the district-switching teacher remained in their current district. This premium declines with age for both male and female teachers, eventually dipping negative (though this estimate is imprecise/underpowered due to the limited quantity of teachers changing districts after 6 years).

Attempting to isolate the influence of district characteristics on wage effects, HKR suggest comparing the differential leverage of residual wages to get a more focused estimate of the association between wages and mobility. We run a similar regression using the payscales estimated in the companion paper, but evaluate separate regressions not just for each level of experience, but also for each certification track. This leads to a boost in the overall fraction of explained variance from 60% cited by HKR to 85% here; as in HKR, other included covariates are consistently significant, suggesting their strong independent correlation with salary levels.

As in HKR, we find the demographic-independent wage differentials to be even more important than the uncontrolled raw wages, with the predicted wage improvement nearly doubling to 0.8%. In contrast to HKR, however, we find a positive relationship between experience and residual wage differentials, with mid-career district switchers experiencing 2-3% higher wages upon arrival to their new employer, by contrast to the null relationship for probationary teachers. This pattern is consistent across the dimension of certification which was ignored by HKR, suggesting the opposite result cannot be attributed to bias introduced by movement patterns of Bachelor’s- vs. Master’s-certified instructors.

Student demographic differentials are very important for predicting teacher turnover, a finding which held in Texas as it does in Wisconsin. Most important in all experience classes and for both genders are the measures of student performance and student poverty – district switchers end up at schools with 4% more students at grade level overall, an effect which is stronger for female teachers and for young teachers. They also end up on average with about 7% fewer students (school-wide) eligible for subsidized lunch. While this finding would need to be bolstered with experimental or quasi-experimental evidence, it hints at the potentially limited scope of teacher labor market policies intended to ameliorate teacher supply problems in hard-to-serve

⁷We also note a difference in the relative shift in population between the two states – Texas observed dramatic changes in its community type distribution over the period of study of only 4 years, while Wisconsin only saw some movement from Rural to Suburban communities.

Origin Community	Percent of Teachers Who Move to				Number Teachers Changing Districts	Percent of Origin Teachers	Change in Share of Teachers 2000-06
	Large Urban	Small Urban	Suburban	Rural			
I. All teachers							
Large Urban	5.8	14.6	58.9	20.6	459	1.8	-0.3%
Small Urban	3.3	13.1	45.2	38.4	500	1.1	-0.2%
Suburban	3.7	15.2	45.0	36.1	1,210	1.7	4.1%
Rural	0.8	11.4	24.3	63.5	2,377	2.1	-3.5%
II. Probationary teachers (1-3 years experience)							
Large Urban	7.8	15.9	56.3	20.0	260	3.5	
Small Urban	4.4	12.4	46.9	36.3	230	3.5	
Suburban	4.5	16.1	41.6	37.7	495	5.2	
Rural	0.5	11.4	25.4	62.6	1,024	7.6	

Table 2: Destination Community Type for Teachers Changing Districts, by Origin Community Type and Teacher Experience Level

districts – schools can much more easily exert influence over their compensation policies than they can dictate their student bodies, but the latter is more efficacious (see Fulbeck 2014 and Glazerman et al. (2013)).

Table 4, which parallels Table 4 of HKR, is the first analysis where the mechanisms of the teacher labor market appear to be working differently from those found in Texas. In particular, while HKR found Large Urban - Suburban district switchers to penalize themselves in pay but to gain in demographic-adjusted pay, Wisconsin teachers lose out on both measures when leaving Large Urban districts, and in fact are even worse off in residual pay than they are in nominal pay. This difference can at least partially be attributed to HKR's exclusion of certification as a conditioning variable, as the pattern here differs substantially by degree. While district switchers with a Bachelor's degree experience a .8% nominal and 3.8% residual drop in wages, Master's degree switchers experience a 6% nominal, but only a 3% residual drop in wages.

The other results of HKR are confirmed in even more dramatic fashion. There is strong evidence of selection on the student performance metric, which does vary quite widely in suburban districts. Teachers leaving Milwaukee tend to end up at districts with 37% more students deemed to be at grade level on the state standardized test. On the other hand, teachers leaving Large Urban districts (i.e, Milwaukee) for the suburbs experience a precipitous drop of 53% black students and 60% subsidized lunch eligibility. This is practically a tautological result, as the student demographics outside of urban areas in Wisconsin are pretty uniformly non-minority – about 90% of suburban districts have fewer than 10% black students, and more than 60% have fewer than 2% black students, whereas Milwaukee is about 62% black. Similarly, teachers leaving Milwaukee for the suburbs have little choice but to end up in a district with far fewer economically disadvantaged students – whereas 71% of Milwaukee Public Schools students are eligible, the median percentage in suburban schools is 11%.

This phenomenon is reflected further in the suburban-to-suburban moves, which reflect little change in the ethnic/racial makeup of student bodies, since a dramatic shift would demonstrate very strong influence of this factor. We also find evidence of selection into economically better-off districts among suburban switchers, but the magnitude of this difference is attenuated with respect to that reported by HKR. We do not find patterns of selection on student performance as strongly as was found in HKR. This may be a reflection of the crudeness of the proficiency measure as compared to the more variable raw scale score measures used by HKR. Lastly, we confirm the finding of HKR that there does not appear to be evidence that teachers are able to select into the more desirable schools within their target districts – The differences in campus-level characteristics are almost identical to the differences in district-level characteristics. This is likely a reflection of supply-side constraints, as the choicest appointments in a district may be awarded to long-serving serving teachers (promotion from within), as well as suburban districts perhaps having only a small number of schools at which to teach a given grade level/subject.

HKR examine the state of Texas, which features substantially more ethnic heterogeneity than does Wisconsin. As a result, they are better-equipped to identify heterogeneity in preferences by teacher ethnicity. Wisconsin, however, only has 2,132 of its 48,077 teachers non-white, so our results are underpowered relative to HKR. Table 5 presents these results, which parallel HKR Table 5. Given how few observations we have of black or Hispanic teachers switching districts, we eschew any temptation to interpret these results. Only black switchers within districts provide enough records to interpret meaningfully; in Wisconsin, we find (in contrast to white within-district switchers) black teachers tend to migrate to economically better-off and higher-performing schools (white teachers only tend to select on the latter characteristic).

To the end of examining heterogeneity in the impact of school and district characteristic differentials on teacher mobility, HKR present their Table 6, which breaks down the three exit rates for each (weighted) quartile of the covariate distribution. We replicate that analysis here in Table 6. Saliiently, our results for the correlation of school characteristics for within-district movers are nearly identical to those found in Texas, which gives a stronger indication that we have identified some fundamental nonpecuniary mechanisms driving sorting among schools in a district.

Differences with respect to the results in Texas begin to emerge for the other destinations of school leavers (other districts and other professions). As noted in Table 1, overall rates of switching districts are quite low compared to Texas and national averages; conditional on this, the patterns of movement by quartile of residual salary exhibit a similar pattern to that in Texas, with teachers in the lowest quartile about 35% more

	Men by Experience Class			Women by Experience Class			All Teachers	
	1-3 years	4-6 years	7-11 years	1-3 years	4-6 years	7-11 years	0-9 Years	
Base year salary (log)	0.004 (0.010)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.022)	0.010 (0.005)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.012)	0.004 (0.004)	
Adjusted salary (log)	-0.012 (0.007)	0.007 (0.011)	0.031 (0.016)	0.001 (0.004)	0.018 (0.007)	0.023 (0.009)	0.007 (0.003)	
Percent proficient	2.9% (0.7%)	1.9% (0.8%)	1.6% (1.1%)	4.8% (0.4%)	3.9% (0.5%)	4.1% (0.6%)	3.9% (0.2%)	
Percent Hispanic	-1.6% (0.3%)	-0.3% (0.4%)	-0.6% (0.5%)	-1.7% (0.2%)	-1.7% (0.2%)	-1.1% (0.3%)	-1.5% (0.1%)	
Percent black	-3.4% (0.9%)	-1.1% (1.0%)	-3.2% (1.1%)	-5.1% (0.5%)	-3.3% (0.7%)	-4.8% (0.8%)	-4.1% (0.3%)	
Percent subsidized lunch	-6.9% (1.1%)	-3.8% (1.4%)	-3.9% (1.6%)	-8.8% (0.6%)	-6.1% (0.8%)	-5.9% (1.0%)	-7.0% (0.4%)	

Table 3: Average Change in Salary and District Student Characteristics (and Standard Deviations) for Teachers Changing Districts, by Gender and Experience

	District Average Characteristics		Campus Average Characteristics	
	Large Urban to Suburban	Suburban to Suburban	Large Urban to Suburban	Suburban to Suburban
Base year salary (log)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.019 (0.008)	—	—
Adjusted salary (log)	-0.037 (0.011)	0.015 (0.006)	—	—
Average Student Characteristics				
Percent proficient	37.1% (0.5%)	0.7% (0.4%)	33.4% (1.3%)	0.1% (0.6%)
Percent Hispanic	-13.2% (0.3%)	-0.6% (0.2%)	-8.3% (1.3%)	-0.8% (0.3%)
Percent black	-52.8% (0.5%)	-0.4% (0.3%)	-56.6% (1.9%)	-0.5% (0.4%)
Percent subsidized lunch	-60.7% (0.7%)	-1.5% (0.5%)	-61.8% (1.2%)	-2.0% (0.6%)

Table 4: Average Change in Salary and in District and Campus Student Characteristics (and Standard Deviations) for Teachers with 1-10 Years of Experience Who Change Districts, by Community Type of Origin and Destination District

	Between District Moves		Within District Moves	
	Black Teachers	Hispanic Teachers	Black Teachers	Hispanic Teachers
Percent proficient	16.5% (4.9%)	5.1% (8.7%)	3.2% (0.9%)	1.7% (1.4%)
Percent Hispanic	-1.1% (1.7%)	-14.2% (7.8%)	0.0% (0.8%)	-7.2% (2.3%)
Percent black	-22.9% (7.8%)	1.7% (5.8%)	-1.6% (1.4%)	0.3% (2.0%)
Percent subsidized lunch	-59.0% (6.5%)	-12.7% (9.4%)	-2.6% (0.6%)	-3.7% (1.3%)
Number of teachers	42	22	549	197

Table 5: Average Change in District and Campus Student Characteristics (and Standard Deviations) for Black and Hispanic Teachers with 1-10 Years of Experience who Change Campuses

likely to change districts than teachers in the highest residual pay quartile. By contrast to HKR, however, who found the opposite association, we find the same trend (at attenuated magnitudes) with respect to leaving Wisconsin public schools, suggesting salary considerations are also important for teachers considering options outside of public school teaching (or in other states).

We also find fairly strong patterns in quitting associated with subsidized lunch eligibility and with the ethnic makeup of schools, with teachers at the most economically advantaged schools 15% less likely to exit teaching; similar numbers obtain for both the quantity of black and of Hispanic students. For teachers moving within districts, however, we observe the opposite pattern, which is difficult to explain *prima facie*, and suggests the presence of confounding factors distorting the patterns away from what should be expected.

Quartile of Distribution	Probability Teachers Move to New School within District	Probability Teachers Move to New District	Probability Teachers Exit Public Schools
Residual salary			
Highest	—	1.3%	4.8%
3rd	—	1.4%	5.1%
2nd	—	1.6%	5.0%
Lowest	—	1.9%	5.4%
Percent proficient			
Highest	5.6%	1.7%	4.7%
3rd	6.8%	1.9%	4.4%
2nd	6.2%	1.9%	5.4%
Lowest	6.9%	1.7%	4.8%
Percent eligible for reduced-price lunch			
Highest	7.7%	1.7%	5.6%
3rd	6.9%	1.6%	4.3%
2nd	6.2%	1.9%	4.5%
Lowest	4.9%	2.0%	4.8%
Percent Black			
Highest	6.7%	1.6%	6.2%
3rd	5.7%	1.5%	4.7%
2nd	6.6%	1.8%	4.5%
Lowest	6.7%	2.2%	3.9%
Percent Hispanic			
Highest	6.9%	1.5%	6.0%
3rd	5.6%	1.9%	4.8%
2nd	6.0%	1.8%	4.5%
Lowest	7.1%	1.9%	4.1%

Table 6: School Average Transition Rates by Distribution of Residual Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics (data weighted by number of teachers in school)

Having identified some key patterns in moments of the data, we now move on to try and separate the confounding effects of each of these and other factors in affecting teacher turnover with the aim of identifying more fundamentally the association between salient district and school characteristics on teacher turnover. Table 7 provides a simple regression model

	Teacher Experience				
	1-3 years	4-6 years	7-11 years	12-30 years	>30 years
First year base salary (log)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.16* (0.08)
First year base salary (log) * female	-0.08 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.10 (0.08)
Campus average student characteristics					
Percent proficient	-0.06** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)
Percent eligible for subsidized lunch	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.03)
Percent Black	0.05** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06 (0.04)
Percent Hispanic	0.03 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.05 (0.05)
Interactions					
Black * percent Black	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.23** (0.09)
Hispanic * percent Black	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.22 (0.35)
Black * percent Hispanic	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.14 (0.24)
Hispanic * percent Hispanic	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.49 (0.31)
Observations	28,287	25,609	35,946	81,801	14,773

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 7: Estimated Effects of Starting Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics on the Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts, by Experience (linear probability models; standard errors in parentheses)

	Teacher Experience				
	1-3 years	12-30 years	4-6 years	7-11 years	>30 years
First year base salary (log)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.31** (0.10)
First year base salary (log) * female	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.11 (0.08)
Campus average student characteristics					
Percent proficient	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.04)
Percent eligible for subsidized lunch	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.05 (0.04)
Percent Black	0.02 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.06** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.09 (0.06)
Percent Hispanic	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.07)
Interactions					
Black * percent Black	-0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.23* (0.09)
Hispanic * percent Black	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.33 (0.36)
Black * percent Hispanic	-0.03 (0.10)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)	0.16 (0.24)
Hispanic * percent Hispanic	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.65* (0.33)
Observations	28,287	81,801	25,609	35,946	14,773

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Estimated Effects of Starting Teacher Salary and Student Demographic Characteristics on the Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts with District Fixed Effects, by Experience (linear probability models; standard errors in parentheses)

Conclusion

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