# 3. Explaining in detail what went wrong.

## Functionality and Usability

The main problem of NHS connecting for health was a lack of benefit for patients, doctors or staff. It failed to meet the requirements; **“Single, centrally-mandated electronic care record for patients and to connect 30,000**[**general practitioners**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_practitioner)**to 300 hospitals, providing secure and audited access to these records by authorised health professionals”.**

The system was slow, cumbersome, insufficiently explained and poorly implemented. I was meant to be a very helpful thing for the NHS staff and patients.

## Contracts

Work to deliver care records, the core of the National Programme, was originally split into five £1bn regional contracts, two of which were held by Accenture and one each by CSC, BT and Fujitsu. Accenture quit in 2006, booking a heavy financial hit in its accounts as its work passed to CSC. Fujitsu departed a year later and has been in dispute over the contract termination ever since.

The project had been divided among five contracts because it was thought this would avoid over-reliance on one firm. Richard Granger, then NHS director of IT, likened it to running a team of huskies, where underperformers are **"chopped up and fed to the other dogs … The survivors work harder, not only because they have had a meal, but because they have seen what will happen should they themselves go lame."**

## Security

Computerising patient records requires adequate privacy safeguards.

Connecting for health did not have include measures to have ‘patient, doctor relationship privacy’

Connecting for health developers were forced to incorporate new “legitimate relationship” controls to prevent any NHS staff (out of a workforce of a million) from browsing the records of celebrities with whom they had no clinical relationship, either out of curiosity or for payment from newspapers.

## Cost

Originally expected to cost [£](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pound_sterling)2.3 billion over three years, in June 2006 the total cost was estimated by the [National Audit Office](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Audit_Office_(United_Kingdom)) to be £12.4bn over 10 years, and the NAO also noted that **"...it was not demonstrated that the financial value of the benefits exceeds the cost of the Programme"**

The NPfIT was described by UK [Members of Parliament](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_of_Parliament) as one of the "worst and most expensive contracting fiascos" ever.

The software part of the project was never finished.