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# INTEGRATING CONFIDENCE AND ASSURANCE ARGUMENTS

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## Abstract

To be considered compelling an assurance case should address its potential deficits, possibly with the use of a confidence argument. Assurance argument and confidence argument should be clearly separated and consistent at the same time. We propose a way of their integration with the use of an element representing rationale for each argumentation strategy. The rationale integrates confidence argument for a given argumentation step and can be used to demonstrate strength of the argument. The approach is illustrated with a confidence argument development case study. The confidence argument has been created for defeaters identified with the use of a checklist.

## 1 Introduction

An assurance case is a reasoned and compelling argument, supported by a body of evidence, that a system, service or organisation will operate as intended for a defined application in a defined environment [17]. Similar definitions (usually based on the definition of a safety case [6]) can be found in e.g. [1, 22]. All of them stress that an argument expressed by an assurance case is supposed to be compelling and valid.

To be compelling and valid, the assurance case should not only provide direct argument and evidence supporting its claims. It should also avoid argumentation fallacies [15,29] and address its own potential deficits like questionable reasoning, inadequate evidence, or uncertainty in general. Such need is being more widely recognized (e.g. [4, 8, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 30]). It is vital for the deficits to be identified and dealt with, instead of being hidden to make an assurance case look better – safety and other critical properties can only be argued by challenging assumptions and doubts, otherwise it's just a “paper exercise” [23]. Some authorities, like FDA, recommend that a separate confidence argument is to be provided as part of an assurance case submission [9].

Our objective is to work out a systematic method of identifying assurance deficits and building the confidence argument. The method includes a way of representing confidence arguments in the context of assurance argument.

## 2 Defeaters and confidence argument

The concept of the confidence argument is based on defending the assurance argument against any doubts, uncertainties, deficiencies and counterarguments. To ensure completeness one needs a systematic approach to identify all the assurance case deficits.

### 2.1 Defeaters

A number of approaches of identifying assurance case deficits can be found in the literature. Different names and definitions are used like deficits, defeaters or rebuttals.

Hawkins et al. [19] analysed the structure of assurance arguments developed using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [17] and identified three types of assertions related to the sufficiency and appropriateness of GSN elements connections and named them Assurance Claim Points (ACPs). Challenging any of the assertions results in a potential defeater. Each identified defeater requires to be addressed by an additional confidence argument:

- Asserted inferences (ACP1) – demonstrate why it should be believed that the supporting premises are sufficient to draw the conclusion;
- Asserted context (ACP2) – demonstrate why it should be believed that citing the specified context defines the appropriate context at this point in the argument;
- Asserted solution (ACP3) – the assurance of the solution depends upon the confidence that the evidence is trustworthy and appropriate to support the claim.

The alternative approach is based on Toulmin's work on defeasible reasoning and model of arguments [27], shown in Fig. 1. Main Toulmin's model specifies the argument as applying the inference rule (warrant - W) to specific data (premises - P1, P2) to justify the conclusion (claim - C). Additional elements are used to express conditions of argument's validity: backing (B) as an explanation and support for inference rule, rebuttals (R1-R4) as the exceptional conditions invalidating the argument and qualifier as restriction of the strength of the argument e.g. “always”, “usually”, “possibly” (not depicted). The similarity of the rebuttal to the concept of a defeater is not accidental, these two terms can be used interchangeably.

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- Diagram illustrating the structure of a defeater:
- Premises:**
- P1: System Test Report reports no errors
  - System requirements are specified
- Defeater Structure:**
- The main line is labeled "so".
- Defeater Types and Conditions:**
- (W) Since:** System features are verified with the use of tests
  - (B) on account of:** Testing each requirement demonstrates its satisfaction
  - (R1) Unless:** Test report is not accurate
  - (R2) Unless:** Feature error reported by a user
  - (R3) Unless:** Wrong system version has been tested
  - (R4) Unless:** Operation profile differs from test data
- Related defeater type:**
- Flawed inference rule (D3)
  - False premises (D1)
  - Counter-evidence (D2)
  - Inference rule misuse (D4)
  - Wrong context (D5)

Our approach to confidence argument structure is based on two observations. First, despite that in Toulmin's theory the backing and the rebuttal play different roles, they both can be mapped to defeaters (see Fig. 1). Depending on whether they are satisfied or not, the reasoning step from premises to the claim is valid or not. The difference is that the backing is to be true and the rebuttals are to be false to ensure that the claim is satisfied. Our conclusion is that the confidence argument should address both the backing and the rebuttals.

The second observation is that the confidence argument is strongly context-related. For example a testing method may be effective for one software module but not adequate for another one which uses concurrent programming environment. Therefore, the confidence argument can be analysed only in a precisely defined context of the main assurance argument. We agree that it is useful to create a confidence case separate from the assurance case (possibly starting with a reliable development process), however we regard as equally important to present and verify the confidence argument for each step of the assurance argument.

Our approach refers to the concept of an assurance case element usually named justification of an argumentation strategy. The objective of a justification is to provide "rationale for its inclusion or its phrasing" [17] or "justification for the validity or merit of its method of reasoning" [20]. Justification usually is used to demonstrate the inference rule to be valid and reasonable for a given type of the claim. It is often regarded to be context-free in the sense that it can be applied multiple times for a given type of claims.

Our proposal is to define the justification as *rationale that a given argumentation strategy supported by listed premises justifies cited claim in the specified context*. We will use the name "rationale" in this paper to describe this kind of a justification. We can say that the rationale provides a confidence argument specific for a given argumentation step. Note that the definition of rationale is different from the typical use of the justification element. The rationale definition does not contradict the idea and the role of the justification in the argument, but instead expands it. This approach allows to integrate the assurance argument and the confidence argument in a way presented in Fig. 2.

The approach allows to present a consistent view on assurance and confidence premises for each argumentation step. This does not prevent the creation of a separate and complete confidence argument as links can be used to connect the rationale premises with it. The user can work focusing on the assurance argument or on the confidence part or on the coupled arguments jointly.

The approach can be compared to ACP approach [19] which specifies assertions on GSN elements relationship (edges on diagrams). ACP approach keeps separate confidence and assurance arguments and it makes more difficult to provide a user with an integrated view on both arguments using APCs. The advantage of APCs is that the assertion type can be easily identified by the location of a small black square on a

relationship connecting strategy or context or evidence. This can be mapped to defeaters types. Information on the defeater type is not presented graphically in our approach.




Fig. 2. General schema of argument integration

The main formal difference between our approach and the ACP concept is the role of the justification element of the argument. In our approach we regard it as a root element for a local confidence argument.

In ACP approach each Assurance Claim Point is an assertion providing a reference to the confidence claim, which is a part of the confidence case. In our approach we use links in a similar way. A separate confidence case can be created which contains the overall decomposition of confidence argument. Each of confidence case claim can be connected by a link with a local confidence argument covered by a rationale in the main assurance argument.

Some similarities can be found between our approach and the concept of confidence maps [11]. The main difference is that we integrate assurance and confidence arguments, both having a unified representation, while confidence maps introduce new type of diagrams which explicitly show defeaters and countermeasures for them.

We have used NOR-STA assurance case tool [13] to develop the integrated assurance and confidence arguments. The tool has been developed at Gdańsk University of Technology (GUT) and is using TCL notation (Trust Case Language). TCL is an assurance case notation developed at GUT since 2001 as part of TRUST-IT methodology [12]. The notation is similar to GSN [17] and CAE [6] and is compliant with ISO/IEC 15026 [20] and OMG's SACM [24].

NOR-STA allows to present and filter confidence arguments and to make assessment of assurance case arguments with respect to both assurance and confidence. It uses assessment mechanism based on Dempster-Schafer theory [26, 7]. This allows for assessment aggregation [5, 8, 27] and also for expressing uncertainty instead of giving a choice between "true" and "false" [5, 8].

## 4 Case study

The presented concept has been implemented in a case study of extending an existing assurance case with a confidence argument. The objectives of the case study were twofold. First to demonstrate the approach for a non-trivial assurance case and also to experience the process of transformation from an ordinary assurance case to the assurance case with the associated confidence arguments.

The case study for a selected assurance case has been conducted in the following steps:

1. For each argumentation step going top-down:
  - a. review the argument to identify defeater
2. For each identified defeater:
  - a. analyse defeater criticality and decide if it requires actions
  - b. identify possible ways for resolution if required
  - c. implement resolution:
    - option 1: modify assurance argument structure to eliminate the defeater cause
    - option 2: develop confidence argument to address the defeater
    - option 3: no action required

The argument selected for our case study was the Open PCA Infusion Pump assurance case developed by Kansas State University [25]. The safety part of the assurance case contains over 600 elements, including 96 claims. It covered a broad range of infusion pump hazards and failure modes required by FDA regulations [9], including human aspect, software, hardware and mechanical elements failures. We were aware of the fact that this assurance case is on the concept design level and some of the claims remained undeveloped but nevertheless it suited well for the purpose of the demonstration of our approach.

We planned the review to be conducted by one person, then independently verified by another. To provide the reviewer with some guidance, we decided to use the 5-item list of defeater types (D1-D5) presented in section 2.1. We chose this defeater classification as we considered it to be the most comprehensible one. The reviewer was supposed to immediately assign category (D1-D5) to each defeater. One of the recognised problems related to defeaters is that it is quite easy to raise doubts regarding every piece of information included in the assurance argument and therefore producing a large number of defeaters expressing more and more incredible conditions [11]. We focused on a more practical approach: a defeater was identified only if the reviewer really considered something as a credible doubt e.g. questionable reasoning based on unclear inference rule, missing premises (indicated by inference rule), inadequate hazard mitigation leaving out some causes or conditions.

During the review 127 defeaters have been identified. This was the first such review and it is hard to judge if it is a normal, low or high level. We should also be aware that:

- the reviewed assurance case had the draft status and it was an research case study intentionally not complete (e.g. missing some of the evidence);

- it focused on assurance aspect only, little attention was paid to confidence aspects e.g. related to the process;
- inference rules were seldom explained and justified thus creating reasons for doubt.

Initially the reviewer used the list of defeater types as a checklist, however soon it turned out that free, unguided searching for argument deficiencies was more efficient. The list was too general and difficult to apply to the concrete claims and arguments of the assurance case. Moreover, classification of defeaters, especially those related to inference rules was problematic. For example when the reviewer finds a scenario when the claim is not satisfied, it can be classified as counterevidence (D2). Deeper analysis however may reveal that it is caused by incomplete inference rule for a given context of the claim (D5).

Although it was not planned in our case study, we decided to analyse the defeaters found, try to identify similarities and create a “defeater checklist” using “bottom-up” approach. The resulting checklist is shown in Table 1, together with the percentage share of defeaters found using each checklist item. Quite surprisingly, we found out that grouping the items of the checklist into more general categories resembles 3 types of ACPs [19]. The defeaters we found were either related to the inference rule, premises (evidence but also sub-claims) or the context (e.g. of using the device). The category for each defeater is indicated by the first letter of its identifier.

The next step of our case study was to address a subset of the identified defeaters. The analysed subset covered all the types of defeaters. Some of them were addressed by altering the assurance argument (e.g. refining context), some by developing confidence argument and some by both. The result was the improved assurance case supported by confidence argument.

Let's consider an example of a claim that given software function works correctly what is argued by module tests where test scope covers function requirements. The argument is presented in thick lines in Fig. 3. The argument review may produce three possible defeaters (however more are possible):

- a) premise may be faulty: test report may be incorrect if the testing process is unreliable;
- b) argumentation strategy may be faulty: the chosen test method may not be sufficient to provide sufficient confidence that the function works correctly;
- c) counterevidence may be available: some function errors may be reported by other tests or operation personnel and not fixed.

Each of the described defeaters can be resolved by adding a confidence claim as presented in Fig. 3.

The main experience from extending the assurance case with supporting confidence argument was that the process involved thorough analysis of the assurance case completeness and consistency. Some of argument deficits were resolved by modification of the main argument without adding any confidence argument.

Some other approaches are focused on building exhaustive confidence argument structure based on trustworthy system

lifecycle and safety management process [2]. In our opinion both directions are important. A reasonable approach would be first to create confidence argument based on the safety management and system development process, then integrate it with the assurance argument for subsequent stages of the assurance case development and periodically review the assurance case to ensure confidence argument completeness.




Fig. 3. Confidence argument example

This raises a question how to efficiently build and maintain completeness and consistency of the confidence argument and the main assurance argument. Assurance case review techniques like the checklist presented in Table 1 can be helpful. Moreover, it is not normally achievable to demonstrate complete confidence, therefore a judgement has to be made what level of confidence should be demonstrated for a given part of an assurance case. For example a higher confidence would be required for critical hazards, while for other issues with limited impact on safety a lower confidence level can be accepted and some confidence deficits can be tolerated. We consider that rationale element is suitable to indicate how much confidence is required/demonstrated. Efficient methods for managing the confidence level and consistency between the assurance and confidence argument are needed. Part of the possible solution is the proposed argument integration and the use of reviews and checklists to ensure its completeness.

## 5 Summary

In this paper we presented an approach for confidence and assurance argument integration and the checklist of defeaters to facilitate the process of building confidence arguments.

The argument integration is based on the idea of extended role of argumentation strategy justification element to represent rationale specific for a given argumentation step. Rationale's objective is to ensure confidence in the argumentation step through decomposition into confidence argument. The approach allows to present comprehensible view of integrated assurance and confidence argument. This does not exclude the construction of separate confidence case

as we can use links to connect to "local" confidence arguments.

Confidence argument can be developed using the results of the checklist-based assurance case review. We presented the defeater checklist developed in our case study of a confidence argument development for an Open PCA Infusion Pump assurance case [25]. The checklist can be helpful in maintaining completeness of confidence argument, however it still requires validation with real-life assurance cases. Argumentation reviews and searching for defeaters to develop confidence arguments helps to improve assurance argument quality and eliminate its gaps, ambiguities and weak spots.

We plan to strengthen the process of managing confidence argument completeness and consistency with the assurance argument. Rationale integrates confidence claims necessary to demonstrate the strength of the argumentation step. This can serve as basis for managing the argument strength level depending on assurance argument goals criticality.

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	Defeater description	% found
I-1	No defined inference rule. It is unknown how the conclusion is drawn from premises.	3,1%
I-2	Wrong inference rule	9,4%
I-3	Inference rule not sufficiently justified (unknown reasons, doubts about completeness)	9,4%
I-4	Inference rule incomplete: not all requirements regarding premises specified. As a result, some premises may be missing.	17,3%
I-5	Inference rule leaves out a specific situation/factor or counterevidence. As a result, some premises are missing.	5,5%
I-6	Inference rule does not consider mutual influence of premises.	4,7%
P-1	One or more premises required by the inference rule are missing	11,0%
P-2	Superfluous premise(s) of unclear role in the inference rule.	0,8%
P-3	Superfluous premise(s) which should be a part of the confidence argument instead of the assurance argument.	0,8%
P-4	Unreliable or faulty premise(s).	15,7%
P-5	Premise not properly defined (unclear, unverifiable).	15,7%
C-1	Required context not specified.	4,7%
C-2	Wrong context assumed.	1,6%

Table 1. Defeater checklist