

Seznam dodatečné literatury

05/03/2021

[readme]

- Nikdo neočekává, že přečtete všechny články ze seznamu (vlastně asi ani polovinu).
- Na (přibližně) všechny z těch článků narazíme během kurzu, takže tento dokument slouží jako centrální bod, kde začít hledat.
- Všechny články ze seznamu jsou (a/nebo budou) dostupné v MS Teams.
- Tento seznam se bude postupně aktualizovat – aktuální verze bude vždy v MS Teams a [zde](#).

1. Ekonomie blahobytu

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Feldman, N. E., Katuščák, P., & Kawano, L. (2016). Taxpayer confusion: Evidence from the child tax credit. *American Economic Review*, 106(3), 807-35.

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2. Realie veřejného sektoru

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Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2020). The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America: Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34(4), 3-26.

3. Daně

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5. Politická ekonomie

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