Strategies of Resistance: Diversification and Diffusion ▌ ⬡

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham   University of Maryland & PRIO
Marianne Dahl   PRIO
Anne Frugé   University of Maryland

Abstract: *Why do organizations choose to use nonviolence? Why do they choose specific nonviolent tactics? Existing quantitative work centers on mass nonviolent campaign, but much of the nonviolence employed in contentious politics is smaller-scale nonviolent direct action. In this article, we explore the determinants of nonviolence with new data at the organization level in self-determination disputes from 1960 to 2005. We present a novel argument about the interdependence of tactical choices among nonviolent options in self-determination movements. Given limitations on their capabilities, competition among organizations in a shared movement, and different resource requirements for nonviolent strategies, we show that organizations have incentives to diversify tactics rather than just copy other organizations. The empirical analysis reveals a rich picture of varied organizational resistance choices, and a complex web of interdependence among tactics.*

The recent use and apparent success of mass nonviolent campaigns have focused attention on nonviolent resistance around the world. The Bil'in Popular Committee (in a Palestinian village divided by an Israeli-built wall) are known internationally for their diverse resistance repertoire, including documentary films and art installations. More broadly, the cascade of uprisings during the Arab Spring demonstrated the power of nonviolence. Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010 was followed by popular demonstrations that toppled leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Boycotts were used to voice dissent ahead of Bahrain's 2014 elections and by Western Sahara activists campaigning in 2010 against Moroccan occupation. Scholars and policy makers increasingly attempt to understand when and why mass nonviolent campaigns occur and when they will be successful.

Despite increased attention, scholarly work on nonviolent campaigns does not yet adequately address either the dynamics or the implications of these complex movements. Social movements often comprise different organizations using a variety of tactics—some nonviolent, some violent, and some considered conventional politics. In some cases, as in Tunisia and Libya, these activities reach the level of a sustained nonviolent campaign or civil war, but in a greater number of cases, organizations like the Bil'in Popular Committee engage in smaller-scale nonviolence. Since the focus has been on large, nonviolent campaigns, tactics requiring few participants (e.g., nonviolent interventions) are often overlooked, even though they are common and have been the catalyst of substantial political change. While many studies have examined the use of violence in a range of forms (irregular war, suicide attacks, etc.), relatively few have addressed questions about the use of nonviolence. Why do organizations choose to use nonviolence? Why do they choose specific nonviolent tactics?

This article advances a novel argument about interdependence of resistance strategies. Nearly all studies examining dissident tactics across organizations center on

DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12304

a *direct diffusion* logic, wherein the use of a tactic by an organization promotes its use by others (Bloom 2005; Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). We argue interdependence can also manifest as *diversification*, wherein organizations choose tactics that differ from those used by other organizations. Diversification of tactics is the result of organizational capacity, the mobilization needs of different tactics, and a desire to remain visible in the dispute when other organizations are active. Based on their mobilization capacity and what other organizations are doing, organizations will choose among strategies that require high or low resources.

These alternative logics (of direct diffusion or diversification) are not mutually exclusive, as both processes can occur simultaneously. Organizations respond to incentives that generate direct diffusion and diversification in the same movement. The prevailing assumption, though, is that organizations make tactical and strategic choices more or less independently from the activities of other organizations, and that when organizations consider the actions of others (and state responses to these), direct tactical diffusion dominates strategic decision making. However, such assumptions are essentially untested. By unpacking social movements and studying the specific nonviolent tactics organizations use, we contribute to a broader understanding of dynamics within these movements, and the determinants of nonviolent resistance.

We analyze diffusion and diversification of nonviolent tactics using new data on the yearly behavior of over 1,100 organizations active in movements for greater national self-determination from 1960 to 2005.[1] These data provide information on the use of five types of nonviolent actions, including economic noncooperation, protest, nonviolent intervention, social noncooperation, and political noncooperation, and information on the use of violence and conventional political tactics. This is the first actor-based, global data set on the use of a variety of types of nonviolent dissent. It reveals that organizations use a wide variety of nonviolent tactics to achieve their goals.

Studies of Strategies of Resistance

Existing studies of political mobilization tend to focus on particular types of action, such as terrorism (Crenshaw 1981; Pape 2005), protest (Beaulieu 2014; Boulding 2014; Francisco 1996), rebellion (Gurr 1970; Scott 1976; Skocpol 1979), or civil war (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Less commonly, scholars focus on tactics as somewhat interchangeable (Asal et al. 2013; Cunningham 2013; Moore 1998), and theoretical models exploring the effect of repression have emphasized the role of substitution (Lichbach 1987).[2]

The study of strategic nonviolence has largely been conducted without incorporating alternative tactics of resistance.[3] Work specifically on the use of nonviolence concerns how to engage in nonviolent resistance (Martin 2001; Sharp 1973), descriptions of nonviolent campaigns (Ackerman and DuVall 2001), normative implications of nonviolence (Gan and Holmes 2005), or its efficacy (Bond 1988). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) allow that mobilization can develop into predominantly nonviolent or violent campaigns, but they focus exclusively on large-scale, mass mobilization.

Recent work on violent conflict emphasizes that groups challenging the state are frequently internally divided, which can lead to a divergence of tactics of contention (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012). Other types of mobilization are similarly subject to internal divides. Yet the emphasis in these works tends to limit analysis to types of actors designated by tactical choice (i.e., armed rebels or political parties), which excludes the possibility of exploring how and when complex actors employ a range of tactics, or the effects these choices have among a set of linked actors.

The literature on social movements has more explicitly incorporated the idea of the same "movement" splitting on the issue of tactics. Haines (1984) highlights movements split between radicals and moderates, arguing that a "radical flank" can strengthen the bargaining position of more moderate actors. However, the designation of "radical" or "moderate" is often linked to the tactics organizations use, with a presumption that an organization will employ violence once it becomes "radical."

Do the tactical choices of organizations influence one another beyond violent contention, where competition is assumed to be the driving force? This question remains unexplored for three reasons. First, the emphasis on single tactics and the role of competition among organizations

---

[1] *Movement* refers to collective mobilization around the same cause within a population. *Organization* describes actors in a movement that are organized entities and mobilize on behalf of the movement population. *Campaign* is used only with respect to nonviolent campaigns as defined by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 14) as a "series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective." Thus, organizations always operate within movements. Campaigns occur within broader social movements; organizations can participate in these but are not defined by them. We do not address spontaneous uprisings (e.g., the Arab Spring), instead focusing on purposive tactical choices of organizations.

[2] See also Davenport (2007) and Koopmans (1993).

[3] See Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) on this limitation.

has not expanded to look at nonviolent contention. Second, scholars typically define strategy diversity as *violence* or *nonviolence*, with little exploration of the variety of nonviolent tactics used. Third, the burgeoning study of nonviolence has centered on mass nonviolent campaigns, downplaying the role of choice by organizations in favor of understanding the overall trajectory of a movement. Cross-national studies have not gone far enough to unpack nonviolent campaigns, in part because of the lack of actor-level data on the use of nonviolence.

Leveraging our new data set on organizational use of nonviolent tactics, we can address this question in ways not possible before. Although research into the diffusion of nonviolent tactics to other countries or other movements has progressed (Chabot 2012; Gallo-Cruz 2012; Gleditsch and Rivera 2015; Isaac et al. 2012), the field still lacks a framework for understanding how the tactical choices by one organization affect choices of other organizations. This is an imperative first step for understanding why movements unfold as they do, allowing further exploration of why some movements develop into large-scale campaigns while others do not, and why some turn violent after nonviolent resistance. Studying the evolution of tactical choices that either reinforce nonviolence or escalate to violence deepens our understanding of strategies of resistance and outcomes in complex social movements.

How Decisions about Tactics and Strategies Are Made

Opposition tactics and strategies are a collection of individual choices (i.e., does an individual detonate a bomb or join a protest?), yet the collective action observed in social movements is often coordinated, rather than spontaneous. This coordination motivates our focus on organizations. Whether it entails elites sitting at a table together or decision-making processes incorporating many members, there are clear instances of organizations deliberating over strategies and tactics. The West Papuan movement in Indonesia brought together people with a diverse set of preferences over tactical choices. Macleod (2014, 71) notes activists and leaders conducted "a cost-benefit analysis of the relative effectiveness of different methods . . . [leading to ongoing] passionate discussions about analysis, targets, goals, strategy, and tactics."

Likewise, intense debate characterized the evolution of strategy and tactical choices among Catholic organizations in Northern Ireland. Internal debate over strategy led to the 1992 publication of "Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland," a document that lays out a plan for sustainable peace.

Kennedy-Pipe (1997, 154) suggests it had "tacit approval" of the Provisional IRA. Even among organizations firmly committed to nonviolence, debates occur over the merits and effectiveness of particular tactics. The anti–Milosevic Otpor movement in Serbia promoted autonomy among local branches in choosing which nonviolent tactics to use, allowing activists to weigh in on tactical choices given different local contexts (Nikolayenko 2013).

Organizations can choose from a number of options when engaging in nonviolence, including protests, blockades, and strikes; individual members can participate in hunger strikes, walkouts, and work stoppages. To explain tactical choice, we begin with a simple model of the organization's decision process. Organizations have some maximal goal they pursue, such as regime change or secession. Adherence to this maximal goal is the primary way organizations are linked within a social movement. For example, all organizations in a self-determination movement seek greater national self-determination for the relevant population, even if their methods or particular preferences diverge.

Organizations pick tactics and strategies they think will work to achieve their goal. In most cases, maximal goals are a long-term prospect. A tactic may be useful for an organization regardless of whether it leads directly to success in achieving the movement's aims if it helps it to attain proximate goals. Proximate goals for organizations include attracting and retaining supporters, gaining international and domestic attention or support, and demonstrating mobilization capacity to increase leverage against the state (i.e., capacity to undermine state authority). For pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, for example, the substantial domestic support and international attention garnered by the 2014 protests may be viewed as a success despite the lack of significant direct concessions.

Given this context of seeking both maximal and proximate goals, each organization makes tactical decisions considering the state's likely response (i.e., the direct impact of their actions) and their ability to withstand repression (i.e., resilience), while trying to maximize movement leverage against the state in pursuit of their overall goal.[4] The strategic context in which organizations operate influences how they gain and keep supporters, and having multiple organizations in the same movement inherently creates a competitive environment (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Gates 2002; Pearlman 2008/2009; Weinstein 2006). Because organizations seek the same

---

[4]See Boudreau (2009) on fear and historical memory in strategic choice.

maximal goal, they compete in broad terms for advantages like constituent support, funding, international support, and recognition. In short, organizations pursue their shared maximal goal while pursuing more proximate goals in the context of intramovement organizational competition.

Organizational Interdependence and Tactical Choice

We propose a framework for organizational tactical choice, emphasizing that organizations have both maximal and proximate goals, are limited by their capabilities, and often operate in the context of implicit competition among organizations in a shared movement. Competition for shared, typically limited, resources means that organizations must consider what other organizations are doing when picking a tactic (McCarthy and Zald 1977). In some cases, the limited pool of resources is dictated by a bounded set of individuals identifying with the cause (e.g., self-determination groups). Yet, even in cases without a bounded identity group, all movements face resource constraints.

Extant literature suggests organizational competition for supporters engenders tactical diffusion based on the logic of learning (i.e., tactics diffuse when organizations believe there is a dominant or most successful tactic). For instance, according to the outbidding model, terrorist organizations choose increased terrorist activity (particularly suicide bombing) to gain supporters (cf. Bloom 2005), and organizations learn what is successful by observing others using the tactic. This diffusion due to competition can also alter organizational choices related to other tactics. When a particular tactic appears to be gaining attention or attracting participants, organizations have an incentive to copy that tactic and capitalize on its perceived success. Consequently, direct diffusion increases the number of organizations using the same tactic.

Typically, scholars examine diffusion as the spread of one type of action (i.e., *direct diffusion* of a tactic), such as civil war or suicide bombing. We develop an alternative for understanding interdependence of nonviolent tactical choices: tactical *diversification*. We argue that resource needs and constraints intersect with the proximate goals of organizations to create more complex incentives for organizations than a simple drive to do what others do. Simply put, organizations can achieve some of their proximate goals more efficiently by diversifying tactics rather than copying.

Organizations have variable capabilities, and different tactics of nonviolence require different resources in terms of the number of participants required to be effective. Organizations pick nonviolent tactics based on the resource needs of the tactic and what resources they expect to mobilize.[5] Resources available to organizations determine, in part, their capacity to engage in different tactics to challenge the state (Olson 1971; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1998).

Some organizations are better placed to capture the market for population-intensive tactics (e.g., protest or electoral boycotts), whereas others excel at low-resource tactics (e.g., blockades or hunger strikes). Some organizations have extensive links within the community and can quickly mobilize large crowds. Others have fewer, but very committed, members willing to take personal risks. Nonviolence is generally seen to be more successful when there are more participants (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; DeNardo 1985). Yet having more participants does not always make a more powerful statement. The impact of the Unknown Protester who stood in front of a column of tanks in Tiananmen Square in 1989 would not necessarily have increased with additional participants. Indeed, the standoff would likely have played out quite differently if others stood next to him. While population-intensive tactics may be more challenging for the government to repress than tactics with low numbers of participants, deep commitment can compensate for low numbers of participants (Schock 2005).

Supporters have limited resources (e.g., time or commitment) to offer the organizations within a movement. Even if they passionately agree with the cause, they are unlikely to participate in every action engaged in by every organization within the movement. Therefore, when an organization with limited resources observes a competing organization in the same movement successfully using population-intensive tactics, it has an incentive to avoid them because it anticipates difficulty in mobilizing adequate participation. Organizations could choose to not act at all. However, withdrawing from participation means that the organization not only does not further the cause, but also will fail to gain any meaningful say if concessions are forthcoming.

Instead, organizations can diversify by choosing to engage in tactics with low-resource needs and keep attention focused on the organization and its goals. By employing a non-resource-intensive tactic, organizations can use a tactic that complements what other organizations are doing while bringing attention to the organization's effort. Organizations can also attempt to differentiate themselves by using tactics that others are not employing. As

---

[5]Kitschelt (1986) argues two additional factors determine success: framing and political opportunity structure.

the only organization that employs hunger strikes, for example, they can seek to influence the dispute through their uniqueness. Moreover, the use of low-resource tactics that entail high personal risk allows organizations to demonstrate deep commitment to the movement by putting members directly in harm's way for the cause. As such, organizations can show they are a force in the dispute, even if they cannot compete with other organizations in terms of large-scale mobilization.

In addition to these resource-oriented incentives to diversify tactics, diversification can increase the resilience of the movement. Schock (2005) contends that while some tactics are concentrated (e.g., protests), and thus easy for the state to target, others are dispersed (e.g., economic boycott) and more difficult for the government to repress. Shifting between tactics can make it possible to withstand repression, thus making the movement more resilient. By applying a broad set of tactics, the government faces attack on multiple fronts, making it harder for them to silence dissidents.

In sum, existing arguments suggest that organizations are more likely to use nonviolence when other organizations are using nonviolence. This follows from organizations competing for supporters and mimicking what appears to be successful tactics of others. Yet that conceptualization does not take into account the resource needs of tactics or variable capacity of organizations to mobilize people. The resource needs of particular tactics and other organizations' resource consumption intersect to shape tactical choices. Specifically, organizations sometimes face resource constraints that make high-resource tactics unattractive and low-resource tactics more attractive. This discussion leads to four main implications. The first hypothesis is about direct diffusion of a tactic, whereas subsequent hypotheses relate to diffusion through diversification. In laying out this argument, we suggest that the diffusion of nonviolence as a strategy is the product of two distinct processes—direct diffusion and tactical diversification among nonviolent actions.

H1: The probability of an organization using a tactic increases as other organizations in the same movement use that tactic.

H2: The probability of an organization using a high-resource tactic (population-intensive) decreases as other organizations in the same movement use high-resource tactics.

H3: The probability of an organization using a low-resource tactic (non-population-intensive) increases as other organizations in the same movement use high-resource tactics.

H4: The probability of an organization using a low-resource tactic increases as other organizations in the same movement use low-resource tactics.

Analysis

We test these hypotheses using our new data on all organizations active in disputes over self-determination (SD) around the world, from 1960 to 2005. We examine SD disputes because they are a unique testing ground. Organizations working within a movement for greater national self-determination share the overarching goal of greater self-rule. These disputes typically remain "active" in the sense that organizations make claims for greater self-determination regardless of whether there is a spike in violent or mass nonviolent activities. Focusing on organizations in SD disputes allows us to look at the tactics and strategies chosen to challenge the state in a very broad context, and without the possibility of artificially restricting organizations' choice sets by looking only at periods of violence or mass nonviolence. One caveat for using a sample of SD movements is that these movements may operate differently from others because withdrawal of consent from the state may be less effective in undermining the center's legitimacy (cf. Shaykhutdinov 2010; Stephan 2006; Svensson and Lindgren 2011). SD movements, then, may rely more heavily on links between the international community and the host state to pressure the government to make concessions (akin to Galtung's 1969 chain of nonviolence).

The sample includes 138 SD movements in 77 countries, ranging from the Sami in Sweden to the Moros in the Philippines and Chechens in Russia. Some SD movements, such as the Zulus in South Africa and Tajiks in Uzbekistan, are represented by one single organization. In contrast, 61 organizations represent the Kashmiri Muslims in India, and 39 represent the Corsicans in France over the time period of the study. The average number of organizations in a movement over the study time period is 8 organizations. The data set features 1,124 organizations. The original identification of organizations comes from Cunningham (2014). To be included in the study, an organization had to represent the SD movement and make demands on the state explicitly related to self-determination.[6] Appendix Figures 2–4 in the SI show the distribution of the number of organizations in these movements.

---

[6]See the supporting information (SI) for details on initial compilation of the organizations.

This data set is novel in three ways. First, the unit of analysis is the organization, identified without regard to its tactical choice. Existing studies typically identify actors based on their dominant tactic (i.e., rebel groups, terrorists, protesters). By starting with an ex ante identified set of actors coded with respect to their demands rather than their tactics, we create a unique data set where actors' tactical choices vary widely. Second, we move beyond mass nonviolence, coding several types of nonviolent action. Finally, we identify these nonviolent actions in a variety of different contexts, including during periods of peace, civil war, and mass nonviolent campaigns. This allows us to look broadly at tactical choice rather than focus only on periods of mass mobilization.

Nonviolent Action

We code unique data at the organization-year level wherein we define a set of five tactic types. Building on the work of Gene Sharp (1973), as well as the work of other nonviolence scholars and practitioners (e.g., Ackerman and DuVall 2001), we developed this categorization of tactic types to encompass a specific set of actions. For each organization, the variable is coded as 1 if the organization was found to use that particular tactic type in a given year. Either the action must be organized by the organization or there must be evidence of people from the organization publicly participating.

- *Economic noncooperation*: strikes, tax refusals, or consumer boycotts
- *Protest and demonstration*: rallies, protests, or demonstrations
- *Nonviolent intervention*: sit-ins, occupations, or blockades
- *Social noncooperation*: hunger strikes, self-immolation, or other self-harm
- *Political noncooperation*: organizational boycotts of elections or withdrawals from political office or coalition in the government

We also code an indicator for the use of violence by an organization against the state.

We identified events by reviewing five sources utilizing different methods of compiling information about organizational behavior. Lexis Nexis, Factiva, and Keesing's Record of World Events pull English-language news articles, whereas the Minorities at Risk Database (MAR) and the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) are constructed by third parties and draw from multiple types of sources. Each observation in the data set represents activity by an SD organization identified through these sources. Indicators for each tactic type are dichotomous. Once evidence of a tactic was found in an organization-year, coders moved on to find evidence of that tactic in the next organization-year. This process was repeated for each tactic of interest for each organization in the data set. The data set relies on event-level data to identify violent and nonviolent behavior by SD organizations, but it does not include a count for the number of events in each category of action.[7]

Our method faces several challenges in terms of reporting bias, source reliability, information availability, and assumptions regarding actors. First, the quality and volume of reporting varies across cases. For example, high-profile events, countries, and personalities receive the most news coverage. Furthermore, the quality of reporting varies such that there is a great deal of information available in some cases but not others. Where we have less information about organizational behavior, Type II errors are more likely. For this reason, we rely on all five sources identified above to collect event data rather than a single news stream.

Second, source reliability is a concern for any researcher. Journalists often cite sources who may have reason to conceal or exaggerate the truth, which biases reporting of events. Reporting bias can affect our coding process by increasing the likelihood of Type I or Type II errors. For this reason, we did not rely solely on journalists' accounts of events. MAR and UCDP help to balance reporting bias, as these sources are based on additional secondary source information (e.g., books and scholarly articles).

A third limitation concerns the scarcity of information. Some reports offer a veneer of detail, preventing confirmation of targets involved or of activity performed. Additionally, event records across most countries are scarcer before 1990. Scarcity of information increases the likelihood of a Type II error. We use multiple sources with different time frames and content to address this concern.

Moreover, we make certain assumptions about actors that simplify the relationships within and between organizations. For the purpose of our coding, and to allow a full range of tactical options for all organizations, we consider SD organizations that are nominally distinct from one another as unique. For example, we treat the political and military wings of the ETA in Spain as separate organizations. Additionally, because we create a dichotomous indicator, we do not assess the proportion of effort allocated to different types of tactics in any given year.

---

[7]Temporally disaggregated events data would provide greater leverage on tactical choices, but they would be extremely resource intensive to code for a global sample.

Lastly, we assume actions taken by one organization are observable to other organizations. Press reports indicated that even small-scale nonviolent intervention and social cooperation tactics were often observable. Local news outlets covered such events, and organizations made public appeals by passing out pamphlets or releasing official statements.[8] For example, the Kurdistan National Liberation Front and the Free Aceh Movement both handed out leaflets advertising hunger strikes or stay-aways.[9] At other times, multiple organizations joined together for a protest. For instance, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and Sa'iqa united under the Fatah banner during a 1992 hunger strike.[10] Another indicator of tactic observability is the level of success. Some stay-aways paralyzed entire regions, making them quite visible to organizations within the same movement.[11]

Despite the challenges of collecting this type of data, our nonviolent actions data set provides an important corrective for conflict scholarship that has focused primarily on violence or mass nonviolent campaigns. The tactics captured in this data set represent a set of vital yet often overlooked tactics of resistance.

Organizations and Tactics

These new data demonstrate a great deal of variation in the tactics employed by organizations. Over the study time period, more organizations used nonviolence than violence. As many as 401 organizations (36%) engaged in nonviolent activity in at least one year. Only 275 organizations engaged in violence against the state (about 25%). Among the 138 self-determination movements, 96 (about 70%) had at least one organization using nonviolent tactics and 103 (about 75%) had at least one organization using violence.

[8]"Sri Lankan Estate Workers Go on Token Strike," *The Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, May 19, 1987. "Strike Closes Shops, Schools in Eastern Sri Lanka," *Japan Economic Newswire* January 28, 2000.

[9]Kurdistan National Liberation Front: "Kurds Stage Hunger Strike in Greece," *United Press International*, June 4, 1996. Free Aceh Movement: "Indonesia: Strike Called by Aceh Separatists Continues in Pidie," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, October 8, 1999. Oromo National Congress (ONC): "Nigeria: Activists Insist on Speedy Trial for OPC Leader," *Africa News*, August 24, 2001.

[10]"Radical Palestinian Chiefs Unite in Hunger Strike," *Reuters News*, October 8, 1992.

[11]"Protest Strikes Against Spanish Premier," *Associated Press*, December 10, 1980. "Radio Pakistan: Strike Follows Reported Shooting of Demonstrators; 50 Injured," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 21, 1994. "Indian Emissary, Kashmir Officials Discuss Hostage Crisis," *Agence France Presse*, August 17, 1995.

While many studies characterize organizations as violent or not, we find that 186 organizations (17%) engaged in both violent and nonviolent action. The widespread occurrence of organizations using a diversity of tactics is impossible to observe without these organization-level data on a breadth of different organizations.

Among organization-year observations where nonviolence is used, we observe the use of only one type of nonviolent action in a given year 74% of the time. When organizations use a single type of nonviolent action in a year, they tend to prefer protests. There are only two instances of an organization engaging in all nonviolent tactics within a single year: Hamas in 1992 (Palestinians) and the All Party Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference representing the Kashmiri Muslims in India in 1998.

Statistical Analysis

Hypotheses 2–4 predict the use of high-resource and low-resource tactics. We classify the five types of actions by resource needs. We categorize economic noncooperation and protests/demonstrations as tactics with high-resource needs. Social noncooperation and nonviolent intervention have low-resource needs. Resources needed for political noncooperation vary. Economic noncooperation requires extensive participation because it is designed to be costly to the government in terms of economic performance. Longer duration and higher participation for economic noncooperation impose greater costs on the state. For example, the Ceylon Workers' Congress representing Tamils in Sri Lanka has engaged in boycotts since the late 1980s, and Akali Dal has periodically called day-long strikes to press Sikh demands in India.

Protests and demonstrations also require large-scale mobilization of people, either at one time or sequentially. In the short term, relatively small protests might gain media attention, though larger protests will be more likely to do so. In the longer term, large protests can impose costs on the state through disruption to normal functioning of government or to the daily life of the citizenry at large. For example, the Kurdistan National Liberation Front organized thousands to protest Turkish treatment of Kurds outside the European Commission in Brussels in 1992.[12]

Alternatively, nonviolent intervention and social and political noncooperation do not necessarily require large numbers of people to mobilize. Nonviolent intervention can be effective with very limited participation. In 1995, Sinn Fein members chained themselves together to block a

[12]"Thousands of Kurds Hold E.C. Demo," *Agence France Presse*, May 21, 1992.

motorway, stopping traffic at rush hour.[13] The amount of resources required depends on the logistical target choice. Successful implementation is contingent on being able to cause disruption to the government or citizenry and the ability to call direct attention to the policy issue under dispute.

Social noncooperation requires only one person, though more people may increase its impact. It requires no resources other than the attention of the media and perhaps some low-cost materials. For example, one member of the ETA's military wing advocated for Basque self-determination by engaging in a 2-month hunger strike in 2004.[14] Similarly, eight members of the Student Solidarity for the People launched a hunger strike in 2003 in support of Acehnese demands on Indonesia.[15]

Political noncooperation may require large-scale participation for electoral boycotts (mass nonparticipation). It also requires physical resources to run a campaign supporting the boycott, as when the Sudanese SPLM led by John Garang boycotted elections in 1986.[16] Withdrawal from government requires fewer, but select, individuals to participate in order to achieve the goal of delegitimizing or calling negative attention to the government. The Basque National Party employed this tactic when it withdrew support from the informal governing coalition in Spain in 1997.[17] Political noncooperation cannot easily be categorized as predominantly high- or low-resource dependent.

Given this categorization, we lay out our expectations with respect to the four hypotheses. Following Hypothesis 1, each tactic is expected to directly diffuse. We expect the use of economic noncooperation or protests should make the other less likely (Hypothesis 2). Hypothesis 3 centers on the effect of high-resource tactics on the use of low-resource tactics. Thus, we expect both economic noncooperation and protests by other organizations to increase the chance of an organization using nonviolent intervention and social noncooperation. Finally, Hypothesis 4 concerns the link between low-resource tactics. We predict that other organizations using nonviolent

intervention and social noncooperation increases the probability that organizations use other low-resource tactics.[18] Table 1 summarizes these expectations, shaded by hypothesis.

Before testing these hypotheses, we examine the interdependence of the use of nonviolence generally. Our initial expectation is that organizational use of nonviolence leads to nonviolence by other organizations because a number of phenomena in political contention follow this pattern. A simple bivariate test of this relationship reveals a positive relationship between organizational use of nonviolence and the use of nonviolence by other organizations (see Appendix Table 25 in the SI). At first glance, it appears that nonviolence diffuses, but this tells us little about whether particular tactics increase the use of those tactics (direct diffusion), other types of tactics (diversification), or both.

Hypotheses 1–4 specifically address how different nonviolent tactical choices are likely to affect the calculus of other organizations. To assess the interdependence of organizational tactical choices, we employ seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) using linear probability modeling. SUR is a way of modeling a system of relationships between independent and dependent variables that are likely linked due to correlated errors. This approach is often used in economics to model trends like household consumption (where the separate dependent variables are categories such as housing, clothing, and food), where the error terms likely are correlated due to expenditures in any one area coming from a single household budget.

We have clear reason to believe nonviolent tactic choices are linked in such a way, particularly for movements that have a limited pool of resources and common aims, such as those seeking national self-determination. SUR allows us to both determine endogenous interdependence and structure the analysis in a way that reflects the theoretical argument that the error terms are correlated. Using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression, we run six equations in which the dependent variable is alternately each nonviolent tactic and an indicator of the use of violence against the state by the organization.[19] In addition to our violent and nonviolent tactics, we include an equation for institutional action (e.g., fielding

---

[13]"Riot Was Sad, Perhaps Fleeting Flashback. Violence Such as Was Seen on Wednesday Does Not Portray the Real Derry," *Irish Times* (City Edition), May 5, 1995.

[14]"Basque Member Ends Hunger Strike," *Associated Press*, February 27, 2000.

[15]"Students Stage Hunger Strike Outside JSC Office," *Antara*, March 10, 2003.

[16]"Sudan Parties Vie for Power/Aftermath of First Free Elections in 18 Years," *The Guardian* (London), April 26, 1986.

[17]*Keesing's Record of World Events*, Volume 43, September 1997, "Spain," page 41827.

[18]Alternatively, we run an analysis grouping high- and low-resource tactics, finding robust support for Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3 (see Appendix Table 21 in the SI).

[19]SUR allows us to look at a set of factors within a system of choices, rather than dichotomously, and has efficiency gains in estimation where information on different equations is combined. Regression coefficient estimators are asymptotically more efficient than those obtained by the separate estimation of equations.

TABLE 1 Expectations

	Economic Noncooperation	Protest	Nonviolent Intervention	Social Noncooperation
Economic noncooperation	Increase (H1)	Decrease (H2)	Increase (H3)	Increase (H3)
Protest	Decrease (H2)	Increase (H1)	Increase (H3)	Increase (H3)
Nonviolent intervention			Increase (H1)	Increase (H4)
Social noncooperation			Increase (H4)	Increase (H1)

candidates)[20] taken by organizations, as this is a key alternative to both nonconventional strategies. We distinguish institutionalized participation from nonviolent direct action because it is not a tactic of disruption and delegitimization (Sharp 1973).

In each equation, we include a lagged measure (1 year) of the number of other organizations in the same self-determination movement that used each type of nonviolent tactic, as well as cubic polynomials for time for each dependent variable.[21] The cubic polynomials address possible temporal dependence—that the use of a specific tactic may be more or less likely depending on how recently that organization used that tactic.

In some equations, we control for the size of the self-determination group represented by the organization, the host country's regime type (measured as Polity2), the host country's reliance on domestic production (measured as imports as a percent of gross domestic product [GDP]), and whether elections occurred in that year (Hyde and Marinov 2011). These controls are added to models where we expect population size or regime type to play a role in influencing the viability of the tactic. Movement population size is included in models where the tactic has high mobilization needs (economic noncooperation and protest). Regime type is included in models of protests and political noncooperation, where we expect the degree of political openness will influence the ease with which these tactics can be used. Imports as a percent of GDP is included in the equation for economic noncooperation, as the government's reliance on domestic production may determine this tactic's attractiveness. Elections are included in the equations for political noncooperation and institutional action, as these tactics are likely

more viable during elections. Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients.[22]

The system of equations analysis indicates interdependence of organizational tactics. The correlation of residuals and the Breusch-Pagan test of independence are statistically significant. The coefficients in Table 2 indicate the predicted change in the probability of an organization's use of a particular tactic as an additional organization uses a particular tactic in the previous year.[23]

The SUR models highlight the presence of direct diffusion among almost all tactics. For every tactic except political noncooperation, an increase in the number of other organizations in the same movement using a tactic makes any particular organization more likely to use that same tactic. Take social noncooperation, where the impact is largest, as an example: The chance of an organization using social noncooperation increases by nearly 75% with the addition of another organization in the same movement using that tactic in the previous year. Figure 1 shows the effect each tactic has on the use of that same tactic.

The impact of direct diffusion is strongest for social noncooperation, followed by economic noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. Protests also have a positive impact on the likelihood that other organizations in the same movement use that same tactic. The smallest impact is seen with institutional action and violence. The relatively small effect of violence (compared to nonviolent tactics) is notable because this is primarily where diffusion has been explored in other studies.

Figure 1 provides evidence at the organization level for a direct diffusion of nonviolence (Hypothesis 1). Yet the analysis in Table 2 demonstrates a great deal of interdependence beyond direct diffusion within a single tactic. Figure 2 shows the percent change in the baseline probability of each tactic being used by an organization as an

---

[20]The indicator for institutional participation takes a value of 1 if an organization registers as a political party or participates in an election or electoral campaign (at the local or national level).

[21]In alternative specifications, we use the percentage of organizations employing specific tactics (see Appendix Table 22 in the SI). Hypothesis 2 is not supported in this alternative model.

[22]The correlation matrix of residuals is reported in Appendix Table 24 in the SI.

[23]We use a 1-year lag to capture the time it takes for organizations to observe the use of strategies by others. We address longer-term trends below.

TABLE 2 SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance

|	Economic Noncoopera- tion	Protest	Social nonco- operation	Nonviolent Intervention	Political Non- cooperation	Institutional Action	Violence
1-year lag of number of organizations using:							
Violence against the	**0.005**	–0.003	–0.000	–0.001	0.001	**–0.005**	**0.017**
state	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Economic	**0.014**	**–0.012**	**–0.006**	–0.004	**0.006**	0.003	–0.005
noncooperation	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Protest	–0.001	**0.023**	**0.007**	**0.007**	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Social	**0.022**	**0.042**	**0.011**	**0.012**	**0.011**	**0.049**	0.012
noncooperation	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Nonviolent	–0.008	0.001	0.005	**0.008**	–0.006	–0.014	0.001
intervention	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Political	–0.006	–0.009	**–0.007**	–0.006	**–0.006**	–0.003	**–0.019**
noncooperation	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Institutional action	0.001	0.006	**0.006**	–0.002	**0.013**	**0.013**	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Imports as % GDP	–0.000						
	(0.000)						
Log group population	**0.005**	**0.01**				**0.005**	
	(0.001)	(0.002)				(0.002)	
Polity2		**0.001**			0.000		
		(0.000)			(0.000)		
Elections					**0.019**	**0.094**	
					(0.003)	(0.006)	
Constant	**0.075**	**0.213**	**0.077**	**0.08**	**0.059**	**0.176**	**0.362**
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Observations	9,941	9,941	9,941	9,941	9,941	9,941	9,941
R-squared	0.051	0.168	0.031	0.025	0.028	0.127	0.220

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, cubic polynomials are included but not reported, and statistically significant indicators are boldfaced (.05 level or better).

additional organization in the same movement uses each nonviolent tactic, as well as institutional action. The top panels illustrate the impact of economic noncooperation, protests and demonstrations, and social noncooperation. The bottom panels show the effect of nonviolent intervention, political noncooperation, and institutional action. In each panel, the x-axis labels indicate the set of tactics we consider. Zero is marked by a dashed line; no bar means there was no statistically significant effect based on the SUR model in Table 2.

What do these trends say with respect to the interdependence of nonviolent tactical choices? We find some support for Hypothesis 2. Our expectation is that economic noncooperation and protests will each make the other tactic less likely to be used by another organization. As Panel 1 in Figure 2 indicates, the use of economic

noncooperation by other organizations decreases the chance that any particular organization in the same movement will use protests. Panel 2 indicates no statistically significant effect of protest on economic noncooperation, though the coefficient is negative in Table 2. Thus, we find that the use of one high-resource tactic reduces the use of another, and that neither has a positive effect on the other.

Hypothesis 3 predicts high-resource tactics (economic noncooperation and protest) would increase the use of low-resource tactics by other organizations in the same movement because organizations are concerned about their ability to mobilize many people but want to remain active in the dispute. Several findings in Table 2 provide support for this claim. Panel 2 shows protests by other organizations make both social

FIGURE 1 Direct Diffusion of Nonviolent Tactics, Institutional Action, and Violence

noncooperation and nonviolent intervention (both low-resource tactics) about 40% more likely. Economic noncooperation makes political noncooperation (which can be a low-resource tactic) about 25% more likely (Panel 1). In contrast to our expectation in Hypothesis 3, economic noncooperation has a negative effect on social noncooperation. This is unexpected because social noncooperation has low-resource needs, whereas economic noncooperation has high-resource needs. We see no discernible effect of economic noncooperation on the use of nonviolent intervention in the same movement.

We also find some support for Hypothesis 4, predicting that low-resource tactics will have a positive effect on one another. Panel 3 reveals social noncooperation increases the use of nonviolent intervention (both low-resource tactics), as well as political noncooperation, by about 75% and 55%, respectively. Interestingly, social noncooperation by other organizations also increases the probability that any particular organization in the same movement will use

FIGURE 2 Diffusion through Tactical Diversification

economic noncooperation and protest, which we do not have predictions about. While we find nonviolent intervention positively affected by both protest and social noncooperation (in line with Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4), nonviolent intervention only has a statistically significant effect on the use of nonviolent intervention (Panel 4).

Taken together, we see clear evidence of diversification based on a logic of resource needs and consequent tactical diversification. We find some support for each hypothesis related to tactical diversification and uncover a great deal of variation in the extent to which tactical choices impact one another across the nonviolent choices.

While we do not have explicit expectations about political noncooperation, Panel 5 suggests it does not precisely follow our predicted pattern for either low- or high-resource tactics. The use of political noncooperation by other organizations in the same movement decreases the use of social noncooperation, nonviolent intervention, political noncooperation, and violence. Yet economic noncooperation, social noncooperation, and institutional action all make political noncooperation more likely. This warrants further exploration. Institutional action (meaning the use of official, government-sanctioned paths to make demands on the state) affects social noncooperation, increasing the chance that an organization in the same movement will use this tactic. Institutional action is also positively associated with political noncooperation, which may reflect a greater sense that political noncooperation can be more effective if more organizations in the same movement are participating in the system.

Table 2 indicates the use of violence by a given organization in a year is negatively affected by political noncooperation. As more organizations use political noncooperation, any given organization in the same movement is less likely to employ violence. Moreover, the use of violence by other organizations increases the chance that an organization will use economic noncooperation and decreases the chance that an organization will employ institutional action. These findings suggest a more complex relationship than is often argued with regard to a radical flank effect, which is in line with Chenoweth and Schock's (2015) argument that violence has an indirect effect on mass nonviolent campaigns.

Our measure of economic vulnerability of the state does not have a statistically significant effect on economic noncooperation. We do find that demographically larger groups are more likely to use high-mobilization tactics (economic noncooperation and protests) and institutional action, which is consistent with the logic that larger groups have a greater opportunity to pressure the state through tactics that require high numbers of participants. An increase in the Polity2 score (indicating more democratic governments) is associated with a greater chance of protest, but not political noncooperation. Finally, political noncooperation and institutional action are more likely in an election year.[24]

Conclusion

This article advances a new perspective for thinking about interdependence in contentious politics. We argue that direct diffusion, where the use of one tactic increases the use of that tactic by other actors in the same movement, is only one path through which interdependence affects tactical choices. Interdependence also leads to tactical diversification. Tactics' varying resource needs, differential capabilities of organizations, and their desire to participate in some way in the dispute create incentives for organizations to diversify when other organizations are active in a shared social movement. Examining the variety of nonviolent tactics used by self-determination organizations, we see not only that there is great variation in what organizations do to challenge the state, but also that there are multiple paths of diffusion at work.

This article focuses empirically on self-determination disputes because these disputes provide an opportunity to look at mobilized actors without limiting the sample to actors that use one specific tactic. In so doing, it also allows for a fuller analysis of the use of nonviolence by these movements and sheds light on why we see so few mass nonviolent campaigns in these movements. Less than 4% of the self-determination movements engage in nonviolent campaigns (Cunningham 2013). Yet, when we look at the organizations seeking self-determination, and at a variety of tactics, we find a great deal of nonviolent actions in self-determination movements. Nonviolence is used in over 75% of the movements, but the dynamic of tactical diversification may impede aggregation into a mass campaign.

Emphasizing rebellion and mass nonviolent campaigns has led to a mischaracterization of these disputes as inherently or overly violent. This mischaracterization can have negative consequences, influencing how scholars and practitioners think about mediation in these cases and where we expect conflict resolution to be successful. Moreover, a mischaracterization of self-determination movements as overly violent affects our understanding of

---

[24]See the SI for further analyses including different time lags, repression, concessions, and ties between organizations.

the practice of nonviolence and our expectations about where it is likely to happen and when it is likely to succeed.

Complex interdependence can also spread beyond actors in the same movement. Preliminary analysis of tactical diffusions across organizations in the same country (rather than just within the same SD movement) suggests that some resistance tactics demonstrate interdependence beyond movement boundaries, but in unique ways (see Appendix Table 18 in the SI). For example, violence promotes protest by other organizations in a shared movement, but it seems to suppress it across organizations in the same country. Further work is necessary to understand the potential spread of nonviolent tactics.

More broadly, the logic of tactical diversification developed here is not necessarily limited to movements for self-determination. This new way of thinking about interdependence could be applied to variation in violent contention or other situations in which actors make interdependent choices about their actions. Scholars could, for example, examine how different tactics influence each other in democratization movements or across borders in conflict-prone areas. The evidence provided here demonstrates that we need to think more rigorously about interdependence, moving beyond looking simply at the diffusion of specific tactics, strategies, or outcomes.

References

Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. 2001. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Asal, Victor, Richard Legault, Ora Szekely, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2013. "Gender Ideologies and Forms of Contentious Mobilization in the Middle East." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 305–18.

Beaulieu, Emily. 2014. *Electoral Protest and Democracy in the Developing World.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bloom, Mia. 2005. *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Bond, Douglas G. 1988. "The Nature and Meanings of Nonviolent Direct Action: An Exploratory Study." *Journal of Peace Research* 25(1): 81–89.

Boudreau, Vincent. 2009. *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boulding, Carew. 2014. *NGOs, Political Protest, and Civil Society.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. *Inequality, Grievances and Civil War.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chabot, Sean. 2012. *Transnational Roots of the Civil Rights Movement: African American Explorations of the Gandhian Repertoire.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2013. "Understanding Nonviolent Resistance: An Introduction." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 271–76.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Kurt Schock. 2015. "Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns?" *Mobilization* 20(4): 427–52.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13(4): 379–99.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2013. "Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 291–304.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2014. *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, Kristin M. Bakke, and Lee J. M. Seymour. 2012. "Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 67–93.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. "State Repression and Political Order." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 1–23.

DeNardo, James. 1985. *Power in Numbers.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.

Francisco, Ronald A. 1996. "Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 1179–1204.

Gallo-Cruz, Selina. 2012. "Organizing Global Nonviolence: The Growth and Spread of Nonviolent INGOs, 1949–2003." *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change* 34: 213–56.

Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3): 167–91.

Gan, Barry L., and Robert L. Holmes. 2005. *Nonviolence in Theory and Practice.* 2nd ed. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

Gates, Scott. 2002. "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 111–30.

Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Mauricio Rivera. 2015. "The Diffusion of Nonviolent Campaigns." *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* doi:0022002715603101.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Haines, Herbert H. 1984. "Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970." *Social Problems* 32(1): 31–43.

Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. 2011. "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20(2): 191–210.

Isaac, Larry, Daniel B. Cornfield, Dennis C. Dickerson, James M. Lawson, and Jonathan S. Coley. 2012. "'Movement Schools' and the Dialogical Diffusion of Nonviolent Praxis: Nashville Workshops in the Southern Civil Rights Movement."

Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change 34: 155–84.

Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. 1997. *The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland.* London: Longman.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structure and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16(1): 57–85.

Koopmans, Ruud. 1993. "The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965–1989." *American Sociological Review* 58(5): 637–58.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1987. "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(2): 266–97.

Macleod, Jason. 2014. "From the Mountains and Jungles to the Villages and Streets: Transitions from Violent to Nonviolent Resistance in West Papua." In *Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Armed to Nonviolent Struggle*, ed. Véronique Dudouet. New York: Routledge, 45–76.

Martin, Brian. 2001. *Technology for Nonviolent Struggle.* London: War Resisters' International.

McCarthy, John, and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6): 1212–41.

Moore, Will H. 1998. "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 851–73.

Nikolayenko, Olena. 2013. "Origins of the Movement's Strategy: The Case of the Serbian Youth Movement Otpor." *International Political Science Review* 34(2): 140–58.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pape, Robert A. 2005. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.* New York: Random House.

Pearlman, Wendy. 2008/2009. "Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process." *International Security* 33(Winter): 79–109.

Pearlman, Wendy, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2012. "Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 3–15.

Schock, Kurt. 2005. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Scott, James C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action.* Boston: Porter Sargent.

Shaykhutdinov, Renat. 2010. "Give Peace a Chance: Nonviolent Protest and the Creation of Territorial Autonomy Arrangements." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 179–91.

Sinn, Fein. 1994. *Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland. A Summary Guide to the Sinn Féin Peace Proposal.* Available from URL: http://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2009/TowardsLastingPeace.pdf

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snow, David, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51(4): 464–81.

Stephan, Maria J. 2006. "Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 30(2): 57–79.

Svensson, Isak, and Mathilda Lindgren. 2011. "Community and Consent: Unarmed Insurrections in Non-democracies." *European Journal of International Relations* 17(1): 97–120.

Tarrow, Sydney. 1998. *Power in Movement.* 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2006. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics
Figure 1. Frequency of Nonviolent Tactics by Organization-year, Organization, and SD movement
Figure 2. Distribution of the Movements Based on Number of Organizations in Movement
Figure 3. Box Plot of Number of SD Movements by Number of Organizations in Movement
Figure 4. Distribution of SD Movements by Yearly Maximum Number of Organizations in Movement
Appendix Table 2. Time Varying Effects of Diffusion and Diversification Within the Same Movement 9
Appendix Table 3. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with 2-year Lag
Appendix Table 4. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with 3-year Lag
Appendix Table 5. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Control for Armed Conflict (Decay Term)
Appendix Table 6. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Imports as % GDP in All Equations
Appendix Table 7. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Controls for Concessions and Repression 14
Appendix Table 8. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Control for Wing Ties Between Organizations 15
Appendix Table 9. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Control for Repression 1-year Lag
Appendix Table 10. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Control for Repression 2-year Lag 17
Appendix Table 11. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Control for Repression 3-year Lag
Appendix Table 12. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Control for Concessions (1-year Lag)
Appendix Table 13. SUR Model on Tactics of Resistance with Control for Concessions (2-year Lag)