Checked C: Adding Memory Safety to LLVM

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


WHAT WE'LL DISCUSS


- What is Checked C?
- Implementation of Checked C in Clang
- Novel algorithm to widen bounds for null-terminated pointers
- Novel algorithm for comparison of expressions
- Conversion of legacy C code to Checked C
- Experimental evaluation
- Resources

MEMORY SAFETY HAZARDS IN C

Buffer Overflow



Null Pointer Dereference




CHECKED C: IN A NUTSHELL



Extension to C

Supports spatial safety



New Pointer Types

Adds 3 new pointer types that are bounds-checked



Incremental Porting

Allows incremental porting from legacy C

<'I'> Syntax like C++

Syntax for checked pointers is borrowed from C++ templates



Implemented in Clang

Checked C has been implemented in our fork of Clang https://bit.ly/3kmepEp

_Ptr <T>

1

Points to a Single Object

Points to an object of type T



No Pointer Arithmetic

Pointer used for dereference only



Runtime Check for Non-nullness

Non-nullness checked at runtime, if necessary

_Ptr <T>

Checked C

```
_Ptr<T> x;
T *x;
int *p;
                      _Ptr<int> p;
                      _Ptr<const int> p;
const int *p;
int x;
                      int x;
int *const p = &x;
                      const _Ptr<int> p = &x;
```

_Array_ptr<T>

Pointer to Array

Points to an element of an array of type T



Pointer arithmetic can be done on this pointer type

Runtime Check for Bounds

Non-nullness and bounds checked at runtime, if necessary

_Array_ptr(T)

Checked C

```
T *x = "";
T x[] = {};

const char *p = "abc";

char *foo(char p[]);

_Array_ptr<char> foo(char p _Checked[]);
_Array_ptr<char> foo(char p _Checked[]);
```

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

"abc\0"

Null Terminated Array

Points to a sequence of elements that ends with a null terminator

'\0'

Element Access

An element of the sequence can be read provided the preceding elements are not the null terminator



Automatic Bounds Widening

Bounds can be widened based on number of elements read

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Checked C

```
T *x = "";
T x[] = {};

Const char *p = "abc";


char *foo(char p[]);

_Nt_array_ptr<Char> foo(char p _Nt_checked[]);
_Nt_array_ptr<Char> foo(char p _Nt_checked[]);
```



BOUNDS FOR ARRAY POINTERS

https://bit.ly/2F8W3YE



LIMIT MEMORY

Describe memory range pointer can access



LOW-LEVEL CONTROL

Programmer declares bounds that act as invariants



RUNTIME CHECKS

Check that memory accesses are within bounds



STATIC CHECKS

Check that bounds invariants are not violated

BOUNDS DECLARATIONS



COUNT

p : count(n)

p can access n array elements



RANGE

p : bounds(e1, e2)

p can access memory from e1 to e2



BYTE COUNT

p : byte_count(n)


p can access n bytes



UNKNOWN

p : bounds(unknown)

p cannot be used to access memory



Insert a dynamic check for the expression and bounds


p[i], bounds(p, p + len)



Visit an expression that reads memory via a pointer **p[i]**



Get the pointer-typed expression that reads memory p[i] == *(p + i) => p + i (pointer p)



Get the bounds of the pointer-typed expression count(len) => bounds(p, p + len)



Insert a dynamic check for the expression and bounds
p[i], bounds(p, p + len)




At runtime, check that the pointer is within bounds

$$\emptyset \leftarrow (p + i) \leftarrow (p + len)$$

$$0 \leftarrow i \leftarrow len$$


When i == len: runtime error!



Visit an expression that reads memory via a pointer p[i]



Get the pointer-typed expression that reads memory p[i] == *(p + i) => p + i (pointer p)



Get the bounds of the pointer-typed expression count(len) => bounds(p, p + len)



Insert a dynamic check for the expression and bounds p + i, bounds(p, p + len)




At runtime, check that the pointer is within bounds

$$0 \leftarrow (p + i) \leftarrow (p + len)$$

$$0 \leftarrow i \leftarrow len$$

STATICALLY CHECKING BOUNDS DECLARATIONS



INFER

Bounds for pointertyped expressions



CONVERT

Inferred and declared bounds to ranges



CHECK

Declared range is within inferred range

LHS = RHS;

ASSIGNMENTS:


Check RHS bounds contain LHS bounds

void f(param);
f(arg);

FUNCTION CALLS:

Check arg bounds contain param bounds


BOUNDS INFERENCE FOR EXPRESSIONS






```
void f(_Array_ptr<int> p : count(x), int x,
      \_Array\_ptr<int>q:count(3)) {
                                            (q, q + 3)
  p = q;
  p = (int _Checked[]){ 0, 1 };
                                            \{0,1\},\{0,1\}+2
  p++; // Original value of p: p-1.
                                            (p - 1, p - 1 + x)
                                            unknown
 x = x * 2; // No original value for x.
```

CONVERT BOUNDS TO RANGE



CHECK RANGES



BOUNDS DECLARATIONS ERRORS


```
_Array_ptr<char> p : count(2) = 0;

_Array_ptr<char> q : count(1) = 0;

// Error: declared bounds for 'p' are invalid


// after assignment.

p = q;
```



BOUNDS DECLARATIONS WARNINGS

```
_Array_ptr<char> p : count(2) = 0;
_Array_ptr<char> q : count(e) = 0;
// Warning: cannot prove declared bounds for 'p'
// are valid after assignment.
p = q;
```



BOUNDS WIDENING FOR NULL TERMINATED POINTERS

```
Lower bound Upper bound

_Nt_array_ptr<T> p : bounds(p, p) = "";
```

Ptr deref is at upper bound. Widen the bounds. New bounds: (p, p + 1)

if
$$(*(p + 1))$$

Ptr deref is at upper bound. Widen the bounds. New bounds: (p, p + 2)

$$if (*(p + 3))$$

Ptr deref is NOT at upper bound. No bounds widening. Flag ERROR!

error: out-of-bounds memory access: if (*(p + 3))

note: accesses memory at or above the upper bound

note: inferred bounds are 'bounds(p, p + 2)'




BOUNDS WIDENING DATAFLOW PROPERTIES

https://bit.ly/35lm4yx



Forward

A basic block is visited before its successors



Path-Sensitive

Dataflow analysis generates different facts on the *then* and *else* branches

Flow-Sensitive

 1:

 2:


Dataflow analysis depends on the order of statements in a basic block

Intra-Procedural



Dataflow analysis is done on one function at a time


BOUNDS WIDENING DATAFLOW EQUATIONS



Gen[Bi->Bj]


 $Gen[Bi->Bj] \cup \{p:1\},$ where p ∈ _Nt_array_ptr

Kill[B]



 $Kill[B] \cup \{p\},$ where $p \in Nt_array_ptr$ and $i \in decl_bounds(p)$


In[B]



 \cap Out[Bi->B], where $Bi \in pred(B)$

Init: $In[Entry] = \emptyset$ In[B] = Top

Out [Bi->Bj]



(In[Bi] - Kill[Bi]) U Gen[Bi->Bj]

Init: Out[Entry->Bj] = \emptyset Out[Bi->Bj] = Top

BOUNDS WIDENING

DATAFLOW ANALYSIS


```
1: int k = 0;

2: _Nt_array_ptr<T> p : bounds(p, p + k);

3: while (*(p + k))

4: if (*(p + k + 1))

5: k = 42;
```



Blocks	Pred	Succ	Gen	Kill	(Init)	(Init)	In	Out	In	Out
ВØ	Ø	{B1}	{B0−>B1: Ø}	Ø	Ø	{B0−>B1: Ø}	Ø	{BØ−>B1: Ø}	Ø	{BØ→>B1: Ø}
B1	{B0, B2, B3}	{B2, B4}	{B1->B2: {p:0}, B1->B4: Ø}	Ø	{p:1}	{B1->B2: {p:1}, B1->B4: {p:1}}	Ø	{B1->B2: {p:0}, B1->B4: Ø}	Ø	{B1->B2: {p:0}, B1->B4: Ø}
B2	{B1}	{B3, B1}	{B2→B3: {p:1}, B2→B1: Ø}	Ø	{p:1}	{B2->B3: {p:1}, B2->B1: {p:1}}	{p:1}	{B2->B3: {p:1} B2->B1: {p:1}}	{p:0}	{B2->B3: {p:1}, B2->B1: ∅}
В3	{B2}	{B1}	{B3->B1: ∅}	{p}	{p:1}	{B3->B1: {p:1}}	{p:1}	{B3->B1: ∅}	{p:1}	{B3->B1: ∅}
B4	{B1}	Ø	Ø	Ø	{p:1}	Ø	{p:1}	Ø	Ø	Ø

Out

BOUNDS WIDENING THE NEED TO COMPARE EXPRESSIONS

$$Nt_array_ptrp: bounds(p, p + i + j + 4);$$

Should Widen Bounds Should Not Widen Bounds

if
$$(*(p + i + j + 1 + 3))$$
 if $(*(p + i + j + 3))$
if $(*(2 + i + p + j + 2 + 0))$ if $(*(p + (i * j) + 4))$
if $(*(p + 5 + i - 1 + j))$ if $(*(p + i + 4))$
if $(*(j + p + i + (2 * 2)))$ if $(*(p + i + j + 4 + k))$




"We need a mechanism to determine if two expressions are equivalent"




SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS THE PREORDER AST

https://bit.ly/3bLT4kx




N-ary

The preorder AST is an n-ary tree



Preorder

It represents an expression in the preoder form



Flattened

The tree is flattened at each level by coalescing nodes with their parents




Normalized

The underlying expression is normalized by constant-folding and sorting the nodes of the tree

SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS

USING THE PREORDER AST




Are E1 and E2 equivalent?

E1 =
$$(b + c + a) * (e + 3 + d + 5)$$


E2 = $(2 + 3 + 3 + d + e) * (c + a + b)$

Step 1: Create preorder ASTs for E1 and E2




SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS


USING THE PREORDER AST




Step 2: Coalesce leaf nodes having a commutative and associative operator




SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS USING THE PREORDER AST




SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS USING THE PREORDER AST





SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS USING THE PREORDER AST





SEMANTIC COMPARISON OF EXPRESSIONS USING THE PREORDER AST

















Now compare the two ASTs node-by-node to check if the underlying expressions are equivalent.

CHALLENGES USING THE PREORDER AST

Integer overflow due to re-association of expressions

$$(e1 + e2) + e3$$

Original expression may not overflow

e1 + (e2 + e3) Expression may overflow after re-association!

Possible Solution

-fwrapv

Treat signed integer overflow as two's complement

What about pointer arithmetic overflow?

-fwrapv-pointer


GCC has this flag

INCREMENTAL CONVERSION



WHAT ABOUT COMPATIBILITY?

Conversion without breaking compatibility?



Bounds-safe interface

BOUNDS-SAFE INTERFACES

https://bit.ly/35qXht0




CONVERSION SUPPORT

Port from legacy C a few lines at a time

T

ALTERNATE TYPES

Specify types for checked parameters



OPTIONAL BOUNDS

Checked arguments must meet bounds



BACKWARDS COMPATIBLE


Accept unchecked pointer arguments



BOUNDS CHECKING

Check bounds for checked arguments

CONVERTING A FUNCTION



CONVERSION EXAMPLE

```
char *strncpy(char *dest, char *src, size_t n);

Pointers to convert
```

DETERMINE CHECKED TYPES

ADD BOUNDS

UPDATE FUNCTION CALLS

```
void unchecked_pointers() {
 // dest points to 3 characters including null terminator.
 char *dest = "12\0";
  // src points to 2 characters including null terminator.
  char *src = "1 \0";
 // Fine - there is no bounds checking for dest and src.
 strncpy(dest, src, 3);
```

UPDATE FUNCTION CALLS

```
void checked_pointers() {
  // dest points to 3 characters including null terminator.
  _Nt_array_ptr<char> dest : count(3) = "12\0";
  // src points to 2 characters including null terminator.
  _Nt_array_ptr<char> src : count(2) = "1 \0";
  // Fine - dest and src both point to at least 2 characters.
  strncpy(dest, src, 2);
  // Error: src points to 2 characters, expected to
  // point to at least 3.
  strncpy(dest, src, 3);
```

CHALLENGE: STRING LENGTHS

```
char *strupr(char *str);
```

```
char *strupr(char *str : itype(_Nt_array_ptr<char>));
```

```
char *strupr(char *str : itype(_Nt_array_ptr<char>) count(?));
```

CHALLENGE: STRING LENGTHS

This would be great...

...but it's not possible

WHY CAN'T WE USE STRLEN?



No modifying expressions are allowed in bounds



Function calls may modify memory

AUTOMATIC CONVERSION




CHECKEDC-CONVERT



https://bit.ly/32hTXOP



CONVERT POINTERS






UMD

Developed at the University of Maryland

CONVERTING MUSL



MUSL STRING LIBRARY

31
FUNCTIONS CONVERTED

316
LINES OF CODE CONVERTED

72
TOTAL FUNCTIONS

1574
TOTAL LINES OF CODE

MUSL NETWORK LIBRARY

51
FUNCTIONS CONVERTED

729
LINES OF CODE CONVERTED

65
TOTAL FUNCTIONS

3524
TOTAL LINES OF CODE

EVALUATION



LNT TESTS

Olden and Ptrdist benchmakrs



CODE SIZE

Impact on generated code



RUNTIME

Overhead introduced by dynamic checks



COMPILING


Impact on compilation time

LINES OF CODE MODIFIED

% Lines of code modified in converted test

17.5%


Average LOC modified



REMAINING UNCHECKED CODE

% Code still unchecked after conversion


9.3%
Average unchecked



CODE SIZE

7.4%
Average overhead

Lower is better




RUNTIME

8.6%

Average overhead

Lower is better




COMPILE TIME

% Compile time overhead

24.3%
Average overhead

Lower is better



RESOURCES



Code Repository

https://bit.ly/2FrHkbh



https://bit.ly/2FmPyRO





SecDev 2018 Paper

https://bit.ly/2Zt2k8g