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

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DIVERSE INTRUSION-TOLERANT SYSTEMS

Doutoramento em Informática

Miguel Garcia Tavares Henriques

Tese orientada por:
Prof. Doutor Alysson Neves Bessani
e co-orientada pelo Prof. Doutor Nuno Fuentecilla Maia Ferreira Neves

Documento especialmente elaborado para a obtenção do grau de doutor

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Abstract

Keywords: Diversity, Vulnerabilities, Operating Systems, Intrusion Tolerance, Proactive Recovery.

Resumo

Palavras-chave: Diversidade, Vulnerabilidades, Sistemas Operativos, Tolerância a Intrusões, Recuperção Proactiva.

Resumo Estendido

Palavras-chave: Diversidade, Vulnerabilidades, Sistemas Operativos, Tolerância a Intrusões, Recuperção Proactiva.

Acknowledgements

To my grandmother.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Context and Motivation

Intrusion Tolerance. Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)[1] is a well-established area of research that aims to guarantee the safety of replicated systems even in the presence of some (Byzantine) faulty nodes. In a nutshell, BFT protocols guarantee that replicas agree on the order of the message execution, and thus, the replicas work as a replicated state machine. The BFT safety holds even if a subpart of the replicas, typically f out of n, is faulty, the remaining replicas are assumed as correct and thus execute correctly. Although not explicit, this assumption leverages on the strict condition that nodes (must) fail independently. Otherwise, compromising f replicas is virtually the same as compromising $f+1$.

BFT was first proposed in 1982 by Lamport *et al.* [104], but it only as awaken the distributed systems research community to its relevancy in 1999 due to Castro and Liskov's Practical BFT [31]. In the last twenty years of active research on BFT replication, there were made great advances on the performance (e.g., [13, 18, 101]), use of resources (e.g., [19, 109, 162, 169, 174]), and robustness (e.g., [9, 23, 40]) of BFT systems. However, BFT in general and these works in particular, assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that replicas fail independently. This assumption implies that it takes more time to compromise the system (i.e., $f+1$ replicas) if the nodes do not share weaknesses. Nevertheless, a few works rely on some orthogonal mechanisms (e.g., [14, 140]) to avoid these common weaknesses, or rule out the possibility of malicious failures from their system models. Moreover, a few works have implemented and experimented with such diversity mechanisms (e.g., [9, 33, 140]), but in a very limited way.

In practice, a few dependable applications take advantage of diversity mechanisms. Nevertheless, in these cases, diversity is applied *intuitively*. For example, in avionics engineering, a few aircraft solutions embraced the diversity of components to avoid accidental failures [173]. Moreover, in 2014, the U.S. Navy developed the Resilient Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical Security (RHIMES) which introduced diversity through a *slightly different implementation* for each programmable logic controller [58]. Another example of a critical system that naturally adopted diversity are the Domain Name System (DNS) root servers.

[1] In this thesis we interchange Byzantine fault tolerance (*noun*) with Byzantine fault-tolerant (*adjective*) using the BFT acronym for both.

According to Lars-Johan Liman (chair of the Root Server System Advisory Committee),[2] each operator has its own configurations, as "*it allows for great operational diversity*". The goal is to avoid that a single software bug cannot bring down all servers. The blockchain growing technology implements a BFT network in a large and dispersed way. Therefore, it shares the same limitations of the enumerated BFT works, i.e., the network nodes may share common weakness. Nevertheless, Ethereum stats show that there are a few Operating Systems (OSes) among the nodes [53, 54] which can deter attacks from exploiting common mode failures.

Despite the adoption of (naive) diversity in practical systems, other variables must be considered to make systems dependable and secure. For example, even considering an initial set of n diverse replicas, long-running services need to be cleaned from possible failures and intrusions. A few works on the proactive recovery of BFT systems [32, 50, 130, 140, 149] periodically restart their replicas to clean undetected faulty states introduced by a stealth attacker. However, these works (i) assume replicas failure independence, (ii) do not provide proof to support their diversity decisions or (iii) use limited solutions (e.g., memory randomization). Therefore, unless careful diversity choices are introduced on recoveries, the replicas do not change, thus keeping the same weaknesses.

Finally, contrary to the already established maturity of BFT solutions, no one debated how to apply diversity in a dependable (i.e., which software configurations are more dependable) and when should these configurations be changed (e.g., recovering replicas with different software).

Vulnerabilities. The reason why BFT solutions need to make stronger assumptions on the replicas failure independence is due to the existence of replicas' vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the code that can be exploited by a malicious agent to compromise some security properties (e.g., integrity and availability). Zero-day vulnerabilities are a particular type of vulnerabilities, which are especially critical as their disclosure occurs only when the attack is already (being) done. On the contrary, if a vulnerability is discovered by a vendor or by a third-party software analyst, the vendor releases a patch as soon as possible. Moreover, such vulnerabilities are traded on the black market as a highly paid service [7, 155]. For example, big companies and organizations are promoting bug bounty programs to try to find zero-day vulnerabilities before the hackers (e.g., Google Vulnerability Reward Program,[3] Facebook Bug Bounty Program,[4] Microsoft Bounty,[5] DARPA VET,[6] and DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge[7]).

[2] https://www.netnod.se/dns/dns-root-server-faq
[3] https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/index.html
[4] https://www.facebook.com/whitehat
[5] https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn425036.aspx
[6] https://www.darpa.mil/program/vetting-commodity-it-software-and-firmware
[7] https://www.darpa.mil/program/cyber-grand-challenge

Applying this information to the BFT context, an attacker can compromise a replica once it finds vulnerabilities in it. If the replicas are equal, they share the same vulnerabilities, once the attacker discovers a zero-day vulnerability, he or she will eventually exploit it on $f+1$ replicas. The rationale behind diversity on BFT is that different replicas do not share the same vulnerabilities. Therefore, to discover and exploit vulnerabilities to compromise $f+1$ replicas is more difficult than to compromise f replicas.

1.2 Objectives and Contributions

In the past, several researchers developed and improved techniques that made intrusion tolerance a cornerstone of security and dependability. Nevertheless, a few problems were left open and still lack effective answers. This thesis aims to push forward intrusion tolerance to more accurate and practical grounds. The main contributions of this thesis are summarized into the following points, along with the related publications.

Evidence for Implementing Diversity

The results achieved during the author's MSc thesis encouraged us to extend the work on the diversity of Off-the-Shelf (OTS) OSes [62]. This first step towards the design and development of dependable BFT systems is to assess how accurate were the implicit or explicit assumptions on diversity (e.g., [4, 21, 32, 33, 39, 43, 93, 101, 119, 174]). In that previous work, we studied the vulnerability data from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [127] the most complete vulnerability database available to answer to the question: *What are the dependability gains from using diverse OSes on a replicated intrusion-tolerant system?* Nevertheless, we have made some extensions to that work, which are presented in this thesis. In particular, we devised three manual strategies for selecting diverse software components to minimize the incidence of common vulnerabilities in replicated systems. Moreover, we observed that using different OS releases of the same OS is enough to warrant its adoption as a more straightforward, less complicated, more manageable configuration for replicated systems. The described contributions (together with the ones published during the MSc [62]) are reported in the following publication:

1. **Analysis of Operating System Diversity for Intrusion Tolerance**, Miguel Garcia, Alysson Bessani, Ilir Gashi Nuno Neves, and Rafael Obelheiro, in *Software: Practice and Experience, 2014* [63].

Applying Diversity on BFT Systems

In our first attempt to validate diversity, we presented substantial evidence to claim that using different OSes guarantees failure independence to some extent. However, this preliminary analysis suffer from some limitations as other works using NVD database (e.g., [8, 28, 60, 71, 72, 144]). It is possible to find vulnerabilities in NVD that were not reported to all affected OSes. We have found these missing vulnerabilities reported on other sources (e.g., the vendors' security advisories). Therefore, some of the results of NVD-based studies may provide less accurate conclusions about selecting different software based on common vulnerabilities. Moreover, NVD lacks from some relevant data concerning exploits and patches that are relevant when considering vulnerabilities life-cycle.

An alternative way to data-based diversity selection (e.g., OTS diversity) is to generate diversity through automatic mechanisms (e.g., [9, 140]). However, these mechanisms lack of evidence to claim that these techniques create real vulnerability independence [27, 146].

Finally, the existent systems that implement time-triggered recoveries assume that it takes the same time/effort to compromise each replica, by assuming that vulnerabilities are all the same. This assumption is unrealistic, especially when the replicas' diversity is considered [123]. Therefore, tailored methods are required to evaluate the risk of a replicated system becoming vulnerable (i.e., $f+1$ replicas suffer from the same weaknesses).

In this thesis, we address these problems from both a theoretical and practical perspective. We address the problems of *finding evidence for supporting diversity*, *manage diversity in a dependable way*, and *support diversity practical mechanisms*. First, suppress the limitations of NVD using clustering techniques, that group similar vulnerabilities, which potentially can be affected by (variations of) the same exploit. Moreover, we add additional Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) data sources to build a complete knowledge base about the possible vulnerabilities, exploits, and patches related to the systems of interest. The clusters and the collected data are used to assess the risk of a BFT system becoming compromised by the existence of common vulnerabilities. Once the risk increases, the system replaces the potentially vulnerable replica by another one, to maximize the failure independence of the replicated service. The solution continuously collects data from the online sources and monitors the risk of the BFT in such a way that removes the human from the loop.

We have implemented these contributions in LAZARUS. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first system that automatically changes the attack surface of a BFT system in a dependable way. LAZARUS continuously collects security data from several OSINT feeds to build a vulnerability knowledge base. This data is used to create clusters of similar vulnerabilities. These clusters and other collected attributes are used to analyze the risk of the BFT system becoming compromised. Once the risk increases, LAZARUS replaces the

potentially vulnerable replica by another one, trying to maximize the failure independence. The replica's replacement is made automatically, while a new replica is deployed in the BFT group, the replaced node is put on quarantine and updated with the available patches, to be re-used later. These mechanisms were implemented to be fully automated and transparent to BFT systems. Moreover, the current implementation of LAZARUS manages 17 OS versions, supporting the BFT replication of a set of representative applications. The replicas run in Virtual Machines (VMs), allowing provisioning mechanisms to configure them. We conducted two sets of experiments: The first one demonstrates that LAZARUS risk management can prevent a group of replicas from sharing vulnerabilities over time; The second one, reveals the potential negative impact that virtualization and diversity can have on performance. In this experiment, we evaluated LAZARUS with three BFT use case applications: (1) a Key-Value Store application, (2) SIEVEQ an application-like firewall (this contribution is presented in the next section), and (3) a BFT ordering service for Hyperledger Fabric a blockchain application. The overall results show that if naive configurations are avoided, BFT applications in diverse configurations can perform close to our homogeneous bare metal setup.

The contributions of this work resulted in the following publications:

2. **DIVERSYS: DIVErse Rejuvenation SYStem**, Miguel Garcia, Nuno Neves, and Alysson Bessani in the *Simpósio Nacional de Informática (INFORUM), 2012 [65].*

3. **Towards an Execution Environment for Intrusion-Tolerant Systems**, Miguel Garcia, Alysson Bessani, and Nuno Neves, Poster session in the *European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys), 2016* [64].

4. **LAZARUS: Automatic Management of Diversity in BFT Systems**, Miguel Garcia, Alysson Bessani, and Nuno Neves – *Submitted for publication.*

BFT Multi-layer Resiliency

LAZARUS implements mechanisms that provide security and dependability for replicated systems. However, not all systems need to be BFT-replicated nor managed with such advanced mechanisms. Some of the most critical applications that can benefit from such management are firewalls. Firewalls are used as the primary protection against external threats, controlling the traffic that flows in and out of a network. Typically, they decide if a packet should go through (or be dropped) based on the analysis of its contents. Most generic firewall solutions suffer from two inherent problems: First, they have vulnerabilities as any other system, and as a consequence, they can also be the target of advanced attacks. For example, the NVD [127] shows that there have been many security issues in commonly used firewalls. NVD's reports present the following numbers of security issues between 2010 and

2018:[8] 205 for the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance; 123 in Juniper Networks solutions; and 50 related to iptables/netfilter. Common protection solutions often have been the target of malicious actions as part of a wider scale attack (e.g., anti-virus software [34], Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [10] or firewalls [37, 38, 92, 153]). Second, firewalls are typically a single point of failure, which means that when they crash, the ability of the protected system to communicate may be compromised, at least momentarily. Therefore, ensuring the correct operation of the firewall under a wide range of failure scenarios becomes imperative.

This last contribution addresses the previously described problems with a new protection system, called SIEVEQ. This system mixes the firewall paradigm with a message queue service. In the last decade, several significant advances occurred in the development of intrusion-tolerant systems. However, to the best of our knowledge, very few works proposed intrusion-tolerant protection devices, such as firewalls. Performance reasons might explain this, as BFT replication protocols are usually associated with significant overheads and limited scalability. Additionally, achieving complete transparency to the rest of the system can be challenging to reconcile with the objective of having fast message filtering under attack. In SIEVEQ, we explore a different design for replicated protection devices, where we trade some transparency on senders and receivers for a more efficient and resilient firewall solution. In particular, we propose an architecture in which critical services and devices can only be accessed through a message queue where application-level filtering is implemented. It is assumed that these services have a limited number of senders, which can be appropriately configured to ensure that only they are authorized to communicate through SIEVEQ. The solution has a fault- and intrusion-tolerant architecture that applies filtering operations in two stages acting like a sieve. The first stage, called *pre-filtering*, performs lightweight checks, making it efficient to detect and discard malicious messages from external adversaries. In particular, messages are only allowed to go through if they come from a pre-defined set of authenticated senders. Denial-of-Service (DoS) traffic from external sources is immediately dropped, preventing those messages from overloading the next stage. The second stage, named *filtering*, enforces more refined application level policies, which can require the inspection of some message fields or need the enforcement of specific ordering rules.

The contributions of this work resulted in the following publications:

5. **An Intrusion-Tolerant Firewall Design for Protecting SIEM Systems**, Miguel Garcia, Nuno Neves, Alysson Bessani, in the *Workshop on Systems Resilience in conjunction with the IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2013* [66].

[8] To the date of Jul 12th 2018.

6. **SIEVEQ: A Layered BFT Protection System for Critical Services**, Miguel Garcia, Nuno Neves, and Alysson Bessani, in *IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2018* [67].

Non-related contributions. To conclude, a collaboration with a colleague resulted in a work on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system enhanced with BFT techniques. We documented the challenges of building such system from a "traditional" non-BFT solution. This effort resulted in a prototype, implemented by the colleague, that integrates the Eclipse NeoSCADA [52] and the BFT-SMART [23] open-source projects. Although this contribution is out of the scope of the thesis, it is easy to envision the integration of the prototype with LAZARUS.

7. **On the Challenges of Building a BFT SCADA**, André Nogueira, Miguel Garcia, Alysson Bessani, and Nuno Neves, in *Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2018* [128].

Thesis Statement

We summarize our findings in the following thesis statement:

> *It is possible to build dependable BFT replicated systems by minimizing the number of replicas' common vulnerabilities through software's diversity. Additionally, it is possible to continuously manage these systems while monitoring OSINT data and deciding when replicas should be diversified as deploying the most dependable configurations.*

1.3 Thesis Overview

Chapter 2: Background. This chapter provides a background overview of intrusion tolerance history. It also presents the most relevant and related works on the different areas comprised by intrusion tolerance. In particular, it is focused on its main areas: Byzantine Fault Tolerance, replica rejuvenations, and diversity. Then, it identifies several works that implemented diversity guided by *intuition*, then it covers the works that analyzed vulnerabilities, and finally, presents some solutions that manage intrusion-tolerant systems.

Chapter 3: A Study on Common Vulnerabilities. The preliminary evidence that diversity could improve systems' dependability was published before this thesis. However, we have made a few additional contributions which are presented in this chapter. The extended work provides more substantial evidence to support the diversity adoption. Moreover, it shows that with advised choices one can build dependable systems. Although some solutions

are (now recognized by us as) naive, they were a significant contribution to push us towards building dependable systems with diversity.

Chapter 4: BFT Diversity Management. This chapter describes the solution's design that we propose to solve a few of the existing open problems of intrusion tolerance. In particular, we show how to solve data source limitations that affected several works in the past. Moreover, we present a new metric that is used by an algorithm to minimize the risk of BFT replicas becoming vulnerable by common mode failures. In the end, we evaluate the efficacy of our metric and algorithm by executing the algorithm against different configuration strategies that have been used in related works.

Chapter 5: LAZARUS. This chapter presents the LAZARUS implementation. It details the different implementation aspects that we addressed in Chapter 4. Moreover, we present an extensive performance evaluation of LAZARUS managed systems. In particular, we evaluate the performance of three real BFT applications, one of which is presented in detail the in following chapter.

Chapter 6: SIEVEQ an Use Case. This chapter presents SIEVEQ, a firewall-like replicated application that implements a new architecture paradigm. The SIEVEQ architecture provides additional resilient mechanisms when compared with state-of-the-art solutions. To conclude, we present an evaluation where we show the resilient mechanism performance when SIEVEQ is attacked.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Research Directions. This chapter summarizes the results that we achieved within this thesis. Additionally, we identify and briefly describe the directions of the work that can be pursued in future research.

2 Background

This chapter presents the reasons why intrusion tolerance is needed, and then it describes the most relevant related works in the different intrusion tolerance areas. It covers mainly the state-of-the-art of BFT replication, the techniques to rejuvenate replicas, and the benefits of using software diversity on distributed and replicated systems. It also presents a few practical attempts to build systems that comprise these techniques. Finally, it describes some of the works on vulnerability analysis and how such analysis can be used to improve classical intrusion-tolerant systems.

2.1 The Need for Intrusion Tolerance

The realistic way to provide security is to build mechanisms that protect potentially vulnerable systems from attackers. This is particularly important when considering critical systems that attract highly motivated attackers. Here, the focus is on designing mechanisms to make systems safer and resilient despite their number of vulnerabilities and the attacker's power. In the following, we make an overview of the different approaches that can be combined to deal with the challenge of providing security and dependability for critical systems.

Vulnerability Prevention

One of the primary techniques to stop attackers is to try to avoid that vulnerabilities persist in the code throughout the software development phases until it is used in production. One way to do that is to detect and remove vulnerabilities during the development and testing stages. Here, we distinguish six different approaches that attempt to prevent software vulnerabilities.

First, the most basic approach is manual analysis, typically developers (named testers) or automatic tools perform a set of tests that validate program inputs and outputs. Often, in this type of analysis, the tester needs to check the results manually. The accuracy of the solution depends on how well the inputs cover all the behavior of the software and if the tester detects the output violations after (a description of this process is presented [165]).

Model checking is another approach, which abstracts the software code and formally verifies the program invariants. However, the most common techniques typically over-

simplify the protocols to make them formally verifiable or just use very particular version to verify [35, 97, 124]. Moreover, this process consumes much time, and it is expensive for most of the companies, which makes this method difficult to scale to complex systems [69]. For example, an OS kernel was formally verified [97], but contrary to the Linux kernel that has more than 20 million lines of code[1] this only has 10k lines of code.

One way to find pieces of code that could harm the correctness of the software is to resort to static vulnerability analyzers. This type of analysis is typically limited as it looks for small parts of the code that alone may not cause major alarm. Additionally, it is exhaustive and depends on the availability of the source code. On the contrary, in the software's reliability area, there are significant advances in automatic and efficient error detection [171]. A particular technique used in security that tackles both coverage and code complexity is taint analysis. In this technique, any program variable that can be modified by a user is seen as a vulnerability trigger. Then, when it is accessed, it becomes tainted for further inspection. The main limitations of taint analysis are that vulnerabilities are detected only for the execution paths that have been explored by the tester, and it is limited to call/return functions being challenging to cover shared memory or global variables [172].

Another conventional solution to explore software bugs is fuzzing. Fuzzing is a dynamic technique, as it runs against executing software, and its success in finding vulnerabilities or bugs results from a good set of input test cases. These can be built manually and tuned for a particular application, or randomly generated, for the latter they are likely to fail on triggering more complex vulnerabilities. The main limitation of fuzzing is the time it takes to perform, as it tries multiple execution paths during the test [61].

There are also solutions that combine some of the previously described techniques like taint analysis and fuzzing. For example, concolic testing is a technique that performs symbolic execution along with a concrete execution path [95]. Therefore, it is more accurate than fuzzing, but it tends to succumb to path explosion. Some of these techniques can be combined to take the best of some of the approaches described before [152].

Finally, some works proposed workarounds that intended to minimize the window of vulnerability between vulnerability disclosure and the patch release. Typically, these solutions have two phases: first, the detection phase where they look for vulnerabilities in the source code, and a second one, where they instrument the code with the vulnerability workaround. Although they may have good coverage of the vulnerabilities, there are a few caveats on applying such solution. For example, some workarounds may crash the application upon the vulnerability activation, or they may disable the main functions that clients use in the software [85], i.e., compromising the availability.

[1] Source: https://www.linuxcounter.net/statistics/kernel on 2nd July 2018

Although these techniques are steps towards more robust software, they all have limitations on coverage, either they fail to cover the whole code surface, or they fail to detect more complex and unknown vulnerabilities. Moreover, these techniques are especially useful to use before the vulnerable system is in production.

Fault Detection and Removal

Most of the previously described techniques work offline and are not complete. Therefore, unknown vulnerabilities may arise when the system is already online, allowing the system to be compromised. Then, we need a more complex approach to cope with the existence of vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The detection and removal approach works by detecting intrusions at runtime and then triggering a recovery mechanism to clear the resulting effects.

Since some attacks employ a combination of different vulnerabilities, which isolated would be harmless, it is hard to detect them when the system is in production. This approach presents three problems: First, there are no perfect intrusion detectors, and therefore, stealth attacks may remain active for long intervals; Second, the service can experience some periods of unavailability while the service is recovering; Finally, recovering a system might clean its faults, but the system remains vulnerable. Therefore, depending on the flow, it could be easy for an attacker to repeat the same procedure to compromise the system every time it recovers.

Fault Tolerance and Masking

The previously described approaches assume that vulnerability removal can be achieved or that is possible to detect all the attacks. However, these assumptions are unrealistic, and it is not advisable to trust the security and dependability of a sole approach, as it creates a single point-of-failure. Thus, once the system becomes compromised the whole infrastructure becomes exposed to more attacks.

The established way to build a system with tolerance and masking properties is to base its implementation on a group of replicas, which execute equal commands in the same order. Primary-backup replication (i.e., $1 + 1$ replicas), would suffice if only crash faults are considered. If one of the replicas stops executing, the other can replace it and deliver the service correctly. However, if arbitrary faults are considered, this form of primary-backup replication is not enough because compromised replicas could return arbitrary outputs to the clients, impeding the correct answer to be delivered.

State Machine Replication (SMR) [103] is an approach that has been employed to ensure fault tolerance [142] of fundamental services in modern internet-scale infrastructures (e.g., [30, 42, 86]). SMR is achieved in distributed systems that run an agreement protocol that guarantees that all the replica nodes (i) start from the same state, (ii) process an equal sequence of messages, and (iii) execute the same state transitions. These properties guarantee that a service runs in a similar manner in all replicas, and therefore, they all produce the same outputs. However, SMR must resort to intrusion tolerance techniques [161] to address malicious (or sometimes called Byzantine) faults.

Intrusion tolerance was first proposed by Fraga and Powell [57] as a solution to address faults without compromising the security of a system. More formally, we adopt the following intrusion tolerance definition:

Definition 1. *"A replicated intrusion-tolerant system is a replicated system in which a malicious adversary needs to compromise more than f out-of n components in less than T time units to make it fail."* [20]

It is necessary to employ BFT SMR, a particular case of SMR, to build a system capable of operating correctly even in the presence of some compromised replicas. Since no single replica can be trusted completely, the correctness of the system comes from the majority of correct nodes. For example, to tolerate a single fault (i.e., $f = 1$) the system must have four replicas, where $n \geq 3f + 1$ [32]. Although BFT protocols provide safety to a bound of f faulty nodes, with sufficient time (i.e., greater than T), an adversary could eventually compromise $f + 1$ nodes. Then, additional mechanisms are needed to clean the faulty state, for example, from time to time the nodes are recovered [32]. However, if a recovered node remains vulnerable to the same attack, the time to compromise $f + 1$ replicas becomes smaller as the attacker already knows how to exploit the existing vulnerabilities. For this reason, several authors have built their systems assuming that nodes fail independently due to some mechanism that provides failure independence (e.g., [21, 32, 149, 162]). For instance, to increase the time T that takes to compromise $f + 1$, one could employ periodic recoveries to reset the replicas' faulty state. Moreover, to avoid reintroducing replicas with the same vulnerabilities in the system, the recovery should change the replica's code somehow. Finally, the recovery procedure needs to managed carefully because otherwise, the decisions that are made with no criteria could lead to a decrease of T. If bad decisions are made, e.g., deploying $f + 1$ replicas with shared weaknesses, an attacker can replicate the same attack on the sufficient number of replicas to compromise the whole system (i.e., $f + 1$). Otherwise, an attacker needs to create $f + 1$ different exploits and apply them to $f + 1$ replicas before T. In the following sections, we present and describe several works on specific areas of intrusion tolerance, covering the various issues that we have just mentioned.

2.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Castro and Liskov's PBFT [31] was the first practical BFT replicated system, and it was initially proposed as a solution to handle faults of both accidental and malicious nature. The correctness of a BFT service arises from the existence of a quorum of correct nodes capable of reaching consensus on the (total) order of messages to be delivered to the replicas. PBFT implements a SMR protocol that guarantees safety for up to $\lfloor \frac{n-1}{3} \rfloor$ faulty replicas out of a total of n. To tolerate a single replica failure, this sort of system typically must have four replicas. This property holds even in asynchronous systems such as the internet.

PBFT implemented a SMR, therefore, it guarantees that each correct replica executes the same commands, in the same order, and then it produces the same output. In Figure 2.1, we present an overview of the PBFT protocol that can be summarized as follows: A client *(c)* sends a message to all the replicas *(R1-R4)* requesting the execution of some service (or operation). Then, the leader replica has to assign a sequence number to the request and multicasts a *propose* message to the other replicas. If the replicas agree with the leader, they send a *write* message to each other. At this phase of the protocol, every correct replica agrees on the ordering of the messages. Next, every replica multicasts an *accept* message. When correct replicas receive the *accept* messages from a quorum, then they execute the request deterministically. In the end, it replies to the client, which waits for $f+1$ equal responses to guarantee that the correct response is delivered.

Every replica shares a key with each other and with clients. These keys are used to authenticate messages with a Message Authentication Code (MAC). The messages that are multicast by the clients are authenticated with a vector of MACs. Then, each replica verifies its own MAC. The authors validated this BFT library implementing a Byzantine fault-tolerant file system. The results show that when the workload increases the throughput and latency is nearly the same as a non-replicated system.



Figure 2.1 – Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol overview, where *C* represents a client of a replicated service enumerated by replicas *Ri*.

PBFT good performance encouraged the use of BFT in common systems, and to develop optimizations to improve BFT protocols. Since the PBFT proposal, many solutions have been dedicated to improve BFT protocols in a different manner. Table 2.1 gives an overview of a few of them.

ZYZZYVA [101]	Introduced speculation to avoid the expensive three-phase commit before processing the requests. This might introduce some inconsistency in the state of the replicas when speculation fails and needs the help from the client to fix the problem.
AARDVARK [40]	Shifted the paradigm to a new design. This design improved the performance under faulty scenarios trading some performance on the normal case. The decision was to design a system that prefers safety over performance on gracious executions. Some counter-intuitive decisions on the architecture favored the overall execution on both gracious and fault scenarios.
UPRIGHT [39]	It provided a straightforward way to support crash fault-tolerant systems, without having to run as many replicas. It combined the protocol of ZYZZYVA and the mechanisms of AARDVARK. It did not require cryptographic signatures as it uses a MACs matrix instead.
MINBFT [162]	Reduced the number n from $3f+1$ to $2f+1$ by leveraging on trusted components. These components are deemed as trusted as it hardware is simple and thus verified. Additionally, this solution reduced one communication step compared to other BFT protocols.
BFT-SMART [23]	It was developed to be a modular and multicore-aware. It also supports replica reconfiguration, as it allows that replicas leave and join the replica group. In this process, the joined replicas received the state from the correct replicas in order to be up to date. It also has a flexible programming interface that simplifies its use.
COP [18]	It is one of the most recent BFT implementations, having reached 2.4 million operations per second. This was achieved mostly due to BFT architecture changes, like the creation of *consensus instances* which are assigned to a client or a group of clients. These (separated) *consensus instances* are executed in parallel increasing the throughput of the system.

Table 2.1 – Brief overview of the most relevant BFT works.

Summary. In this thesis, we propose a control plane for BFT systems. The aim is to guarantee that replicas execute correctly while tolerating malicious failures in a subset of them. The implementation of such BFT protocol is a complex task, namely if it supports mechanisms for state transfer and reconfiguration while ensuring good performance. Therefore, we prefer to rely on existent libraries than to build a new one. Nevertheless, for some contributions (see Chapter 6), we needed to perform some modifications on the chosen library.

2.3 Replica Rejuvenation

Software rejuvenation was proposed in the 90's [83, 84] as a proactive approach to prevent component performance degradation and failures due to software aging. This solution was implemented using three components: a watchdog process (`watchd`), a checkpoint library (`libft`) and a replication mechanism (`REPL`). A primary component executes the application and also runs the `watchd` to monitor the application crashes and hangs. The

backup component keeps its application inactive and observes the primary node in order to be able to substitute it. Additionally, there is a routine (provided by `libft`) that periodically makes checkpoints and logs messages. These checkpoints are replicated with `REPL` in the backup node. When the primary node crashes or hangs, it is restarted, and if needed the backup takes his place on the execution.

Some years later, proactive recovery was also adopted on BFT replicated systems by Castro and Liskov [32]. In order to support long-running services, the aim is to rejuvenate replicas periodically to eliminate the effects that an attacker could have caused on a faulty node. This mechanism allows that the system remains correct as long as the adversary controls up to f replicas before a recovery. Moreover, PBFT introduced additional mechanisms to guarantee that SMR properties are maintained even with recoveries. In particular, a *state transfer* protocol, which allows that recovered replicas fetch a correct and up to date state from the other (correct) replicas. Additional assumptions were needed to guarantee the PBFT liveness and safety during the recoveries: (i) each replica contains a trusted chip to store its private key, and it can sign and decrypt messages without revealing the key; (ii) the replicas' public keys are stored in a read-only memory, which needs physical access to be modified; and (iii) a watchdog timer is used to avoid human interaction to restart replicas. The watchdog hands the execution to the recovery monitor, which cannot be interrupted.

An alternative way to SMR to implement BFT systems is to resort to quorum systems. Zhou *et al.* [179] presented COCA, a fault-tolerant online certification authority to be deployed both in a local area network and on the internet. It also employed proactive recovery to rejuvenate replicas' state including the capacity to refresh the private keys of the replicas. The adoption of quorum systems does not require timing assumptions and, contrary to PBFT, COCA did not rely on trusted components. However, these options may compromise the safety (i.e., f faulty nodes in-between recoveries) of the systems under asynchronous environments as it was shown by Sousa *et al.* [151]. Sousa *et al.* demonstrated the need for hybrid-systems that require some level of synchrony to guarantee safety and liveness of proactive recovery systems.

Virtualization was later identified, by Reiser and Kapitza [136] and Distler *et al.* [51], as a useful mechanism to implement proactive recovery. They proposed an architecture, named VM-FIT, that was divided into two parts: an untrusted domain and a trusted domain. The intrusion-tolerant replicated system executes in the untrusted domain where replicas run in a separate VM. VM-FIT executes in a trusted domain, i.e., in the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM). Virtualization provides isolation between the untrusted and the trusted domains. Therefore, the trusted domain can trigger recoveries in a synchronous manner. Moreover, virtualization reduces downtime of the service during the recovery and makes the state transfer between replicas more efficient. The authors implemented this system using the Xen hypervisor. The trusted domain is placed in the hypervisor `Dom0`, and the replicas run in the untrusted VMs, `DomUs`.

Dealing with the presence of faults that cannot be detected was the drive for the work of Sousa *et al.* [149]. The authors suggested improvements to recovery mechanisms by introducing the Proactive-Reactive Recovery Wormhole (PRRW). It accelerated the rejuvenation process by detecting the faulty replicas behavior and forcing them to recover without sacrificing periodic rejuvenations. This type of technique can only be implemented with synchrony assumptions as the rejuvenations are time triggered [150]. To address this need, the authors proposed a hybrid system model: the payload was an any-synchrony subsystem where the replicas execute, and the wormhole was a synchronous subsystem. The authors implemented this approach using the Xen hypervisor as the wormhole. Zhao *et al.* [178] improved PRRW with an algorithm to schedule the rejuvenations that are triggered by monitoring the network and CPU/memory performance.

Summary. BFT replication with proactive recovery represents one of the cornerstones of intrusion tolerance. Proactive recovery allows the system to reduce the replicas' vulnerability window by cleaning the faulty states, impeding the attacker to be successful at compromising more than f replicas simultaneously. Nevertheless, BFT replication with proactive recovery guarantees the system's correctness while replicas recover before $f+1$ replicas become faulty. All works on *safe* proactive recovery require the use of a trusted local component on each replica to trigger the periodic recoveries [32, 50, 130, 140, 149]. Some of these works used hardware timers while others resorted to virtualization to separate the execution domains. In our proposal, we adopt an architecture inspired on [51] and [149]. However, our solution implements a different (from [149]) algorithm to trigger recoveries. More importantly, most of these solutions assumed that replicas fail independently without addressing that issue, which is a topic central to our research The following section reviews diversity as a way to overcome failure independence difficulties.

2.4 Diversity

In all works presented before, the correctness of the BFT system is ensured under the assumption that replicas fail independently. Therefore, it is assumed implicitly (or explicitly) that there is some mechanism that creates different vulnerable surfaces, which would increase substantially the effort to exploit each replica. One practical way to achieve this is to build diverse replicas.

Diversity can be implemented in different manners [47, 105], which may differ in the mean and on the amount of diversity generated, but the goal is the same: to create different attack surfaces (details in the survey [17]). In particular, it decreases the chances of finding a vulnerability that compromises $f+1$ replicas at the same time [32]. In other words, diversity would contribute to avoiding common vulnerabilities among replicas. We present three different approaches to attain diversity: (i) N-version programming consists of designing

and/or implementing different versions from the same specification; (ii) Automatic diversity by implementing different memory organization schemes and compiling distinct binary executables (from the same source); and (iii) OTS diversity comprises the use of different products with similar functionality, but taking advantage of the various implementations that are already available.

N-version Programming

The first work on diversity was published in 1975 by Randell *et al.* [135]. They introduced the idea of using different software design (i.e., implementations) as a way to achieve reliable software. The idea is to deploy additional and different replicas along the primary replica, and once the replicas have a mismatch result, a spare replica follows up as primary.

Chen and Avizienis [15, 36] defined the notion of N-version programming with the goal of achieving software reliability in redundant systems. The principle was to resort to *N* teams that would develop *N* versions of the same software specification that would be semantically equivalent. Then, the N-version programs would execute and compare the outputs. If the outputs were equivalent, then the result was accepted. These works opened research avenues in the area of security and reliability. In any case, Knight and Leveson [98] made an empirical study that concludes that N-version must be employed with particular care, as it for itself may not provide increased reliability guarantees.

Automatic Diversity

The idea of having to *N* different teams to develop *N* software versions was not attractive from several perspectives (including the cost), and soon appeared automatic approaches for introducing diversity. Forrest *et al.* [56] suggested randomized program transformations to introduce application diversity. They have made modifications to `gcc`, the GNU C Compiler, in such a way that at compiling time random padding is inserted into each stack frame. The diverse versions are generated therefore during the source code compilation, and these works aim to make the intruder's work more difficult when exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities. More recently, a few other works propose the usage of diversity-based compilers to build different executables [100, 130, 140, 168].

Hosek and Cadar [81] proposed VARAN, an N-version Execution framework. VARAN is composed of a leader replica and its followers that share a memory ring where they execute in parallel. These components are launched by a coordinator that orchestrates and setups the execution environment. Each follower runs a binary that has system calls rewritten differently, and this optimization plays a significant performance improvement when compared with other solutions that rewrite the whole program. The implementation of

the memory ring is also a major improvement as it allows concurrent access by multiple producers and consumers. Nevertheless, the results show that some system calls when executed in VARAN can introduce overheads (e.g., of 36% for `close` and 240% for `open`) when compared with a native setup. The authors also scale out the number of followers, which, as expected, increases the overhead as they are added. Although VARAN was purposed for reliability, some principles could be adopted in the security domain after solving some challenges, namely the use of the same address space that would allow return-oriented programming attacks.

BUNSHIN by Xu *et al.* works as classic N-version systems, the N variants receive the input execute it and then a voter checks for divergences in the output. However, BUNSHIN does not create real N-versions, in fact, it splits the program into parts, and each part (of each variant) executes some security check. In this way, they can reduce the overheads of typical N-variant solutions as the code is very practically the same while creating different checks that should capture faulty behavior. Most of the overhead introduced is due to the variants synchronization before the output voting. Nevertheless, the security of the systems holds on the assumption that an attacker cannot easily overpass the sanity checks. Moreover, it is even more challenging to overpass them in all variants, which make sense for more straightforward attacks.

A different approach based on memory address obfuscation (i.e., Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)) was proposed by Bhatkar *et al.* [24]. Their solution transformed object files and executables at the link- and load-time, without kernel or compiler modifications. The goal is to ensure that an attack that compromises one target will not succeed on the other targets. Each time the program is executed its virtual addresses and data are randomized, and therefore the attacker needs to find new ways to exploit memory errors like buffer overflows. However, recent works have shown that solutions like ASLR are still vulnerable to attacks [27, 89, 146, 160].

As it was observed in a survey, by Larsen *et al.* [105], it is quite difficult to measure the efficacy of automatic techniques. For example, entropy analysis may consider two versions of a binary as high entropy but, they could be equally vulnerable to a specific attack. Another way to evaluate these solutions is to test them against real attacks, but this would raise coverage issues. Moreover, to evaluate automatic diversity is time-consuming and it tends to over-generalize.

Off-the-shelf Diversity

The previous approaches generate diversity before software's distribution. On the contrary, OTS diversity does not need pre-distribution of diverse mechanisms. It relies on the existence of different software components that are ready to be used. There are plenty of products

that provide the same functionality and were developed by distinct vendors. In other words, Components Off-the-Shelf (COTS) diversity is like opportunistic N-version programming.

Studies. There are a few works that study the diversity of COTS as a way to achieve failure independence. Han *et al.* [72] made a systematic analysis of the effectiveness of using OTS diversity to improve the system's security. First, the authors tried to find if there were software substitutes to provide the same functionality. Then, they determined if the OTS software shared the same vulnerabilities and if so, if the same vulnerability could be exploited with the same attack. In this study, they analyzed more than 6k vulnerabilities from NVD. The results showed that 98.5% of the vulnerable software had substitutes. Moreover, the majority of them did not have the same vulnerabilities or could not be compromised with the same exploit code. It is not expected that a single exploit works in different OSes because each one has a different memory scheme and file system. Even between releases from the same OS, the low-level functions sometimes change across the versions. The study also concluded that 22.5% of the vulnerabilities were present in multiple software components. However, only 7.1% from those vulnerabilities were present in software that offers the same service. The study findings are a good sign that diversity can improve a system's dependability.

Gashi *et al.* [68] made an experimental evaluation of the benefits of adopting different Structured Query Language (SQL) databases. The authors analyzed bug reports of four database servers (PostgreSQL, Interbase, Oracle, and Microsoft SQL Server) and determined which products were affected by each bug reported. They have found few cases of a single bug compromising more than one server. In fact, there were no coincident failures in more than two of the servers. The conclusion was that OTS database servers' diversity is an effective mean to improve the system's reliability. However, the authors recognize the need for SQL translators, to increase the interoperability between servers in the replicated scenario.

In the same line of the Gashi *et al.* , Garcia *et al.* [62] studied the vulnerabilities shared among OTS OSes. Similar to [72], this study was carried out taking as input the vulnerability feeds from NVD. However, this work was only focused on OSes, and the dataset comprised 11-years of vulnerability reports. Their goal was to find to what extent different OSes had common vulnerabilities. To do that, they analyzed 2270 vulnerabilities entries manually and classified them into different categories. Then, the authors defined three types of servers: (i) a server that contained most the packages/applications available (Fat server); (ii) a server that did not contain unnecessary applications to a particular service (Thin server); and (iii) a thin server but with physically controlled access (Isolated thin server). They assumed that the third setting was the most advisable for critical systems because additional care is taken to install and setup its software. For each configuration, they compared all the common vulnerabilities in pairs of OSes. As expected, in the Isolated thin server, the number of

common vulnerabilities was considerably less than in the other configurations. There was only one vulnerability that was shared among six OSes, two that were shared among five OSes, and 130 that are shared between two OSes. They went further in the study and looked for common vulnerabilities in different versions of the same OS. Even if few OSes are employed, it is possible to achieve vulnerability independence just with different versions. The authors have found evidence that suggests that using OS diversity in a replicated system can improve its dependability.

Network diversity. Diversity assignment was also used as a solution to increase the network's resiliency (in particular its connectivity). Newell *et al.* [126] presented their solution as a Diversity Assignment Problem, that although it is an NP-hard to solve, the authors showed that for medium-size random networks graphs it was feasible to find solutions within an acceptable time. They used mixed-integer programming for medium-sized networks and for larger networks they proposed a fast greedy approach. For the first one, it was possible to achieve optimality, and for the latter an approximation of the optimal. One of the results showed that random diversity assignment is far worse than a criteria assignment (as the one they proposed). Their results showed improvements of diversity on the connectivity (i.e., resiliency). However, their models did not use realistic data, as the authors assumed that the expectancy values for the probability of node compromise were known and independent for each replica.

In the same line, Zhang *et al.* [177] proposed a metric to evaluate the resilience of private networks. The idea was to define what is the least attacking effort to compromise some critical assets of the network (i.e., the work is focused on distributed yet not replicated systems). Therefore, they measured the weakest path to the target that compromises the main asset. The authors proposed three metrics which were evaluated in a simulated environment. None of these metrics used vulnerability data to correlate the existence of common weaknesses, and on the contrary, the metrics used data about the topology, services installed, etc. The authors made a simulated evaluation of generated graph networks and evaluated their metric against these graphs. The results show that increasing the diversity on the nodes reduced the worm propagation on the network.

Summary. We presented three different techniques that support diversity as a fault tolerance mechanism. Classical N-version programming is the most costly since it needs different developers and additional programs to verify if the automatic translations work. On the contrary, OTS and some automatic diversity (like randomization) are almost for free. The first one can be obtained from components that are ready to be used, and the second one is automatic and already supported in most OSes. Diversity still has some gaps that must be addressed to make it a useful building block of intrusion tolerance. For example, how does one measure diversity as a contribution to increasing failure independence?

2.5 Practical Systems with Diversity

Despite the existence of several studies on vulnerabilities, a few works implemented diversity to some level in their systems. Totel *et al.* [158] proposed an IDS based on design diversity. The authors described an architecture that uses a set of replicated COTS servers, a proxy, and an IDS. The proxy is responsible for forwarding the requests from the client to every COTS server. When the servers reply, the proxy sends the responses to the IDS to be analyzed. The IDS compares the responses from the COTS servers, and if it detects some differences, an alarm is raised. Next, the proxy votes the responses and replies to the clients. The authors developed an algorithm to detect intrusions and tested their solutions against Snort [145] and WebStat [164]. The results showed that using a diverse-COTS service (e.g., HTTP) allows the IDS to deliver fewer alarms without missing the intrusions.

Bairavasundaram and Sundararaman [16] implemented ENVYFS, a file system that uses N-version file systems implementations to guarantee the reliability of stored data. Their solution is able to tolerate file system mistakes (e.g., crash and integrity errors). To keep the system simple, the authors used a virtual file system layer that abstract the specific file systems underneath, therefore some challenges arise from the different implementations details. Another challenge was to avoid the need for multiple storages as it uses N-variants of file systems. They solved this issue by resorting to only one storage layer and the different file systems in between. Each file system executes the operations, and then a voter collects the majority of outputs to the storage layer. The results showed that ENVYFS is able to improve the reliability by leveraging on multiple file systems. However, ENVYFS performance pays a performance penalty due to waiting for a majority of file systems responses. In most of the times, it took the sum of the time of the three file systems used.

Diversity has also been adopted to build a malware detector. Xu and Kim [170] introduced PLATPAL that analyzes the behavioral discrepancies of malicious document files on different platforms (e.g.,Windows or Macintosh). PLATPAL loads a file in both systems and monitors the execution traces or crashes. In the end, both systems compare the outputs, and an attack is signaled if divergences are observed. The authors focused on a particular application, the Adobe Acrobat Reader. It reads and displays pdf files, and both OSes have the application available. Therefore, besides the internal discrepancies, the correct executions should be very similar. There are some limitations, namely, it failed to detect attacks that needed some human interaction. Although PLATPAL was proposed to detect malicious payloads on files, it vouched (indirectly) for diversity as it showed that an attacker needed to deploy multiple payloads to compromise a system with the same attack (for the majority of the malware samples used).

Diversity on BFT. A few BFT works already adopted practical diversity mechanisms. One of the first proposals was BASE [33], an extension of PBFT [31] that explored opportunistic

OTS diversity in BFT replication. The system provided an abstraction layer for running diverse service codebases on top of the PBFT library. The key issue addressed by BASE was how to deal with different representations of the replica's state, allowing a replica that recovers from a failure to rebuild its state from other replicas. BASE was evaluated considering four different OSes and their native Network File System (NFS) implementations: Linux, OpenBSD, Solaris, and FreeBSD. The results showed that performance varied significantly when diversity was considered. Nevertheless, BASE did not address the problem of selecting replicas nor the reconfiguration of the replica group.

Roeder and Schneider [140] proposed a solution that combined an automatic diversity with rejuvenations, they called it Proactive Obfuscation (PO). The idea was to change the application and library code periodically, while preserving the original semantics by employing program transformations, i.e., system call obfuscation reordering, memory randomization, and functions return checks (through an IBM `gcc` patch that inserts and checks a random value after the functions return). Each replica generated its own obfuscated executable from a read-only device containing the "master code" based, on time-triggered epochs that a controller initiates in a secure way through a trusted component. All obfuscation mechanisms were implemented and evaluated on OpenBSD 4.0, and their results showed that PO adds little extra overhead to the non-PO execution.

A similar approach by Platania *et al.* [130] adopted a compiler-based diversity for the PRIME BFT library [9] using the MultiCompiler tool [79]. This compiler was used to create diverse binaries from the same source code through randomization and padding techniques. The authors also proposed a theoretical rejuvenation model that received as input: the probability of a replica being correct over a year (c); the number of rejuvenations per day across the whole system (r); the number of replicas (n); and the system's lifetime. Although operators can control only r and n, the authors suggested (but did not show how) that c would be estimated using OSINT from the internet (CERT alerts, bug reports, and other historical data). The authors implemented their solution in two settings, including a virtualized environment provided by the Xen Hypervisor. In this setting, each replica executed in a Linux VM, the recovery watchdog runs in a trusted domain of the same machine, and the proactive-recovery controller runs in another physical machine. In Chapter 5 we present an architecture that evolves from this one.

Summary. Diversity is becoming one of the building blocks of intrusion tolerance, alongside with BFT and rejuvenations. We presented few works that already used in some manner diversity in intrusion-tolerant settings. Although we do not discard the possibility of employing other diversity techniques, such as randomization, we are more interested in COTS diversity. COTS diversity allows us to use data that is freely available, to estimate a risk value that measures how vulnerable is each component.

Previous works are still limited to that extent, e.g., there are none or few concerns on how to create diversity to avoid common failures. They implement diversity assuming complete fault independence, but that is unrealistic. For example, different OTS OSes can share the same weaknesses due to some shared libraries or kernel code. There is a need to understand how diversity can be efficiently employed in a replicated system to make failure independence sound. Moreover, further work is still necessary to create automatic mechanisms that abstract diversity management for the administrators.

2.6 Vulnerability Analysis

In another line of research, a few works were devoted to analyzing vulnerabilities life-cycle and evolution. Massacci and Nguyen [112] analyzed several data sources that provide data about vulnerabilities, exploits, and patches. The authors mentioned some limitations on the data sources. For example, that is difficult to integrate the different sources due to naming and ID differences across them. In the following, we present several studies on vulnerability data that is used to measure and manage the security of computer systems.

The different stages of vulnerability life-cycle were described by Jumratjaroenvanit and Teng-Amnuay [90]. The authors' goal was to understand how the various life-cycle dates can be useful to estimate the probability of an attack. The methodology was to collect and analyze data from public data sources on the discovery-, disclosure-, exploit-date and exploit-, patch-availability. They used this information to define five life cycle types: (i) Zero-Day Attack (ZDA), which typically is done by a black-hat, and is characterized by equal dates of disclosure and exploit; (ii) Pseudo Zero-Day Attack (PZDA), which is a ZDA but with a patch already available, but not applied; (iii) Potential Pseudo Zero-Day Attack (PPZDA) is a PZDA but does not matter if the patch is available or not; (iv) Potential for Attack (POA) is a zero-day vulnerability. The most influential variables were the programs that were scrutinized by the tester with access to the source code, and the programs that were analyzed with some static analysis tool. The results showed that language safety was the less influential factor. The study also demonstrated was that two weeks of work were enough to have a 50% chance of finding a zero-day vulnerability. Sometimes 53 hours were enough to find one vulnerability with more than 95% of probability.

Frei *et al.* [60] made a quantitative analysis of 27k vulnerabilities disclosed in the last decade. The authors proposed a model that explains the leading players in a vulnerability lifecycle. All the dates associated with the vulnerability lifecycle were described in detail before the analysis. A few public vulnerability databases (e.g., NVD and Open Sourced Vulnerability Database (OSVDB)) were used to collect the different data attributes. The results showed that the number of patches increased after the vulnerability's disclosure. One interesting result was the *the gap of insecurity* measurement, where the patch availability

was compared against the exploit availability. The data showed that exploits are always ahead of patches. In some cases, after 30 days of the disclosure, the exploits outnumbered the number of patches by 90%.

A study conducted, by Shahzad *et al.* [144], analyzed data between 1988 to 2011 from three sources: NVD, OSVDB, and the dataset from Frei and colleagues [59]. They collected vulnerabilities that affected popular applications like Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome, and popular OSes such as Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris and several Linux distributions. It was found that 2006 was the peak year for vulnerability disclosures, and since then there was a decrease even with more software products available. However, the complexity of the disclosed vulnerabilities has increased, based on the score of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). From their dataset, 2.8% vulnerabilities have an exploit released before the public disclosure. More dramatic is the percentage of exploits that are released on the day of the vulnerability disclosure, which was in the order of 88.2%. It was observed that 9.7% of the vulnerabilities had exploits released after their disclosure. Microsoft and Apple had more exploits before the vulnerability disclosure than the other software providers. This may primarily be because hackers find it more rewarding to exploit these products due to their broader market capitalization. To what concerns patching, the authors argue that 10% of the vulnerabilities had a patch before their disclosure, and 62% had a patch on its disclosure day. There was a considerable number of vulnerabilities that were disclosed only after a patch was made available, more precisely 28%. Another conclusion was that it is easier to exploit opensource code vulnerabilities than in closed-source – this conclusion may seem obvious, but no one had shown it previously with statistical tests.

Zero-day vulnerabilities between 2008-2011 were part of a systematic study by Bilge and Dumitras [25]. The main dataset comes from the Worldlwide Intelligence Network Environmnet (WINE) (developed by Symantec), which samples and aggregates data from several hosts running Symantec products (e.g., Norton Antivirus). The WINE data was correlated with OSVDB and Symantec's Threat Explorer for attack/exploit information, allowing the measurement of the duration of zero-day attacks. They conclude that the average attack lasts ten months. Moreover, they found that another threat had exploited two years before Stuxnet some of the vulnerabilities exploited in this attack. One of the main conclusions was that the disclosure of zero-day vulnerabilities increases the risk, up to five orders of magnitude, of users being attacked. Therefore, the vendors would be responsible for prioritizing the disclosure of such vulnerabilities and preparing a patch as soon as possible.

Holm [78] made an analysis of malware alarms to verify if there is a statistical distribution to model the number of intrusions or the time to compromise a computer system. The author collected information from different software configurations from 2009 to 2012 from an IT enterprise. During this period, the enterprise had a total of 697 OSes and versions, which were considered in the evaluation. Each computer was equipped with anti-malware software,

and when malware is detected, it sent some logging data to a central database. The results showed that the Pareto distribution is the one that best fits to model the time of the first compromise. Another result was that the more the system is intruded, the more vulnerable it becomes. The author presented a few hypotheses for this result, for example, once a system was broken it can no longer be trusted. Another and more plausible hypothesis is that security awareness only increased in temporarily as a result of the intrusion, and then it is again neglected. Automatic attacks caused most of the malware considered in this study. This is probably due to the type of enterprise. Conclusions may change if malware come due to targeted attacks as they require a different strategy to penetrate the system.

Contrary to the most common approaches that attempt to measure the vulnerability state of a system, Wang *et al.* [167] proposed a different approach to assess this. The authors explored how many zero-day vulnerabilities were required to compromise a network. As they did not consider replication, but instead a "chained" architecture, the use of diversity enhances the security of the overall network, but each service in the network is not dependable. One of the limitations of this approach was that it considered all zero-day vulnerabilities equally likely to occur. Moreover, the metric's calculation is complex, and no evaluation is provided to hint to the reader on how long can it take to calculate.

Poolsappasit *et al.* [131] described a security risk assessment method that incorporated the cause-effect relationships of the network states and the likelihood of exploiting such relationships. To do that, they measured the organizations' security risk using CVSS metric. The authors implemented a tool that generates a map of the network as a Bayesian attack graph. Then, it collects data with a vulnerability scanner, and it fetches the vulnerability exposures for each vulnerability. The result is helpful for system administrators that can have an overview of the network weaknesses and associate a cost to the assets in a way that countermeasures can be taken to avoid such weaknesses. The countermeasures are indicated by the system administrator that will link them to the attributes model. Then, the administrator assigns the damage costs to every attribute. Finally, a genetic algorithm evolves the network for states where the cost of losing assets (i.e., being compromised) is minimal. Their empirical results show the costs of being compromised can be minimized by assessing the security of the system and applying the most cost-efficient countermeasures. Nevertheless, and besides the manual setup that the system administrator needs to perform, a time evaluation is missing on how the system reacts when an attack is detected.

The patch deployment process of ten popular client applications was analyzed over a five-year period by Nappa *et al.* [121]. In some cases, where applications shared libraries, the patching process took a different time from the same vulnerable shared code. The authors have found that there was a strong correlation between the vulnerability disclosure and the start patching process among vendors. It occurred within seven days for 77% of the studied vulnerabilities. A *survival analysis* (inspired in medicine and biology to measure the mortality rates associated with diseases) was performed to measure the probability

of a vulnerable host remains vulnerable beyond a specific time. The vulnerability "dies" once a patch is installed or a non-vulnerable software is installed. The experimental results showed that real-world WINE exploits still compromised 50% of the vulnerable hosts (after vulnerabilities disclosure). The median percentage of hosts that have been patched before the exploit was released was at most 14%. Together with the number of shared vulnerable code with different patching delays, these values motivate attackers to re-used already known exploits or to create patched-based exploits [29]. The authors also showed evidence to support the natural intuition that silent or automatic updates reduce the survivability of vulnerabilities. They also performed an analysis on three different user profiles, which showed that security analysts were more careful on patching software than software developers or regular users.

Machine-learning techniques were employed, by Bozorgi *et al.* [28], to classify vulnerabilities and predict future exploits. Their results showed that their trained classifiers outperform current exploitability measures like CVSS exploitability subscore. They have built a dataset based on two public databases, the Mitre' Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) (which is a subpart of NVD) and the OSVDB. The bag-of-words machine learning technique was utilized to extract the textual attributes that were more relevant to analyze. They also resorted to Support Vector Machines (SVM) to train the model and conduct offline and online experiments. In the offline setting, which they trained and evaluated data in a static fashion, they achieved an accuracy of 90% of correct predictions. In the online setting, the results showed that after a small period the model stabilized and reduced the overall error by 14%. Here, they were able to make predictions up to two days before the exploit was released with an accuracy of 75-80%. The main result, for the interest of this thesis, was the comparison between their model and the CVSS as an indicator of how a vulnerability was likely to be exploited. The CVSS assigned high scores to vulnerabilities that did not become exploited.

An in-depth analysis of four security databases, NVD, Exploit-DB, SYM, and EKITS conducted by Allodi and Massacci [8], *break down* the CVSS on its several attributes. For example, the exploitability subscore *resembled more a constant than a variable*, thus not having a real impact on the CVSS overall score. They used a randomized case-control study, which is applied to different study domains. It was used to assess the effectiveness of treatment over a sample of subjects. In this study, they measured how CVSS influences the *risk factor* of the study cases. A result that is worthy of note was that fixing vulnerabilities based on their CVSS was statistically equivalent to picking a random vulnerability to fix from the security relevance standpoint. On the contrary, the authors suggest that it was more critical to fix vulnerabilities that appear in the black market of vulnerabilities (this was re-evaluated in a recent study by the same authors [7]). The results indicated that the inclusion of black market information as a *risk factor* could increase the risk reduction up to 80%. However, the authors also pointed out that using the EKITS data source may be a

threat to the validity of the study, as it is unstructured data and therefore it requires manual analysis.

In the different and unusual data sources, Sabottke *et al.* [141] presented a study with Twitter data (e.g., specific words, the number of retweets, replies, and information about the users posting these messages) to find information about exploits. A quantitative and qualitative exploration was carried out over the vulnerability-related information disseminated on Twitter. A Twitter-based exploit detector was developed to provide an adequate response in a such short time frame. This allows the security community to foresee the exploit activity before the information reaches the *de facto* disclosure data sources, like NVD and ExploitDB. However, to complement and strengthen their information results, the paper also used sources like NVD, OSVDB, Exploit-DB, Microsoft Security Advisories and Symantec WINE. Real-world exploits were distinguished from the proof-of-concept exploits, as the latter are by-products of the disclosure process. The real-world exploits typically are not known until a critical zero-day attack occurs. The authors used SVM to classify exploits in the social media and tested their robustness to attacks, i.e., if a powerful attack could manipulate the information on Twitter with false accounts and false data. The results showed that with their proposal there was a reasonable level of confidence about the predictions. For example, the SVM classifier set to a precision of 25% could detect the Heartbleed exploits within 10 minutes of their first appearance on Twitter. They also showed that organizations like NVD overestimate the severity of some vulnerabilities (with CVSS) that never become in fact exploited.

Gorbenko *et al.* [71] resorted to the CVE and NVD databases to study vulnerability life-cycles of different OSes. The authors made a particular effort to analyze the relationship between vulnerability discovery and fix, more precisely the time vendors took to patch the vulnerable software. Moreover, they also studied common vulnerabilities among different OSes. The results show that between 2012 and 2016 most of OSes were patched for every vulnerability that was disclosed in that period (the only exception was Ubuntu Server 12.04). Another interesting result was related to *forever-day vulnerability* (i.e., vulnerabilities that are publicly disclosed but not yet patched). They showed that, for the analyzed period, Ubuntu never had a single day free from vulnerabilities, and Windows and Red Hat had only 12 and 10, respectively. However, the most important results were the implications of CVSS on the *days-of-gray-risk* (i.e., the number of days it takes for a vendor to release a patch). It was observed that there was no obvious implication on the level of CVSS severity and the time it took for a vendor to develop a patch.

Other works, not focused on replicated systems dependability, worked on malware prediction. In particular, RISKTELLER [26], proposed by Bilge *et al.* , predicts the risk of a system becoming infected by malware. In this work, the authors conducted a study that accounted for 600k machines belonging to 18 enterprises. They collected the log data from all machines together with external data (e.g., from NVD). They defined a dataset with 89 features, such

as patching behavior, temporal patterns, application categories, and past threat history. RISKTELLER was evaluated by using machine learning models to learn and classify the labeled software of each machine. The results show that it can make predictions on the risk of a system being attacked with an accuracy of 96%.

Summary. We presented several works that carried out the risk assessment in a way to prevent exploits or to take action upon vulnerability detection. This is the last building block that intrusion tolerance is missing. There is a lot of relevant free information available to address the security and dependability of software. In a replicated context this information is even more relevant. First, to react upon vulnerability/exploit disclosures, and second to select what configurations are less vulnerable to common weaknesses. We want to explore the free available data to improve the dependability and security of intrusion-tolerant systems, by ensuring the assumption of failure independence with evidence supported by relevant and sound information. Additionally, some of the works proposed solutions to enhance the reliability and security of networks. In this thesis, we are concerned with the security and dependability of replicated systems. Hence, we are focused on assuring that no more than f replicas become compromised.

2.7 Management of Vulnerable Systems

In the previous sections, we presented approaches to support the recovery and diversity of replicas, several of which in BFT replicated systems. In this section, we focus on some works that already combine, in a very limited way, the idea of diversity and rejuvenations. We review a few more recent works that introduce the idea of risk management (see [175] for a complete survey).

Reynolds *et al.* [139] presented the HACQIT fault-tolerant architecture. It was build to assure fault tolerance by resorting on backup replicas on separate LANs and allowing only authorized clients through Virtual Private Network (VPN). Moreover, it employed redundancy and diversity to detect and mask errors in the system components. The same input is sent to identical nodes, and if the output is different, then some node is considered faulty. Thus it is possible to vote outputs, and the majority is considered as correct. Moreover, it used a forensic agent that analyzed the logs of failed nodes to prevent bad requests in the future. Finally, it implemented a recovery mechanism that was triggered by the native security auditing of Windows NT/2000. Unfortunately, no experimental evaluation was presented. Nevertheless, HACQIT was one of the first systems to promote all these mechanisms together.

Wang *et al.* [166] proposed an architecture, named SITAR, that aims to build intrusion-tolerant systems with diversity and dynamic reconfigurations. SITAR defends a set of

potentially vulnerable COTS servers. The system was protected by an intrusion-tolerant multilayer architecture that used redundancy and security protocols to guarantee that all nodes correctly agreed on the decisions. It is composed of three main components: the proxy servers, the acceptor monitors, and the ballot monitors. The proxies receive the requests and audit them based on the current threat level, and then they propagate the messages to the COTS servers. On the way back, the acceptance monitors validate the response and run an agreement protocol to select a final output from the COTS servers. There was also an adaptive reconfiguration module that monitors the other modules, by receiving heartbeats and intrusion triggers to take action on removing compromised modules and starting new ones. No results on diversity were shown.

The same type of solution was applied on cluster deployments. Arsenault *et al.* [12] presented Self-Cleaning Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) a centralized architecture which goal was to recover the elements of a cluster without harming the availability of the overall service. Recovering the cluster's nodes allows for resetting the state and avoiding huge windows of vulnerability. Nevertheless, the SCIT service itself can be harmed. Therefore, the authors leveraged on trusted hardware to offer additional guarantees to the system, namely predictable and continuous operation regardless of the presence of attacks.

Junqueira *et al.* [91] proposed *informed replication*, as an approach to design distributed systems that can survive catastrophes. It focused on the diversity of the components to avoid common pathogens that could compromise the entire system. A new system model was adopted to map different attributes of a node. These attributes represented characteristics that should be distinct on each node to avoid common failures. While modeling the system, some biases were introduced. For instance, the authors considered that two different services that used the same port were vulnerable to the same vulnerability, or that the same service running with two different ports were not vulnerable. A heuristic was proposed to build configurations in linear time. The goal was to distribute the OSes and applications in different configurations, in such a way that minimized the number of common attributes that could compromise the configuration. Two metrics were utilized to select OSes and applications, one selected them by pick random-uniformly both, and the other chosen them based on their popularity. The results showed that their solution mitigated the number of pathogens that could compromise an entire configuration as its attributes were selected in order to maximize their difference. The heuristic guaranteed 99% chances of data survival on an attack of single- and double-exploit pathogens, while needing only three and five copies respectively.

More focused on reliability, Zhai *et al.* [176] proposed a system that looks for failure independence on the cloud. The system collected and audited data from the system components to evaluate their independence by identifying potential correlated failures. Then, the different configuration dependencies were analyzed and ranked in risk groups as a way to see how the different dependencies made the system fail. The main limitation of this work

was that it depended on the will of cloud providers to share private data to be analyzed by external agents. The authors evaluated the efficacy of their solution on finding the minimal risk groups (with fewer dependencies) on sampling data to make faster decisions while losing some accuracy. The work's main focus was the reliability of cloud systems, thus no evaluation was done on vulnerabilities of such systems.

Seondong *et al.* [77] described a system that used data from NVD to select the best configuration of diverse OSes and web servers. The algorithm minimized the CVSS of shared vulnerabilities among the various software components. Although their experiments explored different configurations of software stacks, the decisions were based on the CVSS. All the experiments were done in a simulator (i.e., CSIM 20) which made it difficult to understand the real performance of the solution. Moreover, the resilience of the system was evaluated against DoS attacks that affect particular vulnerabilities in the software. Depending on the type of the DoS, it can cause a performance decrease without exploiting any vulnerability. This, however, does not shed light on the ability of the system to prevent $f+1$ replicas from being compromised. In any case, this is the work that most resembles one of the main contributions of this thesis. However, it suffers some limitations that we will address in Chapter 4.

Moving Target Defenses. An emerging area, called Moving Target Defense (MTD), re-defines some of the already existing solutions with the goal of achieving a continuous change of the attack surfaces. MTD employs techniques like VM migration, different types of diversity, etc. Some authors have made an effort to formalize this sub-area of intrusion tolerance [180].

Okhravi *et al.* [129] presented TALENT, a framework for live migration of critical infrastructures across heterogeneous platforms. The idea was to create a moving target that made advanced targeted attacks harder to succeed. TALENT implemented OS-level virtualization with containers, which allowed the system to migrate the OS between machines periodically or upon detection of malicious activity. The virtualization was implemented with `OpenVZ` and `LXC` for Linux, `Virtuozzo` for Windows, and `Jail` for FreeBSD. The network was also virtualized, more precisely, a second layer of virtualization was used to migrate the IP address from one container to another. Even an established `ssh` session was preserved during the migration. Additionally, the state of the application also had to be migrated by employing a checkpointing technique. When all the programs were checkpointed, the state was saved and then was migrated by mirroring the file system. The file system synchronization took 98.7% of the migration time. The authors decided to focus on optimizing the file system synchronization. In the optimized version, the file system synchronized in periodic intervals by sending the differences to the destination. Therefore, the migration was made seamless to the application. TALENT also had a sort of risk assessment, called operation assessment, which monitored and adjusted the diverse components using vulnerability infor-

mation. However, there were almost no details on how the risk was measured and on how to adapt to the threats efficiently.

MTD was classified, Hong and Kim [80], into three categories, shuffle, diversity and redundancy, and assessed the effectiveness of each one. The three solutions were integrated in HARM and it was evaluated how each technique could improve the security of distributed systems. The solution was built on top of VMs, as each VM was able to host a few OSes in it. Then, the evaluation scenarios considered three hosts running with two to three VMs inside. The three techniques were evaluated separately, and only two OSes were considered in the diversity evaluation. In the considered scenarios, deploying random diversity did not improve the risk level of the system. For example, in one each host ideally had at least one VM with a diverse OS. On the other hand, having diverse OS across host decreased the connectivity, in case of some OS became compromised. However, these sort of results was not surprising as only two OSes were considered. On the contrary, with more OSes the system would maintain the level of connectivity while assuring the dependability of the hosts.

Summary. We presented a few control systems that manage nodes that are potentially vulnerable and exploitable. Some of the works presented in other sections already combined a few of these mechanisms (e.g., Sousa *et al.* [149] introduce reactive recovery upon detection of faulty behavior). However, only a few have implemented or discussed the real implications of using diversity (with the exceptions like BASE [33] that implemented OTS diversity and assessed its performance overhead).

2.8 Final Remarks

In this chapter, we described the most relevant works that are related to this thesis. We have made background revision of the intrusion tolerance area, and then we described the different topics that support intrusion-tolerant systems. Our main contributions are on the management of BFT systems, in particular, how to create diverse replicas that effectively are independent and when the replicas need to be recovered. Although we could adopt solutions from artificial diversity, we are more interested in employing OTS diversity. OTS diversity allow us to use data to make decisions on which diverse options work better together. Such decisions would take action as rejuvenation triggers.

3 A Study on Common Vulnerabilities

In this chapter, present some strategies to select different OSes to be part of BFT replicated system. These strategies are build from the data that is available on vulnerability database developed in a previous work. The promising results confirm the intuition that applying diversity implies vulnerability independence to some extent. In this contribution, it should be clear what are the security gains from using different OSes on a replicated intrusion-tolerant system.

3.1 Methodology

This section presents the methodology adopted in this study, with a particular focus on how the dataset was selected, processed, and analyzed.

Data Source

We have analyzed OS vulnerability data from the NVD database [127]. According to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) a vulnerability is defined as follows:

Definition 2. *"[...] A weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat source."* [122]

NIST's NVD is the authoritative data source for disclosure of vulnerabilities and associated information. NVD aggregates vulnerability reports from more than 70 security companies, advisory groups, and organizations, thus being the most extensive vulnerability database on the web. All data is made available as Extensible Markup Language (XML) data feeds, containing the reported vulnerabilities on a given period. Each NVD vulnerability receives a unique identifier, in the format CVE-*YEAR-NUMBER*, and a short description provided by the CVE [118]. The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) [117] provides the list of products affected by the vulnerability and the date of the vulnerability publication. The CVSS [44] calculates the vulnerability severity considering several attributes, such as the attack vector, privileges required, exploitability score, and the security properties compromised by the vulnerability (i.e., integrity, confidentiality, or availability).

We developed a program that collects, parses and inserts the XML data feeds into an SQL database, deployed with a custom schema to group vulnerabilities by affected products and versions.

Chosen Products. In this thesis, we are mostly interested in OTS components. Contrary to automatic diversity mechanisms that needs testing to assess the vulnerability correlation, OTS diversity can be supported by data evidence to understand the correlation between vulnerabilities and products. In particular, we focus on the diversity of OSes (not only the kernel but the whole product) for three fundamental reasons: (1) by far, most of the replica's code is the OS; (2) such size and importance, make OSes a valuable target, with new vulnerabilities and exploits being discovered every day; and (3) there are many options of OSes that can be used.

Data Selection

Despite the vast amount of information about each vulnerability available in NVD, for this study, we are only interested in the name, publication date, summary (description), type of exploit (local or remote), and list of affected products. We have collected vulnerabilities reported for 64 CPE [117]. Each one of these describes a system, i.e., a stack of software/hardware components in which the vulnerability may be exploited. These CPE were filtered, resulting in the following information that was stored in our database:

- **Part:** NVD separates this in Hardware, OS and Application. For the purpose of this study we choose only enumerations marked as OS;
- **Product:** The product name of the platform;
- **Vendor:** Name of the supplier or vendor of the product platform.

In our previous work [62] we manually analysed those 64 CPE and grouped them in 11 OS distributions: *OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD, OpenSolaris, Solaris, Debian, Ubuntu, Red Hat,*[1] *Windows2000, Windows2003* and *Windows2008*. These distributions cover the most used *OS products* of the BSD, Solaris, Linux and Windows families.

The use of an SQL database brought us at least three benefits when compared with analyzing the data directly from the XML feeds. First, it allows us to *enrich the data set* by hand, for example, by associating release times and family names to each affected OS distribution. Second, it allows us to modify the CVE fields to correct problems. For instance, one of

[1] *Red Hat* comprises the "old" Red Hat Linux (discontinued in 2003) and the newer Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL).

the problems with NVD is that the same product is occasionally registered with distinct names in different entries; For instance, (*debian_linux*, *debian*) and (*linux*, *debian*) are two (product, vendor) pairs we have found for the Debian Linux distribution. Other users of NVD data feeds previously observed this same problem [48]. Finally, an SQL database is much more convenient to work with than parsing the feeds on demand.

Filtering the Data

The following steps were taken during the work [62] prior to this thesis, however, for the extended contributions we had to re-do some of the steps to keep the database updated. From both works, we selected a selected 2563 vulnerabilities from a total of more than 44,000 vulnerabilities published by NVD. These vulnerabilities are the ones classified as OS-level vulnerabilities ("/o" in their CPE) for the OSes under consideration.

When manually inspecting the data set, we discovered and removed vulnerabilities that contained tags in their descriptions such as *Unknown* and *Unspecified*. These correspond to vulnerabilities for which NVD does not know precisely where they occur or why they exist (however, they are usually included in the NVD database because they were mentioned in some patch released by a vendor). We also found few vulnerabilities flagged as ***DISPUTED***, meaning that product vendors disagree that the vulnerability exists, and *Duplicate*, used for vulnerabilities in which the *summary* points to a duplicate entry or duplicate entry suspicion. Due to the uncertainty that surrounds these vulnerabilities, we decided to exclude them from the study as well.

Table 3.1 shows the distribution of these vulnerabilities across the analyzed OSes, together with the total number of valid vulnerabilities.

OS	Valid	Unknown	Unspecified	Disputed	Duplicate
OpenBSD	153	1	1	1	0
NetBSD	143	0	1	2	0
FreeBSD	279	0	0	2	0
OpenSolaris	31	0	52	0	0
Solaris	426	40	145	0	3
Debian	213	3	1	0	0
Ubuntu	90	2	1	0	0
Red Hat	444	13	8	1	1
Windows2000	495	7	28	5	5
Windows2003	56	5	34	3	5
Windows2008	334	0	8	0	3
#distinct vulns.	2270	63	210	8	12

Table 3.1 – Distribution of OS vulnerabilities in NVD.

An important observation about Table 3.1 is that the columns do not add up to the number of distinct vulnerabilities (last row of the table) because some vulnerabilities are shared among OSes and are counted only once. Notice that about 60% of the removed vulnerabilities affected Solaris and OpenSolaris. Moreover, these two systems are the only ones that have

more than 10% of its vulnerabilities removed. We should remark that this manual filtering was necessary to increase the confidence that only valid vulnerabilities were used in the study.

3.2 OS Diversity Study

This section analyzes the vulnerabilities that were shared in OS pairs over the period of 1994 to 2011. In the investigation, we consider two possible server machine setups offering an increasingly more secure platform. This accommodates the case where system administrators create differentiated OS installations, which contain more or less vulnerabilities depending on the services and applications available in the server. Of course, other setups could be used, but we decided to concentrate on these configurations because they are quite generic and they lead to results that can be directly obtained from the NVD data. The setups are the following:

- **Fat Server:** The server contains most of the software packages for a given OS, and consequently, it can be used to run various kinds of applications by locally or remotely connected users. This server has potentially all vulnerabilities that were reported for the corresponding OS;

- **Isolated Thin Server:** This setting corresponds to a platform that does not contain any applications (except for the replicated service). The server has a decreased security risk because the attack vectors related to applications have been mostly eliminated. Moreover, is placed in a room physically protected from illegal accesses, with remote logins disabled, and therefore it can only be compromised by receiving malicious packets from the network. In this setting, we only consider remotely exploitable vulnerabilities (those with "Network" or "Adjacent Network" values in their CVSS_ACCESS_VECTOR field) that are not classified as *Applications*.

The Fat Server setup corresponds to a case where an attack may target an application available in the OS distribution. Therefore, it provides an upper bound estimate on the number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The Isolated Thin Server setup is the counterpart case, where the system is deployed without applications that come bundled with the OS and thus provide a lower bound estimate on the number of common vulnerabilities and it has the vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited. Of course, in practice, at least one application (such as a name service or a distributed file service) would be deployed in an intrusion-tolerant system, and the vulnerabilities of this application would add up to the flaws that we will report. In any case, since we expect that most of the complexity is in the OS, we anticipate that a single application will have a small contribution to the overall number of vulnerabilities.

Intrusion-tolerant systems are usually built using four or more replicated servers [32]. Therefore, it is useful to understand if there are many vulnerabilities that involve groups of OSes larger than two – if this is the case, then it will be hard to find OS configurations for the various servers that do not share vulnerabilities, and a goal of using OTS diversity will be difficult to be achieved in practice. Figure 3.1 portrays the number of common vulnerabilities that exist simultaneously in increasingly more extensive sets of OSes (with Isolated Thin Servers). The graph shows a rapid decrease in the shared vulnerabilities as the number of OSes grows. The largest group that was affected by the same vulnerability had six OSes, and this occurred only for a single flaw, and there were also two vulnerabilities in sets with five OSes. Vulnerabilities in two and three OSes usually occur in systems from the same family, whose common ancestry implies the reuse of more significant portions of the code base.



Figure 3.1 – Common vulnerabilities for n different OSes (with Isolated Thin Servers).

Table 3.2 lists in more detail the vulnerabilities that can be exploited in larger groups (four to six) of OSes. The first three bugs have a considerable impact because they allow a remote adversary to run arbitrary commands on the local system using a high-privilege account. They occurred either in widespread login services (telnet and rlogin) or in a primary system function, and consequently, several products from the BSD family were affected, as well as Solaris. The NVD entry for the CVE-2001-0554 vulnerability also had external references to the Debian and Red Hat websites, which could indicate that these systems might suffer from a similar (or the same) problem. Vulnerability CVE-2008-1447 occurs in a large number of systems because it results from a bug in the BIND implementation of the DNS. Since BIND is a highly popular service, more OSes could potentially be affected. A closer look at the corresponding NVD entry reveals external references to the sites of OpenBSD, NetBSD, and FreeBSD, indicating that they would be vulnerable in case this software was being used. This sort of vulnerability confirms that from an intrusion-tolerance perspective it is unwise to run the same server software everywhere, and that diverse implementations must be selected (in this case for recursive DNS servers).

The remaining three vulnerabilities are related to the protocol stack of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). All of them affect system availability, allowing different forms of DoS attacks. CVE-2008-4609 is the vulnerability that affects more OSes,

CVE	#affected OS	Description
CVE-1999-0046	4	Buffer Overflow of *rlogin* allows admin access. Affects: NetBSD, FreeBSD, Solaris and Debian.
CVE-2001-0554	4	Buffer overflow in telnetd (telnet daemon) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands. Affects: OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD and Solaris.
CVE-2003-0466	4	Off-by-one error in the Kernel function *fb_realpath()* allows admin access. Affects: OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD and Solaris.
CVE-2005-0356	4	TCP implementations allow a denial of service (DoS) via spoofed packets with large timer values, when used with Protection Against Wrapped Sequence Numbers. Affects: OpenBSD, FreeBSD, Windows2000 and Windows2003.
CVE-2008-1447	5	The BIND 8 and 9 implementation of the DNS protocol allow attackers to spoof DNS traffic via a birthday attack to conduct cache poisoning against recursive resolvers. Affects: Debian, Ubuntu, Red Hat, Windows2000 and Windows2003.
CVE-2001-1244	5	TCP implementations allow a DoS by setting a maximum segment size very small to force the generation of more packets, amplifying network traffic and CPU consumption. Affects: OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD, Solaris and Windows2000.
CVE-2008-4609	6	TCP implementation allows a DoS via multiple vectors that manipulate TCP state table. Affects: OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD, Windows2000, Windows2003 and Windows2008.

Table 3.2 – Vulnerabilities that affect more than four OSes.

according to the NVD database. Given that TCP/IP stack code is often reused across OSes, we checked the websites of the other OSes for reports related to this vulnerability. We only found a disclaimer by Red Hat [2] stating that this flaw affected some releases but that they would not provide an update (they only offered a mitigation solution based on IPtables, the Linux firewall software).

Overall, the above results look encouraging because over a significant period (around 18 years) there are very few vulnerabilities that appear in many OSes. A good portion of them are in the TCP/IP stack implementation, which is probably the most shared software component across OSes, but they only impact on the availability of the system, leaving confidentiality and integrity of data unharmed.

3.3 Strategies for OS Diversity Selection

The preliminary analysis indicates that it is possible to find that some OSes share fewer vulnerabilities than others. Therefore, in this section we present three alternative strategies to select OSes, based on the built dataset, to decrease the chance of common vulnerabilities on replicated systems. We start the section by first describing an approach we called the Common Vulnerability Indicator (CVI), which is used by one of the strategies. For each strategy, we then give example sets of OSes that exhibit a reasonable level of diversity, and perform an evaluation based on the collected data. Finally, we conclude the section with

[2] `https://access.redhat.com/kb/docs/DOC-18730`

an analysis of potential diversity between releases of the same OSes (concentrating on the OSes that the three strategies picked as the best configuration).

Common Vulnerability Indicator

In our previous work [62] we have found that the number of common vulnerabilities that are observed between different OSes varies over time. Thus, in order to be able to evaluate which OS pairs are more (or less) likely to experience common flaws while taking into account the timing of vulnerability disclosures, we developed a new metric, called the *CVI*. This indicator is calculated for a given year *y*, based on the vulnerabilities that were shared by OSes A and B over a period of *tspan* previous years. CVI is built to ensure the following desirable properties:

1. $CVI_y(A,B) = 0$ if A and B have no common vulnerabilities in the *tspan* interval;

2. $CVI_y(A,B) < CVI_y(C,D)$ if A and B shared less vulnerabilities than C and D in each year of the considered period;

3. $CVI_y(A,B) < CVI_y(C,D)$ if A and B had N common vulnerabilities in the distant past while C and D had N shared vulnerabilities more recently;

4. $CVI_{y_2}(A,B) < CVI_{y_1}(A,B)$, with $y_1 < y_2$, if the number of common vulnerabilities for A and B has decreased over the years.

Therefore, CVI is useful for comparison purposes, allowing the identification of OS pairs that have a smaller number of common flaws, while considering the instant when vulnerabilities were found. This last point is particularly crucial because OSes are continually evolving, potentially getting more (or less) diverse, and consequently, one should take into consideration the time dimension when selecting OS configurations (e.g., OS pairs that have had less common flaws recently are likely better candidates). CVI is computed as follows:

First, a weighting factor α_i is defined for each year $i \in \{y - tspan + 1, ..., y-2, y-1, y\}$.

$$\alpha_i = 1 - \frac{y-i}{tspan} \tag{3.1}$$

Then, CVI is obtained using the number of vulnerabilities $v_i(A,B)$ that appeared in both OSes A and B for every year i from the start of the time span up to reference year y.

$$CVI_y(A,B) = \sum_{i=y-tspan+1}^{y} \alpha_i \cdot v_i(A,B) \tag{3.2}$$

	Fat Server			Isolated Thin Server		
OS	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
OpenBSD-NetBSD	17.1	13.8	14.8	8.4	7.1	6.9
OpenBSD-FreeBSD	22.2	18.0	18.1	14.1	11.6	10.3
OpenBSD-Solaris	4.0	3.1	3.3	1.8	1.4	0.9
OpenBSD-Debian	1.7	1.5	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
OpenBSD-Red Hat	5.0	4.1	3.2	1.6	1.4	1.1
OpenBSD-Win2000	1.8	1.5	-	1.8	1.5	-
NetBSD-FreeBSD	19.7	18.3	18.8	11.0	9.3	8.6
NetBSD-Solaris	4.9	4.0	4.2	1.5	1.1	0.7
NetBSD-Debian	1.4	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.2
NetBSD-Red Hat	1.8	1.1	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.2
NetBSD-Win2000	1.6	1.4	-	1.6	1.4	-
FreeBSD-Solaris	6.5	5.4	6.3	2.3	1.7	1.2
FreeBSD-Debian	1.3	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
FreeBSD-Red Hat	5.6	4.4	3.3	1.7	1.4	1.1
FreeBSD-Win2000	2.3	1.9	-	2.3	1.9	-
Solaris-Debian	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Solaris-Red Hat	5.3	6.5	5.5	1.0	0.7	0.5
Solaris-Win2000	5.5	5.7	-	1.0	0.7	-
Debian-Red Hat	26.1	20.5	15.7	3.2	2.1	1.4
Debian-Win2000	0.9	0.8	-	0.9	0.8	-
Red Hat-Win2000	1.8	1.6	-	0.9	0.8	-

Table 3.3 – CVI for the years 2009 to 2011, with *tspan* of 10 years.

Table 3.3 presents CVI values for the years 2009 to 2011. We have excluded from this analysis OSes with vulnerability information missing for more than one year over the period, to avoid using incomplete data in the calculation of the indicators. Therefore, the following OSes were not considered in Table 3.3: Windows2003, Windows2008, Ubuntu, and OpenSolaris. The CVI values are computed for a *tspan* of 10 years to reflect a reasonable history. It is possible to see that, except for one system (Solaris with FreeBSD/Red Hat/Windows2000 in the Fat Server), in all remaining cases CVI shows a decreasing trend. Several of the OSes that have evolved over a considerable period are having less reported vulnerabilities, and this causes a decline in shared vulnerabilities in the recent years. For some of the OS pairs the drop in the CVI value is quite significant, becoming almost one-third of the 2009 value (NetBSD with Debian or Red Hat). In the Isolated Thin Server case, there are three pairs with $CVI(A,B) = 0$, which shows that they have shared no vulnerabilities during the past 12 years, and are thus particularly good candidates to include in intrusion-tolerant configurations. These systems are Debian with either OpenBSD or FreeBSD or Solaris.

From the CVI values in Table 3.3, it is apparent that OpenBSD and Red Hat have become more diverse, in recent years, than Red Hat and Solaris, and to make it advisable, from a diversity standpoint, to choose the former OS pair over the latter.

Building Replicated Systems with Diversity

This section describes three strategies for choosing diverse sets of OSes. These strategies utilize the data analyzed earlier as a basis to make decisions, by assuming that the information reported by NVD on vulnerabilities can be correlated to the amount of diversity among OSes. Of course, there are some caveats associated with this approach, but the alternatives can be even harder to put in practice, especially if one wants to consider a large number of OSes. For example, for closed systems (e.g., Windows) it is challenging to determine the level of sharing of OS components, and therefore, diversity estimations based on the code cannot be performed. Moreover, even if this estimate could be obtained, there is the risk that it does not reflect the number of vulnerabilities that occur simultaneously in several OSes (e.g., two distinct implementations of the same flawed algorithm are vulnerable).

The first strategy, called Common Vulnerability Count Strategy (CVCst), is based on raw data collected over a considerable interval, and it is the most straightforward approach for selecting OS pairs. It should be used when one wants to treat all vulnerabilities, regardless of the time which they were reported, as equally important to make choices. The second strategy, Common Vulnerability Indicator Strategy (CVIst), uses the CVI described in the previous section to select OS pairs taking into account the incidence of common vulnerabilities over the years. It is indicated when one wants to give greater importance to more recent vulnerabilities because it is a weighted sum. The third strategy, Inter-Reporting Times Strategy (IRTst), follows a different approach from the previous ones, focusing not so much on common vulnerabilities directly, but on the frequency in which vulnerabilities appear in the two OSes. If one wants to give more importance to the time interval between successive reports of common vulnerabilities, this is the best strategy. Since this last criterion complements the previous two, one could explore strategies CVCst and CVIst in conjunction with IRTst.

For every strategy, we present OS sets examples for the Fat Server and Isolated Thin Server configurations. Fat Server configurations can be pessimistic in the sense that they may account for common vulnerabilities in applications that are not present in the servers, while Isolated Thin Server configurations reflect more accurately the expected setup of dedicated servers in a replicated system. An intrusion-tolerant system usually requires $3f + 1$ replicas to tolerate f intrusions (e.g., [32]). Therefore, we will focus on sets with four OSes to deploy a hypothetical replicated system with four replicas, which allows one fault to be tolerated.

As a cautious note, one should take into account that Ubuntu and Windows2008 were first released in 2004 and 2008 respectively, so the data for these two OSes was collected for a smaller number of years. Windows2000 is presented in the tables because there are published vulnerabilities until 2010, although it has been gradually replaced by Windows2003 and

Windows2008 in the organizations. Consequently, we do not use Windows2000 when choosing the OS sets. We have excluded OpenSolaris from the study because there is data available for only a limited period. In each strategy and configuration, we present two sets: *setCon* is more conservative, since it does not contain Ubuntu and Windows2008; and *setUpdt* is more up-to-date because it can include Ubuntu and Windows2008. When looking at these two sets, one should keep in mind that setCon is selected from a group of OSes for which there is a significant amount of NVD data, which contributes for higher confidence on the result. On the other hand, setUpdt uses OSes with different amounts of NVD data, which can cause small levels of inaccuracy when making comparisons (e.g., in the CVCst, any OS pair featuring Windows2008 has zero common vulnerabilities until 2007). One way to address this would be only to consider vulnerabilities that appear later than 2007 when choosing setUpdt. We opted not to follow this approach because it has the drawback of discarding too much data.

Common Vulnerability Count (CVCst)

The results from the previous section give a strong indication that it should be possible to choose groups of OSes with few common vulnerabilities over reasonable intervals of time. However, we would like to understand if the data from the NVD database is effective at suggesting these groups of OSes. To address this point, we divided the data into two subsets: the *history period*, comprising the data for the interval between 2000 to 2009, and the *observed period*, from 2010 to 2011. The objective is to employ the historical period to pick the sets of OSes to use on the replicated system (as if the choice was made at the beginning of 2010). Then we use the data for the observed period to verify if these choices would have been adequate, i.e., if they have a small (preferably the smallest) number of common vulnerabilities in this period.

CVCst makes decisions based directly on the empirical data for the number of common vulnerabilities across all OS pairs. This data is displayed in Table 3.4 for OSes with a Fat Server configuration. Numbers to the right and above the diagonal line represent the history period, while numbers to the left and below the line stand for the observed period. For example, the entry corresponding to OpenBSD-Red Hat to the right of the diagonal line has the number 10, which means that these OSes shared 10 vulnerabilities between 2000 and 2009. The equivalent entry, but to the left of the diagonal line, is 0 because they had no common flaws reported in 2010 and 2011. As expected, OS pairs from the same family had the highest counts of common vulnerabilities. The only case where there were more vulnerabilities in the observed period than the historical period is for the Windows2008–Windows2003 pair, which is explained by the recent release date of Windows2008. It is interesting to notice, however, that most pairs had zero common vulnerabilities in the observed period.

	OpenBSD	NetBSD	FreeBSD	Solaris	Debian	Ubuntu	Red Hat	Win2000	Win2003	Win2008	
OpenBSD	-	33	43	9	2	3	10	3	2	1	
NetBSD	4	-	36	9	4	0	6	3	2	1	
FreeBSD	4	6	-	12	4	2	12	4	3	1	
Solaris	1	1	2	-	2	2	8	8	7	0	
Debian	0	0	0	0	-	14	52	1	1	0	
Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0	-	27	1	1	0	
Red Hat	0	0	0	2	0	0	-	2	2	0	
Win2000	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-	216	42	
Win2003	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	49	-	53	
Win2008	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	38	229	-	
	2010-2011										2000-2009

Table 3.4 – History/observed period for CVCst with Fat Servers.

The strategy for building sets of OSes is based on a simple cost function. Given any potential OS pair A and B that could be added to the set, one can perform a lookup in Table 3.4 to determine the pair's number of common vulnerabilities in the historical period. This number corresponds to the cost of adding this OS pair to the group. Similarly, when including a third OS C, it is possible to find in the table the entries for A–C and B–C and take their sum as the cost of integrating C in the group. When building a set with n OSes, the total cost is the addition of each individual cost for all combinations of OS pairs. The sets that lead to smaller values of total cost are considered the best choices for deployment in the replicated system. Accordingly, based on the table, the best groups of four OSes are:

- setCon = {*OpenBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003*}, with a total cost of 23;
- setUpdt = {*NetBSD, Solaris, Ubuntu, Windows2008*}, with a total cost of 12.

One, however, should keep in mind that sometimes the total cost may be only an approximation of the actual number of shared vulnerabilities among the OSes in the set, as specific vulnerabilities might be counted more than once. This will likely not be a problem since overcounting vulnerabilities provides a conservative estimate, or an estimate worse than reality. For example, setUpdt only has 11 shared vulnerabilities for a total cost of 12, since one of the vulnerabilities appears in three of the OSes (and is therefore included in two table entries).

Next we can check to what extent our choice of the best group of four OSes that we would pick from the historical period (2000–2009), as prescribed by Common Vulnerability Count (CVC) cost calculation, remains consistent with the choice of the best group of four OSes from the observed period (2010–2011). We see that both setCon and setUpdt have only two shared vulnerabilities. They are not the best sets in the observed period (2010–2011), since there are groups of OSes with zero common vulnerabilities in the observed period (e.g., by

replacing Solaris with Red Hat), though they do exhibit a high level of diversity. A graphical representation of the sets as Venn diagrams is available in Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b). Below the OS name is the total number of vulnerabilities during the observed period, and the number inside each intersection shows the count of common flaws for the corresponding OSes. For example, in setCon with Fat Servers (Figure 3.2(a)) there is one vulnerability that appears both on Solaris and OpenBSD and another on Solaris and Windows2003.

	OpenBSD	NetBSD	FreeBSD	Solaris	Debian	Ubuntu	Red Hat	Win2000	Win2003	Win2008
OpenBSD	-	13	26	5	0	0	3	3	3	1
NetBSD	1	-	18	4	2	0	2	3	1	1
FreeBSD	1	1	-	6	0	0	3	4	2	1
Solaris	0	0	0	-	0	0	2	2	1	0
Debian	0	0	0	0	-	2	8	1	1	0
Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0	-	1	1	1	0
Red Hat	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	1	1	0
Win2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	81	13
Win2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	-	14
Win2008	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	26	-

2000-2009

2010-2011

Table 3.5 – History/observed period for strategy CVCst with Isolated Thin Servers.

Table 3.5 presents the common vulnerabilities with the Isolated Thin Server configuration data. This configuration represents a class of servers that have a dedicated function and are protected against physical intruders. The same approach can be applied as above: first, we choose the best pairs based on the historical period to build a set of four OSes; next, we evaluate the sets by comparing the results with the values for the observed period. The history period provides two candidate sets:

- setCon = {*NetBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003*}, with a total cost of 9;
- setUpdt = {*Solaris, Debian, Ubuntu, Windows2008*}, with a total cost of 2.

In the observed period, setCon and setUpdt have no common vulnerabilities, showing that the strategy would have chosen sufficiently diverse groups of OSes. A graphical representation of the sets is displayed in Figures 3.2(c) and 3.2(d).

Common Vulnerability Indicator Strategy (CVIst)

This strategy employs the CVI value, defined at the beginning of this section, to make decisions about including/excluding particular OSes. Therefore, besides taking advantage of the available data on total counts of shared vulnerabilities, it also uses the information on how these numbers have evolved through the years.



Figure 3.2 – Venn diagrams for vulnerabilities in setCon and setUpdt for strategies CVCst in Fat Server and Isolated Thin Server configurations.

CVIst is applied by executing the following method, which is based on minimizing a cost function. For a given year and time span, the CVI value is calculated for each of the OS pairs. Typically, one should use the most recent year for which there is available data. The time span should cover a reasonable interval so that the indicator reflects the trend of discovered vulnerabilities. In some cases, however, one may have to resort to smaller time spans due to lack of data, namely with OSes released recently. In this case, the indicator will give a higher weight to the vulnerabilities reported in the last year. In CVIst the cost of creating a group with two OSes A and B is $CVI(A,B)$. Extending this idea to a group of n OSes, the total cost becomes the sum of the individual CVI for all combinations of OS pairs. In order to choose the best groups, the strategy searches for sets of OSes that together have the smallest total cost.

To evaluate this strategy, we split the time into two intervals as we did for CVCst. Table 3.6 presents in the cells for the history period the $CVI_{2009}(A,B)$ for a time span of 10 years in a Fat Server configuration.[3] The cells at left and bottom of the diagonal line correspond to the observed period, and they count as before the number of shared vulnerabilities in 2010 and 2011. After applying CVIst, the following sets are the best with four OSes:

[3] In some cases, we had to use smaller time spans due to the more recent release date of the OSes (e.g., Ubuntu and Windows 2008). When this happened, the CVI value was calculated using the maximum time span that is allowed by the available data.

	OpenBSD	NetBSD	FreeBSD	Solaris	Debian	Ubuntu	Red Hat	Win2000	Win2003	Win2008	
OpenBSD	-	17.1	22.2	4.0	1.7	2.5	5.0	1.8	1.5	0.9	
NetBSD	4	-	19.7	4.9	1.4	0.0	1.8	1.6	1.5	0.9	
FreeBSD	4	6	-	6.5	1.3	1.3	5.6	2.3	2.0	0.9	
Solaris	1	1	2	-	1.0	1.5	5.3	5.5	5.6	0.0	
Debian	0	0	0	0	-	10.5	26.1	0.9	0.9	0.0	
Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0	-	18.5	0.9	0.9	0.0	
Red Hat	0	0	0	2	0	0	-	1.4	1.8	0.0	
Win2000	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-	163.6	39.5	
Win2003	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	49	-	0.0	
Win2008	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	38	229	-	
	2010-2011										CVI_{2009}(A,B)

Table 3.6 – History/observed period for CVIst with Fat Servers.

- setCon = {*OpenBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003*}, with a total cost of 14.7;
- setUpdt = {*NetBSD, Solaris, Ubuntu, Windows2008*}, with a total cost of 7.3.

To verify if CVI is a good indicator for selecting diverse sets, we can look at the number of common vulnerabilities in the observed period (2010–2011). By analyzing Table 3.6, it is possible to see that setCon and setUpdt remain good sets, each one with two shared flaws. As before with CVCst, one can find better sets in observed period, where no common vulnerabilities appear for several pairs, for example by replacing Solaris with Red Hat. The Venn diagrams for these two sets are shown in Figures 3.3(e) and 3.3(f).

	OpenBSD	NetBSD	FreeBSD	Solaris	Debian	Ubuntu	Red Hat	Win2000	Win2003	Win2008	
OpenBSD	-	8.4	14.1	1.8	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.8	1.8	0.9	
NetBSD	1	-	11.0	1.5	0.6	0.0	0.6	1.6	0.9	0.9	
FreeBSD	1	1	-	2.3	0.0	0.0	1.7	2.3	1.5	0.9	
Solaris	0	0	0	-	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.0	
Debian	0	0	0	0	-	1.9	3.2	0.9	0.9	0.0	
Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0	-	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.0	
Red Hat	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0.9	0.9	0.0	
Win2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	58.7	12.5	
Win2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	-	13.5	
Win2008	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	26	-	
	2010-2011										CVI_{2009}(A,B)

Table 3.7 – History/observed period for CVIst with Isolated Thin Servers.

Table 3.7 provides the data for applying CVIst in Isolated Thin Server configurations. It is possible to observe that CVI values have significantly decreased when compared to the previous table. The best groups of four OSes in the historical period are:

- setCon = {*NetBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003*}, with a total cost of 4.5;

- setUpdt = {*Solaris, Debian, Ubuntu, Windows2008*}, with a total cost of 1.9.

By checking the data for the observed period, one can see that both sets do not share a single vulnerability, which indicates that the strategy would have made a good selection of OSes (see also the Venn diagrams in Figures 3.3(g) and 3.3(h)).

	$0 \leq$ IRT ≤ 1	$1 <$IRT ≤ 10	$10 <$IRT ≤ 100	$100 <$IRT ≤ 1000	$1000 <$IRT ≤ 10000
OpenBSD-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
NetBSD-Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0
NetBSD-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
NetBSD-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
FreeBSD-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Solaris-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Debian-Win2000	0	0	0	0	0
Debian-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
Debian-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Ubuntu-Win2000	0	0	0	0	0
Ubuntu-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
Ubuntu-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Red Hat-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
OpenBSD-Win2003	0	0	0	0	1
FreeBSD-Win2003	0	0	0	0	1
Solaris-Debian	0	0	0	0	1
Red Hat-Win2000	0	0	0	0	1
OpenBSD-Win2000	0	0	0	0	2
OpenBSD-Debian	0	0	0	1	0
Solaris-Ubuntu	0	0	0	1	0
NetBSD-Win2000	0	0	0	1	1
FreeBSD-Win2000	0	0	0	2	1
FreeBSD-Ubuntu	0	0	1	0	0
Red Hat-Win2003	0	0	1	0	0
OpenBSD-Solaris	0	0	3	4	2
FreeBSD-Solaris	0	0	5	8	0
FreeBSD-Debian	0	1	0	2	0
OpenBSD-Ubuntu	1	0	0	1	0
NetBSD-Debian	1	0	0	1	0
NetBSD-Solaris	1	0	3	4	1
Solaris-Win2003	1	1	1	4	0
Solaris-Win2000	1	1	1	4	1
NetBSD-Red Hat	2	0	0	3	0
Solaris-Red Hat	2	0	0	7	0
FreeBSD-Red Hat	2	1	2	5	1
Debian-Ubuntu	3	2	3	5	0
OpenBSD-Red Hat	4	0	1	4	0
NetBSD-FreeBSD	4	3	20	14	0
OpenBSD-NetBSD	7	3	14	12	0
Ubuntu-Red Hat	11	2	7	6	0
OpenBSD-FreeBSD	11	5	16	14	0
Debian-Red Hat	22	3	18	8	0
Win2000-Win2008	54	7	15	3	0
Win2000-Win2003	167	29	66	2	0
Win2003-Win2008	222	16	41	2	0

Table 3.8 – Number of two consecutive vulnerabilities occurring in each IRT period, between 2000 and 2011 (with Fat Servers).

Inter-Reporting Times Strategy (IRTst)

This strategy is mainly concerned with the *IRT*, i.e., the number of days between successive reports of common vulnerabilities in different OS pairs, rather than vulnerability counts.



Figure 3.3 – Venn diagrams for vulnerabilities in setCon and setUpdt for strategies CVIst in Fat Server and Isolated Thin Server configurations.

The assumption underlying this strategy is that lower inter-reporting times suggest a greater similarity between OSes, and thus it would be advisable, from a diversity standpoint, to select OSes with higher IRT.

Table 3.8 presents the number of vulnerabilities for each pair of OSes in five IRT intervals, from 0 to 10000 days. The values in the table were obtained in the following manner: first, for a given OS pair A and B, we collected the dates for common vulnerabilities; next, we calculated the IRT in days of every two consecutive vulnerabilities; and then, we counted the number of vulnerabilities that were within each interval. The table is organized such that on the top are the OSes without common vulnerabilities, which are then followed by the ones that had larger IRT values. Therefore, each horizontal line separates groups of OS pairs that have positive IRT values in the same leftmost column, starting from the rightmost column (i.e., with the longer IRT). From a diversity perspective, it is interesting to notice that in the table there are 29% of the pairs that do not have two consecutive vulnerabilities, and that 11% only have consecutive vulnerabilities from 1000 days on (last column).

The IRTst strategy allows the selection of OSes with longer IRT. This criteria is essential if one wants to deploy a system that has a short lifetime, e.g., a batching process, which ideally would only be in operation between the discovery of common vulnerabilities. IRTst tries first to select OS pair with zero common vulnerabilities; when this is not possible, it

chooses the next pair whose common vulnerabilities appear in the rightmost columns. By inspecting the table, we can see that the best two sets of four OSes are:

- setCon = {*OpenBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003*};
- setUpdt = {*NetBSD, Solaris, Ubuntu, Windows2008*}.

Table 3.9 presents the IRT for an Isolated Thin Server configuration. Since each OS pair has less common vulnerabilities, this often translates to larger IRT. The percentage of lines with zero IRT in all intervals is higher, 51%, but remained the same for the OS pairs that share vulnerabilities with longer IRT (11%). When applying the strategy to this table, the best sets of OSes are:

- setCon = {*OpenBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003*};
- setUpdt = {*OpenBSD, Debian, Ubuntu, Windows2008*}.

Comparing the three strategies

In one hand, the three strategies explore distinct characteristics of the data to pick the OSes to be deployed. Qualitatively they differ in the method of selection, and potentially the result of applying them to our data could lead to distinct sets being chosen. On the other hand, all of them try to find OSes that when placed together in the same system have a low probability of experiencing common vulnerabilities in the future. Therefore, if there is a small collection of OS sets with this property, then all strategies should elect one of these sets as the best choice. This is precisely what we observed with the NVD data, and consequently, the selected best sets are not too different from each other. Only when one needs to find many OS sets with reasonable levels of diversity, such as with the implementation of proactive recovery mechanisms in intrusion-tolerant systems [32, 149], then the distinctions among the strategies start to become apparent. We leave it as future work a more refined study on the comparison of the strategies with larger groups of OS sets.

The OS sets that resulted from the execution of the strategies achieved reasonable levels of diversity when evaluated in the observed period (years 2010 and 2011). As expected from our analysis, several of the best sets contained an OS from each of the families. The exception to this rule occurred with the Linux family, wherein a few cases it had two representatives (Debian and Ubuntu) because these OSes had very few vulnerabilities reported in the last three years. Even though the BSD family also had a small number of recent vulnerabilities, since these occasionally affected more OSes, the strategies opted for including just one of the BSD OSes.

	$0 \leq$ IRT ≤ 1	$1 <$IRT ≤ 10	$10 <$IRT ≤ 100	$100 <$IRT ≤ 1000	$1000 <$IRT ≤ 10000
OpenBSD-Debian	0	0	0	0	0
OpenBSD-Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0
OpenBSD-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
NetBSD-Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0
NetBSD-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
NetBSD-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
FreeBSD-Debian	0	0	0	0	0
FreeBSD-Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0
FreeBSD-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Solaris-Debian	0	0	0	0	0
Solaris-Ubuntu	0	0	0	0	0
Solaris-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
Solaris-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Debian-Win2000	0	0	0	0	0
Debian-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
Debian-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Ubuntu-Red Hat	0	0	0	0	0
Ubuntu-Win2000	0	0	0	0	0
Ubuntu-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
Ubuntu-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
Red Hat-Win2000	0	0	0	0	0
Red Hat-Win2003	0	0	0	0	0
Red Hat-Win2008	0	0	0	0	0
OpenBSD-Win2003	0	0	0	0	1
FreeBSD-Win2003	0	0	0	0	1
Solaris-Red Hat	0	0	0	0	1
Solaris-Win2000	0	0	0	0	1
OpenBSD-Win2000	0	0	0	0	2
Debian-Ubuntu	0	0	0	1	0
NetBSD-Win2000	0	0	0	1	1
FreeBSD-Win2000	0	0	0	2	1
NetBSD-Solaris	0	0	1	2	0
OpenBSD-Solaris	0	0	1	3	0
FreeBSD-Solaris	0	0	1	4	0
NetBSD-Debian	1	0	0	0	0
NetBSD-Red Hat	1	0	0	0	0
Debian-Red Hat	1	0	1	3	2
OpenBSD-Red Hat	2	0	0	0	0
FreeBSD-Red Hat	2	0	0	0	0
OpenBSD-NetBSD	2	0	3	7	1
NetBSD-FreeBSD	2	0	6	9	1
OpenBSD-FreeBSD	6	0	9	10	1
Win2000-Win2008	8	1	3	3	0
Win2003-Win2008	16	2	19	2	0
Win2000-Win2003	35	8	36	5	0

Table 3.9 – Number of two consecutive vulnerabilities occurring in each IRT period, between 2000 and 2011 (Isolated Thin Servers).

In the next section, we will look into OS versions as a way to increase diversity. For this study, we will use the set that was most selected by the different strategies: {*OpenBSD, Debian, Solaris, Windows2003*} (4 out of 12 choices, considering both Fat Server and Isolated Thin Server configurations).

Exploring Diversity Across OS Releases

If one wants to build systems capable of tolerating a few intrusions, our results show that it is possible to select OSes for the replicas with a small collection of common vulnerabilities. It is hard, however, to support critical services that need to remain correct with higher numbers

of compromised replicas or to use some BFT algorithms that trade off performance for extra replicas (e.g., [4, 101, 143]). The number of available OSes is limited, and consequently, one rapidly runs out of different OSes (e.g., 13 distinct OSes are needed to tolerate $f = 4$ faults in a $3f + 1$ system). However, our experiments are relatively pessimistic in the sense that they are based on long periods of time, and no distinctions are made between OS releases.

Newer releases of an OS can contain essential code changes, and therefore, old vulnerabilities may disappear and/or new vulnerabilities may be introduced. As a result, if we consider (OS, release) pairs, one may augment the number of different systems that do not share vulnerabilities.

4-diverse sets

In this section, we explore the diversity of a particular *4-diverse* set in the Isolated Thin Server configuration. In particular, we analyze in more detail the vulnerabilities for the set {*OpenBSD, Debian, Solaris, Windows2003*} across their releases between 2000 and 2011. Despite the year of the release, since some vulnerabilities can be inherited from older versions of the code, we will include all vulnerabilities no matter the published date (i.e., even the flaws before 2000).

From all releases available for our 4-version replicated system,[1] we looked at the major releases that had non-zero vulnerabilities. Since OpenBSD follows a fixed six-month release cycle, in this case, we selected one version every three years, which is reasonable given our 12-year time span (considering all 18 releases would require 154 entries in the table). Therefore, the OS releases that are taken into the study are: OpenBSD 5.0, OpenBSD 4.4, OpenBSD 3.8, OpenBSD 3.2, Solaris 8.0, Solaris 9.0, Solaris 10.0, Solaris 11.0, Debian 2.2, Debian 3.0, Debian 4.0, Debian 5.0, Debian 6.0 and Windows2003.

Table 3.10 shows the number of common vulnerabilities for each pair of OS-release (pairs with zero values are not displayed). The first observation is that there are many releases within this set of 4 OSes that appear to be free of common flaws. Second, these shared bugs occur more often between releases of the same OS. This is anticipated because more code is re-used within the same OS. Additionally, one can notice that releases of the same OS typically have less shared vulnerabilities when comparing older and newer versions. This is particularly evident for the OpenBSD and Debian releases. This result is quite promising because it supports our thesis that one should be able to explore diversity across releases, as

[1] OpenBSD 2.7, OpenBSD 2.8, OpenBSD 2.9, OpenBSD 3.0, OpenBSD 3.1, OpenBSD 3.2, OpenBSD 3.3, OpenBSD 3.4, OpenBSD 3.5, OpenBSD 3.6, OpenBSD 3.7, OpenBSD 3.8 OpenBSD 3.9, OpenBSD 4.0, OpenBSD 4.1, OpenBSD 4.2, OpenBSD 4.3, OpenBSD 4.4, Solaris 10.0, Solaris 11.0, Solaris 8.0, Solaris 8.1, Solaris 8.2, Solaris 9.0, Solaris 9.1, Debian 2.2, Debian 2.3, Debian 3.0, Debian 3.1, Debian 4.0, Debian 6.0, Debian 6.2, and Windows 2003.

OS Versions	Total
Solaris 8.0-Solaris 9.0	21
Solaris 9.0-Solaris 10.0	8
Solaris 8.0-Solaris 10.0	7
OpenBSD 3.2-OpenBSD 3.8	4
OpenBSD 3.2-Solaris 9.0	2
OpenBSD 3.2-Windows2003	2
OpenBSD 3.2-Solaris 8.0	1
OpenBSD 3.8-Windows2003	1
Solaris 8.0-Windows2003	1
Solaris 9.0-Windows2003	1
Solaris 10.0-Windows2003	1
Solaris 10.0-Solaris 11.0	1
Solaris 8.0-Debian 2.2	1
Debian 4.0-Windows2003	1

Table 3.10 – Common vulnerabilities between OS releases.

a way to increase the number of available candidates for the construction of the diverse OS sets.

3.4 Decisions About Deploying Diversity

We have underscored that these results are only *prima facie* evidence for the usefulness of diversity. On average, we would expect our estimates to be conservative as we analyzed aggregated vulnerabilities across releases: common vulnerabilities could be much smaller in a "specific set" of diverse OS releases. However, there are limitations on what can be claimed from the analysis of the NVD data alone without further manual analysis (other than what we have done, e.g., developing/finding and running exploit scripts on every OS for each vulnerability). A better analysis would be obtained if the NVD vulnerability reports were combined with the exploit reports (including exploiting counts), and even better if they also had indications about the users' usage profile. Moreover, we have seen that NVD has some limitations, as we have found that some of the vulnerabilities were not reported in the NVD, but several security advisory websites have reported those vulnerabilities. Additionally, there are partial exploit reports available from other sites (e.g., [48]).

Given these limitations, *how can individual user organizations decide whether diversity is a suitable option for them, with their specific requirements and usage profiles?* The cost is reasonably easy to assess: costs of the software products, the required middleware (if any), added the complexity of management, difficulties with client applications that require vendor-specific features, hardware costs, run-time cost of the synchronization and consistency enforcing mechanisms, and possibly more complex recovery after some failures. The gains in improved security (from some tolerance to zero-day vulnerabilities and easier recovery from some exploits, set against possible extra vulnerabilities due to the increased complexity of the system) are difficult to predict except empirically.

The first step onto adopting diversity as a dependable mechanism is done. The other limitations will be addressed in the rest of this thesis.

3.5 Final Remmarks

In this chapter we presented results from an analysis of 18 years (1994–2011) of vulnerability reports from the NVD database. It is worth to notice that the main manual work of analyzing the 2270 vulnerabilities of eleven OS distributions was done before this thesis. In this thesis, we developed three strategies to deploy diverse sets, some of which the ideas will be used in Chapter 4. In particular, the CVIst, as it introduces the notion of time evolution, which is fundamental for the following contributions. In this first chapter of contributions, we intended to reinforce the answer to the main questions that drove our research for this thesis: *what are the potential security gains that could be attained from using diverse OSes in a replicated intrusion-tolerant system?*

4 BFT Diversity Management

**********TO IGNORE**********

4.1 Introduction

This paper presents LAZARUS, the first system that automatically changes the attack surface of a BFT system in a dependable way. LAZARUS continuously collects security data from OSINT feeds on the internet to build a knowledge base about the possible vulnerabilities, exploits, and patches related to the systems of interest. This data is used to create clusters of similar vulnerabilities, which potentially can be affected by (variations of) the same exploit. These clusters and other collected attributes are used to analyze the risk of the BFT system becoming compromised. Once the risk increases, LAZARUS replaces the potentially vulnerable replica by another one, trying to maximize the failure independence. Then, the replaced node is put on quarantine and updated with the available patches, to be re-used later. These mechanisms were implemented to be fully automated, removing the human from the loop.

The current implementation of LAZARUS manages 17 OS versions, supporting the BFT replication of a set of representative applications. The replicas run in VMs, allowing provisioning mechanisms to configure them. We conducted two sets of experiments, one demonstrates that LAZARUS risk management can prevent a group of replicas from sharing vulnerabilities over time; the other, reveals the potential negative impact that virtualization and diversity can have on performance. However, we also show that if naive configurations are avoided, BFT applications in diverse configurations can actually perform close to our homogeneous bare metal setup.

In summary, we make the following contributions:

1. LAZARUS, a control plane that monitors OSINT data and manages the BFT service replicas, selecting and reconfiguring the system to always run the "most diverse" set of replicas at any given time (Sections **??** and 5.1);

2. A method for assessing the risk of a group of replicas being compromised based on the security news feeds available on the internet. The method overcomes limitations

from works that use NVD data for managing the replicas vulnerability independence (Section 4.6);

3. An evaluation of our risk management method based on real historical vulnerability data showing its effectiveness in keeping a group of replicas safe from common vulnerabilities (Section 4.7);

4. An extensive evaluation of LAZARUS prototype using 17 OS versions, a BFT replication library, and some BFT applications (i.e., a Key-Value Storage (KVS), an application-level firewall/message queuing service, and a blockchain service) showing the costs of supporting diversity in BFT systems (Section 5.2).

In a nutshell, as displayed in Figure 4.1, LAZARUS provides a distributed operating system for BFT-replicated services. The system manages in its execution plane a set of nodes that can run *unmodified replicas* (encapsulated in VMs or containers). Each node must have a small Logical Trusted Unit (LTU) that allows the activation and deactivation of replicas as demanded by the LAZARUS *Controller*, in the control plane. The controller decides which software should run at any given time by monitoring the existing vulnerabilities in the pool of replicas, aiming to minimize the risk of having several nodes being compromised by the same attack.



Figure 4.1 – LAZARUS overview.

4.2 System Model

LAZARUS system model shares some similarity with previous works on the proactive recovery of BFT systems (e.g., [32, 130, 140, 149]). More specifically, we consider a *hybrid system model* composed of two planes with different properties and assumptions:

- **Execution Plane:** This plane is componsed of replica processes that can be subject to Byzantine failures. Therefore, a Byzantine replica can try to mislead the other replicas or the clients. These replicas communicate through an asynchronous network that can delay, drop or modify messages, just like most BFT system models [13, 23, 32, 101]. This plane hosts n replicas from which at most f can be compromised at any given

moment. In this paper, we consider the typical scenario in which $n = 3f + 1$ [13, 21, 32, 101, 119].

- **Control Plane:** For simplicity, we will address this component as a logical-centralized controller, which requires stronger assumptions. However, in Chapter **??** we introduce BATON which requires weaker assumptions like the Execution Plane.

  In this plane, we assume that each component can only fail by crashing. Each *node* hosting processes contains a LTU, and there is a logically-centralized controller to reconfigure the system, just like what has been used in several previous works on proactive recovery (e.g., [130, 140, 149]). The failures of such components do not compromise the liveness and safety of the service as long as the control plane is recovered before f replicas fail.

Besides the execution and control planes, we assume the existence of two types of external components: (1) clients of the replicated service, which can be subject to Byzantine failures; (2) OSINT sources (e.g., NVD, ExploitDB) that can not be subverted and controlled by the adversary. In practice, this assumption lead us consider only well-established and authenticated data sources. Dealing with untrusted sources is an active area of research in the threat intelligence community (e.g., [110, 141]), which we consider out of scope for this paper.

4.3 Execution Plane

The Execution Plane can accomodate any replicated system that already levareges on the existence of a controller node (e.g., [67, 130, 140, 149]) or any BFT system that would benefit from the LAZARUS assistence (e.g., [148]).

4.4 Control Plane

LAZARUS is the first control plane that automatically changes the attack surface of a BFT system in a dependable way. LAZARUS continuously collects security data from OSINT feeds on the internet to build a knowledge base about the possible vulnerabilities, exploits, and patches related to the systems of interest. This data is used to create clusters of similar vulnerabilities, which potentially can be affected by (variations of) the same exploit. These clusters and other collected attributes are used to analyze the risk of the BFT system becoming compromised. Once the risk increases, LAZARUS replaces the potentially vulnerable replica by another one, trying to maximize the failure independence. Then, the replaced node is put on quarantine and updated with the available patches, to be re-used

later. These mechanisms were implemented to be fully automated, removing the human from the loop.

The current implementation of LAZARUS manages 17 OS versions, supporting the BFT replication of a set of representative applications. The replicas run in VMs, allowing provisioning mechanisms to configure them. We conducted two sets of experiments, one demonstrates that LAZARUS risk management can prevent a group of replicas from sharing vulnerabilities over time; the other, reveals the potential negative impact that virtualization and diversity can have on performance. However, we also show that if naive configurations are avoided, BFT applications in diverse configurations can actually perform close to our homogeneous bare metal setup.

4.5 Diversity of Replicas

For our purposes, each *replica* is composed of a stack of software, including an OS (kernel plus other software contained in an OS distribution), execution support (e.g., Java Virtual Machine (JVM), Databases Management Systems (DBMS)), a BFT library, and the service that is provided by the system. The set of n replicas is called a *System configuration*.

It is possible to improve the *replicas* fault independence by resorting to different OTS components in the software stack [47]. For example, it has been shown that using distinct OSes [63], filesystems [6, 16, 33], and databases [68], can yield important benefits in terms of fault independence. In addition, automatic techniques could enhance diversity, like randomization/obfuscation of OSes [140] and applications [168].

In Chapter **??** we explained why we focoused on OS diversity. Moreover, we do not explicitly consider the diversity of the BFT library (i.e., the protocol implementation) or the service code implemented on top of it. Four facts justify this decision: (1) N-version programming is too costly for this [15]; (2) there have been some works showing that such protocol implementations can be generated from formally verified specifications [76, 134]; (3) the relatively small size of such components (e.g., a key-value store on top of BFT-SMaRt has less than 15k lines of code [23]) make them relatively simple to test and assess with some confidence [107, 111]; and (4) there are no reported vulnerabilities about these system to support our study. Notice that, although we do not explicitly consider the diversity of BFT libraries, nothing prevents LAZARUS from monitoring them (when several alternatives become available). Additionally, as a pragmatic approach, we could employ automatic diversity techniques in this layer [130, 140].

CVE (affected OS)	Description
CVE-2014-0157 (Opensuse 13)	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Horizon Orchestration dashboard in OpenStack Dashboard (aka Horizon) 2013.2 before 2013.2.4 and icehouse before icehouse-rc2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the description field of a Heat template.
CVE-2015-3988 (Solaris 11.2)	Multiple XSS vulnerabilities in OpenStack Dashboard (Horizon) 2015.1.0 allow remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the metadata to a (1) Glance image, (2) Nova flavor or (3) Host Aggregate.
CVE-2016-4428 (Debian 8.0)	XSS vulnerability in OpenStack Dashboard (Horizon) 8.0.1 and earlier and 9.0.0 through 9.0.1 allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML by injecting an AngularJS template in a dashboard form.

Table 4.1 – Similar vulnerabilities affecting different OSes.

4.6 Diversity-aware Reconfigurations

The core of LAZARUS is the vulnerability evaluation method used to assess the risk of having replicas with shared vulnerabilities. This section details this method.

Finding Common Vulnerabilities

WE USE THE NVD (as described in Chapter 3

Previous studies on diversity solely count the number of shared vulnerabilities among different OSes, assuming that less common vulnerabilities implies a smaller probability of compromising $f+1$ OSes [63]. Although this intuition may seem acceptable, in practice it underestimates the number of shared vulnerabilities due to imprecisions in the data sources. For example, Table 4.1 shows three vulnerabilities, affecting three different OSes at distinct dates. At first glance, one may consider that these OSes do not share vulnerabilities. However, a careful inspection of the descriptions shows that they are very similar. Moreover, we checked this resemblance by searching for additional information on security web sites, and we found out that CVE-2016-4428, for example, also affects Solaris.[1]

Even with these imperfections, NVD is still the best data source for vulnerabilities. Therefore, we exploit its curated data feeds for obtaining the unstructured information present in the vulnerability text descriptions and use this information to find similar weaknesses. A usual way to find similarity in unstructured data is to use clustering algorithms [88]. Clustering is the process of aggregating related elements into groups, named clusters, and is one of the most popular unsupervised machine learning techniques. We apply this technique to build clusters of similar vulnerabilities (see Section **??** for details), even if the data feed reports that they affect different products. For example, the vulnerabilities in Table 4.1 will

[1] `https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/bulletinjul2016-3090568.html`

be placed in the same cluster as there is some resemblance among the descriptions, and they can potentially be activated by (variations of) the same exploit.

It is worth to remark that by using clusters to find similar vulnerabilities, we conservatively increase the chances of capturing shared weaknesses contributing to the score of a pair of replicas.

Measuring Risk

As discussed before, each vulnerability in NVD has an associated CVSS severity score. Therefore, a straw man solution for measuring risk would be to sum the CVSS scores of all common vulnerabilities in the software stack of two replicas to get an estimate of how dangerous are their shared weaknesses. However, CVSS has some limitations that make it unsuitable for managing the risk of replicated systems: (1) In practice, it has been shown that there is no correlation between the CVSS exploitability score and the existence of real exploits for the vulnerability [28]; (2) CVSS does not provide information about vulnerabilities exploiting and patching times [121]; (3) CVSS does not account for the vulnerability age, which means that severity remains the same over the years [59, 113]; and (4) some studies show that CVSS may overestimate severity [141], as for example larger scores do not correspond to higher prices in the vulnerabilities' black markets [7, 8].

Given these limitations, we derive a novel, more refined, metric to measure the risk of a BFT system being affected by common vulnerabilities. In our particular context, we are mostly interested in capturing information that relates to the window of exposure that vulnerabilities have, mainly when they are correlated among *replicas*. Therefore, we developed a risk metric that aims to overpass the identified limitations. We solved (1) and (2) by using additional OSINT sources that provide information about the exploit and patch dates. Since NVD does not provide this information, we collect more data from other OSINT sources like Exploit-DB [45] for exploits, patching information from CVE-details [48], and additional vendor websites, such as Ubuntu Security Notices [159], Debian Security Tracker [46], and Microsoft Security Advisories and Bulletins [114] (which also give additional product versions affected by the vulnerability). We solve (3) using the vulnerability published date to calculate its age. Finally, we only use the CVSS attributes that concern to integrity and availability, the properties traditionally related with BFT replication (4).

Our metric considers all this information to measure the risk of a set of n replicas having active shared vulnerabilities. More specifically, it works as an indicator of how fault-independent is a *System configuration*. Equation 4.1 shows the risk of a *System configuration* as the sum of the different *replica* pairs' score. This score is calculated based on the set of vulnerabilities $\mathcal{V}_{i,j}$ that affects both r_i and r_j or that are present in a cluster containing vulnerabilities affecting both *replicas* (Equation 4.2). Finally, we calculate the score of

$$risk(sc) = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{n} common(rc_i, rc_j) \tag{4.1}$$

$$common(rc_i, rc_j) = \sum_{v_k \in \mathscr{V}_{i,j}} score(v_k) \tag{4.2}$$

$$score(v_k) = (A + I + exp(v_k)) \times tdist(v_k) \tag{4.3}$$

$$exp(v_k) = \begin{cases} max(DP - DE, 0) + 1 & v_k \text{ exploited, patched} \\ DE & v_k \text{ exploited, not patched} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{4.4}$$

each vulnerability in $\mathscr{V}_{i,j}$ (Equation 4.3). We assign a *dynamic score* to each vulnerability, considering the referred attributes: *(i)* we take two CVSS attributes to capture the extent to which a vulnerability v_k affects availability (A) and integrity (I); *(ii)* we account for the number of days the vulnerability was exposed with *exp*, i.e., there was an exploit and no patch available. This is calculated considering the number of days to patch (DP) and to exploit (DE) v_k (Equation 4.4); *(iii)* and we use an amortization function to reflect the fact that older vulnerabilities have are less likely to harm the system ($tdist(v_k) \in [0,1]$).

Selecting Configurations

We use the risk metric to choose the *replicas* that should be included in the *System configuration*. This is done by periodically evaluating the risk of the current *System configuration*. If the risk exceeds a pre-defined threshold, a mechanism is triggered to replace replicas and reduce the overall risk. First, it decides which *replica* (`r`) should be removed and put in a quarantine set (`QUARANTINE`). Then, it selects (one of) the best candidate(s) replicas from all the available candidates (`POOL`) to make the substitution. When the replacement takes place, the resulting *System configuration* (`CONFIG`) has lower risk than the previous one. Additionally, we ensure that removed *replicas* can sometime later re-enter the system, and the ones that are in the system, despite their overall score, are eventually replaced. Therefore, each replica `r` in `CONFIG` has an *age* value that is incremented. On the contrary, each removed replica `r` in `QUARANTINE`, has a *healing* value that is decremented.

This procedure is detailed in Algorithm 1. The *Monitor* function is called on each monitoring round (e.g., on every hour). Consider a `CONFIG` that is already running with risk$= \alpha$. First, the algorithm increments the *age* of each `r` in `CONFIG` (lines 6-7). Then, it verifies if the risk of `CONFIG` (Equation 4.1) does not exceed the predefined *threshold* (line 8). In the affirmative case, a *replica* replacement is started. First, some local variables are initialized

(lines 9-10). Second, it randomly gets pairs $\langle i, j \rangle$ from CONFIG (line 11) and saves some of them that augment the risk in MAXIMALS (Equation 4.2) (lines 12-14). Third, the algorithm picks the older replica (i.e., the one that is in CONFIG for more time) of all selected pairs (lines 15-18). This replica is removed from CONFIG (line 19) and added to QUARANTINE (line 21). The *healing* value is initialized with a value, different for each *replica*, based on historical data about the time it takes for a patch to be published for this software (line 20). The algorithm calls a function that selects a new replica to join CONFIG (line 22). Finally, it decrements the *healing* of each r in QUARANTINE (line 24). When such value reaches zero, r is removed from QUARANTINE and added to POOL (lines 25-28).

Function *Find_new_config()* (line 22) solves the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underline{\text{min}} & risk(\texttt{CONFIG} \cup \{r\}) \\ \underline{\text{subject to}} & r \in \texttt{POOL} \end{array}$$

where CONFIG is the set of $n-1$ replicas that will stay in the system and r is the new replica (which we have to find) among the ones in POOL. The twist in our case is that we avoid deterministic solutions to increase the difficulty of an adversary guessing the next configurations. Therefore, we developed a simple heuristic that finds the k best replicas in POOL (e.g., $k = 3$) and randomly picks one of them to be added to CONFIG. The heuristic is quite simple: we just calculate the risk of a configuration with each candidate replica from POOL, and choose one of the k replicas that induce lower risk.

Although better heuristics can be developed, this brute-force method works in LAZARUS because we do not expect POOL (our solution space) to be large. In addition, this function is only called if the risk exceeds the threshold.

Algorithm 1: Replica Set Reconfiguration

```
1  CONFIG: set replicas in the System configuration;
2  POOL: set with the available replicas (not in use);
3  MAXIMALS: set of candidate replicas to remove;
4  QUARANTINE: set of quarantine replicas;
5  Function Monitor ()
6      foreach r in CONFIG do
7          increment(r.age);
8      if risk(CONFIG) > threshold then
9          maxScore, maxAge ← 0;
10         toRemove ← ⊥;
11         foreach ⟨i, j⟩ in CONFIG do
12             if common(i,j) ≥ maxScore then
13                 MAXIMALS ← MAXIMALS ∪ {⟨i, j⟩};
14                 maxScore ← common(i,j);
15         foreach ⟨i, j⟩ in MAXIMALS do
16             if older(i,j) ≥ maxAge then
17                 toRemove ← older(i,j);
18                 maxAge ← toRemove.age;
19         CONFIG ← CONFIG \ { toRemove };
20         toRemove.healing ← init_healing(toRemove);
21         QUARANTINE ← QUARANTINE ∪ { toRemove };
22         CONFIG ← Find_new_config(POOL, CONFIG);
23     foreach r in QUARANTINE do
24         decrement(r.healing);
25         if r.healing = 0 then
26             QUARANTINE ← QUARANTINE \ {r};
27             r.age ← 0;
28             POOL ← POOL ∪ {r};
```

4.7 Evaluation

This section evaluates how LAZARUS performs on the selection of dependable *replica* configurations. As discussed in Section **??**, we focus our experimental evaluation solely on the OS diversity.

In these experiments, we emulate live executions of the system by dividing the collected data into two periods: (i) a *learning phase* covering all vulnerability data between *2010-1-1* and *2017-9-29*, which is used to setup the *Risk manager*'s algorithm; and (ii) an *execution phase* composed of the period between *2017-10-1* and *2018-3-30*. This last period is divided into three intervals of two months (OUT-NOV, DEC-JAN, and FEB-MAR), allowing for three independent tests. The goal is to create a knowledge base in the *learning phase* that is used to assess LAZARUS choices during each interval of the *execution phase*. A run starts

on the first day of an interval and then progresses through each day of the interval until the end. Every day, we check if the currently executing replica set could be compromised by an attack exploring the vulnerabilities released on that day. We take the most pessimist approach, which is to say that we consider the system to be broken if a vulnerability comes out that affects at least two OSes that would be executing at that time.

Three additional strategies, inspired by previous works, were defined to be compared with LAZARUS (Section 4.6):

- **Equal:** all the replicas use the same randomly-selected OS during the whole execution. This strategy corresponds to the scenario where most past BFT systems have been implemented and evaluated (e.g., [9, 13, 18, 19, 23, 40, 101, 109, 162, 174]). Here, compromising a replica would mean an opportunity to intrude the remaining ones.

- **Static:** a configuration of n different OSes is randomly selected, and there are no changes during the whole execution. This corresponds to a diverse BFT system without reconfigurations (e.g., [33]).

- **Random:** a configuration of n OSes is randomly selected, and at the beginning of each day, a new OS is randomly picked to replace an existing one. This solution represents a system with proactive recovery and diversity, but with no informed strategy for choosing the next *System configuration*.

The experiments consider a pool of 38 OS versions to be deployed on four replicas. At the beginning of the execution phase, the OSes are assumed to be fully patched.

Diversity vs Vulnerabilities

We evaluate how each strategy can prevent the replicated system from being compromised. Each strategy is analyzed over 5000 runs throughout the execution phase in two-month slots. Different runs are initiated with distinct random number generator seeds, resulting in potentially different OS selections over the time slot. On each day, we check if there is a vulnerability affecting more than one replica in the current *System configuration*, and in the affirmative case the execution is stopped.

Results: Figure 4.2 compares the percentage of compromised runs of all strategies. Each bar represents the percentage of runs that did not terminate successfully (lower is better). In all three periods, LAZARUS presents the best results. The *Random* strategy performs worse because eventually, it picks a group of OSes with common vulnerabilities. This result provides evidence for the claim that LAZARUS improves the dependability, reducing the probability that $f+1$ OSes eventually become compromised. Interestingly, and contrary to



Figure 4.2 – Compromised system runs over 2 month slots.

intuition, changing OSes every day with no criteria will always create unsafe configurations. Therefore, it is paramount to have selection strategies like the ones we use in LAZARUS.

Risk Evaluation

In order to better understand how LAZARUS performed, we isolated one of the 5000 runs to observe the risk evolution over time. We picked the *Random* and LAZARUS strategies for this analysis, with results displayed in Figure 4.3. The graphs present the evolution of the common vulnerabilities, the common clusters, and our risk metric for both schemes. Notice that two OSes might appear in the same cluster but with no mutual flaw as clusters can include many distinct vulnerabilities.



(a) Random **(b)** LAZARUS

Figure 4.3 – Execution phase for Random and LAZARUS OS configuration strategies (log scale).

Results: As shown in Figure 4.3a, *Random* survives only for 10 days. The number of shared clusters and vulnerabilities remains small for the first days. Then, there is a replica replacement that adds to the configuration an OS that has common vulnerabilities with the others.

LAZARUS survives until the end of the experiment, as the risk is continually managed to keep the system safe. Figure 4.3b shows that shared clusters sometimes increase, at the same pace as the risk. But then, the next reconfigurations are carried out with the goal of decreasing the risk. Notice that the risk value is always under 1 for LAZARUS, and in the *Random* is mostly above 10.

Samba: *On February 2, 2017, security researchers published details about a zero-day vulnerability in Server Message Block (SMB) of Windows, affecting several versions such as 8.1, 10, Server 2012 R2, and Server 2016. Could cause a DoS condition when a client accesses a malicious SMB.* **CVES:** CVE-2017-0016
Wanna Cry: *On Friday, May 12, 2017, the world was alarmed to discover a widespread ransomware attack that hit organizations in more than 100 countries. Based on a vulnerability in Windows' SMB protocol (nicknamed EternalBlue), discovered by the NSA and leaked by Shadow Brokers.* **CVES:** CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0146, CVE-2017-0147, CVE-2017-0148
PowerShell: *Security feature bypass vulnerabilities in Device Guard that could allow an attacker to inject malicious code into a Windows PowerShell session.* **CVES:** CVE-2017-0219, CVE-2017-0173, CVE-2017-0215, CVE-2017-0216, CVE-2017-0218
Stackclash: *In its 2017 malware forecast, SophosLabs warned that attackers would increasingly target Linux. The flaw, discovered by researchers at Qualys, is in the memory management of several operating systems and affects Linux, OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD and Solaris.* **CVES:** CVE-2017-1000365, CVE-2017-1000366, CVE-2017-1000367, CVE-2017-1000369, CVE-2017-1000370, CVE-2017-1000370, CVE-2017-1000371, CVE-2017-1000372, CVE-2017-1000373, CVE-2017-1000374, CVE-2017-1000375, CVE-2017-1000376, CVE-2017-1000379, CVE-2017-1083, CVE-2017-1084, CVE-2017-3629, CVE-2017-3630, CVE-2017-3631

Table 4.2 – Notable attacks during 2017.

Diversity vs Attacks

This experiment evaluates the strategies when facing notable attacks/vulnerabilities that appeared in 2017. Each attack potentially exploits several flaws, some of which affecting different OSes. The attacks were selected by searching the security news sites for high impact problems, most of them related to more than one CVE. As some of the CVEs include applications, we added more vulnerabilities to the database for this purpose. Table 4.2 lists the attacks and related CVEs: Samba,[2] WannaCry,[3] Powershell,[4] and Stackclash.[5]

Since some of these attacks might have been prepared months before the vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed, we augmented the execution phase to the full six months. As before, the strategies are analyzed over 5000 runs.

Results: Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of compromised runs for each attack and all attacks put together. LAZARUS is clearly the best at handling the various scenarios, with no compromised executions. *Random* is the worse, as it does not use any criteria to select the OSes. Both *Equal* and *Static* may perform not so bad as they are static, i.e., the OSes selected by random chance might end up not being exploitable until the end of the run.

[2] https://www.secureworks.com/blog/attacking-windows-smb-zero-day-vulnerability
[3] https://securityintelligence.com/wannacry-ransomware-spreads-across-the-globe-makes-organizations-wanna-cry-about-microsoft-vulnerability/
[4] http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/ms-tuesday.html
[5] https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2017/06/20/stack-clash-linux-vulnerability-you-need-to-patch-now/



Figure 4.4 – Compromised runs with notable attacks.

4.8 Final Remarks

LAZARUS addresses the long-standing open problem of evaluating, selecting, and managing the diversity of a BFT system to make it resilient to malicious adversaries. Our work focuses on two fundamental issues: how to select the best replicas to run together given the current threat landscape, and what is the performance overhead of running a diverse BFT system in practice.

5 LAZARUS

**************TO IGNORE*********** jump to Descentralized Lazarus Version**
This chapter presents LAZARUS iplementation, these mechanisms were implemented to be fully automated, removing the human from the loop. The current implementation of LAZARUS manages 17 OS versions, supporting the BFT replication of a set of representative applications. The replicas run in VMs, allowing provisioning mechanisms to configure them. We conducted two sets of experiments, one demonstrates that LAZARUS risk management can prevent a group of replicas from sharing vulnerabilities over time; the other, reveals the potential negative impact that virtualization and diversity can have on performance. However, we also show that if naive configurations are avoided, BFT applications in diverse configurations can actually perform close to our homogeneous bare metal setup.

5.1 Implementation

This section details the implementation of each component of LAZARUS. It also briefly presents other aspects of our prototype.

Control Plane

Figure 5.1 shows LAZARUS control plane with its four main modules, described below.



Figure 5.1 – LAZARUS architecture.

❶ ***Data manager.*** LAZARUS needs to know the software stack of each available replica to be able to look for vulnerabilities in this software. The list of software products is provided following the CPE Dictionary [117], which is also used by NVD. For each software, the administrator can indicate the time interval (in years) during which data should be obtained from NVD' feeds.

The *Data manager* parses the NVD feeds considering only the vulnerabilities that affect the chosen products. The processing is carried out with several threads cooperatively assemblying as much data as possible about each vulnerability – a queue is populated with requests pertaining a particular vulnerability, and other threads will look for related data in additional OSINT sources. Typically, the other sources are not as well structured as NVD, and therefore they have to be handled with specialized HTML parsers that we have developed. Currently, the prototype supports five other sources, namely Exploit DB, CVE-details, Ubuntu, Debian, and Microsoft. As previously mentioned, such sources provide complementary data, like additional affected products versions not mentioned in NVD.

The collected data is stored in a relational database (MySQL). For each vulnerability we keep its CVE identifier, the published date, the products it affects, its text description, some CVSS attributes (e.g., availability and integrity); and exploit and patching dates.

❷ ***Risk manager.*** This component finds out when it is necessary to replace the currently running group of *replicas* and discovers an alternative configuration that decreases the risk. As explained in Section 4.6, the risk is computed using score values that require two kinds of data: the information about the vulnerabilities, which is collected by the *Data manager*; and the vulnerability clusters. A vulnerability cluster is a set of vulnerabilities that are related accordingly to their description (see Section **??** for details). The *Risk manager* also runs Algorithm 1 to monitor the replicated system and trigger reconfigurations.

❸ ***Deploy manager.*** This component automates the setup and execution of the diverse replicas. It creates and deploys the *replicas* in the execution environment implementing the decisions of the *Risk manager*, i.e., it dictates when and which *replicas* leave and join the system. We developed a replica builder on top of Vagrant [74]. It is responsible for downloading, installing, and configuring the *replicas*. Moreover, it performs replica maintenance, where *replicas* in `QUARANTINE` are booted to carry out automatic software updates (i.e., patching).

Setup. The box configuration is defined in a configuration file, named *Vagrantfile*, consider the example in Listing 5.1. In this file, it is possible to set several options of the box, to name a few: the box name, the number of CPUs, the amount of memory RAM, the IP, the type of network, sync folders between host and the box, etc. Additionally, it is possible to pass some VM-specific parameters, e.g., some CPU/mother board flags such as enabling

VT-x technology – consider the `modifyvm` fields in Listing 5.1 (lines 6-14). It is possible to select different VM providers (e.g., libvirt, VMware, VirtualBox, Parallels, Docker, etc), we rely on VirtualBox since it is the one with more diversity opportunities in the Vagrant Cloud [75]. Vagrant Cloud is a website that offers a plethora of different VMs.

```
1  Vagrant.configure(2) do |config|
2   config.vm.box = "geerlingguy/ubuntu1604"
3   config.ssh.insert_key = false
4   config.vm.provider "virtualbox" do |v|
5    v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--cpus", 4]
6    v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--memory", 22000]
7    v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--cpuexecutioncap", 100]
8    v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--ioapic", "on"]
9    v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--hwvirtex", "on"]
10   v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--nestedpaging", "on"]
11   v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--pae", "on"]
12   v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--natdnshostresolver1", "on"]
13   v.customize ["modifyvm", :id, "--natdnsproxy1", "on"]
14  end
15  config.vm.network "public_network", ip:"192.168.2.50", bridge:"em1"
16  config.vm.provision :shell, path: "run_debian.sh", privileged: true
17 end
```

Listing 5.1 – Windows Server 2016 Vagrantfile

Download. One of the fields of the *Vagranfile* is the boxname, the `box` field is the key that is used to choose which box will be downloaded, each key is unique for each box. There are plenty of OSes and versions ready-to-use, and the same OS/version can have different "manufacturers" – some of which are official.

Deploy and provision. Vagrant supports complex provisions mechanisms, such as Chef or Puppet, but shell script was sufficient for us. This is set in the *Vagranfile* `provision` field, one can describe the provision steps inline or in an external file and link it to the *Vagranfile*. Then, when the OS is booting, after the basic setup, the OSes will execute the provision script. In this script, we program which software will be downloaded and run in the VMs and what configurations are needed. We have developed shell scripts for each OSes, some of which share the same script as Debian and Ubuntu. Each OSes, especially the ones from different OSes families (e.g., Solaris and BSD) have different commands to execute the same instructions. Although different, all scripts were meant to do the same thing: First the script installs the software that is missing in the box – this is not true for all OSes – like Java 8, `wget`, `unzip`, and any additional software that one wants to install/run after the OSes boot.

Command and Control. There are some simple commands to boot and halt a box, e.g., `vagrant up` and `vagrant halt`. Vagrant also provides an ssh command (`vagrant`

`ssh`) that allows the host to connect to the box. Our manager component makes the bridge between the *Risk manager* and the execution environment. We developed an API on top of Vagrant, another level of abstraction made to manage replicated systems.

❹ **LTUs.** Each node that hosts a replica has a Vagrant daemon (see details in next section) running on its trusted domain. This component is isolated from the internet and communicates only with the LAZARUS controller through Transport Layer Security (TLS) channels.

Clustering

A few steps are carried out to create the vulnerability clusters. First, the vulnerability description needs to be transformed into a vector, where a numerical value is associated with the most relevant words (up to 200 words). This operation entails, for example, converting all words to a canonical form and calculating their frequency (less frequent words are given higher weights). Then, the K-means algorithm is applied to build the clusters [88], where the number of clusters to be formed is determined by the elbow method [157]. We used the open-source machine learning library Weka [137] to build the clusters.

Clustering is the process of aggregating elements into similar groups, named clusters. For example, two elements from the same cluster have a higher probability of being similar than two elements from different clusters. We apply this technique to build clusters of similar vulnerabilities. One of the benefits of applying clustering techniques to vulnerability-data is that the algorithm does not need prior knowledge about the data. It is the process alone that discovers the hidden knowledge in the data. Each cluster is used as a hint that similar vulnerabilities are likely to be activated through the same or similar exploit. We considered the vulnerability description and published date to find these similarities. In the end, it is expected that the clusters have a minimal number of elements that just represent the same or similar vulnerabilities.

In order to apply a clustering technique to our data, we need to follow some steps:

1) Data representation We transform the data that is stored in a database into a format that is readable by the clustering algorithm. Since we are using Weka [137], the data must be represented as Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF). Basically, this is a CSV file with some meta information, see Listing 5.2.

```
1 @RELATION vulnerabilities
2 @ATTRIBUTE cve string
3 @ATTRIBUTE description string
4 @ATTRIBUTE published_date date "yyyy-MM-dd"
5 @DATA
```

```
6 CVE-2017-3301, 'vulnerability in the solaris component of oracle sun
    systems products suite subcomponent kernel the supported version that
     is [...] attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized
    update insert or delete access to some of solaris accessible data
    cvss v base score integrity impacts', '2017-01-27'
7 ... more
```

Listing 5.2 – ARFF file describing a vulnerability.

This file contains all the vulnerabilities entries in the database. As we are interested in the vulnerability similarities, we select only the CVE identifier, the text, that contains the most relevant and nonstructured information, and the published date. These attributes add meaning and temporal reference to the clustering algorithm.

2) Data preparation In general, machine learning algorithms do not handle raw data, then the data needs to be prepared: First, we transform the CVE string into a number, basically, for each CVE, there is a real number that identifies each CVE unequivocally. This attribute is transformed in numeric values using *StringToNominal* filter. Each CVE identifier is mapped to a numeric value. Second, we transform the published date to a number format that Weka can handle using the *NumericToNominal* filter. Third, the text description must be transformed into a vector, the vector will represent the frequencies of each word in the whole document of strings. We used the *StringToWordVector* to transform a text string into a vector of word weights, these weights represent the relevance of each word in the document. This filter contains the following parameters:

- **TF- and IDF-Transform**, both set to true, TF-IDF stands for term frequency-inverse document frequency. This is a statistical measure used to evaluate how relevant a word is to a document in a collection. The relevance increases proportionally to the number of times a word appears in the document but is offset by the frequency of the word in the corpus. For example, words that appear in all vulnerability descriptions, are less relevant than the ones that appear more in few vulnerabilities.

- **lowerCaseTokens**, convert all the words to lower case.

- **minTermFreq**, set to -1, this will preserve any word despite their occurrences in the document.

- **normalizeDocLength**, set to normalize all data.

- **stopwords**, we define a stop word list, then words from this list are discarded. We begin with a general English stop word list containing pronouns, articles, etc.

- **tokenizer**, set to *WordTokenizer*, this filter will remove special characters from the text, there is a default set of characters but we added a few more.

- **wordsTopKeep**, is the number of words that will be kept to make the clusters. We kept 200 as it was the number of words that represent better the lexical of vulnerabilities after removing the *stopwords*.

Our goal is to build clusters in such way that similar vulnerabilities, even if they affect different products, are put together in the same cluster. For example, recall the vulnerabilities in Table 4.1, which can be put in the same cluster since they are very similar. Some of the parameters listed above needed some tuning to achieve our goals. For example, before the tuning, some of the clusters were representing types of vulnerabilities, e.g., buffer overflow, cross-site scripting, etc. Since we are not interested in that type of clusters we have refined our *stopword list* to reduce the description vocabulary to contain only what matters for us. We have done this by iterating the process and checking the most used words (top 200 words) for clustering (this can be seen in Weka's intermediary output). Then, we added the most relevant from the 200 words that were deviating from our goal. In the end, we have a stop word list [1] without the security-vocabulary noise.

When the pre-filtering ends, Weka presents a file very similar to the previous ARFF file with the difference that the features are the most relevant words in the corpus. And each instance contains a value of relevance for each word.

3) Making clusters K-means is an unsupervised machine learning algorithm that groups data in K clusters. The *K-means* has two important parameters: the number of clusters to be formed, we set to 200 clusters. We used the elbow method [157] to decide $k = 200$; and the *distance function*, to calculate the distance between objects, the *Euclidean Distance* is the most adequate for this type of data; The *K-means* computes the distance from each data entry to the cluster center (randomly selected in the first round). Then, it assigns each data entry to a cluster based on the minimum distance (i.e., Euclidean distance) to each cluster center. Then, it computes the centroid, that is the average of each data attribute using only the members of each cluster. Calculate the distance from each data entry to the recent centroids. If there is no modification (i.e., re-arrangement of the elements in the cluster), then the clusters are complete, or it recalculates the distance that best fits the elements. When the K-means finishes the execution, we take the cluster assignments of each vulnerability. The assignments will be added to a new ARFF file, similar to the first one but with a new attribute that is the cluster name (e.g., cluster1, cluster2, etc).

Sometimes the resulting clusters include vulnerabilities that are unrelated. Therefore, we use the Jaccard index (J-index) to measure the similarity between the vulnerabilities within

[1] Stop word list is available: here

the cluster. We calculate the J-index of each element, and then the average J-index of the cluster. The clusters with a smaller average J-index (below a certain threshold) are considered ill-formed. In this case, we select the vulnerabilities with lower J-index and move them to another cluster that would result in a better J-index. If no such cluster exists, then we create a new one with the "orphan" vulnerability.

BFT replication. Although there has been relevant research on BFT protocols over the last twenty years, there are few open-source replication libraries that implement them. LAZARUS can use any of those libraries, as long as they support replica set reconfigurations. More specifically, to manage the *replicas*, we need the ability to add first a new *replica* to the set and then remove the old *replica* to be quarantined. Therefore, we employ BFT-SMaRt [23], a stable BFT library that provides reconfigurations on the *replicas* set.

Replica Virtualization. VMs can be used to implement replicated systems, leveraging on the isolation between the untrusted and the trusted domains [49, 50, 130, 149]. Recovery triggering can be initiated from the isolated domain in a synchronous manner, reducing the downtime of the service during the reconfigurations. In our implementation, we resort to the Vagrant [74] provisioning tool to do fast deployment of ready-to-use OSes and applications on VMs. Vagrant supports several virtualization providers, e.g., VMware and Docker. From the available alternatives, we chose VirtualBox [138] because it offers more diversity opportunities, i.e., it supports a more extensive set of different guests OSes.

Descentralized LAZARUS Version

So far we have been describing LAZARUS control plane as a logically centralized component. In this section, we present a replicated and intrusion-tolerant version of LAZARUS. This architecture envisions a set of servers that run LAZARUS in a coordinated manner. Therefore, these servers can manage the replicas in the *Execution Plane* as before, and also manage their self. This version introduces some significant modifications to the system model and architecture which are explained below.

System Model. This version LAZARUS shares some similarities with the centralized version. For instance, the *Execution Plane* remains practically unmodified. On the contrary, the *Control Plane* suffers some changes. The new *Control Plane* is composed of replica processes, named *Controller replicas*, which can be subject to Byzantine failures. Therefore, a Byzantine *Controller replica* can try to mislead the other replicas. This plane hosts n replicas from which at most f can be compromised at any given moment. Each replica has a LTU co-allocated that is assumed as trusted. This component actions cannot deviate from their correct intention, this is especially important for the replicas recovery.

Architecture. We have designed a new architecture for replicated LAZARUS, an overview of the architecture is shown in the Figure 5.2. In this new architecture, we have two instances of SMR. The first one runs a specific service in the *Execution Plane*, and it was already presented in Chapter 4. The second one runs in the *Control Plane*, that was assumed as a trusted and centralized component before. In this version, LAZARUS is replicated as a BFT SMR. *Controller Replicas* are coordinated to manage the *Service Replicas* in the other plane. Both, types of replicas have a LTU co-allocated with each replica. Each LTU run a BFT library client (i.e., BFT-SMART client). These clients communicate with the library server that runs on *Controller Replicas*.



Figure 5.2 – Distributed LAZARUS architecture.

Recovery Protocol. The communication between LTUs and *Controller Replicas* is made via BFT-SMART and it is solely to trigger recoveries both on *Controller Replicas* and *Service Replicas*. Each LTU runs a *Controller Proxy* that can invoke *Controller Replicas* commands in a coordinated way, and it receives messages from *Controller Replicas*. It has to wait for $f + 1$ matching messages as to know that the message is correct. Therefore, the *Controller Proxy* is ready to trigger a recovery on a *Service Replica* or on a *Controller Replica*. Contrary to the usual request-response of SMR, here, the *Controller Proxy* receives "responses" without a prior request.

Replica Synchronization Protocol. In the centralized version, LAZARUS takes decisions alone. For example, it decides when it is time to contact OSINT sources to look for new data, or when it is the time to start recoveries. On the contrary, in a SMR setting the replicas must be coordinated to execute the same command *at the same time*. One way to do that is to assume that replicas have synchronous clocks, and then, all the requests are synchronized. However, we want to make the few timely assumptions as possible. Moreover, by using the internet to communicate with OSINT sources, LAZARUS communication is subject to different levels of delays. Therefore, we propose a solution that uses a logical timeout protocol to (logically) synchronize replicas. This protocol was proposed by Kirsch *et al.* [96] to coordinate replicas to poll requests to a sensor in the context of SCADA systems. The

authors named this protocol as Logical Time Out protocol, and it can be briefly described as: All *Controller Replicas* run an algorithm that periodically sends a `SYNC` message. This message is used to inform other replicas of the current timeouts that a replica has. Each replica will set their own timeouts by setting up a timeout $\mathtt{T}_x$ with the local time c_i and the local expiration time d to a replica i. Then, it communicates to the others the $\mathtt{T}_x$ sending the c_i and d within a `SYNC` message. This allows every replica to update their own list of timeouts, and each replica sets the expiration time as $c_i + d$ for $\mathtt{T}_x$. When a `SYNC` message from i says that the local clock is greater than $c_i + d$, then the timeout $\mathtt{T}_x$ was expired. When a logical timeout is triggered concerning $f + 1$ different replicas the timeout $\mathtt{T}_x$ is delivered to the application. This way, it is guaranteed that replicas will trigger some action only when $f + 1$ replicas had $\mathtt{T}_x$ expired.

Distributed Random Generation Protocol. As it was explained in Chapter 4, LAZARUS algorithm selects random configurations to prevent attackers from guessing which will be the next configuration. In the centralized version of LAZARUS, it is simple to select a random configuration. However, distributed random number generation is a challenge on distributed systems. In particular, to determine a random value among the replicas without prior knowledge of anyone and guaranteeing that random value is not biased, i.e., that a malicious replica is not influencing the final value. We adopted the Syta *et al.* [156] soltuion named RANDSHARE, as it guarantees unbiasability, unpredictability, and availability on random number generation. The protocol was developed in such a way that after a protocol barrier, honest peers will eventually output the previously decided value despite the adversary's behavior. The protocol uses secret sharing and polynomial commitments to create shares of a local random number and distributed them among the peers. With the polynomial commitment, a peer is able to verify if the share is valid without revealing information of the secret. When all their verifications are made each peer sends that information to the others, at the end of this phase, each peer should know all the validations done by the others. After this stage, all nodes can recover the secrets via Lagrange interpolation. Finally, the random number is generated through a `xor` operation with the different recovered secrets.

Distributed Storage. The last major modification that we have identified is the storage location. In a centralized way, the storage is a single database that is accessed by the controller. A strawman solution would use full replication of the pool and each *Controller Proxy* would wait for $f + 1$ responses (the actual replica image and a cryptographic hash of the image to verify). However, this solution is not resource efficient as it requires that all replica images be replicated on all *Controller Replicas*. A more sophisticated solution would take advantage of erasure codes with secret sharing. This approach would minimize the use of resources, as each *Controller Replica* would store only parts of the complete. Moreover, it would simplify the recovery of these replicas as they would only need to recover parts of the original pool instead of the complete pool. Nevertheless, this approach implies additional complexity on the *Controller Proxy* as it needs to rebuild the blocks and verify them.

Deterministic Image Patching. One of the main problems that the replicated solution brings is to guarantee that the images are loaded in a deterministic way. SMR requires that the replicas start from the same state and apply the same operations to the state in such a way that the replicas reply with the same answers to the clients. That said, a problem is raised as it is a challenge to create VM images that are equal. A primary approach would be to guarantee that in a setup phase all the *Controller replicas* have a copy of the VM images distributed in a secure way. However, once a replica is patched in the background it becomes difficult to guarantee that the images remain equal across the *Controller replicas*. Therefore, once a *Controller proxy* that is responsible to load a VM (in the *Execution plane*) cannot vote which image is correct as they are different among the (even correct) *Controller replicas* due to the patches.

5.2 Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate how LAZARUS' affects the performance of diverse replicated systems. First, we run the BFT-SMaRt microbenchmarks in our virtualized environment using 17 OS versions to understand how the performance of a BFT protocol varies with different OSes, and how they compare with the performance of a homogeneous bare metal setup. Second, we use the same benchmarks to measure the performance of specific diverse setups. Third, we analyze the performance of the system along LAZARUS-managed reconfigurations. Fourth, we measure the time that each OS takes to boot. Finally, we evaluate the performance of three BFT services running in the LAZARUS infrastructure.

These experiments were conducted in a cluster of Dell PowerEdge R410 machines, where each one has 32 GB of memory and two quad-core 2.27 GHz Intel Xeon E5520 processor with hyper-threading, i.e., supporting 16 hardware threads on each node. The machines communicate through a gigabit Ethernet network. Each server runs Ubuntu Linux 14.04 LTS (3.13.0-32-generic Kernel) and VirtualBox 5.1.28, for supporting the execution of VMs with different OSes. Additionally, Vagrant 2.0.0 was used as the provisioning tool to automate the deployment process. In all experiments, we configure BFT-SMaRt v1.1 with four replicas ($f = 1$), one replica per physical machine.

Table 5.1 lists the 17 OS versions used in the experiments and the number of cores used by their corresponding VMs. These values correspond to the maximum number of CPUs supported by VirtualBox with that particular OS. The table also shows the JVM used in each OS, and the amount of memory supported by each of these VMs. Given these limitations we setup our environment to establish a fair baseline by configuring an *homogeneous* Bare Metal (BM) environment that uses only four cores of the physical machine.

ID	Name	Cores	JVM	Mem.
UB14	Ubuntu 14.04	4	Java Oracle 1.8.0_144	15GB
UB16	Ubuntu 16.04	4	Java Oracle 1.8.0_144	15GB
UB17	Ubuntu 17.04	4	Java Oracle 1.8.0_144	15GB
OS42	OpenSuse 42.1	4	Openjdk 1.8.0_141	15GB
FE24	Fedora 24	4	Openjdk 1.8.0_141	15GB
FE25	Fedora 25	4	Openjdk 1.8.0_141	15GB
FE26	Fedora 26	4	Openjdk 1.8.0_141	15GB
DE7	Debian 7	4	Java Oracle 1.8.0_151	15GB
DE8	Debian 8	4	Openjdk 1.8.0_131	15GB
W10	Windows 10	4	Java Oracle 1.8.0_151	1GB
WS12	Win. Server 2012	4	Java Oracle 1.8.0_151	1GB
FB10	FreeBSD 10	4	Openjdk 1.8.0_144	15GB
FB11	FreeBSD 11	4	Openjdk 1.8.0_144	15GB
SO10	Solaris 10	1	Java Oracle 1.8.0_141	15GB
SO11	Solaris 11	1	Java Oracle 1.8.0_05	15GB
OB60	OpenBSD 6.0	1	Openjdk 1.8.0_72	1GB
OB61	OpenBSD 6.1	1	Openjdk 1.8.0_121	1GB

Table 5.1 – The different OSes used in the experiments and the configurations of their VMs and JVMs.

Homogeneous Replicas Throughput

We start by running the BFT-SMaRt microbenchmark using the *same OS version* in all replicas. The microbenchmark considers an empty service that receives and replies variable size payloads, and is commonly used to evaluate BFT state-machine replication protocols (e.g., [18, 19, 23, 31, 109]). Here, we consider the $0/0$ and $1024/1024$ workloads, i.e., 0 and 1024 bytes requests/response, respectively. The experiments employ up to 1400 client processes spread on seven machines to create the workload.

Results: Figure 5.3 shows the throughput of each OS running the benchmark for both loads. To establish a baseline, we executed the benchmark in our bare metal Ubuntu, without LAZARUS virtualization environment.

The results show that there are some significant differences between running the system on top of different OSes. This difference is more significant for the $0/0$ workload as it is much more CPU intensive than the $1024/1024$ workload. Ubuntu, OpenSuse, and Fedora OSes are well supported by our virtualization environment and achieved a throughput around $40k$ and $10k$ for the $0/0$ and $1024/1024$ workloads, which corresponds to approx. 66% and 75% of the bare metal results, respectively. For Debian, Windows, and FreeBSD, the results are much worse for the CPU intensive $0/0$ workloads but close to the previous group for $1024/1024$. Finally, single core VMs running Solaris and OpenBSD reached no more than 3000 ops/sec with both workloads.

These results show that the virtualization platform limitations on supporting different OSes, strongly limits the performance of specific OSes in our testbed.



Figure 5.3 – Microbenchmark for 0/0 and 1024/1024 (request/replying) for homogeneous OSes configurations.

Diverse Replicas Throughput

The previous results show the performance of BFT-SMaRt when running on top of different OSes, but with all replicas running in the same environment. In this experiment, we evaluate three diverse sets of four replicas, one with the fastest OSes (UB17, UB16, FE24, and OS42), another with one replica of each OS family (UB16, W10, SO10, and OB61), and a last one with the slowest OSes (OB60, OB61, SO10, and SO11). The idea is to set an upper and lower bound on all possible diverse sets throughput.



Figure 5.4 – Microbenchmark for 0/0 and 1024/1024 (request/reply) for three diverse OS configurations.

Results: Figure 5.4 shows that throughput drops from 39k to 6k for the $0/0$ workload (65% and 10% of the bare metal performance), and from 11.5k to 2.5k for the $1024/1024$ workload (82% and 18% of the bare metal performance). When comparing these two sets with the non-diverse sets of Figure 5.3, the fastest set is in 7^{th}, and the slowest set is in 16^{th}. It is worth to stress that the slowest set is composed of OSes that only support a single CPU – due to the VirtualBox limitations – therefore the low performance is somewhat expected. The set with OSes from different families is very close to the slowest set, as two of the replicas use single-CPU OSes, and BFT-SMaRt always makes progress in the speed of the 3rd fastest replica (a Solaris VM), since its Byzantine quorum needs three replicas for

ordering requests. These results show that running LAZARUS with current virtualization technology results in a significant performance variation, depending on the configurations selected by the system. This opens interesting avenues for future work on protocols that consider such performance diversity, as will be discussed in Section **??**.

Performance During Replicas' Reconfiguration

In this experiment, we show how LAZARUS-triggered reconfigurations affect the replicas' performance. Reconfigurations, in this case, subsumes to the addition of a new replica and the removal of the old one, using the BFT-SMaRt reconfiguration protocols [23]. We execute this experiment with an in-memory KVS service that comes with the BFT-SMaRT library.

The experiment was conducted with a Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB) [41] workload of 50% of reads and 50% of writes, with values of 1024 bytes associated with small numeric keys, varying the state size of the KVS. We run this experiment for 400 seconds, and reconfigure the set of replicas with a period of 100 seconds. The initial OS configuration is the fastest OS set (i.e., UB17, UB16, FE24, OS42).



(a) KVS state size ≈ 30MBs.



(b) KVS state size ≈ 60MBs.

Figure 5.5 – KVS performance with LAZARUS-triggered reconfigurations on a 50/50 YCSB workload and 1kB-values.

Results: Figure 5.5 shows two types of performance drops. The first type happens at every 1000 writes and is due to the state checkpoints used to trim the operation logs. The second type is more severe and less frequent, and happens during reconfigurations, mostly due to the state transfer to the new replica joining the system. These types of performance perturbations, which become more severe with bigger states, were already identified, and mitigated in previous works [22].[2]

[2]We employ the standard checkpoint and state transfer protocols of BFT-SMaRt and not the one introduced in [22] as the developers of the system pointed them as more stable.

The figure shows that the reconfigurations take around 10 seconds for these setups, and did not change significantly with states of approx. 30 and 60 MBs. Regarding diversity, the figure shows no noticeable disruption when changing Ubuntu 17 to Fedora 26 and Fedora 25 to Fedora 24, but the replacement of a Debian 8 by an OpenSuse 42 replica significantly decreases the performance, which is consistent with the results from Figure 5.3.

Replicas' Booting Time

Before triggering a reconfiguration, LAZARUS needs to start the new VM, boot the OSes, and launch the BFT-SMaRt replica. Therefore, the total time to replace a "risky" replica roughly comprises the time required to boot the new OS plus the reconfiguration time (discussed in the previous section). This experiment measures the boot time of the OSes supported by LAZARUS prototype.



Figure 5.6 – OSes boot times (seconds).

Results: Figure 5.6 shows the average boot time of 20 executions boot for each OS. As can be seen, most OSes take less than 40s to boot, with exceptions of Fedora 24 (50s), FreeBSD 10.3 (59s), and Solaris 11.2 (91s). In any case, these results together with the reconfiguration times of the previous section show that LAZARUS can react to a new threat in less than two minutes (in the worst case).

Application Benchmarks

Our last set of experiments aims to measure the throughput of three existing BFT services built on top of BFT-SMaRt when running in LAZARUS. The considered applications and workloads are:

- *KVS* is the same BFT-SMaRt application employed in Section 5.2. It represents a consistent non-relational database that stores data in memory, similarly to a coordination service (an evaluation scenario used in many recent papers on BFT [19, 109]). In this

evaluation, we employ the YCSB 50%/50% read/write workload with values of 4k bytes.

- SIEVEQ [67] is a BFT message queue service that can also be used as an application-level firewall, filtering messages that do not comply with a pre-configured security policy. Its architecture, based on several filtering layers, reduces the costs of filtering invalid messages in a BFT-replicated state machine. In our evaluation, we consider all the layers were running on the same four physical machines as the diverse BFT-SMaRt replicas (under different OSes). The workload imposed to the system is composed of messages of 1k bytes.

- *BFT ordering for Hyperledger Fabric* [148] is the first BFT ordering service for Fabric [11]. Fabric is an extensible blockchain platform designed for business applications beyond the basic digital coin. The ordering service is the core of Fabric, being responsible for ordering and grouping issued transactions in signed blocks that form the blockchain. In our evaluation, we consider transactions of 1k bytes, blocks of 10 transactions and a single block receiver.

As in Section 5.2, we run the applications on the fastest and slowest diverse replica sets and compare them with the results obtained in bare metal.

Results: Figure 5.7 shows the peak sustained throughput of the applications. The KVS results show a throughput of 6.1k and 1.2k ops/sec, for the fastest and slowest configurations, respectively. This corresponds to 86% and 18% of the 7.1k ops/sec achieved on bare metal.

The SIEVEQ results show a smaller performance loss when compared with bare metal results. More specifically, SIEVEQ in the fastest replica set reaches 94% of the throughput achieved on the bare metal. Even with the slowest set, the system achieved 53% of the throughput of bare metal. This smaller loss happens due to the layered architecture of SIEVEQ, in which most of the message validations happen before the message reaches the BFT replicated state machine (which is the only layer managed by LAZARUS).

The Fabric ordering service results show that running the application on LAZARUS virtualization infrastructure lead to 91% (fastest set) to 39% (slowest set) of the throughput achieved on bare metal.

Nonetheless, even the slowest configurations would not be a significant bottleneck if one takes into consideration the current performance of Fabric [148]



Figure 5.7 – Different BFT applications running in the bare metal, fastest and slowest OS configurations.

5.3 Final Remarks

LAZARUS addresses the long-standing open problem of evaluating, selecting, and managing the diversity of a BFT system to make it resilient to malicious adversaries. Our work focuses on two fundamental issues: how to select the best replicas to run together given the current threat landscape, and what is the performance overhead of running a diverse BFT system in practice.

6 SieveQ an Use Case

In the previous chapter, we presented a data-plane controller for BFT systems, named Lazarus. Although we have already introduced SieveQ in the evaluation of Lazarus, we will detail SieveQ contributions in this chapter. SieveQ a message queue service that protects and regulates the access to critical systems, in a way similar to an application-level firewall. The solution provides fault and intrusion tolerance by employing an architecture based on two filtering layers, enabling efficient removal of invalid messages at early stages and decreasing the costs associated with BFT replication of previous solutions.

6.1 Introduction

Firewalls are one of the primary protection mechanisms against external threats, controlling the traffic that flows in and out of a network. Typically, they decide if a packet should go through (or be dropped) based on the analysis of its contents. Over the years, this analysis has been performed at different levels of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (see [94] for a comprehensive survey), but the most sophisticated rules are based on the inspection of application data included in the packets. State-of-the-art solutions for application-level firewalls include network appliances from several vendors, such as Juniper [1], Palo Alto [2], and Dell [3]. Such appliances are strategically placed on the network borders, and therefore, the security of the whole infrastructure relies on them. A skilled attacker, however, may find weaknesses to compromise the firewall's detection/prevention capabilities. When this happens, critical services under the protection of such devices may be affected, as in the SCADA systems targeted in the Stuxnet [55] or Dragonfly [154] attacks.

Most generic firewall solutions suffer from two inherent problems: First, they have vulnerabilities as any other system, and as a consequence, they can also be the target of advanced attacks. For example, the NVD [127] shows that there have been many security issues in commonly used firewalls. NVD's reports present the following numbers of security issues between 2010 and 2015: 157 for the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance; 109 in Juniper Networks solutions; 29 for the Sonicwall firewall; and 24 related to `iptables`/`netfilter`. Common protection solutions often have been the target of malicious actions as part of a wider scale attack (e.g., anti-virus software [34], IDS [10] or firewalls [37, 38, 92, 153]). Second, firewalls are typically a single point of failure, which means that when they crash,

the ability of the protected system to communicate may be compromised, at least momentarily. Therefore, ensuring the correct operation of the firewall under a wide range of failure scenarios becomes imperative. To tolerate faults, one typically resorts to the replication of the components.

In this chapter, we propose a new protection system called SIEVEQ that mixes the firewall paradigm with a message queue service, with the goal of improving the state-of-the-art approaches under accidental failures and/or attacks. The solution has a fault- and intrusion-tolerant architecture that applies filtering operations in two stages acting like a sieve. The first stage, called *pre-filtering*, performs lightweight checks, making it efficient to detect and discard malicious messages from external adversaries. In particular, messages are only allowed to go through if they come from a pre-defined set of authenticated senders. DoS traffic from external sources is immediately dropped, preventing those messages from overloading the next stage. The second stage, named *filtering*, enforces more refined application level policies, which can require the inspection of some message fields or need the enforcement of specific ordering rules.

6.2 Intrusion-Tolerant Firewalls

In the last decade, several significant advances occurred in the development of intrusion-tolerant systems. However, to the best of our knowledge, very few works proposed intrusion-tolerant protection devices, such as firewalls. Performance reasons might explain this, as BFT replication protocols are usually associated with significant overheads and limited scalability. Additionally, achieving complete transparency to the rest of the system can be challenging to reconcile with the objective of having fast message filtering under attack.

Figure 6.1 shows an implementation of an intrusion-tolerant firewall, illustrating existing works in this area [140, 149]. In this design, a sender transmits the messages through the network (e.g., the internet) towards the receiver. As packets reach the firewall, they are disseminated to the replicas. Each replica applies the same filtering rules to decide whether the messages are acceptable. Invalid messages are discarded (and eventually logged). Messages deemed valid are conveyed to the receiver together with a proof of validity, which demonstrates that a sufficiently large quorum of replicas agrees on their validity. The proof of validity is checked by a voter module at the receiver, before delivering the messages to the receiving application. Thus, if a compromised replica produces a message with malicious content, it will be eliminated as it lacks the necessary proof of validity or it is in conflict with the messages transmitted by the other correct replicas.

Although this architecture has interesting characteristics, such as an increased failure resilience, it suffers from some fundamental limitations:



Figure 6.1 – Architecture of a state-of-the-art replicated firewall.

1. The dissemination of a message to all replicas can be detrimental to the proper operation of the firewall. For example, a traffic replicator device (e.g., hub) can be placed at the entry of the firewall to reproduce all messages [140, 149] transparently. An obvious consequence of this approach is that malicious messages from an external attacker are also replicated, and therefore, all replicas have to spend the same effort to process them. As a consequence the attack is amplified by the replicator device. Alternatively, a leader replica could receive the traffic and then disseminate the messages to the others [140]. The drawback is that the leader becomes a natural bottleneck, especially when under attack (instead of dispersing the attack load over all replicas [9]).

2. The support for stateful firewall filtering requires that all correct replicas process messages in the same order [142]. As a consequence, to ensure an agreement in a common sequence of messages, replicas need to continuously run a BFT consensus protocol [32] to establish message ordering. A significant amount of work can be wasted with malicious messages since all messages have to be agreed. This is particularly relevant because a consensus protocol consumes both computational and network resources.

3. The creation and check of the proof of validity can be a complex task. For example, one approach requires a trusted component to be deployed in the replicas to generate a MAC as a proof that a message is valid [149]. The component only returns the MAC when a quorum of replicas accepted the message. Another solution uses threshold cryptography to ensure that every replica can individually produce a partial signature (that corresponds to a part of the proof) [140]. To recreate the full proof, the voter needs to wait for the arrival of a quorum of partial proofs. When building a firewall, it would be useful if a more straightforward approach could be employed, with no need for specialized trusted components or expensive threshold cryptography.

These drawbacks can have a significant impact on the firewall performance depending on the considered setting. For example, a typical DoS attack can create a substantial decrease in the throughput and several orders of magnitude growth in the latency of message delivery.

To illustrate this behavior we implemented the architecture of Figure 6.1 and launched a DoS attack on this system (see Section 6.6 for a description of the setup and environment). The results show that the system performance is significantly affected by the attack (see Figure 6.2).



Figure 6.2 – Effect of a DoS attack (initiated at second 50) on the latency and throughput of the intrusion-tolerant firewall architecture displayed in Figure 6.1.

In SIEVEQ, we explore a different design for replicated protection devices, where we trade some transparency on senders and receivers for a more efficient and resilient firewall solution. In particular, we propose an architecture in which critical services and devices can only be accessed through a message queue and implement the application-level filtering in this queue. It is assumed that these services have a limited number of senders, which can be appropriately configured to ensure that only they are authorized to communicate through SIEVEQ.

6.3 Overview of SIEVEQ

Typical resilient firewall designs are based on primary-backup replication, and consequently, they are able to tolerate only crash failures. Therefore, more elaborated failure modes may allow an adversary to penetrate into the protected network.

Some organizations deal with crashes (or DoS attacks) by resorting to several firewalls to support multiple entry points. This solution is helpful to address some (accidental) failures but is incapable of dealing with an intrusion in a firewall. In this case, the adversary gains access to the internal network, enabling an escalation of the attack, which at that stage can only be stopped if other protection mechanisms are in place.

SIEVEQ provides a message queue abstraction for critical services, applying various filtering rules to determine if messages are allowed to go through. SIEVEQ is not a conventional firewall, and we do not claim that it should replace existing firewalls in all deployment scenarios. We are focusing on service- or information-critical systems that require a high-level of protection, and therefore, justify the implementation of advanced replication mechanisms.

The system we propose is able to deliver messages while guaranteeing authenticity, integrity, and availability. As a consequence, and in contrast to conventional firewalls, we lose transparency on senders and receivers, since they are aware of the SIEVEQ's end-points. The rest of the section explains how we address some of the mentioned issues and introduces the main design choices and the architecture of SIEVEQ.

Design Principles

Our solution was guided by the following principles:

- *Application-level filtering*: support sophisticated firewall filtering rules that take advantage of application knowledge. SIEVEQ implements this sort of rules by maintaining state about the existing flows, and this state has to be consistently replicated using a BFT protocol.

- *Performance*: address the most probable attack scenarios with highly efficient approaches, and as early as possible in the filtering stages; Reduce communication costs with external senders, as these messages may have to travel over high latency links (e.g., do not require message multicasts).

- *Resilience*: tolerate a broad range of failure scenarios, including malicious external/internal attackers, compromised authenticated senders, and intrusions in a subset of the SIEVEQ components; Prevent malicious external traffic from reaching the internal network by requiring explicit message authentication.

SIEVEQ Architecture

A fundamental difference between the SIEVEQ architecture and the other replicated firewall designs (see Figure 6.1), is the separation of filtering in several stages. The rationale for this change is to gain flexibility in the filtering operations while ensuring better performance under attack, retaining the ability to tolerate intrusions. As observed previously, despite the significant improvements in state-of-the-art BFT implementations, there is an inherent trade-off between the benefits of BFT replication and its performance, namely due to the need to disseminate (and eventually authenticate) all messages at the replicas, which includes both valid and invalid messages.

Figure 6.3 presents the architecture of SIEVEQ. In this architecture, message processing starts with a first filtering layer that implements a message authentication mechanism and is responsible for discarding most of the malicious traffic efficiently. This layer is based on a set of *pre-SQ* modules, each of them in charge of the communications with a subgroup

of senders. During a typical operation, a sender only interacts with its own *pre-SQ*. The assignment of a *sender-SQ* to a *pre-SQ* is done during the channel setup. Initially, a sender connects with one of a few statically-configured *pre-SQs*. If a *pre-SQ* becomes overloaded, it will request the creation of more *pre-SQs* (see details in Section 13) and/or hand of the new *sender-SQ* channel to another node.



Figure 6.3 – SIEVEQ layered architecture.

The messages are sent to the second filtering layer by the *pre-SQ* to perform a more detailed inspection, which can take advantage of state information kept from previous messages and application-related rules. This layer is implemented by a group of *replica-SQs* acting together as a BFT replicated state machine. They receive all accepted messages from the *pre-SQs* and process them in the same order, which guarantees that every *replica-SQ* reaches the same decision (discard or accept a message). However, if f replicas are faulty, their output could be different. Consequently, as long as more than two-thirds of the *replica-SQs* are correct, the right decision is taken by the *post-SQ* by performing a message voting.

In the following, we describe each module of SIEVEQ presented in Figure 6.3:

Sender-SQ. The sender nodes cooperate with SIEVEQ to secure the messages by deploying a *sender-SQ* module locally. Its primary role is to secure the messages and assist in the detection of some intruded SIEVEQ components. The module can be implemented inside the sender's OS (e.g., as a kernel module or a specialized device driver) or as a library to be linked with the applications. The decision to have this module corresponds to a trade-off in our design, where we are willing to lose some transparency to improve the system's resilience.

Pre-SQ. These are the SIEVEQ front-end, and although it only performs stateless filtering to improve efficiency, it can deter the most common attacks. *Pre-SQ* modules discard invalid messages, while the approved ones are forwarded to the *replica-SQ* using a *Byzantine Total Ordered Multicast (TOM)* protocol [23]. The *pre-SQs* can be deployed, for instance, as VMs. The effect of this layer is a significant reduction in the communication and computational overhead caused by malicious packets at the *replica-SQ*.

Replica-SQ. These components implement a replicated filtering service that tolerates Byzantine faults. The actual filtering rules can be more or less complex depending on the needs of the critical service. The TOM ensures that *replica-SQs* receive the messages in the same order. Consequently, identical rules are applied across the *replica-SQs*, and therefore, the same decision should be reached on the validity of messages. Each *replica-SQ* individually transmits approved messages to the final receiver (the others are dropped). Overall, this layer allows for sophisticated filtering as the replicas are stateful.

Post-SQ. This module runs on the receiver side, and it is responsible for the delivery of messages to the application. A *post-SQ* carries out a voting operation on the arriving data because a *replica-SQ* might be intruded and corrupt messages. It delivers a message to the application only after receiving the same approved message from a quorum of *replica-SQs*. From a deployment perspective, this module can be implemented in the OS or as a library, as in the sender.

Controller. This module is a trusted component of SIEVEQ that runs with high privilege. It takes input from the *replica-SQs* to decide on the creation or destruction of *pre-SQs* if some misbehavior is observed. Depending on the actual SIEVEQ implementation, it can be developed in different ways. This sort of component was used in previous works, and it can be implemented both in a centralized [130, 140] or distributed [149] way. In the same way, we have presented two possible solutions for the LAZARUS controller in Chapter 5.

Resilience Mechanisms

The SIEVEQ architecture is built to tolerate both faults with an accidental nature (e.g., crashes) and caused by malicious actions (e.g., a vulnerability is exploited, and a specific module is compromised). To be conservative, we assume that all failed components are controlled by a single entity, which will make them act together in the worst possible manner to defeat the correctness of the system. Therefore, failed components can, for instance, stop sending messages, produce erroneous information, or try to delay the system. SIEVEQ performs several mitigation actions to guarantee a valid operation (as long as the number of faults is within the assumed bounds, see Section 6.3).

The most common attack scenario occurs when an external adversary attempts to attack a system that is being protected by SIEVEQ. He can deploy many nodes, whose aim is either to delay the communications or bypass SIEVEQ protection and reach the internal network. SIEVEQ addresses these attacks by discarding unauthenticated or corrupted messages with minimal effort at the *pre-SQ* filtering stage. As with any other firewall, if a DoS attack completely overloads the incoming channels, SIEVEQ cannot handle or react to

the attack. The network needs to include other defense mechanisms to deal with this sort of problem [116].

As (authenticated) senders might be spread over many (outside) networks, it is advisable to consider a second scenario where an adversary is capable of taking control of some of these nodes. In this case, we assume that the adversary gains access to all data stored locally, including the *sender-SQ* keys. Thus, he will be able to generate traffic that is correctly authenticated, allowing these messages to go through the first filtering step. The messages are however still checked against the application related rules (namely, the ones defined in the *replica-SQ*), which can cause most malicious traffic to be dropped (e.g., a pre-defined *sender-SQ* can only send messages to a particular *post-SQ* accordingly to a specific application protocol). If the messages follow all the rules, the firewall has to forward them because they are indistinguishable from any other valid messages.

A third scenario occurs when the adversary is able to cause an intrusion in SIEVEQ and compromises a few of the *pre-SQs* and/or *replica-SQs*. When this happens, these components can act in an erroneous (Byzantine) way. However, unlike with an intruded *sender-SQ*, malicious *pre-SQs* cannot generate fully authenticated messages, since they lack all the required keys. They can still perform DoS attacks on the *replica-SQs*, e.g., by transmitting many messages, but this strategy creates obvious misbehavior allowing discovery immediately. Malicious *pre-SQs* are detected with the assistance of correct *sender-SQ* and *replica-SQs*, eventually leading to their substitution.

Replica-SQs modules are much harder to exploit because they do not face the external network. However, if they end up being intruded, *replica-SQs* can produce arbitrary traffic to the internal network. *Post-SQ* addresses this issue by carrying out a voting step, which excludes these messages. Moreover, an alarm is generated and sent to the *controller*.

The SIEVEQ architecture does not attempt to recover from intrusions in the *controller* and *post-SQ*. The first is assumed to be trusted, as it is deployed in a separated administrative domain and is to be used only in a few very specific operations. Moreover, its simplicity allows the audit of its code and ensures correctness with a high level of confidence. The *post-SQ* already runs in the internal network, and therefore, SIEVEQ can not preclude its misbehavior.

System and Threat Model

The system is composed of a (potentially) large number of external nodes, called *senders*, some internal nodes, called *receivers*, and SIEVEQ nodes. Senders run *sender-SQ* modules to be able to transmit packets through the SIEVEQ, while receivers receive validated messages by using *post-SQ* modules.

Communications can experience accidental faults or attacks. Thus, packets might be lost, delayed, reordered or corrupted, but we assume that if messages are retransmitted, eventually they will be correctly received by SIEVEQ. The fault model also assumes that *sender-SQ*, *pre-SQ*, and *replica-SQ* nodes can suffer from arbitrary (Byzantine) faults. When this happens, failed nodes may perform actions that deviate from their specification, including colluding against the system. However, at most f_{ps} *pre-SQs* from a total of $N_{ps} = f_{ps} + k$ (with $k > 1$), and f_{rs} *replica-SQ* from a total of $N_{rs} = 3f_{rs} + 1$ may fail. Redundant components should fail independently by employing diversity techniques such as the ones described in Chapter 4. A component that is unable to communicate is also considered faulty because from a practical perspective it is indistinguishable from a crashed module.

The cryptographic operations used in the SIEVEQ protocol are assumed to be secure, and therefore, they cannot be subverted by an adversary. Consequently, traditional properties of digital signatures, MACs, and hash functions will hold as long as the associated keys are kept safe. The deployment of SIEVEQ requires a key distribution scheme to create shared keys between the *sender-SQ* and the *pre-SQ* and to periodically re-issue private-public key pairs for the *sender-SQ*. We assume that the key distribution scheme is similar to solutions that already address this sort of problem (e.g., [73]). If required, the key distribution infrastructure could also be made intrusion-tolerant (e.g., [102, 179]).

Resilience Mechanisms

The SIEVEQ architecture is built to tolerate both faults with an accidental nature (e.g., crashes) and caused by malicious actions (e.g., a vulnerability is exploited, and a specific module is compromised). To be conservative, we assume that all failed components are controlled by a single entity, which will make them act together in the worst possible manner to defeat the correctness of the system. Therefore, failed components can stop sending messages, produce erroneous information, or try to delay the system. SIEVEQ performs several mitigation actions to guarantee a valid operation (as long as the number of faults is within the assumed bounds, see Section 6.3).

The most common attack scenario occurs when an external adversary attempts to attack a system that is being protected by SIEVEQ. He can deploy many nodes, whose aim is either to delay the communications or bypass SIEVEQ protection and reach the internal network. SIEVEQ addresses these attacks by discarding unauthenticated or corrupted messages with minimal effort at the *pre-SQ* filtering stage. As with any other firewall, if a DoS attack completely overloads the incoming channels, SIEVEQ cannot handle or react to the attack. The network needs to include other defense mechanisms to deal with this sort of problem [116].

As (authenticated) senders might be spread over many (outside) networks, it is advisable to consider a second scenario where an adversary is capable of taking control of some of these nodes. In this case, we assume that the adversary gains access to all data stored locally, including the *sender-SQ* keys. Thus, he will be able to generate traffic that is correctly authenticated, allowing these messages to go through the first filtering step. Then, the messages are still checked against the application related rules (namely, the ones defined in the *replica-SQ*), which can cause most malicious traffic to be dropped (e.g., a predefined *sender-SQ* can only send messages to a particular *post-SQ* accordingly to a specific application protocol). If the messages follow all the rules, the firewall has to forward them because they are indistinguishable from any other valid messages.

A third scenario occurs when the adversary can cause an intrusion in SIEVEQ and compromises a few of the *pre-SQs* and/or *replica-SQs*. When this happens, these components can act in an erroneous (Byzantine) way. However, unlike with an intruded *sender-SQ*, malicious *pre-SQs* cannot generate fully authenticated messages, since they lack all the required keys. They can still perform DoS attacks on the *replica-SQs*, e.g., by transmitting many messages, but this strategy creates apparent misbehavior allowing immediate discovery. Malicious *pre-SQs* are detected with the assistance of correct *sender-SQ* and *replica-SQs*, eventually leading to their substitution.

Replica-SQs modules are much harder to exploit because they do not face the external network. However, if they end up being intruded, *replica-SQs* can produce arbitrary traffic to the internal network. *Post-SQ* addresses this issue by carrying out a voting step, which excludes these messages. Moreover, an alarm is generated and sent to the *controller*.

The SIEVEQ architecture does not attempt to recover from intrusions in the *controller* and *post-SQ*. The *post-SQ* already runs in the internal network, and therefore, SIEVEQ can not preclude its misbehavior. In this chapter, for the sake of simplicity we are considering the *controller* as trusted. However, in Chapter 5 we discuss alternatives with weaker assumptions. Moreover, its simplicity allows the audit of its code and ensures correctness with a high level of confidence.

6.4 SIEVEQ Protocol

This section details the SIEVEQ protocol and the service properties. We conclude the section with an analysis of the behavior of the system under different kinds of attacks and component failures and highlight how the countermeasures integrated into our design mitigate such threats.

Properties

SIEVEQ protocol guarantees the following three properties for messages transmitted from a sender to a receiver:

Compliance. *If a message, transmitted by a correct sender, is delivered to a correct receiver then the message is in accordance with the security policy of* SIEVEQ.

Validity. *If a correct receiver delivers a message* `Msg.DATA`*, then the message was transmitted by* `Msg.sender`*.*

Liveness. *If a correct sender sends a message, then the message eventually will be delivered to the correct receiver.*

These properties require SIEVEQ to behave in a way similar to most firewalls while offering a few extra guarantees. Only external messages that are approved by the policies defined in SIEVEQ can reach the receivers, and the rest should be dropped (Compliance). *Post-SQ* can use the message field `Msg.sender` to find who transmitted the message contents (`Msg.DATA`), and accordingly decide if the message should be delivered to the receiver application (Validity). Progress is also ensured, as correct senders eventually can transmit their messages (Liveness).

Besides these functional properties (related to message filtering), SIEVEQ also ensures a *resilience* property related to the detection and recovery of components of the system that exhibit faulty behavior:

Resilience. *Every component exhibiting observable faulty behavior will be eventually removed or recovered.*

In the following, we present the mechanisms for implementing the SIEVEQ functionalities, i.e., the mechanisms for satisfying the three functional properties stated above. The mechanisms for ensuring resilience will be detailed after that.

Message Transmission

***Sender-SQ* processing** This module gets a buffer with the `DATA` to be transmitted to a particular application placed behind SIEVEQ. The buffer needs to be encapsulated in a message with some extra information required for protection (see (6.1), below): we add a *sender-SQ* identifier S_i and a sequence number *sn* that is incremented on each message. This information is needed to prevent replay attacks, either from the network or from a compromised *pre-SQ*. Some information is also added to protect the integrity and authenticate the message. A signature sgn_{Si} is performed over the message contents, and a MAC



Figure 6.4 – Filtering stages at the SIEVEQ.

mac_{ski} is computed using a shared key established with the *pre-SQ*. This MAC serves as an optimization to speed up checks [39].

$$\texttt{Msg} = \langle S_i, sn, \texttt{DATA}, sgn_{Si} \rangle_{mac_{ski}} \tag{6.1}$$

After constructing the message, it is sent to the *pre-SQ* assigned to the *sender-SQ*, and a timer is started. If this timer expires before the *sender-SQ* receives an acknowledgment message, it re-sends the `Msg` to another *pre-SQ*.

***Pre-SQ* filtering** The *pre-SQ* determines if an arriving message `Msg` should be forwarded or discarded (stages (a)–(d) in Figure 6.4). It applies the following checks to make this decision:

(a) **White list:** each *pre-SQ* maintains a list of the nodes that are allowed to transmit messages (i.e., which were authorized by the system administrator). Messages coming from other nodes are dropped. This check is based on the address of the message sender, and therefore it serves as an efficient first test, but it is vulnerable to spoofing.

(b) **Sequence number:** finds out if a message with sequence number *sn* from *sender-SQ* S_i was seen before. In the affirmative case, the message is discarded to prevent replay attacks. Messages are also dropped if their *sn* is much higher than the largest sequence

number ever observed from that *sender-SQ* (a sliding window of acceptable sequence numbers is used).

(c) **MAC test:** MAC mac_{ski} is verified to authenticate the message contents, including to find out if the expected S_i is the sender. If the check is invalid, the message is dropped, and the sequence number information is updated to forget that this message was ever received (the update carried out in the previous step needs to be undone).

(d) **Grant check:** each *pre-SQ* controls the amount of traffic that a *sender-SQ* is transmitting. Messages that fall outside the allocated amount are dropped to ensure that all senders get a fair share of the available bandwidth (and to avoid DoS attacks by compromised senders). The amount of traffic that is allowed to each *sender-SQ* is adjusted dynamically based on the available and consumed resources.

Finally, the *pre-SQ* invokes the TOM primitive to forward the message to every correct *replica-SQ*.

***Replica-SQ* filtering** When a correct *replica-SQ* delivers a message to be filtered, the following checks are applied:

(e) **Grant check, sequence number, and signature:** since a *pre-SQ* may have been intruded and may collude with malicious *sender-SQ*, extra checks are required on the amount of forwarded traffic and on the integrity of the message. The grant check and the test on the sequence number are similar to the ones performed by the *pre-SQ*, and the signature ensures that all *replica-SQs* reach the same decision regarding the validity of the message content.

(f) **Application-level rules:** apply the application-defined filtering rules to determine if the message is compliant with the security policy of the firewall.

Although uncommon, *replica-SQs* may receive messages in a different order from what is defined in their sequence numbers. As a consequence, the *replica-SQ*'s application-level rules may drop some of the out-of-order messages, which later on will have to be re-transmitted by the *sender-SQ*. For example, if messages `A` and `B` should appear in this sequence but are re-ordered, then the rules may consider `B` invalid and then accept `A`. At some point, the *sender-SQ* would consider `B` as lost, and re-transmit it.[1]

To address this issue, each *replica-SQ* enqueues messages with a sequence number greater than the expected for a while, as long as they do not exceed a threshold above the last

[1] It is important to remark that, independently of any violation on the order of delivery of sender messages, all correct *replica-SQs* receive the messages in the same order.

processed sequence number. These messages are processed when either: 1) the missing messages with smaller sequence numbers arrive, and then they are all tested in order, or 2) the *replica-SQ* gives up on waiting and checks the enqueued messages. This last decision is made after processing a pre-determined number of other messages.

Valid messages are encapsulated in a new format (see (6.2), below) and are sent to their receivers. Basically, *replica-SQ* RS_j substitutes the signature with a new MAC, mac_{skj}. This MAC is created with a shared key between the *replica-SQ* and the *post-SQ*.

$$\texttt{Msg}' = \langle S_i, sn, \texttt{DATA}, RS_j \rangle_{mac_{skj}} \tag{6.2}$$

***Post-SQ* processing** *Post-SQ* accumulates the messages that arrive from *replica-SQs* until enough evidence is collected to allow their delivery.

(g) *vote:* A message can be delivered to the application when it is received from $f_{rs}+1$ *replica-SQs*.

Algorithm 2 presents the *post-SQ* voting protocol. The *post-SQ* starts by checking if the message contains a valid MAC (lines 5 and 6). Then, it finds out if the message carries an acceptable sequence number before storing it in a `WaitingQuorom` set (lines 7 and 8). Notice that a different set is used for each sender S_i and *sn* pair. Messages with sequence numbers already delivered or higher than a threshold (`snThreshold`) are discarded.

The expected sequence number is stored in the auxiliary variable *k* (line 9). Next, the *post-SQ* tries to find a message with this sequence number and with at least $f_{rs}+1$ votes (by searching the corresponding set and using function `equalMsg` — line 10). For each different `DATA` value that may exist in the set, the `equalMsg` function counts the number of times its appears, and returns the largest count.[2] Next, while there are `Msg`'s with a $f_{rs}+1$ quorum, *post-SQ* delivers `Msg`'s in order (line 10-13). The function `mostVotedMsg` returns the message with the `DATA` value with most votes (line 11). Then, the `deliver` function delivers `DATA` to the application on the receiver and deletes the `WaitingQuorom` set. Finally, the `snExpect` is incremented (line 12) and the *k* index is updated (line 13). This allows *post-SQ* to deliver messages in order while there are messages with the expected sequence number in its buffer.

[2]Notice that all correct *replica-SQs* transmit messages with the same `DATA` value and that malicious replicas can send at most f_{rs} arbitrary `DATA` values. Therefore, eventually there will be a `DATA` value with at least $f_{rs}+1$ votes because there are at least $2f_{rs}+1$ correct *replica-SQs*.

Algorithm 2: *post-SQ* protocol

```
1  Init : executed only once
2  snExpect_Si, k ← 0;
3  WaitingQuorom_Si,sn ← ⊥;
4  Function Filter (Msg')
5      if ( verifyMAC(Msg') = FALSE ) then
6          return errorMAC;
7      if (snExpect_Si ≤ Msg'.sn < (snExpect_Si + snThreshold))
         then
8          WaitingQuorom_Si,sn ← WaitingQuorom_Si,sn ∪ {Msg'};
9      k ← snExpect_Si;
10     while ( equalMsg(WaitingQuorom_Si,k) ≥ f_rs + 1 ) do
11         deliver(mostVotedMsg(WaitingQuorom_Si,k)) ;
12         snExpect_Si ← snExpect_Si + 1 ;
13         k ← snExpect_Si;
```

Correctness Argument

In the following, we show that SIEVEQ design satisfies the three functional properties described in Section 6.4. The proofs work under the assumptions of our system and threat model (defined in Section 6.3).

Validity. *If a correct receiver delivers a message* `Msg.DATA`*, then the message was transmitted by* `Msg.sender`*.*

Proof. Assume that a receiver R_j gets a message content `Msg.DATA` with the `Msg.sender` $=$ `Msg.`S_i. For this to happen, the *post-SQ* of R_j waited for the arrival of at least $f_{rs}+1$ correctly authenticated messages[3] with equal `Msg.`S_i, `Msg.`*sn*, and `Msg.DATA`. Therefore, at least $f_{rs}+1$ *replica-SQs* received `Msg` signed by S_i, and verified the signature sgn_{S_i} as valid. This indicates that `Msg.DATA` was not modified by the network or by any *pre-SQ*. Only a sender `Msg.`S_i (correct or not) can create and authenticate a `Msg` with its signature. Therefore, S_i is the `Msg.sender`, i.e., the creator of `Msg.DATA`. □

Compliance. *If a message, transmitted by a correct sender, is delivered to a correct receiver then the message is in accordance with the security policy of* SIEVEQ.

Proof. The proof of the *Compliance* property is very similar to the *Validity* proof. The difference is that, we also know that if $f_{rs}+1$ *replica-SQs* sent `Msg` to a *post-SQ*, then `Msg`

[3]Note that *replica-SQs* send `Msg`′ (defined in (6.2)) instead of `Msg` (defined in (6.1)). Both are similar, but `Msg`' has a MAC instead of a signature to authenticate its contents with *post-SQ*. For the sake of simplicity we will only use the `Msg` notation in the rest of the proof.

was verified against the security policy in at least one correct *replica-SQ*, which approved it. □

Liveness. *If a correct sender sends a message, then the message eventually will be delivered to the correct receiver.*

Proof. For the sake of simplicity, our proof only considers nodes that drop or delay messages. Attacks to the integrity will make the message be discarded (i.e., dropped).

Assume that a sender S_i transmits a message `Msg` with the sequence number *sn* to a *pre-SQ* PS_u. Then S_i sets a timer $timer_{sn}$ for `Msg`.*sn*. If PS_u is correct, after it receives a message, it re-sends `Msg` via TOM to the *replica-SQs*. At least $f_{rs}+1$ correct *replica-SQs* will send `Msg` to the *post-SQ*, which will deliver `Msg.DATA` to the receiver R_j. If the PS_u is faulty, i.e., drops or delays messages, $timer_{sn}$ in S_i will eventually expire. When this happens, S_i re-transmits `Msg` to another *pre-SQ*. Eventually, this process will make some correct *pre-SQ* forward `Msg` to the *replica-SQs* using the TOM primitive, which will cause `Msg.DATA` to be delivered to R_j. □

Addressing Component Failures

In this section, we discuss the implications of failures in the different components of the SIEVEQ, and how they are handled for ensuring the *Resilience* property stated in Section 6.4.

In the Byzantine model, every failed component can behave arbitrarily, intentionally or accidentally. Therefore, the SIEVEQ design incorporates mechanisms that are resilient to different failure scenarios. Given the architecture of Figure 6.3, one has to address faults in authenticated *sender-SQs*, *pre-SQs* and *replica-SQs*, as they are the main components subject to Byzantine failures in our model. *Post-SQ* is not considered in this section as it is co-located with the receiver. Therefore, we can not make further assumptions about it. In this chapter, we assume the *controller* as trusted for simplicity. In Chapter 5 we presented an intrusion-tolerant *controller*

In the following, we try to focus on complex scenarios whereas faulty components send syntactically-valid messages. Therefore avoiding cases that could be easily detected and recovered by existing network monitoring and protection tools (e.g., it is easy to discover that a *pre-SQ* is sending messages to another *pre-SQ*, something our protocol does not allow).

Since *pre-SQs* are directly exposed to the external network, there is a higher risk of them being compromised. Then, to keep the SIEVEQ operational, it is required that failed

pre-SQs are identified and recovered. We leverage from the *replica-SQ* setup to perform failure detection, and then use the *controller* to restart erroneous *pre-SQs*. Replacing these components is almost trivial because they are stateless.

Replica-SQs execute as a BFT replicated state machine, processing messages in the same order and producing identical results. Consequently, *replica-SQs* faults can be tolerated by employing a voting technique on the *post-SQ* that selects results supported by a sufficiently large quorum (as explained above, an output with at least $f_{rs}+1$ votes). Below, we discuss in more detail a few failure scenarios.

Faulty *Sender-SQ*

A faulty *sender-SQ* is authorized to communicate while suffering from some arbitrary problem (e.g., intrusion). Therefore, it can produce correctly authenticated messages to attack the firewall. In some scenarios, it is possible to discard these messages. For example, if the SIEVEQ receives a correctly signed message with a sequence number is higher than what was expected, then it can be easily detected and eliminated (checks *(b)* and *(e)* in Figure 6.4).

A more demanding scenario occurs when a *sender-SQ* transmits faster than the allowed rate (verification (d) of Figure 6.4). In this case, some defense action has to be carried out, as these attacks can lead SIEVEQ to waste resources. To be conservative, we decided to follow a simple procedure to protect the firewall: SIEVEQ maintains a counter per sender that is incremented whenever new evidence of failure can be attributed to it, e.g., the faulty *sender-SQ* is overloading the system with invalid messages or if it is sending messages to *pre-SQs* which it was not assigned. When the counter reaches a pre-defined value, the *sender-SQ* is disallowed from communicating with SIEVEQ by temporarily removing it from the whitelist and adding it to a quarantine list (failing verification (a) of Figure 6.4) and by giving a warning to the system administrator. *This ensures that faulty sender-SQs are eventually removed from the system.*

Excluded *sender-SQs* may regain access to the service later on because the counter is periodically decreased (when the counter falls below a certain threshold, the *sender-SQ* is moved back into the whitelist). Additionally, the administrator is free to update the white/quarantine lists. For instance, he may choose to manually add a faulty sender to the quarantine list or even deploy policies to do that under certain conditions (e.g., if the same sender is in the quarantine list for a certain number of times).

Faulty *Pre-SQ*

Addressing failures in *pre-SQs* is difficult because these components may look as compromised even when they are correct. Notably, when a *pre-SQ* is under a DoS attack, messages can start to be dropped due to buffer exhaustion, and this is indistinguishable from malicious behavior in which messages are selectively discarded. In the same way, a failed signature check at a *replica-SQ* indicates that either the *pre-SQ* is faulty (it is tampering/generating invalid messages) or that a *sender-SQ* is misbehaving (recall that a *pre-SQ* verifies the message MAC, but not its signature). Finally, a *replica-SQ* may also detect problems if it observes a sudden increase in the arrival of messages (above the grant check), which could indicate a DoS attack by a malicious *pre-SQ* (maybe colluding with a compromised *sender-SQ*). This kind of ambiguity precludes exact failure detection, and consequently, we aim to provide a mechanism that allows SIEVEQ to recover from end-to-end problems and continue to deliver a correct service.

An initial step to deal with these complex failure scenarios is to make *pre-SQs* evaluate their own state. This is done by analyzing the amount of arriving traffic and by observing if it could overload the *pre-SQ*. The analysis can be done by measuring the inter-arrival times of messages over a specified period. If those intervals are small (on average), there is a chance that the *pre-SQ* is working at its full capacity or is even overloaded. When this happens, the *pre-SQ* broadcasts (using the TOM primitive) a `WARNREQ` message to the *replica-SQs*, so that they may take some action to solve the problem (see below).

When the *pre-SQ* is faulty, the *sender-SQ* and *replica-SQs* need to detect it together. SIEVEQ provides a procedure to find how many messages are being discarded on *pre-SQ*:

1. Periodically, the *sender-SQ* sends a special `ACKREQ` request to *replica-SQs*, in which it indicates the sequence number of the last message that was sent (plus a signature and a MAC). This request is first sent to the preferred *pre-SQ*, but if no answer is received within some time window, and then it is forwarded to another *pre-SQ*. The waiting period is adjusted in each retransmission by doubling its value.

2. When the *replica-SQs* receive the request, the included sequence number together with local information is used to find how many messages are missing. The local information is the set of sequence numbers of the messages that were correctly delivered since the last `ACKREQ`.

3. Based on the number of missing messages, the *replica-SQs* transmit through the same *pre-SQ* a response `ACKRES` to the sender, where they state the observed failure rate and other control information (plus a signature). *Replica-SQs* may also perform some recovery action if the failure rate is too high.

Additionally, if a *replica-SQ* detects that a signature is invalid or that it is receiving more messages than the expected (check (e) in Figure 6.4), it suspects the *pre-SQ* that sent the messages and takes some action.

Once the problem is detected, the *replica-SQs* should attempt to fix the erroneous behavior by employing one of three possible remediation actions, depending on the extent of the perceived failures:

- *Redistribute load:* if a *pre-SQ* has sent a warning about its load, or a high failure rate related with this component is observed, the first course of action is to move some of the messages flows from the problematic component to other *pre-SQ*. This is achieved by specifying, in the `ACKRES` response to a *sender-SQ*, the identifier of a new *pre-SQ* that should be contacted. At that point, the *sender-SQ* is expected to connect to the indicated *pre-SQ* and begin sending its traffic through it.

- *Increase the pre-SQs capacity:* if the existing *pre-SQs* are unable to process the current load, then the SIEVEQ needs to create more *pre-SQs* (depending on the available hardware resources). To do that, *replica-SQs* contact the *controller* informing that an extra *pre-SQ* should be started. When the controller receives $f_{rs}+1$ messages, it performs the necessary steps to launch the new *pre-SQ* (which are dependent on the deployment environment). The new *pre-SQ* begins with a few startup operations, which include the creation of a communication endpoint, and then it uses the TOM channel to inform the *replica-SQ* that it is ready to accept messages from *sender-SQs*.

- *Kill the pre-SQ:* when there is a significant level of suspicion on a *pre-SQ*, the safest course of action is for *replica-SQs* to ask the controller to destroy it. Moreover, if the load on the firewall is perceived as having decreased substantially, the *replica-SQs* select the oldest *pre-SQ* for elimination, allowing future aging problems to be addressed. The controller carries out the needed actions when it gets $f_{rs}+1$ of such requests (once again, which depend on how SIEVEQ is deployed). The affected *sender-SQs* will be informed about the *pre-SQ* replacement through the `ACKREQ` mechanism, i.e., they will eventually use another *pre-SQ* to send a request, and get the information about their newly assigned *pre-SQ* in the response. Moreover, the new *pre-SQ* is informed about the expected sequence number for each *sender-SQ*. This information is stored by *replica-SQs*, which contrary to *pre-SQs* are stateful.

Together, these mechanisms ensure that *a faulty pre-SQ affecting the* SIEVEQ *performance will be eventually removed from the system*.

Faulty *Replica-SQ*

A *post-SQ* only delivers a message if it receives $f_{rs}+1$ matching approvals for this message. Given the number of *replica-SQs*, this quorum is achievable for a correct message even if up to f_{rs} *replica-SQs* are faulty. However, a faulty *replica-SQ* can create a large number of messages addressed to other components of the system, effectively causing a DoS attack. Therefore, we need countermeasures to disallow a faulty *replica-SQ* to degrade the performance of the system in a similar way as illustrated in Figure 6.2. For example, a faulty *replica-SQ* can send an unexpected amount of messages to a *pre-SQ*, making it slower and triggering suspicions that may lead it to be killed. Similarly, it can attack other *replica-SQs* to make the system slower. Finally, a faulty *replica-SQ* can also overload the *post-SQ* with invalid messages.

Each of these attacks requires a different detection and recovery strategy:

- When a *pre-SQ* is being attacked it complains to the controller, which first requests the *pre-SQ* replacement (assuming it might be compromised) and increases a suspect counter against the *replica-SQ*. If $f_{ps}+1$ *pre-SQs* also complain about the same *replica-SQ*, the controller starts an *individual recovery* in this *replica-SQ* (see below).

- If more than f_{rs} other *replica-SQs* are being attacked, they will probably become slower. In this case, it is possible to detect such attacks if $f_{rs}+1$ *replica-SQs* complain about a single *replica-SQ*. This would be possible because target *replica-SQs* would observe unjustifiable high traffic coming from a single replica and because such spontaneously generated messages would be deemed invalid. When this attack is detected, the controller starts an individual *replica-SQ* recovery.

- If only up to f_{rs} other *replica-SQs* are being attacked it is still possible to make the system slower without being detected by the previous mechanism. This happens because $N_{rs}-f_{rs}$ replicas must participate in the TOM protocol [23], and the target f_{rs} plus the attacker intersect this quorum in a least one component. This intersecting component will define the pace of the messages coming, which typically will be slow. We can mitigate this attack as each *replica-SQ* periodically informs the *post-SQ* about its throughput (number of processed messages per second), piggybacking this value in some approved messages submitted for voting. The *post-SQ* verifies that there are *replica-SQs* presenting throughputs lower than expected and initiates a *recovery round* on all the *replica-SQs* (as described below).

- When the *post-SQ* is being attacked it detects the abnormal behavior. Then, it requests the individual recovery of the compromised replica.

The previous mitigation mechanisms suggest two kinds of recovery actions. First, an individual recovery, where the machine is rebooted with clean code (we addressed this in Chapter 4) and then is reintegrated in the system. Second, a recovery round is used when a performance degradation attack is detected, but there is no certainty about which *replica-SQ* was compromised.

The integration of these reactive recovery mechanisms into LAZARUS' risk management can be assessed by drastically increasing the individual risk of each replica (e.g., similarly to the *age* value of reach replica). Then, LAZARUS proceeds with the recovery of the faulty replica.

6.5 Implementation

We implemented a prototype of SIEVEQ following the specification of the previous section to validate our design. The *sender-SQ* and *post-SQ* were developed as libraries that are linked with the sender and receiver applications. The libraries offer an interface similar to the TCP sockets, to simplify the integration and minimize changes both in the client and server applications. A sender can provide a buffer to be transmitted, and the receiver can indicate a buffer where the received data is to be stored. Internally, the *sender-SQ* library adds a MAC and a signature to each message. The MAC is created using Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-256 hash function and a 256-bit key, and the signature employs Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) with 512-bit keys. Messages are authenticated at the *post-SQ* also using HMAC. The RSA keys were kept relatively small for performance reasons. However, since they should be updated periodically (e.g., every few hours), this precludes all practical brute force attacks [5].

The *pre-SQs* operate as separate processes receiving the messages and forwarding them to the *replica-SQs*. We resorted to BFT-SMART, a SMR library [23], to implement the TOM and manage the *replica-SQs*. BFT-SMART, like most SMR systems (e.g., PBFT [32], ZYZZYVA [101], PRIME [9]) follows a client-server model, where a client transmits request messages to a group of server replicas and then receives the output messages with the results of some computation. We had to modify BFT-SMART because this model does not fit well with the message flow of SIEVEQ. Therefore, we have decoupled the client-server model into a client-server-client model. The client sends messages (but does not wait for responses as in the traditional SMR), and the server forwards them (after the validation) to another client, which is the last receiver. A reverse procedure is carried out for the traffic originating from the receiver. Furthermore, in BFT-SMART, the replicated servers are typically designed with a single-thread to process requests. To improve performance, we also modified the system to allow CPU-costly operations (like a signature verification) to occur concurrently with the rest of the checks performed by *replica-SQs*.

In the prototype, a *pre-SQ* can be replaced on two occasions: first, voluntarily by asking for a substitution to the *replica-SQs*, when it is flooded with unauthorized messages (DoS attack); and second, when a *replica-SQ* detects message corruptions by a *pre-SQ*. In both situations, the *replica-SQs* make a request to the *controller*, which will replace a *pre-SQ* instance. Notice that the *controller* has to wait for $f_{rs}+1$ messages, requesting a *pre-SQ* replacement, to ensure that a faulty *replica-SQ* cannot force the recovery of a correct *pre-SQ*. The *replica-SQs* are recovered when the collected information indicates that some component might be attacking other components. The information is collected and sent to the trusted controller to evaluate and decide if the replicas are making progress as expected. The information allows the system to suspect on $f_{rs}+1$ *replica-SQs* and recover them (there is no need to recover all the *replica-SQs*).

Since BFT-SMART is programmed in Java, we decided to use the same language to develop the various SIEVEQ components. If the sender and receiver applications are coded in other languages, they can still be supported by implementing specific *sender-SQ* and *post-SQ* libraries.

6.6 Evaluation

In this section, we present the evaluation of SIEVEQ under different network and attack conditions. We present the results of four types of experiments. In the first one, we evaluate the latency for different *sender-SQ* workloads, assessing the performance of SIEVEQ in the absence of failures. The second experiment assesses the effect of filtering rules complexity on the performance of the system. In the third experiment, we assess the throughput in three scenarios: *i)* the normal case, *ii)* a DoS attack without countermeasures; and *iii)* a DoS with all the resilience mechanisms enabled (in fact we considered two DoS attacks: external, from a malicious *sender-SQ*, and internal, from a compromised *replica-SQ*). The last experiment considers the capability of SIEVEQ to safeguard a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system under a similar workload as the one observed in the 2012 Summer Olympic Games.

Testbed Setup

Figure 6.5 illustrates the testbed, showing how the various SIEVEQ components were deployed in the machines. We consider one *sender-SQ* and one *post-SQ* deployed in different physical nodes, and an additional host acted as a malicious external adversary. The *controller* and *pre-SQs* were located in the same physical machine for convenience but in different VMs. Four *replica-SQs* were placed in distinct physical nodes. Every machine had two Quad-core Intel Xeon 2.27 GHz CPUs, with 32 GB of memory, and a Broadcom

NetXtreme II Gigabit network card. All the machines were connected by a 1Gbps switched network and run Ubuntu 10.04 64-bit LTS (kernel 2.6.32-server) and Java 7 (1.7.0_67).



Figure 6.5 – The SIEVEQ testbed architecture used in the experiments.

Methodology

SIEVEQ acts as a highly resilient protection device, receiving messages on one side and forwarding them to the other side. Therefore, the performance of SIEVEQ is assessed with latency/throughput measurements that can be attained under different network loads. In the experiments, the sender transmits data at a constant rate, i.e., 100 to 10000 messages per second, with three different message payload sizes, i.e., 100 bytes, 500 bytes and 1k bytes. We used the Guava library [70] to control the message sending rate.

Latency measures the time it takes to transmit a message from *sender-SQ* until it is delivered to the application on the *post-SQ*. The following procedure was employed to compute the latency: *sender-SQ* obtains the local time before transmitting a message. When the message arrives and is ready to be delivered to the receiver application (after voting), the *post-SQ* returns an acknowledgment over a dedicated User Datagram Protocol (UDP) channel. The *Sender-SQ* gets the current time again when the acknowledgment arrives. The latency of a message is the elapsed time calculated at *sender-SQ* (receive time minus send time) subtracted by the average time it takes to transmit a UDP message from *post-SQ* to *sender-SQ*.

Throughput gives a measure of the number of messages per second that can be processed by SIEVEQ. It was calculated at the *post-SQ* using a counter. This counter is incremented every time a message is delivered to the receiver application, and the counter is reset to zero after one second. Consequently, the server can calculate the number of messages delivered every second. The throughput is computed as the average value of the individual measurements collected over a period of time (in our case, 5 minutes after the steady state was reached).

In some experiments, we wanted to assess the behavior of SIEVEQ under a DoS attack. The attack was made using `PyLoris` [133], a tool built to exploit vulnerabilities on TCP

connection handling. The tool implements the Slowloris attack method, which opens many TCP connections and keeps them open. The tool allows the user to define parameters like group size of attack threads, the maximum number of connections, and the time interval between connections among others. In our setup, `PyLoris` was configured to perform an unlimited number of connections, with 0.1 milliseconds between each connection.

In all experiments, measurements were taken only after the JVM was warmed-up, and the disks were not used (all data is kept in memory).

Performance in Failure-free Executions

This experiment measures the latency of SIEVEQ with several message sizes and distinct message transmission rates. It demonstrates the overall performance of SIEVEQ in different scenarios, gradually stressing the *post-SQ* side as the workload is slowly increased. Measurements were collected after the system reached a steady state. The experiments were repeated 10 times for every workload and the average result is reported.



Figure 6.6 – SIEVEQ latency for each workload (message size and transmission rate).

Figure 6.6 shows how the latency is affected by the transmission rate and message size. As expected, when the system becomes increasingly loaded, the latency grows proportionally because resources have to be shared among the various messages. The latency increase is approximately linear for the messages with 100 and 500 bytes until the throughput reaches $10k$ messages per second. The messages with $1k$ bytes have a linear increase on latency until the throughput reaches approximately $7k$ messages per second, and then it has a higher increase as more load is put on the system. This means that very high workloads can only be supported if applications have some tolerance to network delays. Overall, the performance degrades gracefully when varying the message payload sizes, for rates under $7k$ messages per second.

We performed a more detailed analysis of the overheads introduced by the various components of SIEVEQ. We observed that *sender-SQ* performs the most expensive operations, which is interesting because it shows that our design offloads part of the effort to the edges, reducing bottlenecks. The most important overheads were caused by the tasks associated with securing the message payload (which in fact are the most costly operations in the

Payload size ($bytes$)	Non-optimized (msg/sec)	Optimized (msg/sec)
100	1360	10682
500	1320	10618
1000	1311	10332

Table 6.1 – Maximum load induced by the *sender-SQ* library with various message sizes

system). Several optimizations were made to mitigate the performance penalties during the message serialization (e.g., the creation of the signature), including the use of parallelization to take advantage of the multicore architecture (as done, for example, in [96]). Table 6.1 shows the gain of using the optimized version of the *sender-SQ* library. Similar optimizations were employed in other components.

Effect of Filtering Rules Complexity

The results presented in the previous section do not consider any complex filtering rule set. This section presents experiments with a fully loaded system and application-level filtering rules with different complexity at the *replica-SQs*.

Given the diverse requirements imposed by application-level firewalls, we decided to approximate the complexity of the filtering rules by considering a variable number of string matchings on processed messages. It is well recognized that the most expensive aspect of message filtering is exactly finding (or not) specific strings in the packet contents (besides crypto verifications, which were included in all our experiments). The high cost of running such algorithms leads for instance to several implementations in Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) to improve performance in firewalls and IDS (e.g., [106, 120]).

We used a classical algorithm for string matching (Knuth–Morris–Pratt (KMP) [99]) at the *replica-SQs* to implement the filtering rules. This algorithm is employed in IDSs [132] and firewalls like `iptables` [125]. The algorithm employs a pre-computed table to execute string matching in $O(n+k)$ complexity, where n is the string length, and k is the pattern length.

We measured the latency of the system by varying the message size from 100 to 1000 bytes and the string pattern size from 5 to 20 bytes. Both the message content and the strings were randomly generated. The experiments were performed with the maximum throughput of 10000 messages per second, as identified in the previous section. Figure 6.7 shows the latency of SIEVEQ without message filtering (Baseline) and string matching (KMP) of different sizes. In the last group of experiments, where the message size is 1000 bytes, and



Figure 6.7 – Comparison of the SIEVEQ's latency between the baseline and adding the filtering rules.

the pattern is 20 bytes, the latency increases by 50%. In other cases, sometimes higher overheads were observed, e.g., with 500 bytes messages and 20 bytes pattern the overhead is approximately 200%. This result is expected as the string matching is a slow operation and it needs to be performed in the critical path of message processing. Implementations with hardware support (as mentioned before) could be integrated with SIEVEQ to reduce these delays significantly.

SIEVEQ Under Attack

Our next set of experiments aims to evaluate the system under different attack scenarios. Here, the *sender-SQ* creates a steady load of 1000 500-byte messages per second. We measured the latency and throughput of the system in three conditions: failure-free operation, a malicious external and internal DoS attack, and a malicious attack with remediation mechanisms. Before presenting the results, we need to stress that these experiments must be compared with the results displayed in Figure 6.2, which were obtained in the same way but with a different architecture (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.8a and Figure 6.8b show the latency and throughput, in the failure-free scenario. One can observe that latency stays on average around 3.4 milliseconds. The throughput is approximately constant during the whole period. It is possible to observe some momentary spikes in the latency and throughput, which happens due to Java garbage collector and a queuing effect from the SMR.

The behavior of the SIEVEQ during a DoS attack is displayed in Figure 6.9a and Figure 6.9b. In this scenario, we have disabled the SIEVEQ capability of replacing *pre-SQs* at runtime. The attack consists in stressing the TCP socket interface of the *pre-SQs* by creating many TCP connections, which consumes network bandwidth and wastes resources at system and application levels. When the attack is started, it executes for 50 seconds. The latency graph displays a reasonable impact regarding an increase in the delays for message delivery. In



(a) Baseline latency. **(b)** Baseline throughput.

Figure 6.8 – Performance of SIEVEQ in fault-free executions.

some cases, the latency is not too affected, but in others, there is a drastic delay, with some messages taking more than 3 seconds. The attack also has consequences on the throughput as it is possible to observe an oscillation between 0 to 4000 messages per second (which correspond to the situation when the *post-SQ* processes a batch of messages that have been accumulated).



(a) DoS w/ no recovery. **(b)** DoS w/ no recovery.

Figure 6.9 – Performance of SIEVEQ under DoS attack conditions.

Figure 6.10a and Figure 6.10b show the latency and throughput when a similar DoS was carried out, but in this case the SIEVEQ replaced the *pre-SQ* under attack with a new *pre-SQ*. When the *pre-SQ* finds out that it is being overloaded with messages coming from non-authorized senders, it asks for a replacement. After that, the controller replaces the faulty *pre-SQ*, and the existing *sender-SQs* are contacted to migrate their connections. As the figures show, the impact of the attack is minimized, since only a few messages are delayed, and throughput is only affected momentarily while the *pre-SQ* is switched. Once the new *pre-SQ* takes over, the messages lost during the switching period are retransmitted and delivered. In practice, the attack becomes ineffective because, although it continues to consume network bandwidth, there is no longer a *pre-SQ* to process the malicious messages. An adversary could increase the attack sophistication and try to find a new *pre-SQ* target. However, even in this case, the attack has limited effect because during an interval of time (while there is a search for a fresh target) the system can make progress.



(a) DoS w/ recovery. **(b)** DoS w/ recovery.

Figure 6.10 – Performance of SIEVEQ under DoS attack conditions with recovery.

Figure 6.11a and Figure 6.11b shows the SIEVEQ throughput when an internal attack is carried out by a compromised *replica-SQ*. The experiment was made with a *replica-SQ* ($r1$) launching a DoS to another *replica-SQ* ($r2$). The attack consists in overloading a *replica-SQ* with *state transfer* requests, which are the most demanding request a replica can receive in BFT-SMART [22]. Figure 6.11a shows the impact on the SIEVEQ throughput during an attack lasting 50 seconds, without any recovery capability on the system. As can be seen, the performance of the system is severely disrupted during the attack. Figure 6.11b shows the same attack but with the detection and recovery mechanism described in Section 13. The *post-SQ* detects the problem by noticing that $f_{rs}+1$ *replica-SQs* are sending fewer messages than the others and then requests a recovery. When the *replica-SQ* is recovered, it requests the state from the other replicas, and then after applying the new state, the replica resumes the normal execution (end line in the figure). In the experiment of Figure 6.11b we show a case in which the faulty *replica-SQ* is the first to be recovered. It could happen that SIEVEQ recovered f_{rs} *replica-SQs* before the faulty one. This would take $(f_{rs}+1)\times$ 3 seconds (in our setup) before the system resumes the normal execution.



(a) Internal DoS execution without recovery actions. **(b)** Internal DoS execution with recovery actions.

Figure 6.11 – Performance of SIEVEQ under internal DoS attack conditions without and with recovery.

SieveQ to Protect a SIEM System

SIEM systems offer various capabilities for the collection and analysis of security events and information in networked infrastructures [115]. Organizations are employing these systems as a way to help with the monitoring and analysis of their infrastructures. They integrate an extensive range of security and network capabilities, which allow the correlation of thousands of events and the reporting of attacks and intrusions in near real-time.

A SIEM operates by collecting data from the monitored network and applications through a group of sensors, which then forward the events towards a correlation engine at the core facility. The engine performs an analysis of the stream of events and generates alarms and other information for post-processing by other SIEM components. Examples of such components are an archival subsystem for the storage of data needed to support forensic investigations, or a communication subsystem to send alarms to the system administrators.



Figure 6.12 – Overview of a SIEM architecture, showing some of the core facility subsystems protected by the SieveQ.

As part of the MASSIF European project [163], we have implemented a resilient SIEM system, where SieveQ was used to protect the access to the core facility (in Figure 6.12). In the SieveQ architecture, the sensors had the *sender-SQ* while the *post-SQ* was placed in the correlation engine. Additionally, we had access to an anonymized trace with the security events collected during the 2012 Olympic Games. Each event corresponds basically to a string describing some observed problem by a sensor. The strings of text had lengths varying between a minimum of 551 bytes and a maximum of 2132 bytes, with an average length of 1990 bytes (and a standard deviation of 420 bytes). Based on this log, we built a sensor emulator that generates traffic at a pre-defined rate. Basically, when it is time to produce a new event, the emulator selects an event from the trace and feeds it to the *sender-SQ*.

During the 2012 Olympic Games, the workload was approximately 11 million events per day, i.e., around 127 events per second. Figure 6.13 shows the latency imposed by SieveQ for this workload, and when it is scaled up from 2 to 16 times more. As can be observed, the latency is in the order of 4 milliseconds for the emulated scenario. Even with the highest load (16 times), the observed values had a latency below 70 milliseconds. This means that SieveQ could potentially deliver on average 176 million events per day, which is more than

enough to accommodate the expected growth in the number of events for the next Olympic Games[4].



Figure 6.13 – SIEVEQ latency for the 2012 Summer Olympic Games scenario throughput requirement (127 events per second) and how the SIEVEQ scale, we doubled on each experiment the number of events.

6.7 Discussion

SIEVEQ differs from standard firewalls like `iptables` [125] that do not need client- or server-side code modifications. However, our system requires these modifications to ensure end-to-end message integrity and tolerance of compromised components. Complete transparency would be hard to achieve mainly due to the use of voting. Nonetheless, it is worth stressing that SIEVEQ is to be used as an additional protection device in critical systems, not as a substitute to regular L3 firewalls. SIEVEQ provides a protection similar to an application-level/L7 firewall, as one can implement arbitrary rules on the *replica-SQ* module.

State machine replication is a well-known approach for replication [142]. In this technique, every replica is required to process requests in a deterministic way. This requirement traditionally implies in two limitations: (1) replicas cannot use their local clock during request processing, and (2) all requests are executed sequentially. The first limitation can affect the capacity of SIEVEQ to process rules that use time. We remove this limitation by making use of the timestamps generated by the leader replica and agreed upon on each consensus, as proposed in PBFT [32] and implemented in BFT-SMART [23]. The second limitation can constraint the performance of the system, especially when CPU-costly operations such as signature verifications are executed. One of the optimizations we implemented in SIEVEQ was to add multi-threading support in the BFT-SMART replicas. More precisely, the signature verification is done by a pool of threads that either accept or discard messages. Once accepted, a message is added to a processing queue following the order established by the total order multicast protocol. A single thread consumes messages from this queue, verifies them against the security policy, updates the firewall

[4] In 2016 the Rio's Olympic Games the number of events per second was approximated 174, source: `https://diginomica.com/2016/11/24/securing-the-olympics-lessons-for-enterprise-cyber-security/`

state (if needed) and forwards them to their destinations, without violating the determinism requirement.

6.8 Final Remarks

We presented SIEVEQ, a new intrusion-tolerant protection system for critical services, such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SIEM systems. Our system exports a message queue interface which is used by senders and receivers to interact in a regulated way. The main improvement of the SIEVEQ architecture, when compared with previous systems, is the separation of message filtering in several components that carry on verifications progressively more costly and complex. This allows the proposed system to be more efficient than the state-of-the-art replicated firewalls under attack. SIEVEQ also includes several resilience mechanisms that allow the creation, removal, and recovery of components in a dynamic way, to respond to evolving threats against the system effectively. Experimental results show that such resilience mechanisms can significantly reduce the effects of DoS attacks against the system.

7 Conclusion and Future Research Directions

7.1 Conclusions

The correctness of BFT systems is tied to the assumption that replicas fail independently. Otherwise, once a replica is compromised, the next $f+1$ replicas would be compromised within virtually the same time. In this thesis, we addressed the long-standing open problem of many works over the past 20 years of BFT replication research: evaluate, select, and manage the failure independence (through diversity) of BFT systems. That said, we developed a control plane that maximizes the failure independence of BFT replicated nodes practically and effectively to make them more resilient to malicious adversaries.

The first step to achieve this objective was, following the line of prior work to this thesis, to validate the diversity hypothesis. To this end, we leverage on the study using NVD data about the shared vulnerabilities among OSes and conducted an analysis more focused on the deciding which OSes provide dependable configuration sets for replicated systems. In particular, we presented several strategies to choose the most diverse OSes. These strategies comprise different approaches to the data depending on whether one (i) considers all common vulnerabilities as being of equal importance; (ii) place greater emphasis on more recent common vulnerabilities; or (iii) is primarily interested in the common vulnerabilities being reported less frequently in calendar time. All strategies delivered the same best combination of OSes, and this emphasizes the importance of carefully select OSes that minimize the number of common weaknesses.

Despite the good results that we have achieved in the previous contribution, we have identified some problems that lead us to pursue further analysis. Namely, our and a few other works that used NVD as a primary data source were missing essential data. In particular, NVD does not report all producs that are affected by a particular vulnerability. We addressed this issue by using clustering techniques to group similar vulnerabilities. Moreover, we added other data sources with other relevant data (that NVD does not provide) to enrich our data. We devised a new metric that uses the vulnerability attributes provided by NVD and CVSS, and other attributes added from additional OSINT sources. This metric is used by an algorithm that builds and reconfigures replica sets on BFT systems. The algorithm decides when and which replica should be replaced by estimating the risk of the BFT system

being vulnerable and potentially compromised. The results show that our algorithm supports better decisions when selecting OSes to run in the replicated system. For example, for the evaluated time it *compromised rate* varies between 2%-5% of the total of executions while a random selection varies between 98%-99%.

Besides the lack of proof for supporting diversity, most of the works did not address diversity in a practical manner. We implemented LAZARUS to manage BFT systems according to security data available online that is then analyzed to trigger replicas' recoveries. We conducted an extensive evaluation of the costs of using real OS diversity in BFT systems. In the experiments, we have found a significant limitation on the virtualization technology, forcing us to limit the evaluation setup by reconfiguring the bare metal machines (e.g., limit the number of CPUs). Therefore, we manage to make a fair comparison (for some of the cases) between a bare metal configuration with a virtualized (yet limited) solution that accommodates LAZARUS. Although most of the results show a non-negligible overhead, we have shown that for OSes that did not suffer virtualization limitations the overhead is minimal. In these cases, the performance of the replicated system managed by LAZARUS is 86%-94% of the bare metal, which runs a replicated non-virtualized homogenous OS configuration.

One of the BFT systems used in the LAZARUS evaluation, is SIEVEQ. It is a multi-layer firewall-like application that was designed to absorb most of the external and internal attacks with additional resilient mechanisms. Firewalls represent one of the most critical roles in infrastructures, as they control which packets go in and out of the network. The main improvement of the SIEVEQ multi-layered architecture, when compared with previous systems, is the separation of message filtering in several components that carry on verifications progressively more costly and complex. This allows the proposed system to be more efficient than the state-of-the-art replicated firewalls under attack. SIEVEQ also includes several resilience mechanisms that allow the creation, removal, and recovery of components in a dynamic way, to respond to evolving threats against the system adequately. Experimental results show that such resilience mechanisms can significantly reduce the effects of DoS attacks against the system.

7.2 Future Work

The results of this thesis open many avenues for future work on this research topic, which we address in the following topics:

Integration of prevention techniques: In Chapter 2, we have briefly described a few prevention techniques. Although we did not address them in this thesis, here, we initiate the discussion on how to integrate such techniques in LAZARUS. The LAZARUS replicas have

two states were they are dormant when they are in quarantine or before they are deployed in the execution plane. Thus, this time could be used to apply a battery of automatic procedures (e.g., vulnerability detectors) that would (1) detect additional weaknesses, which could be reported to NVD, and (2) remediate these weaknesses with automatic mechanisms like automatic patching [85]. Moreover, although limited to open source products, it could use vulnerable code clone detectors, that would indicate potentially shared vulnerabilities [95, 170]. Such mechanisms would decrease the vulnerability surface, especially if common vulnerabilities are detected. Although we are most concern with more complex attacks (e.g., Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)), using automatic attacks [82] could activate some common vulnerabilities before the replicas deployment. These would trigger the algorithm to adjust the risk associated with such replicas avoiding their selection.

Extending the LAZARUS source types and sensors: LAZARUS monitors five security data feeds on the internet to collect data about vulnerabilities, exploits, and patches for the OSes it manages. However, it could be extended to monitor other indicators of compromise (e.g., IP blacklists) extracted from a much richer set of sources [108, 141]. Similarly, LAZARUS could additionally use the outputs of IDSs to assess the BFT system behavior and trigger replica's reconfigurations in case of need. Finally, and exploring a different domain it could be interesting to mine black market data sources to discover new threats that could compromise several replicas [8].

Virtualization technology: LAZARUS paid a performance penalty due to the limitations of the virtualization platform we used (VirtualBox). VirtualBox was selected because it is the platform where we could run more OSes. Therefore its use enabled LAZARUS to support 17 different OSes for running BFT systems. It would be great to have a VM technology capable of supporting all existing OSes without the resource limitations we experienced. The idea of replacing VirtualBox with an alternative solution would reduce the opportunities available to create diversity. However, it could be interesting to use different VMMs by taking the most of each one. For example, OSes that have CPU limitations on VirtualBox would run in the alternative VMM (e.g., Xen). Although this solution seems promising, as it also creates another level of diversity, by the knowledge we have so far, the OSes that have limitations in VirtualBox have fewer compatibilities with other VMMs like Xen.

Diversity-aware replication: In the same line, the evaluation of BFT-SMART on top of LAZARUS shows that different replica set configurations can impact on the performance of applications, mostly due to the performance heterogeneity of the different OSes. It would be interesting to consider protocols in which this heterogeneity is taken into account. For example, the leader could be allocated in the fastest replica, or weighted-replication protocols such as WHEAT [147] could be used to assign higher weights to the replicas running in faster replicas. These approaches would reduce the impact of running OSes that suffer from resource limitations.

Trusted components: Our prototype implements the LTU as a trusted component isolated from the rest of the replica in a VM, as many works on hybrid BFT [50, 130, 140, 149, 162]. The recent popularization of trusted computing technologies such as Intel SGX [87], and its use for implementing efficient BFT replication [19], open interesting possibilities for using novel hardware to support services like LAZARUS on bare metal.

Acronyms

APTs Advanced Persistent Threats. 117

ARFF Attribute-Relation File Format. 70, 72

ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization. 16, 17

BFT Byzantine Fault Tolerance. 1, 2, 4–7, 11–15, 20, 21, 26, 29, 31, 49, 53–56, 58, 62, 65, 67, 73, 74, 76, 80–85, 87, 88, 99, 115–117

BM Bare Metal. 76

COTS Components Off-the-Shelf. 17, 19, 21, 27

CPE Common Platform Enumeration. 31–33, 68

CVC Common Vulnerability Count. 41

CVCst Common Vulnerability Count Strategy. 39, 40, 43, 44

CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. 24, 26, 31, 32, 64, 68, 71

CVI Common Vulnerability Indicator. 36–39, 42–44

CVIst Common Vulnerability Indicator Strategy. 39, 43, 51

CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System. 22, 24–26, 28, 31, 58, 59, 68, 115

DBMS Databases Management Systems. 56

DNS Domain Name System. 1, 2, 35

DoS Denial-of-Service. 5, 28, 35, 64, 84–86, 89–92, 95, 100, 102, 104, 105, 108–110, 113, 116

FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array. 107

GPU Graphics Processing Unit. 107

HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code. 103

ICS Industrial Control Systems. 113

IDS Intrusion Detection System. 5, 19, 83, 107, 117

IP Internet Protocol. 35, 36, 117

IRT Inter-Reporting Times. xxii, 45–47

IRTst Inter-Reporting Times Strategy. 39, 46

JVM Java Virtual Machine. 56, 76, 106

KMP Knuth–Morris–Pratt. 107

KVS Key-Value Storage. 54, 79, 81

LTU Logical Trusted Unit. 54, 55, 73, 74

MAC Message Authentication Code. 12, 85, 91, 93–97, 100, 103

MTD Moving Target Defense. 28, 29

NFS Network File System. 20

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology. 31

NVD National Vulnerability Database. 2, 3, 5, 18, 22, 24–26, 28, 31–36, 39, 40, 47, 50, 51, 55, 57, 58, 68, 83, 115, 117

OS Operating System. 2–4, 9, 18–23, 26–29, 31–51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 62–64, 67, 69, 73, 76–80, 88, 89, 115–118

OSI Open Systems Interconnection. 83

OSINT Open Source Intelligence. 3, 4, 21, 53, 55, 58, 68, 74, 115

OSVDB Open Sourced Vulnerability Database. 22–25

OTS Off-the-Shelf. 2, 3, 16–21, 29, 30, 32, 35, 56

PO Proactive Obfuscation. 20, 21

POA Potential for Attack. 22

PPZDA Potential Pseudo Zero-Day Attack. 22

PRRW Proactive-Reactive Recovery Wormhole. 15

PZDA Pseudo Zero-Day Attack. 22

RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman. 103

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. 6, 74, 83

SCIT Self-Cleaning Intrusion Tolerance. 27

SHA Secure Hash Algorithm. 103

SIEM Security Information and Event Management. 104, 111, 113

SMR State Machine Replication. 11, 12, 14, 73, 74, 103, 108

SQL Structured Query Language. 17, 18, 32, 33

SVM Support Vector Machines. 25

TCP Transmission Control Protocol. 35, 36, 103, 105, 106, 108

TLS Transport Layer Security. 70

TOM Total Ordered Multicast. 88, 89, 95, 98, 100–103

UDP User Datagram Protocol. 105

VM Virtual Machine. 4, 14, 15, 21, 28, 29, 53, 54, 56, 67–69, 73, 76, 78, 79, 88, 117

VMM Virtual Machine Manager. 14, 117

VPN Virtual Private Network. 26

WINE Worldlwide Intelligence Network Environmnet. 23

XML Extensible Markup Language. 31, 32

XSS Cross-site scripting. 57

YCSB Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmark. 79, 80

ZDA Zero-Day Attack. 22

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