



Rainbow and Mastumoto-Imai as Signature Schemes

Reporte de Estancia de Investigación

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MPKC

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MPKC

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$$P = (p_1(w_1, \dots, w_n), \dots, p_m(w_1, \dots, w_n))$$

- These polynomials are defined on a finite field $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_q$.

Signature Scheme

Private Key for Rainbow

The maps

$$\begin{aligned} L_1 &: K^{n-v} \mapsto K^{n-v}, \\ L_2 &: K^n \mapsto K^n, \text{ and} \\ F &: K^n \mapsto K^{n-v}. \end{aligned}$$

Signature Scheme

Public Key for Rainbow

The $n - v$ polynomial components of F and the algebraic structure of K

Signing a Document

To sign a document an entity A must consider the next steps:

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- define the verification transformation $V_A : M_h S \mapsto \{true, false\}$

$$V_{A,h}(\bar{m}, s^*) = \begin{cases} true & \text{if } L_1 \circ F \circ L_2(s^*) := h(m) \\ false & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}.$$

Verifying the signature

Once entity A hands over the document m , s^* , and $V_{A,h}$


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Verifying the signature

Once entity A hands over the document m , s^* , and $V_{A,h}$

- Entity B must evaluate $\tilde{m} = h(m)$
- given \tilde{m} and s^* , compute $u = V_{A,h}(\tilde{m}, s^*)$

Matsumoto-Imai Signature Scheme



Private Key

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


Figure: The set of z 's available for entity A

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


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- $z_i(x_1, \dots, x_n) := \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_{ji} x_j + \beta_i$

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- Entity A must also define a random map $f : K^r \mapsto K^n$ given by
$$f(z_1, \dots, z_r) := (f_1(z_1, \dots, z_r), \dots, f_n(z_1, \dots, z_r))$$

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


Figure: Image of all the z 's in K^r

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


Figure: Perturbation points

Private Key

Properties

The final property is are the linear maps:

$$L_1, L_2 : K^n \mapsto K^n$$

Public key

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Public key

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- The n multivariate polynomial components of F
- the algebraic structure of K

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- our **digital signature** is then

$$s^* := \hat{F}(\bar{m})$$

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- If $Z(y_{\lambda_0}) := \mu_0$ go to the next step
- Finally if $\bar{m}_0 := L_2^{-1}(y_{\lambda})$ is such that $\bar{m}_0 = h(m)$, we are done.

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