

THE CHINESE WALL SECURITY POLICY

Dr. David F.C. Brewer and Dr. Michael J. Nash, 1989

November 06, 2015

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Who is the enemy?

CHINESE WALL

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- ▶ Coined in 1929 following the Wall Street crash
- ▶ Chinese Wall policies are already in use
 - ▶ Not necessarily digital
 - ▶ Can have authority of law
- ▶ Other terms, as some find the original offensive
 - ▶ "Screen", "firewall", "cone of silence", and "ethical wall"

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- ▶ Before 1989, most security policies were military
 - ▶ E.g. Bell-LaPadula (more about this later)
- ▶ Need of something that holds up in court
- ▶ Relevant anywhere conflicts of interest can exist

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Terminology

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- ▶ Proposed by Bell and LaPadula in 1973
- ▶ Security policy model
- ▶ Designed for military use

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- ▶ **Security Label**
- ▶ **Object** – Data or program
 - ▶ **Classification** – Minimum security level
 - ▶ **Category** – Security group(s)
- ▶ **Subject** – Person or program
 - ▶ **Clearance** – Maximum security level
 - ▶ **Need-to-know** – Security group(s)

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Simple security: access is granted only if the subject's clearance is *greater* than the object's classification and the subject's need-to-know *includes* the object's category(ies)

***-property:** write access is granted only if the output object's classification is *greater* than the classification of all input objects, and its category *includes* the category(ies) of all input objects.

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Example

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(TOP SECRET, {CRYPTO, FOREIGN})

(TOP SECRET, {CRYPTO})

(TOP SECRET, {})

(SECRET, {CRYPTO, FOREIGN})

(SECRET, {CRYPTO})

(SECRET, {})

(UNCLASSIFIED, {})

Example (2)

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
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Fundamentals

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► Terminology

- Object
- Subject
- Company Dataset (CD)
- Conflict of Interest Class (COIC)

- Main difference: At most one CD in each COIC, starting with free choice

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Abstract Example

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See blackboard...

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Hierarchical Example

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
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Users X, Y



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Simple security

Access is only granted if the object requested

1. is in the *same company dataset* as an object already accessed by that subject, i.e. within the Wall, *or*
2. belongs to an *entirely different conflict of interest class*.

*-property

Write access is only permitted if

1. access is permitted by the simple security rule, and
2. no object can be read which is in a different company dataset to the one for which write access is requested and contains unsanitized information.

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- ▶ Not all data within a company is sensitive
- ▶ It can be necessary to share data between users
- ▶ Assumed possible by de-privatizing
- ▶ Simply solved by adding extra CD within its own COIC

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Comparison with BLP

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- ▶ Important to show power of CW, compared to BLP
- ▶ Two important properties: mandatory and free choice
- ▶ It is possible to use BLP, but it cannot satisfy both properties

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Clark and Wilson

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- ▶ General rules for commercial data processing
- ▶ Important distinction between *users* and *processes*



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- ▶ Business
- ▶ Cloud computing (think servers and VMs)
- ▶ Basically anywhere there can be conflicts of interest

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- ▶ Important in its own right
- ▶ Differs from previous models
- ▶ Provable integrity

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Questions?



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