THE CHINESE WALL SECURITY POLICY

Dr. David F.C. Brewer and Dr. Michael J. Nash, 1989

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Who is the enemy?

CHINESE WALL

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Introduction

Background Relevance

Bell-LaPadula

Access rules

Access rule

Chinese Wall

Abstract Example

Hierarchical Exam

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Introduction

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Access rules

Chinese Wall

Abstract Example Hierarchical Example Access rules





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Introduction

Backgroun Relevance

Bell-LaPadula

Access rules

Chinese Wall

Abstract Example Hierarchical Example Access rules







Background

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Background

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Bell-LaPadul

Terminology Access rules

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Abstract Example Hierarchical Example

- ► Coined in 1929 following the Wall Street crash
- ► Chinese Wall policies are already in use
 - Not necessarily digital
 - Can have authority of law
- Other terms, as some find the original offensive
 - ► "Screen", "firewall", "cone of silence", and "ethical wall"

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Relevance

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Abstract Example

Hierarchical Examp

- ► Before 1989, most security policies were military
 - ► E.g. Bell-LaPadula (more about this later)
- Need of something that holds up in court
- Relevant anywhere conflicts of interest can exist



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Terminology Access rules

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Abstract Example Hierarchical Example

Hierarchical Examp

► Proposed by Bell and LaPadula in 1973

- Security policy model
- ► Designed for military use



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Terminology

- ► Security Label
- ▶ Object Data or program
 - ► Classification Minimum security level
 - Category Security group(s)
- Subject Person or program
 - ► Clearance Maximum security level
 - ► Need-to-know Security group(s)

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Access rules

Simple security: access is granted only if the subject's clearance is *greater* than the object's classification and the subject's need-to-know includes the object's category(ies)

*-property: write access is granted only if the output object's classification is greater than the classification of all input objects, and its category includes the category(ies) of all input objects.



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Terminology


Access rules

Example Chinese Wall

Abstract Example

Hierarchical Example

Access rules





Example (2)

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Terminology

Access rules


Example

Chinese Wall

Abstract Example

Hierarchical Exam

Access rules



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12



Fundamentals

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- ▶ Terminology
 - ▶ Object
 - Subject
 - Company Dataset (CD)
 - ► Conflict of Interest Class (COIC)
- ▶ Main difference: At most one CD in each COIC, starting with free choice



Abstract Example

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terminology Access rule:

Access rule

Chinese Wall Abstract Example

Abstract Example

Hierarchical Example

See blackboard...



Hierarchical Example

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Hierarchical Example

Users X, Y

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12

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Introductio

Backgroun Relevance

Bell-LaPadu

Terminology

Access rules

Example

Chinese Wall

Abstract Example
Hierarchical Example

Access rules

Simple security

Access is only granted if the object requested

- is in the same company dataset as an object already accessed by that subject, i.e. within the Wall. or
- 2. belongs to an *entirely* different conflict of interest class.

*-property

Write access is only permitted if

- access is permitted by the simple security rule, and
- 2. no object can be read which is in a different company dataset to the one for which write access is requested and contains unsanitized information.

Questions?

