Putting Out the Fire with Gasoline:

How States React to Internal Challengers

- Online Appendices -

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A   Explanations of the Territorial Contenders Data

More information on each of these territorial contenders along with code sheets can be found on the data set website as well as in Lemke and Crabtree (2020).

A.1   Country-Years in which Multiple TCs Emerged

There are 23 instances in which more than one territorial contender emerged in a given country-year. Four such instances are in the year the state entered the data set. Most of these are coterminous with the start of the state. In the case of India, Hyderabad and Sikkim are pre-existing at the time of the state's formation. All incidents of multiple TC emergence are collapsed in our analyses.

Table 1: Country-Years in which Multiple TCs Emerged in the Same Year

State Name	Years with multiple TC emergence
Brazil	1835, 1893
Burma	1948*, 1966, 1989
Cambodia	1979
Ethiopia	1975, 1977
Georgia	1991*
Guatemala	1848
India	1947*, 1980, 1988
Iran	1909, 1945
Mali	1991
Sierra Leone	1991
Somalia	1991
Uganda	1981, 1986
Congo/Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960*, 1998, 2003

Note: *Year in which country entered the data set.

A.2 Heat Map: Total TCs Per Country Over Observed Period

Figure 1 illustrates the number of territorial contenders faced by each sovereign state over the entire period of observation. State borders reflect 2019 borders. As such, some borders and states are not accurately reflected (e.g. United States of Central America or South Vietnam). This figure is intended for illustrative purposes. Map created using mapchart.net and the Territorial Contenders data from Lemke and Crabtree (2020).


Figure 1: Heat Map of Total Territorial Contenders Per Country Over Entire Observed Time Period

B Tabled Results for Figures in the Main Text

B.1 Figure 1 - PWP Gap Time Model Results

Table 2: PWP Gap Time Model Results

| | All TCs | Separate PWP Models, By TC Iteration | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.083**		2.005***	1.499	0.431
	(0.492)		(0.638)	(1.289)	(1.306)
Fighting w/ TC	1.467***		2.958***	1.993**	2.306***
	(0.480)		(0.629)	(1.162)	(1.242)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.452		0.541	0.061	−0.783
	(0.408)		(0.756)	(0.583)	(0.903)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.401		1.712***	0.648*	0.578
	(0.373)		(0.648)	(0.543)	(0.755)
Absorbed	0.824*		0.421	0.651	0.086
	(0.489)		(0.815)	(0.806)	(0.900)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.877***	0.393	−3.303***	−0.901	−1.583
	(0.721)	(1.488)	(1.278)	(1.555)	(1.883)
State Area (logged)	0.061	0.123	0.256	0.180*	−0.316***
	(0.079)	(0.125)	(0.156)	(0.172)	(0.253)
Mountains	0.056	0.217**	0.075	0.100	−0.229
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.221)	(0.430)
ELF	1.827**	1.103	0.823	1.374	1.193
	(0.563)	(0.801)	(0.826)	(1.348)	(2.022)
TC Tally	0.354***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.2 Figure 2 - PWP Elapsed Time Model Results

Table 3: PWP Elapsed Time Model Results

	All TCs	Separate PWP Models, By TC Iteration		
		First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4+
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Peace w/ TC	0.598*		0.900**	0.750
	(0.428)		(0.494)	(0.863)
Fighting w/ TC	1.730***		2.463***	2.653***
	(0.430)		(0.544)	(0.849)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.318		0.079	−1.322**
	(0.591)		(0.837)	(0.802)
Favorable Outcome for TC	1.143***		1.319***	1.035***
	(0.494)		(0.623)	(0.787)
Absorbed	−0.012		−0.126	−0.972
	(0.902)		(1.197)	(1.089)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.938**	0.393	−1.717*	−1.057
	(0.953)	(1.488)	(1.429)	(2.124)
State Area (logged)	0.092	0.123	0.361**	0.067
	(0.088)	(0.125)	(0.162)	(0.189)
Mountains	0.080	0.217**	0.046	0.321
	(0.089)	(0.118)	(0.145)	(0.237)
ELF	1.730**	1.103	1.226	3.231***
	(0.638)	(0.801)	(0.966)	(1.560)
TC Tally	0.686***			
	(0.084)			
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	1,206

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

C Alternative Variables

In addition to our main model specification, we ran sensitivity analyses using several alternative variables. These include a disaggregated version of our past TC outcome variables, absorbed by another TC combined with our favorable outcome for TC variable, state failure, state birth type, number of rivals, and polity and the V-Dem electoral democracy index as regime type indicators. All models below use the PWP Gap Time model with a 20 year linear decay. Summaries of our findings can be found below.

Included Variables:

No major changes in state behavior findings, however, ELF

and democracy lose significance.

Uses the Polity score to indicate regime type.

No major changes in findings, though polity is largely insignificant.

Uses V-Dem's electoral democracy index instead of the liberal

democracy index to indicate regime type. No major changes in findings.

Includes indicator of state birth legacy from Lemke and Carter 2016.

No major change in findings.

Includes indicator of number of state rivals from Thompson & Dreyer 2012.

No major change in findings.

Includes indicator of number of state rivals from Diehl & Goertz 2000.

No major change in findings.

C.1 Disaggregated TC Outcome Types

Table 4: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Disaggregated

| | All TCs | Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.128**		2.009***	1.633	0.332
	(0.487)		(0.640)	(1.317)	(1.321)
Fighting w/ TC	1.442***		2.961***	2.206**	2.260**
	(0.480)		(0.631)	(1.199)	(1.228)
Forceful Reintegration	−0.385		0.541	−0.099	−0.835
	(0.408)		(0.756)	(0.611)	(0.917)
Absorbed	0.696		0.418	1.155*	0.300
	(0.512)		(0.817)	(0.917)	(0.988)
Peaceful Reintegration	0.223		1.695***	0.989**	0.729
	(0.411)		(0.685)	(0.641)	(0.796)
Promoted to Sovereign	1.026**		1.780	−0.133	0.121
	(0.493)		(1.089)	(0.980)	(0.997)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.798***	0.393	−3.292***	−1.516	−1.716
	(0.728)	(1.488)	(1.284)	(1.716)	(1.885)
State Area (logged)	0.064	0.123	0.257	0.195	−0.292**
	(0.080)	(0.125)	(0.156)	(0.181)	(0.270)
Mountains	0.064	0.217**	0.075	0.081	−0.232
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.224)	(0.454)
ELF	1.850**	1.103	0.838	1.294	1.266
	(0.565)	(0.801)	(0.848)	(1.340)	(2.121)
TC Tally	0.375***				
	(0.054)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.2 Absorbed as part of Favorable Outcome for TCs

Table 5: PWP Gap Time - Absorbed Included in Favorable Outcome for State

	All TCs	First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
		Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration			
Peace w/ TC	1.129***		1.932***	1.574	0.491
	(0.486)		(0.644)	(1.276)	(1.314)
Fighting w/ TC	1.565***		2.915***	2.074**	2.407***
	(0.475)		(0.628)	(1.153)	(1.244)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.089		0.341	0.263	−0.151
	(0.391)		(0.696)	(0.611)	(0.998)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.407		1.643***	0.663*	0.463
	(0.369)		(0.660)	(0.549)	(0.759)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.835***	0.393	−3.224***	−0.910	−1.565
	(0.719)	(1.488)	(1.272)	(1.562)	(1.881)
State Area (logged)	0.074	0.123	0.268	0.190*	−0.309*
	(0.078)	(0.125)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.258)
Mountains	0.035	0.217**	0.068	0.056	−0.304
	(0.082)	(0.118)	(0.137)	(0.209)	(0.424)
ELF	1.833**	1.103	0.883	1.415*	0.956
	(0.558)	(0.801)	(0.825)	(1.288)	(2.009)
TC Tally	0.335***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.3 State Failure

Table 6: PWP Gap Time Model Results - State Failure

	All TCs	First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
		Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration			
Peace w/ TC	0.764*		1.874***	1.283	0.294
	(0.508)		(0.659)	(1.322)	(1.454)
Fighting w/ TC	1.160***		2.827***	1.806*	1.875***
	(0.488)		(0.633)	(1.191)	(1.342)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.439		0.492	0.077	0.022
	(0.406)		(0.762)	(0.571)	(1.264)
Favorable Outcome for TC	−0.019		1.498**	0.392	0.163
	(0.400)		(0.662)	(0.630)	(0.849)
Absorbed	0.369		−0.076	0.506	−0.506
	(0.500)		(0.864)	(0.835)	(0.926)
Liberal Democracy Index	−0.976	0.837	−2.665**	−0.389	1.256
	(0.737)	(1.507)	(1.322)	(1.651)	(2.614)
State Area (logged)	0.086	0.079	0.286	0.224*	−0.565**
	(0.075)	(0.128)	(0.154)	(0.170)	(0.289)
Mountains	0.046	0.201*	0.086	0.066	0.080
	(0.084)	(0.121)	(0.140)	(0.227)	(0.497)
ELF	1.162	1.228	0.544	0.919	−2.751
	(0.577)	(0.808)	(0.862)	(1.471)	(2.679)
State Failure	1.495***	2.308***	0.911	0.556	4.499*
	(0.296)	(0.552)	(0.518)	(0.656)	(1.604)
TC Tally	0.400***				
	(0.054)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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C.4 Polity 2

Table 7: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Polity 2

| | All TCs | Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	0.788**		1.282**	1.744	0.333
	(0.427)		(0.529)	(1.310)	(1.319)
Fighting w/ TC	1.111***		2.284***	2.186**	1.950**
	(0.421)		(0.540)	(1.179)	(1.170)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.197		0.607	−0.187	−0.515
	(0.388)		(0.662)	(0.663)	(0.969)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.456		1.452***	0.959**	0.663
	(0.365)		(0.610)	(0.638)	(0.745)
Absorbed	0.837		0.329	0.529	0.276
	(0.479)		(0.802)	(0.832)	(0.868)
Polity Score	−0.021	0.046*	−0.049*	−0.042	0.026
	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.054)
State Area (logged)	0.070	0.227**	0.182	0.198**	−0.379***
	(0.073)	(0.117)	(0.134)	(0.172)	(0.252)
Mountains	0.036	0.136	0.066	0.127	−0.292
	(0.077)	(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.217)	(0.451)
ELF	1.534**	0.792	0.948	1.994*	0.585
	(0.496)	(0.706)	(0.723)	(1.503)	(2.073)
TC Tally	0.375***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	4,270	1,864	1,170	773	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.5 V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index

Table 8: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Electoral Democracy

| | All TCs | *Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration* | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.062**		1.918***	1.461	0.423
	(0.491)		(0.632)	(1.280)	(1.313)
Fighting w/ TC	1.434***		2.870***	1.973**	2.193**
	(0.478)		(0.625)	(1.159)	(1.218)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.422		0.479	0.096	−0.809
	(0.403)		(0.755)	(0.587)	(0.906)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.387		1.604***	0.646*	0.576
	(0.372)		(0.648)	(0.541)	(0.753)
Absorbed	0.825*		0.330	0.680	0.157
	(0.487)		(0.821)	(0.813)	(0.889)
Electoral Democracy Index	−1.112**	1.320	−2.246***	−0.490	−0.908
	(0.569)	(1.068)	(1.003)	(1.217)	(1.567)
State Area (logged)	0.051	0.156	0.223	0.169*	−0.319***
	(0.078)	(0.127)	(0.152)	(0.169)	(0.254)
Mountains	0.051	0.223**	0.032	0.106	−0.205
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.136)	(0.222)	(0.430)
ELF	1.835**	1.018	0.914	1.348	1.111
	(0.568)	(0.787)	(0.840)	(1.379)	(2.028)
TC Tally	0.353***				
	(0.052)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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C.6 Birth Type

Table 9: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Birth Type

	All TCs	First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
		Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration			
Peace w/ TC	1.286***		2.123***	1.409	0.539
	(0.496)		(0.642)	(1.314)	(1.427)
Fighting w/ TC	1.576***		3.101***	2.114**	2.404**
	(0.481)		(0.634)	(1.187)	(1.346)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.481		0.439	−0.066	−0.783
	(0.412)		(0.769)	(0.600)	(0.902)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.581*		1.689***	0.243	0.665
	(0.377)		(0.645)	(0.644)	(0.887)
Absorbed	1.018*		0.567	0.349	0.104
	(0.498)		(0.827)	(0.864)	(0.907)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.845***	0.354	−3.158***	−1.217	−1.457
	(0.712)	(1.507)	(1.246)	(1.620)	(2.012)
State Area (logged)	0.038	0.134	0.244	0.215**	−0.348**
	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.152)	(0.177)	(0.307)
Mountains	−0.030	0.238**	0.010	0.170	−0.289
	(0.089)	(0.122)	(0.144)	(0.225)	(0.529)
ELF	2.183**	0.881	0.963	1.551*	1.015
	(0.586)	(0.871)	(0.836)	(1.361)	(2.210)
Birth Type	0.194**	−0.078	0.146	−0.181	0.048
	(0.070)	(0.126)	(0.109)	(0.160)	(0.253)
TC Tally	0.429***				
	(0.060)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

C.7 Rivalry - Thompson & Dreyer

Table 10: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Rivalry (Thompson & Dreyer)

	All TCs	Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration			
		First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
Peace w/ TC	1.027**		2.033***	1.506	0.490
	(0.500)		(0.642)	(1.304)	(1.317)
Fighting w/ TC	1.505***		2.996***	1.990**	2.358***
	(0.482)		(0.633)	(1.164)	(1.277)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.393		0.561	0.057	−0.624
	(0.404)		(0.755)	(0.599)	(0.907)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.473		1.779***	0.644	0.468
	(0.380)		(0.654)	(0.554)	(0.753)
Absorbed	0.852*		0.535	0.657	0.184
	(0.483)		(0.828)	(0.824)	(0.903)
Liberal Democracy Index	−2.001***	0.358	−3.242***	−0.909	−2.381**
	(0.712)	(1.501)	(1.260)	(1.574)	(2.098)
State Area (logged)	0.027	0.126	0.223	0.182*	−0.469***
	(0.082)	(0.125)	(0.157)	(0.179)	(0.301)
Mountains	0.037	0.215**	0.050	0.102	−0.433**
	(0.087)	(0.118)	(0.142)	(0.225)	(0.468)
ELF	2.046**	1.055	0.864	1.371	−0.200
	(0.597)	(0.819)	(0.853)	(1.351)	(2.418)
Number of Rivals	0.194**	−0.034	0.145	−0.007	0.436*
	(0.076)	(0.144)	(0.128)	(0.197)	(0.431)
TC Tally	0.393***				
	(0.055)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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C.8 Rivalry - Diehl & Goertz

Table 11: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Rivalry (Diehl & Goertz)

| | All TCs | *Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration* | | | |
		First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
Peace w/ TC	1.033**		2.560***	1.008	−0.702
	(0.574)		(0.800)	(1.533)	(1.582)
Fighting w/ TC	1.186***		3.119***	1.446	0.978
	(0.529)		(0.738)	(1.228)	(1.437)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.591		0.771	0.123	−0.263
	(0.459)		(0.808)	(0.803)	(0.981)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.369		1.764**	0.843*	−1.123*
	(0.429)		(0.865)	(0.602)	(1.248)
Absorbed	0.779		0.055	0.813*	−0.037
	(0.523)		(0.912)	(0.937)	(0.972)
Liberal Democracy Index	−2.639***	0.422	−4.881***	−0.164	−4.336**
	(0.896)	(1.583)	(1.678)	(1.707)	(4.052)
State Area (logged)	0.040	0.101	0.298	0.154*	−0.268*
	(0.085)	(0.129)	(0.178)	(0.182)	(0.306)
Mountains	0.048	0.222**	0.204	0.164	0.036
	(0.092)	(0.124)	(0.173)	(0.244)	(0.606)
ELF	2.030**	1.075	0.810	1.271	6.540***
	(0.615)	(0.854)	(0.888)	(1.477)	(3.826)
Number of Rivals	0.188	0.010	−0.011	0.150	−1.139
	(0.147)	(0.209)	(0.306)	(0.405)	(0.905)
TC Tally	0.371***				
	(0.056)				
Observations	3,347	1,443	895	636	373

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D   Decay Function Alternatives

While in our main text, we present our results using a 20 year linear decay on our past TC outcome variables, our results are very robust to other decay assumptions. In none of the alternative specifications do our findings meaningfully vary. All reported results using alternative decay assumptions use our standard PWP model.

A half-life decay represents an assumption that the decaying effect of past TC outcomes is non-linear. We specify four separate half-life assumptions. Half-life decay t years after the event is given by:

$$N(t) = (1/2)^{t/h} \tag{1}$$

Where N(t) reflects the value at time t and h represents the number of years after the TC emerges when the effect is assumed to have reduced to one half. This results in a value of 1 in the year that a new TC emerges (time 0) and an exponentially decreasing value for each year after. We also specify our models with the assumption that there is no decay on the effect of previous TC outcomes. We specify this using a binary indicator of whether a TC within the state suffered a given outcome in the past 10 (D.1) or 20 (D.2) years.

Alternative Decay Assumptions:

D.1 10 Year Binary

Table 12: PWP Gap Time Model Results - 10 Year Binary

| | All TCs | *Separate PWP Models, By TC Iteration* | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.020**		2.051***	1.369	0.329
	(0.485)		(0.639)	(1.293)	(1.331)
Fighting w/ TC	1.425***		3.090***	1.959**	2.261***
	(0.476)		(0.643)	(1.168)	(1.276)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.494		0.408	0.114	−0.913*
	(0.353)		(0.643)	(0.540)	(0.693)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.286		1.749***	0.126	0.482
	(0.301)		(0.563)	(0.479)	(0.586)
Absorbed	0.644		0.257	0.535	0.251
	(0.432)		(0.831)	(0.675)	(0.691)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.904***	0.393	−3.638***	−0.737	−1.921
	(0.723)	(1.488)	(1.299)	(1.594)	(1.880)
State Area (logged)	0.058	0.123	0.295	0.144	−0.346***
	(0.079)	(0.125)	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.262)
Mountains	0.053	0.217**	0.080	0.057	−0.255
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.136)	(0.219)	(0.430)
ELF	1.893***	1.103	0.807	1.317	1.669**
	(0.562)	(0.801)	(0.830)	(1.337)	(2.073)
TC Tally	0.356***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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D.2 20 Year Binary

Table 13: PWP Gap Time Model Results - 20 Year Binary

| | All TCs | Separate PWP Models, By TC Iteration | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.057**		2.081***	1.601	0.501
	(0.499)		(0.670)	(1.316)	(1.316)
Fighting w/ TC	1.464***		2.986***	2.090**	2.367***
	(0.493)		(0.666)	(1.181)	(1.235)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.327		0.548	−0.053	−0.442
	(0.307)		(0.530)	(0.525)	(0.724)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.198		1.244**	0.791**	0.226
	(0.305)		(0.582)	(0.457)	(0.565)
Absorbed	0.628		0.585	0.583	−0.313
	(0.389)		(0.725)	(0.694)	(0.687)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.820***	0.393	−3.392***	−1.151	−1.752
	(0.716)	(1.488)	(1.315)	(1.462)	(2.014)
State Area (logged)	0.061	0.123	0.201	0.187*	−0.354***
	(0.078)	(0.125)	(0.149)	(0.177)	(0.246)
Mountains	0.054	0.217**	0.073	0.141	−0.273
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.227)	(0.412)
ELF	1.821**	1.103	0.979	1.616*	1.002
	(0.558)	(0.801)	(0.814)	(1.411)	(1.954)
TC Tally	0.356***				
	(0.052)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3 Exponential Decay - 5 Year Halflife

Table 14: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Exponential Decay 5 Year Halflife

| | All TCs | *Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration* | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.053**		1.810***	1.474	0.297
	(0.482)		(0.610)	(1.285)	(1.304)
Fighting w/ TC	1.446***		2.759***	1.983**	2.165**
	(0.472)		(0.599)	(1.160)	(1.232)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.432		0.389	0.126	−0.976
	(0.455)		(0.850)	(0.617)	(1.020)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.361		1.693***	0.560	0.272
	(0.424)		(0.683)	(0.616)	(0.883)
Absorbed	0.750		0.271	0.681	−0.083
	(0.586)		(0.904)	(0.978)	(1.180)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.861***	0.393	−3.004***	−0.857	−1.748
	(0.722)	(1.488)	(1.238)	(1.561)	(1.872)
State Area (logged)	0.061	0.123	0.267	0.172*	−0.294**
	(0.078)	(0.125)	(0.154)	(0.169)	(0.261)
Mountains	0.048	0.217**	0.072	0.079	−0.179
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.219)	(0.441)
ELF	1.843**	1.103	0.800	1.332	1.875*
	(0.565)	(0.801)	(0.828)	(1.310)	(2.079)
TC Tally	0.351***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.4 Exponential Decay - 10 Year Halflife

Table 15: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Exponential Decay 10 Year Halflife

| | All TCs | *Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration* | | | |
| | | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.095**		1.956***	1.578	0.424
	(0.493)		(0.638)	(1.297)	(1.302)
Fighting w/ TC	1.484***		2.876***	2.039**	2.299**
	(0.481)		(0.620)	(1.165)	(1.232)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.355		0.521	0.165	−0.912
	(0.423)		(0.741)	(0.617)	(1.039)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.390		1.608**	0.735*	0.591
	(0.390)		(0.657)	(0.559)	(0.834)
Absorbed	0.757		0.440	0.692	−0.254
	(0.503)		(0.829)	(0.851)	(0.967)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.843***	0.393	−3.165***	−0.852	−1.857
	(0.720)	(1.488)	(1.260)	(1.536)	(1.945)
State Area (logged)	0.061	0.123	0.248	0.185*	−0.291**
	(0.079)	(0.125)	(0.152)	(0.173)	(0.253)
Mountains	0.051	0.217**	0.066	0.108	−0.203
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.139)	(0.222)	(0.436)
ELF	1.817**	1.103	0.854	1.282	1.402
	(0.566)	(0.801)	(0.829)	(1.367)	(2.064)
TC Tally	0.351***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

| *Note:* | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

D.5 Exponential Decay - 15 Year Halflife

Table 16: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Exponential Decay 15 Year Halflife

	All TCs	*Separate PWP Gap Time Models, By TC Iteration*			
		First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.138**		1.985***	1.636	0.493
	(0.497)		(0.648)	(1.307)	(1.305)
Fighting w/ TC	1.523***		2.877***	2.088**	2.370***
	(0.485)		(0.624)	(1.171)	(1.236)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.244		0.545	0.188	−0.795
	(0.402)		(0.674)	(0.615)	(1.107)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.409		1.475**	0.825**	0.670
	(0.374)		(0.635)	(0.539)	(0.823)
Absorbed	0.735		0.512	0.693	−0.268
	(0.470)		(0.805)	(0.817)	(0.877)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.830***	0.393	−3.177***	−0.880	−1.968*
	(0.718)	(1.488)	(1.263)	(1.512)	(2.000)
State Area (logged)	0.061	0.123	0.233	0.190*	−0.300*
	(0.079)	(0.125)	(0.149)	(0.176)	(0.253)
Mountains	0.050	0.217**	0.062	0.124	−0.245
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.223)	(0.436)
ELF	1.787**	1.103	0.901	1.308	1.159
	(0.566)	(0.801)	(0.829)	(1.386)	(2.071)
TC Tally	0.350***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.6 Exponential Decay - 20 Year Halflife

Table 17: PWP Gap Time Model Results - Exponential Decay 20 Year Halflife

| | | *Separate PWP Models, By TC Iteration* | | |
| | All TCs | First TC | TC 2 or 3 | TC 4 or 5 | TC 6+ |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.172***		1.980***	1.671	0.530
	(0.499)		(0.652)	(1.316)	(1.309)
Fighting w/ TC	1.553***		2.854***	2.125**	2.413***
	(0.487)		(0.624)	(1.176)	(1.241)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.158		0.535	0.202	−0.666
	(0.388)		(0.632)	(0.609)	(1.183)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.424		1.366**	0.874**	0.686
	(0.364)		(0.616)	(0.531)	(0.813)
Absorbed	0.724		0.545	0.693	−0.259
	(0.452)		(0.794)	(0.801)	(0.824)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.827***	0.393	−3.153***	−0.905	−2.049*
	(0.718)	(1.488)	(1.261)	(1.495)	(2.036)
State Area (logged)	0.060	0.123	0.225	0.192*	−0.309*
	(0.079)	(0.125)	(0.147)	(0.177)	(0.255)
Mountains	0.050	0.217**	0.060	0.132	−0.281
	(0.083)	(0.118)	(0.142)	(0.225)	(0.437)
ELF	1.765**	1.103	0.934	1.353	1.017
	(0.565)	(0.801)	(0.829)	(1.391)	(2.076)
TC Tally	0.349***				
	(0.051)				
Observations	3,884	1,623	1,055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E   Alternative Modeling Strategies

Our findings are highly robust to alternative repeat-failure modeling strategies. A list of all models applied as robustness checks in our analyses is found below. We include a brief discussion of each model. Appendices D.1 - D.4 show alternative repeat failure modeling strategies. We also estimated several non-duration models using our data: the censored probit, the zero-inflated negative binomial, and the hurdle model. Our findings are not robust to the different assumptions of these models. However, we do not believe that these are appropriate tests of our hypotheses.

Alternative Models Considered:

A variance correction extension of the Cox model in which the risk of the nth event is assumed to be conditionally independent of previous events. The AG model restricts the baseline hazards for all events to be the same. We believe these assumptions are untenable in the case of TCs due to the fact that TC emergence occurs within the context of the state's history. We observe evidence of variable coefficient effects across events in our main model, lending support to our assertion. There are no major differences in findings using the AG model.

E.2 WLW Marginal Elapsed Time

The marginal risk set approach of the WLW model applies a competing risks set-up to repeat events data. The model treats all states as being at risk for their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc TC from the moment they enter the data set. This means that in theory, the third territorial contender could emerge before the first. Separate baseline hazards are estimated for each event number. The baseline hazard is allowed to vary for each event number, though covariate effects are assumed to be constant across event ranks. This model is unable to be fit using gap time as opposed to elapsed time. We do not believe these assumptions are tenable in the case of territorial contenders due to the fact that TCs likely observe how the state reacted to previous TCs when determining whether to emerge. Nonetheless, our finding hold when using the WLW instead of the PWP model.

E.3 Conditional Frailty in Gap Time - Gamma

Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2014) recommend the conditional frailty (random effects) model for repeated events. The conditional frailty model in gap time fits a Cox proportional hazard model to the data while including a frailty term with an assumed distribution (either Gamma or Gaussian). There is no theoretical guidance for what distribution to assign to the frailty term. As such, we follow the advice of Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004) and fit two frailty models with different assumptions to test the robustness of our findings. D.3 shows the results using a Gamma frailty while D.4. shows the

results using a Gaussian frailty. The gamma frailty term is never significant. Frailties capture the idea that some states may be inherently more prone to experiencing multiple territorial contenders. The conditional frailty model controls for event dependence through event stratification.

We are agnostic as to whether the PWP or frailty models are more theoretically appropriate in the case of the Territorial Contender data. However, due to the limited number of observations for high event ranks, we were unable to reach model convergence while including a counter for the number of TCs the state had faced previously in the frailty models. Nonetheless, our findings using the conditional frailty model as opposed to the PWP model are consistent, leading us to conclude that our results hold for both the PWP and frailty models.

E.4 Conditional Frailty in Gap Time - Gaussian

There is no theoretical guidance for what distribution to assign to the frailty term in the conditional frailty model. As such, we follow the advice of Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004) and fit two frailty models with different assumptions to test the robustness of our findings. D.3 shows the results using a Gamma frailty while D.4. shows the results using a Gaussian frailty. The Gaussian frailty term is significant only in the first TC model. Our findings using the conditional frailty model as opposed to the PWP model are consistent, leading us to conclude that our results hold for both the PWP and frailty models.

E.5 Censored Probit   p.34

 The censored probit is a two-stage selection model in which the first stage
assesses the factors that lead to initial territorial contender emergence and
the second looks at factors that impact the likelihood of subsequent emer-
gence. We do not believe that a censored probit approach is appropriate
for testing our hypotheses due to the time-centric nature of our theory. The
model reported in D.5 does include cubic polynomials for years since the
last territorial contender emerged in an attempt to account for temporal non-
independence (coefficient results not reported), but this does not fully ac-
count for the fact that the effects of state behavior might change in later
TC iterations. An additional concern is that the censored probit collapses
all subsequent TCs into the second stage, obscuring the variation over time.
These reasons lead us to be confident that a repeat-failure approach is more
appropriate for our analyses. We exclude area and terrain from the second
state for identification purposes. When the model is run with those factors
included in the second stage, they are insignificant. Our findings using a
duration approach are inconsistent with the censored probit results.

E.6 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial   p.35

 The Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model (ZINB) is a split population
model designed to assess the different processes that lead to a state getting
its first TC as opposed to subsequent TCs. The first stage models the binary
outcome of whether a state experiences any TCs over the observed time

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period. The second stage models the count process of the number of TCs experienced by the state. This is inappropriate for assessing our hypotheses on state behavior as subsequent TCs are collapsed together into one process, with no allowance for variables affecting the emergence of the 2nd TC differently than the 4th. The ZINB model finds that all state strategies increase the number of TCs that emerge, though these results are not appropriate given the modeling assumptions. The ZINB model splits states that have not seen TCs into two populations: states that cannot face TCs and those who could face TCs but have during the observation period. For this and the hurdle model, results are reported only to display how alternative modeling strategies are not appropriate in this case.

E.7 Hurdle p.36

The Cragg Hurdle model, similarly to the ZINB, is a split population model designed to assess the different processes that lead to a state getting its first TC as opposed to subsequent TCs. The first stage models the binary outcome of whether a state experiences any TCs over the observed time period. The second stage models the count process of the number of TCs experienced by the state. This is inappropriate for assessing our hypotheses on state behavior as subsequent TCs are collapsed together. We find results similar to our other models when only the zero-hurdle is assessed, however the results on subsequent TC emergence are not appropriate for this study.

E.1 Anderson Gill Variance Correction Model

Table 18: Anderson Gill Variance Correction Model

	Separate AG Models:	
	All TCs	TC 2+
Peace w/ TC	0.477*	0.916***
	(0.308)	(0.396)
Fighting w/ TC	1.216***	1.809***
	(0.290)	(0.371)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.426**	−0.312
	(0.289)	(0.302)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.423**	0.705***
	(0.299)	(0.319)
Absorbed	−0.325	−0.270
	(0.415)	(0.424)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.589***	−2.349***
	(0.646)	(0.758)
State Area (logged)	0.079	0.105
	(0.067)	(0.087)
Mountains	0.074	−0.004
	(0.073)	(0.095)
ELF	1.703***	1.970***
	(0.465)	(0.565)
TC Tally	0.048**	0.019
	(0.025)	(0.027)
Observations	3,884	2,261

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E.2 WLW Marginal Elapsed Time Model

Table 19: WLW Marginal Elapsed Time Model

	Dependent variable: Elapsed Time
Peace w/ TC	0.604*
	(0.429)
Fighting w/ TC	1.694***
	(0.426)
Favorable Outcome for State	−0.307
	(0.584)
Favorable Outcome for TC	1.101***
	(0.492)
Absorbed	−0.066
	(0.890)
Liberal Democracy Index	−1.832**
	(0.948)
State Area (logged)	0.090
	(0.088)
Mountains	0.080
	(0.089)
ELF	1.666**
	(0.631)
TC Tally	0.619***
	(0.083)
Observations	58,260

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E.3 Conditional Frailty in Gap Time - Gamma Frailty

Table 20: Conditional Frailty in Gap Time - Gamma

	Separate Frailty Models, By TC Iteration				
	All TCs	First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.413***		2.005***	1.499	0.431
	(0.475)		(0.638)	(1.289)	(1.307)
Fighting w/ TC	2.278***		2.958***	1.993*	2.306*
	(0.451)		(0.629)	(1.162)	(1.242)
Favorable Outcome for State	-0.097		0.541	0.061	-0.783
	(0.371)		(0.756)	(0.583)	(0.903)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.755**		1.712***	0.648	0.578
	(0.336)		(0.648)	(0.543)	(0.755)
Absorbed	0.379		0.421	0.651	0.086
	(0.467)		(0.816)	(0.806)	(0.900)
Liberal Democracy Index	-1.412**	0.393	-3.303***	-0.901	-1.583
	(0.688)	(1.488)	(1.278)	(1.555)	(1.884)
State Area (logged)	0.123	0.123	0.256	0.180	-0.316
	(0.076)	(0.125)	(0.156)	(0.172)	(0.253)
Mountains	0.132*	0.217*	0.075	0.100	-0.229
	(0.078)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.221)	(0.430)
ELF	1.161**	1.103	0.823	1.374	1.193
	(0.493)	(0.801)	(0.826)	(1.348)	(2.022)
Frailty (Gamma)					
Observations	3884	1623	1055	743	463

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

E.4 Conditional Frailty in Gap Time - Gaussian Frailty

Table 21: Conditional Frailty in Gap Time - Gaussian

		Separate Frailty Models, By TC Iteration			
	All TCs	First TC	TC 2 or 3	TC 4 or 5	TC 6+
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Peace w/ TC	1.424***		2.278***	1.542	0.431
	(0.484)		(0.712)	(1.328)	(1.307)
Fighting w/ TC	2.304***		3.209***	2.092*	2.306*
	(0.459)		(0.671)	(1.191)	(1.242)
Favorable Outcome for State	-0.100		0.667	0.027	-0.783
	(0.378)		(0.860)	(0.618)	(0.904)
Favorable Outcome for TC	0.758**		1.921	0.612***	0.577
	(0.346)		(0.715)	(0.578)	(0.756)
Absorbed	0.392		0.046	0.620	0.087
	(0.488)		(0.962)	(0.868)	(0.900)
Liberal Democracy Index	-1.379*	0.828	-3.049**	-0.955	-1.582
	(0.728)	(1.767)	(1.517)	(1.618)	(1.885)
State Area (logged)	0.129	0.203	0.274	0.182	-0.316
	(0.080)	(0.157)	(0.188)	(0.180)	(0.253)
Mountains	0.141*	0.295*	0.059	0.085	-0.229
	(0.083)	(0.157)	(0.186)	(0.235)	(0.430)
ELF	1.165**	1.313	1.247	1.444	1.192
	(0.524)	(1.045)	(1.077)	(1.428)	(2.024)
Frailty (Gaussian)		*			
Observations	3884	1623	1055	743	463

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E.5 Censored Probit

Table 22: Censored Probit

	Dependent variable:	
	First TC	New TC
Peace w/ TC		-0.316**
		(0.141)
Fighting w/ TC		0.287
		(0.190)
Favorable Outcome for SS		-0.619***
		(0.108)
Favorable Outcome for TC		-0.087
		(0.123)
Absorbed		0.105
		(0.251)
Liberal Democracy Index	1.060	-1.008***
	(0.671)	(0.296)
State Area (logged)	0.224**	
	(0.092)	
Mountains	0.194**	
	(0.108)	
ELF	-0.471	1.158***
	(0.59)	(0.246)
TC Tally		0.014
		(0.016)
Constant	-1.477**	-1.805***
	(0.627)	(0.296)
Observations	3,884	2,296

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Includes cubic polynomials for years since the last TC. Coefficients not reported.

E.6 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial

Table 23: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial

	Dependent variable:	
	Zero-Inflated	TC Count
Peace w/ TC		0.674***
		(0.255)
Fighting w/ TC		0.792***
		(0.261)
Favorable Outcome for State		0.997***
		(0.225)
Favorable Outcome for TC		0.846***
		(0.275)
Absorbed		0.808***
		(0.221)
Liberal Democracy Index	-0.172	0.687
	(5.319)	(0.448)
State Area (logged)	-0.349	0.291**
	(0.767)	(0.125)
Mountains	-5.126***	0.095
	(1.715)	(0.147)
ELF	8.076	-0.717
	(6.051)	(0.644)
Constant	-3.043	-1.489
	(4.062)	(0.932)
Observations	3,884	2,296

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E.7 Hurdle Model

Table 24: Cragg Hurdle Model

	Dependent variable:	
	Selection	TC Tally
Peace w/ TC		1.170
		(1.917)
Fighting w/ TC		4.292
		(3.330)
Favorable Outcome for State		3.144
		(2.359)
Favorable Outcome for TC		3.894
		(2.447)
Absorbed		7.788***
		(2.346)
Liberal Democracy Index	1.061	-0.805
	(0.671)	(3.913)
State Area (logged)	0.224**	2.241 **
	(0.092)	(1.117)
Mountains	0.194*	0.638
	(0.109)	(1.083)
ELF	-0.470	-2.610
	(0.594)	(4.852)
Constant	-1.478**	-17.497*
	(0.626)	(9.560)
Observations	3,884	2,296

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01