IESDS



If there are not pure strategies that dominate other pure strategies, we can consider <u>mixed strategies that dominate pure strategies</u> as it follows.



We start from player1, if we consider (A,B) as a mixed strategy, with probabilities p=1/2 for A and 1-p for B, we can observe the payoff of mixed (A,B) is always greater than the payoff of C so we can eliminate C.

For player1 (A,B) strictly dominates C.



Now for player1 we have A and B, we cannot have a mixed strategy with only two strategies left so for player1 IESDS stops.

Now I pass to player2. **Note that for player2 I have to take into account C**.



For player2 B dominates A so I can eliminate A.



For player1 now B strictly dominates A so I can eliminate A.



For player2 B strictly dominates C so I can eliminate C.